91.  The applicants accepted that any informed assessment of whether an  <mask> with Article 8 rights was “necessary in a democratic society” would be accorded a margin of appreciation, the width of that margin depending on the context. However, they submitted that in the present case the margin should be narrow, because deprivation of sleep by exposure to excessive noise, like the infliction of inhuman or degrading treatment, was a matter which could and should be judged by similar standards in similar Contracting States.


26.  The Government agreed that there had been an  <mask> with the applicant’s right to respect for her private life. However, they argued that the interference was provided for by law, namely by Article 8 of Law No. 982 on access to information (see paragraph 20 above), had pursued a legitimate aim, and had been necessary in a democratic society. The Government stressed that, in their view, the present case very much resembled the case of M.S. v. Sweden (27 August 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑IV) and asked the Court to adopt a similar approach to it.


82.  The Government in their preliminary objections referred to the applicant’s right to request the court to examine his case in private. The Court observes that the domestic law does not provide that there should necessarily be a party’s request for an in camera hearing of the case; the trial court can order it of its own motion (paragraph 32 above). The law does, however, oblige the authorities to take all possible measures to protect the private life of the individuals from unnecessary  <mask> (paragraph 29 above).


35.  The Government maintained the position that there had been no  <mask> by a public authority. The police had merely indicated to Mrs S. a way of obtaining evidence against the applicant, and had provided technical assistance. At the decisive moments Mrs S. had acted of her own free will. She had not performed any actions that, in the context of a criminal investigation, were reserved for the police or the criminal justice authorities. There had been nothing to prevent her from using a cassette tape recorder to record her telephone conversations with the applicant.


37.  The Government claimed at the outset that the initial removal of L. from Ukraine was not wrongful for the purposes of the Hague Convention, given that the applicant herself had authorised L.’s travel for the period between 30 July 2010 and 28 February 2011. They next submitted that the  <mask> with the applicant’s family life on account of her son’s retention in Georgia had a legal basis, namely Article 13 § b of the Hague Convention. It had also served the legitimate aim of protecting the child’s best interests. Specifically, they maintained, in line with the reasoning of the first-instance court and the Supreme Court, that if returned to Ukraine L. would be exposed to psychological harm. The Government stressed that the domestic courts had relied on all the evidence adduced in the case, including two social welfare reports produced by the relevant authorities in respect of the child’s general situation and emotional state of mind, and evidence given by a psychologist concerning the boy’s psychological condition. In view of these reports they maintained that L.’s separation from his father would further aggravate his psychological trauma and hence was not in the child’s best interests.


33.  The Government, in their memorandum of 9 July 2003, submitted that the applicant had not been a victim of the alleged violation. They claimed that the applicant had lived in the contested flat without any legal title. She had not been the spouse of the tenant of the flat and she had had no legal entitlement to continuation of the tenancy after his death. Therefore, in the Government’s opinion, there was no  <mask> with her rights under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention.


54.  The Government emphasised that it was not in dispute that from 1980 until 1991 the applicant had worked as a driver in the KGB. Furthermore, the  <mask> with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life was in accordance with law and it was necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Government pointed out that for the transfer from a totalitarian regime to a democratic system, Estonia took various measures which, in aggregate, had to ensure the development and security of the democratic system. Criminal liability for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed under the totalitarian regime was established and an obligation to take an oath of conscience was introduced for those seeking the highest offices in the country. The Disclosure Act dealt with the persons who had not committed any crimes but had been employed by or collaborated with the intelligence or counterintelligence authorities of the States which had occupied Estonia. It was found that such persons had to come to terms with their past and not to try to forget, conceal or be silent about it. There was also a significant public interest in the publicity of information relating to the past; this had to guarantee transparency and clarity as well as overall internal peace in the society. Obtaining complete information about the members and agents of the security and intelligence authorities which had operated on the territory of Estonia was also important for the protection of independence and security of the Republic of Estonia. Estonia was lacking the relevant information; such information, including the lists of persons who had worked in the KGB, was in the hands of foreign States. There could be attempts to recruit former staff of the security authorities and make them perform security or intelligence tasks, or they could be subject to blackmailing. Such situation was dangerous and damaging for Estonia. The Government referred to recent cases where former employees or collaborators of the KGB had provided a foreign country with state secrets leading to their conviction of treason.


32.  The Government submitted that, to the extent that the drafting of the report was to be regarded as an  <mask> with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention, it had been in accordance with the domestic legislation in force at the material time. Furthermore, it had been necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety and the prevention of disorder.


56.  The Government acknowledged that the use of closed overalls amounted to an  <mask> with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life. The interference had a basis in national law, especially in Section 9d of the Act on Execution of Sentences and in other orders and rules in force at the relevant time, and it pursued the legitimate aims of public safety, prevention of disorder or crime and protection of health and rights and freedoms of others.


61.  The applicant contended that the decisions of the Romanian courts dealing with his request for the return of his child and the position of the Romanian Ministry throughout the proceedings, initiated at his request under the Hague Convention, constituted an  <mask> with his right to respect for his family life. The authorities made it impossible for him to have his child returned to the family’s common residence and to exercise his parental rights according to Hungarian law.


27.  The Government, by their own admission, had recognised that the applicant did not have any procedural status as regards her husband's complaint, as criminal proceedings had never been instituted. This, she argued, would have made it all the more difficult for her to have gained knowledge or possession of a copy of the contested police decision any earlier. Moreover, the Constitutional Court, when rejecting her complaint as out of time, had taken the date of the issuance of the police decision, namely 3 July 2000, as the key date. This ran counter to the provision in section 53 (3) of the Constitutional Court Act which stipulated that the time‑limit was to be counted from the date on which the plaintiff learned or could have learned about the contested measure or other  <mask> complained of.


69.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust available domestic remedies by not complaining about the privacy of his meeting with his lawyer and by complaining about the  <mask> with correspondence to the wrong court (the investigating judge, who did not have authority to deal with such matters) instead of the common courts. They added that the applicant’s correspondence had not been interfered with. The few letters which he had submitted as evidence, bearing the stamp of the prison authorities, had been sent without an envelope by the sender. They were addressed to the prison authorities and a copy was to be given to the applicant. As to the meeting of 30 July 2007, it had taken place in a special room where privacy had been ensured. Since the applicant had already been convicted by that time, the meeting could not have referred to any issues concerning detention pending trial, and thus Article 5 § 4 did not apply. This distinguishes the present case from the cases of Castravet v. Moldova (no. 23393/05, §§ 45-61, 13 March 2007); Istratii and Others v. Moldova (nos. 8721/05, 8705/05 and 8742/05, §§ 85-101, 27 March 2007); and Modarca v. Moldova (no. 14437/05, §§ 83-99, 10 May 2007), where the Court has found violations of Article 5 § 4.


70.  The Government contended, as they did at the admissibility stage, that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention as they had not sought redress by means of an action under Article 11 et seq. of the Civil Code as regards the alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In the Government's view, that remedy was effective within the meaning of the Court's case-law as it gave the applicants the opportunity to have the unjustified  <mask> with their personal rights stopped and also to obtain financial compensation for any non-pecuniary damage which they may have suffered. That remedy was thus also capable of remedying the negative consequences of the protracted length of the proceedings complained of.


23.  The Government submitted that it had not been confirmed that the impugned letter was indeed intercepted, and if so, whether it was intercepted and opened by the authorities. They referred to the fact that the notice on the envelope which indicated that the letter had been opened and read was not signed. Should the Court accept that this was indeed the case, the Government decline to take a stand as to whether this amounted to an  <mask> with the applicant’s right to respect for correspondence within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention.


75.  The Government stressed the important role of digital archives for the collective memory, as they helped to document contemporary history by preserving printed materials and information published only in digital form. In their view, imposing an ongoing obligation on the media to verify their digital archives in order to make reports anonymous would constitute excessive  <mask>. Contrary to the applicants’ claims, such an obligation would require considerable efforts on the part of the media in terms of both personnel and technical resources, especially since the quantity of digital archives was increasing constantly.


202.  The applicant alleged that the pastor who attempted to visit him was denied access in June and September 2009. This was confirmed by the pastor in a letter to the Court (see paragraph 45 above). The two respondent Governments have not made any submissions on this point. The Court sees no reason to doubt the description of the facts provided by the applicant and the pastor and accepts that there was  <mask> with the applicant’s right to freedom of religion.


16.  The applicants disagreed. They pointed out that they had lived as a family in Bulgaria and that there was no doubt that the first applicant’s expulsion represented an  <mask> with their right to family life. They argued that the measures against the first applicant had been arbitrary, since the allegations against him had remained unproven and had been unsupported by any evidence. Moreover, according to the applicants it was doubtful whether some of the actions alleged on the first applicant could indeed be seen as impinging upon the national security of Bulgaria. Lastly, the Supreme Administrative Court had applied a formalistic approach, failing to verify the executive’s allegations against the first applicant, and had failed to respond in a meaningful manner to his arguments related to his right to family life.


32.  The applicants argued that the approach taken by the domestic courts as regards the protection of their child’s personality was dangerous. In particular, they argued that if the perception by an individual of a potential  <mask> with his image and, a fortiori, his personality were to be a prerequisite for his judicial protection, then the dignity and integrity of certain categories of persons could be at risk.


69.   The Government further held that if the Court were to find that there had been an  <mask> with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life, it was evident that the expulsion orders against the first, second and fourth applicants were in accordance with law within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. They further argued that the regulation in the Aliens Act served the legitimate aim of protecting the economic well-being of Sweden and preventing disorder.


37.  The Government emphasised that even supposing that there had been  <mask>, the German legal system guaranteed sufficient protection. They observed that the present application did not concern the applicant’s right to seek an injunction against the advertisement (Unterlassungsansruch), which the Regional Court had recognised and which had therefore not been the subject of the impugned proceedings. The question was not whether but how the German courts should have intervened. On that point the Government took the view that the possibility provided for in German law of applying for an injunction provided adequate protection against advertising. The applicant had not in fact made any attempt to seek protection against the advertisement, but rather had hoped to derive a pecuniary advantage, even though Article 8 of the Convention did not provide for any such compensation.


143.  The applicant submitted that the ban imposed by the public authorities on wearing the Islamic headscarf clearly constituted  <mask> with her right to education, which had resulted in her being refused access to oncology examinations on 12 March 1998, prevented from enrolling with the university’s administrative department on 20 March 1998, and refused access to a lecture on neurology on 16 April 1998 and a written examination on public health on 10 June 1998.


30.  The applicant said that she defended the rights of the child. In France it was possible to act as if the mother did not exist, whereas in most countries in the world birth automatically created parental ties between the mother and the child she had brought into the world. By a legal fiction and because she had expressly sought confidentiality, the applicant's mother was deemed never to have given birth. The applicant described how difficult it was for her to live without knowing her original identity and complained not only of the arbitrary  <mask> in her life as an ordinary citizen caused by the system used to preserve confidentiality, but also of culpable failure on the part of the domestic authorities through their refusal to disclose the requested information even though it was available in the file.


823.  The Government maintained that there had been no  <mask> with the applicants’ rights under Article 8 of the Convention. The Government emphasised that any limitation of the applicants’ rights under Article 8 was related to their criminal conviction and was inherent in the very concept of criminal punishment. The Government described the geographical position of the Krasnokamensk colony (where the first applicant had been sent) and the Kharp colony (where the second applicant had been sent) and transport routes linking them to Moscow, where the applicants’ families lived. They concluded that there had been no interference with the applicants’ private lives on account of their placement in those particular penal colonies.


138.  The applicant maintained that her inclusion in the testing pool from 2008 onwards constituted serious and repeated  <mask> with her private life. In practice, the unannounced tests took place at her home or at her temporary lodgings when she was travelling, as this was the only fixed point where she could definitely be located. This requirement had had an impact on all her family, and therefore also amounted to interference with family life.


157.  The Government concluded, in view of the above, that the present case was different from Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria (no. 62540/00, 28 June 2007) where the Court had refused to apply the “reasonable likelihood” test because of the absence of any safeguards against unlawful interception in Bulgaria. Given that Russian law provided for adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse in the sphere of interception of communications, including available remedies, in the Government’s opinion the applicant could not claim an  <mask> as a result of the mere existence of legislation permitting secret surveillance. In the absence of a “reasonable likelihood” that his telephone communications had been intercepted, he could not claim to be a victim of the alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention.


33.  The Government considered that the  <mask> with the applicant companies' rights did not appear disproportionate, regard being had to the scale of the operations conducted simultaneously in order to prevent the disappearance or concealment of evidence whose production had been necessary for the prosecution of offences. They also relied on the margin of appreciation left to States in assessing the need for interference. It was accepted that the entitlement to interfere was more far-reaching where business premises or professional activities were concerned. In the instant case, the right of inspection had been exercised on juristic persons' business premises, which were not always at the official address of their registered office, and had not been accompanied by “intrusive” measures such as searches or coercion. In any event, the Government submitted that the applicant companies could not claim to have sustained any obvious damage as a result of the interference, as they had not alleged a violation of their right until many years after the impugned measures had been taken.


74.  The Government made the following observations on the merits of Ms Polyakova’s and Mr Yeliashvili’s applications. Article 81 of the CES provided for a convict to be transferred to another penal facility on health or safety grounds, for administrative reasons in the event of reorganisation or liquidation of the facility in which he or she had been detained, and “in other exceptional circumstances”. The CES did not provide for an exhaustive list of such exceptional circumstances, because it would be unfeasible to envision all possible life situations in which it could be necessary to transfer a convict to another facility. The Government concluded that an alleged  <mask> with the right to respect for private and/or family life could serve as grounds for a convict’s transfer to another facility. They did not provide any examples from the practice of the domestic courts to illustrate their submissions.


39.  The Government noted that the impugned  <mask> took place on two occasions between 24 November 2004 and 31 January 2005 when the applicant was in detention on remand. The Government referred to the amendments introduced to the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences on 24 July 2003, but did not point to a concrete basis in the domestic law that would justify such interference.


59.  The applicants further submitted that the Supreme Court had been unfair in finding that they had accepted the  <mask> with their rights by having chosen to settle in the building that had been built in 1952, after the launch of the plant’s industrial activities in 1939. They argued that the building had been constructed during Soviet times when any construction of that type fell within the exclusive competence of the State and, in any event, they had only learnt about the danger emanating from the plant after they had moved into the building.


124.  The Government, acknowledging that the measures complained of had constituted an  <mask> with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life, maintained that the restriction and subsequent prohibition of contact with his daughter had had a basis in national law, namely section 106 of the MFR Act, and that they had been aimed at protecting S.’s best interests. The Government pointed to the requirement to give due weight to the wishes of a child who was capable of understanding the meaning and implications of the proceedings, observing that S. had consistently refused to accept having contact with the applicant, a strength of feeling which, despite the intensive involvement of a number of specialists and two social work centres in the case, had only deepened with time. In this regard, the Government noted the findings of a number of psychologists, according to which S. had been evaluated as mature for her age and resolute in her thinking and expression. Two experts had assessed her rejection of the applicant as genuine and not the result of external manipulation; they had noted that the level of conflict between the applicant and S. was so severe that she could not have, at the time, re-established an emotional connection with her father. On the other hand, the applicant had showed no willingness to adjust his attitude and had considered contact to be his exclusive right and not also that of his daughter. Having regard to these considerations and the conclusions of the expert panels, the Government maintained that the restriction and subsequent prohibition of contact had been necessary and justified by relevant and sufficient reasons.


35.  The Government submitted that the applicant did not have the status of a victim and that there had been no  <mask> with his right to respect for his private life or his correspondence, because, as evident from the letter of the National Security Agency, he had not been subjected to secret surveillance. His supposition that he had been subjected to such surveillance, formed wrongly on the basis of random incidents, was erroneous. A perusal of his applications and requests showed that he had mistakenly interpreted certain facts. By law, the class of persons who could be subjected to surveillance was quite limited, as were the authorities which could request such surveillance. In that connection, it was not to be overlooked that in 2008‑09 the Special Surveillance Means Act 1997 and the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act 1988 had been amended, reinforcing the relevant safeguards. The law now provided for judicial authorisation of secret surveillance and for written notification of those concerned in cases of unlawful surveillance. Moreover, the 1988 Act provided for State liability in cases of unlawful surveillance.


33.  The Government submitted that the limitation on the number of prison visits had been based on section 18 of the Pre-Trial Detention Act and had been proportionate to the legitimate aim of the prevention of disorder and crime because the applicant had been held in custody on account of the gravity of the charges against him and his capacity for obstructing the establishment of the truth. Glass partitions were fitted in accordance with the Rules of Internal Order in Remand Prisons and served to prevent any objects from being passed between detainees and visitors and also to protect visitors from spontaneous dangerous acts on the part of detainees, as well as for the reasons of hygiene, to stifle the spread of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis. In the Government’s view, removal of partitions would require a greater number of supervising officers and a closer monitoring of detainees and visitors. This would probably reduce the privacy available to them and bring about a more serious  <mask> with their right to respect for family life.


37.  The applicant went on to argue that the above arguments also showed that there had been an  <mask> with his Article 8 rights. That interference had not complied with the requirements of the second paragraph of that provision, as interpreted by the Court in relation to secret surveillance. The applicant drew attention to the Court’s findings in Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev (cited above), and laid particular emphasis on the Court’s finding that under Bulgarian law it was not possible to obtain any information about the use of special means of surveillance. In the applicant’s view, that impossibility was in breach of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Constitutional Court, the Access to Public Information Act 2000, and the laws governing protection of personal data. The national courts’ rulings in the three cases brought by him had disregarded those provisions, thus doing away with an important safeguard against the unlawful use of secret surveillance. It was also necessary to point out that in Bulgaria there were no public reports on the overall operation of the system of secret surveillance, and that legal challenges aiming to obtain access to classified reports or statistical information about it had been unsuccessful. At the same time, the Bulgarian public had become aware, from scandals in the press, of a number of abuses of special means of surveillance on the part of the authorities.


57.  The Government submitted that there had been no  <mask> with the applicant’s rights under Article 8. They pointed out that after the child’s birth the applicant had decided not to assume responsibility for the burial of the body, even though he had been well aware of the hospital’s procedure in such cases. The applicant had thus waived his right to bury his stillborn child and to know details of where the body was laid to rest. The hospital had never promised the applicant or his wife that it would bury the child’s body in a particular manner, and no circumstances had existed which could have prompted the hospital to believe that the applicant or his wife would ever have wanted to visit the child’s grave. The applicant had thus tacitly accepted that the hospital take care of the child’s body in accordance with established procedure. The applicant and his wife had been left with sufficient time to think about whether they wished to take care of the body so they could not blame the hospital for their own failures, especially since no provision of the relevant domestic law obliged the hospital to take care of the child’s body in a manner the applicant considered appropriate. Lastly, the Government pointed out that the decisions of the domestic authorities in the applicant’s case had been based on the relevant domestic law and had not been unfair.


52. The applicants complained that the freeing order was a disproportionate  <mask> with their rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention because the domestic authorities failed to keep their assessment of their family situation under review and because the reasons given by the trial judge were neither relevant nor sufficient. The applicants also argued that, procedurally, it was improper for a freeing order to have been made in advance of an adoption order. If the freeing order had been refused, the applicants would have been able to participate at the adoption order hearing.


57.  The applicants stated that the main objective of the measure in question had been to impose the 72-hour rule on them. The authorities had thus twisted the real purpose of Article 76a of the Code of Civil Procedure in order to settle a conflict of opinion between parents and doctors, which could not be deemed to be in conformity with the law. Accordingly, the second applicant’s return to the hospital had been ordered unnecessarily and without the conditions of Article 76a having been met since he had been in good health and in no danger. Doctor D.’s note appeared too vague in that respect and could not be regarded as prima facie credible. The applicants argued that had there been an imminent danger in the present case, the doctor could have acted without the court’s authorisation. As that had not been the case, the court should have taken a critical view of the doctor’s observation in order to prevent unjustified and unnecessary  <mask> in their rights. In their submission, the measure of 26 October 2007 had been based on a general supposition and the court had not examined whether there was any actual risk to the life or health of the second applicant. Furthermore, neither the first applicant nor her partner had in any way been involved in the decision-making process.


23.  The applicant organisation contested that argument. It had relied in its appeal to the Federal Supreme Court on its right to freedom of expression and reiterated that any  <mask> with B.K.’s personality rights had been justified. Referring to its essential role as a public watchdog, the applicant organisation complained that the High Court’s decision had prevented it from fulfilling its task of informing the public according to its statutory purpose and its publicly acknowledged standing. In general, it had contended before the Federal Supreme Court that there had been a breach of its right to pursue its information activities and thus a violation of its right to freedom of expression.


62.  The Government further submitted that the  <mask> in issue had been necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 8 § 2. Citing the Court’s case-law (in particular, Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, and Odièvre, cited above), they observed that, in striking a fair balance between competing interests, the Court afforded States a certain margin of appreciation and that, in assessing whether or not they had overstepped that margin, it took particular care to ensure that the child’s best interests were preserved. In the instant case the Government submitted that, in such a delicate situation as the abandonment of a child by a mother who wished the birth to be registered anonymously, the French legislation attempted to square the various interests at stake: those of the child, the mother and the adoptive family.


18.  The Government contended that Article 8 was not applicable on account of a lack of significant  <mask> with the applicant’s private life. They submitted that the measure complained of had not significantly affected the development of the applicant’s social identity, or his ability to develop relationships with the outside world (contrast Bigaeva v. Greece (no. 26713/05, §23, 28 May 2009, and Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, § 48, ECHR 2004‑VIII). Furthermore, the Bar’s refusal to register the applicant as a lawyer came shortly after the entrance exam, and the applicant was free to choose between two different liberal professions, so the measure by no means banned him from becoming a lawyer.


52.  The Government accepted that the inspection and copying of the applicant’s materials had constituted “ <mask> by a public authority” with the applicant’s “private life”. However, they denied that there had been any reading or copying of the applicant’s “correspondence”. The photographs taken by the applicant and which had given rise to the copying procedure could not pass for such “correspondence” within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. The customs officers had not read any personal correspondence and had not copied any email, Facebook or Skype passwords. The applicant had failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence of any “interference” in that regard.


23.  The applicant did not contest the lawfulness of the  <mask> with his right to respect for his private life, but considered it unjustified. He first of all complained that the means used to achieve the aim of the measure were disproportionate. In his view, the provisions of Article 1 of the 1987 Decree on the aim of the measure were overly extensive in terms of scope and too vague in terms of definition. The authorities accordingly had excessive latitude, with sweeping, undifferentiated powers vis-à-vis the retention of data. He complained of a genuine risk of abuse on account of misconduct extending to other databases as well.


75.  The applicant emphasised that the Austrian authorities, when examining the decision to lift his asylum status and to expel him, in respect of a possible  <mask> with his right to respect for family life overlooked the fact that his wife and the two children, born in 2004 and 2007, had independent asylum status in Austria. In those asylum decisions, the Independent Asylum Panel explicitly stated that the applicant’s wife had a well-founded fear of independent persecution if she returned to the Russian Federation. It followed that the applicant’s wife and children could not reasonably be expected to follow the applicant to the Russian Federation to maintain family life; in fact, an expulsion of the applicant to the Russian Federation would render any effective family relations impossible.


32.  The Government submitted that the decision rendered by the Bucharest Court of Appeal did not constitute an  <mask> with the applicants’ right to respect for family life. In this connection, the Government pointed out that at the time of the second applicant’s removal, the first applicant had not had sole custody rights and the two spouses had not lived together since 23 January 2008, when a restraining order was issued against the first applicant. Furthermore, the Government pointed out that the first applicant had breached the restraining order.


36.  The applicant company, on the other hand, submitted that it had been forced to cooperate and that by its very nature a search constituted  <mask> with its right to inviolability of its private address (“home”). In the instant case the search had been disproportionate because it had had to be justified by aims other than ascertaining the identity of the author of the article, who had been readily identifiable. Even if such identification really had been the aim of the search, the latter had been disproportionate because the courts had had other means of obtaining this information, such as writing to the editor-in-chief for confirmation of the journalist’s authorship.


31.  The Government stressed that, since the applicant’s stay in Norway had been unlawful, the impugned expulsion did not constitute an  <mask> with her right to respect for her family life for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention. The question was rather whether the Norwegian authorities “were under a duty to allow the .., applicant to reside” in Norway, “thus enabling [her] to maintain and develop family life” in that country (see, Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, no. 50435/99, § 38, ECHR 2006‑I). In other words, the case should be regarded as “one involving an allegation of failure on the part of the respondent State to comply with a positive obligation” (ibid.).


48.  The applicant argued that the customs officials’ actions had amounted to “ <mask> by a public authority” with both his “private life” and his “correspondence” within the autonomous meanings arising from Article 8 of the Convention. That “interference” had been unlawful because there had been no criminal investigation in respect of him and no court order, in breach of Article 23 of the Constitution, Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and section 8 of the Operational-Search Activities Act of 1995 (see paragraphs 25, 40 and 41 above). The domestic courts had failed to make any substantive findings on the matter of legality and had carried out no proportionality assessment in respect of the impugned “interference”. It could not be reasonably accepted that the contested measures had been lawfully authorised by the Customs Code (namely Article 372) since that only concerned an “inspection” of “vehicles, cargo and goods” (see paragraph 28 above). The situation complained of had not fallen in any of the above categories. In particular, the electronic data on the applicant’s laptop was not “goods” within the ordinary meaning of that term under the Civil Code or the Customs Code.


70.  The applicants pointed out that unlike the child in R.K. and A.K., O.D. had serious health concerns from before birth which were unrelated to any child protection concerns. He therefore showed symptoms other than the unexplained fractures, such as an inability to gain weight. The Government's attempt to justify the  <mask> with their right to respect for their family life by reference to these pre-existing medical conditions was inappropriate.


75.  The applicant considered that F.’s interest did not justify the  <mask> with his right of access. In fact, the suspension of access exposed his child to danger for her health and well-being. The courts, relying on F.’s statements, had ignored findings of modern psychology according to which a child did not have an independent will. In his view, F.’s wishes had been manipulated in the course of the lengthy proceedings and a wrong image construed by her mother. Moreover, the delay in the proceedings and the failure to enforce the initial decisions ordering access had contributed to alienating F. from him.


90.  The applicants argued that it was well established from previous case-law that aircraft noise was capable of infringing the Article 8 rights of those sufficiently affected by it and that national authorities owed a positive duty to take steps to ensure the effective protection of these rights. Relying on earlier environmental cases and also child-care and other cases under Article 8, they submitted that the duty could be breached in circumstances where, having regard to the margin of appreciation, the Court considered that the State had struck the wrong substantive balance between the interest it pursued and the individual's effective enjoyment of the Article 8 right, or where there had been a procedural failing, such as the failure to disclose information to an individual affected by environmental nuisance or a failure to base a decision-making process on the relevant considerations or to give relevant and sufficient reasons for an  <mask> with a fundamental right.


88.  The applicant described in detail the relevant legal framework and on this basis alleged that the entirety of his mail whilst in detention, including that with his lawyers, had been monitored, not only before December 2000 and April 2006, but also after that. The legal basis for the  <mask> until April 2006 had been defective and had been set aside by the national courts. The ensuing legal framework had remained unclear and was thus insufficient for the purposes of the Convention. Furthermore, the interference had not been necessary in a democratic society, as correspondence with lawyers was as a rule privileged.


75.  The applicant contested the Government's assertion that the High Court had assessed the proportionality of the  <mask>. He also rejected their contention that he courted attention on 20 August 1995. He further disputed their questioning of his motivation by their reference to his voluntary media appearances in 1996: his image had already been published and broadcast without his consent and he was identified by those who knew him. He then correctly pursued any remedies available, which procedures were public, and he could not be criticised for speaking about his predicament to responsible media. He faced the classic dilemma of one whose privacy has been interfered with: seeking a remedy and defending one's position by speaking out inevitably led to further publicity.


73.  The Government have not submitted any evidence which would indicate either that there was no reason for Dr W. to consult a dermatologist earlier than she did, or that even if she had, Schamberg's disease could not have been diagnosed any earlier. The Court is therefore satisfied that while there were relevant and sufficient reasons for the authorities to suspect abuse at the time the second applicant was admitted to hospital, the delay in consulting a dermatologist extended the  <mask> with the applicants' right to respect for their family life and was not proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting the second applicant from harm.


106.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s right to correspondence had been restricted in accordance with Article 91 § 2 of the Penal Code. However, the scope of the right as guaranteed by this provision had not been violated. The Government averred that all the applicant’s letters to the law-enforcement agencies, the Ombudsman, bar associations, his counsel and the Court had been sent to the addressees. The Government enclosed extracts of postal registers kept at Lgov remand prison IZ-46/2, remand prison IZ-46/1, Kursk Region, and correctional colony no. 11, Khabarovsk Region, pertaining to the applicant’s correspondence. They also submitted that during his placement in remand prison IZ-46/1 the applicant had received a letter and two postal packets. The Government contended that there had been no  <mask> with the applicant’s correspondence.


44.  The applicants maintained that the first and second applicants had had a relationship since the spring of 2001 and had been married since 2 February 2003. On 20 September 2006 a child had been born from their union, the third applicant. In the event of the first applicant's being expelled to Nigeria it would not be possible for the second and third applicants to follow him to settle there. The expulsion of the father would lead to the family being split, which would have particularly adverse consequences for the wife and the child and would amount to a disproportionate  <mask> with the applicants' right to respect for private and family life.


34.  The Government maintained that the  <mask> had been in accordance with the law. They relied on the conclusions reached by the Senate of the Supreme Court to the effect that the MADEKKI was authorised to check the quality of health care not only in situations where it had received a complaint from a patient. The Senate was of the opinion that a provider of health care services, “with the aim of protecting public interests, is also entitled to request the assessment of the quality of medical care” in order that, should any irregularities be found, they might be eliminated and their recurrence with respect to other patients avoided in the future.


47.  The Government did not contest that there had been an  <mask> with the applicants’ right to respect for private life. They nevertheless submitted that the interference had been lawful and had pursued a legitimate aim. Notably, the contested interception of the applicants’ telephone conversations had been carried out in accordance with the Law on Operational Activities. Referring to the document provided by the Supreme Court (see paragraph 7 above), the Government contended that the interception of phone conversations had been duly authorised by a specially designated judge of the Supreme Court, as provided for by section 17 of the above law.


116.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article 11 of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The  <mask> with the applicant's rights was not prescribed by law and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


24.  The applicant pointed out that the disciplinary sanction was imposed on the basis of Article 18 of the 1946 decree. That provision had been criticised for being of general application and its constitutionality had even been disputed before the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, the applicant maintained, it did not qualify as a law within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 11 and the  <mask> had not therefore been “prescribed by law”. Furthermore, on the basis of the legislation in force and the case-law at the material time on the said Article 18, the applicant was entitled to believe that his membership of the Freemasons was not incompatible with the law.


88.  The applicant further pointed out that the data on the content of communication had been obtained without the Slovenian authorities’ involvement. The Slovenian authorities would have needed a court order for obtaining such data, but had avoided that otherwise necessary step by requesting the subscriber information on the basis of section 149b(3) of the CPA. As regards the letter, the applicant alleged that at the time when the Slovenian police had obtained the data connecting his IP address to his identity, the law regulating access to such data had not been clear (lex certa) and therefore the lawfulness required by the second paragraph of Article 8 had not been met. In particular, at the time of the  <mask> (August 2006), the domestic law provisions regarding this issue had been contradictory. The second paragraph of Article 37 of the Constitution required a court order for interference with the right to privacy of communication. The ECA provided that traffic data should be kept secret and that communication could be intercepted only on the basis of an order by a competent authority. In the domestic legal system that could only be a court order or, theoretically, a prosecution order. Anyhow, under section 107 it was possible only to “intercept” data and not to hand over certain retained data. Moreover, the providers were under an obligation to delete retained data pursuant to section 104 as soon as they no longer needed them for billing purposes. On the other hand, section 149b(1) and (3) of the CPA provided for different conditions of accessing data and it was unclear what the distinction in application between the two was. As a result of that uncertainty in the domestic legislation, one could not say that the legal protection against arbitrary interference by public authorities with the right to privacy was sufficient.


49.  The Government refrained from expressing their opinion on the admissibility and merits of the complaint under Article 8. They argued, however, that only two out of five letters had apparently been opened as only two letters had been stamped. As regards the remaining three, the Government submitted that the stamp “censored” cannot prove that there had been an  <mask> with the applicant’s right to respect for his correspondence in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.


52.  The Government considered that no  <mask> with the first applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions had occurred, in so far as Romanian law established a duty on the parents to provide for their underage children. Lastly, they recalled that the second applicant, through her legal guardian, had not requested the exequatur for the enforcement in Israel of the judgment of 18 September 2002.


110.  The applicant also maintained that the police units had not only occupied his estate but had also damaged it and that this  <mask> with his Convention rights had not been justified either. He argued that section 21 of the Law on Suppression of Terrorism was neither precise nor foreseeable, as, in particular, it was unclear whether the wording “other legally protected interests” referred to terrorists and any other individuals (see paragraph 100 above). The applicant further insisted that no active warfare had been conducted in the Nadterechny District, and therefore the damaging of his property had not been connected to the struggle against terrorism. He also stated that that the nature of the damage inflicted on his estate, as reflected in the evaluation reports, indicated that his estate had been wrecked as a result of irresponsible treatment by the police units who had occupied it rather than as a result of any pressing need. The applicant thus argued that the damaging of his property had not pursued any legitimate aim.


72.  The Government submitted that that there had been no  <mask> with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life. Although removed from his office, the applicant had not lost his job in the civil service, but had been transferred to another post. In their view, his reputation could not have been harmed by the decision on removal, or the subsequent judgements of the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court. Indeed, there was nothing to indicate that the applicant’s removal from office had any effect on his private life. Lastly, the Government emphasised that the applicant had held the post of Head of the State Administration Office for only a little more than two months, which was a relatively short period of time to build a professional reputation in a service of that kind.


84.  The Government insisted that the  <mask> with the applicant company’s rights had been “prescribed by law”. They referred to the domestic legislation and case-law summarised in paragraphs 32 to 36, 38 and 39 of the Chamber judgment, as well as the Court’s relevant case-law as summarised in the Chamber judgment. The Government also pointed out that there was no Estonian case-law on the basis of which Delfi – which encouraged the posting of comments on the articles selected and published by it – could have presumed that the owner of an Internet portal as a new media publication was not liable for the damage caused by comments posted on its articles, which formed an integral part of the news and which only Delfi could administer. Further, by the time the domestic judgments had been handed down in Delfi, it was more than clear that Internet media had a wide influence over the public and that, in order to protect the private life of others, liability rules had to apply to new media as well.


20.  The applicants submitted that they had victim status and that there had therefore been  <mask> with their rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. Even though they did not all possess licences to practise issued by the Ministry of Justice, they all represented applicants before the European Court of Human Rights. They were all members of the Lawyers for Human Rights organisation, which was considered by the Government as a subversive organisation acting against the interests of the State. The Lawyers for Human Rights organisation represented many persons who met the criteria for the application of the interception measures referred to by the Government both in domestic proceedings and in proceedings before the Court. The applicants gave the example of such persons as P. Popovici, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment, P. Stici and M. Ursu, who were accused of having killed the son of the Speaker of the Parliament, and C. Becciev and E. Duca, both accused of very serious crimes. They also referred to many persons who had disputes with the leaders of the ruling Communist Party as well as two persons who had brought proceedings against the Secret Services of Moldova. The applicants submitted that, even though not all the members of their organisation worked on serious cases, all members used the telephones of the organisation and therefore risked interception.


39.  The applicant was ordered to vacate the flat in question by the national courts under Croatian laws regulating ownership, which allow an owner to seek repossession of his or her property when the possessor has no legal grounds for possession. The Court, noting that its power to review compliance with domestic law is limited (see, among other authorities, Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 25 October 1989, Series A no. 163, p. 17, § 57), is thus satisfied that the national courts' decisions ordering the applicant's eviction were in accordance with domestic law and in particular the relevant legislation related to the disposal of the housing stock (see §§ 17-19). The  <mask> in question therefore pursued the legitimate aim of the economic well-being of the country.


83.  The Government accepted that there had been  <mask> with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention. However, they considered that such interference had been lawful and justified. In particular, the secret surveillance orders had been based on Article 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and had been issued and supervised by an investigating judge pursuant to reasoned and substantiated requests from the competent State Attorney’s Office, which the investigating judge had accepted as such. Moreover, such interference had pursued the legitimate aim of investigating and prosecuting the crime of currency counterfeiting and had been proportionate to the circumstances and the gravity of the offence at issue and the applicant’s criminal activity.


94.  The Government asked the Court to dismiss the claims in respect of pecuniary damage on the ground that they concerned an economic aspect of employment and not the right to  <mask> guaranteed by Article 8. With regard to non-pecuniary damage, the applicant’s allegation that he had been stigmatised and discriminated against was unfounded since, shortly after being dismissed, he had found another job. If the Court were to conclude that there had been a violation of the Convention, that finding would be sufficient just satisfaction.


157.  The applicant considered that the State had failed to provide him with access to information in violation of his rights under Article 8. The Court observes that, in addition to the primarily negative undertakings in Article 8 of the Convention, there may be positive obligations inherent in effective  <mask>. In determining whether or not such a positive obligation exists, it will have regard to the fair balance that has to be struck


189.  The Government referred several times in their written submissions to the fact that the applicant herself disclosed details of the caution to her prospective employer, and that the details she disclosed were merely confirmed by the Criminal Records Office. The Court observes that the posts for which the applicant applied were subject to vetting. In this context she was asked for details of her conviction and caution history and provided them as requested. The Court notes and agrees with the comments of Lords Hope and Neuberger in R (L), to the effect that the fact that disclosure follows upon a request by the data subject or with her consent is no answer to concerns regarding the compatibility of disclosure with Article 8 of the Convention. Individuals have no real choice if an employer in their chosen profession insists, and is entitled to do so, on disclosure: as Lord Hope noted, consent to a request for criminal record data is conditional on the right to  <mask> being respected (see paragraph 106 above). The applicant’s agreement to disclosure does not deprive her of the protection afforded by the Convention (see paragraph 110 above).


5.  The applicant himself did not invoke Article 8. It was this Court which invoked it. The Chamber legitimately mentions, in paragraph 18, that the applicant initially invoked other Articles (see § 4 above), but also that he “contended ... that his dismissal had ruined his career and reputation as well as his social and professional relationships”. The Chamber also mentions that “following the disjoinder ... of the present complaint from the initial application”, the applicant “also invoked Article 8 ... and explicitly argued that the termination of his mandate had violated his right to  <mask>, including the development of relationships of a professional nature” (ibid.). What the Chamber does not state is that the applicant “also invoked Article 8” following not only the “disjoinder of the present complaint from the initial application” but also the communication of this complaint to the respondent Government (and to the applicant) by the Court, not under the Articles initially invoked by the applicant, but under Article 8 – to be precise, under its first paragraph. The applicant “also invoked Article 8” because it had already been invoked by the Court.


38.  The Government explained that German law did not only provide for injunctions in the event of a violation of the right to  <mask>, but also granted pecuniary compensation in some cases. In the instant case the Federal Court of Justice had considered whether there were any reasons for granting the applicant a notional licence and, after weighing up the competing interests, had concluded that the interference had not been sufficiently serious to justify such action and that the company’s freedom of expression prevailed. The Federal Court of Justice had noted that even statements made for a commercial purpose were protected by freedom of expression as guaranteed under the Basic Law, that contributions with the purpose of entertainment could also help shape public opinion, that the interference had not been particularly serious because it had been neither offensive nor scornful, and that the advertisement had not led to any identification between the applicant and the product advertised.


30.  The applicant submitted that filming of him in the police station violated his right to  <mask>. He disputed that the custody area could be regarded as a public area or that the camera was running as a matter of routine. It had been run at a different speed to produce a sharper, clearer image of the applicant. He was only in the police station because he had been brought there by the police, and if anything persons in custody required greater protection than the public. He denied that he knew of the camera or that he was aware that he was being filmed. Even if he saw the camera, he could not have known that it was to be used unlawfully for identification purposes. Furthermore, the purpose of the recording was to obtain evidence to prosecute the applicant.


55.  The applicant asserted in particular that the Federal Court of Justice had dismissed his claim primarily because the company’s freedom of expression enjoyed a higher degree of legal protection than his right to  <mask>. This meant, in his submission, that it had failed to conduct a proper balancing exercise between the interests at stake. The Government submitted that the Federal Court had conducted such a balancing exercise when deciding whether there were any grounds for awarding the applicant the notional licence which he had sought.


20.  The Government contested the applicability of Article 8 in the present case. Referring to the case of Axel Springer AG v. Germany ([GC] no. 39954/08, 7 February 2012), they did not dispute that the right to protection of reputation fell within the notion of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8. However, they submitted that the applicability of Article 8 to such cases required that the attack on a person’s reputation had to attain a certain level of seriousness and be in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to  <mask>. They argued that in the present case, however, the attack on the applicant’s reputation had not fulfilled the “certain level of seriousness” requirement established in the Court’s case-law.


125.  The applicant considered that the duty should be triggered where any aspect of private life was engaged. It would therefore not be limited to the intended disclosure of intimate or sexual details of private life. As such, the duty would be a relatively broad one. Notwithstanding the concerns expressed by the Government and the interveners (see paragraphs 89, 94, 97 and 101 above) the Court considers that the concept of “private life” is sufficiently well understood for newspapers and reporters to be able to identify when a publication could infringe the right to  <mask>. Specific considerations would arise, for example in the context of photographs of crowds, but suitable provisions could be included in any law. The Court is further of the view that a satisfactory definition of those who would be subject to the requirement could be found. It would appear possible, for example, to provide for a duty which would apply to those within the purview of the Editors’ Code.


44.  The Government have argued that the publication at issue did not affect the second applicant’s rights under Article 8 seriously enough for that provision to be applicable. The Court reiterates, however, that in the article the second applicant had been named as a person holding public office and repeatedly breaking the law. It has already been accepted in the Convention organs’ case-law that a person’s right to protection of his or her reputation is encompassed by Article 8 as being part of the right to  <mask>. The Court therefore considered that a person’s reputation, even if that person was criticised in the context of a public debate, formed part of his or her personal identity and psychological integrity and therefore also fell within the scope of his or her “private life” (see Pfeifer v. Austria, no. 12556/03, § 35, 15 November 2007, with further references). The Court explained its approach to such cases in its judgment in A. v. Norway (no. 28070/06, § 64, 9 April 2009), holding that in order for Article 8 to come into play, the attack on personal honour and reputation must attain a certain level of gravity and in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life (see Mikolajová v. Slovakia, no. 4479/03, § 55, 18 January 2011; Roberts and Roberts v. the United Kingdom, (dec.), no. 38681/08, §§ 40-41, 5 July 2011). Having regard to the accusations in respect of the second applicant, the Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. Article 8 of the Convention thus applies. The Court also finds that the second applicant’s complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. The complaint must therefore be declared admissible.


23.  The applicant submitted, firstly, that even though the paternity proceedings had been aimed at the dissolution of existing family ties, the determination of his legal relations with his child undoubtedly concerned his private life (Rasmussen v. Denmark, judgment of 21 November 1984, Series A no. 87, p. 13, § 33). The State had a positive obligation under Article 8 to secure  <mask> even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves (Botta v. Italy, judgment of 24 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I, p. 422, § 33). In particular, the child had the right under Article 8 to establish a legal relationship with his natural father (Mikulić v. Croatia, no. 53176/99, §§ 64-66, ECHR 2002‑I) and the husband had the right to contest paternity in order to establish that he was not the biological father. In the applicant’s opinion, Article 8 guaranteed the right to dissolve a family tie which was not the result of a biological bond. He concluded on the basis of the Kroon judgment that biological and social reality should prevail over legal presumptions and the quest for legal certainty of relations, so that any presumption of paternity had to be effectively capable of being rebutted and not amount to a de facto rule (Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 27 October 1994, Series A no. 297‑C, § 40). The right to contest paternity was accepted in all Contracting States, including the Russian Federation. The applicant contended that the decisions of the domestic courts to declare his action disclaiming paternity time-barred constituted an interference with his right to respect for his private and family life.


39.  The Government explained that German law did not only provide for injunctions in the event of a violation of the right to  <mask>, but also granted pecuniary compensation in some cases. In the instant case the Federal Court of Justice had considered whether there were any reasons for granting the applicant a notional licence and, after weighing up the competing interests, had concluded that the interference had not been sufficiently serious to justify such action and that the company’s freedom of expression prevailed. The Federal Court of Justice had noted that even statements made for a commercial purpose were protected by freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Basic Law, that contributions with the purpose of entertainment could also help shape public opinion, that the interference had not been particularly serious because it had been neither offensive nor scornful, and that the advertisement had not led to any identification of the applicant with the product advertised.


76.  The Government accepted that, taken as a whole, the applicant’s examination pursuant to Schedule 7 of TACT gave rise to an interference with the right guaranteed to her under Article 8 of the Convention. In the present case, in addition to being stopped and questioned, the applicant and her luggage were searched. In Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, no. 4158/05, § 63, ECHR 2010 (extracts) the Court held that the use of “coercive powers” to require an individual to submit to a “detailed search of his person, his clothing and his personal belongings” amounted to a clear interference with the right to  <mask>. While the Court expressly recognised the potential distinction between the “stop and search powers” under section 44 of TACT and “the search to which passengers uncomplainingly submit at airports or at the entrance of a public building” (see Gillan and Quinton, cited above, § 64), Schedule 7 powers were clearly wider that the immigration powers to which travellers might reasonably expect to be subjected. In view both of this fact, and of the Government’s concession, the Court would accept that there was an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention.


55.  The applicant was still a minor when, on 9 August 2005, she applied to be reunited with her family in Denmark. She had reached the age of majority when the refusal to reinstate her residence permit became final on 19 January 2008, when leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused. The Court has accepted in a number of cases concerning young adults who had not yet founded a family of their own that their relationship with their parents and other close family members also constituted “family life”. Furthermore, Article 8 also protects the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world and can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual’s social identity, it must be accepted that the totality of social ties between settled migrants and the community in which they are living constitutes part of the concept of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8. Regardless of the existence or otherwise of a “family life”, the expulsion of a settled migrant therefore constitutes an interference with his or her right to  <mask>. It will depend on the circumstances of the particular case whether it is appropriate for the Court to focus on the “family life” rather than the “private life” aspect (Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, §§ 62-63, 23 June 2008.


105.  The Government inferred from the fact that the complaint fell to be examined from the standpoint of positive obligations that “it [was] unnecessary to examine whether the interference [had been] in accordance with the law”. The refusal of the applicants’ requests had pursued a legitimate aim as it had been guided by the French principle of the inalienability of civil status, according to which the decision to amend a birth certificate could not be a matter for the individual’s choice alone, even though that choice fell within the sphere of  <mask>. It was because the reliability and consistency of French civil-status records were at stake, and in the interests of the necessary structural role of sexual identity within the country’s social and legal arrangements, that a change of gender in civil-status documents could be permitted only when the irreversible nature of the gender reassignment process had been objectively established.


47.  The Government did not contest that there had been an interference with the applicants’ right to  <mask>. They nevertheless submitted that the interference had been lawful and had pursued a legitimate aim. Notably, the contested interception of the applicants’ telephone conversations had been carried out in accordance with the Law on Operational Activities. Referring to the document provided by the Supreme Court (see paragraph 7 above), the Government contended that the interception of phone conversations had been duly authorised by a specially designated judge of the Supreme Court, as provided for by section 17 of the above law.


26.  The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as they failed to institute civil proceedings before the ordinary judge in civil matters, against the HE Chamber (Eccelentissima Camera) of the Republic of San Marino (in charge of the patrimony of the State), challenging the seizure in their respect and requesting compensation for any resulting damage. They highlighted that in the San Marino domestic legal system, the ordinary judge in civil matters was the only judge having jurisdiction to assess disputes concerning the right to  <mask> and correspondence as well as that of property.


76.  The Government further argued that any positive obligation could be satisfied if a civil, administrative or disciplinary remedy was available. The prosecution of those allegedly responsible was not required under Article 8. Dr L. had received an administrative punishment from the MADEKKI for failing to ensure that the applicant had the AFP test. This administrative sanction was adequate to satisfy any positive obligation to ensure effective  <mask>.


33.  The applicant submitted in reply that the right to  <mask> also covered the right to one’s surname and forename (referring to, among other authorities, Von Hannover v. Germany, no. 59320/00, ECHR 2004‑VI; Mentzen v. Latvia (dec.), no. 71074/01, ECHR 2004‑XII; and Burghartz v. Switzerland, 22 February 1994, Series A no. 280‑B). Article 8 of the Convention was thus indisputably applicable to the present case.


29.  The Government maintained, on the contrary, that the dispute did not fall within the scope of the Convention. Article 8 of the Convention did not safeguard aspirations, yet to be fulfilled, to found a family. Refusing to grant a person prior administrative approval for a possible adoption was not a decision that interfered with a person's private life and so it did not fall within the scope of Article 8. While  <mask> should also comprise “to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings” (see Niemietz v. Germany, judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 251-B, p. 33-34, § 29), the right to adopt was not included as such among the rights guaranteed by the Convention (see Di Lazzaro v. Italy, no. 31924/96, Commission decision of 10 July 1997, Decisions and Reports (DR) 90-B, p. 134).


81.  The Government further submitted that instead of using the above effective remedy, Mr Zubkov and Mr Ippolitov (applications nos. 29431/05 and 7070/06) had chosen to raise the issue of covert surveillance in the criminal proceedings against them by contesting the admissibility of the audio and video recordings as evidence. The Government considered that contesting the admissibility of evidence in the framework of criminal proceedings could not be regarded as an effective remedy in respect of a complaint under Article 8. The aim of such a remedy was to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence from the list of evidence examined during the trial. It could therefore provide appropriate redress for a complaint under Article 6, but not for a complaint under Article 8. Indeed, the purpose of the criminal proceedings was to establish whether the defendant was innocent or guilty of the criminal charges levelled against him or her, rather than to attribute responsibility for the alleged violations of his or her right to  <mask>, home or correspondence. The remedy used by Mr Gorbunov (application no. 5402/07) had also been ineffective because he had appealed against the refusal to give him a copy of the judicial authorisation, rather than against the actions of the State officials who had intercepted his communications.


31.  The Government accepted that the right to respect for the honour and dignity of a deceased relative was an element of the right to  <mask> guaranteed by Article 8. They went on to say that the decisive factor was whether the domestic courts had struck a fair balance between the applicant’s right to respect for his private life under Article 8 and the journalist’s right to freedom of expression. They asserted, however, that, given that the article in question was presented in the form of the journalist’s interview with a film director and producer, it reflected and reported the film makers’ perception of certain events and a description of characters created by them. Furthermore, the article did not mention the name of the applicant’s father and made no allegations of his having collaborated with the Gestapo. Consequently, the Ukrainian courts had not breached the applicant’s rights under Article 8 as there was no dissemination of untruthful information.


60.  The applicants submitted that the retention of their fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles interfered with their right to  <mask> as they were crucially linked to their individual identity and concerned a type of personal information that they were entitled to keep within their control. They pointed out that the initial taking of such bioinformation had consistently been held to engage Article 8 and submitted that their retention was more controversial given the wealth of private information that became permanently available to others and thus came out of the control of the person concerned. They stressed, in particular, the social stigma and psychological implications provoked by such retention in the case of children, which made the interference with the right to private life all the more pressing in respect of the first applicant.


64.  The Government contested that claim and submitted that the refusal to authorise gender reassignment surgery on the ground that the statutory conditions were not satisfied could not be said to constitute interference with the exercise of the right to  <mask> within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. In addressing the issue whether the right of transgender persons to effective respect for their private life gave rise to a positive obligation for the State, regard had to be had to the “fair balance which [had] to be struck between the general interest and the interests of the individual.” In its judgments in Rees v. the United Kingdom (17 October 1986, Series A no. 106), and Cossey v. the United Kingdom (27 September 1990, Series A no. 184), the Court had taken into account, among other considerations, the fact that “[t]he requirement of striking a fair balance could not give rise to any direct obligation on the respondent State to alter the very basis of its system”, in order to conclude that no such obligation existed for the respondent State.


23.  The applicant relied on the judgments in Van Kück v. Germany (no. 35968/97, § 69, ECHR 2003‑VII), Pretty v. the United Kingdom (no. 2346/02, § 61, ECHR 2002‑III), Mikulić v. Croatia (no. 53176/99, § 54, ECHR 2002‑I), and Bensaid v. the United Kingdom (no. 44599/98, § 47, ECHR 2001‑I). He submitted that the right to know one’s parentage lay at the heart of the right to  <mask>.


49.  The applicants considered that the right to  <mask> did admittedly have to be upheld, but that it was not absolute, especially when it clashed with the right to freedom of expression and information, and the rights of the other people concerned by the publication. They criticised the domestic courts for failing to balance the Prince’s rights against other rights which, they submitted, were of equal value: the rights of the mother, which they considered to be no less legitimate in a democratic society; the child’s right to be officially recognised; and the magazine’s right to impart information of public interest which was no longer confidential at the date of publication.


63.  The Government accepted that fingerprints, DNA profiles and samples were “personal data” within the meaning of the Data Protection Act in the hands of those who can identify the individual. They considered, however, that the mere retention of fingerprints, DNA profiles and samples for the limited use permitted under section 64 of PACE did not fall within the ambit of the right to  <mask> under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. Unlike the initial taking of this data, their retention did not interfere with the physical and psychological integrity of the persons; nor did it breach their right to personal development, to establish and develop relationships with other human beings or the right to self-determination.


63.  The Government argue that in certain circumstances a particularly intrusive search may amount to an interference with an individual's Article 8 rights, as may a search which involves perusing an address book or diary or correspondence, but that a superficial search which does not involve the discovery of such items does not do so. The Court is unable to accept this view. Irrespective of whether in any particular case correspondence or diaries or other private documents are discovered and read or other intimate items are revealed in the search, the Court considers that the use of the coercive powers conferred by the legislation to require an individual to submit to a detailed search of his person, his clothing and his personal belongings amounts to a clear interference with the right to  <mask>. Although the search is undertaken in a public place, this does not mean that Article 8 is inapplicable. Indeed, in the Court's view, the public nature of the search may, in certain cases, compound the seriousness of the interference because of an element of humiliation and embarrassment. Items such as bags, wallets, notebooks and diaries may, moreover, contain personal information which the owner may feel uncomfortable about having exposed to the view of his companions or the wider public.


69.  The applicants further complained that the Federal Court of Justice had failed to recognise the specific dangers of the Internet era, as demonstrated by its reference to the Lebach judgment, delivered by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1973. In their submission, the report at issue in the Lebach case had undoubtedly reached a significant level of dissemination as it had been shown on one of the three public channels existing at the time. However, a television programme was forgotten after a certain period of time, whereas Internet search engines allowed information on a specific event to be obtained at any time free of charge, rapidly, from anywhere and on a continuous basis. Dissemination on the Internet therefore amounted to a lasting breach of the right to  <mask>.


118.  The Government argued that the alleged interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life was not attributable to the State. Unlike in similar cases decided by the Court (Sciacca v. Italy, no. 50774/99, ECHR 2005‑I, and Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, no. 13470/02, 23 October 2008), here the applicant’s private data had not been released to the press by State authorities. On the contrary, the Rīga Regional Court had explicitly prohibited the publication of such data, yet Rīgas Balss had published the applicant’s photo, his name and other data in defiance of that prohibition. In so far as the State’s positive obligation to adopt measures designed to secure  <mask> in the sphere of relations between private parties was concerned, the respondent Government submitted that Latvia had complied with this obligation for the following reasons.


51.  The applicants further submitted, with regard to the necessity of the impugned interference, that any exception to a fundamental freedom must be interpreted restrictively, and that exceptions to freedom of expression could not therefore be punished disproportionately. They alleged that the right to  <mask> was not absolute, and argued that the decisions by the domestic courts in the present case did not correspond to a pressing social need, in that the courts had not carried out a thorough balancing exercise in respect of the conflicting rights in issue or taken account of the criteria established in the Court’s case-law.


40.  The Government acknowledged that the collection and disclosure of the applicant’s financial information had constituted a relatively minor interference with his right to  <mask>. They pointed out that the information in question had consisted entirely of financial data and had not revealed any private or intimate details of the applicant’s life. The Government further submitted that only a fraction of the original information had been included in the case file, and that only a limited number of people, in essence the defence lawyers of the co‑accused, had had access to the case file. Moreover, the Regional Court had further restricted access to the bank account information to people who could provide reasons proving sufficient interest.


49.  The applicant pointed out that she was systematically and intentionally followed and filmed by professionals specifically trained for this purpose, which, coupled with the storage and selection of the video material, constituted a serious interference with her right to  <mask>. The impact of the surveillance on her private life was evident in that the insurance company used those images in order to significantly reduce the amount of benefits she was entitled to receive.


53.  The Government observed that detention entailed inherent limitations on private and family life. They did not contest that the second applicant’s inability to receive an MP3 player from J.G. had interfered with his right to  <mask> under Article 8 of the Convention. However, the Government was of the view that that interference had been in accordance with the law (see paragraphs 24 and 27 above) and had pursued the legitimate aim of motivating inmates to work, to communicate with their relatives and to enhance their social ties, as well as the aim of preventing the possession of items acquired by criminal means.


56.  The applicant asserted in particular that the Federal Court of Justice had dismissed his claim primarily because the company’s freedom of expression enjoyed a higher degree of legal protection than his right to  <mask>. This meant, in his submission, that it had failed to conduct a proper balancing exercise between the interests at stake. The Government submitted that the Federal Court had conducted such a balancing exercise when deciding whether there were any grounds for awarding the applicant the notional licence which he had sought.


31.  The Government accepted that the State's obligations under Article 8 could extend to the adoption of measures designed to secure  <mask> in the sphere of relations between individuals. They went on to say that what was decisive in weighing the applicant's right to the protection of his private life against the right to freedom of expression was whether and to what extent the statement at issue had made a contribution to a debate of general interest. The impugned statement in the letter to subscribers to Zur Zeit and the related previous article had to be seen in the context of an ongoing political discussion between persons of different ideological convictions.


38.  The Government submitted that a person who had committed offences or crimes should envisage various restrictions on his or her rights, including the right to  <mask>. After the applicant had committed a breach of public order, caused damage to the honour and dignity of the authorities and been escorted to the police station, his private life had been brought into the public domain. The video-recording had been made openly, the applicant had been aware that he was being filmed for television and had not objected to it. In fact, he had asked for the media to be brought to the police station. The Government further claimed that the applicant had been filmed in accordance with the law, with a view to securing evidence of his unlawful behaviour and establishing his identity as an offender. The Murman television company had acted lawfully, because under the relevant legislation it was permitted to seek and obtain information on any subject and to broadcast reliable information about the behaviour of a State official. The TV-21 and Blits television companies had merely rebroadcast the footage filmed by Murman. The Government contended that neither the sending of the videotape by the police chief to the public prosecutor’s office nor its circulation for screening to the members of the regional Duma had amounted to “dissemination of information”.


69.  The applicant argued that where choices related to the exercise of a right to  <mask> occurred in a legally regulated area, the State was obliged to provide adequate legal protection in the regulatory scheme put in place, notably by ensuring that the law was accessible and foreseeable, enabling individuals to regulate their conduct accordingly (citing Ternovszky, cited above, § 24). However, she claimed that she had not been provided with adequate legal protection. Neither the MADEKKI nor the national courts had investigated the case properly in order to establish the relevant facts and determine whether Dr L. had fulfilled her duties according to national law. Further, while Dr L. had been invited to give evidence before the Regional Court and on appeal, the applicant’s request to give evidence had been denied. She had therefore not been questioned on the crucial facts of the case by the courts or by the MADEKKI.


56.  The applicant maintained that the procedure to have the sex/gender marker in the civil status register changed was not regulated by law nor was there any established judicial practice in respect of the matter. The law did not differentiate between the rectification and alteration of entries in the public records. The case at issue confirmed that there was no “quick, transparent and accessible” legal gender recognition procedure in the respondent State. Furthermore, the authorities had arbitrarily created and imposed on him a surgery requirement. Relying on the case of A.P., Garçon and Nicot (cited above), the applicant submitted that the imposition of that requirement had been in violation of the right to  <mask> under Article 8. That case had set a precedent that transgender people should not be forced to choose between their right to bodily integrity and the right to have their gender identity legally recognised. Contrary to that principle, he had been required to undergo genital surgery even though (i)  there had not been a statutory basis and (ii)  it had not been justified.


68.  The applicant also contended that the criminal conviction had adversely affected his moral and psychological integrity and that he had suffered personally, socially, psychologically and economically. The Court observes that the protection of an individual’s moral and psychological integrity is an important aspect of Article 8 of the Convention. It notes, however, that there is no Convention case-law in which the Court has accepted that a criminal conviction in itself constitutes an interference with the convict’s right to  <mask>. The Court does not ignore that such a criminal conviction may entail personal, social, psychological and economic suffering for the convicted person. In the Court’s view, though, such repercussions may be foreseeable consequences of the commission of a criminal offence and can therefore not be relied on in order to complain that a criminal conviction in itself amounts to an interference with the right to respect for “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention.


1.  The applicant alleges that the prohibition under Italian law on donating embryos conceived through medically assisted reproduction to scientific research is incompatible with her right to  <mask>. The Court has ruled that her ability to exercise a conscious and considered choice regarding “the fate of her embryos” concerns an intimate aspect of her personal life and, accordingly, relates to her right to “self-determination” (see paragraph 159 of the present judgment). On this basis, it concludes that Article 8 of the Convention is applicable. It proceeds to find no violation because, inter alia, the ban was “necessary in a democratic society” to protect the rights and freedoms of others within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


23.  The applicant complained that the disclosure of information of a medical nature by the CFD to her employer constituted a violation of her right to  <mask> as provided in Article 8 of the Convention. She also alleged that the proceedings in which her action against the CFD had been examined had been unfair because the courts had adopted arbitrary decisions and failed to give reasons for them. Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, on which the applicant relied, read as follows:


18.  The applicant complained that he had been dismissed from his position of Vice-President, three years and ten months before the statutory date of his term’s expiry, by means of an ad hominem legislative measure. In the initial application of 20 June 2012 he invoked Articles 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention, as well as Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and contended, in particular, that his dismissal had ruined his career and reputation as well as his social and professional relationships and had also resulted in his unjustified deprivation of the peaceful enjoyment of the benefits that would have been due to him during his term of office. In a memorial summarising his arguments following the disjoinder, on 19 March 2014, of the present complaint from the initial application (see paragraph 1 above), the applicant also invoked Article 8 of the Convention and explicitly argued that the termination of his mandate had violated his right to  <mask>, including the development of relationships of a professional nature.


64.  The Government noted that the applicant had not denied his need for a mentor. It was inherent in the nature of the powers given to the mentor that he was not bound by the expressions of will of the ward but had to make all decisions in the interests of the ward. Otherwise such an appointment would be pointless. The partial dismissal of the applicant’s mentor would not be decisive for his right to  <mask> or family life. Therefore, no real interference with the applicant’s Article 8 rights had taken place.


22.  The applicant complained that the State had failed to secure her right to  <mask> as a result of the derisory sum of non-pecuniary damages awarded to her, even though the domestic courts had found that a serious violation of her privacy had been committed by the newspaper Lietuvos Rytas. She also argued that the national legislation did not provide an effective remedy from the point of view of Article 8 of the Convention as it limited the maximum amount of non-pecuniary damages for a breach of privacy by the mass media. The applicant relied on Articles 1, 8 and 13 of the Convention.


52.  The Government refuted the suggestion that, to comply with Article 8 § 2, the safeguards put in place in respect of the intercepted material had themselves to comply with the “in accordance with the law” criteria. In any event, the functions of the Commissioner and the Tribunal were embodied in statutory provisions that were sufficiently certain and accessible, and in assessing whether the “foreseeability” requirements of Article 8 § 2 had been met, it was legitimate to take into account the existence of general  <mask> such as these (the Government relied on Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimzhiev v. Bulgaria, no. 62540/00, §§ 77-94, 28 June 2007 and Christie v. the United Kingdom, no. 21482/93, Commission decision of 27 June 1994). Moreover, the 1985 Act provided that interception was criminal except where the Secretary of State had issued a warrant and sections 2 and 3(2) set out in very clear terms that, during the relevant period, any person in the United Kingdom who sent or received any form of telecommunication outside Britain could in principle have had it intercepted pursuant to such a warrant. The provisions of primary legislation were, therefore, sufficient to provide reasonable notice to individuals to the degree required in this particular context, and provided adequate protection against arbitrary interference. Article 8 § 2 did not require that the nature of the “arrangements” made by the Secretary of State under section 6 of the 1985 Act be set out in legislation (see Malone v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82, § 68), and for security reasons it had not been possible to reveal such information to the public, but the arrangements had been subject to review by the Commissioners, each of whom had found them to be satisfactory (see paragraph 33 above).


86.  The Government argue that  <mask> are provided by the right of an individual to challenge a stop and search by way of judicial review or an action in damages. But the limitations of both actions are clearly demonstrated by the present case. In particular, in the absence of any obligation on the part of the officer to show a reasonable suspicion, it is likely to be difficult if not impossible to prove that the power was improperly exercised.


191.  The applicant submitted that, although domestic law required prior judicial authorisation for interceptions, the authorisation procedure did not provide for sufficient  <mask>. Firstly, in urgent cases communications could be intercepted without judicial authorisation for up to forty-eight hours. Secondly, in contrast to the CCrP, the OSAA did not provide for any requirements concerning the content of the interception authorisation. In particular, it did not require that the interception subject be clearly specified in the authorisation by name, telephone number or address (see, by contrast, the United Kingdom’s and Bulgaria’s legislation reproduced in Kennedy, cited above, §§ 41 and 160, and Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev, cited above, § 13). Nor did domestic law require that the authorisation specify which communications, or types of communications, should be recorded in order to limit the law-enforcement authorities’ discretion to determine the scope of surveillance measures. Russian law did not establish any special rules for surveillance in sensitive situations, for example where the confidentiality of journalists’ sources was at stake, or where surveillance concerned privileged lawyer-client communications.


66.  The applicants submitted that the object of the legal certainty requirement running through the Convention was to give protection against arbitrary interference by the public authorities. It followed that “law” must be accessible, foreseeable and compatible with the rule of law, giving an adequate indication of the circumstances in which a power might be exercised and thereby enabling members of the public to regulate their conduct and foresee the consequences of their actions. The executive could not be granted an unfettered discretion; moreover, the scope of any discretion conferred on the executive had to be defined with such precision, appropriate to the subject matter, as to make clear the conditions in which a power might be exercised. In addition, there had to be legal  <mask>.


39.  The Government submitted that the search warrant had been in compliance with the second paragraph of Article 8 of the Convention. The decision to carry out a search had been based on a reasonable suspicion that the applicants might have committed tax evasion between 2002 and 2006. Moreover, the search warrant had been subjected to prior judicial control and contained reasons justifying its issuance. Accordingly, the applicants had enjoyed sufficient  <mask>.


71.  The Government submitted that the requirement of lawfulness under the Convention was met in the present case by a combination of the legislative provisions; the information given to individuals following a search under section 44; the precise instructions in the Code on how search powers were to be exercised; and the availability of court proceedings to challenge the use of those powers by the police in individual cases. Sections 44-45 of the 2000 Act were clear as to their effect. They gave notice to citizens that they might be required to submit to a stop and search and provided  <mask>, well in excess of provisions of national law that the Court or Commission in cases had held to be sufficiently foreseeable in the national security context (as in, for example, Brind v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 18714/91, 9 May 1994; Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963/99, §§ 117-129, 20 June 2002; Esbester v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 18601/91, 2 April 1993).


157.  The Government concluded, in view of the above, that the present case was different from Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria (no. 62540/00, 28 June 2007) where the Court had refused to apply the “reasonable likelihood” test because of the absence of any safeguards against unlawful interception in Bulgaria. Given that Russian law provided for adequate and sufficient  <mask> in the sphere of interception of communications, including available remedies, in the Government’s opinion the applicant could not claim an interference as a result of the mere existence of legislation permitting secret surveillance. In the absence of a “reasonable likelihood” that his telephone communications had been intercepted, he could not claim to be a victim of the alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention.