34.  The applicant argued that the measure in question had not been  <mask> and that it had not pursued any legitimate aim. Furthermore, it had not been proportionate because he had purchased the flat in question pursuant to the relevant laws and the contract of sale had been approved by the competent State Attorney’s Office. He could not move into the flat because an illegal occupier had already moved in beforehand. The findings of the national courts in his case had been contrary to the established practice of the Supreme Court.


80.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant's initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied her liberty in circumstances which did not follow a procedure  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities' failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


31.  The applicants submitted that by virtue of the law, couple S. obtained the right to continue occupying the premises by title of lease. Thus, the law imposed a unilateral relationship allowing the tenants to indefinitely reside in the applicants’ property. In their view, the law was neither precise nor foreseeable and no procedural safeguards were in place to ensure the balance of interests between those of the tenants and the applicants as owners. Their attempt to evict the tenants had been unsuccessful and no other remedy existed for them to recover possession of their premises. Similarly the rent having been imposed by law, the Rent Regulation Board could not alter such rent or increase it beyond the limits  <mask>.


83.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant's initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied her liberty in circumstances which did not follow a procedure  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities' failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


28.  The Government also submitted that the  <mask> with the applicant’s property rights had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the interests of others, notably people in need of housing. The Government further noted that the repossession of the flat by the municipality had not placed an excessive burden on the applicant. She had not been evicted and continued to reside in the flat. In addition, the applicant had owned other real estate which she had sold once the prosecutor had brought an action against her in respect of the flat. Lastly, the Government submitted that the applicant had been put on the waiting list of people in need of social housing. She had also been successful in the action against the person who had sold the flat to her.


39.  The applicants submitted that they had a statutory entitlement to receive compensation for the property destroyed during the counterterrorist operation. For administrative reasons, their duly lodged claims had not been processed for years. The administrative authorities and courts acknowledged that they were entitled to a decision on compensation, but refused to apply any other mechanism of compensation even though the processing of their claims had been blocked. Referring to the Court’s case‑law (Malysh and Others v. Russia, no. 30280/03, § 85, 11 February 2010, and Yuriy Lobanov v. Russia, no. 15578/03, § 54, 2 December 2010), the applicants alleged that there had been a disproportionate  <mask> with their right to property.


136.  The applicants in the present case disputed the aim of the  <mask> with their property rights by arguing that there were no forests on the land which had been given to them, or that those forests were not of national importance (see paragraph 121 above). In this connection, the Court reiterates that it is not its task to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as such errors may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see, among many other authorities, García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I, and Jantner v. Slovakia, no. 39050/97, § 32, 4 March 2003). In other words, the Court cannot question the assessment of the domestic authorities unless there is clear evidence of arbitrariness (see, among many other authorities, Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], no. 60654/00, § 89, ECHR 2007‑I). It therefore considers that in the present case it was primarily the role of the domestic courts to establish whether the applicants’ land included forests and whether those forests were of national importance, in accordance with domestic law. The Court cannot overlook the fact that in some of the applicants’ cases different public registers provided inconsistent information about whether their land was forested (see paragraphs 15, 23 and 67 above), or that the various authorities in charge of the protection of forests had not objected to the restoration of that land to the applicants (see paragraphs 16, 43 and 65 above). However, the domestic courts held that the presence of forests on the applicants’ land had been sufficiently established by the information provided by the State Forest Management Service (see paragraphs 23, 26 and 67 above). The courts also found that those forests were urban forests because the areas in which they were situated had become part of the Vilnius city municipality in 1996, and that they had been officially designated as forests of national importance in 2000 (see paragraphs 19, 26, 46 and 67 above). Having examined the domestic courts’ reasoning, the Court cannot regard their findings as arbitrary and sees no reason to substitute them with its own assessment.


53.  The Government contested the assertion that there had been an  <mask> with the applicant’s property rights within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, on the basis that the law at issue had already been in force when the applicant had inherited the property. The Court notes that the application of legislation affecting landlords’ rights over many years constitutes a continued interference for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Hutten‑Czapska [GC], no. 35014/97, § 210, ECHR 2006‑). Thus, in circumstances such as those of the present case, both the applicant’s mother and subsequently the applicant suffered interference with their property rights (see, mutatis mutandis, Amato Gauci, cited above, § 51). For the purposes of this case, however, the complaint is confined to the application of the 1979 amendments to the applicant’s rights over his property, from 3 November 2008 onwards.


80.  The applicants complained under Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about an  <mask> with their property rights, notably about not having been issued with a building permit for a shopping centre in the first set of proceedings. They also complained about: (a) the length of the administrative proceedings related to the completion of the urban plot of land (see paragraphs 17-23 above) and lack of an effective domestic remedy in that regard, and (b) the length of the enforcement proceedings pursuant to the Commercial Court’s judgment of 7 April 2006 (see paragraph 31-39 above), and lack of an effective domestic remedy in that regard.


51.  The Government submitted that the case did not disclose any  <mask> with the applicant’s property rights. They explained that the applicant had complained against the second-instance judgment, which had reversed that of the first-instance court passed in his favour. However, since he could not have acquired any right under the first-instance judgment that had not become final, the judgment of the second-instance court could not have interfered with his property rights.


68.  The Government claimed that the  <mask> with the applicant’s property rights had been lawful and justified. In particular, divesting the applicant of his right to the early-retirement pension had been provided for by law and was in the public interest. There was also a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the interference and the interests pursued. In the Polish social security system only retirement pensions granted under the general scheme were, in principle, permanent and irrevocable. All other benefits, based on conditions subject to change were subject to verification and possible revocation.


45.  The Government conceded that the applicant should be awarded the damage which he had incurred for loss of rent for the excessive length of the proceedings but contested the period calculated by the applicant. As regards the costs incurred in the domestic proceedings, the Government argued that the costs of the proceedings on the merits were not related to the alleged violations and that the costs incurred during the enforcement stage were due only for the period that was regarded as being a disproportionate  <mask> with the applicant’s right of property.


47.  The Government disputed that there had been any  <mask> with the negative aspect of the applicant’s right to freedom of association, as provided for in Article 11 of the Convention. It submitted that the applicant company was merely under the obligation to pay contributions to the Social Welfare Fund which were used to pay benefits to employers and employees in the building industry. The applicant company did not become, nor was it obliged to become, a member of the Social Welfare Fund on account of the declaration of general applicability of the VTV, nor of the employers’ associations which concluded the VTV. It was not threatened with sanctions or other disadvantages if it did not join. There was, therefore, no compulsion that the applicant company join an association.


47.  The applicant company further argued that the  <mask> in question had not been proportionate, as it had failed to strike a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and its own right to protection of its property rights. In particular, although it agreed with the Government that States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in implementing fiscal legislation, their discretion in that respect could not be considered to be limitless. In that connection it argued that it had had to bear an individual and excessive burden which upset the fair balance that had to be maintained between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the right of property. In particular, although the applicant company had complied with its VAT reporting obligations fully and in time, because of its supplier’s failure to discharge its VAT reporting obligations in the same manner (a) it had still been denied the right to deduct the input VAT of BGN 3,610 (EUR 1,851); (b) it had then been ordered to pay the VAT of BGN 3,610 (EUR 1,851) a second time, but this time to the State budget; (c) it had additionally been ordered to pay interest of BGN 200.24 (EUR 102) on that amount; (d) the VAT it had paid to its supplier had not been recognised as a tax-deductible expense and corporate income tax had then been charged on it; (e) it had incurred additional court fees and expenses in challenging the tax assessment; (f) it had thus been unduly and severely sanctioned for an infringement by the supplier, which had in fact discharged its VAT reporting obligations, but with a slight delay; and (g) general uncertainty had arisen in the fiscal affairs of the applicant company because all its VAT supplies could similarly be compromised by the failure of a supplier to discharge its VAT reporting obligations. Moreover, the applicant company would have no knowledge of this until such time as the tax authorities refused to recognise the right to deduct the input VAT relating to a particular transaction.


59.  The Government submitted that the making of the contested confiscation order did not amount to a disproportionate  <mask> with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. In particular, they submitted that the order was in accordance with the law; it represented a control of the use of property in accordance with a recognised public interest; and it was proportionate to the aim pursued.


34.  The applicant argued that the  <mask> with his property rights could not be justified under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The policies of the “TRNC” could not furnish a legitimate aim since the establishment of the “TRNC” was an illegitimate act. In any event, the need to re-house displaced Turkish Cypriots could not justify the complete negation of the applicant’s property rights. This conclusion was reinforced by the fact that much of the property taken from Greek Cypriots had been used to house settlers from mainland Turkey. The fact that property rights had been one of the subjects under discussion in the inter-communal talks could not justify the taking of property without compensation.


86.  The Government reiterated the criteria set out by the Court for a measure to be qualified as State  <mask> with the use of property, and stressed the State’s considerable margin of appreciation. Concerning the legality of the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996, they submitted that the task of interpreting and applying domestic law lay primarily with the national courts, although the Court could intervene in cases of manifest abuse, a description which did not apply to the applicant’s case. As to the legitimate aim of the measure, the Government asserted that the UAR’s decision had been designed to promote the general interest, having been intended to ensure that all the decisions concerning admission to and exclusion from the legal profession were made by the same competent body under the relevant legislation.


91.  The Government considered that the  <mask> complained of was lawful, pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate in the circumstances of the case. They submitted that the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions was not absolute and that certain restrictions were permissible. The restrictions in the present case were based on the general interest, namely protection of the natural environment. The Government further submitted that the property in question had been classified as “farmland” when the applicant bought it and that it had never been designated for construction purposes, even before the creation of the Wigry National Park and the adoption of the local development plan of 1994. Consequently, the Government invited the Court to find the present application manifestly ill‑founded.


40.  The Government noted that the judgment in the applicant's favour had been quashed after it had become final and enforceable. Accordingly, there was an  <mask> with the applicant's right to receive the funds awarded to him by that judgment. However, they maintained that the interference did not have any consequences for the applicant's right to receive those funds as it merely changed the procedure for recovering the indexed deposit. They further maintained that there are other people with deposits at the State Savings Bank who are also not entitled to retrieve their money. Therefore the interference with the applicant's rights was in accordance with the general interest and complied with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


55.  The Government accepted that there had been an  <mask> with the applicant’s property rights but they considered that such interference had been in accordance with the law and that it had pursued a legitimate aim of securing the payment of public contributions and penalties, namely the enforcement of a possible confiscation order against the applicant. The Government also argued that the seizure of the applicant’s real property had not disproportionately affected his rights and had not imposed an excessive individual burden on him.


124.  The applicant bank submitted that its licence was essential to the continuation of its activity and its withdrawal could accordingly be analysed as an  <mask> with its possessions. Under Bulgarian law, revocation of the licence automatically triggered winding-up proceedings and the eventual disappearance of the bank as a legal person, without there being any possibility of a reversal of the course of events. Admittedly, the BNB had to be vested with supervisory and enforcement powers, but the inability to seek judicial review of its decision to revoke the licence at any time was disproportionate and did not serve any legitimate public interest. The aim of avoiding harm to the banking system could be achieved through depriving any appeal of suspensive effect and appointing special administrators with immediate effect. Such an arrangement would have the advantage of making it easier to correct mistakes by the BNB. It would also facilitate the relatively seamless resumption of the affected bank’s activity.


31.  The applicant alleged that the compensation awarded to her was unfair and inadequate, as it was many times lower than the market value of the land when she lost her title to it. Therefore, she could not afford to acquire a new comparable plot of land, especially taking into account her advanced age and the fact that she had had a disability since 1994. The applicant also did not agree with the Government’s allegation that such  <mask> was necessary to protect the public interest.


37.  The applicants maintained their complaints. Mr Sergunin considered that he had bought the plot of land in good faith and, as a matter of law, Kazan City Council should have been prevented from recovering the said property from him. He further considered that the  <mask> had not pursued a legitimate aim and that the Government had failed to specify any such aim in their submissions. The lawfulness of the transactions with the plot of land had been subject to State control. Each time the property had changed hands the registration authorities had had an opportunity to verify the legitimacy of the transaction. The first transaction had taken place in 2009 and it had taken the authorities almost four years to detect the fraud committed by G. The Government had failed to furnish any explanation as to why the fraud had been discovered with such a delay. The mistakes and errors committed by the authorities had been corrected at the applicant’s expense placing an excessive burden on him.


130.  The Government further submitted that under the law the courts which had annulled the applicants’ property rights could not award them compensation at the same time, but the applicants had retained the right to have their property rights restored in one of the forms provided for by law (see paragraphs 92 and 93 above). They submitted that there was enough vacant land in the Vilnius Region and the adjacent areas which could be given to the applicants. At the same time, the Government stated that the Convention did not guarantee the right to restitution of property in natura (see Jasiūnienė v. Lithuania, no. 41510/98, §§ 40-41, 6 March 2003). They also argued that cooperation of applicants with the public authorities in the restitution process was of key importance when determining the proportionality of the  <mask> with their property rights. They submitted that the domestic authorities had been active in contacting the applicants and informing them about the process, but they were not entitled to take over the initiative from the applicants. The restitution could not be finalised until the applicants expressed their intentions as to their preferred form of restitution. While the Government acknowledged that the first and second applicants had cooperated with the authorities, they argued that the third and fourth applicants had failed to do so.


83.  The Government further argued that, if the Court found that the applicant had had possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the  <mask> with his possessions had been lawful, pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate. Regarding the lawfulness of the interference, the Government pointed out that Croatia had agreed to pay YPA military pensions under certain conditions, which were even more flexible than the conditions later set out in the Succession Agreement. Referring to the case-law in Carson and Others (cited above) the Government argued that the payment of pensions abroad had been possible only under a treaty or a reciprocal agreement, which were legitimate requirements of the domestic law within the State’s margin of appreciation. There had been no international treaty or reciprocal agreement with Serbia on payment of YPA military pensions abroad, and the applicant’s misinterpretation of the relevant law, notably the Social Insurance Agreement, had had no bearing in this respect. Since at the time Serbia was not paying pensions to YPA military pensioners living in Croatia, the Government saw no reason why Croatia should be paying such pensions in Serbia. In the Government’s view, the domestic authorities had sufficiently reasoned their decisions when dismissing the applicant’s request, and it appeared from his submissions to the Court that he had himself understood the whole situation. The Government also pointed out that the applicant had dual citizenship, Croatian and Serbian, and that it had been open to him to apply to the Serbian authorities for a pension. He had, however, failed to do so, and had then later returned to Croatia, following which the payment of his pension was resumed since the previously existing impediments had been removed. The Government also submitted that Annexe E of the Agreement on Succession Issues was not applicable to the applicant’s situation at the time, since it had come into force only later. In any event, under that Agreement the obligation to pay the applicant’s pension had been on Serbia. The Government also considered that ILO Convention 48 was not applicable to the applicant’s case, since it concerned contributory pension systems, and the applicant had not been a member of such a scheme in Croatia.


49.  The Government admitted that the national courts’ decision to order the applicant’s eviction had constituted an inference with his right to respect for his “home” under Article 8 of the Convention. They considered that such  <mask> had been lawful, pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible for social housing and that it had been proportionate to that aim. In particular, the applicant had only lived in the flat for about eleven months before his eviction, which in their opinion was insufficient to develop a long-lasting connection to it. He had moreover not asked that eviction be suspended.


108.  The Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, given that the forfeiture of their various assets and payment of the fine had not constituted a deprivation of property or some other type of  <mask> with the peaceful enjoyment thereof, but rather a voluntary decision to reimburse the damage caused to the State by the first applicant’s criminal activity and, as a lawful and entirely proportionate measure, had formed part of the relevant plea bargain.


89.  The Government accepted that there had been an  <mask> with the applicant company's property rights but maintained that it was necessary for an efficient fight against organised crime and was proportionate to that aim. The Government referred particularly to the opportunity the applicant company had at any time to make requests to the authorities and courts for the seizure to be terminated, and maintained that the length of the seizure had been necessitated by the complexity and extensiveness of the investigation.


46.  The Government argued that the execution of the judicial orders had pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring compliance with the applicant's contractual obligations. Thus it had been in the public interest. The execution had been carried out in accordance with the law then in force. In the circumstances of the case, the  <mask> had not been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.


25.  The Government stressed that the applicants had failed to adduce evidence of any pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the alleged violation. As regards the costs incurred in the domestic proceedings, the Government argued that the costs of the proceedings on the merits were not related to the alleged violations and that the costs incurred during the enforcement stage were due only for the period that was regarded as being a disproportionate  <mask> with the applicants' right of property.


23.  The applicant had not left the northern part of Cyprus of her own will, but had been forced to flee. Between 1974 and her death, there had been continuous  <mask> with her enjoyment of her right to property. Moreover, there had been a significant change in the treatment of Greek-Cypriot property in the northern part of the island with the enactment by the “TRNC” of Law No. 52 of 1995, which gave effect to Article 159 of the “TRNC” Constitution, a provision allowing expropriation.


64.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> had been in accordance with the substantive legal provisions applicable at the time of the interference, which had taken place on 15 May 2004, the date on which the BCEA order had been issued. On that date, the applicant did not have any right to the plot of land underneath the house. The house itself was not in the applicant’s private ownership at that time either. Therefore, the provisions of the 1982 Housing Code concerning dwellings belonging to the State and public housing funds, which were in force at the material time, were applicable in the present case. The Government argued that, on the other hand, “all the legal provisions referred to by the applicant [had come] into force after that date [15 May 2004] and therefore [could not] be applied in the present case”.


289.  The Government pointed out, first of all, that the relevant applicants had not adduced any documents proving their title to the houses, or any detailed description of the property allegedly lost by them. The Government argued that it was incumbent on the relevant applicants to have their property rights confirmed under domestic law by the competent national authorities. They further argued that the alleged  <mask> with the relevant applicants’ rights secured by Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been lawful, as the counter-terrorism operation in the Chechen Republic, in the context of which the strikes of 19 October 1999 had been executed, had been launched and carried out on the basis of Presidential Decrees nos. 2137, 2166 and 2155c of 30 November and 9 December 1994 and 23 September 1999 respectively, Governmental Decree no. 1360 of 9 December 1994, and the Suppression of Terrorism Act of 25 July 1998. In the Government’s submission, the aforementioned decrees, except for certain provisions, had been found compatible with the Russian Constitution by the Russian Constitutional Court. The Government insisted that all the aforementioned legal instruments had met the requirements of foreseeability and accessibility.


29.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> had been lawful and justified: it was in the public interest to protect the rights of other citizens to the disputed land, which had previously been assigned to the applicant by mistake. They also observed that the applicant had made no major investments in or improvements to the plot before it was taken away by the State. As a result, the interference was proportionate.


38.  The Government first submitted that the case did not disclose any  <mask> with the applicant's property rights. They argued that when a judgment could not be enforced because the enforcement had become time-barred, this did not constitute interference within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They explained that the right of a creditor to enforce his or her claim lapses upon the expiration of the statutory limitation period, which periods were determined by clear legal regulations, and their expiration did not depend on any actions or acts by the state authorities. Moreover, if the debtor fulfilled his or her obligation after the expiration of the limitation period, he or she could not claim back what had been given. Furthermore, the debtor must plead that the limitation period had expired, because the court could not take it into account of its own motion, but only if the debtor raised it. Therefore, the Government argued that the applicant's claim still existed, but, due to the expiration of the statutory limitation period in which he had failed to undertake necessary legal steps for its enforcement, he could no longer enforce his claim through the courts. For this reason, the Government argued that his claim had not been extinguished or limited and therefore there had been no deprivation or control of possessions by the state authorities.


69.  The Government argued that the applicant had no legitimate expectations to possess the licence given that he had failed to satisfy the applicable criteria. The licence included an authorisation to carry out a public service and could not amount to a possession. It had been revoked on the basis of valid law and this could thus not amount to an  <mask> with property. The Government further submitted that the applicant’s property had not in any way been affected by the contested measure. Although he could no longer work as a liquidator, he could exercise other professions.


18.  The applicant observed that he had produced prima facie evidence that in 1990 he had become the owner of a field with trees in the village of Ayios Epiktitos. Relying on the principles laid down by the Court in the case of Loizidou v. Turkey ((merits), 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI), he alleged that the  <mask> with his property rights had been unlawful, had not served a legitimate aim and had been in any event not a proportionate act maintaining a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the public interest.


29.  The Government admitted that there had been an  <mask> with the applicant company's property rights but maintained that it was necessary for the efficient fight against organised crime and was proportionate to that aim. The Government referred particularly to the possibility of the applicant company at any time to petition the authorities and courts, to terminate the seizure and maintained that the length of the seizure had been necessitated by the complexity and extensiveness of the investigation.


871.  The Government claimed, referring to Ferrazzini, cited above, that the recovery of unpaid company taxes from the first applicant cannot be analysed in terms of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 since it was not an “interference” with the applicant’s rights guaranteed by this provision. The Court considers, however, that the Government’s reading of Ferrazzini is misconceived. The question for the Court in the present case is not to define whether the “tax proceedings” are “civil proceedings” for the purposes of Article 6 § 1, but to define whether Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable to the court order recovering a certain amount of unpaid taxes from a taxpayer. Even if tax proceedings are not civil (cf. Yukos judgment, §§ 527 and 528), a pecuniary award made against a taxpayer within such proceedings may still constitute an “interference” with his possessions. As the Court held in Burden, cited above, “taxation is in principle an  <mask> with the right guaranteed by the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, since it deprives the person concerned of a possession, namely the amount of money which must be paid” (§ 59). The fact that the State enjoys a large margin of appreciation in this sphere does not affect that conclusion.


20.  The Government stated that the applicant’s complaint concerned neither an “existing possession” nor a “legitimate expectation”. They further maintained that there was no unjustified  <mask> with the applicant’s property rights, since the national courts had not recognised the applicant’s entitlement to a 20% increase in salary or annual bonuses, as the effect of the relevant legislative provision had been suspended. They further maintained that there was a conflict between two Acts - the Education Act and the State Budget Act - for the relevant year, but the provisions of the latter prevailed, being a lex specialis.


80.  The applicant company submitted that the  <mask> stemmed from the Supreme Court’s judgment of 23 January 2001, which had attached greater weight to the Bilateral Agreement of 1986 than to the chronologically earlier application for registration of the “Budweiser” mark. It was that judgment which had effectively deprived the applicant company of its right of property of the mark in circumstances which, in its submission, infringed the relevant international instruments and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for failure to comply with the priority rule. Had the Bilateral Agreement not been applied, the applicant company’s application for registration would necessarily have been accepted, since it satisfied all the other applicable statutory conditions.


38.  The applicant claimed that the  <mask> was not “in accordance with the law” because the search had been authorised by a deputy prosecutor rather than by a court, as the Constitution required. The Court observes that under the Russian Constitution, the right to respect for a person's home may be interfered with on the basis of a federal law or a judicial decision (see paragraph 26 above). The RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure – which had the status of federal law in the Russian legal system – vested the power to issue search warrants in investigators acting with the consent of a prosecutor (see paragraph 27 above). The Court is satisfied that that procedure was followed in the present case and that the interference was therefore “in accordance with the law”.


41.  The applicants’ right of property thus became precarious and defeasible over a long period of time (see Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 23 September 1982, § 60, Series A no. 52). There was therefore an  <mask> with the applicants’ right of property. It remains to be ascertained whether the interference in question breached Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


29.  The Government further contended that cooperation of applicants with the public authorities in the restitution process was of key importance when determining the proportionality of the  <mask> with their property rights. They submitted that the domestic authorities had been active in contacting the applicant and informing him about the restitution process, but were not entitled to take over the initiative from him. The restitution could not be finalised until the applicant expressed his intentions as to his preferred form of restitution. However, the applicant had failed to cooperate with the authorities and he had actively precluded the finalisation of the restitution process by refusing to choose any plots until his case was decided by the Court (see paragraphs 14-18 above).


24.  The Government admitted that the applicant had been deprived of his property, but argued that such deprivation was in compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They submitted that the land had been assigned and sold to the applicant in breach of “imperative legal norms” protecting the interests of former owners, so the relevant administrative decisions and purchase agreement had been annulled in accordance with the Civil Code. They also maintained that the  <mask> with the applicant’s property rights was justified as being “in the public interest”, namely in defence of the rights of former owners who had lost their title to land during the Soviet regime.


49.  The Government further maintained that the  <mask>, provided that the Court found that there was one, was in the public interest and was justified on ethical, health and sanitary and hygiene grounds. In particular, determination of the time of death, special diligence in cases of communicable diseases and special hygiene requirements concerning the transport and keeping of remains did not allow for a free market regime in this field. In addition, it would be unethical and not in the interest of the consumer to allow competition in this area of services. Control of these services by local authorities was therefore essential.


54.  The Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the  <mask> with the applicant's property rights was not disproportionate; therefore, there is no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


47.  The Government admitted that those measures constituted an  <mask> with the applicant's property rights. They maintained however that the interference was lawful. In particular, the Instruction had been validly adopted and was foreseeable in its application. In their opinion the Instruction could be viewed as “law” for the purpose of the Convention. Moreover, the application of progressive taxation to all types of the applicant's income was supported by the Presidential Decree and the Income Tax Decree.


30.  The Government firstly argued that the applicants had not had any “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention as they could only submit the photocopies of their share certificates instead of the originals of them and the shares in Demirbank had no monetary value at the time when it had been taken over by the Fund. They further maintained that the  <mask> by the public authorities in the operation of Demirbank had a legal basis in domestic law and pursued a legitimate aim, namely to maintain financial stability of the economic system and that regard must be had to all the circumstances of the cases as a whole. They therefore invited the Court to find no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


75.  The Government submitted that, in accordance with the general rules of international law, the provisions of the Convention and its Protocol did not bind a Contracting Party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the Convention and its Protocols with respect to that Party (see Kadiķis v. Latvia (dec.), no. 47634/99, judgment of 29 June 2000). The Court’s temporal jurisdiction was to be determined in relation to the facts constitutive of the alleged  <mask>. The subsequent alleged failure of remedies aimed at redressing that interference could not bring it within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction (see Bleĉiĉ v. Croatia, no. 59532/00, judgment of 8 March 2006, §77). The Convention did not impose on the Contracting States any specific obligation to provide redress for wrongs or damage caused prior to that date (see Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 38, ECHR 2004‑IX). Any other approach would undermine both the principle of non-retroactivity in the law of treaties and the fundamental distinction between violation and reparation that underlies the law of State responsibility.


58.  The Government claimed that the  <mask> with the applicant’s property rights had been lawful and justified. In particular, divesting the applicant of her right to the early-retirement pension had been provided for by law and was in the public interest. There was also a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the interference and the interests pursued. In the Polish social security system only retirement pensions granted under the general scheme, were, in principle, permanent and irrevocable. All other benefits based on conditions subject to change were subject to verification and possible revocation.


51.  The applicants alleged that it appeared from the contract signed by their father that the requisition, made in time of war, had been intended as a temporary measure and that the authorities would at some future stage hand back the keys. However, this had not happened. Moreover, the contract in issue had taken effect on 1 March 1941, when no requisition had yet existed. Interferences of short duration during war time would have been in the public interest; in the present case, however, there had been continued  <mask> which was prolonged even after the legislation on requisitions had been repealed. Furthermore, in 1979 the government had acquired properties belonging to the Church and to the British military while it was stationed in Malta. After this date, the use of the applicants’ property could not be considered legitimate and necessary.


140.  The applicants argued that it was not in doubt that there had been an  <mask> with their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. They were forcibly evicted from their homes and land by the security forces and restrictions were imposed by the authorities on their return to their village. As a result of continuous denial of access to the village they were effectively deprived of their revenue and forced to live in poor conditions in other regions of the country.


31.  The applicants reply that their claims were enforceable. In accordance with the constant case-law at the time, they had “a legitimate expectation” that the courts would have found in their favour if they had applied the provisions of the relevant ministerial decision as they were understood prior to the legislative  <mask>. They further maintain that Law no. 2233/1994 did not observe a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the objective to be achieved and the burden that was imposed on them.


38.  The Government further argued that entitling M.V. to use the applicant's flat had been a measure to control the use of property. The resultant  <mask> had been based on law, namely section 5 of the Takeover Act and, later on, the Termination Act and the 2002 Amendments. Moreover, the impugned measure had been in accordance with the general interest as it had pursued a legitimate aim. The aim of these statutes and the ensuing measure had been: (a) to protect from deterioration and devastation the property which had been abandoned by its owners, (b) to enable the persons whose homes had been destroyed in the war to solve temporarily their housing needs, (c) to secure repossession of property of persons who had left Croatia but were subsequently returning, and, at the same time, (d) to protect those refugees and displaced persons who had been placed in the abandoned houses and flats.


26.  The Government considered that the courts’ refusal to declare null and void the sale to a third party had not represented an  <mask> with the applicant’s right. Were the Court to hold that there had been interference, the Government submitted that it had been provided for by law and proportionate to its aim. The sale to the third party was legally performed, in accordance with Law no. 112/1995 and with his valid title to property.


28.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant complaints were only in respect of “field plots” and not in respect of her “home”. Moreover, she was no longer living in the area where she alleged she had had her “home”. In any event, the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged  <mask> with her rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, for the prevention of disorder and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


37.  The Government contested the period calculated by the applicants. As regards the costs incurred in the domestic proceedings, the Government argued that the costs of the proceedings on the merits were not related to the alleged violations and that the costs incurred during the enforcement stage were due only for the period that was regarded as being a disproportionate  <mask> with the applicants’ right of property.


70.  The Government claimed that the  <mask> with the applicant’s property rights had been lawful and justified. In particular, divesting the applicant of her right to the early-retirement pension had been provided for by law and was in the public interest. There was also a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the interference and the interests pursued. In the Polish social security system only retirement pensions granted under the general scheme, were, in principle, permanent and irrevocable. All other benefits based on conditions subject to change were subject to verification and possible revocation.


44.  The Government acknowledged that the repossession of the first applicant’s flat by the City of Moscow and the ensuing eviction had constituted an  <mask> with her property rights. However, they considered that such an interference had been “in accordance with the law” and that it had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the interests of Ol., a vulnerable person suffering from a psychiatric disorder. The Government conceded that the first applicant had sustained a certain financial loss as a result of the repossession of the flat by the City of Moscow. However, her losses had been caused by the fraudulent acts of other individuals and she could recover the damage by bringing a civil action for damages against the person(s) who had sold the flat to her. In the Government’s opinion, the loss of the real property in such circumstances did not amount to a disproportionate burden for the first applicant, given that she and her daughters had not been evicted and continued to reside in the flat. Should she consider herself in need of social housing, it remained open to her to lodge the relevant application with the authorities.


50.  The applicant considered that the  <mask> with his property rights had not been in accordance with the applicable laws. In his view, the City of Moscow had not had standing, under Article 302 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, to reclaim the flat from him given that he had bought it in good faith. The City of Moscow had decided of its own will to cede ownership of the flat and to transfer it to K. It had verified and authorised all the transactions in respect of the flat. The applicant considered that his situation bore close resemblance to the one examined by the Court in the case of Gladysheva (cited above, §§ 77-83). In particular, he claimed that the loss of his flat had amounted to a disproportionate interference with his rights, as set out in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The authorities had placed an excessive burden on him. Even though he had acquired the property in good faith, they had failed to ensure a fair balance between their decision to reclaim the property from him, and his own interests. He further argued that the State bore responsibility for the fraudulent transactions in respect of the flat he had later purchased. It had been incumbent on them to verify the compliance of those transactions with the applicable laws. However, the authorities had failed to do so in a timely and diligent manner and had managed to recover the property from him only by flagrantly disregarding his interests. Lastly, the applicant submitted that he had been deprived of his property without compensation.


97.  The Government questioned whether there could have been an  <mask> with the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions in a situation where the State had in no way restricted the owners’ acquired rights, but, on the contrary, the owners themselves had entirely voluntarily entered into the existing tenancy relationships as the original owner-landlord with full knowledge of the regulations on tenancy agreements as valid at that time. In the Government’s opinion, the new owners had thus, in a way, waived their right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions in so far as their ownership rights had been restricted at the time when they had voluntarily acquired them. Nor could the owners have any specific legitimate expectation that in the future the restriction of their ownership rights would be abolished as regards rent control.


142.  The Government relied on sections 13 and 21 of the Law on Suppression of Terrorism and the presidential decree of 23 September 1999 as the basis for the  <mask> in question. As regards section 13 of the Law on Suppression of Terrorism, the Court accepts the applicant's argument that the said provision provided grounds for State agents' access to private housing or other premises during the immediate pursuit of a suspect rather than authorising occupation of such housing or premises even for a short time. In the Court's view, this legal provision clearly could not be regarded as the basis for the interference at issue.


21.  The Government submitted that the authorities had made three attempts to enforce the judgment of 18 March 2002. The delay in enforcement had been due to objective reasons, namely the difficulty in identifying an equivalent land, as well as the fluctuant conduct of the applicant, who requested only in 2006 compensation with land in the neighbouring plot. They also argued that there had been no  <mask> with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions, since the authorities had offered her different lands in compensation. Were the Court to hold that there had been interference based on delay in enforcement of the judgment of 18 March 2002, the Government submitted that the alleged interference had been justified and proportionate.


76.   The Government further asked the Court not to take cognisance of the allegations of discrimination in so far as they had not been raised before the domestic courts. In conclusion they considered that the  <mask> had been necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest, namely that of an environmental nature and, in the circumstances of the present case, it had not imposed an excessive individual burden.


28.  The Government stressed that the applicant had failed to adduce evidence of any pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the alleged violation. As regards the costs incurred in the domestic proceedings, the Government argued that the costs of the proceedings on the merits were not related to the alleged violations and that the costs incurred during the enforcement stage were due only for the period that was regarded as being a disproportionate  <mask> with the applicant's right of property.


51.  The Government further submitted that, should the Court find that there had been an  <mask> with the applicants’ peaceful enjoyment of their property, that interference was in line with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The cancellation of the property restoration and the ordering of restitution by payment of monetary equivalent were in accordance with domestic law, and they were applied in order to protect the public interest – to ensure that title to land was not restored to persons who did not have a right to have land restored to them.


24.  The Government admitted that the applicant had been deprived of her property, but argued that such deprivation was in compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They submitted that the land had been assigned and sold to the applicant in breach of “imperative legal norms” protecting the interests of former owners, as found by the Constitutional Court, so the relevant administrative decision and purchase agreement had been annulled in accordance with the Civil Code. They also maintained that the  <mask> with the applicant’s property rights was justified as being “in the public interest”, namely in defence of the rights of former owners who had lost their title to land during the Soviet regime.


94.  The Government submitted that the present case was to be distinguished from those previously examined by the Court in connection with the question of “legislative validations”, and particularly from the cases of Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis and Zielinski and Pradal & Gonzalez and Others, cited above. The law complained of was different in nature and could not be classified as “validating” legislation nor be compared to those previously criticised by the Court. The object of the Law of 4 March 2002 had not been to frustrate actions going through the courts but rather, following the debate on the Perruche judgment, to clarify liability rules which were causing difficulties. Intervening independently of any particular dispute, in a field which was appropriate for legislative intervention, and without interfering either in pre-existing contractual relations or with the proper administration of justice, Parliament had enacted a law which was not really retrospective but essentially interpretative. Moreover, the State was not in any way a party in the dispute which had given rise to the present case, nor was it defending its own interests. It followed that the legislature’s intervention did not amount to  <mask> and had not been intended to influence the outcome of the dispute. Furthermore, even if it were accepted that there had been such interference, it was justified since the Law of 4 March 2002 pursued several legitimate objectives, to which the Conseil d’Etat had drawn attention in its opinion of 6 December 2002 (set out in paragraph 62 above). Lastly, the Government repeated their argument that there was a “reasonable relationship of proportionality” between the objective pursued by the legislature and the means it had employed. It emphasised the level of assistance provided by way of national solidarity, referring not only to the measures already taken domestically but also to those planned for the future.


33.  The applicant further challenged the Government’s assertion that the  <mask> with his property rights had pursued a legitimate aim. He argued that, following recognition of the State’s title in 2005, the flat had remained unoccupied until 2011. The authorities had failed to register their title to the flat and to assign it to anyone in need of social housing.


27.  The applicants argued that the policies of the “TRNC” could not furnish a legitimate aim since the establishment of the “TRNC” was an illegitimate act that had been condemned by the UN Security Council. For the same reason, the  <mask> could not be found to have been in accordance with the law and the general principles of international law. Nor had it been proportionate. The need to rehouse displaced Turkish-Cypriots could not justify the complete negation of their property rights.


58.  The Government first submitted that there had been no  <mask> with the applicant's right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. The plot bought by the applicant had originally been designated for agricultural purposes. Even if there had been no public investment planned for his plot, the applicant would not automatically have had the right to use it for housing construction, or to demand its designation for such purposes (Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden, no. 18/1987/141/195, 25 October 1989, § 60; Matti and Marianne Hiltunen against Finland (dec.), no. 30337/96, 28 September 1999). In 1991, when the applicant had acquired ownership of the land, the planned course of the new ring-road had already been known.


69.  The Government submitted that there had not been any  <mask> with the applicants’ peaceful enjoyment of possessions for which the Government could be held responsible under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They further submitted that “although it took some time until the compensation was paid to the applicants, their rights were safeguarded by the civil law and they have already obtained redress at the domestic level for any negative consequences”. The Government did not dispute that the payment of the compensation had been delayed. However, in their view it had not led to increased financial loss for the applicants.


51.  The Government considered that the  <mask> with the applicant’s property rights had been “in accordance with the law”. In their view, the flat had left the City’s possession against its will and the City had the right to reclaim the flat even from a bona fide purchaser. The Government also considered that the interference with the applicant’s property rights had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the interests of others, notably persons in need of housing. The transfer of the flat to the State should not be viewed as having been carried out in the State’s interests only. The City of Moscow was responsible for providing affordable housing to people on low incomes. Accordingly, the City had reclaimed the flat in the interests of those people. Lastly, the Government argued that the interference with the applicant’s right could not be considered disproportionate given that he had been allowed to use the flat and to obtain title to it through the privatisation scheme.


59.  The Government claimed that the  <mask> with the applicant’s property rights had been lawful and justified. In particular, divesting the applicant of his right to the early‑retirement pension had been provided for by law and was in the public interest. There was also a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the interference and the interests pursued. In the Polish social security system only retirement pensions granted under the general scheme, were, in principle, permanent and irrevocable. All other benefits based on conditions subject to change were subject to verification and possible revocation.


37.  The Government did not dispute that the apartment had been the applicant’s home and that the amount of damages awarded to him had been below the market price of comparable apartments at the time when that award had been made. They acknowledged that the applicant’s eviction from his home had constituted an  <mask> with his rights, but argued that that interference had complied with the requirements of the Convention – in particular, that the applicant had not had to bear an individual and excessive burden.


115.  The applicant submitted that he had successfully farmed the land. The prosecutor’s action and the outcome of the ensuing proceedings had interfered with his peaceful enjoyment of his land. The farmers had never presented any claims. The prosecutor had failed to submit how the land possession was to be organized and whether Luch Farm would retain its possession of the land. The domestic courts had not determined this issue either. In those circumstances, the aim of the prosecutor’s suit was simply to take away the land possessed by Luch Farm, without any intention of restoring state and public interests. It had not been legitimate and proportionate and it had imposed an excessive burden on Luch Farm. The  <mask> had destroyed Luch Farm and the quality of the land, which had not been farmed. The domestic courts had failed to find a fair balance between the genuine public interest and the private interests of Luch Farm. An excessive individual burden had been imposed on the applicant as a result of the uncertainty concerning the legal status of the possession of the plot granted to Luch Farm, because a permanent threat of expropriation by the other persons involved of the results of his efforts, such as the crops, had hung over him. The national authorities had thus violated the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


64.  The applicant maintained in particular that the  <mask> complained of could not be justified in the general interest of a democratic society as it placed the gardeners at an advantage without any justified reason. The owners had been unable to use the land for forty years and the relevant law had impaired their situation in that it had allowed the gardeners to continue benefiting from the land on conditions which were detrimental to the owners. In particular, the applicant alleged that the rent which the gardeners had been obliged to pay for the use of her land was negligible compared with the market rent which could be received for the land.


55.  The Government also submitted that the  <mask> in question had sought a legitimate aim, in that that the reopening of the proceedings concerning the size of S.F.’s land had been necessary to ensure that property rights were not restored to undeserving claimants, and to prevent unjust enrichment at public expense. They argued that rights to restoration of title in respect of S.F.’s land had been transferred to over a hundred individuals, and the total value of their claims had amounted to approximately LTL 1,908,000 (EUR 552,600), and thus the State had been justified in seeking to prevent such a considerable loss from its budget.


69.  The applicant submitted that once he had paid the debt in full, the enforcement court had to discontinue the enforcement proceedings of its own motion pursuant to section 67(1) of the Enforcement Act (see paragraph 45 above). He contested, in particular, the Government’s submission that he had already lost his share in the property on 17 March 2011 when the second public auction had been held (see paragraphs 21 above and 75 below). He explained that under the Enforcement Act, an award decision had to become final before ownership could pass to the buyer (see paragraphs 50-52 above). In his case, however, on 17 March 2011 the enforcement court had not even issued such a decision. Nothing had therefore prevented that court from discontinuing the proceedings and ordering restitution. Consequently, the  <mask> with his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions had not been provided for by law.


15.  The applicant disagreed with the Government’s proposal and argued that the Government’s submissions about the authorities’ failure to find the defendant were untrue and abusive. According to the applicant the non-enforcement of the final judgment in his favour was due to the defendant’s political influence and to the  <mask> of those in political power in the affairs of the judiciary.


56.  The Government accepted that the amount awarded to the applicant company by the domestic courts constituted a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and that there had been  <mask> with its right of property on account of the non-enforcement. Nevertheless, they maintained that the provision had not been breached since the interference was reasonably justified and pursued a legitimate aim in the general interest.


66.  The applicant considered that the failure of the State to enforce a binding legal judgment of 26 August 1998 formed part of the multi-stage “continuing situation” of  <mask> with his rights. Although the domestic court did not specify the means by which the liquidator should have provided the applicant with redress, it had been open to the liquidator to either recover the money from those to whom it had been unlawfully distributed or to employ any other means within his discretion. Those possibilities were not in any way precluded by the debtor’s lack of funds. In fact, the continued absence of assets was caused precisely by the liquidator’s unlawful actions and his failure to comply with the terms of the court order to rectify the situation (assuming that the bank indeed had no assets).


37.  The Government pointed out at the outset that the Court was not empowered to examine questions linked to the deprivation of property itself, such questions clearly being beyond its jurisdiction ratione temporis. In the Government’s submission, it was the lack of any payment of compensation for expropriation which constituted an  <mask> with the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. The applicants agreed with that submission and complained that, in depriving them of any compensation, judgments nos. 3156/1995 of the Salonika Court of Appeal and 1302/1997 of the Court of Cassation had imposed an excessive burden on them.


66.  The Government considered, however, that the  <mask> pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate. They claimed that Z.B. and G.B.’s numerous complaints to the authorities had to be examined following the procedure provided for by law, taking into account the interests of all the relevant parties to the proceedings. The authorities had to balance the right of Z.B. and G.B. to respect for their home on one hand and the right of the applicants to peacefully enjoy their possessions on the other. While acknowledging the delayed enforcement of the decision of the Šiauliai District Court of 21 December 2011 (see paragraph 7 above), the Government stated that the behaviour of Z.B. and G.B. had to be taken into account also when assessing the question of proportionality. In this context, the Government submitted that the bailiff had immediately taken action to enforce the judgment of the Šiauliai District Court on forced eviction (see paragraph 7 above) by issuing repeated notices to Z.B. and G.B. to vacate the house and, when that had been unsuccessful – by issuing notices of forced eviction. The bailiff also drew the courts’ attention to the fact that Z.B. had possibly abused his procedural rights. However, the domestic courts had not taken that into account. The Government further stated that the bailiff had tried to help the applicants by advising the first applicant to lodge court proceedings in order to be able to evict other persons temporarily present in the house (see paragraph 21 above). Furthermore, the bailiff had asked Z.B. to submit the relevant documents concerning G.B.’s illness, had asked Z.B.’s daughter and the Children’s Rights Protection Service about the place of residence of Z.B.’s granddaughter. Numerous applications submitted by Z.B. and G.B. had to be thoroughly examined by the domestic courts, seeking to carefully balance the competing interests of the debtors and the applicants. After the court had concluded that Z.B. had been seeking to delay the enforcement of the judgment of the court and the court then had urged the bailiff to continue the eviction proceedings (see paragraph 25 above), the eviction had taken place straight away (see paragraph 28 above). The Government concluded that it had been Z.B. and not the authorities who had delayed the eviction proceedings by submitting numerous complaints, sometimes even false information, which the courts had had to examine nevertheless.


212.  The Government further contended that the alleged  <mask> with the applicants’ rights had been lawful, given that the counter-terrorism measures within the territory of the Chechen Republic had been taken on the basis of the Suppression of Terrorism Act (see paragraph 138 above) and “relevant legal instruments of State bodies”. The Government insisted that the interference in question had been in the public interest as it was necessary to suppress the criminal activity of the illegal armed groups. They added that they had complied with their obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 by enacting a number of legal instruments enabling the applicants to obtain compensation for their lost property. The Government thus concluded that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the present case.


81.  The Government admitted that the order to return the 0.05 hectares to the State had constituted an  <mask> with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, but argued that the interference had been in compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They submitted that the land had been assigned and sold to the applicant in breach of “imperative legal norms” (see paragraphs 16, 25, 61, 64 and 65 above), so the decision to apply restitution had been taken in accordance with the relevant domestic law. They also maintained that the interference with the applicant’s property rights had been justified as being “in the public interest”, namely to protect the lawful sale of State land and the structure of the street.


46.  The applicants considered that they had a possession provided for by domestic law that fell within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Their right to a pension had been based on the salaries they had earned; however, because of Law no. 296/06 that right had been denied to people like the applicants who had worked in Switzerland. While it was true that the Italo–Swiss Convention had provided for the possibility for the State to enact specific norms regulating the matter, norms which totally reshaped the law to the detriment of the applicants had only come into being thirty-eight years after the adoption of that Convention. By that time, in the absence of a lex specialis, the rights in question had matured and become part of the applicants’ patrimony in accordance with the applicable general laws. Thus, the new law had interfered with the applicants’ peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, in an arbitrary and radically unjustified manner, drastically reducing their pensions. They further considered the  <mask> to be discriminatory and aimed solely at those people who had worked abroad, particularly in Switzerland.


150.  The applicants maintained that, as a result of their displacement and denial of access to their possessions, they had been forced to live in very poor conditions due to the lack of employment, housing, health care and a sanitary environment. They contended that, in the absence of economic and social measures to remedy their living conditions, the  <mask> complained of could not be described as proportionate to the aim pursued.


25.  The Government pointed out that the  <mask> with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of her property was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. They concluded that, taking into consideration the interests of both the landlord and the tenant, the burden imposed on the applicant had not been excessive. The Government pointed out that the statutory measures had been taken in the general interest to protect tenants, regard being had to the inner-city-housing crisis and the difficulty in providing adequate housing for low-income tenants who have been evicted.


62.  The Government emphasised that there had been no  <mask> with the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, because the special pension she received prior to the lustration decision was a special privilege attached to her position as a retired judge. Hence, its removal should not be regarded as an interference with an inalienable and irrevocable right. It should rather be seen as a refusal by the State to honour, in cases such as the applicant’s, the special privilege given to judges upon the termination of their service on condition that they continued to fulfil the moral qualifications that a judge should possess.


69.  The Government argued, were the Court to find that the applicant had possession, that the  <mask> with the applicant’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was lawful.  The judgment ordering the applicant to repay the unemployment benefits had had its legal basis in section 210 of the Civil Obligation Act, which had been clear, foreseeable and publicly available. Further to this, it had been in the general interest for the unduly received benefits to be paid back.


62.  The Government submitted that even if the Court were to find Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 applicable to the present case, the State could not be held liable for the alleged  <mask> with the applicant’s rights in this connection. The Government stated that Latvia could not be held responsible for acts of individuals, in this case the alleged perpetrators of the burglaries, against whom the applicant had filed civil claims during the pre-trial investigation. The Government further reiterated their view that the applicant’s alleged property rights had never been established by a court judgment and that the applicant’s right to compensation had never become enforceable, so that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was not applicable in the instant case. Finally, the Government pointed out that although criminal case no. 225641955 had been terminated, the applicant could still lodge a civil action in order to claim damages.


57.  The applicants claimed that the State's failure to effect payments under the Urozhay-90 bonds amounted to an  <mask> with their property rights. The laws enacted by the State had not furnished legal and practical possibilities for enforcing the obligations arising out of the bonds. Moreover, by enacting successive laws which had suspended the application of the relevant provision of the Commodity Bonds Act, the State had elevated itself to a privileged position and thereby breached the constitutional principle of equality before the law.


57.  The Government admitted that the final restitution order given in the applicant’s favour constituted a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and that the quashing of the order amounted to a deprivation of his possessions. However, they submitted that the  <mask> had been lawful; it had pursued a legitimate aim in the public interest; and it had been proportionate. In this connection they stated that it had been carried out in accordance with sections 267 and 268 of the Administrative Proceedings Act (see paragraphs 44 and 45 above). The Solicitor General, as a party to the proceedings, had sought revocation of the restitution order, which had been impossible to enforce, given the errors noted by the Commission and the Supreme Court. The restitution order of 2000, which had been adopted at a particular political moment and in an extremely short procedure in which State interests were not represented, had disregarded or failed to establish certain relevant facts, namely: the share in the property of the former owners indicated in the 1945 judgment; the property that could have been the subject of restitution, given the fact that the 1999 judgment had concerned only one former shareholder; that the property in question had meanwhile been developed with public funds; and that there were socially owned apartments on the site (referring to the “workers’” apartments), which accommodated thirty-three families. In this connection they submitted letters that the Restitution Commission had sent on 10 July 2008 to twenty-three individuals, seeking information regarding their tenancies. Those issues had made the enforcement of the restitution order burdensome.


45.  The applicants complained that the enactment of Law no. 296/2006 and its application to their cases constituted an unjustified  <mask> with their possessions. Moreover, it was arbitrary since it created a disparity in treatment between people who had chosen to work in Switzerland and those who had remained in Italy. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. The relevant provisions read as follows:


46.  The applicants submitted that the  <mask> with their possessions had no basis in law. Having failed to pay their debts, the State deprived them of the actual possession of their property, in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They maintained that the public interest justifications mentioned by the Government could not be relied on at their expense, and that it was for the State to find a solution for the payment of their salaries.


32.  The Government in their submissions confirmed that the amount awarded to the applicant by the domestic court constituted a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They acknowledged that the non-enforcement of the judgment in favour of the applicant could be considered to be an  <mask> with the applicant's right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. However, the Government claimed that such interference was justified in the general interest, namely the need to control the export of contaminated materials from the Chernobyl area. The large number of creditors of the liquidated company required the liquidation commission and the State to develop comprehensive measures to satisfy all claims.


58.  The Government claimed that the  <mask> with the applicant’s property rights had been lawful and justified. In particular, divesting the applicant of his right to the early‑retirement pension had been provided for by law and was in the public interest. There was also a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the interference and the interests pursued. In the Polish social security system only retirement pensions granted under the general scheme, were, in principle, permanent and irrevocable. All other benefits based on conditions subject to change were subject to verification and possible revocation.


126.  The Government submitted that the revoking of the licence did not constitute deprivation of possessions, but was a control of the use of property. They further argued that that  <mask> was lawful and sought to safeguard an important public interest: the stability of the banking system. The interference was also proportionate to the attainment of that aim. Both conditions for withdrawing the licence were satisfied.


29.  The Government pointed out that the  <mask> with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his property was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. They concluded that, taking into consideration the interests of both the landlord and the tenant, the burden imposed on the applicant had not been excessive. The Government pointed out that the statutory measures had been taken in the general interest to protect tenants, regard being had to the inner-city housing crisis and the difficulty in providing adequate housing for low-income tenants who have been evicted. The Government added that a large number of leases had expired in 1982 and 1983 and that the simultaneous execution of repossession orders in respect of all the premises concerned would have resulted in severe social unrest. The purpose of the measures in issue had therefore been to maintain order. It had been necessary to stagger the provision of police assistance because it was impossible to guarantee everyone assistance at the same time.


35.  The applicant company contended that the retrospective application of section 31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act, which had later been annulled by the Constitutional Court, had stripped the protection afforded to its trademark by Legislative Decree no. 556 of all meaning. That provision had constituted  <mask> by the legislature, in that it had entered into force in order to resolve the case in favour of the other party, a powerful media group. Moreover, the other newspaper, Vatan, had not been published between 1977 and 2002 and could not have been considered a well-known trademark as alleged by the domestic authorities.


26.  The applicant argued that the rent‑control scheme constituted an  <mask> with his right to peaceful enjoyment of his property. He claimed that the statutory basis regulating the rent‑control scheme lacked consistency, and that the scheme had constituted a disproportionate burden on his ownership rights. He argued that the regulated rent was substantially lower than the market prices for similar flats in the area, and submitted that the level of regulated rent was less than one-tenth of the market rent for comparable flats. As a result he had been forced to satisfy the housing needs of other people at his own expense, with no possibility of terminating the leases or receiving adequate compensation for them. In this connection he argued, inter alia, that the rent he had been entitled to charge for his flats under the rent-control scheme had not even covered the costs of their maintenance. He argued that owing to the repeated delays in deregulation of rents, he was in a permanent state of uncertainty and his health had deteriorated.


110.  The Government further contended that even assuming that to a certain extent there had been an  <mask> with the applicant company’s rights, that interference was proportionate. They maintained that during the proceedings G.G. and M.N. had exercised their procedural rights to request provisional measures with a view to securing their civil claims. Those rights, as well as the applicant company’s right to seek to defend its property rights by ordering the claimants to secure its eventual losses, were set out in the Code of Civil Procedure. In addition, the Government noted that as early as February 1996, and prior to the initiation of the civil proceedings in question, it was clear that the applicant company had failed to comply with its obligations under the said mortgage loan agreement.


41.  The applicant argued that the seizure of the fuel had been unlawful because there had been no decision issued by an investigator or prosecutor under Article 84 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure (CCrP) (see paragraph 25 above). Furthermore, the decision to discontinue the proceedings against Mr P had not included a ruling on what was to happen to the fuel, in breach of Article 85 of the CCrP. Article 84 of the CCrP governed relations between the authorities, the safe keeper of movable property and its owner, where the property in question was attached as physical evidence in criminal proceedings. The fuel in question had not constituted such evidence. The retention of the fuel thereafter amounted to a  <mask>. Nor had the seizure of the fuel or its retention pursued any legitimate aim.


26.  The Government further submitted that the applicant had only started paying land taxes after the institution of the civil proceedings. In addition, they claimed that she had acquired the land without participating in a public auction and had paid an advantageous price. The Government acknowledged that a  <mask> had taken place, but justified it by the need to protect the public interest.


22.  The applicant argued that the rent‑control scheme had constituted an interference with his right to peaceful enjoyment of his property. He claimed that the restrictions imposed on the use of his property and their duration could amount to a de facto  <mask>. He had been forced to satisfy the housing needs of other people at his own expense, and had had no possibility of terminating the leases or receiving adequate compensation for them.


62.  The applicants maintained that the proceedings under consideration concerned a wide scope of complex legal issues relating to the lawfulness of their  <mask>. Such issues could not be determined in a fair manner without hearing the parties. They contended, with reference to the Constitutional Court’s finding that Article 250f of the Code of Civil Procedure was contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that their right to a public hearing before a tribunal had not been respected.


51.  The applicant's ownership share in the real property in issue was transferred to the other co-owner in the context of execution proceedings brought with a view to obtaining sums of money which the domestic courts had earlier ordered to be paid to the applicant's creditor. Even if the interference in question did not involve an expropriation by the State, the contested measure resulted in deprivation of the applicant of his property. The Government have not contested that there was a  <mask> within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 1 and the Court will accordingly examine it under the “rule” set out in that provision, it being understood that the three rules set out in that provision are not “distinct” in the sense of being unconnected (see, for example, Bruncrona v. Finland, no. 41673/98, § 65, 16 November 2004 or Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, §§ 108-14, ECHR 2000-I).


16.  The Government considered that the applicants’  <mask> had not been arbitrary, but governed by strict rules meant to balance the interests of pre-nationalisation and post-nationalisation owners. They argued that the applicants had had a possibility to receive adequate compensation through compensation bonds, but had failed to make due use of it. Furthermore, the applicants themselves bore responsibility for the outcome of the restitution proceedings, as they had failed to mount an effective defence in relation to the defect found in their title. In this regard, the Government submitted two judgments of the Supreme Court of Cassation where actions under section 7 of the Restitution Law, based on claims that the respective decisions of the municipal authorities to sell property to citizens had not been approved by the Minister of Finance, had been dismissed. Lastly, the Government pointed out that in 2008 the first applicant had been accommodated in municipally-owned dwelling and considered that the second and third applicant had not suffered “any special hardship” because at the time when the first applicant had been evicted they had not been living in the disputed flat.


40.  The Government further argued that there was no direct connection between forfeiture of bail and acquittal. The purpose of bail was to replace custody and at the same time to discourage a person being prosecuted from frustrating or avoiding criminal prosecution. If the person did not comply with the conditions of bail, the logical consequence of such behaviour was the forfeiture of the bail, and it was therefore a legitimate  <mask> in this respect. The fact that the accused had eventually been acquitted did not in any way affect the lawfulness of the custody. The purpose of bail and the purpose of punishment were very different. If the conditions provided for by law were fulfilled, the bail was returned. Bail was not punishment for an offence committed, but was a form of security.


46.  The applicants disagreed. They were of the view that the decisions of the land commission and the Teteven District Court allowing their restitution claims had resulted in their acquiring property rights, and that the ensuing impossibility of the enforcement of these decisions, once the civil courts had found that the preconditions for restitution in kind had not been met, amounted to  <mask>. The applicants also contended that this deprivation had not been provided for by law and that it had not been in the public interest. In addition, they argued that the compensation which they had received, namely through compensation bonds which they had sold for the sum of BGN 2,823.88, had been inadequate. They argued also that the restitution proceedings had been too lengthy and that they had been placed in a situation of prolonged uncertainty. They claimed that the procedure had continued until 2013, because it had been only then that they had been able to sell the compensation bonds received in 2006.


49.  The applicant maintained her complaint. Firstly, her eviction from the Pushkinska flat and the annulment of her title to the property to it had been unlawful as it had not been based on any legal provisions providing for such an expropriation. Articles 110 and 112 of the Housing Code cited by the domestic courts concerned eviction from State-owned buildings and provided the method of the latter, whereas the Pushkinska flat had been her private property. Article 346 § 2 of the Civil Code was a reference rule but neither the Yalta authorities nor the courts had cited any relevant law which would have provided for a  <mask> in her situation. There was a legislative gap in that connection.


36.  The Government conceded that, whilst Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 did not in all circumstances guarantee a right to full compensation for  <mask>, the normal circumstances of the present case did entitle the applicants to compensation at such a level. Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation afforded to the State, the Government considered, however, that the compensation for the expropriated property had been reasonably related to its market value at the relevant time. The Government concluded therefore that the interference with the applicants' property rights had been proportionate to the legitimate aim sought to be achieved.


64.  The Government stated that, since bankruptcy proceedings were prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim, namely ensuring that creditors recovered at least part of their debts, the resulting  <mask> did not infringe Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. As to the length of the proceedings, the Government said that it was primarily attributable to the unsuccessful attempts that had been made to sell the applicant's house at auction. Following attempts on unspecified dates in 1985, 1991 and 1995, the sale had finally been fixed for 19 April 1996, then adjourned to 21 April 1996. The applicant was also responsible for the length of the proceedings, as he had resorted to every means possible to block the liquidation process. He had made an application for a composition with the creditors, which had been declared inadmissible on 1 April 1996, requested the bankruptcy judge on 5 April 1996 to refer an issue to the Constitutional Court thereby causing the proceedings to be stayed, made an application on 17 April 1996 for a stay of execution of the order for sale (which was dismissed the following day) and followed that up with a like application on an unspecified date to the Court of Cassation.


34.  The applicant company argued that the interference had not amounted to control of the use of property, because it had not been intended to prevent tax evasion, but rather had been a  <mask>. It also submitted that the interference had not been lawful and that the Excise Act 1994 had been wrongly applied. The company went on to argue that during the inspections in the clubs the authorities had failed to establish the owner of the alcohol. Lastly, the company submitted that the impounding and forfeiture of the alcohol had been disproportionate because it had not been allowed to take part in the administrative‑penal proceedings.


63.  The applicants claimed 47,500 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage representing the average between the two valuations submitted by the experts for the unlawful  <mask> and, in the alternative, had the Court to consider the measure lawful, they claimed EUR 33,250 in the light of the public purpose behind the deprivation. They further claimed EUR 15,000 in non-pecuniary damage.


47.  The applicant submitted that divesting her, in the circumstances of the case, of her acquired right to an early-retirement pension had amounted to an unjustified  <mask>. She also argued that even if the right had indeed been granted erroneously, an individual who had applied for the right in good faith should not be expected to pay the price for the mistake of public authorities acting without due diligence.


38.  The applicants submitted that they had been deprived of the house lawfully purchased by the first applicant under the court administered tender procedure. In their view, the fact that the court bailiff's fault had been established in the domestic proceedings should have entailed the State's full liability for damages. However, all they had managed to obtain through the domestic proceedings was compensation for part of the reconstruction costs. The applicants claimed that this compensation was insufficient to buy a comparable dwelling. The applicants presented calculations based on the 2003 Directive issued by the State Construction Agency which stated that the market value of residential real estate in the Saratov Region in the last quarter of 2003 was RUR 8,200 per square metre. On this basis the applicants claimed that at the time it was paid the award of RUR 89,522 was sufficient to pay for only 10.9 square metres, while the forfeited house measured 78.3 square metres. As for the social housing they received, they maintained that even in combination with the above award it was insufficient because of its unsatisfactory quality and size, and in any event they did not own it. They considered that their overall losses were so substantial as to amount to a  <mask> for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


74.  The Government submit that, even if the Court finds that there has been a  <mask>, the finding of a violation would, in the circumstances, constitute sufficient just satisfaction. In effect, the Government submit that the applicant could and still can bring proceedings before the domestic courts and seek compensation, especially following the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Cathleen Georgallides v. The Attorney-General; there is a potential eventuality of the applicant ending up with double compensation. However, if the Court decided to grant an award, the Government stress that the deprivation of the property took place on 27 March 1978 and maintain that it would be difficult to accept the relevance of the market value of the property at any time after that date, in particular in view of the fact that in 1992 she transferred her rights to her children. Furthermore, the Court should take into consideration that in 1978 the market value of plot 565 was 70 Cyprus pounds per square meter, and that by 1978, because of the street-widening scheme, considerable betterment had accrued to the remaining part of plot 565 and its market value thus increased.


22.  The applicant argued that the interpretation according to which its claims against ÁPV Rt were unenforceable for want of a decision by the Tax Authority was wrong and amounted to an inadmissible interference by the State with market relations, as a result of which its claims, acquired onerously on the market, had become worthless. This had amounted to arbitrary  <mask>.


73.  The applicant submitted that divesting him, in the circumstances of the case, of his acquired right to an early-retirement pension had amounted to an unjustified  <mask>. He also argued that even if the benefit had indeed been granted erroneously, an individual who had applied for it in good faith should not be expected to pay the price for the mistake of public authorities acting without due diligence.


108.  The Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, given that the forfeiture of their various assets and payment of the fine had not constituted a  <mask> or some other type of interference with the peaceful enjoyment thereof, but rather a voluntary decision to reimburse the damage caused to the State by the first applicant’s criminal activity and, as a lawful and entirely proportionate measure, had formed part of the relevant plea bargain.


38.  The applicant submitted that he had suffered interference with his property rights as he had been deprived of his possessions unilaterally on 20 November 2000. Although the original grant in temporary emphyteusis had expired, contrary to his expectation that the property would revert to him vacant on termination of the contract, the 1979 Act gave the tenants the right to retain possession of the property under a new lease. Thus, the fact that he retained ownership in circumstances in which he was unable to foresee when, if ever, the property would revert to him, could not exclude a  <mask> in the Convention sense. Indeed the concept of tenant was a wide one (see “Relevant domestic law” paragraph 22 above) and the applicant had legitimate fears that the property would not revert to him in the foreseeable future. Moreover, the sums paid in succession tax related to a time when the property was still under the original emphyteusis and could not justify the subsequent interference.


60.  The applicants submitted that the unlawful house sale, the ensuing litigation, the  <mask>, the eviction from their home and their subsequent hardships living in cramped and substandard accommodation with a large family including small children and an elderly person had caused them severe distress. They claimed EUR 228,000 for non-pecuniary damage, which amount they claimed on behalf of eight family members each of whom had been through six years of sufferings.


64.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> was in accordance with the Ordinance and was thus lawful. The premises had been taken in order to relocate the Office of the Attorney General. However, the implementation of the project had stalled because part of the premises had been occupied by squatters and steps had to be taken for their eviction. After that there were problems with the issuing of the relevant permits (as the previous one had expired) by the planning authorities, mainly because of planning restrictions related to Valletta’s World Heritage status, as well as the fact that the façade of the building had to be preserved while rebuilding the interior. In the Government’s view the fact that, to date, the property had not yet been used did not cancel the original public interest behind the taking given that the authorities’ action had been constant, as had also been held by the Constitutional Court which was best placed to assess the public interest requirement. Relying on the Court’s case‑law, they noted that placing in reserve expropriated property even for a long time, did not necessarily entail a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They noted that from the witness testimony during the domestic proceedings it transpired that the property was abandoned and in total dilapidation, generating no revenue for the owners. Furthermore, any increase in the value of the property was reflected in the compensation offered to the applicant companies, which they could withdraw, and contest if they did not agree with the quantum.


40.  The Government argued that the primary aim of the impugned measure had to be taken into consideration when deciding on the nature of the interference. Since it had been clear from the relevant law that the properties affected by the establishment of a water protection zone could not remain in the ownership of the applicants, any measure interfering with the applicant’s rights aimed at and amounted to a  <mask>. Furthermore, even in the absence of a formal expropriation, regard must be had to the realities of the situation, that is the de facto expropriation of the applicants’ property with effect from 2002 (see paragraph 31 above). Moreover, the case was to be distinguished from situations where expropriation of the applicants’ property had been engaged but not carried out (see Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52), and where the Court examined the case under the first rule in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.