127.  The Government further submitted that the first applicant’s request for recognition and compulsory enforcement of the judgment of Prague 4 District Court of 2 June 2011 granting him custody of the second applicant had been rejected by the Russian courts due to the fact that O.H., the second applicant’s mother, had not been duly notified of the relevant proceedings and had thereby been deprived of the opportunity to take part in them, in violation of the principle of equality of arms. The relevant decisions of the domestic courts had pursued a legitimate aim and had been  <mask>, in particular because the handing over of the second applicant to the father would have violated O.H.’s right to respect for her family life and would not have been in “the best interests of the child”. In view of the above, the judgment of 2 June 2011 could not be enforced in Russia.


28.  The Government submitted in the alternative that any interference with the applicant’s right under Article 8 had been carried out on the basis of section 48(A)(5) of Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. They provided the Court with extracts of this provision containing the amendments of 2008 (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). The Government also relied on section 39(1) of the Regulation on Private Tutoring Centres. They further contended that the applicant’s dismissal had pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining national security, territorial integrity, public safety, public order and preventing crime, and that it had been  <mask> in the circumstances of the case.


29.  The Government accepted that the applicant had enjoyed family and private life in the United Kingdom prior to his deportation and stated that it was not in doubt, and had not been contended by the applicant, that his deportation was anything other than in accordance with the law and in pursuit of a legitimate aim. As such, the only issue before the Court was whether the deportation was  <mask>.


66.  The Government conceded that there was family life between the applicant and M. and that the impugned access restrictions, with the exception of those agreed, and the refusal to terminate the public care had amounted to interferences with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. However, the interferences had been in accordance with the law, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been  <mask>.


67.  The applicant argued that the quashing by the City Court of the judgment of 2 December 2015 ordering V.’s immediate return to Finland had amounted to unlawful and disproportionate interference with his rights under Article 8 of the Convention, as it had not been  <mask>. He challenged the City Court’s interpretation of the provisions of the Hague Convention regarding its basic concepts, such as “habitual residence”, “wrongfulness of the removal”, and “exceptions to immediate return”. In interpreting those concepts, the court had applied approaches characteristic of the national law, without regard to their autonomous meaning in the light of the Hague Convention. He criticised the court’s finding that Finland had not been the place of his daughter’s habitual residence despite the fact that she had been born in Finland and had lived there for over two years prior to her removal to Russia, where she had never been before. The applicant noted in this connection that I.K. had not disputed the fact that Finland had been the country of V.’s habitual residence (see paragraphs 14 and 33 above).


54.  The Government emphasised that it was not in dispute that from 1980 until 1991 the applicant had worked as a driver in the KGB. Furthermore, the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life was in accordance with law and it was  <mask> in the interests of national security, public safety and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Government pointed out that for the transfer from a totalitarian regime to a democratic system, Estonia took various measures which, in aggregate, had to ensure the development and security of the democratic system. Criminal liability for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed under the totalitarian regime was established and an obligation to take an oath of conscience was introduced for those seeking the highest offices in the country. The Disclosure Act dealt with the persons who had not committed any crimes but had been employed by or collaborated with the intelligence or counterintelligence authorities of the States which had occupied Estonia. It was found that such persons had to come to terms with their past and not to try to forget, conceal or be silent about it. There was also a significant public interest in the publicity of information relating to the past; this had to guarantee transparency and clarity as well as overall internal peace in the society. Obtaining complete information about the members and agents of the security and intelligence authorities which had operated on the territory of Estonia was also important for the protection of independence and security of the Republic of Estonia. Estonia was lacking the relevant information; such information, including the lists of persons who had worked in the KGB, was in the hands of foreign States. There could be attempts to recruit former staff of the security authorities and make them perform security or intelligence tasks, or they could be subject to blackmailing. Such situation was dangerous and damaging for Estonia. The Government referred to recent cases where former employees or collaborators of the KGB had provided a foreign country with state secrets leading to their conviction of treason.


131.  The Government admitted that the sale of the applicant’s home and the ensuing eviction constituted an inference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life. However, they argued that it was in accordance with domestic law, in particular the Enforcement Code, and pursued two legitimate aims, namely the “economic well-being of the country” and “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. As to whether the measures had been  <mask>, the Government referred to their submissions in relation to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see above, §§ 101-107). They added that it was important that property which had been attached be sold as soon as possible to avoid depreciation of its value. Moreover, once the property had been sold, regard should also be had to the purchaser’s legitimate interest in obtaining access to the property which he or she had acquired and paid for.


44.  The Government did not contest that the applicant’s criminal conviction had interfered with his right to the enjoyment of his private and family life. They considered, however, that this interference had been justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8 as being  <mask> in the interest of the prevention of disorder and for the protection of morals.


54.  The Government acknowledged that the search of the applicant’s home interfered with his right to respect for his private life. They submitted that it was justifiable under the second paragraph of Article 8 of the Convention as being  <mask> for the prevention of disorder or crime. The Government further submitted that the search warrant was executed in compliance with the procedural requirements set out in Articles 227, 228 and 230 of the CCP.


32.  The Government accepted that the exercise of the right to enter the applicant’s home by the investigating officer had amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his home within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. They considered however that the interference had been justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention: the investigator had acted in accordance with Articles 178 and 179 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, which laid down the scope and manner of exercise of the power conferred on the investigator to inspect the scene of the crime; that his actions pursued the legitimate aim of investigating the incident of forgery of an official document; and that they were  <mask>.


105.  The Government further submitted that the interference had been  <mask>. They outlined the complex and extremely hostile relationship between the applicant and the children’s mother, providing details of the pre-investigation inquiry carried out into her allegations against the applicant in connection with his visit to the school on 27 November 2012 (see paragraphs 15-16 above).


88.  The applicant described in detail the relevant legal framework and on this basis alleged that the entirety of his mail whilst in detention, including that with his lawyers, had been monitored, not only before December 2000 and April 2006, but also after that. The legal basis for the interference until April 2006 had been defective and had been set aside by the national courts. The ensuing legal framework had remained unclear and was thus insufficient for the purposes of the Convention. Furthermore, the interference had not been  <mask>, as correspondence with lawyers was as a rule privileged.


32.  The applicants complained that the decision to remove the first applicant constituted an unjustified interference with their family life, in so far as it had led to the separation of the nuclear family. In particular, the applicants argued that the first applicant's removal had not been  <mask> and was in breach of the guarantees of Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


37.  The applicant agreed that she had been an adult when the Paternity Act had entered into force but pointed out that she had learned about her origins only in 2001. She had lived with her mother and the latter’s husband all her life, she bore her stepfather’s name and nobody, not even her mother, had told her the truth. She had had no reason to suspect, during the statutory five-year period, what her origins were. Nor had she had any idea of the identity of her biological father. Had she known the truth at the time, she would have started the proceedings against her biological father within the five-year time-limit. The application of the five-year time-limit was too strict and absolute. The interference with the applicant’s rights had thus not been  <mask>.


31.  The Government further submitted that corruption, and in particular bribe-taking, was a serious criminal offence that was very difficult to detect. It was therefore necessary to resort to covert surveillance to combat it. Covert surveillance could only be carried out for the purposes specified in the OSAA and only on the basis of a court order. Those legal provisions guaranteed that covert surveillance, including that in the applicant’s case, was ordered only when  <mask>.


207.  The Government accepted that the forced medication of the applicant had interfered with her right to respect for her private life. It had, however, pursued the legitimate aim of protection of health and the rights and freedoms of others. The impugned measure had been based on law, namely section 8 of the Mental Health Act, which had been both accessible and foreseeable. The Government also contended that the impugned measure had been  <mask> and that it fell, in any case, within the margin of appreciation accorded to the State.


47.  The applicant said that a tap had been put on his telephone immediately after his office had been sealed, as evidenced by the disturbances on the line. He had had no way of confirming or dispelling his misgivings in this regard, as under Bulgarian law such information could not be released. He also submitted that if there had been such tapping, it had been unlawful, because he had been merely a witness and the authorities had not had sufficient material to entertain a reasonable suspicion against him. In view of this, and of the applicant’s capacity as a lawyer, it had clearly not been  <mask> to intercept his telephone communications. He concluded that these circumstances had amounted to a breach of Article 8.


41.  The Government lastly argued that the alleged interference had met the requirement of being  <mask>. They took the view that to find such documents inadmissible would prevent courts from ruling on situations that might present a risk for the health, morals or stability of other family members, especially where there were alcohol-related problems. They added that the fact of excluding documents obtained by duress or fraud fulfilled the State’s positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention. The Government further indicated that the Court of Appeal had maintained the applicant’s right of contact in respect of his children pending the results of the expert’s report, and inferred from this that any interference would thus, in any event, have been proportionate. Lastly, they observed that such interference, when compared with that in Z v. Finland (cited above) and M.S. v. Sweden, (27 August 1997, Reports 1997‑IV), appeared far less significant and was circumscribed by the requisite safeguards.


31.  The Government submitted that the authorisation of the official receiver to have access to the applicant’s correspondence could be considered to be in furtherance of the protection of the “rights of others” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention and thus to pursue a legitimate aim. In order to prevent the concealment of a bankrupt’s assets to the detriment of his creditors, the authorities may consider it necessary to have recourse to the interception of a bankrupt’s correspondence in order to identify and trace the sources of his income. In the present case, J. had opened one single letter addressed to the applicant, which had been sent by an insurance company. The said letter concerned the price of an apartment which had been pledged as security for the payment of debts. Neither the sender’s name nor any other external fact gave reason to assume that the letter could have been, as is alleged by the applicant, of a private nature. It was also of relevance that the delivered mail was a letter sent by an insurance company, and there was reason to believe that the letter related to property belonging to the bankrupt’s estate. The letter could have, for example, been sent for the purpose of repudiating an insurance policy. It must also be remembered that the official receiver was under an obligation to administer the property of the bankrupt’s estate, subject to liability for damages, and this included a duty to ensure that the property was covered by an appropriate insurance. The various domestic courts that examined the case all observed that the contents of the letter were such that the letter could have concerned property belonging to the bankruptcy estate. Any interference may, thus, be regarded as  <mask>. It had not been shown that any other mail addressed to the applicant was received by J. during the relevant period.


32.  The Government submitted that, to the extent that the drafting of the report was to be regarded as an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention, it had been in accordance with the domestic legislation in force at the material time. Furthermore, it had been  <mask> in the interests of public safety and the prevention of disorder.


35.  The Government further contended that the measure had been  <mask> within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention and that the Swiss authorities had not overstepped their margin of appreciation. Particular reference was made to the nature of the offences committed, the length of the prison sentence, the duration of the applicant’s stay in Switzerland and the effects which the refusal to prolong the residence permit would have on the applicant’s wife. In the present case, both the Federal Court and the Administrative Court of the Canton of Zürich carefully examined the applicant’s situation. Their analysis of the situation could not be called in question by reason of the fact that the applicant had not committed any offences after his release from prison.


20.  The Government admitted that there had been an interference with the applicant’s family life. However, they considered that such interference was justified. They maintained that the issue of authorisation for family visits was foreseen by the domestic law, namely Article 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The refusal to allow such family visits during the investigation stage was in the interests of public safety and was  <mask>.


84.  The Government maintained that there had been no violation of Article 8 as a result of the initial taking into care of the applicant’s children. The interference with his right to respect for his family life was based on various provisions of the Child Welfare Act and the related decree which are intended to protect the best interests of children. The placement of the applicant’s children in public care was proportionate to that aim and thus  <mask> as required by Article 8 § 2. The public care orders were grounded and upheld on the basis of a large number of reports by social authorities and doctors, all concluding that the children had to be taken into care.


74.  The Government accepted that the decision to place the applicant’s child in a foster care and to transfer parental rights and responsibilities to the director of the foster care centre and to the district mayor could be seen as interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. They considered that the impugned interference had been in accordance with the law, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been  <mask>. They asserted, in particular, that the domestic authorities had struck a fair balance between the interests of the child and those of the applicant and that the decisions they had taken had served the best interests of the child.


40.  The Government submitted that if the Court concluded that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life and correspondence, which they disputed, then the alleged interference had been in accordance with the law and  <mask> for the protection of national security and the prevention of disorder or crime. Additionally, the alleged “legislative interference” had been justified in the interests of public safety and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as set forth in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


29.  The applicant expressed the view that the criminal charge brought against him in 2006 should not have been taken into account by the Swiss authorities when assessing whether he constituted a risk to public safety because the criminal proceedings had ended in a nolle prosequi and he had been declared innocent. He added that the domestic authorities and the Government had given too much weight to his conviction and the criminal charges brought against him, while disregarding all other elements. He maintained that his expulsion from Switzerland had not been  <mask> under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


75.  The Government conceded that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. However, they argued that the interference in the form of the domestic courts’ refusal to order the return of the applicant’s son to the United States had been in accordance with the law, had pursued a legitimate aim, and had been  <mask>. In particular, the decision had been based on Article 13 § 1 (b) of the Hague Convention and had sought to protect the rights of others, namely the applicant’s son.


199.  The Government further referred to the Plenary Supreme Court’s Ruling of 27 June 2013, which explained to the lower courts that any restrictions on human rights and freedoms had to be prescribed by law and be  <mask>, that is, proportionate to a legitimate aim. Courts were instructed to rely on established facts, verify the existence of relevant and sufficient reasons to justify a restriction on an individual’s rights and balance the interests of the individual whose rights were being restricted against the interests of other individuals, the State and society as a whole. The OSAA explicitly required the courts to give reasons for the decision to authorise interception. In line with the Constitutional Court’s decision of 8 February 2007 (see paragraph 42 above), the interception authorisation was to refer to the specific grounds for suspecting the person in respect of whom operational-search measures were requested of a criminal offence or of activities endangering national, military, economic or ecological security. In its decision of 2 October 2003 (see paragraph 41 above), the Constitutional Court also held that judges had an obligation to examine the materials submitted to them carefully and thoroughly.


73.  The Government acknowledged that the applicant’s expulsion would amount to an interference with his right to respect for his family life. However, such an interference was in accordance with the law and  <mask>. During the period of his residence in the Russian Federation, the applicant had been convicted twice of criminal offences. In particular, on 18 November 1999 the Shuya Town Court of the Ivanovo Region had found him guilty of extortion committed by a group of persons (a serious crime) and theft of a passport (a minor offence) and sentenced him to three years and one month’s imprisonment. On 26 April 2005 the Town Court had found him guilty of theft (an offence of medium gravity) and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. The Government stressed that the fact that the applicant committed the theft shortly after having served his first prison sentence should not be overlooked, as it showed his firm propensity to commit crimes against property. Furthermore, on 19 June 2007 and 8 July 2010 the applicant had been held administratively liable for failing to have his residency in Russia duly authorised. According to the information from the police, the applicant was a member of an organised criminal gang, was actively involved in drug dealing and was a drug addict himself. He was unemployed and did not support his wife and children. Accordingly, his expulsion would not have any bearing on his family’s financial situation. His wife had been aware of his convictions prior to marrying him. She had never met her parents-in-law in person. She maintained contact with them by telephone or via the internet.


70.  The applicant submitted that the domestic courts’ refusal to order the return of his son to the United States had amounted to an interference with his right to respect for his family life. That interference had been unlawful, it had not aimed to protect the interests of the child, but solely those of the mother, and thus it had not been  <mask>. In particular, as regards the requirement of lawfulness, the applicant argued that the domestic courts had construed the exception set out in Article 13 § 1 (b) of the Hague Convention too widely, an exception which must be interpreted strictly, and had misapplied that Article to the facts of the case.


59.  The Government did not deny that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life and correspondence. They believed, however, that the interference at issue was prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate aim and was  <mask>. The interference had resulted from the interception of A.B.’s telephone conversations, which had been authorised under section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities. In the Government’s view this was sufficient to conclude that the criterion of lawfulness was met in the present case. Moreover, the lawfulness of the interception had subsequently been confirmed on several occasions by the prosecutor’s office in response to the applicant’s complaints (paragraphs 11-15 above). They claimed that it had also been verified by the relevant judge of the Criminal Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court (in the context of the criminal proceedings). Lastly, they referred to the findings of the Constitutional Court confirming that the said provision had been sufficiently clear and precise as to exclude arbitrariness. Namely, the said provision contained an exhaustive list of offences and the necessary precondition for its application was a situation requiring immediate action. Furthermore, the Government submitted that the interference at issue had pursued the legitimate aim of preventing crime, given that it had been carried out in the framework of criminal proceedings in connection with aggravated bribery. In response to the applicant’s argument, they further reiterated that owing to the rapid development of events from 27 to 30 December 2005 no measures other than the operational interception of telecommunications would have been efficient for gathering credible information about the details of and accomplices involved in the bribery scheme.


59.  The Government did not dispute that the applicants’ removal from the territory of Moldova had constituted an interference with their private and family lives. However, that interference had been in accordance with the provisions of the Status of Aliens Act, had pursued the legitimate aim of protection of national security and had been  <mask> because it had been justified by the pressing social need to ensure the nation’s safety. The Government also argued that the applicants’ families had not even attempted to visit them in Turkey during their detention and expressed the view that they would not be at any risk in Turkey. The Turkish authorities had informed the applicants’ families that the applicants had been taken into custody and the latter had been visited by family members who lived in Turkey on multiple occasions.


40.  The Government argued that the exercise of the right of freedom of expression demanded from the user some duties and responsibilities, which could be subject to restrictions and penalties as were prescribed by law and  <mask> in the interests of – with respect to the present case – public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others or for maintaining the authority of the judiciary. The statements made by the applicant were broadly reported by the mass media to whom he gave a press conference.


43.  The Government submitted that the first applicant’s expulsion would be justified under Article 8 § 2 as being in accordance with the law and  <mask>. They emphasised that the applicant had been the subject of several criminal convictions and that his expulsion would pursue the legitimate aim of the prevention of crime and the protection of the rights of others.


38.  The Government further submitted that if the Court were to decide that there had been an interference, such an interference had been in accordance with the law, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of other persons living in the dormitory building who had moved in lawfully, and had been  <mask>. In particular, in taking the decision to evict the adult female applicants, the domestic courts had taken into account that those applicants had moved into the building unlawfully and had been registered as living in other premises. The courts had also duly examined the adult female applicants’ arguments as regards their right to live together with their husbands and children, and had dismissed those arguments as ill-founded. The Government also pointed out that the adult male applicants had never applied to the authorities with a request to acquire ownership of the rooms in the dormitory building by way of privatisation, and had not asked to conclude a special tenancy agreement in respect of the rooms they occupied. Lastly, the eviction order had not placed a disproportionate burden on the adult female applicants.


44.  The Government argued that, were the Court to find that there had been interference, the interference was justified under the second paragraph of Article 8. In their submission it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim, namely preventing disorder and crime, and was  <mask>. The Government explained that there were legal guarantees to protect people against arbitrary interference by the public authorities. Lastly, they submitted that the State was under no obligation to cover the cost of translating prisoners’ correspondence, no such obligation being provided for in the Convention.


62.  The Government further submitted that the interference in issue had been  <mask> within the meaning of Article 8 § 2. Citing the Court’s case-law (in particular, Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, and Odièvre, cited above), they observed that, in striking a fair balance between competing interests, the Court afforded States a certain margin of appreciation and that, in assessing whether or not they had overstepped that margin, it took particular care to ensure that the child’s best interests were preserved. In the instant case the Government submitted that, in such a delicate situation as the abandonment of a child by a mother who wished the birth to be registered anonymously, the French legislation attempted to square the various interests at stake: those of the child, the mother and the adoptive family.


74.  The Government contended that the non-application of the 28‑year exception rule to the first applicant was in accordance with the law, that is section 9, subsection 7, of the Aliens Act. The 28‑year rule pursued a legitimate aim, namely ensuring that Danish expatriates with strong and lasting ties with Denmark would be able to obtain family reunion in Denmark. The rationale was that it would be unproblematic to grant such persons family reunion with a foreign spouse because the latter would normally be successfully integrated into Danish society. Politically it was felt that this group had been unintentionally and unfairly disadvantaged by the tightening of the attachment requirement introduced in 2002. More generally, the 28-year rule pursued the legitimate aim of immigration control and improving integration, which were important economic and social considerations. The Government also maintained that the refusal to grant the second applicant family reunion in Denmark struck a fair balance and was  <mask>.


53.  The applicant further argued that the ten-year exclusion order was in itself a new fact, was not  <mask> within the meaning of Article 8 § 2, and thus constituted a fresh violation of his right to respect for his private and family life. He added that the offences he had committed were not of such a nature or seriousness as to justify maintaining his exclusion at the present time. He argued in this connection that the offences had been mistakes of youth and that, by the time of the Federal Court’s revision judgment of 6 July 2009, he had become a responsible adult, being a married man and in gainful employment.


37.  The Government concluded that the Swiss authorities had quite rightly, after a detailed examination of the case, held that the first applicant’s expulsion was a measure that was  <mask> for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. The authorities could not therefore be found to have overstepped the margin of appreciation afforded to them in the present case. Accordingly, there had been no violation of Article 8.


32.  The applicant submitted that the uncertainty and insecurity to which he had been subjected for twelve years and the various restrictions placed on him as an asylum-seeker had affected the very fabric of his personal, social and economic relations, which he considered as part of his private and family life. He had therefore suffered interference which, moreover, had not been prescribed by law, had not pursued a legitimate aim and had not been  <mask>. In that regard he pointed out, first of all, that the authorities had given no reason for the waiting period imposed upon him, which he described as very long, and, secondly, that he had been in a situation of vulnerability and should have been granted official protection much more quickly.


45.  The Government said that, on the contrary, the actions of the domestic authorities had not interfered with the first applicant’s rights under Article 10. The searches had been unproductive, as the sole document seized was not one the first applicant had used as a source for his newspaper article. Any interference had, in any event, been prescribed by law, namely Article 65 of the Criminal Investigation Code, and pursued the legitimate aim of preventing disorder or crime. It had also been  <mask> and was proportionate to the aim pursued. The approach followed in Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 27 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II) could not be applied in the instant case. Firstly, the first applicant had not been required to reveal his source on pain of a fine, but had merely been subjected to a search that had resulted in the seizure of a single document. Secondly, the aim pursued by the interference in the instant case was far more important than that of protecting the economic interests of a private undertaking, as in Goodwin. The investigation into an allegation of breach of professional confidence was of direct relevance to the proper functioning of public institutions. The prevention and punishment of that offence thus constituted a “pressing social need” that justified the interference.


34.  The Government submitted that the decision to deny the first applicant continued residence in the Netherlands was  <mask> and was proportionate. Referring to the guiding principles for cases of this nature as established by the Court (Boultif v. Switzerland, no. 54273/00, § 48, ECHR-2001), they argued that the first applicant had been convicted of an extremely serious drug offence, of the kind that creates a sense of unease and insecurity in society. The Government added that drug offences are regarded both nationally and internationally as a very serious threat, and that considerable efforts have been made, and are still being made, to counter them. The mere fact that the first applicant had not been convicted of such crimes again should not be of decisive importance when balancing the different interests involved in relation to Article 8 of the Convention.


133.  The applicant stressed that the relevant legislation had given the authorities a virtually unlimited power to interfere with his correspondence. He maintained that, even assuming that the authorities had intended to secure the proper conduct of the criminal proceedings in his case, the duration of that measure, as well as its scope and nature had by no means been  <mask>. The need to achieve the aim pursued by the authorities had not required them to read all his letters, notwithstanding whether they had been of strictly personal or of official character. In particular, there had been no reason whatsoever to open and read his correspondence to the lawyer representing him before the Commission and the Court, as such letters were privileged under Article 8 of the Convention.


57.  The Government submitted that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life, since he had not lost personal ties with his daughter. The applicant had never sought contact with V. in Russia by bringing this issue before the childcare authority or the courts. His lack of contact with the child had thus resulted from his own failure to act. If, however, the Court were to find that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life, the Government considered that it had been in accordance with the law, proportionate and  <mask>.


49.  The applicants submitted that the impugned video surveillance had been unlawful, had not pursued any legitimate aim and had not been  <mask>. The Dean of the School had collected and processed the data obtained thereby without any restriction and the applicants had had no effective control over that information. The Agency had also failed to live up to its legal obligations, thus in addition making the interference arbitrary.


17.  The applicant submitted that the refusal to grant him compassionate leave was in breach of Article 8 of the Convention. He emphasised that, in accordance with the Court’s case‑law, even if a detainee must be subjected to various limitations of his rights and freedoms, each of these limitations must be justifiable as  <mask>. It was the duty of the State to demonstrate that such necessity really existed in the applicant’s case. The applicant considered that the Government failed to demonstrate such necessity. The refusal of leave was based mainly on the gravity of the committed offence and the penitentiary authorities failed to take into account the progress of the applicant’s rehabilitation. He further considered that the authorities should have acted with greater expediency, having regard to the urgency of the situation.


32.  The Government argued that the present case differed from the cases Sallinen and Others v. Finland (no. 50882/99, 27 September 2005) and Sorvisto v. Finland (no. 19348/04, 13 January 2009) both as to the facts and the fact that the applicant had not been a suspect but a witness. Also, the extent of the search had been different. Therefore, in the Government's view, the interference had been in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and had been  <mask>.


52.  The Government acknowledged that the contact restrictions constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her private and family life but that these limitations were in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and were  <mask>. They stressed that it was the best interests of the children which were of crucial importance and that the domestic authorities had constantly based their measures on the established need to protect the children, having regard to the applicant’s conduct and behaviour and their negative reactions to this. Here the Government observed that each meeting with the applicant had been trying for the children and that the applicant’s behaviour had made them feel scared, bad or ill at ease and that they had reacted in different ways to the visits, inter alia, through sleeping difficulties, bed wetting, anxiety and depression. Moreover, an extension of the visits would have been against the expressed will of the children. Therefore, the Social Council had feared that the visits would ultimately be detrimental to the children’s well-being and contrary to their best interest.


63.  The Government accepted that the police officers' entry into the front garden of the applicant's house constituted an interference with her right to respect for her home guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. However, the interference had been in “accordance with the law”. According to the Government, the interference had been based on section 13(19) of the Police Act of 18 December 1990, and in particular on provisions authorising the police to enter private houses without the consent of the owner and to inspect them in order to put an end to offences and to pursue persons suspected of having committed an offence. The Government also argued that the interference had pursued a legitimate aim and had been  <mask>.


82.  The Government submitted that Russian law treated all aliens on an equal basis, irrespective of whether or not they had a minor child in Russia. There was no evidence that the State authorities had prevented the applicant from being reunited with his son in a different State. Nor had he shown that he had taken any steps to remove his son from Russia. In any event, the Convention does not guarantee the right to establish family life in any specific country (here they referred to the case of Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321/99, § 97, ECHR 2003‑X). Unlike the first applicant in the Slivenko case, who had come to Latvia when she had been only ten months old and had spent her entire life there, the applicant had arrived in Russia as an adult and had lived there for only eight years. His integration into Russian society was open to doubt since he had been unable, by his own admission, to read a document handwritten in Russian. Moreover, owing to their profession, religious missionaries must be prepared to change their place of residence with greater ease. Finally, the Government submitted that, in any event, the interference with the applicant’s family life had been in accordance with law, pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of national security and had also been  <mask>.


128.  The Government did not produce any evidence to demonstrate that the Russian courts acted differently in the present case. In particular, they failed to submit copies of the surveillance authorisations in respect of the applicants and thereby made it impossible for the Court to verify whether the authorisations were based on a reasonable suspicion that the applicants had committed criminal offences. Nor could the Court verify whether the reasons adduced to justify the surveillance measures were “relevant” and “sufficient”, that is to say that the interception of the applicants’ communications was  <mask> and, in particular, proportionate to any legitimate aim pursued.


80.  The Government admitted that the practice of monitoring the applicant’s letters constituted an interference with his right to respect for his correspondence. They maintained, however, that the interference had been in accordance with the law and pursued the legitimate aim of preventing the applicant’s absconding from justice and obstructing the investigation of the crime he had been charged with. They further submitted that the interference had been  <mask> to achieve that aim. Lastly, they noted that as of 6 February 2003 the applicant’s letters to the Ombudsman had not been subject to review.


32.  The Government accepted that the judgments of the Austrian courts on the applicants request for visiting rights constituted an interference with their right to respect for their family life. That interference was in accordance with the law, that is, it was based on Article 148 (4) of the Civil Code, and it also served a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, that is, the child concerned and his biological mother. The interference was also  <mask>. The Austrian courts had carefully balanced the interest of the applicants in further personal contact with their former foster child against the interest of the biological mother of the child in re-constituting and protecting an undisturbed and fruitful mother-child relationship, as well as taking into account the welfare of the child himself. Austrian law attributed a particularly high priority to the welfare of the child in decisions on family-law matters and the interests of adults had often to give way to this priority.


104.  The applicant argued that his wife orally asked the first instance court to authorise her to visit her husband, but the court refused. The fact that the applicant complained to the prosecutor and later instituted proceedings in which he challenged the ban on visits is proof of that. In any event, the interference did not have a legitimate aim and was not  <mask>.


125.  The Government argued, with reference to section 10 of the Detention on Remand Act 1993, that the interference had been lawful. It was aimed at preventing the applicant from hampering the investigation. The interference had been  <mask> as both the applicant and his wife had been accused of a particularly serious offence in the context of organised crime and the applicant had tried secretly to send a letter to his wife from prison.


25.  The Government submitted that even if the expulsion order interferes with the applicant's family life, it discloses no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. Given the seriousness of the offence which the applicant committed in Denmark the measure of expulsion was called for in the interest of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and was  <mask> within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. The Government drew attention to the fact that the applicant has very strong ties with his country of origin since he was already an adult when he left Iran and had his entire school education in Iran. He masters the local language, he served part of his compulsory military service and he has family there. In comparison, the applicant does not have strong ties with Denmark. At the time the expulsion order was made he had resided for only eight years in Denmark. Moreover, in the Government's view, there is no evidence to prove that the applicant's spouse, the children of the marriage, and the spouse's child of another relationship will not be able to accompany the applicant to Iran.


24.  The applicant accepted that the judgments of the domestic courts had been based on the law in force at the material time. He stressed, however, that the Government had not advanced any reasons to show that the law in question had pursued a legitimate aim and that the interference had been  <mask>. The applicant submitted that the interference had not been necessary and was not justified for the following reasons.


103.  The Government maintained that, given the evidence before the High Court, that court's reasons for its detention orders and the conditions imposed by that court, there was no interference with the applicant's right to respect for his family or private life. Indeed, they argue that he did not have a family life for a considerable period of time prior to the relevant period of detention. Alternatively, any interference with his private or family life was in accordance with the law, had a legitimate aim (the protection of the applicant and others and the prevention of disorder and crime) and was  <mask>: given the State's margin of appreciation, it was a proportionate response to the legitimate aim sought to be achieved.


49.  The Government submitted that the monitoring of the applicants’ letters had been in accordance with the law and had pursued the legitimate aim of preventing escape from and disorder in detention facilities. They further submitted that the interference had been  <mask> to achieve those aims. They contested the applicants’ submissions that some of their letters had not been sent on to the addressees.


49.  The Government accepted that the expulsion order interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life within the meaning of Article 8 § 1. In the Government’s view, the measure at issue was justified under § 2 of that same provision as being in accordance with the law and  <mask>. They pointed out that the domestic authorities, on request, generally set a time-limit to the ban to re‑enter German territory, as provided by section 8 of the Aliens Act. While the applicant had lodged such a request, he did not appear to have made sustained efforts to pursue it. In particular, he had not answered to the Regional Government’s letter of 30 January 2004.


169.  The Government argued that the decision to prevent the applicant from making a fresh application for full legal capacity to be restored to her had been in accordance with Article 186 § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was in the interest of the applicant and the persons in her environment and was  <mask> in the circumstances of the case.


96.  The applicant submitted that the prison authorities did not inform either him or his mother about the need to lodge a request in order to obtain an authorisation to correspond. Neither did they issue a reasoned decision to restrict the applicant's right to correspondence. Moreover, in his particular case, the prohibition on corresponding with his mother was not  <mask>.


55.  The applicant submitted that she had been living in the flat since 2005 and that it had become her home. The invalidation of her title to the flat, leading to the eviction order, amounted to an interference with her right to respect for her home. She accepted that the interference was in accordance with the domestic law and that it pursued a legitimate aim. However, she argued that it was not  <mask>, did not correspond to a pressing social need and was not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. She further asserted that the domestic authorities had made it clear to her that they would not provide her with assistance in resolving her housing need.


63.  The Government maintained that even supposing that the search amounted to an interference with the second applicant’s rights under Article 8, it had been justified under paragraph 2 of that provision. The interference was in accordance with the law and pursued a legitimate aim, namely the prevention and punishment of criminal offences. Lastly, it had been  <mask>. The search warrants had been drafted in narrow terms covering only the search for and seizure of a single document. The offences that had triggered the search were serious ones, as they called into question the very functioning of the State institutions, a factor that justified the investigating judge’s taking any measure which he considered would assist in establishing the truth.


46.  The Government acknowledged that the impugned measures interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life but submitted that they were “in accordance with the law” and pursued the protection of health and morals of the children in question, namely to provide them with stable and safe living conditions and secure their development. They further submitted that the measures were  <mask>. They pointed out that the national authorities had the benefit of contact with the persons concerned and that a parent was not entitled under Article 8 to have measures taken which would harm a child’s health or development.


77.  The Government acknowledged that there had been an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention, as a result of the first applicant’s parental authority over the second applicant being restricted. At the same time, they insisted that the interference in question had been lawful, pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the health and rights of a minor, the second applicant, and that it had been  <mask>, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


32.  The Government submitted that the interference in question had been prescribed by law and had pursued a number of legitimate aims, namely the protection of national security, territorial integrity, public safety, public order and prevention of crime. They also claimed that the restriction had been  <mask> because it had been carried out as a result of a pressing social need and had been proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. They concluded that, in the exercise of their discretion, the prison authorities had decided not to allow the impugned letter to be sent outside.


108.  The Government stated that the measures against the applicant had been lawful and  <mask> for the maintenance of ordre public and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Emphasising that the applicant had owed significant amounts in taxes and had refused to pay, contesting her debt, the Government considered that the measure against the applicant had been imposed on an individual basis, taking into account her behaviour. Also, the applicant had owned and managed a firm in Austria, not in Bulgaria, which allegedly meant that no security for payment had been available. The principle of proportionality had been respected.


26.  The Government agreed that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her private life. However, they argued that the interference was provided for by law, namely by Article 8 of Law No. 982 on access to information (see paragraph 20 above), had pursued a legitimate aim, and had been  <mask>. The Government stressed that, in their view, the present case very much resembled the case of M.S. v. Sweden (27 August 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑IV) and asked the Court to adopt a similar approach to it.


78.  The Government acknowledged that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 as concerned the search of its offices. They disputed, however, that there had been such an interference in relation to the seizure of the USB memory stick and the external hard disk drive since the domestic courts had reasonably considered that those items belonged to Draupner and not the applicant, in accordance with the presumption that any documents found on the premises linked to a business should be presumed to belong to that business. Nor had the search of the flat interfered with the applicant’s rights as it did not belong to the applicant but had been the business premises of Draupner, as concluded by the courts in several decisions. With respect to the search of the applicant’s offices, the Government further asserted that it had been in accordance with the law and  <mask> and that, thus, it had not involved a violation of Article 8.


24.  The Government acknowledged that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to family life. They stressed however that intervention by the domestic courts had been prescribed by law, namely section 92 (4) of the Csjt. (see paragraph 15 above). Moreover, it pursued a legitimate aim, that is, the protection of the child’s interests, and was  <mask>. They added that in this field the child’s interests were paramount, overriding the interests of the parents.


81.  The Government disagreed. They accepted that the first applicant’s psychiatric examination constituted interference with his private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. They argued, however, that this interference was justified under paragraph 2 of the provision at issue. In particular, the assessment had been carried out based on Mrs L.’s complaints about the first applicant’s deviant behaviour, which had posed a threat to her own safety and the safety of others. These complaints had not been unsubstantiated; in particular, in June 2000 the first applicant had injured Mrs L. Other villagers had also complained to various authorities about the first applicant’s provocative conduct. The Government submitted in this regard copies of complaints concerning the first applicant’s conduct signed by various individuals and dated 2000 – 2003. In the light of this, the first applicant’s psychiatric examination had pursued a legitimate aim – namely, protection of the rights of others. It had been  <mask> and was conducted in accordance with the law. In particular, the relevant provision was section 11 of the Law of Ukraine “On Psychiatric Assistance”, authorising forcible psychiatric assessments of persons manifesting real intention to commit acts putting others in danger. Lastly, the Government submitted that the lawfulness of the application of that provision in the first applicant’s case had been confirmed by judicial authorities of two levels in the course of the contested proceedings.


45.  The applicant argued that the interference in the present case had not been  <mask>. Even assuming that the actions of the MADEKKI had pursued a legitimate aim in aiding the Cēsis hospital in the process of ascertaining the lawfulness of its employees’ actions, it could have done so by using means less restrictive of individual rights. For instance, the Cēsis hospital could have forwarded the applicant’s data to the MADEKKI without disclosing her name.


78.  The Government admitted that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. However, they considered that such interference had been  <mask> and had been justified by the need to ensure public safety and to prevent any obstruction by the applicant of the investigation of the criminal case against him.


65.  The Government submitted that Article 10 was not applicable in the present case. In any event they stated that the application of the KGB Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of the protection of national security and was  <mask> in view of the applicants’ lack of loyalty to the State. The applicants had not been punished for their views, be they views which they hold at present or views that they might have held in the past. The KGB Act had not imposed a collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in section 3 of the KGB Act showed that there had been a well-founded suspicion that the applicants had been lacking in loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Accordingly, there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.


68.  The applicant maintained that the publication of the Commission’s decision on its website before it had become final had been unlawful and not  <mask>. The removal of such a decision from the Commission’s website if the administrative courts had set it aside would not have offset the adverse effects it had caused. In that connection, he submitted articles from newspapers and online portals after the Commission had posted its decision on its website and before it had been served on him. Lastly, he argued that the impugned publication had not pursued any legitimate aim.


27.  The Government accepted that the residence prohibition interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life. In the Government’s view, the measure at issue was justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention as being in accordance with the law, namely the relevant provisions of the 1992 and 1997 Aliens Act. In this respect they submitted that the applicant did not meet the requirements of Section 38 § 1 (4) of the 1997 Aliens Act, as he clearly had not grown up in Austria from an early age onwards since he had left Austria when he was only seven months old and did not return until he was ten. This had also been pointed out in the reasoning of the domestic authorities’ decisions of 25 March and 27 April 1998 which dismissed his application for lifting the residence prohibition. The measure also pursued the legitimate aim of the prevention of disorder or crime. Having regard to the seriousness of the offence and the severity of the penalty, the Government argued that the measure had been  <mask>, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention and that the Austrian authorities had not overstepped their margin of appreciation.


40.  The Government accepted that the decision to withdraw, among other things, the applicants’ right to determine the children’s place of residence and the fact that their children had been subsequently forcibly separated from their parents had constituted interferences with the right to respect for the applicants’ family life. The interferences had been, however, in accordance with the law and had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the health, rights and freedoms of the applicants’ children. Moreover, the interferences had been  <mask>. The German authorities had established, based on the information available at the relevant time, that the best interest of the children had been at risk and that this fact had required the partial withdrawal of parental authority. Despite compulsory school attendance, the children had not attended a State school for years. The schooling by, in particular, their mother had had to be regarded as inadequate, since the children had been taught only for five hours a day, interrupted by a lunch break, and, notwithstanding their different ages, all children had been taught together and the same curriculum. In addition, the children had had no regular contact with society and hardly any opportunity to meet children of their own age, for example during music lessons or in sports clubs, or to acquire social skills. They consequently had grown up isolated within their own family enclave, in which the applicants had ensured that their children had established a strong attachment to them, to the exclusion of others. The courts had therefore correctly assumed that a “symbiotic” family system had emerged. Further information had not been available to the authorities as the applicants had persistently resisted and prevented the children’s situation from being examined in detail by the youth office or the Education Authority. The domestic courts, in particular the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal, outlined these sufficient and relevant reasons in detail in their decisions. The courts had also assessed whether less severe measures had been available but had correctly concluded that, given the applicants’ previous conduct and persistent rejection of schooling outside their own home, which could not even be changed by criminal sanctions, no other measures had been available. Moreover, as soon as the learning assessment had been undertaken and the applicants had agreed to send their children to a public school, the children had been returned to their parents.


113.  The applicants contended that the Court could not be reduced to being an “accountant” of majoritarian domestic views. On the contrary, it had to be the guardian of the Convention and its underlying values, which include the protection of minorities (they referred in this connection to L. and V. v. Austria, nos. 39392/98 and 39829/98, § 52, ECHR 2003‑I, and Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, § 97, ECHR 1999‑VI). The applicants noted that bias was still present throughout Europe, and could be stronger in certain countries where prejudice against homosexuals was rooted in traditional, if not archaic, convictions and where democratic ideals and practices had only established themselves in recent times. The applicants noted that empirical evidence (submitted to the Court) showed that lack of recognition of same-sex couples in a given state corresponded to a lower degree of social acceptance of homosexuality. It followed that by simply deferring normative choices to the national authorities, the Court would fail to take account of the fact that certain national choices were in fact based on prevailing discriminatory attitudes against homosexuals, rather than the outcome of a genuine democratic process guided by the consideration of what is strictly  <mask>.


35.  The Government accepted that there had been an interference with the applicant's private life but maintained that this interference had been in accordance with the law and that it had been  <mask> for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The purpose of the Paternity Act was to guarantee equality in law between children, irrespective of descent, and for this reason it was retroactive. The limitation of retroactivity to five years only concerned those cases where paternity was to be established by a court decision. According to the preparatory works of the Paternity Act, the requirement of legal certainty required rapid elimination of uncertainty about possible claims to be made against putative fathers. The restriction concerning the death of the man was justified on the grounds that it was no longer possible to obtain sufficient evidence of the man's paternity if he were deceased. The child welfare supervisor could only initiate paternity proceedings in respect of a child who had been born before the entry into force of the Paternity Act if the child was under fifteen years of age and the mother or the legal guardian had expressed the wish for such proceedings to be initiated.


30.  The Government argued that the letter contained factual allegations which the applicant had failed to prove, although she had been given an opportunity to do so in the domestic proceedings. The Government also submitted that the applicant did not complain about the amount she had been ordered to pay in compensation and that it was within the competence of the domestic authorities to determine other measures necessary to remedy the situation, including ordering the applicant to retract the statements by rescinding the impugned letter. Therefore, the Government stated that the interference had been  <mask> and was proportionate.


40.  The Government argued that the exercise of the right of freedom of expression demanded from the user some duties and responsibilities, which could be subject to restrictions and penalties as were prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of – with respect to the present case – public safety, for the  <mask> or crime, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others or for maintaining the authority of the judiciary. The statements made by the applicant were broadly reported by the mass media to whom he gave a press conference.


25.  The Government submitted that even if the expulsion order interferes with the applicant's family life, it discloses no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. Given the seriousness of the offence which the applicant committed in Denmark the measure of expulsion was called for in the interest of public safety, for the  <mask> or crime, and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and was necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. The Government drew attention to the fact that the applicant has very strong ties with his country of origin since he was already an adult when he left Iran and had his entire school education in Iran. He masters the local language, he served part of his compulsory military service and he has family there. In comparison, the applicant does not have strong ties with Denmark. At the time the expulsion order was made he had resided for only eight years in Denmark. Moreover, in the Government's view, there is no evidence to prove that the applicant's spouse, the children of the marriage, and the spouse's child of another relationship will not be able to accompany the applicant to Iran.


26.  The applicant argued that the measure constituted an interference with his rights under Article 8 of the Convention, which had also been conceded by the Austrian authorities. However, when applying the relevant provisions of the 1992 Aliens Act, the domestic authorities had wrongly found that the measure was “necessary in a democratic society”. In particular it did not correspond to a “pressing social need” for the  <mask> or crime. Unlike the administrative authorities, the Juvenile Court, by suspending the major part of the sentence, had obviously made a positive prognosis in respect of the applicant. The Juvenile Court had taken into account the applicant’s young age of eighteen years, the short period of time during which he had committed the offences, namely two and a half months, together with the fact that the applicant had no previous criminal record. Further, the administrative authorities had grossly disregarded the applicant’s high degree of integration in Austria, namely his lawful residence and that of his family for years, as well as his school education and completion of a vocational training on the one hand, and the lack of any family ties with Serbia and Montenegro after his grandparents’ death on the other. Thus, the imposition of a residence prohibition of an unlimited duration was disproportionate to the aims pursued.


33.  The Government submitted that the limitation on the number of prison visits had been based on section 18 of the Pre-Trial Detention Act and had been proportionate to the legitimate aim of the  <mask> and crime because the applicant had been held in custody on account of the gravity of the charges against him and his capacity for obstructing the establishment of the truth. Glass partitions were fitted in accordance with the Rules of Internal Order in Remand Prisons and served to prevent any objects from being passed between detainees and visitors and also to protect visitors from spontaneous dangerous acts on the part of detainees, as well as for the reasons of hygiene, to stifle the spread of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis. In the Government’s view, removal of partitions would require a greater number of supervising officers and a closer monitoring of detainees and visitors. This would probably reduce the privacy available to them and bring about a more serious interference with their right to respect for family life.


30.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with his rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, for the  <mask> and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


103.  The Government maintained that, given the evidence before the High Court, that court's reasons for its detention orders and the conditions imposed by that court, there was no interference with the applicant's right to respect for his family or private life. Indeed, they argue that he did not have a family life for a considerable period of time prior to the relevant period of detention. Alternatively, any interference with his private or family life was in accordance with the law, had a legitimate aim (the protection of the applicant and others and the  <mask> and crime) and was necessary in a democratic society: given the State's margin of appreciation, it was a proportionate response to the legitimate aim sought to be achieved.


27.  The Government accepted that the residence prohibition interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life. In the Government’s view, the measure at issue was justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention as being in accordance with the law, namely the relevant provisions of the 1992 and 1997 Aliens Act. In this respect they submitted that the applicant did not meet the requirements of Section 38 § 1 (4) of the 1997 Aliens Act, as he clearly had not grown up in Austria from an early age onwards since he had left Austria when he was only seven months old and did not return until he was ten. This had also been pointed out in the reasoning of the domestic authorities’ decisions of 25 March and 27 April 1998 which dismissed his application for lifting the residence prohibition. The measure also pursued the legitimate aim of the  <mask> or crime. Having regard to the seriousness of the offence and the severity of the penalty, the Government argued that the measure had been necessary in a democratic society, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention and that the Austrian authorities had not overstepped their margin of appreciation.


55.  The applicant in the present case committed a single offence and has produced reports indicating that his risk of reoffending was low (see paragraphs 11 and 14 above). Further, the AIT in its judgment of April 2007 accepted that there was a low risk that the applicant would reoffend (see paragraph 20 above). It is also of some significance that the deportation order served on the applicant in July 2004 did not refer to the aims of “public safety” or “protection of the rights of others”. In light of these considerations, and in the absence of any specific observations from the Government to support their contention that the applicant’s deportation would serve the additional aims to which they now refer, the Court considers that in the present case the intended deportation of the applicant pursued the legitimate aim of the “ <mask> or crime”.


176.  The applicant’s case is troubling, since his intransigence has led to his spending a substantial period of time in prison for what is – in itself – usually a relatively trivial offence (see paragraph 100 above). However, the applicant’s imprisonment is the consequence of his repeated violation of the criminal law in full knowledge of the consequences, through conduct which he knew full well not only goes against the standards of accepted public behaviour in any modern democratic society but also is liable to be alarming and morally and otherwise offensive to other, unwarned members of the public going about their ordinary business. Having regard to the considerations set out above and to the wide margin of appreciation, the Court finds that the reasons for the measures adopted by the police, the prosecuting authorities and the courts, and in particular those adopted in respect of his arrest in 2011, were “relevant and sufficient” and that the measures met a pressing social need in response to repeated anti-social conduct by the applicant. It cannot be said that the repressive measures taken in reaction to the particular, repeated form of expression chosen by the applicant to communicate his opinion on nudity were, even if considered cumulatively, disproportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued, namely the  <mask> and crime. In particular, Article 10 does not go so far as to enable individuals, even those sincerely convinced of the virtue of their own beliefs, to repeatedly impose their antisocial conduct on other, unwilling members of society and then to claim a disproportionate interference with the exercise of their freedom of expression when the State, in the performance of its duty to protect the public from public nuisances, enforces the law in respect of such deliberately repetitive antisocial conduct. Even though, cumulatively, the penalties imposed on the applicant undoubtedly did entail serious consequences for him, the Court cannot find in the circumstances of his case, having regard in particular to his own responsibility for his plight, that the public authorities in Scotland unjustifiably interfered with his exercise of freedom of expression. Accordingly, no violation of Article 10 of the Convention has been established.


44.  The Government did not contest that the applicant’s criminal conviction had interfered with his right to the enjoyment of his private and family life. They considered, however, that this interference had been justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8 as being necessary in a democratic society in the interest of the  <mask> and for the protection of morals.


16.  The Government firstly noted that the applicant had been allowed to attend the funeral. They agreed that there was an interference with his rights, which was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim for the  <mask> or crime. They stressed that there had been no positive criminological prognosis as the applicant was a habitual offender sentenced to a long term of imprisonment and he could have tried to escape if no precautions had been taken. Consequently, the interference was also “necessary in a democratic society”.


63.  The Government have not pointed to any concern regarding the applicant’s conduct in the seven years since his release from prison and rely solely on the seriousness of the offence to justify concerns as to his continued presence in the United Kingdom and his risk to the public (see paragraphs 41-42 and 44 above). The Court reiterates that the factors to be taken into consideration in cases involving deportation following a criminal offence are partially designed to evaluate the extent to which the applicant can be expected to cause disorder or to engage in criminal activities (see paragraph 57 above). In particular, the fact that a significant period of good conduct has elapsed following the commission of the offence necessarily has an impact on the assessment of the risk which the applicant poses to society (see Boultif, cited above, § 51; Maslov, cited above, § 90; and A.W. Khan, cited above, § 41). Accordingly, the Court considers the present factor to be of particular importance when assessing whether the seriousness of the offence in itself is sufficient to justify the applicant’s deportation for the  <mask> or crime.


20.  The Government accept that the residence prohibition interfered with the applicant's right to respect for his private and family life. However, the measure at issue was justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8, being in accordance with the law – the relevant provisions of the Aliens Act – and having pursued the legitimate aim of the  <mask> or crime. The Government further contend that measure was necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention and that the Austrian authorities have not overstepped their margin of appreciation.


29.  The Government admitted that the rejection of the applications for leave to attend the funerals constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. However, they asserted that it was an “inherent and unavoidable consequence ... of the detention on remand”. Furthermore, the interference was in accordance with the law as it was based on Articles 59 § 1 and 88 § 2 of the Code of Enforcement of Sentences. In addition, it was necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public safety and for the  <mask> or crime.


34.  The Government contested the allegation of a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. Reference was made to sections 7(1), 10(1) and 11(3) of the Aliens’ Domicile and Residence Act as well as to Article 16 § 3 of the ordinance implementing the Act, all of which had been duly published and which provided a sufficient legal basis for the interference. According to these provisions, the residence permit of the foreign spouse of a Swiss citizen would not be renewed if there was a ground for expulsion. The Swiss authorities were called upon to examine the proportionality of the measure. Given the offences which the applicant had committed in Switzerland, there could be no doubt that the refusal not to renew the residence permit was called for in the interests of public safety, for the  <mask> or crime and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


68.  The Government submitted that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life, but that that interference had been justified by at least two legitimate aims: the  <mask> or crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. According to the Government, the interference complained of had been proportionate in the light of the requirements set forth in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. Furthermore, the strip searches had been performed in the presence of two officers of the same sex with no third persons present. The applicant had not been treated in a humiliating way and nobody had used abusive or offensive language towards him.


28.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant complaints were only in respect of “field plots” and not in respect of her “home”. Moreover, she was no longer living in the area where she alleged she had had her “home”. In any event, the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with her rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, for the  <mask> and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


36.  The Government further submitted that the interference complained of had been justified in order to safeguard order and security within the penitentiary, which included preventing criminal offences and thwarting escape attempts. The interference thus pursued the legitimate aims of protecting public safety, the  <mask> or crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as set out in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


60.  The Government replied that the reason for the refusal to record the particulars of the US birth certificates in the French register of births, marriages and deaths was that this would have given effect to a surrogacy agreement, which was formally forbidden under a domestic public-policy provision and constituted a punishable offence if performed in France. French law accordingly reflected ethical and moral principles according to which the human body could not become a commercial instrument and the child be reduced to the object of a contract. In their submission, the “legitimate aims” of the interference were the  <mask> or crime, the protection of health and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. They added that the reason the public prosecutor’s office had requested that the particulars of the birth certificates of the third and fourth applicants be recorded was precisely to enable it to request subsequently that these entries be annulled. In doing so it had complied with Article 511 of the general circular on civil status of 11 May 1999, which prescribed automatic registration where public policy was concerned, particularly where it was necessary to annul a civil-status document concerning a French national that had been drawn up abroad in accordance with local procedures.


32.  The Government submitted that, to the extent that the drafting of the report was to be regarded as an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention, it had been in accordance with the domestic legislation in force at the material time. Furthermore, it had been necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety and the  <mask>.


91.  The Government further stated that the interference was necessary and proportionate for the legitimate purpose of the  <mask> or crime and/or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. It was of vital importance that law enforcement agencies took full advantage of available techniques of modern technology and forensic science in the prevention, investigation and detection of crime for the interests of society generally. They submitted that the retained material was of inestimable value in the fight against crime and terrorism and the detection of the guilty, and provided statistics in support of this view. They emphasised that the benefits to the criminal-justice system were enormous, not only permitting the detection of the guilty but also eliminating the innocent from inquiries and correcting and preventing miscarriages of justice.


40.  The Government submitted that if the Court concluded that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life and correspondence, which they disputed, then the alleged interference had been in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society for the protection of national security and the  <mask> or crime. Additionally, the alleged “legislative interference” had been justified in the interests of public safety and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as set forth in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


29. The Government submitted that the decision to deport the applicant was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, namely, the protection of health and morals and the  <mask> and crime. The Government relied on the Court’s jurisprudence, which had recognised the serious nature of drugs offences and found that they were capable of justifying “great firmness” on the part of the State (El Boujaïdi v. France, 26 September 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VI; Baghli v. France, no. 34374/97, ECHR 1999‑VIII; Dalia v. France, 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I).


54.  The Government acknowledged that the search of the applicant’s home interfered with his right to respect for his private life. They submitted that it was justifiable under the second paragraph of Article 8 of the Convention as being necessary in a democratic society for the  <mask> or crime. The Government further submitted that the search warrant was executed in compliance with the procedural requirements set out in Articles 227, 228 and 230 of the CCP.


76.  The Government pointed out that on a case-by-case basis the applicant had been provided with the opportunity to make extra phone calls to his daughter. Providing him with unrestricted access would have amounted to favouritism to the detriment of other inmates. Moreover, the applicant’s correspondence with his daughter was not restricted. Therefore the Government were of the opinion that the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life in this respect did not go beyond what was inherent in the pre-trial detention and was not disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, that is, the  <mask> and the protection of the rights of others.


46.  The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that his expulsion led to a separation from his wife and children. While the measure might have had a legitimate aim, namely the  <mask> and crime, it had not been necessary in a democratic society. In this respect he stressed that he – having lived for more than 27 years in Germany – had fully integrated into German society and that he did not have any remaining links to Turkey other than his nationality, also lacking sufficient knowledge of the Turkish language. He maintained that he had been employed during the major part of his adult life and that he had been working in Germany from January 2001 until his second deportation in August 2003. His children could not be expected to accompany him to Turkey, as they would not be able to follow school there because of their poor knowledge of the Turkish language.


56.  The Government acknowledged that the use of closed overalls amounted to an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life. The interference had a basis in national law, especially in Section 9d of the Act on Execution of Sentences and in other orders and rules in force at the relevant time, and it pursued the legitimate aims of public safety,  <mask> or crime and protection of health and rights and freedoms of others.


28.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with his rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, for the  <mask> and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


35.  The Government maintained that the imposition of special conditions relating to the applicant’s attendance at the funeral of his daughter did not deprive him of the effective possibility of attending the funeral. They submitted that the applicant could have attended the funeral in plain clothes. This issue was regulated by law and the Director of the Detention Centre could not have decided otherwise. The applicant and his sister must have misunderstood the Director. They further stressed that the applicant was young and very strong and therefore he would have had to wear handcuffs without, however, having to be restrained by joined shackles (“prowadnice”). They agreed that there was an interference with the applicant’s rights, which was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim for the  <mask> or crime. They were of the opinion that the applicant could have tried to escape if no precautions were taken during the funeral of his daughter.


27.  The applicant challenged the submission that the ban in question satisfied the condition laid down in paragraph 2 of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention of necessity in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the  <mask>, the protection of health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. With regard to the aim of “living together” in a democratic society, it was the opposite reasoning – that of openness and tolerance – which should take precedence in a pluralist democratic society as was evidenced by the tolerance that there had always been of dress codes rejecting the living together principle. At best, it could be regarded as a praiseworthy political objective, but one that could not be achieved by some stigmatising by-laws that were contrary to the Convention. In her submission, the factors justifying the ban on safety grounds had been advanced exclusively with regard to the full-face veil, were non-existent and the real aim being pursued by the by-laws was the prohibition of the full-face veil in public places. She argued, lastly, that the issue of dignity and gender equality was irrelevant to justification on grounds of “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” since the exercise of the freedom and wishes of women themselves was hindered.


27.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant was no longer living in the area where he allegedly had had his “home”. In any event, the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with his rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, for the  <mask> and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


689.  The Government contended that the search of the homes and offices of certain applicants, and the confiscation of personal items and files, was in accordance with the law, namely Article 11 of the Law on the State of Emergency No. 2935, Article 3 of Decree No. 430 for the state of emergency region and Articles 90 to 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They were necessary under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention in the interests of national security, public safety, for the  <mask> and crime, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others from terrorist attack. Furthermore, these matters did not raise any issue under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as any interference with the applicants' property was justified in the public interest, within the meaning of that provision. In this connection, the Government emphasised that the searches in the present case were part of an operation against the PKK, an illegal terrorist organisation responsible for thousands of atrocious murders and maimings, as well as serious economic and social losses.


116.  The Government submitted that the secret surveillance of the applicant’s telephone conversations was justified for the purpose of investigating the information received at the NSS suggesting that the organisation led by the applicant was carrying out activities aimed at overthrowing the government through unconstitutional means. The interference was in accordance with the law since the grounds and the procedure for it were prescribed by the CCP. It pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in the interests of national security and for the  <mask> and crime.


protection of the rights and freedoms of others

32.  The Government accept that there has been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life as guaranteed by Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. However, the measure was justified under Article 8 § 2, being in accordance with the law - Section 176 of the Civil Code - and having pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of health or morals and the  <mask>. The Government further contend that the measure was necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 and that the Austrian authorities have not overstepped their margin of appreciation.


91.  The Government further stated that the interference was necessary and proportionate for the legitimate purpose of the prevention of disorder or crime and/or the  <mask>. It was of vital importance that law enforcement agencies took full advantage of available techniques of modern technology and forensic science in the prevention, investigation and detection of crime for the interests of society generally. They submitted that the retained material was of inestimable value in the fight against crime and terrorism and the detection of the guilty, and provided statistics in support of this view. They emphasised that the benefits to the criminal-justice system were enormous, not only permitting the detection of the guilty but also eliminating the innocent from inquiries and correcting and preventing miscarriages of justice.


25.  The Government submitted that even if the expulsion order interferes with the applicant's family life, it discloses no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. Given the seriousness of the offence which the applicant committed in Denmark the measure of expulsion was called for in the interest of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, and for the  <mask>, and was necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. The Government drew attention to the fact that the applicant has very strong ties with his country of origin since he was already an adult when he left Iran and had his entire school education in Iran. He masters the local language, he served part of his compulsory military service and he has family there. In comparison, the applicant does not have strong ties with Denmark. At the time the expulsion order was made he had resided for only eight years in Denmark. Moreover, in the Government's view, there is no evidence to prove that the applicant's spouse, the children of the marriage, and the spouse's child of another relationship will not be able to accompany the applicant to Iran.


28.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with his rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, for the prevention of disorder and for the  <mask>.


40.  The Government submitted that if the Court concluded that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life and correspondence, which they disputed, then the alleged interference had been in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society for the protection of national security and the prevention of disorder or crime. Additionally, the alleged “legislative interference” had been justified in the interests of public safety and the  <mask>, as set forth in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


38.  The Government considered that this interference could be regarded as satisfying at least two of the legitimate aims provided for in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. The family-affairs judge had certainly been required to take account of the  <mask>, because the applicant’s alcoholism had been considered as part of the cause of the violence he had been inflicting on his wife at the time, and the judge had also had a duty to protect the health and morals of the children, in respect of whom a right of visiting and staying contact had been granted to their father.


27.  The applicant challenged the submission that the ban in question satisfied the condition laid down in paragraph 2 of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention of necessity in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the prevention of disorder, the protection of health or morals or the  <mask>. With regard to the aim of “living together” in a democratic society, it was the opposite reasoning – that of openness and tolerance – which should take precedence in a pluralist democratic society as was evidenced by the tolerance that there had always been of dress codes rejecting the living together principle. At best, it could be regarded as a praiseworthy political objective, but one that could not be achieved by some stigmatising by-laws that were contrary to the Convention. In her submission, the factors justifying the ban on safety grounds had been advanced exclusively with regard to the full-face veil, were non-existent and the real aim being pursued by the by-laws was the prohibition of the full-face veil in public places. She argued, lastly, that the issue of dignity and gender equality was irrelevant to justification on grounds of “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” since the exercise of the freedom and wishes of women themselves was hindered.


39.  The Government contended that any interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 § 1 was justified within the meaning of Article 8 § 2. The local authority’s decisions to procure a notice to quit from his wife and subsequently to commence possession proceedings were taken in accordance with the law and pursued a number of legitimate aims, namely (a) the protection of the rights of the authority as owner of the property with responsibility for the management of its social housing stock; (b) the  <mask> on the authority’s waiting list to be provided with housing out of the authority’s stock of homes to meet their needs; and (c) the promotion of the economic well‑being of the country. Furthermore, given that it was necessary in a democracy to have in place clear and certain rules governing property rights, and in view of the fact that under ordinary property law the authority had an absolute right to recover the property in question, the Government submitted that the interference which arose by virtue of the recognition and implementation of those rights by the courts was “necessary in a democratic society” and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.


30.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with his rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, for the prevention of disorder and for the  <mask>.


108.  The Government stated that the measures against the applicant had been lawful and necessary in a democratic society for the maintenance of ordre public and the  <mask>. Emphasising that the applicant had owed significant amounts in taxes and had refused to pay, contesting her debt, the Government considered that the measure against the applicant had been imposed on an individual basis, taking into account her behaviour. Also, the applicant had owned and managed a firm in Austria, not in Bulgaria, which allegedly meant that no security for payment had been available. The principle of proportionality had been respected.