50.  The applicant further argued that there had been no legitimate aim in punishing his conduct during the funeral and the demonstration, which had consisted of him walking in front of a coffin, making a “V” sign and applauding. Even assuming that there had been a legitimate aim in his criminal convictions, they had in any case not been  <mask>. In that regard, the applicant submitted that he had not used or advocated violence and had not incited other people to hatred or violence. The applicant therefore argued that his criminal convictions had not corresponded to any pressing social need. In that connection, the applicant referred to a number of the Court’s judgments, such as Incal v. Turkey (9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑IV), İsak Tepe v. Turkey (no. 17129/02, 21 October 2008), Unay v. Turkey (no. 5290/02, 21 October 2008), Açık and Others v. Turkey (no. 31451/03, 13 January 2009) and Gözel and Özer v. Turkey (nos. 43453/04 and 31098/05, 6 July 2010).


46.  The applicant complained under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention that the allegedly arbitrary denial of Latvian citizenship through naturalisation was a punitive measure imposed on him because he had imparted ideas and exercised his right of assembly in order to criticise the government’s position. He further complained that the aforementioned infringements of his rights, contrary to the requirements of Article 10 § 2 and Article 11 § 2 of the Convention, were not prescribed by law, did not pursue a legitimate aim and were disproportionate and not  <mask>. Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention read as follows.


40.  The applicants submitted that the interference with their right to freedom of assembly stemmed from the Regional Governor’s order which banned the rallies that they had planned and which was enforced by the police. As a result, the applicants were forced to change their initial plan to celebrate near the Rozhen Monastery. The police also interfered with their rights by carrying out unusually lengthy checks of their vehicles (which delayed the event by almost two hours), and preventing them from approaching the Monastery and from organising the event in Melnik as planned. Those interferences were neither lawful nor  <mask>.


57.  The applicants maintained that the domestic authorities had refused to recognise the applicant association as a religious entity in both sets of proceedings despite the fact that it had existed and operated for many years before the 2007 Act had entered into force. They argued that the interference with their rights under this head had not been in accordance with the law, had not pursued any legitimate aim and had not been  <mask>.


30.  The Government submitted that the applicants, together with other members of the National Bolsheviks Party, had effected a forcible and unauthorised entry into the premises of the President’s Administration, had held an unauthorised assembly there, had voiced unlawful demands for the President’s resignation, had hampered the normal functioning of the President’s Administration and had destroyed State property there. Their protest had not been peaceful and had amounted to a criminal offence of mass disorder. They had been therefore lawfully prosecuted for participation in mass disorder involving destruction of State property. Their arrest, detention and conviction had pursued the legitimate aim of investigating criminal offences and punishing those responsible and had been  <mask>.


28.  The applicants argued that the refusal to register the Civic Committee had not been in accordance with the law, that it had not pursued a legitimate aim and had not been  <mask>. The applicants also alleged that their case concerned several aspects of the national legislation and administrative practice which run counter to the principles embodied in Article 11 of the Convention.


64.  The applicant contested the Government's submissions on every point. First, he disagreed that the ban on the public events he had sought to hold had been imposed in accordance with the law. He pointed out that neither the Assemblies Act nor any other legislative instrument provided for a ban on public events. The restrictions set out in section 8(1) of the Act on holding events in venues which were unsuitable for safety reasons required the authorities to suggest another venue, as set out in section 12 of the Act, and not to ban the event. In any case, even if the Court were to accept that the alleged impossibility of avoiding public disorder at any venue could provide a justification for the ban under domestic law, the applicant maintained that the ban did not comply with two other requirements of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention, in that it had failed to pursue a legitimate aim and had not been  <mask>.


70.  The applicants claimed that the right to freedom of religion encompassed the expectation that members would be allowed to associate freely without arbitrary State intervention. Therefore, the State was prohibited from regulating State-Church relationships arbitrarily; any interference in that sphere had to be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim and be  <mask>. The requirements relating to the registration of Churches had to be objective and reasonable, because in this matter the State was required to remain neutral and impartial. Consequently, if a religious community met the legal requirements it had to be entitled to be registered as a Church, and the registration procedure had to offer guarantees of fairness.


31.  The Government submitted that the right to freedom of association was not absolute and might be subject to restrictions, as provided by Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. They reiterated that, in accordance with the norms and principles of public international law, the right to strike could also be restricted. For instance, Article 8 § 2 of the ICESCR (see paragraph 19 above) allowed the banning of strikes by members of the police, army and State administration, and permitted restrictions on the right to strike of other people when it was  <mask>.


29.  The applicant additionally submitted that the interference had not been  <mask>. He referred to the principles developed in Court's case‑law on this issue and argued that he had been penalised solely for the ideas expressed in the association's articles. The association had not engaged in any action which could characterise it as propagating violence or undemocratic principles. The idea of a monarchy and the related insignia were not undemocratic or violent, as evidenced in particular by the fact that the name of the coalition which had ruled the country as between 2001 and 2005 had been “National Movement Simeon II”, after the former heir to the throne Simeon Saxe-Coburggotski, who had become prime minister. Even before his starting into office in 2001 Bulgaria's coat of arms had featured a crown, whereas the public debate over the form of government – republic or monarchy – continued. While the Constitution indeed needed stability, it was by no means carved into stone. Its amendment could be envisaged for the purpose of bringing it in line with the dominant public views on the form of government, whereas suppressing any ideas in this respect could harm democracy and constituted unfettered majority rule.


53.  The applicant complained of a violation of his right to peaceful assembly. He claimed that the ban repeatedly imposed by the Moscow authorities on holding the Pride March and the picketing had not been in accordance with the law, had not pursued any legitimate aim and had not been  <mask>. He relied on Article 11 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


39. The applicants maintained that the State’s interference had not been justified and  <mask>. They stated that there had been no legitimate aim justifying the dissolution of the Association, nor had the reasons given by the Constitutional Court been relevant or sufficient. Having regard to the Court’s case-law, they argued that the Court had found restrictions imposed on freedom of expression and freedom of association by the Contracting States necessary only in two types of cases: in cases of threats of use of violence and in cases of justification of the use of violence.


13.  The applicant complained under Article 11 of the Convention of a violation of his right to freedom of association, arguing that the rejection by the domestic courts of the application for registration of the association founded by him and four other associates had not been  <mask> and that the courts had failed to provide relevant and sufficient reasons for that restriction. The relevant part of the aforementioned Article reads as follows:


64.  The Government submitted that the police intervention in the demonstration after 5 p.m. was prescribed by law, namely Articles 7 and 14 of the Law on Freedom of Assembly, pursued the legitimate aim of preventing disorder and protecting the rights of others, and was  <mask> as the demonstrators had behaved aggressively and had intended to continue an unlawful demonstration. The Government noted that the demonstration took place without any police intervention from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m., which was the period notified by the organisers. However, as the demonstrators had refused to disperse after 5 p.m., the time the assembly was supposed to end, despite numerous warnings by the police, the latter had to intervene.


75.  The applicants submitted that the legislative amendments described by the Government were relevant for the general measures which Bulgaria was bound to adopt in execution of the judgment in United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – PIRIN and Others (cited above), but had no bearing on the interferences in issue in the present case. Those interferences had been neither lawful nor  <mask>. During UMO Ilinden – PIRIN’s first re‑registration attempt the Sofia City Court had failed to give them instructions concerning the purported irregularities in the party’s registration documents and had refused to allow them to adduce additional evidence. In view of the trivial nature of the irregularities on which the court had based its decision and of its earlier refusal to allow the applicants to rectify those irregularities, its refusal to register the party had been excessive. Moreover, the proceedings had been accompanied by a hostile campaign by the authorities against the party’s registration. The applicants and about five thousand other members of the party had been targeted in an unprecedented campaign of harassment by the police; some of them had been intimidated into signing declarations renouncing their membership. As a result, the authorities had obtained and had submitted to the Sofia City Court sixty‑six such declarations. During the second re‑registration attempt the national courts had not taken into account the binding effect of this Court’s judgment in United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – PIRIN and Others (cited above). The Sofia City Court had in part relied on reasons that had been found problematic in that judgment. The Supreme Court of Cassation had based the refusal to register the party on the lack of an up‑to‑date list of members, contrary to the express indications given by the Committee of Minister’s Secretariat, and had not clearly disavowed the problematic reasoning given by the Sofia City Court.


163.  The applicants claimed that the interference had not been prescribed by law or  <mask>. It had been established by the Presnenskiy District Court on 16 August 2002 that the Moscow Justice Department had not invoked the dissolution proceedings before the Golovinskiy District Court as a ground for refusing re-registration. Furthermore, the four criminal investigations between June 1996 and April 1998 had found no criminal activity on the part of the applicant community. In April 1999, after a detailed expert study, the Ministry of Justice had granted re-registration to the federal organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses, of which the applicant community had been a member. Likewise, 398 communities of Jehovah's Witnesses in other Russian regions had been granted registration or re-registration during the same period.


32.  The applicants complained under Article 11 of the Convention that UMO Ilinden – PIRIN had been declared unconstitutional and as a result dissolved. They submitted that this interference with their freedom of association had not been prescribed by law, as in its interpretative judgment no. 7 of 1996 the Constitutional Court had held that restrictions of freedom of speech – which, in the applicants’ view, applied mutatis mutandis to freedom of association – would only be justified if the speech in issue posed an immediate threat of violent overturning of the constitutional order and democracy. The applicants further submitted that the interference had not been  <mask>, as the Constitutional Court had failed to adduce relevant and sufficient reasons for declaring the applicant party unconstitutional.


220.  The applicant argued that, since the criminal proceedings against him had been politically motivated, such interference could not be considered as prescribed by law. As regards the dispersal of the demonstration, none of the concerns raised in the Armenian Ombudsman’s report regarding the lawfulness of the police operation had been addressed either during the investigation or in the Government’s observations. All the evidence provided by the police had been considered reliable and their actions, without a proper examination and assessment, had been considered lawful by the courts, which had failed to carry out an objective and thorough establishment of the facts. Neither the interference with the expression of his political opinions, nor the dispersal of the demonstration were  <mask>. As regards the latter, a number of questions remained unanswered. In particular, the disproportionate manner in which the demonstration had been dispersed, resulting in more than one hundred persons injured; the failure of the police to communicate with the opposition leader when the latter proposed to listen to their demands; the reasons for choosing such an early hour to carry out such a large-scale police operation, moreover, assuming that it had been a search and seizure operation, it being prohibited under the rules of criminal procedure; the failure to video record a police operation involving such a large number of police officers, while hindering and restricting journalists from video recording those events; the reasons why all the participants in the sit-in had been dispersed, as well as why Freedom Square had remained closed for any gatherings by the opposition for the following 38 months, if the purpose of the police operation had only been to carry out a search and seizure of illegal weapons.


24.  The applicants submitted that the interference was not prescribed by law because the national courts failed to give them clear indications on how to proceed to obtain registration, and construed arbitrarily the constitutional restrictions on freedom to associate. The interference was not  <mask> either, because the national courts did not have before them any evidence showing that the registration of Ilinden would endanger Bulgaria’s sovereignty or national security. However, those courts accepted uncritically the “official position” on the so‑called “Macedonian question” and justified the refusal on grounds that had nothing to do with the principles of democracy.


85.  The applicant party further maintained that where the confiscation of the assets of a political party forced it to curtail its expenditure and cease its activities on account of the resulting financial hardship, such a measure could not be considered to be proportionate to any legitimate aims pursued, if such aims ever existed. The applicant party stressed that while the Government had argued that the amounts confiscated were relatively low in comparison with the party’s income, that consideration had no relevance to the “test of proportionality” set by the Court. The adverse consequences of the impugned sanctions imposed on the party had already been brought to the Court’s attention (see paragraph 66 above). Those consequences had been brought about by the Constitutional Court’s subjective and restrictive interpretation of the legal requirements on expenditure and the formalities regarding the provision of supporting documentation, and did not as such concern any abuse, corruption or other financial crime on the part of the party. In view of the nature of the irregularities in question, including those concerning documentation, it would have been more proportionate to issue warnings or give prior notice for rectification, but the relevant Act did not provide for such a possibility. In those circumstances, it could not be accepted that the sanctions imposed had been  <mask>.


52.  The Government did not argue that there had not been an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of assembly other than to submit that the case was not within the scope of Article 11. Even assuming that the applicant’s acts had fallen within the scope of Article 11, they submitted that the State authorities’ acts and decisions had had the legitimate aims of protecting national security, territorial integrity, public safety and public order as well as the prevention of crime. They argued that interfering with the demonstrations in question, which had incited people to violence and which had been organised by members of the PKK, a terrorist organisation, had corresponded to a pressing social need and had been  <mask>. They stressed that the applicant had not been convicted for taking part in a funeral.


35.  The applicants argued that UMO Ilinden – PIRIN’s dissolution had not been  <mask>, because it was a democratic political party. There was nothing in its activity or in the activities of its leaders of members which could suggest hostility towards the democratic form of government. Nor had it made any calls for the use of violence.


37.  The Government submitted that the interference had been  <mask>. In this connection, they pointed out that although the Association had been registered as a public association, it had engaged in religious activities that only religious organisations were allowed to perform under domestic law. Lastly, the Government noted that the Association had not kept accounting records, contrary to the requirements of domestic law, a situation that would inevitably lead to money laundering.


40.  The applicants complained that during their detention at the Buiucani Police Station their mobile telephones were taken away from them and that the police officers searched through their telephones’ memory and deleted audio and video files of sounds and images of the demonstration. According to them, the police deleted materials which would have been inconsistent with the latter’s version of the events. This fact constituted an interference with their right to private life and correspondence which was not prescribed by law and was not  <mask>.


77.  The applicant also complained that the interference with his right to freedom of expression had not pursued any legitimate aim and had not been  <mask>. He argued that it was important for the public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards unlawful peaceful gatherings (he referred to Nurettin Aldemir and Others v. Turkey, nos. 32124/02 and 6 others, 18 December 2007). Consequently, it was also important to show the same degree of tolerance towards articles published on the Internet about preparations for such peaceful gatherings. The Russian authorities had shown zero tolerance in his own case, however. Furthermore, by blocking access to his VKontakte account, they had blocked access to other material published thereon which had not been found to be illegal. The judicial review of the blocking decision had been superficial: the domestic courts had not applied the “proportionality” or the “necessity in a democratic society” tests.


39.  The Government submitted that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly as he was convicted of minor hooliganism under Article 172 of the CAO. In any event, even assuming that there had been an interference, it was prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate aim and was  <mask> since the applicant was found to have committed reprehensible acts.


34.  The Government acknowledged that the refusal to register the applicant group constituted an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of religion. In their view, the interference was “prescribed by law” and all the refusals of registration had been based on the relevant legal provisions. The interference pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of protecting public order (they referred to Kimlya, cited above, § 97). The Government justified the interference as having been  <mask> for suppressing manifestations of religious discord (they referred to Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, 25 November 1996, § 58, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V, and Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, § 50, Series A no. 295‑A). They also claimed that similar waiting periods were provided for by the laws of some other Member States. According to their information, Austrian law set the waiting period at twenty years, Latvian law at twenty-five years, and Romania’s Law no. 489 of 28 December 2006 provided that religious denominations, other than the eighteen listed in the law, may be recognised if they can prove their existence in the country for at least twelve years.


51.  The applicant parties alleged that their dissolution had entailed a violation of their right to freedom of association. Describing Institutional Law no. 6/2002 on political parties (“the LOPP”) as an ad hoc law, they argued that it was neither accessible nor foreseeable and complained that it had been applied retrospectively. Stating that the purpose of their dissolution had been to eliminate political debate in the Basque Country, they complained that the measure had had no legitimate aim. They argued that it could not be considered  <mask> and considered it to be in violation of the principle of proportionality. The relevant parts of Article 11 provide:


83.  The Government argued that the sanctions in question had pursued a number of legitimate aims, such as securing the fulfilment of the functions of political parties, protecting their constitutional position, ensuring respect for the “principle of clarity” in democratic societies and informing the public, and that they had also been  <mask> for the achievement of those aims. The Government also argued that the amounts confiscated from the applicant party were relatively low in comparison with the latter’s income for the years under review.


187.  The Government submitted that there had been an interference with the exercise of the applicants’ freedom of peaceful assembly within the meaning of Article 11 and their freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention, but that the interference had been in accordance with the law, in particular Article 71 of the Criminal Code. They submitted that the interference had been in the interests of public safety. They also argued that it had been  <mask>, particularly because the applicants’ actions during the events of 9 March 2001 had gone beyond the range allowed to be committed by an individual in exercising his rights under the Convention, as they had been accompanied by riotous damage, destruction of property and resistance towards the authorities. Their rally had therefore not been of a peaceful character.


86.  The Government submitted that the interference was  <mask> and proportionate to the aim pursued. It was aimed at preventing the applicant’s unlawful actions and avoiding social disorder. The sanction imposed was at the lower end of the scale of penalties prescribed for the offence committed by the applicant. The Contracting Parties enjoyed a margin of appreciation as far as the necessity of an interference was concerned and the reasons given by the domestic authorities were relevant and sufficient.


22.  The applicant contested the Government’s submission that the measure in question had purported to prevent a possible abuse by the association in acting as a political party and had been aimed at upholding the rules regulating political parties. In so far as the association had not existed before and neither it nor its founding members had engaged in activities of a political nature, the refusal of the registration appeared disproportionate to the aim pursued and had been un <mask>. That was all the more so since Government Ordinance no. 26/2000 allowed the State authorities to dissolve any association which had pursued goals that were different from the ones for which it had been founded.


45.  The applicants argued that dissolving a political party did not comply with the needs of a democratic society and made it impossible to achieve pluralism. The dissolution of HADEP was not  <mask>. In support of their submissions the applicants referred to the previous political party dissolution cases decided by the Court, as well as the guidelines proposed by the Venice Commission (see paragraph 26 above).


29.  The Government, admitting that the refusal to register the applicant as an association amounted to interference to its right to freedom of association, considers nevertheless that this interference was prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate aim and was  <mask>. In this respect, they referred to Government Ordinance no. 26/2000 which provides that if the legal requirements for the setting up of an association are not satisfied, the request to register is dismissed. The refusal to register the applicant association in the instant case pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public order and the rights and liberties of the others, namely the rights of those who use the services of lawyers to represent their interests.


120.  The Government submitted that the interference complained of was  <mask>. In the first place, to recognise the applicant Church the State would have had to give up its position of neutrality in religious matters, and in religious conflicts in particular, which would have been contrary to the Moldovan Constitution and Moldovan public policy. It was therefore in order to discharge its duty of neutrality that the Government had urged the applicant Church to settle its differences with the Metropolitan Church of Moldova first.


29.  The Government were of the opinion that, even assuming an interference, it had been prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate aim (namely, the protection of the rights and freedoms of others) and been  <mask>. The interference, if any, had not constituted a hidden obstacle to a peaceful, spontaneous assembly. They referred to the case of Éva Molnár (cited above, § 39), in which the Court had established that those events – which were direct consequences of the incident discussed in the present case – had not disclosed special circumstances of the kind to which the only adequate response had been an immediate demonstration. In any event, the applicant could have exercised his right to assembly in a manner which would not have violated the criminal law. However, the applicant had opted to engage in criminal conduct, the sanction for which was nevertheless very mild, by no means disproportionate.


19.  The Government contested the applicant’s argument. They submitted that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of assembly had been prescribed by law, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public order and the rights of others and had been  <mask>. They noted that the applicant had not only attended a demonstration organised in support of the PKK, which was considered to be a terrorist organisation by a number of international organisations, including the Court itself, but had also disseminated propaganda in its favour.


62.  The applicants furthermore maintained that physical force had been used against them by police, and that that force had not been  <mask> and had in any event been disproportionate to whatever legitimate aim the Government had claimed to be pursuing. While reiterating the Court’s reasoning in the case of Bukta and Others v. Hungary (no. 25691/04, § 37, ECHR 2007‑III), they submitted that the public authorities should have shown a certain degree of tolerance towards their peaceful gatherings at the University. Lastly, in their view, the imposition of administrative fines had only served to punish them for their having exercised their rights under Article 10 and Article 11 of the Convention and had been intended to have a “chilling effect” upon anyone who might have been willing to protest against the Government’s reforms in the educational sphere.


40.  The applicant submitted that his conviction for minor hooliganism had been based on the fact of participation in a demonstration and therefore interfered with his rights under Article 11. In the absence of any details of the public order offence allegedly committed by him, it was the fact of participation itself which was qualified as a violation of public order. Furthermore, Article 172 of the CAO was too vague, the interference did not pursue a legitimate aim and it was not  <mask>.


54.  The Government further argued that the bans had been prescribed by law, namely section 12(2)(2) of the Meetings and Marches Act. Also, the measures complained of had pursued a wide range of legitimate aims: protecting national security and public safety, guaranteeing public order in the local community, protecting the rights and freedoms of others and preventing disorder and crime. They had also been  <mask>, because the authorities had acted in conformity with the laws of the country, their actions had not been arbitrary and they had complied with their positive obligations to guarantee the citizens’ rights under Article 11 of the Convention. Referring to the case of Gustafsson v. Sweden (judgment of 25 April 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑II, pp. 652‑53, § 45), the Government submitted that the Contracting States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in their choice of the means to be employed to attain a legitimate aim.


121.  The applicants submitted that the refusal to recognise the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia was not  <mask>. They asserted that all the arguments put forward by the Government were without foundation and unsubstantiated and that they did not correspond to a “pressing social need”. There was nothing in the file to show that the applicants had intended or carried on or sought to carry on activities capable of undermining Moldovan territorial integrity, national security or public order.


45.  The applicants further contended that the interference in question was not  <mask>, since the slogans chanted by them had not contained any element of incitement to violence. They had not chanted the slogans “Long live our Party, MLKP” and “Victory to the revolution, long live the MLKP” and the Ankara Assize Court had established the circumstances of the case only on the basis of a police report. The allegedly illegal documents found in the homes of some of them were books, scientific articles, legal associations’ leaflets, and notes regarding a non-governmental organisation and a legal political party.


22.  The applicant association complained of a violation of its right to peaceful assembly. It claimed that the ban imposed on it on holding a demonstration had not been in accordance with the law, had not pursued any legitimate aim and had not been  <mask>. It relied on Article 11 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


34.  The applicant further argued that there had been no legitimate aim in punishing him. His conviction and lengthy prison sentence had been a part of the Government policies to put pressure on the DTP. As to the necessity of the interference, he had not advocated violence and had not incited other people to hatred or violence during the demonstrations in question. He had been the head of the local branch of a political party and had been punished on account of his political activities. He therefore claimed that his criminal conviction had not been  <mask>. Lastly, the applicant argued that the interference with his right to freedom of assembly had been grossly disproportionate given that he had been sentenced to a total of six years and three months’ imprisonment, which had then been reduced to five years, two months and fifteen days’ imprisonment.


18.  The applicant argued that, while having been  <mask>, the interference complained of had not pursued a legitimate aim. As regards its necessity, he argued that had the demonstration been authorised it would not have caused any disproportionate obstacle to the traffic. Venyige Street, with the service lane included, was wide enough to accommodate the expected number of participants, some 200; and the police could have secured access to the prison notwithstanding the on-going event. In sum, the applicant found abusive the Government’s reliance on the traffic hindrance argument.


36.  The Government accepted that the applicants’ arrest at the site of the public event and their administrative convictions had constituted an interference with their right to freedom of peaceful assembly and their right to freedom of expression. Such an interference constitutes a breach of Articles 10 and/or 11 of the Convention unless it is  <mask>, pursues one or more legitimate aims under paragraph 2 of each Article, and is “necessary in a democratic society”.


30.  The Government submitted that the interference was  <mask>. In particular, the applicant was convicted under Article 180.1 of the CAO for “violation of the prescribed rules for organising or holding assemblies, rallies, street marches and demonstrations”. These rules were prescribed by the USSR Law on Approving Decrees of the Chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on Making Amendments and Supplements to Certain USSR Legal Acts of 28 October 1988 and were accessible and formulated with sufficient precision.


66.  The Government of Cyprus observed that the interference by the Turkish police with the peaceful assembly which was taking place in the buffer zone had not been  <mask>, was unnecessary and grossly disproportionate in relation to any conduct by the applicant or any claimed public-order issue which could have arisen. The laws of the Republic of Cyprus, applicable to the area where the demonstration took place, did not permit such an interference. The respondent Government could not alter the legal system in the occupied territory and had not invoked any Turkish law that could have provided a legal basis for its agents' behaviour.


82.  The Government further submitted that the interference in question had been  <mask>. They noted in this regard that the applicant’s conviction had been based on section 23(b) of Law no. 2911 and Articles 220 § 6 and 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code. According to the Government, these provisions, and in particular Article 220 § 6 of the Criminal Code, fulfilled the requirement of “foreseeability” for the purposes of Article 11 of the Convention.


105.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article 11 of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant's rights was not  <mask> and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


107.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article 11 of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant's rights was not  <mask> and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


49.  The applicant argued that his convictions under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code and section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 had constituted an interference with his right to freedom of assembly. He stated that the interference in question had not been  <mask>, within the meaning of Article 11 of the Convention, since he had been unable to foresee that his participation in the funeral of 28 March 2006 or the demonstration of 5 March 2007 and his conduct during those events would lead to his prosecution and conviction for membership of an illegal organisation and a prison sentence of seven years and eleven months. The applicant referred to the opinion of the dissenting assize court judge (see paragraph 21 above).


42.  The Government contended that the applicants had acted unlawfully by holding a public event without the authorities’ approval. Its dispersal had therefore been lawful and justified. They disputed that the event held by the applicants could be qualified as genuinely spontaneous. The date of the examination of the draft law had indeed been announced two days before, making it impossible to submit a notification within the statutory time-limit. However, on that date the State Duma had examined the draft law at the second reading, while three readings were necessary for a law to be adopted. There had been sufficient time to organise a public event in accordance with the procedure  <mask> before the third and final reading of the draft law by the State Duma. The facts of the present case had not disclosed special circumstances such as would warrant an immediate demonstration as the only adequate response. The applicants had therefore been lawfully fined for participating in a public event held without prior notification. The amount of fines had been reasonable.


33.  The Government submitted that the interference was  <mask>. In particular, the applicant was convicted under Article 180.1 of the CAO for “violation of the prescribed rules for organising or holding assemblies, rallies, street marches and demonstrations”. These rules were prescribed by the USSR Law on Approving Decrees of the Chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on Making Amendments and Supplements to Certain USSR Legal Acts of 28 October 1988 and were accessible and formulated with sufficient precision.


65.  The Government further argued that the applicants’ detention had also been justified under sub-paragraph (b) of Article 5 § 1. It had been necessary to secure the fulfilment of an obligation  <mask>. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, it was certain that the applicants would not have fulfilled their legal duty to comply with an order to report to a police station in their town of residence at regular intervals (Meldeauflage) or with an order not to enter a particular area (Platzverweis). The applicants had travelled several hundred kilometres in order to reach the venue of the G8 summit and had resisted the identity check. They had thus demonstrated that they would not follow orders given by the police. Having regard to the exceptional situation at hand, it had not been necessary to wait until the applicants had in fact breached such an order. Bearing in mind the great number of demonstrators present, it would not have been possible to prevent the applicants from committing offences upon their doing so. Therefore, compliance with their legal duties to follow such an order and the prevention of specific offences could only have been secured by their instantaneous detention.


14.  The Government submitted that the interference was  <mask>, namely by the relevant provisions of the Assembly Act. Furthermore, it pursued the legitimate aim of securing the rights of others, that is, those of other road users. As to its necessity, the Government stressed that the police had had to balance the right to assembly and the right to free movement. Since in the present case the event was likely to cause inordinate traffic congestion in both Venyige Street and the neighbouring major thoroughfare, it was the police’s prerogative to restrict the applicant’s Article 11 rights: the measure was thus a necessary and proportionate restriction on the right to assembly.


37.  The Government further argued that the interference with the applicant’s rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, if any, was  <mask>. The applicant’s conviction had been based on Article 220 § 7 of the Criminal Code and the wording of that provision met the accessibility and foreseeability requirements within the meaning of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. The interference in question had the legitimate aims of protecting national security and public order as well as preventing crime.


220.  The applicant argued that, since the criminal proceedings against him had been politically motivated, such interference could not be considered as  <mask>. As regards the dispersal of the demonstration, none of the concerns raised in the Armenian Ombudsman’s report regarding the lawfulness of the police operation had been addressed either during the investigation or in the Government’s observations. All the evidence provided by the police had been considered reliable and their actions, without a proper examination and assessment, had been considered lawful by the courts, which had failed to carry out an objective and thorough establishment of the facts. Neither the interference with the expression of his political opinions, nor the dispersal of the demonstration were necessary in a democratic society. As regards the latter, a number of questions remained unanswered. In particular, the disproportionate manner in which the demonstration had been dispersed, resulting in more than one hundred persons injured; the failure of the police to communicate with the opposition leader when the latter proposed to listen to their demands; the reasons for choosing such an early hour to carry out such a large-scale police operation, moreover, assuming that it had been a search and seizure operation, it being prohibited under the rules of criminal procedure; the failure to video record a police operation involving such a large number of police officers, while hindering and restricting journalists from video recording those events; the reasons why all the participants in the sit-in had been dispersed, as well as why Freedom Square had remained closed for any gatherings by the opposition for the following 38 months, if the purpose of the police operation had only been to carry out a search and seizure of illegal weapons.


48.  The applicants argued that the interference was not  <mask>, because the Law on non‑governmental organisations (public associations and foundations) (“the NGO Act”), being vague and imprecise, gave the Ministry of Justice an unlimited discretion to issue warnings to public associations without specifying clearly the scope of such discretion. This situation allowed the Ministry to request dissolution of an association for anything that it deemed to be a breach of the requirements of the NGO Act, even if it was relatively minor. Therefore, the NGO Act was not formulated with sufficient precision, which made it impossible to foresee, to a reasonable degree, the specific actions (or omissions) that could entail the forced dissolution of the Association.


116.  The Government submitted that the applicants’ administrative detention was imposed under Article 5 § 1 (a) and was compatible with the requirements of that provision. Their cases were examined by a court of first instance, which was the sole competent authority to do so. The sentences were imposed in a procedure  <mask> and in compliance with the relevant procedural rules.


116.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article 11 of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant's rights was not  <mask> and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


39.  The Government submitted that there had been no violation of the applicant organisation’s right to freedom of assembly. Since the applicant organisation had not been informed of the Mayor’s decision within the 72 hours  <mask>, it automatically acquired the right to conduct the planned event by virtue of Section 12 §§ 1, 7 and 8 of the Act. Being unaware of that decision on the date of the event, they had a legal right to conduct the rally as planned. The applicant organisation, however, had decided not to avail itself of this right.


74.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant's initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied her liberty in circumstances which did not follow a procedure  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities' failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


36.  The Government contended that the interference in question was  <mask>, namely Law no. 2911, and that it had pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and protecting public safety. They further claimed that the measure imposed by the security forces should be regarded as answering a pressing social need and was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.


48.  The applicant union submitted that the large-scale wrongful dismissal of its members by their employer had resulted in the absolute eradication of trade unionism across the whole company in less than a year. In that regard, it drew attention to the domestic courts’ responsibility in failing to examine its application within the time  <mask>, thus giving the employer the time to put an end to all trade-union activity in its factories by means of wrongful dismissals. It also emphasised that the domestic courts had given the employer the choice between reinstating the dismissed employees and paying compensation for their dismissal, and that in doing so, they had left the way open for the dismissal of those employees wishing to remain members of the union. In the applicant union’s submission, the national legal system in force at the material time had not safeguarded trade unions’ right to organise within a company, when that company had dismissed all employees belonging to a trade union and then paid them compensation for wrongful dismissal as provided by law.


113.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article 11 of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant's rights was not  <mask> and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


39.  The Government submitted that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly as he was convicted of minor hooliganism under Article 172 of the CAO. In any event, even assuming that there had been an interference, it was  <mask>, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society since the applicant was found to have committed reprehensible acts.


32.  The applicants complained under Article 11 of the Convention that UMO Ilinden – PIRIN had been declared unconstitutional and as a result dissolved. They submitted that this interference with their freedom of association had not been  <mask>, as in its interpretative judgment no. 7 of 1996 the Constitutional Court had held that restrictions of freedom of speech – which, in the applicants’ view, applied mutatis mutandis to freedom of association – would only be justified if the speech in issue posed an immediate threat of violent overturning of the constitutional order and democracy. The applicants further submitted that the interference had not been necessary in a democratic society, as the Constitutional Court had failed to adduce relevant and sufficient reasons for declaring the applicant party unconstitutional.


103.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant’s right to demonstrate under Article 11 of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant’s rights was not  <mask> and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


38.  The applicants contested the Government’s submissions. They argued that the interference was not  <mask>, did not pursue a legitimate aim and was disproportionate. They further submitted that the Association was not a religious organisation and had not engaged in any religious activity. They also noted that although Article 1 of the Law on Non-Governmental Organisations excluded religious organisations from the ambit of the Law, it lacked clarity and accessibility.


79.  The Government submitted that, if the Court were to conclude that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly, this interference was  <mask>. The applicant blocked Mashtots Avenue with a group of people and, by doing so, violated public order, which was qualified as minor hooliganism and fell within the ambit of Article 172 of the CAO.


97.  The Government claimed that the interference in the form of dissolution of the applicant community had been justified,  <mask> and had also pursued a legitimate aim. They referred to the Court's position to the effect that the State was “entitled to verify whether a movement or association carries on, ostensibly in pursuit of religious aims, activities which are harmful to the population” (Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, 26 September 1996, § 40, Reports 1996‑IV) and also “may legitimately consider it necessary to take measures aimed at repressing certain forms of conduct... judged incompatible with respect for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of others” (Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, § 47, Series A no. 295‑A).


104.  The Government submitted that, if the Court were to conclude that there had been an interference with the applicant's right to freedom of peaceful assembly, this interference was  <mask>. The applicant blocked Mashtots Avenue with a group of people and, by doing so, violated public order, which was qualified as minor hooliganism and fell within the ambit of Article 172 of the CAO.


28.  The Government maintained that there had been no interference with the exercise of the applicant’s right to freedom of assembly. They further submitted that, even assuming that there had been interference, it was  <mask> and pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and protecting public safety. They further claimed that the measure imposed by the security forces should be regarded as answering a pressing social need and was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. In this connection, the Government dismissed the applicant’s allegations of ill‑treatment and claimed that, in the circumstances of the present case, the force used on the applicant had been proportionate to the aims pursued.


54.  The Government further argued that the bans had been  <mask>, namely section 12(2)(2) of the Meetings and Marches Act. Also, the measures complained of had pursued a wide range of legitimate aims: protecting national security and public safety, guaranteeing public order in the local community, protecting the rights and freedoms of others and preventing disorder and crime. They had also been necessary in a democratic society, because the authorities had acted in conformity with the laws of the country, their actions had not been arbitrary and they had complied with their positive obligations to guarantee the citizens’ rights under Article 11 of the Convention. Referring to the case of Gustafsson v. Sweden (judgment of 25 April 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑II, pp. 652‑53, § 45), the Government submitted that the Contracting States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in their choice of the means to be employed to attain a legitimate aim.


46. The Government submitted that the State’s interference with the applicants’ freedom of association had been  <mask>. They stated that Article 20 of the Constitution had provided for boundaries in exercising freedom of association. The same restrictions were set out in Article 4 of the Act. They asserted that the Constitutional Court, on the basis of these provisions, had found that the Association’s name and the ideology of Ivan Mihajlov which it pursued had encouraged and incited to national hatred and intolerance and had led to a denial of the free expression of the Macedonian national affiliation. They maintained that the affirmation of the ideas of the Movement, as a terrorist association, would in practice mean killings, terrorist activities and support of fascism and its ideology. That had caused disorder and public reactions, resulting in two incidents at the Association’s opening ceremony. They presented a number of documents concerning Ivan Mihajlov’s life and his activities; the activities of the organisation called the VMRO (Внатрешна Македонска Револуционерна Организација) under his leadership, in particular in the period 1924-1934, and his alleged alliance with the fascist regime during the Second World War. Referring to that material, they maintained that Ivan (Vančo) Mihajlov (Radko) was considered as a person who used terrorist methods to impose the fascist idea of denunciation of the Macedonian people’s identity and to promote the latter as a fictitious and non-existent people called “Macedonian Bulgarians” (Македонски Болгари). They stated that in pursuance of that idea, he and his followers had killed and massacred a considerable number of Macedonians who had fought for the national freedom of their people. The Government stated that the creation and operation of an Association, the name, platform and programme activities of which had been inspired by the name and image of Ivan Mihajlov, had irrefutably been directed towards incitement to national hatred or intolerance, contrary to Article 20 § 3 of the Constitution, something that could result in clashes between the Macedonian people and the citizens associated with the Association. They claimed that repudiation of the identity of the Macedonian people and its statehood had been at the heart of the Association’s activity. Accordingly, violent destruction of the constitutional order was the fundamental objective of the Association. As stated by the Government, the public reaction on the opening ceremony had been clear evidence that the Association would incite to national hatred. The Association’s members had had recourse to brutal physical force against their adversaries, causing injuries for which they had been subsequently convicted by a court and sentenced to imprisonment. The Government submitted that the existence of the Association should be considered as an abuse of freedom of association, as its aim had not been the expression of thoughts and beliefs, but negation of the identity of the Macedonian people through promotion of the fascist ideas of Ivan Mihajlov concerning the “Macedonian Bulgarians”, who were unknown in history, legal science and practice. The ultimate objective of the Association was to initiate national hatred, religious unrest and a revival of the terror that Ivan Mihajlov had practiced in his time, when he executed hundreds of opponents.


94.  The Government submitted that by organising an unauthorised public event, the applicant had committed an administrative offence. The police had warned her that the public event had been unlawful and had demanded that it be stopped. She had not complied. She had also refused to go to the police station. Her escorting to the police station and her administrative arrest had therefore been justified by the need to stop the administrative offence and to hold her liable. Both the escorting and the arrest had been performed in accordance with the procedure  <mask>. She had been released as soon as all the requisite procedural documents had been drawn up. The length of her arrest had been within the statutory limits: it had lasted for four hours and fifteen minutes, which had subsequently been deducted from her penalty.


24.  The applicants submitted that the interference was not  <mask> because the national courts failed to give them clear indications on how to proceed to obtain registration, and construed arbitrarily the constitutional restrictions on freedom to associate. The interference was not necessary in a democratic society either, because the national courts did not have before them any evidence showing that the registration of Ilinden would endanger Bulgaria’s sovereignty or national security. However, those courts accepted uncritically the “official position” on the so‑called “Macedonian question” and justified the refusal on grounds that had nothing to do with the principles of democracy.


19.  The Government submitted that the interference was  <mask>, namely by the relevant provisions of Act no. III of 1989 on the Right of Assembly. Furthermore, it pursued the legitimate aim of securing the rights of others, that is, those of traffic users. As to its necessity, the Government referred to the expert opinion given by the Traffic Division of the Budapest Police Department and stressed that the police had had to balance between the right to assembly and the right to free movement. Since in the present case the event was likely to congest inordinately the traffic of both Venyige Street and perhaps that of Maglódi Road, the neighbouring major thoroughfare, as well, it was the police’s call to restrict the applicant’s Article 11 rights: the measure was thus a necessary and proportionate restriction on the right to assembly.


21.  The applicant argued that the interference with his freedom of religion and assembly was not  <mask> because the deputy head of the Chekhov Town Council had not given reasons for the refusal. If the authorities considered that holding an assembly in the place he had proposed might disturb public order, they could have suggested another place or time. An unqualified ban on services of worship in public places had been disproportionate. He further argued that the authority's apprehension that the peaceful assembly might disturb public order was unsubstantiated. In 1998 the church had held services in public in the town of Chekhov which had not caused any disturbances. Other denominations, such as the Russian Orthodox Church, were allowed to hold services in public and such worship did not provoke any disorder in the town either.


98.  The Government claimed that at about 6.30 p.m. on 31 December 2010 the applicant had been arrested in accordance with Article 27.3 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. He was then taken to the police station as required by Article 27.2 § 1 of the Code to draw up a report on the administrative offence. His subsequent detention pending trial did not exceed the forty-eight hour time-limit set forth in Article 27.5 § 3 of the Code. They considered that the police had fully complied with the procedure  <mask>. They further pointed out that the applicant had been able to challenge his detention before the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow and that on 12 January 2011 it had dismissed the applicant’s appeal, including the point concerning the lawfulness of his detention.


64.  The Government submitted that the police intervention in the demonstration after 5 p.m. was  <mask>, namely Articles 7 and 14 of the Law on Freedom of Assembly, pursued the legitimate aim of preventing disorder and protecting the rights of others, and was necessary in a democratic society as the demonstrators had behaved aggressively and had intended to continue an unlawful demonstration. The Government noted that the demonstration took place without any police intervention from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m., which was the period notified by the organisers. However, as the demonstrators had refused to disperse after 5 p.m., the time the assembly was supposed to end, despite numerous warnings by the police, the latter had to intervene.


46.  The applicant complained under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention that the allegedly arbitrary denial of Latvian citizenship through naturalisation was a punitive measure imposed on him because he had imparted ideas and exercised his right of assembly in order to criticise the government’s position. He further complained that the aforementioned infringements of his rights, contrary to the requirements of Article 10 § 2 and Article 11 § 2 of the Convention, were not  <mask>, did not pursue a legitimate aim and were disproportionate and not necessary in a democratic society. Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention read as follows.


29.  The Government, admitting that the refusal to register the applicant as an association amounted to interference to its right to freedom of association, considers nevertheless that this interference was  <mask>, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. In this respect, they referred to Government Ordinance no. 26/2000 which provides that if the legal requirements for the setting up of an association are not satisfied, the request to register is dismissed. The refusal to register the applicant association in the instant case pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public order and the rights and liberties of the others, namely the rights of those who use the services of lawyers to represent their interests.


44.  The applicants alleged that their conviction under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code, on the basis of Articles 220 § 7 and 314 § 3 of the same Code, and section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 constituted an interference with their right to freedom of assembly. They stated that the interference in question was not  <mask>, within the meaning of Article 11 of the Convention, since they had been unable to anticipate that their participation in the demonstrations of 17 December 2005 and 19 February 2006 and their conduct during those events would lead to them being prosecuted pursuant to these provisions and to the sentences imposed on them. They stressed in this connection that both the ESP and the SGD, in whose activities they had participated, were legal civil society organisations and that the demonstrations in question had been lawful and peaceful.


68.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant’s initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied her liberty in circumstances which did not follow a procedure  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities’ failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


160.  The Government and the applicants agreed with the Chamber’s finding that the interference in question was  <mask>. For the purposes of the present case, the Grand Chamber can accept that the interference was prescribed by law, as interpreted by the combined civil divisions of the Court of Cassation, the highest judicial body to have ruled on the case.


163.  The applicants claimed that the interference had not been  <mask> or necessary in a democratic society. It had been established by the Presnenskiy District Court on 16 August 2002 that the Moscow Justice Department had not invoked the dissolution proceedings before the Golovinskiy District Court as a ground for refusing re-registration. Furthermore, the four criminal investigations between June 1996 and April 1998 had found no criminal activity on the part of the applicant community. In April 1999, after a detailed expert study, the Ministry of Justice had granted re-registration to the federal organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses, of which the applicant community had been a member. Likewise, 398 communities of Jehovah's Witnesses in other Russian regions had been granted registration or re-registration during the same period.


33.  The applicant argued that his conviction under Articles 220 § 7 and 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code had constituted an interference with his right to freedom of assembly. He stated that the interference in question had not been  <mask>, within the meaning of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. In that connection, the applicant argued that the domestic courts had interpreted Article 220 § 7 extensively. He considered that he could not have foreseen that his participation in the public gatherings and expressing his opinions during those events would lead to his prosecution and conviction for aiding an illegal organisation and membership of that organisation. The offence of “aiding an illegal organisation” should be understood as providing weapons, material or confidential information to an illegal organisation, not expressing one’s opinions and attendance at public demonstrations.


84.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant's initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied his liberty in circumstances which did not follow a procedure  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities' failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


70.  The applicants claimed that the right to freedom of religion encompassed the expectation that members would be allowed to associate freely without arbitrary State intervention. Therefore, the State was prohibited from regulating State-Church relationships arbitrarily; any interference in that sphere had to be  <mask>, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society. The requirements relating to the registration of Churches had to be objective and reasonable, because in this matter the State was required to remain neutral and impartial. Consequently, if a religious community met the legal requirements it had to be entitled to be registered as a Church, and the registration procedure had to offer guarantees of fairness.


69.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant's initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied his liberty in circumstances which did not follow a procedure  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities' failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for his arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


96.  The Government submitted that the interference had been  <mask>, namely by the amended section 3 § 2 and section 41 of the Political Parties Act and section 2 of the Amending Act (see paragraphs 33, 34 and 54 above). In particular, the above provisions required that, by 1 January 2006, all political parties should increase their membership to 50,000 persons and the membership of their regional branches to 500 persons. It also followed from those legal provisions that if a party had not increased its membership it had to reorganise itself into a public association or be dissolved. The applicable domestic law was accessible and formulated in clear terms so that the applicant had been able to foresee that failure to comply with the above requirements would lead to its dissolution.


22.  The Government submitted that under Article 11 of the Convention the right of assembly was not an absolute right and therefore could be subjected to restrictions. In Hungary, the possibility of interfering with that right was laid down in an Act of Parliament. The holding of certain assemblies and meetings on public areas must be notified three days ahead. Under section 11(2) of the Assembly Act, the police were empowered to remove from the venue those who disturbed the assembly. In the course of securing an assembly, a police officer might, upon the well-founded suspicion of an administrative or criminal offence, apprehend the perpetrator; under section 142(2) b) of Act no. LXIX of 1999 on Administrative Offences, disobedience was punishable with a fine. Thus, the applicant’s right to freedom of assembly had been restricted in compliance with the conditions  <mask>.


67.  The Government further argued that the applicants’ detention had been lawful and in accordance with a procedure  <mask>. It had been based on section 55(1), paragraph 2 (a), of the PSOA. The detention of the second applicant, who had been arrested in 2002 on suspicion of dangerous interference with rail traffic, had been based, in addition, on section 55(1), paragraph 2 (c), of the PSOA.


117.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article 11 of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant's rights was not  <mask> and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


35.  The applicants pointed out that the sole reason for the St Petersburg City Court’s upholding the refusal to register the applicant group as a religious organisation had been the lack of a reliable document confirming its presence in St Petersburg for fifteen years. They contended that the refusal had not been “prescribed by law” because the law did not meet the standards of clarity and foreseeability required under the Convention. Referring to Article 132 of the Russian Constitution and sections 7(2) and 11(5) of the Religions Act, the applicants submitted that the law expressly authorised local authorities to issue letters confirming the length of a group’s existence and that the courts’ rejection of the confirmation letter on the basis of an alleged lack of authority was unreasonable. Furthermore, whereas the Religions Act required only formal presentation of a confirmation letter, the courts had rejected it as “unreliable” with reference to arbitrary criteria that were not  <mask> and had imposed an unforeseeable and unattainable threshold.


15.  The Government submitted that the interference was  <mask>, namely by the relevant provisions of the Assembly Act. Furthermore, it pursued the legitimate aim of securing the rights of others, that is, those of other road users. As to its necessity, the Government stressed that the police had had to balance the right to assembly and the right to free movement. Since in the present case the event was likely to cause inordinate traffic congestion in both Venyige Street and the neighbouring major thoroughfare, it was the police’s prerogative to restrict the applicant’s Article 11 rights: the measure was thus a necessary and proportionate restriction on the right to assembly.


33.  The Government claimed that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies in respect of the decision of 7 April 2003, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. According to Article 286 of the CAO, the court's decision to impose an administrative penalty was final and not subject to appeal except for the cases  <mask>. Such an exception in respect of cases concerning offences under Article 172 of the CAO was provided by Article 294 of the CAO. This Article prescribed two possibilities to have the court's decision quashed, either by requesting the prosecutor to lodge a protest or by lodging an appeal directly with the chairman of a superior court. Thus, if a party had applied to a prosecutor but the latter refused to lodge a protest, then this party was entitled to appeal to the chairman of a superior court. Moreover, a party was entitled to appeal immediately to the chairman of a superior court without having first applied to a prosecutor. The applicant was informed about this possibility, since the decision of 7 April 2003 stated that “it was subject to review by the Chairman of the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal”. However, he used only the first of these two possibilities and did not apply to the Chairman.


50.  The applicant’s deprivation of liberty clearly did not fall under sub‑paragraphs (a), (d), (e) or (f) of paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Convention. Nor could it be said to fall under sub—paragraph (b): there was no evidence of non‑compliance with a lawful order of a court and the applicant’s detention could not have been to secure the fulfilment of an obligation  <mask> because, at the time his arrest, there was no unfulfilled obligation on the applicant (see Vasileva v. Denmark, no. 52792/99, § 36, 25 September 2003).


42.  The Government firstly submitted that the applicant party’s dissolution had been  <mask>, namely the Constitution of 1991 and the Political Parties Act of 1990. By Article 149 § 1 (5) of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court had the power to rule on the constitutionality of political parties. The grounds for declaring the applicant party unconstitutional were Article 44 of the Constitution and section 3 of the Political Parties Act of 1990. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court had exercised its powers in a lawful manner.


81.  The applicants further submitted that the interference with their rights was not  <mask>. In particular, arresting and detaining persons active in opposition politics ostensibly for the administrative offence of failing to obey police orders but in reality in order to prevent their attendance of opposition rallies could not be considered as a measure prescribed by law. Furthermore, the interference did not pursue a legitimate aim, since the aim of such administrative detention was not to prevent disorder but to hinder opposition calls challenging the incumbent President. There was no history of public disorder at previous opposition demonstrations, nor was there any ban on demonstrations in April 2004 which were essentially peaceful rallies. Thus, their detention was merely a pretext to interfere unlawfully with the opposition campaign of peaceful protests.


41.  The Government submitted that the evacuation order that had brought the assembly to an end was  <mask>. The Ordinance of 12 Messidor, Year VIII, and Article L. 2512-13 of the Code of the Territorial Authorities conferred on the Paris Commissioner of Police full powers to maintain public order. The Commissioner of Police had therefore possessed the necessary power to make the order of 22 August 1996 for the eviction of the occupants of St Bernard's Church.


23.  The Government submitted that the applicants had been escorted to the police station and then administratively arrested for the legitimate purpose of drawing up an administrative offence record. While Russian law did not establish a maximum length of time for escorting to a police station, administrative arrest was limited to three hours. That requirement had been respected in the applicants’ cases, as their administrative arrest had not exceeded three hours: from 10.30 a.m. to 1.20 p.m. as regards the first applicant and from 10.30 a.m. to 1.10 a.m. as regards the second applicant. All procedural requirements  <mask> had therefore been respected.


102.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant’s right to demonstrate under Article 11 of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant’s rights was not  <mask> and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


40.  The applicants complained that during their detention at the Buiucani Police Station their mobile telephones were taken away from them and that the police officers searched through their telephones’ memory and deleted audio and video files of sounds and images of the demonstration. According to them, the police deleted materials which would have been inconsistent with the latter’s version of the events. This fact constituted an interference with their right to private life and correspondence which was not  <mask> and was not necessary in a democratic society.


80.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant's initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied her liberty in circumstances which did not follow a procedure  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities' failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


29.  The Government were of the opinion that, even assuming an interference, it had been  <mask>, pursued a legitimate aim (namely, the protection of the rights and freedoms of others) and been necessary in a democratic society. The interference, if any, had not constituted a hidden obstacle to a peaceful, spontaneous assembly. They referred to the case of Éva Molnár (cited above, § 39), in which the Court had established that those events – which were direct consequences of the incident discussed in the present case – had not disclosed special circumstances of the kind to which the only adequate response had been an immediate demonstration. In any event, the applicant could have exercised his right to assembly in a manner which would not have violated the criminal law. However, the applicant had opted to engage in criminal conduct, the sanction for which was nevertheless very mild, by no means disproportionate.


19.  The Government contested the applicant’s argument. They submitted that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of assembly had been  <mask>, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public order and the rights of others and had been necessary in a democratic society. They noted that the applicant had not only attended a demonstration organised in support of the PKK, which was considered to be a terrorist organisation by a number of international organisations, including the Court itself, but had also disseminated propaganda in its favour.


31.  The Government were further of the view that the interference with the applicant's rights had been  <mask>, namely the Constitution of 1991, the Persons and Family Act of 1949 and the Political Parties Act of 1990. It had been intended to safeguard a wide range of public interests. All three levels of court had lawfully and justifiably refused to register the association.


34.  The applicant alleged a breach of her right to freedom of peaceful assembly with other aliens for the purposes of denouncing their treatment. The interference with that right was not  <mask> (as the evacuation order was illegal), and was neither justified by a legitimate aim, nor proportionate. She alleged a violation of Article 11 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:


83.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant's initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied her liberty in circumstances which did not follow a procedure  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities' failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


28.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of assembly was  <mask>, namely by section 6 of the Assembly Act. It served a legitimate aim, as its purpose was to maintain public order and to protect the rights and freedoms of others, namely the undisturbed worship of all those visiting the cemetery on All Saints’ Day, an activity which was itself protected by Article 9 of the Convention.


105.  The Government submitted that any possible interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of peaceful assembly had been  <mask>. The applicants had been convicted under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code, prescribing punishment for serious breaches of public order. Referring to the Court’s judgment in Galstyan (cited above, § 107) and taking into account the diversity inherent in public-order offences, the Government considered that the domestic legal norm had been formulated with sufficient precision (see also the arguments developed by the Government under Article 7 of the Convention – paragraphs 188-91 below).


56.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s judicial-review complaint against the refusal to approve the location of her public event had been examined before the planned date of that event and had been allowed in part. The domestic courts had found, in particular, that the town administration had failed to provide her with a well-reasoned proposal to change the location of the event. Moreover, no writ of execution had been issued. The Government further submitted that the domestic courts had had to assess whether the contested decision had been lawful and well-reasoned, and whether the procedure  <mask> for adopting it had been complied with. However, the courts had no competence to examine the “reasonableness” of any proposal to change the location.


47.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of assembly was  <mask>. The applicants’ convictions had been based on Articles 220 § 7 and 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code and section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. The wording of those provisions met the explicitness and predictability requirements within the meaning of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. The applicants had participated in demonstrations in favour of the MLKP and had chanted illegal slogans. Moreover, the police had seized illegal items from the homes of Deniz Bakır, Metin Kürekçi, Alihan Alhan and Necla Çomak, who had been found to have organic links with the MLKP and who had disseminated propaganda in favour of that organisation.


70.  The applicant argued that her message on VKontakte had not contained any calls for participation; it had simply informed the readers about her intention to hold a meeting. The domestic authorities had not, however, attempted to draw a distinction between “campaigning” and “informing”. Moreover, the District Court’s conviction judgment had contradicted its previous decision that the refusal to approve the meeting had been unlawful. The interference with the applicant’s rights had not therefore been  <mask>.


57.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant’s initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied her liberty in circumstances which did not follow a procedure  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities’ failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


66.  The applicants accepted in principle that protection of  <mask> and the rights and freedoms of others and the prevention of crime might depend on safeguarding the principle of secularism. However, they submitted that in pleading those aims the Government sought to conceal the underlying reasons which had led to Refah’s dissolution. In reality, they argued, this had been the aim of major business concerns and the military, whose interests were threatened by Refah’s economic policy, involving a reduction of the national debt to zero.


36.  The Government contended that the interference in question was prescribed by law, namely Law no. 2911, and that it had pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and protecting  <mask>. They further claimed that the measure imposed by the security forces should be regarded as answering a pressing social need and was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.


52.  The Government did not argue that there had not been an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of assembly other than to submit that the case was not within the scope of Article 11. Even assuming that the applicant’s acts had fallen within the scope of Article 11, they submitted that the State authorities’ acts and decisions had had the legitimate aims of protecting national security, territorial integrity,  <mask> and public order as well as the prevention of crime. They argued that interfering with the demonstrations in question, which had incited people to violence and which had been organised by members of the PKK, a terrorist organisation, had corresponded to a pressing social need and had been necessary in a democratic society. They stressed that the applicant had not been convicted for taking part in a funeral.


96.  The Government considered that neither Article 10 nor Article 11 of the Convention had been breached. The interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression and freedom of assembly by their detention had been justified. It had been based on section 55(1), paragraph 2 (a), of the PSOA, a provision which had been sufficiently precise to be foreseeable in terms of its application to the applicants. It had pursued legitimate aims, as the applicants’ detention had been in the interest of  <mask> and for the prevention of crime.


34.  The applicants argued that by refusing to register Ilinden the authorities had infringed their rights under Article 11 of the Convention. The refusal of the courts had been based on deliberately erroneous findings in respect of the relevant facts and a misconstruction of the applicable law. It was clear that freedom of association could not be subjected to restrictions other than those which were provided for by law for the protection of national security and  <mask>, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


21.  The applicant also contended that the fact that the domestic courts had considered that the principles promoted by the association had been very general and had given rise to the possibility of their being classified as belonging to the domain of political parties could not have amounted to sufficient and compelling evidence of a threat to national security or to  <mask> and order. There had also been no similarity between the activities listed by the founding members of the association in the organisation’s articles of association and the activities carried out by political parties as defined by Law no. 14/2003 on political parties.


125.  The Government also argued that, even assuming there had been interference with the applicant’s rights, such interference was prescribed by sections 7 and 8 of the Public Gatherings Act; it aimed at ensuring  <mask>, preventing disorder and protecting the rights of others. The interference had been necessary since the applicant had made unsubstantiated statements accusing judges of criminal offences, attacking their reputation and honour, and thus undermining the authority of the judiciary. The dispersal of the demonstration had also been justified, since the applicant and others had acted in violation of the Public Gatherings Act. In any event, the Public Gatherings Act expressly prohibited public events in the immediate vicinity of court buildings, including the buildings of the Supreme Court of Russia.


54.  The Government further argued that the bans had been prescribed by law, namely section 12(2)(2) of the Meetings and Marches Act. Also, the measures complained of had pursued a wide range of legitimate aims: protecting national security and  <mask>, guaranteeing public order in the local community, protecting the rights and freedoms of others and preventing disorder and crime. They had also been necessary in a democratic society, because the authorities had acted in conformity with the laws of the country, their actions had not been arbitrary and they had complied with their positive obligations to guarantee the citizens’ rights under Article 11 of the Convention. Referring to the case of Gustafsson v. Sweden (judgment of 25 April 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑II, pp. 652‑53, § 45), the Government submitted that the Contracting States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in their choice of the means to be employed to attain a legitimate aim.


15.  The Government submitted in particular that the interference, lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of securing the unimpeded operation of the representative bodies of the people (that is,  <mask> and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others). Furthermore, they argued that the applicant had been adamant in rejecting the police’s suggested compromise to limit the area in question to a secluded part of Kossuth Square, although this solution would have been reconcilable with the undisturbed work and the free movement of the MPs. The envisaged event, foreseen to involve 150 to 200 participants and sound amplification, would have constituted a large crowd in Kossuth Square, capable of disrupting Parliament’s activities if spread over the entire area. In the light of this, the interference had not been disproportionate in their view.


44.  The applicant contested the Government’s argument that the dissolution of the Association had pursued a legitimate aim in the interests of national security or  <mask>, that is, for the prevention of disorder and crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others within the meaning of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. In his view, the courts had failed to establish any instances of actual disorder or any violation of the rights of others. He stressed that the domestic decisions had referred to a merely hypothetical danger whose prevention could not be seen as a legitimate aim under the Convention.


28.  The Government maintained that there had been no interference with the exercise of the applicant’s right to freedom of assembly. They further submitted that, even assuming that there had been interference, it was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and protecting  <mask>. They further claimed that the measure imposed by the security forces should be regarded as answering a pressing social need and was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. In this connection, the Government dismissed the applicant’s allegations of ill‑treatment and claimed that, in the circumstances of the present case, the force used on the applicant had been proportionate to the aims pursued.


93.  The applicant submitted, firstly, that the requirements of minimum membership and regional representation were not justified under the second paragraph of Article 11. In particular, they were unreasonable and did not pursue any legitimate aim. The imposition of such requirements on political parties could not be justified by the interests of national security or  <mask>. Nor were they necessary for the prevention of disorder or crime or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


187.  The Government submitted that there had been an interference with the exercise of the applicants’ freedom of peaceful assembly within the meaning of Article 11 and their freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention, but that the interference had been in accordance with the law, in particular Article 71 of the Criminal Code. They submitted that the interference had been in the interests of  <mask>. They also argued that it had been necessary in a democratic society, particularly because the applicants’ actions during the events of 9 March 2001 had gone beyond the range allowed to be committed by an individual in exercising his rights under the Convention, as they had been accompanied by riotous damage, destruction of property and resistance towards the authorities. Their rally had therefore not been of a peaceful character.


48.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s rights had been lawful, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been proportionate to that aim. The domestic legal provisions governing the notification and conduct of public events struck a fair balance between the interests of the organisers of and participants in such events on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of all others – in particular, by providing for adequate measures to prevent and punish infringements of public order and  <mask>.


106.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of  <mask> and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


110.  The Government contended that the applicants could not rely on the moratorium on the Act on the Re-establishment of the State of Lithuania as it never came into effect since the precondition of the USSR opening bilateral negotiations was not respected (paragraphs 14-17 and 67-68 above). The applicants were aware of this as they and the Soviet Union had continued to insist that Lithuania renounce that Act (paragraphs 14, 19 and 20 above). In any event, the Act itself did not fall within the proposed moratorium and its validity remained unaffected. Moreover, the Supreme Council did not suspend any of its legislative or other activities aimed at consolidating the restoration of independence. The conditional moratorium thus had no impact on the  <mask> of the criminal nature of the applicants’ behaviour. Instead they sought to prevent negotiations with the USSR, preferring the use of force. The recognition of this situation by the USSR and the applicants is demonstrated by the repeated demands during the periods of 29 June - 28 December 1990 and January - August 1991 that Lithuania renounce its legislation of 11 March 1990 and reinstate the Soviet Constitution.


92.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of  <mask> and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


35.  The applicants pointed out that the sole reason for the St Petersburg City Court’s upholding the refusal to register the applicant group as a religious organisation had been the lack of a reliable document confirming its presence in St Petersburg for fifteen years. They contended that the refusal had not been “prescribed by law” because the law did not meet the standards of clarity and  <mask> required under the Convention. Referring to Article 132 of the Russian Constitution and sections 7(2) and 11(5) of the Religions Act, the applicants submitted that the law expressly authorised local authorities to issue letters confirming the length of a group’s existence and that the courts’ rejection of the confirmation letter on the basis of an alleged lack of authority was unreasonable. Furthermore, whereas the Religions Act required only formal presentation of a confirmation letter, the courts had rejected it as “unreliable” with reference to arbitrary criteria that were not prescribed by law and had imposed an unforeseeable and unattainable threshold.


93.  The applicants submitted that the domestic legislation serving as a basis for their criminal conviction had not complied with the principle of  <mask>. They argued in particular that each time they had been convicted for failing to stop participating in an unauthorised demonstration, despite the fact that the procedure for holding an assembly had not been clearly defined in domestic law.


70.  The applicant submitted that the domestic law serving as a basis for his conviction had not complied with the principle of  <mask>. In particular, he had been convicted for failing to stop participating in an unauthorised demonstration, despite the fact that the procedure for holding an assembly had not been clearly defined in domestic law. While the Constitution required only prior notification about a planned assembly, application by the authorities of certain provisions of the Law on Freedom of Assembly of 13 November 1998 resulted in a de facto system of prior authorisation.


37.  The Government further argued that the interference with the applicant’s rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, if any, was prescribed by law. The applicant’s conviction had been based on Article 220 § 7 of the Criminal Code and the wording of that provision met the accessibility and  <mask> requirements within the meaning of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. The interference in question had the legitimate aims of protecting national security and public order as well as preventing crime.