45.  The applicant argued that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly did not comply with principles of  <mask> and precision: while the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned public assembly, the system of prior authorisation, which was applied in practice and stemmed from certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998, allowed for arbitrary interference with freedom of assembly and permitted abusive banning or dispersal of public gatherings.


95.  The Government submitted that the domestic legislation on freedom of assembly complied with the principle of  <mask>. It clearly stipulated the procedure for the organisation and holding of assemblies and vested the police with the power to disperse unauthorised demonstrations. Failure to comply with a lawful order of the police and breach of the procedure for the organisation and holding of assemblies clearly constituted an offence under domestic law.


65.  The applicants argued that the protest they held was a spontaneous assembly with a limited number of participants, and therefore no prior notification of the BCEA was required by law. They complained that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly did not comply with principles of  <mask> and precision: the requirement of prior authorisation, which was applied in practice and stemmed from certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998, allowed for arbitrary interference with freedom of assembly and permitted abusive banning or dispersal of public gatherings.


32.  The applicant argued that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly did not comply with the principles of  <mask> and precision. While the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned public assembly, the system of prior authorisation – which was applied in practice and stemmed from certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998 – allowed for arbitrary interference with freedom of assembly and permitted abusive banning or dispersal of public gatherings. The applicant also argued that his arrest and conviction under Article 310.1 of the CAO had been arbitrary. He further submitted that the authorities had not taken into consideration the fact that the organisers had given prior notice of the demonstrations to the relevant authority, and that the demonstrations had been intended to be peaceful and had been held in a peaceful manner.


162.  The applicant submitted that he had been held at the police station between around 6.30 a.m. and 10.30 p.m. on 1 March 2008 unlawfully and without any status. His so-called “bringing-in” (բերման ենթարկելը), including the record drawn up in that respect, had been unlawful. Moreover, during that period he was questioned as a witness in the absence of a lawyer. The legal provisions regulating and defining the procedures of “bringing-in” and “arrest”, relied on by the Government, failed to meet the requirements of certainty and  <mask>. In particular, in accordance with Article 128 of the CCP, as interpreted by the Court of Cassation in its decision of 18 December 2009 (see paragraph 123 above), the procedural status of a suspect was effective only from the moment when the record of his arrest was drawn up. Thus, the procedure of “bringing-in”, which was an initial stage of deprivation of liberty of a suspect largely practised in Armenia, lacked legal certainty. Article 153 of the CCP, which defined the concept of “bringing-in”, was not applicable in his case, while the only other Article of the CCP which mentioned that procedure was Article 180 § 2. As a result, after having been “brought-in” at 6.30 a.m. on 1 March 2008, he was kept in a state of uncertainty as a non-suspect in a police cell until, at 10.30 p.m., the record of his arrest was drawn up. The lack of legal certainty had also been acknowledged by the Court of Cassation in its above-mentioned decision, whereby it attempted to add some certainty to the status of those who, like the applicant, were brought in but no record of arrest was drawn up to enable them to obtain the status of a suspect. The applicant lastly submitted that he had been taken into custody at around 6.30 a.m. on 1 March 2008 but taken before a judge only at 7 p.m. on 4 March 2008. Thus, he had been kept at the police station for an extra twelve and a half hours, in excess of the maximum 72‑hour period for arrest allowed by Article 129 of the CCP. In sum, his arrest had violated the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


37.  The applicant argued that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly did not comply with principles of  <mask> and precision: while the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned public assembly, the system of prior authorisation, which was applied in practice and stemmed from certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998, allowed for arbitrary interference with freedom of assembly and permitted abusive banning or dispersal of public gatherings.


39.  The applicant argued that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly did not comply with principles of  <mask> and precision: while the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned public assembly, the system of prior authorisation, which was applied in practice and stemmed from certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998, allowed for arbitrary interference with freedom of assembly and permitted abusive banning or dispersal of public gatherings.


100.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of  <mask> and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


45.  The applicant argued that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly did not comply with the principles of  <mask> and precision. While the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned public assembly, the system of prior authorisation – which was applied in practice and stemmed from certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998 – allowed for arbitrary interference with freedom of assembly and permitted abusive banning or dispersal of public gatherings.


33.  The applicants argued that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly did not comply with the principles of  <mask> and precision. While the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned public assembly, the system of prior authorisation – which was applied in practice and stemmed from certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998 – allowed for arbitrary interference with freedom of assembly and permitted abusive banning or dispersal of public gatherings. The applicants also argued that their arrest and conviction under Article 310.1 of the CAO had been arbitrary. They further submitted that the authorities had not taken into consideration the fact that the organisers had given prior notice of the demonstrations to the relevant authorities, and that the demonstrations had been intended to be peaceful and had been held in a peaceful manner.


73.  The applicant submitted that the domestic law serving as a basis for his conviction had not complied with the principle of  <mask>. In particular, he had been convicted for failing to stop participating in an unauthorised demonstration, despite the fact that the procedure for holding an assembly had not been clearly defined in domestic law. While the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned assembly, application by the authorities of certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998 resulted in a de facto system of prior authorisation.


98.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of  <mask> and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


61.  The applicants submitted that the domestic legislation serving as a basis for their criminal conviction had not complied with the principle of  <mask>. They argued in particular that each of them had been convicted for failing to stop participating in an unauthorised demonstration, despite the fact that the procedure for holding an assembly had not been clearly defined in domestic law. While the Constitution required only prior notification of a planned assembly, application by the authorities of certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998 had resulted in a de facto system of prior authorisation.


70.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s rights had been lawful. The Political Parties Act established a special authorisation procedure for registration of political parties. The requirement to obtain a registration authorisation was justified by the special status and role of political parties. The Political Parties Act did not differentiate between types of registration. The same rules therefore applied to the registration of a newly established political party and to the registration of any amendments to the information contained in the Register. In all cases a political party had to submit the documents specified in section 16 of the Political Parties Act (see paragraph 44 above) and the registration authority had competence to verify those documents and decide whether to authorise or refuse registration (see sections 15 § 5, 29 § 1 and 38 § 1 of the Political Parties Act in paragraphs 43, 45 and 53 above). The fact that those provisions allowed different interpretations was not contrary to the Convention. Many laws were inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, were vague and whose interpretation and application were questions of practice. The role of adjudication vested in the courts was precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remained, taking into account the changes in everyday practice (the Government referred to Rekvényi v. Hungary [GC], no. 25390/94, § 34, ECHR 1999‑III, and Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, § 65, ECHR 2004‑I). The Government concluded that domestic provisions governing registration of political parties met the requirements of accessibility and  <mask>. In any event, the applicant had applied to the domestic authorities for instructions as to the registration procedure to be followed and had received detailed explanations. It was also significant that the lawfulness of the refusal of registration had been examined and confirmed by the domestic courts. Given that it was in the first place for the national authorities, and notably the courts, to interpret domestic law, it was not the Court’s task to substitute its own interpretation for theirs in the absence of arbitrariness (they referred to Tejedor García v. Spain, 16 December 1997, § 31, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VIII).


36.  The applicant argued that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly did not comply with principles of  <mask> and precision: while the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned public assembly, the system of prior authorisation, which was applied in practice and stemmed from certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998, allowed for arbitrary interference with freedom of assembly and permitted abusive banning or dispersal of public gatherings.


47.  The applicants argued that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly did not comply with the principles of  <mask> and precision. While the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned public assembly, the system of prior authorisation – which was applied in practice and stemmed from certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998 – allowed for arbitrary interference with freedom of assembly and permitted abusive banning or dispersal of public gatherings. The applicants also argued that their arrest and conviction under Article 310.1 of the CAO had been arbitrary. They further submitted that the authorities had not taken into consideration the fact that the organisers had given prior notice of the demonstrations to the relevant authorities, and that the demonstrations had been intended to be peaceful and had been held in a peaceful manner.


98.  The applicant party submitted that the Constitutional Court had issued warnings in relation to some of its expenses. However, it was not clear why the expenses in question had attracted warnings instead of the more serious sanction of confiscation of assets, in the absence of any guidance in the relevant Act as to when warnings, as opposed to confiscation orders, would be issued. In the applicant party’s opinion, this matter was left completely to the discretion of the Constitutional Court, which compounded the problem of un <mask>.


109.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of  <mask> and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


43.  The applicant argued that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly did not comply with principles of  <mask> and precision: while the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned public assembly, the system of prior authorisation, which was applied in practice and stemmed from certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998, allowed for arbitrary interference with freedom of assembly and permitted abusive banning or dispersal of public gatherings.


95.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of  <mask> and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


69.  The applicant further submitted that Russian law did not define the term “campaign for participation”. The Constitutional Court had explained in its Ruling no. 15-П of 30 October 2003 that “campaigning” meant “calling for participation”. It did not explain, however, the difference between “calling for participation” and disseminating information about a forthcoming public event, its preparation and the advancement of the approval procedures. In the absence of clear legal criteria for distinguishing between “campaigning” and “disseminating information”, any information about a public event, its aims, type, location, time and estimated number of participants could be qualified by the authorities as campaigning for participation in that event. The domestic law therefore lacked clarity and  <mask>.


63.  The Government submitted that the domestic legislation on freedom of assembly complied with the principle of  <mask>. It clearly stipulated the procedure for the organisation and holding of assemblies and vested the police with the power to disperse unauthorised demonstrations. Failure to comply with a lawful order of the police and breach of the procedure for the organisation and holding of assemblies clearly constituted an offence under domestic law.


110.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of  <mask> and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


59.  The applicants replied that their arrest was unlawful because it was clear that section 76(3) § 1 (f) of the Courts Act did not empower bailiffs to arrest people outside a court-house; these officers could only “prevent offences from being committed inside a court-house”. The applicants complained that the overly extensive interpretation given to this provision by the domestic courts and the respondent Government arbitrarily expanded the territorial application of the bailiffs’ powers of arrest, which did not meet the requirement of  <mask> and was thus unlawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


89.  The applicant maintained that the authorities had interfered with his right to  <mask> by interrupting the gatherings, or perceived gatherings, by arresting him and by imposing administrative liability for breaches of procedure in conducting public events or for non‑compliance with police orders. As regards two occasions, he contested that the events in question had constituted a public gathering. First, on 27 October 2012 he had been arrested on the pretext that he was holding a march, whereas he had merely been walking away from the venue of a static demonstration. Secondly, on 24 February 2014 at 12 noon he had been arrested while waiting in front of the court-house because he wished to attend the delivery of the judgment in a high-profile case. This gathering, if classified as one, could not have been foreseen or notified to the authorities, and it caused no disturbance which would have merited its dispersal, arrests or the ensuing prosecution.


94.  The Government considered that the interference with the applicant’s  <mask> had complied with domestic law and was necessary “for the prevention of disorder or crime” and “for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. They claimed that on all seven occasions the applicant had attempted to conduct unauthorised public gatherings, which the police had lawfully intercepted, and that the competent courts had justifiably found him guilty of administrative offences. They did not consider that on any of these occasions there had been special circumstances absolving the protestors from compliance with the requirement of prior notification of their assembly. They gave examples of other, lawful public events in which the applicant had participated without any interference. They challenged the applicant’s allegations that those assemblies had not caused any noise or nuisance, given the size of the groups at issue and the presence of the media. In particular, on 27 October 2012 (the fifth occasion) he held a march which had obstructed traffic and, contrary to what the applicant suggested, “it was unlikely” that some of the other events “did [not] produce any noise and cause any nuisance to the pedestrians” in view of the number of people participating, their locations and time (notably the first on 5 March 2012 and the last two on 27 February 2014). They also challenged the applicant’s submission that he did not obstruct traffic in the seventh episode.


99.  The applicant submitted that the Government's assertion that he did not participate in the demonstration, so that there was no interference with his right to  <mask>, contradicted the findings of the domestic court, according to which he had allegedly behaved in an anti-social way during the demonstration of 7 April 2003. If he had blocked a street which had nothing to do with the demonstration, as the Government claimed, this fact would have been disclosed by the investigating authority and without any doubt would have been used in the administrative case against him.


24.  The applicants argued that the authorities had interfered with their rights to  <mask> and freedom of expression in two ways. Firstly, their arrest on 24 November 2007 had allegedly prevented them from attending the gathering on Chistoprudnyy Boulevard, an event which had been authorised by the Moscow authorities. Secondly, their arrest and conviction for administrative offences had been a form of retribution for them expressing their political views at the opposition rally earlier on that day. They both contended that they had not planned a march after the gathering on Academician Sakharov Prospekt, and that they had been walking towards the next gathering when the riot police had obstructed their path and arrested them without giving them an opportunity to disperse. They complained that the courts had dismissed their evidence as false when they had refused to call and examine other witnesses or, as in the first applicant’s case, admit video recordings.


89.  The Government submitted that there had been no violation of the applicants’ rights to  <mask> and to freedom of expression, as the relevant domestic authorities had not impeded their public gathering in any manner. On the contrary, the applicants and other participants of the demonstration were able to assemble freely near the Tbilisi Concert Hall and then proceeded with their march. As the organiser of the event had given a prior warning, the Ministry of the Interior deployed police units to the scene of the event. Police patrol vehicles escorted the LGBT marchers. As to the manner in which the police reacted to the clash between the marchers and counter-demonstrators, the Government admitted that that reaction had been somewhat delayed. However, they claimed that that had been done on purpose and in the marchers’ best interests. Thus, the Government asserted that where a serious threat of a violent counter-demonstration exists, the domestic authorities have wide discretion in the choice of means to employ to protect assemblies. They referred to the Court’s case-law in Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” (cited above, § 34). Considering the large number of counter-demonstrators and their aggressive attitude towards the demonstrators, immediate preventive measures by the police could have provoked an even greater outburst of violence. Nevertheless, the law-enforcement officers remained at the scene and instantly intervened when the verbal attacks degenerated into actual physical violence by evacuating the attacked applicants from the scene. The police officers also separated the opposing parties by standing between them, verbally warning both sides to behave in an appropriate manner. As regards the applicants’ complaints of discriminatory intent under Article 14 of the Convention, the Government limited their response to noting that that provision was complementary and could not be invoked autonomously in the absence of a violation under Articles 10 and 11.


48.  The applicant complained that his right to  <mask> had been violated as a result of unlawful and disproportionate interference by the police, namely the dispersal of the assembly at Freedom Square, and that he had had no effective remedy against the breach of that right. He relied on Articles 11 and 13 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant read as follows:


120.  The applicants considered that their decision to stage the roadblocks had been as a last resort in order to defend their interests as farmers. This was a form of demonstration accepted in Europe, in situations where no other means of protecting the demonstrators’ rights existed. In such circumstances, the right to  <mask> should have prevailed over any resulting minimal disturbances to the free movement of goods. In this connection, the applicants alleged that Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 (see paragraph 77 above) recognised roadblocks as a form of strike action.


97.  The Government submitted that there was no interference with the applicant's right to  <mask> guaranteed by Article 11 since he, as he claimed himself, did not participate in the demonstration in question. According to the Government, the applicant was far away from the demonstration and, simply for hooligan reasons, blocked a street that had nothing to do with it. Such actions, however, cannot be considered as necessary for the exercise of one's right to freedom of peaceful assembly.


100.  The applicant alleged a violation of his right to  <mask>, referring to the measures taken as regards the assembly in general and the specific measures taken against him personally. He alleged that the crowd-control measures implemented by the police at Bolotnaya Square had in effect provoked a confrontation between the protesters and the police, and that the police had then used the incident as a pretext for the early termination of the meeting and its dispersal. He claimed, moreover, that the authorities had intended from the outset to suppress the rally in order to discourage street protest and political dissent. He argued that his own arrest at the site of the rally, his pre-trial detention and the ensuing conviction for an administrative offence had been arbitrary and unnecessary.


63.  The applicant alleged that there had been a violation of his rights to freedom of expression and to  <mask>. He complained, in particular, that disruptive security measures had been implemented at the site of the meeting at Bolotnaya Square. He further argued that his ensuing prosecution and criminal conviction for participation in acts of mass disorder had been arbitrary and disproportionate. The applicant relied on Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, which read as follows:


229.  The Government did not appear to contest that the fifth applicant, regardless of the fact that proceedings against him had been discontinued, could still claim to be a “victim” of a violation of his right under Article 11 of the Convention and that there had been an interference with that right (see paragraph 199 above). In any event, like the other applicants, the fifth applicant was removed from the site by the police, which in itself constitutes an interference with the right to  <mask>, and later formally reprimanded for his actions (see paragraphs 43 and 62 above). Therefore, the applicant can continue to claim to be the victim of an interference with his right under Article 11 of the Convention.


155.  The applicant alleged a violation of his right to freedom of expression and to  <mask>. He complained, in particular, of disruptive security measures implemented at the site of the meeting at Bolotnaya Square, and claimed that his ensuing prosecution and criminal conviction for participation in mass disorders had been unlawful and arbitrary, had pursued political aims, and had been disproportionate. He relied on Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, which read as follows:


104.  The Government submitted that, if the Court were to conclude that there had been an interference with the applicant's right to  <mask>, this interference was prescribed by law. The applicant blocked Mashtots Avenue with a group of people and, by doing so, violated public order, which was qualified as minor hooliganism and fell within the ambit of Article 172 of the CAO.


139.  The applicants claimed 9,000 euros (EUR) in respect of the non‑pecuniary damage flowing from the alleged breach of their right to  <mask>. They submitted that that amount, which was fifty percent higher than the amounts awarded in Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov (both cited above), was justified in view of the systemic and persistent nature of the breach of their right to freedom of assembly, which had lasted more than twenty years and had continued unabated – and had even intensified – despite two judgments of the Court. The applicants further claimed EUR 3,000 in respect of the alleged breach of their right not to be discriminated against. They requested that any amounts awarded under those heads be paid into the bank account of the second applicant.


31.  The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. Under the 1990 Meetings and Marches Act, they could have sought judicial review of the Regional Governor’s order, but had failed to do so. In support of that assertion the Government cited a decision and judgment in which the Supreme Administrative Court held that mayoral bans of rallies were subject to judicial review (опр. № 8132 от 14 август 2007 г. по адм. д. № 5942/2007 г., ВАС, ІІІ о.) and examined whether one such ban could amount to discrimination (реш. № 11295 от 16 ноември 2007 г. по адм. д. № 6407/2007 г., ВАС, петчленен състав). The Government further submitted that the police orders served on some of the applicants had been subject to judicial review under the Code of Administrative Procedure; there was no indication that such review had been sought. Lastly, they submitted that the applicants could have brought a claim under section 1 of the 1998 Act and sought compensation for any pecuniary or non‑pecuniary damage flowing from the alleged breach of their right to  <mask>.


36.  The Government accepted that the applicants’ arrest at the site of the public event and their administrative convictions had constituted an interference with their right to  <mask> and their right to freedom of expression. Such an interference constitutes a breach of Articles 10 and/or 11 of the Convention unless it is prescribed by law, pursues one or more legitimate aims under paragraph 2 of each Article, and is “necessary in a democratic society”.


41.  The Government appear to have suggested that there was no interference with the applicant organisation’s right to  <mask> because, not having received a copy of the Mayor’s decision of 8 May 2008, it was entitled to proceed with the planned event. The Court does not, however, accept the Government’s line of reasoning. The decision in question banned the applicant organisation from holding the event and the fact that a copy of it had not been served on the applicant organisation did not in any way nullify that decision. Furthermore, the applicant organisation was prevented by the police from holding the planned march, apparently on the basis of the Mayor’s ban.


116.  The applicants submitted that it was particularly important for the Court to examine the complaint under Article 14 as well. Only a ruling under that provision would spur a real solution to the problem. Otherwise, the authorities would feel encouraged to continue their practice of searching for various pretexts to restrict the exercise of the applicants’ right to  <mask>. In that relation, one had to bear in mind the general situation in the country in relation to the so‑called “Macedonian question”. The interference with the applicants’ rights was a result of the lack of recognition of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and of the resulting infringement of that minority’s rights. The non‑execution of a number of the Court’s judgments in previous cases concerning Ilinden showed that even now individuals asserting a Macedonian ethnic consciousness were being denied the right to freedom of assembly and association. The Macedonian minority was the only one not recognised by Bulgaria and, as a result, suffered diverse instances of discrimination. It was precisely the refusal to recognise the existence of a Macedonian minority that lay at the source of the systematic banning and hindering of Ilinden’s rallies.


41.  The Government objected that the first applicant did not have standing under the Convention to claim a violation of its rights on account of facts which had affected some of its individual members. They stated, in particular, that a legal entity could not by its very nature claim, either in its own name or on behalf of its individual members, to have been subjected to ill-treatment or a breach of the right to respect for private life and to  <mask>, within the meaning of Articles 3, 8 and 11 of the Convention.


34.  The applicant alleged a breach of her right to  <mask> with other aliens for the purposes of denouncing their treatment. The interference with that right was not prescribed by law (as the evacuation order was illegal), and was neither justified by a legitimate aim, nor proportionate. She alleged a violation of Article 11 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:


199.  The Government conceded that there had been an interference with the third to sixth applicants’ right to  <mask> but submitted that it had complied with the requirements of Article 11 § 2. The interference had been lawful, being based on Article 185 of the Code of Administrative Offences. It had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the health of the protesters and the workers involved in the construction work: by being on the construction site, the third to sixth applicants had been interfering with the construction work and putting their and others’ lives in danger.


125.  The applicants submitted that the Government’s observations were almost entirely based on a report drawn up by the Blagoevgrad police. Given that it was precisely that police force who had on a number of occasions interfered with the applicants’ rights and exerted pressure on Ilinden’s members, the evidential value of that document was open to doubt. The applicants went on to say that the breaches of their right to  <mask> found by the Court in Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden, United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov and Ivanov and Others (cited above) had persisted during the period 2004‑09. The Court’s findings in those cases held good for the events in issue in the present case as well. The authorities had continued to give the same unspecific and repetitive grounds for interfering with Ilinden’s rallies despite the fact that such grounds had already been found inadequate by the Court. On certain occasions, such as that on 12 September 2004, the authorities had failed to prevent aggressive counter‑demonstrators from disrupting Ilinden’s rallies.


136.  The Government finally relied on Guideline 3.5 of the Guidelines on  <mask> (second edition) prepared by the Panel of Experts on the Freedom of Assembly of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in consultation with the European Commission for Democracy though Law (the Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe, which read:


198.  The Government submitted that there had been no interference with the first and second applicants’ right to  <mask>. Before the domestic authorities, those applicants had explained their presence at the scene by curiosity rather than by a will to express their position through participation in an assembly. The Government referred to the applicants’ statements to the police on 28 May 2010 and to the District Court to the effect that they had been merely passing by the place of the events and had been attracted there by curiosity (see paragraphs 46, 47, 52 and 53 above). The Government stressed that, in contrast to such cases as Galstyan v. Armenia (no. 26986/03, §§ 100 and 116, 15 November 2007), in which the domestic authorities had punished the applicant for his conduct in the course of a demonstration, in the present case the domestic authorities had not referred to the applicants’ participation in an assembly but merely to their refusal to obey the police officers’ demands. Thus neither the applicants’ statements before the domestic authorities nor any decisions taken by those authorities had referred to their participation in an assembly.


32.  The Government submitted that the restrictions on the right of peaceful assembly in public areas served to protect the rights of others, for example the right to freedom of movement or the orderly circulation of traffic. They further submitted that  <mask> could not be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere. On certain occasions, positive measures had to be taken in order to ensure that an assembly was peaceful.


60.  The applicant alleged that there had been a violation of his rights to freedom of expression and to  <mask>. He complained, in particular, that disruptive security measures had been implemented at the site of the meeting at Bolotnaya Square. He further argued that his ensuing prosecution and criminal conviction for participation in acts of mass disorder had been arbitrary and disproportionate. The applicant relied on Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, which read as follows:


73.  The Government claimed that there was no interference with the applicant’s right to  <mask> guaranteed by Article 11 as far as the decision of 7 April 2003 was concerned. The applicant was convicted of a public order offence and therefore the penalty imposed was not connected with the exercise by the applicant of her right to freedom of peaceful assembly. According to the Government, the applicant was far away from the demonstration and, simply for hooligan reasons, blocked a street that had nothing to do with it. Such actions, however, cannot be considered as necessary for the exercise of one’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly.


39.  The Government submitted that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to  <mask> as he was convicted of minor hooliganism under Article 172 of the CAO. In any event, even assuming that there had been an interference, it was prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society since the applicant was found to have committed reprehensible acts.


67.  The applicant wanted to fly from Sheremetyevo airport to Samara to participate in the March of Dissent scheduled for the same day. The Government do not dispute that this was the purpose of his flight. Nor is there any doubt that participation in such a rally would have been an exercise of the applicant’s right to  <mask>. The applicant’s arrest and detention, and the seizure of his passport and ticket made it impossible for him to fly that day. Having been denied access to the Samara flight, at such short notice, there would have been no other way for him to make it to Samara in time for the rally. The applicant’s arrest and detention prevented him from attending the rally. There has, therefore, been an interference with his right to freedom of assembly.


95.  The Government argued that freedom of expression and  <mask> were both constitutional values. However, their exercise was legitimately subject to statutory regulation, in particular under the Public Assemblies Act. Such regulation was aimed, on one hand, at providing a framework for exercising individual freedoms and, on the other, at securing public order and safety to avoid any harm to morals and the health of other citizens. The regulation sought to strike a fair balance between the interests of the organisers and participants of public events, on the one hand, and the need to secure the protection of other persons’ rights and freedoms, on the other. This was done, inter alia, by putting in place adequate measures to prevent breaches of public order and safety, and procedures to ensure legal responsibility for such breaches.


77.  The applicants further argued that there has been interference with their  <mask> and freedom of expression. They alleged that their arrest on 14 April 2007 had prevented them from attending the meeting at the Griboyedov monument, an event authorised by the Moscow authorities. Moreover, the administrative liability imposed on them following the arrest also constituted disproportionate interference with their Convention rights.


80.  The applicants submitted that their arrests and detention were aimed at silencing their political opposition which they expressed by, inter alia, attending political demonstrations. They were known to be members of political parties and the timing of their detention for alleged administrative offences in late March and early April 2004 was intended to prevent them, and indeed did prevent them, from attending and encouraging others to attend public demonstrations organised during that time by their respective parties, calling for a referendum and challenging the incumbent President. This constituted an interference with their right to freedom of expression and to  <mask>.


79.  The Government submitted that, if the Court were to conclude that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to  <mask>, this interference was prescribed by law. The applicant blocked Mashtots Avenue with a group of people and, by doing so, violated public order, which was qualified as minor hooliganism and fell within the ambit of Article 172 of the CAO.


49.  The applicants claimed 12,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. They submitted that the ban of the meeting in issue in the present case had been only one of many such bans. They also pointed out that despite the numerous rulings by the Court relating to earlier breaches of their rights under Article 11 of the Convention, the Bulgarian Government’s policy toward them had improved little if at all. This had made them feel a particularly acute sense of injustice and helplessness, and had exacerbated the distress suffered by them on account of the breach of their right to  <mask>.


26.  The applicant organisation complained that there had been an unlawful interference with its right to  <mask>, as provided in Article 11 of the Convention, on account of the prohibition issued by the municipality of the public rally planned for 19 April 2000. It also complained of the lack of an effective domestic remedy for its complaint under Article 11 of the Convention on account of the domestic courts having declared null and void the prohibition issued by the municipality almost a year after the date of the planned event and also in view of the alleged inability to seek redress for the actions of the municipality.


131.  The Government asserted that the applicants had not been convicted for participating in the protests, but for specific criminal behaviour during the demonstrations, which had restricted public life to a greater extent than the exercise of  <mask> should normally do. The roadblocks were not an immediate and spontaneous response to a sudden event, overriding the obligation of prior notification. Consequently, the mode of exercising their Article 11 rights chosen by the applicants had shown a severe lack of respect for other members of society.


94.  The applicants argued that their detention had violated both their freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention and their  <mask> under Article 11 of the Convention. The interference with those rights by their detention had not been justified. It had not been “prescribed by law” and had not pursued a legitimate aim for the reasons they set out in relation to Article 5 § 1 (see paragraph 57 above). In particular, it had been uncertain if, when and where the applicants would display the banners “Freedom for prisoners” and “Free all now”. Doing so would, furthermore, not have been an offence under the Criminal Code. The slogans could not have been understood as an incitement to a very uncommon crime but had had a different, more obvious meaning. With more than 1,000 demonstrators having been detained in connection with the G8 summit but only 100 detentions having been approved by the courts, there had been more than enough reason to criticise the deprivations of liberty that had taken place in connection with the summit.


187.  The Government submitted that there had been an interference with the exercise of the applicants’  <mask> within the meaning of Article 11 and their freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention, but that the interference had been in accordance with the law, in particular Article 71 of the Criminal Code. They submitted that the interference had been in the interests of public safety. They also argued that it had been necessary in a democratic society, particularly because the applicants’ actions during the events of 9 March 2001 had gone beyond the range allowed to be committed by an individual in exercising his rights under the Convention, as they had been accompanied by riotous damage, destruction of property and resistance towards the authorities. Their rally had therefore not been of a peaceful character.


105.  The Government submitted that any possible interference with the applicants’ right to  <mask> had been prescribed by law. The applicants had been convicted under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code, prescribing punishment for serious breaches of public order. Referring to the Court’s judgment in Galstyan (cited above, § 107) and taking into account the diversity inherent in public-order offences, the Government considered that the domestic legal norm had been formulated with sufficient precision (see also the arguments developed by the Government under Article 7 of the Convention – paragraphs 188-91 below).


85.  The applicant alleged that there had been a violation of his rights to freedom of expression and to  <mask>. He complained, in particular, that disruptive security measures had been implemented at the site of the meeting at Bolotnaya Square. He further argued that his ensuing prosecution and criminal conviction for participation in acts of mass disorder had been arbitrary and disproportionate. The applicant relied on Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, which read as follows:


49.  The Government conceded that the Zagreb County Court’s judgment of 8 April 2005 (see paragraph 19 above) prohibiting the applicant union from holding a strike on 11 April 2005, which had been upheld by the Supreme Court’s judgment of 27 April 2005 (see paragraph 23 above), had constituted an  <mask> with the applicant union’s freedom of association. The Court, having regard to its case-law according to which strike action is protected under Article 11 of the Convention (see Enerji Yapı-Yol Sen v. Turkey, no. 68959/01, § 24, 21 April 2009, and National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. the United Kingdom, no. 31045/10, § 84, ECHR 2014), sees no reason to hold otherwise.


117.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article 11 of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The  <mask> with the applicant's rights was not prescribed by law and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


77.  The Government claimed that the applicants’ removal with the involvement of the police had had a legal basis in the Law on the Police and the Law on Assembly and Demonstrations, and had been aimed at preventing further disruption to public order, as well as the protection of the rights of G.Kh. and others. The Court accepts that the impugned  <mask> had a basis in domestic law. It notes that the police acted at the request of the acting Rector of the University (see paragraph 65 above). The removal was preceded by G.Kh. and other administrative staff members, and then by the police, explicitly and repeatedly asking the applicants to leave the acting Rector’s office. It therefore finds that the requirement of lawfulness is satisfied.


73.  The Government claimed that there was no  <mask> with the applicant’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly guaranteed by Article 11 as far as the decision of 7 April 2003 was concerned. The applicant was convicted of a public order offence and therefore the penalty imposed was not connected with the exercise by the applicant of her right to freedom of peaceful assembly. According to the Government, the applicant was far away from the demonstration and, simply for hooligan reasons, blocked a street that had nothing to do with it. Such actions, however, cannot be considered as necessary for the exercise of one’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly.


36.  The applicant in the present case held a picket in front of a regional court. Some time later he was found administratively liable and fined for having breached the procedure for organising and holding a public assembly. The Court considers that the administrative prosecution amounted to an  <mask> with the applicant’s right to freedom of assembly, interpreted in the light of his right to freedom of expression. Accordingly, its task is to determine whether the interference was justified.


12.  The applicant complained that the disciplinary sanction that had been imposed on him for his participation in trade union activities, had amounted to disproportionate  <mask> with his rights under the Convention. In this regard, he relied on Articles 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. The Court considers that the applicant’s complaints fall to be examined under Article 11 of the Convention alone.


108.  The Government submitted that the circumstances of the case had not disclosed any  <mask> with the applicant’s freedom of expression. The applicant had been arrested and then prosecuted for disobeying a lawful order from the police and not in relation to his exercise of the freedom to impart or receive information. The applicant, “who considered himself as a journalist”, should have foreseen the consequences of his presence in the immediate proximity to an unlawful public event and the consequences of active resistance to the police.


84.  The Government submitted that in some of the cases about which the applicants complained there had been no  <mask> with their rights under Article 11 of the Convention. Thus, on 30 July 2000, even though the mayor had banned the meeting and the District Court had upheld that ban, Ilinden had been able to hold it without interference by the authorities. Likewise, there had been no interference with Ilinden's meeting in April 2000. Despite the provocative attitude of some of the organisation's leaders, the police had been able to preserve public order without impinging on their freedom of assembly. Further, there had been no interference with the meeting held on 22 April 2001 near the Rozhen monastery. The applicants' averment that the police had ordered the removing of the band on the wreath laid by members and followers of Ilinden and had arrested one person was untrue. The police had merely taken one person who was drunk out of the area where the meeting had been taking place. This could not be interpreted as an interference with the applicants' freedom of assembly. There had been no interference with the meeting held on 4 May 2001 either. The members and followers of Ilinden had gathered in the centre of Blagoevgrad and the police had asked them to continue the event in a nearby church only with a view to protecting them. The applicants' averment that the police had seized a camera and had ordered the members and followers of Ilinden to remove the band from the wreath they had laid at the monument was untrue. Finally, the meeting held on 12 September 2002 had not been interfered with. Despite the presence of a hostile crowd, the police had been able to secure the members and followers of Ilinden access to the site of the event. Only the adequate actions of the police had prevented the occurring of serious incidents.


237.  The applicant submitted that, since the proceedings against him had been fabricated, they could not have been lawful, while the Government did not make any particular submissions regarding the lawfulness of the  <mask> and submitted that it pursued the legitimate aim of preventing disorder and crime. The Court, however, does not consider it necessary to decide these issues having regard to its conclusions set out below, regarding the necessity of the interference (see, mutatis mutandis, Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova, no. 28793/02, §§ 49-54, ECHR 2006‑II).


47.  The applicant claimed EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. In particular, he submitted that, as a result of the unlawful  <mask>, his reputation as a political activist was seriously damaged. The imposition of a fine was degrading in the eyes of his party colleagues, as well as his family and those citizens who supported his party. The applicant made no claim in respect of pecuniary damage.


43.  The Government argued that there had been no  <mask> with the applicant's freedom of association, noting that the Ministry had not formally refused to register the association. Instead, it merely returned the association's foundation documents to the founders so that the latter could rectify the deficiencies and ensure that they complied with the requirements of the domestic law. The Government contended that, although “a refusal to register a public association might be regarded as a violation of the right to freedom of association, a delayed response to [an application for state registration] is not a violation of this right”.


53.  The Government further submitted that the lawful requirement to bring the founding documents of a religious organisation into compliance with the existing law did not amount to an  <mask> within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Articles 11 or 9 of the Convention. In any event, the Russian authorities could not be blamed for the applicant branch’s unwillingness to apply for re-registration.


106.  The Government argued that no separate issues arose under either Article 10 or Article 11 in the circumstances of the present case in so far as the first, second, fourth and fifth applicants were concerned. They had not been the subject of personnel security checks. The information on them held by the Security Police was apparently never consulted by third parties. In fact, it seemed only to have been released to the applicants themselves following their own requests for access. Furthermore, their suspicions that the Security Police were holding information on them – suspicions that were confirmed when information was indeed released to them – appeared not to have had any impact on their opportunities to exercise their rights under either Article 10 or Article 11. They had at all times been free to hold and express their political or other opinions. It was not supported by the facts of the present case that their opportunities to enjoy freedom of association had in any way been impaired. Therefore, the Government maintained that there had been no  <mask> with their rights under Articles 10 and 11 and requested the Court to declare their complaints under these provisions inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded.


81.   The applicants replied that, first, the  <mask> with the demonstration had not been “prescribed by law” since the bailiffs did not have the power under either section 76(3) § 1 (f) of the Courts Act or Article 208 § 6(1) of the CCP, the two legal provisions relied on by the national authorities as the basis for the interference, which was to prevent offences occurring outside court-houses. As a result, the applicants could not have known to what extent they could exercise their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly without being deprived of their liberty. The applicants further complained that, in her decision of 29 June 2006 the President of the Tbilisi Court of Appeal had not given relevant and sufficient reasons justifying the interference.


33.  The applicants argued that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly did not comply with the principles of foreseeability and precision. While the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned public assembly, the system of prior authorisation – which was applied in practice and stemmed from certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998 – allowed for arbitrary  <mask> with freedom of assembly and permitted abusive banning or dispersal of public gatherings. The applicants also argued that their arrest and conviction under Article 310.1 of the CAO had been arbitrary. They further submitted that the authorities had not taken into consideration the fact that the organisers had given prior notice of the demonstrations to the relevant authorities, and that the demonstrations had been intended to be peaceful and had been held in a peaceful manner.


18.  The Government submitted that in United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov (no. 2) (cited above) the Court had already given a broad ruling in relation to  <mask> by the authorities with rallies organised by Ilinden. It was therefore not warranted to take up the same issue in a case brought by an individual claiming to have himself suffered a breach of his rights under Article 11 of the Convention. Although the applicant had not been a party to that earlier case, he did not have any separate legal interest requiring protection, and could not claim that he had suffered separate damage calling for an award of just satisfaction. Nor did the case concern a continuing breach, so as to require consecutive rulings by the Court.


15.  The Government submitted in particular that the  <mask>, lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of securing the unimpeded operation of the representative bodies of the people (that is, public safety and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others). Furthermore, they argued that the applicant had been adamant in rejecting the police’s suggested compromise to limit the area in question to a secluded part of Kossuth Square, although this solution would have been reconcilable with the undisturbed work and the free movement of the MPs. The envisaged event, foreseen to involve 150 to 200 participants and sound amplification, would have constituted a large crowd in Kossuth Square, capable of disrupting Parliament’s activities if spread over the entire area. In the light of this, the interference had not been disproportionate in their view.


107.  The applicants accepted that the  <mask> in question was prescribed by the Religious Denominations Act. They asserted nevertheless that the procedure laid down by the Act had been misapplied, since the real reason for refusal to register had been political; the Government had neither submitted nor proved that the applicant Church had failed to comply with the laws of the Republic.


40.  The applicants submitted that the  <mask> with their right to freedom of assembly stemmed from the Regional Governor’s order which banned the rallies that they had planned and which was enforced by the police. As a result, the applicants were forced to change their initial plan to celebrate near the Rozhen Monastery. The police also interfered with their rights by carrying out unusually lengthy checks of their vehicles (which delayed the event by almost two hours), and preventing them from approaching the Monastery and from organising the event in Melnik as planned. Those interferences were neither lawful nor necessary in a democratic society.


34.  The Government contended that there had been no  <mask> with the applicant's right to freedom of assembly and association and that accordingly there had been no violation of Article 11 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, the Government maintained that the applicant had not belonged to a trade union. At the material time, there had only been one trade union at Komunenergiya and the applicant had withdrawn from that union in February 1999. The Government further submitted that the applicant had been dismissed for her repeated breach of her duties of employment and not because of the alleged labour dispute between the management and employees of Komunenergiya. According to the Government, the picket on 3 March 1999 had not been related to the applicant's work at Komunenergiya. Rather, it concerned a dispute which she had had with Rivneteplokomunenergo. Despite the fact that it had been held in front of the Komunenergiya office, the picket had been actually directed against the management of Rivneteplokomunenergo.


229.  The Government did not appear to contest that the fifth applicant, regardless of the fact that proceedings against him had been discontinued, could still claim to be a “victim” of a violation of his right under Article 11 of the Convention and that there had been an  <mask> with that right (see paragraph 199 above). In any event, like the other applicants, the fifth applicant was removed from the site by the police, which in itself constitutes an interference with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, and later formally reprimanded for his actions (see paragraphs 43 and 62 above). Therefore, the applicant can continue to claim to be the victim of an interference with his right under Article 11 of the Convention.


46.  The applicant disputed the arguments of the respondent Government. He submitted that his complaints had not focused in practice or in theory upon freedom of movement as such. It was the inability to engage in peaceful discourse and intercourse, to pursue the basic democratic rights of receiving and imparting “information and ideas with those on the island of Cyprus who shared his aims of a peaceful and friendly resolution of the problems of that island without  <mask> by public authority and regardless of frontiers” that lay at the heart of his application. In the circumstances of the current situation in Cyprus, he felt that it was only by meetings between Turkish and Greek Cypriots that ideas for a peaceful political settlement could be truly imparted, received and exchanged. However, he stated that such meetings could not be held in northern Cyprus and meetings of equivalent range and quality could not be organised anywhere other than in southern Cyprus. Thus, the lack of a proper system to regulate crossing from north to south and the arbitrary and erratic way in which he alleged he had been prevented from attending various relevant meetings in the south had substantially and adversely affected his Convention rights to freedom of assembly and association as well as expression.


19.  The Government contested this view. They noted that, in the applicant’s view, it was the police decision on non-competence that violated his right to freedom of assembly. However, the  <mask> in fact resulted from the original police measure declaring the area in question a “security operational zone”. Against such a measure, a distinct complaint might be filed with the police body in charge, and the latter’s decision could be appealed before the superior organ. The resulting administrative ruling was susceptible to judicial review, an effective remedy in the circumstances. However, the applicant had not pursued this avenue; instead, he had filed appeals against, and sought judicial review of, the police order on non‑competence. In other words, he had been challenging the wrong decision. In respect of the area closure itself, successful proceedings, including judicial review, had already been completed (case no. 27.K.31.354/2010/9.); and the applicant could have availed himself of the same, failing which he had not exhausted domestic remedies.


43.  The applicants pointed out that the  <mask> with their rights under Article 11 of the Convention had not been lawful. The police had had no power to give them orders because they had not committed any administrative or criminal offence. The authorities had failed to effectively inform the demonstrators of the termination of the assembly and of the order to disperse. The applicants had been unaware of their decision to end the assembly. They pointed out that under domestic law the police were required to suspend the assembly first, and to give the organisers time to remedy any breach, before they could terminate it. However, in the present case no time had been given either to the organisers or to the demonstrators to follow the police instructions to disperse.


79.  The Government submitted that, if the Court were to conclude that there had been an  <mask> with the applicant’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly, this interference was prescribed by law. The applicant blocked Mashtots Avenue with a group of people and, by doing so, violated public order, which was qualified as minor hooliganism and fell within the ambit of Article 172 of the CAO.


29.  The applicant submitted that the  <mask> with his right to peaceful assembly had been unjustified. He noted that the police had unlawfully prevented the reading out of the press release prepared by the Human Rights Association and had used disproportionate force to arrest him and a fellow demonstrator. In this connection, the applicant maintained that he had been beaten by the police because he had taken part in a demonstration and had intervened when a fellow demonstrator was being arrested. He further claimed that, despite a cursory examination, the medical report still noted his head injury, which demonstrated in itself that he had been subjected to torture and inhuman treatment.


78.  The applicant party contended that the  <mask> with its right to freedom of association had not been “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 11 of the Convention. It stated that the interference in question was based principally on Article 69 § 3 of the Constitution, which provided that “the income and expenditure of political parties shall be consistent with their objectives”. There was, however, no guidance in the law or elsewhere to clarify what expenses could be lawfully incurred within the scope of the “objectives of a political party” or what would be considered to constitute “political activities”. Moreover, section 74(1) of the Political Parties Act, which entrusted the Constitutional Court with the duty of inspecting the “lawfulness” of the finances of political parties, was also framed in imprecise terms, thereby leaving that court at liberty to adopt an overly formalistic and restrictive interpretation of the vague requirements of the Act. That uncertainty as regards the exact nature of the expenditure requirements, coupled with the lack of precision regarding the scope and extent of the Constitutional Court’s authority, had made it impossible to foresee the possible consequences of the expenses incurred. By way of example, it had had no way of knowing that travel expenses, legal fees or court costs, gifts and flowers presented at weddings, or official dinners connected to the party’s political activities could not lawfully be charged as party expenses.


45.  The applicants also submitted that the refusal to register Ilinden had been discriminatory. In examining that issue, one had to bear in mind the general situation in the country in relation to the so‑called “Macedonian question”. The  <mask> with the applicants’ rights was a result of the lack of recognition of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and of the resulting infringement of that minority’s rights. The non‑execution of a number of the Court’s judgments in previous cases concerning Ilinden showed that even now individuals asserting a Macedonian ethnic consciousness were being denied the rights to freedom of assembly and association. The Macedonian minority was the only one not recognised by Bulgaria, and had as a result suffered diverse instances of discrimination. That had been noted by various Council of Europe bodies, such as the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, and the Commissioner for Human Rights. The national courts systematically refused to register any organisation which endeavoured to defend the rights of the Macedonian minority, because they feared that such registration would amount to a recognition of that minority.


36.  The applicant argued that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly did not comply with principles of foreseeability and precision: while the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned public assembly, the system of prior authorisation, which was applied in practice and stemmed from certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998, allowed for arbitrary  <mask> with freedom of assembly and permitted abusive banning or dispersal of public gatherings.


29.  The applicant additionally submitted that the  <mask> had not been necessary in a democratic society. He referred to the principles developed in Court's case‑law on this issue and argued that he had been penalised solely for the ideas expressed in the association's articles. The association had not engaged in any action which could characterise it as propagating violence or undemocratic principles. The idea of a monarchy and the related insignia were not undemocratic or violent, as evidenced in particular by the fact that the name of the coalition which had ruled the country as between 2001 and 2005 had been “National Movement Simeon II”, after the former heir to the throne Simeon Saxe-Coburggotski, who had become prime minister. Even before his starting into office in 2001 Bulgaria's coat of arms had featured a crown, whereas the public debate over the form of government – republic or monarchy – continued. While the Constitution indeed needed stability, it was by no means carved into stone. Its amendment could be envisaged for the purpose of bringing it in line with the dominant public views on the form of government, whereas suppressing any ideas in this respect could harm democracy and constituted unfettered majority rule.


24.  The applicant association submitted that the domestic courts had not provided cogent reasons for their decisions. There had been no “pressing social need” which the impugned  <mask> served. The crucial argument on which the domestic court’s refusal to register the applicant association had rested was that the applicant association would violate the rights and freedoms of others, namely adherents of the MOC. Behind that argument lay the doctrine that no Orthodox church other than the MOC should be allowed to operate in the respondent State. That doctrine ran contrary to the respondent Government’s duty of neutrality and impartiality and the principle of religious pluralism. Furthermore, it had not been alleged that the applicant association had engaged or intended to engage in any unlawful activities or had pursued any illegal aims. Accordingly, the interference with the applicant association’s rights under this head was not “necessary in a democratic society”.


76.  The Government accepted that the refusal of the authorities to register the applicant association amounted to an  <mask> with its rights under this head. In doing so they relied on the 1997 and 2007 Acts, as applicable at the material time, and stated also that the refusal had pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


34.  The Government submitted that the picket held by the applicant had not been interrupted and that the dispute relating to blocking access to the court entrance had been promptly resolved. However, it did not exclude the possibility of subjecting the applicant to administrative measures at a later time. The applicant had been found liable for obstructing citizens’ access to the Regional Court, belated notification of the picket and also dissemination of materials which were at variance with the declared aim of the picket. Having regard to the insignificant amount of the fine, the Government considered that the  <mask> had been justified and proportionate.


47.  The Government disputed that there had been any  <mask> with the negative aspect of the applicant’s right to freedom of association, as provided for in Article 11 of the Convention. It submitted that the applicant company was merely under the obligation to pay contributions to the Social Welfare Fund which were used to pay benefits to employers and employees in the building industry. The applicant company did not become, nor was it obliged to become, a member of the Social Welfare Fund on account of the declaration of general applicability of the VTV, nor of the employers’ associations which concluded the VTV. It was not threatened with sanctions or other disadvantages if it did not join. There was, therefore, no compulsion that the applicant company join an association.


82.  The applicants lastly submitted that mass arrests of opposition activists and supporters to prevent them from attending peaceful political demonstrations could not be “necessary in a democratic society”. Freedom of political debate and of peaceful assembly were at the core of a democratic society. In light of the peaceful nature of previous demonstrations and of those held in April 2004, the authorities could not convincingly establish that there existed a “pressing social need” to arrest and subsequently sentence them to administrative detention. Furthermore, the  <mask> was disproportionate as they had been twice sentenced to the highest penalty available, that is to a period of administrative detention. Moreover, their detention operated as prior restraint in that it was imposed in order to prevent them from attending political demonstrations. Thus, the detention could be said to have had a chilling effect since they had the serious potential to deter other opposition supporters from attending those demonstrations or indeed in engaging actively in opposition politics.


82.  The Government maintained that the  <mask> pursued one or more legitimate aims: the prevention of crime, in so far as the first applicant’s own safety was concerned by the bomb threats, and the interests of national security with regard to all the applicants. In each case the interference was moreover “necessary” for the achievement of the legitimate aim or aims pursued.


187.  The Government submitted that there had been an  <mask> with the exercise of the applicants’ freedom of peaceful assembly within the meaning of Article 11 and their freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention, but that the interference had been in accordance with the law, in particular Article 71 of the Criminal Code. They submitted that the interference had been in the interests of public safety. They also argued that it had been necessary in a democratic society, particularly because the applicants’ actions during the events of 9 March 2001 had gone beyond the range allowed to be committed by an individual in exercising his rights under the Convention, as they had been accompanied by riotous damage, destruction of property and resistance towards the authorities. Their rally had therefore not been of a peaceful character.


30.  The applicants considered that the suspension of Tüm Haber Sen's activities and its dissolution constituted a violation of their rights under Article 11 of the Convention. The Government argued that there had been no  <mask> since, in their opinion, the domestic courts had penalised the applicant trade union on the ground that it laid stress on its supposed legal attributes to strike and to conduct collective bargaining, attributes which fall outside the scope of Article 11 of the Convention.


49.  The Government further submitted that the complaint regarding secondary strike action should be rejected as manifestly ill-founded. They considered that there had been no violation of, or even  <mask> with, the applicant union’s right of freedom of association since Article 11 did not confer any right to take secondary action. Instead, it was plain from the very wording of that provision that it contemplated collective action by workers to protect their own interests. Sympathy strikes, which were no more than a show of solidarity with another group of workers, lacked the requisite nexus between collective action and the direct interests of the persons taking part in it. It did not appear from the facts adduced that the situation of the RMT members employed by Hydrex had any real bearing on the situation of their union colleagues employed by Jarvis. Had any similar threat to the latter’s interests materialised, it would have been open to them to take strike action, just as the Hydrex members had done.


28.  The Government maintained that there had been no  <mask> with the exercise of the applicant’s right to freedom of assembly. They further submitted that, even assuming that there had been interference, it was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and protecting public safety. They further claimed that the measure imposed by the security forces should be regarded as answering a pressing social need and was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. In this connection, the Government dismissed the applicant’s allegations of ill‑treatment and claimed that, in the circumstances of the present case, the force used on the applicant had been proportionate to the aims pursued.


96.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> had been prescribed by law, namely by the amended section 3 § 2 and section 41 of the Political Parties Act and section 2 of the Amending Act (see paragraphs 33, 34 and 54 above). In particular, the above provisions required that, by 1 January 2006, all political parties should increase their membership to 50,000 persons and the membership of their regional branches to 500 persons. It also followed from those legal provisions that if a party had not increased its membership it had to reorganise itself into a public association or be dissolved. The applicable domestic law was accessible and formulated in clear terms so that the applicant had been able to foresee that failure to comply with the above requirements would lead to its dissolution.


63.  The Government submitted that the right to hold demonstrations inside the premises of public institutions was not unlimited (see Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 44306/98, § 47, ECHR 2003‑VI). They referred in this connection to Article 9 § 1 of the Law on Assembly and Demonstrations, which provided that no assembly or demonstration could be held, inter alia, in a building of a governmental institution (see paragraph 45 above). They stated that there had been alternative venues at the disposal of the applicants and their supporters, such as the courtyard of the University, where they could have organised their protest. They stressed in this connection the idea that a university, being an educational establishment, was exclusively devoted to providing educational services; therefore, if the Government were to allow unrestricted demonstrations on its premises it would put a disproportionate burden on the educational establishment, jeopardising its proper functioning. They thus maintained that in the instant case, no  <mask> with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly had taken place at all.


81.  The applicants further submitted that the  <mask> with their rights was not prescribed by law. In particular, arresting and detaining persons active in opposition politics ostensibly for the administrative offence of failing to obey police orders but in reality in order to prevent their attendance of opposition rallies could not be considered as a measure prescribed by law. Furthermore, the interference did not pursue a legitimate aim, since the aim of such administrative detention was not to prevent disorder but to hinder opposition calls challenging the incumbent President. There was no history of public disorder at previous opposition demonstrations, nor was there any ban on demonstrations in April 2004 which were essentially peaceful rallies. Thus, their detention was merely a pretext to interfere unlawfully with the opposition campaign of peaceful protests.


50.  The applicants contested the lawfulness of the measures taken against them, alleging, in particular, that the police had had no grounds to give them orders to disperse. The Court considers that in this case the questions of compliance with the law and of the existence of a legitimate aim cannot be dissociated from the question whether the  <mask> was “necessary in a democratic society”, and that there is no need to examine them separately (see, for similar reasoning, Nemtsov, cited above, § 75).


44.  The applicants alleged that their conviction under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code, on the basis of Articles 220 § 7 and 314 § 3 of the same Code, and section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 constituted an  <mask> with their right to freedom of assembly. They stated that the interference in question was not prescribed by law, within the meaning of Article 11 of the Convention, since they had been unable to anticipate that their participation in the demonstrations of 17 December 2005 and 19 February 2006 and their conduct during those events would lead to them being prosecuted pursuant to these provisions and to the sentences imposed on them. They stressed in this connection that both the ESP and the SGD, in whose activities they had participated, were legal civil society organisations and that the demonstrations in question had been lawful and peaceful.


24.  The applicant pointed out that the disciplinary sanction was imposed on the basis of Article 18 of the 1946 decree. That provision had been criticised for being of general application and its constitutionality had even been disputed before the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, the applicant maintained, it did not qualify as a law within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 11 and the  <mask> had not therefore been “prescribed by law”. Furthermore, on the basis of the legislation in force and the case-law at the material time on the said Article 18, the applicant was entitled to believe that his membership of the Freemasons was not incompatible with the law.


51.  The Government denied that there had been an  <mask> with the applicant’s right to freedom of association. The police officer had only requested her to show him the leaflets which she had been distributing in a hospital, during working hours, and without having obtained the hospital administration’s permission. Each work place had its own rules; even more so hospitals. The applicant, as a nurse, should have obtained permission or at least informed the chief doctor. She could have distributed the leaflets outside the hospital, in her own time and without any prior permission.


70.  The applicant argued that her message on VKontakte had not contained any calls for participation; it had simply informed the readers about her intention to hold a meeting. The domestic authorities had not, however, attempted to draw a distinction between “campaigning” and “informing”. Moreover, the District Court’s conviction judgment had contradicted its previous decision that the refusal to approve the meeting had been unlawful. The  <mask> with the applicant’s rights had not therefore been prescribed by law.


29.  The Government, admitting that the refusal to register the applicant as an association amounted to  <mask> to its right to freedom of association, considers nevertheless that this interference was prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. In this respect, they referred to Government Ordinance no. 26/2000 which provides that if the legal requirements for the setting up of an association are not satisfied, the request to register is dismissed. The refusal to register the applicant association in the instant case pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public order and the rights and liberties of the others, namely the rights of those who use the services of lawyers to represent their interests.


81.  The Government accepted that the applicants’ arrest and their conviction of an administrative offence had constituted  <mask> with their freedom of assembly. However, they maintained that those measures had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining public order and had been proportionate to that aim for the purposes of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. They claimed, in particular, that the applicants had been offered a different venue at which to conduct a public event on the requested date and that the proposed changes had seemingly been accepted by the event organisers. Moreover, the authorised meeting had indeed taken place at the Griboyedov monument, and the applicants could have participated in it. Instead, the applicants had pursued the itinerary indicated in the original request, walking on the pavement and on the road, obstructing pedestrians and traffic, and had then tried to enter Red Square. Given that this route had not been agreed with the Moscow authorities, the police could not have foreseen that the march would take place there and then and therefore could not have taken measures to maintain public order and safety. That was why the applicants, who were ignoring the police warnings, had had to be arrested. This had also justified imposing an administrative sanction on them which, moreover, had been relatively mild.


51.  The applicants argued that the delays in responding to their registration requests, which were significantly beyond the time-limits set by the domestic law, constituted an  <mask> with, and a violation of, their right to freedom of association. The applicants maintained that such delays were in breach of the domestic law. Moreover, the applicants noted that the Ministry cited a new, different deficiency in the association's foundation documents each time it returned the documents to the founders. However, under the domestic law, the Ministry was obliged to identify all the deficiencies after the first registration request, and after these deficiencies had been rectified by the founders upon their second registration request, the Ministry was obliged to issue a final decision, i.e. either register the association or issue an official refusal to register it.


199.  The Government conceded that there had been an  <mask> with the third to sixth applicants’ right to freedom of peaceful assembly but submitted that it had complied with the requirements of Article 11 § 2. The interference had been lawful, being based on Article 185 of the Code of Administrative Offences. It had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the health of the protesters and the workers involved in the construction work: by being on the construction site, the third to sixth applicants had been interfering with the construction work and putting their and others’ lives in danger.


36.  The Government contended that Article 11 did not impose any positive obligation to enact legislation of the kind suggested by the applicant. They submitted that in assessing the extent, if any, of the State’s positive obligation, the Court should consider whether the nature of the  <mask> struck at the “very substance” of the right or freedom concerned (Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, 13 August 1981, § 55, Series A no. 44, Sørensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark [GC], nos. 52562/99 and 52620/99, § 54, ECHR 2006‑I). However, it did not necessarily follow from the fact that someone was dismissed from their employment as a consequence of manifesting certain political views that there would be an interference with their rights under Article 11 which struck at the very substance of the right so as to engage the State’s positive obligation. In this regard the Government relied, by analogy, on Stedman v the United Kingdom, application no. 29107/95, decision of 9 April 1997, in which the Commission rejected as inadmissible a complaint under Article 9 of the Convention by a Christian applicant who had been dismissed because she refused to work on Sundays. The Commission noted that there had been no pressure on the applicant to change her religious views or to prevent her from manifesting her religion or beliefs. It followed that the Government could not be expected “to have legislation that would protect employees against such dismissals by private employers”.


45.  The applicant argued that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly did not comply with principles of foreseeability and precision: while the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned public assembly, the system of prior authorisation, which was applied in practice and stemmed from certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998, allowed for arbitrary  <mask> with freedom of assembly and permitted abusive banning or dispersal of public gatherings.


48.  The Government accepted that the applicants’ arrest and their conviction for an administrative offence had constituted an  <mask> with their freedom of expression and their freedom of assembly. However, they maintained that those measures had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining public order and had been proportionate to that aim, in compliance with Articles 10 § 2 and 11 § 2 of the Convention. They claimed that the applicants had attempted to conduct a spontaneous unauthorised public march in the centre of Moscow, that the police had lawfully demanded them to stop the march, but that they had persisted with their illegal conduct and had had to be dispersed and arrested.


31.  The Government were further of the view that the  <mask> with the applicant's rights had been prescribed by law, namely the Constitution of 1991, the Persons and Family Act of 1949 and the Political Parties Act of 1990. It had been intended to safeguard a wide range of public interests. All three levels of court had lawfully and justifiably refused to register the association.


116.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article 11 of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The  <mask> with the applicant's rights was not prescribed by law and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


98.  The Government further submitted that, being far away from the demonstration and not participating in it, the applicant could only exercise the right to freedom of expression and, more specifically, the right to receive information guaranteed by Article 10. However, there was no  <mask> with this Article either, since the applicant exercised his right to receive information without any obstacles. In any event, the penalty imposed on the applicant was not connected with the exercise of his rights under Article 10, since he was convicted of minor hooliganism under Article 172 of the CAO.


50.  The applicant contended that he was not aware of any relevant law regulating the matters of which he complained and that there was no legal protection against arbitrary  <mask> by the public authorities with his rights. In this connection he argued that the respondent Government had made no effort at all to indicate the grounds on which such interference might have been justified, nor had they shown it to be necessary in a democratic society.


44.  The Government added that the law was also aimed at the “prevention of crime”, in that it was more difficult to check the origin and lawfulness of funds from abroad. The Court observes that that was not the Conseil d’Etat’s assessment in the present case, but considers it unnecessary to determine this question since it is sufficient that the  <mask> in issue pursued just one of the legitimate aims listed. It will therefore confine itself to its above finding that the aim of the interference was the “prevention of disorder”.


49.  The applicant argued that his convictions under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code and section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 had constituted an  <mask> with his right to freedom of assembly. He stated that the interference in question had not been prescribed by law, within the meaning of Article 11 of the Convention, since he had been unable to foresee that his participation in the funeral of 28 March 2006 or the demonstration of 5 March 2007 and his conduct during those events would lead to his prosecution and conviction for membership of an illegal organisation and a prison sentence of seven years and eleven months. The applicant referred to the opinion of the dissenting assize court judge (see paragraph 21 above).


21.  The applicant argued that the  <mask> with his freedom of religion and assembly was not prescribed by law because the deputy head of the Chekhov Town Council had not given reasons for the refusal. If the authorities considered that holding an assembly in the place he had proposed might disturb public order, they could have suggested another place or time. An unqualified ban on services of worship in public places had been disproportionate. He further argued that the authority's apprehension that the peaceful assembly might disturb public order was unsubstantiated. In 1998 the church had held services in public in the town of Chekhov which had not caused any disturbances. Other denominations, such as the Russian Orthodox Church, were allowed to hold services in public and such worship did not provoke any disorder in the town either.


217.  The applicant argued that there had been an  <mask> with his right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly as a result of both the dispersal of the peaceful demonstration in the morning of 1 March 2008 and the criminal case against him. The charges against him under Articles 225.1 § 2, 301 and 318 § 1 of the CC for inciting disobedience and making calls for a violent overthrow of the government and for insulting public officials also pointed to the existence of an interference with his freedom of expression because he was basically prosecuted for publicly voicing his opinions at the rallies. Even if those charges were later dropped, they had nevertheless been the basis for his being kept in detention.


39.  The applicant argued that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly did not comply with principles of foreseeability and precision: while the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned public assembly, the system of prior authorisation, which was applied in practice and stemmed from certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998, allowed for arbitrary  <mask> with freedom of assembly and permitted abusive banning or dispersal of public gatherings.


23.  The Government further submitted that the  <mask> sought to safeguard a wide range of societal interests. All three levels of court rightfully refused to register Ilinden. Firstly, they found that the association’s articles did not comply with the statutory requirements, because there was a disparity between the number of members of its managing council envisaged by its articles and the number actually elected. It was important to point out in that connection that the procedure for registering an association did not result in a ruling having res judicata, and that it was thus open to Ilinden to re‑apply for registration. To avoid another refusal, it simply had to bring its founding documents in line with the applicable requirements. Secondly, the courts found that the association pursued political aims, which could be pursued only by a political party. While an association’s founders were free to choose its aims, their choice could not run counter to the Constitution and the laws of the country.


27.  The Government emphasised, firstly, that Turkish legislation, while granting public-sector employees the freedom to set up associations to defend their rights, did not guarantee trade-union freedom in the public sector, covering the rights to strike and to conduct collective bargaining. They noted, secondly, that the trade union's representatives had argued from the outset before the national courts that their association was a trade union of public-sector employees and that the concept of trade union included the rights to strike and to collective bargaining. Referring to National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium (27 October 1975, § 39, Series A no. 19) and Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden (6 February 1976, § 34, Series A no. 21), they asserted that Article 11 of the Convention did not secure any particular treatment of trade-union members by the State or the right to conclude collective-bargaining agreements. They alleged that the Convention's requirement was that trade unions be authorised to strive for the protection of their members' interests through means that the State was free to determine. In the instant case, the decision to dissolve Tüm Haber Sen had been intended to prevent unlawful unionisation, and the  <mask> had been justified in terms of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention.


36.  The Government accepted that the applicants’ arrest at the site of the public event and their administrative convictions had constituted an  <mask> with their right to freedom of peaceful assembly and their right to freedom of expression. Such an interference constitutes a breach of Articles 10 and/or 11 of the Convention unless it is prescribed by law, pursues one or more legitimate aims under paragraph 2 of each Article, and is “necessary in a democratic society”.


36.  The Government accepted that the dissolution of the Association amounted to an  <mask> with the applicants’ right to freedom of association. The Government maintained that the interference was prescribed by domestic law, which was both accessible and foreseeable. In this connection, they relied on Article 31 of the Law on Non-Governmental Organisations and Article 59 of the Civil Code, noting that those provisions provided for liability of a non-governmental organisation and the possibility of interference with its activities. The Government submitted that the interference pursued the legitimate aims of “protection of public safety”, “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” and “prevention of crime”.


86.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> was necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the aim pursued. It was aimed at preventing the applicant’s unlawful actions and avoiding social disorder. The sanction imposed was at the lower end of the scale of penalties prescribed for the offence committed by the applicant. The Contracting Parties enjoyed a margin of appreciation as far as the necessity of an interference was concerned and the reasons given by the domestic authorities were relevant and sufficient.