40.  The applicant complained that the above-mentioned proceedings had not been fair because: (a) a  <mask> had not been held, (b) the proceedings had not been adversarial and the principle of equality of arms had not been respected in that the expert opinions of eminent lawyers and opinions and information obtained from various institutions by the Constitutional Court had been served on her only after the proceedings had ended, and (c) the Constitutional Court had not been impartial given that judges M.J. and D.Š. had sat in the panel of that court that delivered the decision in her case even though these two judges had acted as third parties in the previous proceedings before the Administrative Court, in which they, inter alia, had expressed their opinion that the election of the three judges to the Constitutional Court had been lawful. The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


82.  The applicant complained that the proceedings concerning his sick leave, that is the second and fifth sets of proceedings, had been unfair and discriminatory. The applicant further submitted that he had not received any legal aid during the second set of proceedings. With respect to the first set of proceedings, the applicant also complained about the lack of a  <mask>.


33.  The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 that the supervisory review decision of 10 August 2001 violated the principle of legal certainty. The applicant further complained under Article 6 of the Convention that in breach of the right to a fair and  <mask> neither he nor his lawyer were summoned to the supervisory review hearing held by the Supreme Court of Russia on 10 August 2001. Insofar as relevant, these Articles read as follows:


192.  The applicant claimed EUR 153,532 for the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Chamber and EUR 27,338.70 for the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber (including those of the  <mask> before the Grand Chamber). He submitted detailed time sheets indicating the amount of hours spent by his lawyers for the preparation of the case before the Court: 669.5 hours of legal work, charged at an hourly rate of EUR 190.50, and 406.9 hours of para-legal work, including translations, charged at an hourly rate of EUR 63.50, in respect of the proceedings before the Chamber; 135.6 hours of legal work and 13.4 hours of para-legal work in respect of the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, charged at the same hourly rates. The applicant’s total claim for costs and expenses came to EUR 180,870.70.


33.  The applicant complained, in particular, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that no information was provided to him about the date and time of the hearing on 14 August 2000 in the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Court and that there was no  <mask> on that occasion. The applicant alleged various violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant provides as follows:


76.  The Government submitted that the applicant had had a fair and  <mask>. He had failed to submit any proof in support of his allegation that the judge had not been impartial. The applicant had been provided with an opportunity to call witnesses, submit evidence and to lodge requests and challenges, which he had failed to do. The judge had advised the applicant to avail himself of his right to have a lawyer but he did not wish to do so. The applicant’s argument that the materials of the administrative case against him had not been revealed to him prior to the hearing was not supported by the materials of the case: both the record of arrest and the record of an administrative offence had been signed by the applicant after he was taken to the police station. Thus, taking into account that the applicant had signed the record of an administrative offence without any objections, had refused to have a lawyer, had not lodged any requests and had not availed himself of other procedural rights, the police officers had considered two hours to be sufficient for the preparation of the applicant’s defence.


129.  The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that his right to a fair and  <mask> during the appellate proceedings had been restricted, that he had been unable to obtain examination of witnesses prepared to testify on his behalf, and that the court had been biased in favour of the prosecution and had rejected the majority of his petitions without justification. Article 6 provides, where relevant, as follows:


106.  The applicants alleged that the proceedings before the CONSOB had been essentially in written form, that no  <mask> had been scheduled and that the rights of the defence were not respected. The Court of Cassation itself had acknowledged that the guarantees of a fair trial and protection of the rights of the defence (Articles 111 and 24 of the Constitution) did not apply to administrative proceedings (see paragraph 38 above).


90.  The Government asserted that the Juvenile Court had heard the applicant in person on 2 August 2000. As to the question whether there should have been a  <mask>, the Government asserted that the 1854 Non-Contentious Proceedings Act left it to the discretion of the court whether or not to hold a hearing in public. However, the right to a public hearing was not absolute and an exclusion of the public was admissible under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, inter alia, in the interests of a minor or for the protection of the private life of the parties. Referring to B. and P. v. the United Kingdom (nos. 36337/97 and 35974/97, § 38, ECHR 2001-III), the Government argued that court proceedings involving custody decisions of minors were prime examples of such justified exclusion of the public. Finally, they submitted that the applicant had not asked for a public hearing.


35.  The applicants considered that it was the concept of debate itself that lay at the heart of their applications. A debate necessarily entailed unity of time and place. However, under French law, the place where the debate was organised was the  <mask> held by the Criminal Division and the debate began on the day of the hearing. They contended that they had been deprived of unity of time and place, as their pleadings had been lodged at the beginning of the proceedings before the Court of Cassation, whereas the advocate-general had made his submissions on the day of the hearing. Furthermore, appellants in the Court of Cassation had to make their representations in writing whereas the advocate-general made his submissions orally. The solution would therefore be to permit appellants in the Court of Cassation to take part in all the stages of the proceedings before the Criminal Division, including the hearing, with the assistance of a lawyer of their choosing, that is to say without being required to instruct a member of the Conseil d'Etat and Court of Cassation Bar. On that point, they challenged the monopoly of the members of the Conseil d'Etat and Court of Cassation Bar, pointing out, inter alia, firstly, that lawyers practising at a European bar had sufficient technical expertise to take part in proceedings before the Court of Cassation, as attested by the fact that they were entitled to appear before all other national and European courts and, secondly, that the monopoly on the rights to address the Court of Cassation was not based on any provision of domestic law.


64.  The Government submitted that the applicant had had a fair and  <mask>. He had failed to submit any proof in support of his allegation that the judge had not been impartial. The applicant had been provided with an opportunity to call witnesses, submit evidence and to lodge requests and challenges, which he had failed to do. The police officers and the judge had advised the applicant to avail himself of his right to have a lawyer but he himself had not wished to do so. The materials of the case had been revealed to the applicant prior to the hearing, which was demonstrated by the fact that those materials had been signed by the applicant. Thus, taking into account that the applicant had signed the record of an administrative offence without any objections, had refused to have a lawyer, had not lodged any requests and had not availed himself of other procedural rights, the police officers had considered two hours to be sufficient for the preparation of the applicant's defence.


39.  The applicant further disputed the facts as established by the Ljubljana District Court, and argued that he had never had a chance to tell his side of the story, let alone be heard at a  <mask>. He argued that under the domestic law he should have been given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings. He submitted that the Companies Act required that the general provisions of the Non-Litigious Civil Procedure Act applied to the proceedings in the present case (see paragraphs 24 and 25 above). In his view, the judge deciding the case had consciously acted in breach of law, expecting that his decision would not be subject to any further scrutiny.


130.  The Government submitted that the applicants had had a fair and  <mask>. They had failed to submit any proof in support of their allegations that the judges examining their cases were not impartial. The courts had not based their findings solely on the materials prepared by the police but also on the applicants’ own submissions made in court. The applicants had been provided with an opportunity to call and examine witnesses, submit evidence and file motions and challenges, which they had failed to do. Furthermore, they had been informed of their right to have a lawyer both by the police officers and during the court proceedings, but they had not wish to do so. The applicants had had sufficient time and facilities for the preparation of their defence.


71.  The applicants argued that the rules on exclusion of the public from a hearing should be construed narrowly and that such exclusion should occur only when it was strictly necessary in the circumstances of a case. They maintained that in their case the exclusion of the public from the entire trial and the appeal proceedings had been unjustified and that the courts should have opted for partial exclusion. The trial had been held entirely in camera, even though some evidence heard by the Regional Court was not classified. The Court of Appeal had not held a  <mask> either, despite the fact that the classified evidence had been excluded.


49.  The Government added that this judgment was not the final decision in the case, the determination of the scope of the applicant’s property rights to the lands in question being the subject of the subsequent proceedings before the Land Office. In this context, they emphasised, as they had already done at the admissibility stage, that the applicant could have lodged a remedy against the Land Office’s decision of 25 July 1995, as provided for in section 9(6) of the Land Ownership Act. If he had done so, he could have requested the Municipal Court to re-examine this administrative decision at a  <mask>. Furthermore, the applicant could have brought a civil action before a competent district court, pursuant to section 8(1) of the Land Ownership Act, thereby disputing the validity of the transfer of his father’s property to the natural persons concerned.


31.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that they had been deprived of their right to a fair and  <mask> in the determination of the criminal charges against them. They stressed the fact that the courts had determined their case without holding a hearing. The applicants further alleged a breach of Article 6 § 3 (a) of the Convention in that they had not been informed promptly of the accusations against them as the public prosecutor's indictment had not been communicated to them. Finally, they complained that they had been deprived of their right to submit counter-arguments and evidence, including the examination of witnesses, within the meaning of Article 6 § 3 (b) and (d).


23.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that his conviction was unfair. In particular, he challenged the independence and impartiality of the trial judge, as he had to take into the consideration the position of the Regional Court expressed in its decision of 30 November 1999. He also complained that the non- <mask> of the case on 22 June 2000 was unreasonable and unlawful.


51.  The Government argued, in particular, that the reservation at issue could not be considered as a prohibited reservation of a general nature. The wording of the reservation referred to a specific Convention Article, Article 6 § 1, and, more specifically, to the requirement that “... everyone is entitled to a fair and  <mask> ...” and that “[j]udgment shall be pronounced publicly”.


31.  The applicant company complained about the quashing of the resolution of the Review Panel of 11 March 1999, stating that the latter had been the final and binding decision given in its favour. It alleged that the procedure before the Plenary Court had been incompatible with the principles of legal certainty, equality of arms and a  <mask>. The applicant invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:


61.  The Government maintained that the only point at issue in the proceedings complained of was whether the applicants were entitled to have the property restored within the meaning of Section 4 of the Land Ownership Act and, in particular, whether or not that property had been expropriated from individuals or from a legal person. Since the Regional Court had determined that issue in a different set of proceedings, to which the applicants had been a party and in the course of which a  <mask> had been held, the Government concluded that the Nitra Regional Court’s failure to hold a hearing in the proceedings complained of had not been contrary to the requirements of Article 6 § 1.


96.  The Government submitted that after the CCrP had been amended in 1999, pre-trial detention was ordered by the competent first‑instance court, after a  <mask> in the presence of the prospective detainee and of his counsel. The court issued a decision forthwith and in case of an appeal, the hearing before the appellate court was scheduled for not later than seven days after that. The basis for these amendments had been the Convention, which was directly applicable in Bulgaria.


27. The Government further stressed that had the Supreme Court found it necessary to take oral evidence, it would have been required under Article 157 (3) of the Penal Code to do so. However, the applicant did not avail himself of the possibility under Icelandic law to request the Supreme Court to hear witnesses. Nor did he use the possibility of being present at the  <mask> in his case, during which it would have been possible for him to address that court. The matter of which he complains under the Convention was never put to the Supreme Court, either in substance or by express reference to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant's counsel had tacitly accepted on his behalf that there was no reason for the applicant or the witnesses to give oral testimony to the Supreme Court.


17.  The applicant submitted that his right to a  <mask> under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had been breached. Relying on the Court’s case‑law in Fredin v. Sweden (no. 2) (23 February 1994, Series A no.  283‑A), and Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden (no. 2) (19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I) he was of the view that only exceptional circumstances could justify not holding an oral hearing. He stressed that his case before the domestic courts involved numerous questions of fact and difficult legal issues which were of fundamental significance. Therefore, he saw no reason to dispense with a hearing.


24.  The applicant submitted that the Administrative Court had unlawfully dismissed his request to hold an oral hearing, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to discuss the expert opinions in the context of a  <mask>. Since an oral hearing could have elucidated the facts of the case, the Court's refusal to hold one was in breach of Article 6 of the Convention.


18.  The applicant complained that he did not have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and that he was not allowed to defend himself in person or through a lawyer as there were no public hearings. Moreover, he complained that he did not have the possibility of an effective appeal to the Court of Cassation. He claimed that if he had a regular trial with a  <mask>, rather than a penal order, he would have also had the chance to appeal before the Court of Cassation. He invoked Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention:


69.  The Government submitted that in accordance with Article 360 § 1 (3) of the CCP a court could order that part or all of a hearing be held in camera if a  <mask> might disclose matters which should remain secret in the light of significant State interest. In the present case that interest concerned the secrecy of police investigation procedures. In the Government’s view, it remained within the State’s margin of appreciation to order part or all of the hearing to be held in camera or to classify the evidence. The Government underlined that the exclusion of the public from the hearing had been indispensable in order to protect the secrecy of police investigation procedures and ensure their efficacy. The exclusion in the present case had been “strictly necessary” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.


28.  The Government disputed the applicant’s allegations, arguing that all elements of a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had been preserved in the relevant proceedings before the Icelandic courts. The Government stressed that applicant’s case had been argued orally at a  <mask> in the District Court where the parties had enjoyed equal status in every respect and unlimited and equal access to the evidence adduced and the same possibilities to call witnesses. In the proceedings before the Supreme Court the defendant had waived his right to respond to the applicant’s appeal with written pleadings and additional evidence. As a consequence, under the relevant statutory rules on civil procedure, he was then assumed to adhere to the requests he had made to the District Court. This had not, however, entailed any restriction on the applicant’s right to submit her requests and new evidence to the Supreme Court. The statutory arrangement that her case would not be orally argued before the Supreme Court under these circumstances had been based on reasonable and justifiable grounds relating to the changed nature of the proceedings when the adversary party opted not to respond appellant’s submissions.


28.  The Government argued that the applicants had not sustained a significant disadvantage owing to the failure of the Constitutional Court to hold an oral and  <mask>. An oral hearing would not have contributed to the establishment of new or different facts. The relevant facts regarding the applicants’ removal from the Parliament gallery had been undisputed between the parties and could have been established on the basis of written evidence submitted in support of the applicants’ constitutional complaint.


31.  The applicant complained of a breach, before the Court of Audit, of his right to a “fair and  <mask> ... by an ... impartial tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. He submitted that, prior to the hearing, neither he nor his lawyer had received the reporting judge’s report (whereas it had been sent to State Counsel) and that the reporting judge had taken part in the deliberations of the bench despite having previously been involved in investigating the case. Referring to Guisset v. France (no. 33933/96, §§ 72-74, ECHR 2000‑IX), he added that he had neither been summoned to the hearing nor invited to submit his observations, nor even informed of the date of the hearing, which, moreover, was not public.


56.  The applicant asserted that he had not been given all the necessary guarantees that the members of the jury were intellectually capable of reasoning in decisive terms, even though professional judges had previously drawn their attention to that issue. In the applicant's submission, it would have been possible to proceed in a manner that respected everyone's rights; it was not unfeasible to hear evidence from masked or hidden witnesses at a  <mask> in the Assize Court, or during an investigation, as was shown by the case of Van Mechelen and Others v. the Netherlands (23 April 1997, Reports 1997-III).


18.  The Government emphasised that in the present case the Regional Court had neither considered the first-instance judgment ill-founded nor found it necessary to take evidence or to hear the applicant. The applicant’s case had not presented any special circumstances requiring the defendant to be heard by the appellate court, unlike other cases with which the Court has dealt with (cf. Constantinescu v. Romania, op. cit., § 58; Botten v. Norway, judgment of 19 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-I, § 50). Neither the character of the offence nor the nature of the evidence had imperatively required the applicant to be heard by the appellate court: his credibility had not been decisive in assessing the evidence. Lastly, the Government pointed out that the appellate court, unlike the above-mentioned cases where the second-instance court had found the defendants guilty the first time, had simply reviewed the first-instance judgment already convicting the applicant. In these circumstances it had not been necessary to hold a  <mask>.


93.  The applicant bank’s shareholders could also assert their rights by making objections to the list of agreed claims drawn up by the bank’s liquidators. Such objections would be examined jointly by the liquidators, the debtor (the applicant bank), the creditor whose claim was challenged, and the person who had made the objection. If the liquidators rejected their objections, the shareholders could later repeat them before the insolvency court, which would examine them at a  <mask> (see paragraph 66 above). In such proceedings the courts could scrutinize the facts disputed by the applicant bank, including the question of the existence of the debt to the Commercial and Savings Bank AD and its repayment. The applicant bank’s shareholders had not availed themselves of that possibility.


37.  The applicants further complained under Article 6 of the Convention about the lack of a  <mask> before the Constitutional Court. They also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the Republic of Austria, by repeatedly appealing against the decisions of the agricultural authorities, was trying deliberately to delay the exchange of the right to the use of the wood for ownership of the land.


80.  The applicant finally claimed that the hearing was not public since it was allegedly held in a judge's office at 23h00. The Court reiterates that the public character of court hearings constitutes a fundamental principle enshrined in Article 6 § 1 (see, among other authorities, Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263, pp. 19-20, § 58). The accused's right to a  <mask> is not only an additional guarantee that an endeavour will be made to establish the truth but also helps to ensure that he is satisfied that his case is being determined by a tribunal whose independence and impartiality he may verify. The public character of proceedings before judicial bodies protects litigants against the administration of justice in secret without public scrutiny; it is also one of the means whereby confidence in the courts, superior and inferior, can be maintained. By rendering the administration of justice visible, publicity contributes to the achievement of the aim of Article 6 § 1, namely a fair trial, the guarantee of which is one of the fundamental principles of any democratic society, within the meaning of the Convention (see Fejde v. Sweden, judgment of 29 October 1991, Series A no. 212‑C, pp. 67-68, § 28; Tierce and Others v. San Marino, nos. 24954/94, 24971/94 and 24972/94, § 92, ECHR 2000‑IX).


70.  The Government submitted that the applicant had had a fair and  <mask>. He had failed to submit any proof in support of his allegation that the judge had not been impartial. The applicant had been provided with an opportunity to call witnesses, submit evidence and to lodge requests and challenges, which he had failed to do. The court had issued a reasoned decision which was based on various materials, including a witness statement. Both the police officers and the judge had advised the applicant to avail himself of his right to have a lawyer but he had not wished to do so. Lastly, the applicant had been afforded adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence.


193.  The Government contested these claims. They considered that the costs incurred on account of claiming damages related to the applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 could not be considered to have been necessarily incurred and reasonable. The Government also submitted that the applicant’s claims for costs and expenses related to the  <mask> before the Grand Chamber were excessive and exaggerated.


81.  The applicant argued that the reservation made by Liechtenstein in respect of the publicity of proceedings did not extend to holding an oral hearing with the parties alone, including the questioning of witnesses. Article 6 § 1 guaranteed three distinct rights, namely the right to a controversial oral hearing, the right to a  <mask> and the right to a public pronouncing of the judgment. Under the Court’s case-law, reservations had to be interpreted in a restrictive manner (the applicant referred, inter alia, to Schmautzer, cited above). Liechtenstein’s reservation only concerned the publicity of the hearing and the public pronouncing of judgments. It did not cover oral hearings, be it in camera, with the parties alone being present.


23.  The applicants maintained that they had not waived their right to a  <mask>. Neither a request nor advice within the meaning of Article 250f of the Code of Civil Procedure had been served on them. The fact that the letter had been served on their counsel's son raised a question as to the date upon which it had been served. A mere legal fiction could not be an unequivocal waiver of right, and they had not intended to waive their right to a public hearing. Moreover, such an assumption could not be made in this case since the request and the relevant advice had not been served on the applicants.


107.  The applicants submitted that CONSOB Resolutions no. 12697 of 2 August 2000 and no. 15086 of 21 June 2005 had de facto eliminated the principle of adversarial proceedings, which was, however, a requirement under Article187 septies of Legislative Decree no. 58 of 1998... As in the present case, those resolutions permitted non-communication to the defendant of the Directorate’s conclusions, which then formed the basis of the decision taken by the Commission; in addition, the latter did not receive the pleadings submitted by the defendants during the investigation phase. Furthermore, the Commission ruled without hearing the defendants and without a  <mask>, a fact which, in the present case, had prevented the applicants from addressing the Commission directly and from defending themselves in relation to the Directorate’s findings. Those findings had been important evidence, and familiarity with them would have enabled the applicants to detect inconsistencies in the investigation or to obtain relevant information for their defence. The Commission held only an internal meeting, in the course of which the sole individual questioned had been a civil servant from the IT Office (that is, from the body responsible for the “charge”). The applicants were not invited to the meeting and had not even been able to obtain a copy of its minutes.


76.  The Government submitted that the applicant had had a fair and  <mask>. He had failed to submit any proof in support of his allegation that the judge had not been impartial. The applicant had been provided with an opportunity to call witnesses, submit evidence and to lodge requests and challenges, which he had failed to do. The judge had advised the applicant to avail himself of his right to have a lawyer but he did not wish to do so. The applicant’s argument that the materials of the administrative case against him had not been revealed to him prior to the hearing contradicted the materials of the case: both the record of arrest and the record of an administrative offence had been signed by the applicant after he was taken to the police station. Thus, taking into account that the applicant had signed the record of an administrative offence without any objections, had refused to have a lawyer, had not lodged any requests and had not availed himself of other procedural rights, the police officers had considered two hours to be sufficient for the preparation of the applicant’s defence.


61.  The applicant complained that his employer had arbitrarily collected, retained, and used sensitive, obsolete and irrelevant data concerning his mental health in considering his application for promotion, and had unlawfully and unfairly disclosed this data to the applicant’s colleagues and to a civil court during a  <mask>. The applicant relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


22.  The Government contended that the decision to hold the hearing in camera had not worked against the full and objective examination of the evidence. They argued that there had been exceptional circumstances which had justified, according to the Court's case-law, dispensing with a  <mask> in the applicant's case (cf. Håkansson and Sturesson v. Sweden, judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 171-A, p. 20, § 64; Fredin v. Sweden (no. 2), judgment of 23 February 1994, Series A no. 283‑A, pp. 10-11, §§ 21-22; Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden (no. 2), judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I, p. 168, § 46).


19.  The applicant maintained that, even if the proceedings had been formally in line with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Proceedings, this did not automatically mean that the principle of ‘equality of arms’ had been observed in the case. In his view, the fact that neither he nor the prosecution had been present at the second-instance proceedings did not render the proceedings fair as a whole, since the Regional Court was entitled to decide in both question of facts and law. The applicant referred to the Court’s case law in this respect requiring the same safeguards to be implemented during the appellate trial as during the first-instance proceedings, in particular the obligation to hold a  <mask>.


53.  The Government argued that the Administrative Court had decided the case on the basis of facts which had been sufficiently established by the administrative bodies. The case had not been complex and it had not required additional evidence to be adduced before the court. The Administrative Court had not reassessed the facts, but had decided on purely legal issues related to the interpretation of the relevant legislation. In its judgment it considered the issue of whether in the relevant period there were conditions for treating the applicant in the respondent State irrelevant and excluded it from its consideration. They further argued that holding a hearing in the case would run contrary to the principle of efficiency and economy of the proceedings, especially in view of their length. The issues decided by the court did not require a  <mask> and, in view of the nature of the present issue, it could have been expected that the applicant would have requested that the public be excluded. The fact that the Administrative Court did not address the applicant’s request for a public hearing only concerned the reasoning of the court’s judgment.


32.  The applicants maintained that in the present case the Constitutional Court had not been called on to decide only issues of law. There had been several contested issues of fact, which had required that an oral and  <mask> be held in the presence of the applicants and their representatives. Those issues concerned the manner in which the applicants had been removed from the Parliament gallery, notably whether the reasons for their removal had been explained to them, who had authorised the actions of the security officers, the level of force used by them and whether any security officer had been injured in the incident. Other disputed issues of fact concerned the applicants’ (in)ability to follow the incident in the parliamentary chamber and the security risk that had required, as established by the Constitutional Court, their removal. In the latter context, they referred to the dissenting opinion of Judge N.G.D. of the Constitutional Court, in which the above elements had been pointed out (see paragraph 15 above). The applicants further argued that an oral and public hearing had been required not only for the purpose of establishing the relevant facts, but also given the “exceptional public interest” in the case. The holding of a public hearing would have contributed to public confidence in the administration of justice.


82.  The applicant replied that the fact that the Constitutional Court Act expressly provided for a possibility of holding a  <mask> only in abstract constitutional review proceedings did not mean that holding such a hearing in the proceedings following an individual constitutional complaint was prohibited. In any event, the Government’s argument had been disproved by the practice of the Constitutional Court, which on 8 April 2011 had held a public hearing in proceedings instituted by the constitutional complaint of Mr P.T. (see paragraph 27 above) and had invited him to attend it.


51.  The Government maintained that the lack of an oral hearing before the administrative courts did not violate the applicant’s right to a fair and  <mask> within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The right to an oral hearing was not absolute. Social security disputes were generally rather technical, their outcome usually being dependent on written opinions given by medical doctors, and many such disputes were better dealt with in writing than in oral argument. The administrative courts had to have regard also to the demands of efficiency and economy: systematic holding of oral hearings could be an obstacle to the particular diligence required in social security cases.


80.  The Government further pointed out that the Constitutional Court Act in its section 50 provided for a possibility of holding a  <mask> but only in the abstract constitutional review proceedings (see paragraph 25 above), and that the Constitutional Court had held only two public hearings since 1990. However, such a possibility was not at all provided for in respect of the proceedings following an individual constitutional complaint, and was therefore excluded. Consequently, the applicant’s request for an oral hearing could not have been granted, and she, as a legal professional, must or should have been aware of this.


52.  The Government noted that the costs and expenses before the Regional Court had not been incurred in order to prevent or repair the alleged breach of the Convention and that the costs and expenses incurred before the Constitutional Court would be justified in the event of a finding of a violation of the applicants' right to a  <mask>. The Government had no objection to the reimbursement of about CZK 9,500 for costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court.


20.  The Government emphasised that, in the present case, the Regional Court had neither considered the first-instance judgment ill-founded nor had found it necessary to take evidence or to hear the applicant. The applicant’s case had not presented special circumstances requiring the defendant to be heard by the appellate court, unlike other cases which the Court has dealt with (cf. Constantinescu v. Romania, op. cit., § 58; Botten v. Norway, judgment of 19 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-I, § 50). Neither the character of the offence nor the nature of the evidence had imperatively required the applicant to be heard by the appellate court: his credibility had not been decisive in assessing the evidence. Lastly, the Government pointed out that the appellate court, unlike the above-mentioned cases where the second-instance court had found the defendants guilty the first time, had simply reviewed the first-instance judgment which had already convicted the applicant. In these circumstances, holding a  <mask> had not been necessary.


68.  The applicant company observed that on 9 June 1998 the trial of Case no. 13/10-98 had been adjourned until the delivery of a new judgment in Case no. 70/10-98 and that under Ukrainian law the tribunal should first have decided whether to reopen the proceedings in Case no. 13/10-98 before ruling on the merits of that case. However, on 23 June 1998 the tribunal had decided the merits of Case no. 13/10-98 without formally reopening the proceedings or inviting submissions from the parties. The applicant company therefore considered that its right to a  <mask> had not been complied with.


19.  The applicant complained that he did not receive a fair and  <mask>, in the determination of the criminal charge against him. He further complained that he was not informed promptly of the accusation against him, he did not have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and that he was not allowed to defend himself in person or through a lawyer. He invoked Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a), (b) and (c) of the Convention:


79.  The Government pointed out that, according to the Court’s case-law, the obligation to hold a (public) hearing was not absolute. Most of the cases in which no oral hearing had been held and where the Court had found no violation of Article 6 were civil cases, in contrast to criminal cases where the requirement to hold a  <mask> was more imperative. In particular, in the Jussila case the Court held that: “the character of the circumstances that may justify dispensing with an oral hearing essentially comes down to the nature of the issues to be decided by the competent national court” (see Jussila v. Finland [GC], no. 73053/01, § 42, ECHR 2006‑XIII). Therefore, a (public) hearing was not required where a tribunal was only called upon to decide on questions of law of no particular complexity (see Valová, Slezák and Slezák v. Slovakia, no. 44925/98, § 64, 1 June 2004), or in cases that raised no questions of fact or law which could not be adequately resolved on the basis of the case-file and the parties’ written observations (see Döry v. Sweden, no. 28394/95, § 37, 12 November 2002, and Pursiheimo v. Finland (dec.), no. 57795/00, 25 November 2003). Where cases were better dealt with in writing than in oral argument, the Court had held that it was “understandable that in this sphere the national authorities should have regard to the demands of efficiency and economy” (see Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 24 June 1993, § 58, Series A no. 263).


36.  The Government argued that the special features of the proceedings constituted “exceptional circumstances” which justified the absence of a  <mask>. The Government noted in this regard that the case concerned a rather technical matter and the applicant, in her complaint with the Administrative Court, raised only points of law and questions concerning the formal aspects of the proceedings before the Regional Government. The Administrative Court could therefore adequately decide the case on the basis of the case file.


21.  The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. He further alleged under the same provision that he had not been afforded a  <mask> and had not been notified of the public prosecutor’s written opinion, which had denied him the right to a fair hearing.


18.  The Government claimed that the applicant’s right to a  <mask> was not violated. The applicant had taken part in the examination of his case by the first-instance court. He had been duly notified of the appeal hearing of 8 February 2005. The summons had been sent to him on 30 December 2004. However, the applicant did not appear at that hearing and did not inform the appeal court of the reasons of his absence. Therefore, the appeal court decided to examine the applicant’s appeal in his absence. The Government submitted that the issues to be examined by the appeal court were not such as to require the applicant’s personal presence at the hearing.


79.  The Government submitted that plea bargaining in Georgia implied a waiver of certain procedural rights in exchange for a more lenient sentence and an expedited trial. Nevertheless, the most substantive guarantees of a fair trial had still been retained under the domestic law, and they had been duly put into practice in the first applicant’s criminal case. Thus, first of all, the first applicant had been represented by qualified legal counsel, had given his prior approval before negotiations with the public prosecutor were started, and had provided the requisite written acceptance, countersigned by his lawyer, of the terms of the agreement reached. Subsequently, the trial court had examined the plea bargain at an oral and  <mask>, during which it had enquired as to whether the plea bargain had been reached without duress and under otherwise fair conditions and whether the first applicant was willing to accept it in full awareness of the nature of the charges and the potential sentence. As further guarantees, the Government referred to the fact that not only had the first applicant been entitled to reject the agreed plea bargain during the court’s review, but also the judge, who had been required to assess the validity of the accusations, had been empowered to block the plea bargain in the event of any doubt as to the first applicant’s criminal liability.


39.  The applicant argued that he had not known what steps he should have taken in order to take part in the appeal hearing. The Court notes that at the beginning of the trial, the presiding judge informed the defendants of their rights to  <mask>, to bring an appeal against the judgment, and to participate in the appeal hearing (see paragraph 6 above).


43.  The Government submitted that the first applicant was not precluded from lodging an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation but there was a certain procedure envisaged by the law at the material time which should have been respected by a person wishing to apply to this court. They argued that procedural requirements for lodging appeals were not incompatible with the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention. Furthermore, the domestic law envisaged a possibility to receive  <mask> upon the initiative of an advocate. The Government finally submitted that the requirement that appeals on points of law could only be lodged by licensed advocates pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring the quality of appeals lodged with the Court of Cassation and was later abolished due to difficulties revealed during the practical implementation of the relevant procedural rules.


18.  The Government submitted that the domestic courts had acted in compliance with criminal procedural legislation, which did not provide for obligatory legal representation in cassation proceedings where, as in the applicant’s case, no worsening of the convicted person’s situation was possible. The Government noted in that connection that the applicant had been sentenced by the first-instance court to life imprisonment, the heaviest penalty and one which could not be made more severe. They did not agree that the lack of  <mask> for him at that stage had run counter to the interests of justice.


2.  The applicant was charged with two different offences: the offence of failure to comply with a lawful order given by a public official, as set out in Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“CAO”), and the offence of participation in a public gathering which had not been notified in advance to the authorities, as provided for in Article 20.2 of the CAO. Given that both charges against the applicant arose from the same event, I will proceed to examine whether the interests of justice required that the applicant should have had an opportunity to obtain  <mask> for this case taken as a whole. A formalistic approach to the facts, separating the two imputed offences, would hinder the adequate consideration of the substance of the case.


74.  The Government submitted that a detainee had the opportunity to seek legal advice, for a fee, from a bar association or a law firm. A lawyer or other persons could be authorised to visit a convicted detainee, including for a legal consultation. The applicant had not however requested any such meetings. While the national legislation did not require provision of  <mask> in civil court proceedings, the applicant’s reference to lack of financial means should not have prevented him from seeking legal advice, which would have been readily available free of charge in cases concerning damage to health under the Advocates Act. Lastly, the prosecutor acted as a respondent in the civil case. In view of the above, the applicant had not been put at any significant disadvantage vis-à-vis the other parties.


23.  The Government submitted that the domestic courts had acted in compliance with the criminal procedural legislation, which did not provide for obligatory legal representation in cassation proceedings where, as in the applicant’s case, no possible worsening of the convicted person’s situation was at stake. The Government noted, in this connection, that the applicant had been sentenced by the first-instance court to life imprisonment, the heaviest penalty, which could not be worsened any further. They did not consider the lack of  <mask> for him at that stage to have run counter to the interests of justice.


22.  The applicant maintained that the complexity of his case, the risk of his being sentenced to life imprisonment which was the gravest criminal punishment, as well as his lack of any income, required that his free legal representation be ensured by the State in the proceedings before the Supreme Court. Given that the domestic legislation recognised such a need during a pre-trial investigation and a trial at the first-instance court, the applicant considered it incomprehensible and unjustified that the  <mask> was not retained for him further on.


82.  The Government pointed out that under the domestic legislation on the matter of free legal aid, a prisoner’s difficult financial situation was a necessary precondition for him to be entitled to  <mask>. Then again, even if an individual satisfied that condition, the provision of legal aid was to be terminated upon the finding of a court that the proceedings had no prospects of success.


94.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s grievances, except for those concerning legal assistance relating to the appeal in 2004, were either unsupported by evidence or unfounded. They considered that, in any event, all alleged shortcomings should have been definitely remedied in the new appeal proceedings in 2008. The applicant had had  <mask> provided by A., who had studied the case file and had conducted a proper defence in support of the appeal statement lodged by Y. in 2004. The applicant’s mother could not have served as a lay defence representative for health reasons and, similarly, the applicant’s cellmate had been serving a sentence of imprisonment. The applicant had studied the case file in 2003; the new volumes had not contained any information affecting the appeal proceedings; and the applicant had been given access to all relevant submissions made by the other parties. The obligation to bear counsel’s fees was acceptable and had not offended against Article 6 of the Convention.


65.  The Government, relying on Article 45 § 2 of the CCP, contended that legal representation of the applicant at that stage of proceedings had not been mandatory, as he had been sentenced to the heaviest penalty and his position could not have been worsened. This argument is immaterial for the Court, as even assuming that the applicant was not entitled to  <mask> under domestic law, the question is whether he was entitled to that assistance under the Convention.


62.  The applicant complained under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention of the alleged unfairness and the outcome of the proceedings in her cases. She further complained that she had not been able to obtain any legal assistance in her cases as the insufficient amount of her pension had not allowed her to pay a lawyer and the law did not provide for  <mask> in civil cases. In the applicant's opinion, the absence of qualified legal assistance significantly delayed and complicated the consideration of her cases.


62.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been granted  <mask> from the day of his initial interview on 9 April 2004 and all the investigative measures, including interviews, confrontations with witnesses, etc., were carried out in the lawyer’s presence. The applicant had given his consent to be represented by the lawyer in question, which he once again confirmed on 10 April 2004. There was no evidence that, during either the investigation or the proceedings at two judicial instances, he was unsatisfied with his lawyer. He had never made any statements or complaints about the lawyer’s behaviour. If the applicant was unsatisfied with his lawyer, he could have dispensed with his services at any time.


38.  The applicant argued that there existed a crucial difference between his case and Croissant (cited above). While Mr Croissant had not requested  <mask> on the basis of his indigence, the applicant had specifically done so. His request had however been overlooked by the trial court, which had appointed counsel for him on a different ground. That had in itself amounted to a breach of Article 6 § 3 (c).


93.  The Government also maintained that the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention had not extended to the obligation of the State to provide an alleged victim of ill-treatment with free legal representation to support his allegations before the domestic authorities. Nevertheless, they stated that for the purpose of effective participation in the criminal proceedings the applicant did have access to legal representation. The right to legal assistance had been guaranteed by Article 59 of the Constitution of Ukraine and by the Social Services Act. They further noted that the new  <mask> Act had been adopted on 2 June 2011, and specifically addressed the issue. In practical terms, the applicant could apply for legal assistance to the Horodenka territorial social support centre for pensioners, handicapped people and single disabled people. He could also apply to the legal advice office at the Horodenka District Department of Justice, which opened in 2003 and which could advise the applicant on legal issues and assist him in the preparation of various procedural documents. The Government lastly submitted that the applicant could apply to the national ombudsman and other authorities who would address his requests within their competence.


30.  The applicant alleged, in a general manner, that he was disadvantaged because he was not represented by counsel despite facing two parties, the public prosecutor and S., the latter being represented by a lawyer. However, it does not follow from either the principle of equality of arms or the right to  <mask> that free legal assistance has to be provided in each and every case to a party whose opponent is represented by counsel. The applicant did furthermore not argue that he had not been given the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed by either the public prosecutor or S. in the proceedings before the District Court. In fact, it is not in dispute that he was given access to the file and that he made submissions on multiple occasions (see paragraphs 7, 9 and 11 above).


36.  The Government further noted that the applicant had signed a waiver refusing a lawyer during the questioning of 12 and 15 April 1998. Furthermore, on the latter date the applicant had been represented by a lawyer engaged by his farther and had talked to him before questioning but refused his services during the questioning. They also submitted that the applicant had never requested  <mask> and that by the time his actions had been reclassified as a crime that required obligatory legal representation of the suspect, the applicant was represented.


17.  The applicant maintained that the complexity of his case, the risk of his being sentenced to life imprisonment, the most serious criminal punishment, as well as his lack of any income, had required that he be afforded free legal representation by the State in the proceedings before the Supreme Court. Given that domestic legislation recognised such a need during a pre-trial investigation and in a trial before a first-instance court, the applicant found it incomprehensible and unjustified that  <mask> had not been provided for him in the subsequent proceedings.


93.  The applicants accepted that there was no obligation under the Convention to make legal aid available for disputes (contestations) in civil proceedings, as under the Court's case-law there was a clear distinction between the wording of Article 6 § 3 (c), which guaranteed the right to  <mask> on certain conditions in criminal proceedings, and of Article 6 § 1, which made no reference to legal assistance (Del Sol v. France, no. 46800/99, § 20, ECHR 2002‑II).


44.  The Government also submitted that the civil aspect of Article 6 of the Convention was inapplicable in respect of the relevant domestic proceedings under the CAO. The criminal limb of Article 6 was also inapplicable, since Russian law made no provision for  <mask> in CAO proceedings. However, the applicant could retain counsel for such proceedings, which were in any event quite simple. The applicant had been made aware of her procedural rights and had made use of them during the proceedings, in particular by way of lodging submissions. Provision of free legal assistance was not made necessary by the circumstances of the case, in view of the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant, and the simplicity of the procedure, which could be fully understood by a lay person. In fact, the contents of the applicant’s submission to the domestic courts disclosed that she was well versed in domestic law.


88.  The applicant complained that she had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Van State Security Court which tried and convicted her. She further complained under the same head that her right to a public hearing as well as  <mask> had been infringed. Finally, the applicant claimed that the principle of “equality of arms” had not been respected, since the bill of indictment was not in a language she could understand. The applicant relied on Article 6 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:


23.  The applicant argued that the Berlin Tiergarten District Court was obliged to appoint, of its own motion, defence counsel for him in the first‑instance criminal proceedings, in which he was convicted of libel and two counts of assault, sentenced to a fine, and ordered to pay damages to the victim. The victim was represented by counsel as the private accessory prosecutor and with regard to his civil claims. Thus, the applicant was confronted with two lawyers, the public prosecutor and counsel for the victim. In this scenario, the District Court was obliged to appoint counsel for him ex officio and free of charge in order to respect the principle of equality of arms, bearing in mind that he lacked sufficient means to pay for counsel himself. He had neither been informed about the possibility to apply for  <mask> nor had he been asked about aspects speaking in favour of granting him legal assistance.


20.  The applicant referred to the Constitutional Court’s decision of 8 October 2008 which stated, inter alia, that according to the information provided by the Chamber of Advocates only two out of four public defenders authorised to act before the Court of Cassation had drafted sixteen appeals on points of law on a pro bono basis. It further stated that, given the high number of civil and criminal cases examined in Armenian courts, there was a very scarce guarantee ensuring  <mask> by licensed advocates in the absence of a clear procedure and circumstances of such assistance which was simply dependent on the “good will” of the Office of the Public Defender.


49.  The Government considered that the applicant had suffered no “significant disadvantage” (see, among others, Giuran v. Romania, no. 24360/04, §§ 21-23, ECHR 2011 (extracts), and Van Velden v. the Netherlands, no. 30666/08, §§ 37-39, 19 July 2011). The Court accepts that the fines imposed on the applicant were small. The Court observes that the present case raises issues concerning applicability of Article 6 of the Convention in relation to the procedure prescribed by the Russian Code of Administrative Offences and the absence of any provision for a right to  <mask> under the CAO. Both issues arise in a number of similar pending applications before the Court in respect of Russia. Noting the nature of the issues raised in the present case, which also arguably concerns an important matter of principle, as well as the scope of the limitations, the Court does not find it appropriate to dismiss the present application with reference to Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention (see Berladir and Others v. Russia, no. 34202/06, § 34, 10 July 2012, and also paragraph 40 above).


57.  The Government submitted that, as a matter of law, the applicant, who had been serving a prison sentence at the time, did not have the right to be personally present at the court hearing concerning determination of his civil rights and obligations or to be entitled to  <mask>. Nor did the interests of justice require that he be provided with legal aid. Accordingly, the domestic courts' decision to hear the case in the applicant's absence had been in compliance with applicable domestic laws. The courts had duly advised the applicant of the date and time of the court hearings and of his procedural rights, including the rights to appoint a representative to plead the case on his behalf and to ask the court to procure evidence. The applicant, however, had chosen not to avail himself of them. The courts had thoroughly examined the applicant's claims and the submissions made by the respondent parties in accordance with the rules of civil procedure. In the Government's opinion, the fact that the applicant had not been present in court was not decisive for the outcome of the proceedings. Nor had the principle of the equality of arms been infringed.


27.  The Government submitted that the right of access to court is not absolute and that the domestic law provided for exceptions for persons who were unable to afford the services of an advocate. They pointed out in particular Article 6 of the Advocacy Act which stated, at the material time, that a person could receive  <mask> upon the initiative of an advocate.


63.  The Government, relying on Article 45 § 2 of the CCP, contended that the applicant had not been entitled to compulsory legal representation at that stage of proceedings as he had been convicted to the heaviest penalty and his position could not be aggravated. This argument is immaterial for the Court, as even assuming that the applicant was not entitled to  <mask> under the domestic law, the question is whether he was entitled to that assistance under the Convention.


33.  The Government contended that the applicant never applied to a licensed advocate and only assumed that she would not be able to meet the costs involved, while the advocates were entitled to provide pro bono legal services. Instead, she applied to the Court of Cassation directly and therefore failed to comply with the rules of procedure. The Court notes in this regard that the Government failed to provide any concrete examples of cases where licensed advocates had agreed to provide  <mask> to persons willing to lodge an appeal on points of law. This argument therefore is of a purely speculative nature. The Court further notes that the essence of the applicant’s complaint is that her appeal on points of law was not admitted by the Court of Cassation because of the procedural requirement that such appeals should be lodged by qualified advocates whose services she could not afford, given her difficult financial situation. In such circumstances, it cannot be considered that the applicant failed to meet the requirements of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention by not having lodged an appeal on points of law through a licensed advocate. The Government’s objection, therefore, should be dismissed.


35.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not proved that he lacked the financial resources to appoint defence counsel. They further submitted that the interests of justice did not require the provision of  <mask> in the present case because first, the case brought against the applicant was neither serious nor complex; secondly, the applicant was legally represented in the proceedings before the Nova Zagora District Court, and no new evidence was produced before the Sliven Regional Court; thirdly, the applicant was well-educated and in good health; and finally, unlike the applicant in Raykov v. Bulgaria (no. 35185/03, 22 October 2009), the applicant in the present case did not face the threat of deprivation of liberty as the Nova Zagora District Court had already replaced the criminal liability with administrative liability.


37.  The Government maintained that the applicant had contributed to the delay by the failure to specify her claims and comply with the Regional Court's orders to do so. On several occasions she amended her claims, which entailed the defendants' obligation to comment on them. The Government made also reference to the fact that she had lodged two requests for an interim measure, two requests for exemption from court costs and a request for  <mask>, as well as subsequent appeals against all decisions refusing those requests.


20.  The applicant complained of unfairness of the criminal proceedings against him. In particular, he alleged that one of the judges at first instance had not been impartial; that his conviction had been based in part on his and his co-defendants’ statements which had been obtained under duress and in in breach of the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination; that the first-instance court had refused to summon some of the witnesses he had requested it to call; that he had not been provided with adequate time to study the case-file after his conviction; and that he had not been provided with  <mask> to prepare his appeal against the conviction of 20 December 2005. The applicant relied on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. The Court considers that this part of the applicant’s complaints falls to be examined under Article 6 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


37.  The Government pointed out that in the TRNC it was the constitutional right of everyone charged with an offence to be given  <mask>. It was also standard procedure to assign free legal assistance in serious cases, such as a murder or a manslaughter trial, even if the person charged did not himself appoint a lawyer to represent him. Nevertheless, the applicant had not asked the police to appoint a lawyer for him whilst he was being questioned by them.


21.  The applicant complained that the decision of the District Court not to appoint, of its own motion, defence counsel for him for the first-instance proceedings before it, breached his right to a fair trial, in particular the principle of equality of arms and the right to  <mask>. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a) and (c) of the Convention alone and taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Wetjen and Others v. Germany, nos. 68125/14 and 72204/14, § 44, 22 March 2018, with further references), finds it appropriate to examine this complaint solely under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


26.  The Government submitted that the applicant was not precluded from lodging an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation but there was a certain procedure envisaged by the law at the material time which should have been respected by a person willing to apply to this court. They argued that procedural requirements for lodging appeals were not incompatible with the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention. Furthermore, the domestic law envisaged a possibility to receive  <mask> upon the initiative of an advocate. The Government finally submitted that the requirement that appeals on points of law could only be lodged by licensed advocates pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring the quality of appeals lodged with the Court of Cassation and was later abolished due to difficulties revealed during the practical implementation of the relevant procedural rules.


50.  The applicant complained that his detention had been unlawful and therefore contrary to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. He further complained that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 since he had been convicted by a court that could not qualify as an “ <mask> established by law” and that moreover had not afforded him a fair trial. The relevant parts of Articles 5 and 6 read as follows:


32.  The applicant complained that his detention had been unlawful and therefore contrary to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. He further complained that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 since he had been convicted by a court that could not qualify as an “ <mask> established by law” and that moreover it had not afforded him a fair trial. The relevant parts of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention read as follows:


44.  The Government replied that the independence of the administrative court was guaranteed at the highest level in the hierarchy of domestic norms, the Constitutional Council having recognised it in 1980 as a constitutional principle by nature. As regards the members of the Conseil d'Etat, they enjoyed a status enshrined in legislative and regulatory provisions of the Administrative Courts Code which were underpinned by a strong tradition of independence. The Government referred to the guarantees of independence inherent in the status of the members of the French Conseil d'Etat, as described by the Court in the above-mentioned Kress judgment. They submitted that this status entailed sound safeguards that could be compared to those of the Council of State in the Netherlands, which the Court had examined in connection with the right to be heard by an  <mask> in its above-mentioned Kleyn and Others judgment. In that judgment the Court held that “in the absence of any indication of a lack of sufficient and adequate safeguards against possible extraneous pressure, [it had] found nothing in the applicants' submissions that could substantiate their concerns as to the independence of the Council of State and its members”. Mutatis mutandis, the Government requested the Court to apply this case-law to the question of the status of member of the French Conseil d'Etat.


223.  The Government submitted that Article 6 § 2 of the Convention could not prevent the authorities from informing the public about any criminal investigations in progress. They maintained that the applicants’  <mask> had not been breached and that neither any preliminary court decisions nor any public statements pointed to by the applicants had depicted them as criminals or established their guilt prior to their criminal conviction.


33.  The Government maintained that the High Court had made every effort to ensure compatibility with the  <mask> in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. In its judgment it had provided an account of the differences in the standard of proof respectively in criminal and civil cases and had clearly distinguished between the criminal and civil liability in the case of the applicant. This distinction the High Court had reinforced by its diligent underlining and application of the standard of clear preponderance of evidence, a different standard than the criminal one. It had also stressed that its award of compensation did not affect the correctness of the applicant’s acquittal, unlike in the High Court judgment that had been the subject of review in Orr (cited above, § 53).


46.  The applicant’s complaint concerns the alleged violation of his right to the  <mask> on account of the wording used in a judgment issued in separate (civil) proceedings. In its judgment, the Voroshilovskiy District Court stated that the police officers had intended to “put an end to the breach of public order, consisting of [showing] disrespect to society accompanied by the use of foul language in a public place [by the applicant], disturbing citizens in an insulting manner and refusing to obey an order by a public official”.


43.  The Government also argued that the applicant’s complaint concerning the breach of his right to the  <mask> as a result of the virulent press campaign against him was inadmissible as incompatible ratione personae. They submitted that the media campaign had been carried out by the media and had represented the point of view of the journalists who had authored the newspaper articles and of the civil parties to the case, and therefore concluded that the State could not be held responsible for their actions or for their opinions. They further argued that the applicant had not proved that he had been the object of a virulent media campaign which had breached his right to the presumption of innocence. Moreover, there had been no evidence that the media campaign had had any influence on the outcome of the case or that the appellate courts examining his case had started from the presumption that the burden of proof in respect of the applicant’s guilt did not fall on the Prosecutor’s Office. Furthermore, by relying on the Court’s case-law, in particular Mircea v. Romania (no. 41250/02, 29 March 2007) and Viorel Burzo v. Romania (no. 75109/01 and 12639/02, 30 June 2009), they submitted that the media campaign complained of by the applicant had ended in 2000, two years prior to the decision delivered by the first-instance court. Consequently, it could not be argued that the judges could have continued to be influenced by the said campaign. Also, the impact such a campaign would have had on public opinion had been greatly diminished following the judgments of the domestic courts.


29.  The Government considered that issues relating to the  <mask> only arose in cases in which criminal proceedings were still pending. When those criminal proceedings were concluded, as was the case in the present application, the national court could express its opinion as to whether an accused was guilty or not. Hence, no mention could be made of a “presumption” in respect of the offence attributed to a defendant since his or her guilt would have been proven as an actual fact.


27.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted all available and effective domestic remedies. In particular, he had failed to lodge a civil claim under Articles 199 and 200 of the Obligations Act, or a “citizen’s complaint” (appeal) with the Court of Serbia and Montenegro (see paragraphs 15-16 above). Further, since Article 19 of the Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civic Freedoms (see paragraph 12 above) enshrined the  <mask>, the present case clearly fell within that court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae. Lastly, the Government submitted that the Court of Serbia and Montenegro Act was being reviewed and that its jurisdiction might, in due course, be amended so that citizens’ complaints could be considered by the plenary court instead of chambers and, further, that rulings it adopted under such a procedure would formally be “decisions” rather than “judgments”.


44.  The applicant submitted that the reasoning in the Regional Court’s judgment had violated the  <mask> under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. He stressed that the Regional Court, in its written judgment, had expressed the opinion that “the core events described by the witness have a factual basis, that is, that the accused actually carried out sexual assaults on his daughter in his car”. He considered that these statements amounted to a finding of guilt despite the fact that the Regional Court had acquitted him on account of insufficiency of proof.


22.  The applicant submits that the drawing of a distinction between a full acquittal and an acquittal in dubio pro reo is contrary to the  <mask> as it is incompatible with this principle to have two classes of acquittal. Such a distinction is also not in line with the Court’s case-law (Sekanina v. Austria judgment of 25 August 1993, Series A no. 266-A; Asan Rushiti v. Austria, no. 28389/95, 21.3.2000). Thus, the reasoning of the Innsbruck Regional Court and the Innsbruck Court of Appeal violated the principle of the presumption of innocence as they disregarded the final acquittal in the criminal proceedings.


31.  The Government further submitted that the  <mask> did not apply to the instant proceedings, as the applicant had not been charged with a criminal offence and the proceedings were not aimed at establishing the applicant’s guilt. In deciding whether to suspend a sentence on probation in accordance with Article 57a § 1 of the Criminal Code, the execution of sentence chamber had to make its own prognosis on the danger posed by the convicted person.


94.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted all available and effective domestic remedies in respect of the impugned joint statement of law enforcement authorities. In this regard, the Government submitted that the applicant could make use of the procedure concerning appeals against the prosecution authorities' actions and decisions set out in Articles 449-451 of the CCrP or lodge a criminal complaint for defamation. The Government did not comment on the part of the complaint concerning the alleged breach of the  <mask> by the domestic courts.


66.  The Government submitted that a thorough and effective investigation of the applicants' allegations of ill-treatment had been conducted by the prosecutors. 15 witnesses of the events of 4 October 1993 had been questioned, and opinions of the experts had been obtained in order to establish the credibility of the applicants' complaints. The prosecution had decided to discontinue the investigation as the majority of the testimonies had confirmed the version of the events given by the police; the decision had been taken also with due respect to the principle of the  <mask> of the policemen.


32.  The applicants submitted that Article 6 § 2 of the Convention required that the late accused’s necessary expenses be borne by the treasury, given that his conviction had not become final. The decision of the Regional Court of 5 April 2012 to discontinue the proceedings and to refrain from charging his necessary expenses to the treasury reinforced the finding of guilt contained in the trial judgment. It clearly endorsed that judgment’s findings and fully attributed the absence of a final conviction to the defence strategy. Thereby, an image of the finality of the late accused’s conviction was created while eliminating any possibility for his effective defence, notably the examination of the grounds of his appeal on points of law. In fact, the provision applied by the Regional Court (Article 467 § 3, second sentence, number 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), as interpreted by the domestic courts, itself was bound to infringe the  <mask> by requiring that the procedural impediment be the sole reason for the absence of a final conviction, which would otherwise have been certain.


37.  The applicant further complained under Article 7 of the Convention that the conduct leading to her conviction did not constitute a criminal offence under national law as S.K. had voluntarily transferred the money to her account. From that moment on the money had no longer formed a part of his, and subsequently his estate’s, possessions. She had, therefore, not been obliged to report the money in the estate inventory. She further complained that the unlawful conviction even constituted a breach of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, as the  <mask> had not been respected by the courts.


212.  The applicant complained that the joint statements made by the Prosecutor General's Office, the MNS and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the press on 20 and 21 October 2005 had amounted to an infringement of his right to the  <mask>. He also complained that, subsequently during the course of the pre-trial investigation, various public officials, including the President of Azerbaijan and the Prosecutor General, had made public statements describing him as a criminal. Lastly, he complained that, in the decisions ordering and extending his pre-trial detention, the domestic courts had also breached his presumption of innocence by prejudging his guilt before he had been proved guilty following a criminal trial. Article 6 § 2 of the Convention provides as follows:


88.  The Government stated that during the investigation of the criminal case against the first applicant it had been revealed that he had been assisted by another person. Since the witnesses recognised the third applicant as this person, on 6 June 2000 the third applicant was charged with fraud. However, since the third applicant was missing, the criminal proceedings against him were stayed and on 21 January 2004 the court considered only the criminal case against the first applicant. The Government insisted that the court's findings were limited only to the fact that the first applicant was assisted by his son, without determining of the latter's guilt. In the Government's view the court had referred to the witnesses' statements about the third applicant assisting his father in committing “unlawful actions”, but these findings could not breach the principle of the  <mask> in respect to the third applicant.


18.  The applicant complained that she had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court which tried and convicted her. She maintained that her right to the  <mask> had also been breached since there was no concrete evidence to secure a conviction other than her statements obtained under duress by police officers. The applicant further claimed that she had been denied the assistance of a lawyer during the initial stages of the criminal proceedings and that she had not been informed promptly of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. She finally contended that the State Security Court had heard the witnesses against her, but had refused to hear the witnesses who would testify for her. She relied on Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (a), (c) and (d) of the Convention, which read as follows:


157.  The Government noted that Article 6 § 2 of the Convention could not prevent the authorities from informing the public, with all the necessary discretion and circumspection, about criminal investigations in progress. They submitted that the applicant's  <mask> had not been violated in the present case. They noted that the Prosecutor General's comments had not depicted the applicant as a criminal. The Prosecutor General had simply commented on the reasons for instituting a criminal case and informed the public that an investigation was being conducted.


37.  The applicant maintained that the domestic courts, and, in particular, the execution of sentence chamber of the Marburg Regional Court, in its decision of 23 February 1999, had assumed that he had committed the crime he had been accused of in 1997, notwithstanding the fact that he had been acquitted of all charges in this respect. That court had thus disrespected the  <mask>. All further decisions on the applicant’s requests to suspend the further execution of his sentence on probation based their assessment on the assumption that he had committed the act he had been accused of in 1997, and thus perpetuated the violation of his Convention rights.


47.  The Government further maintained that in so far as the applicant complained about the media attention that the Regional Court’s judgment had attracted in particular in Turkey, and even assuming that protection from public attention formed part of the principle of the  <mask>, he could have been expected to exhaust the appropriate civil-law remedies in that respect. In any event, the Government could not be held responsible for statements made in the Turkish media.


32.  The applicant further claimed that the labour court not only disregarded the final acquittal and found that the applicant had committed the offence of incitement, but that in doing so it also relied on the self-incriminating statements given by the applicant to the police in the absence of her lawyer. The Court notes in this context that it has already found that the use as evidence for a criminal conviction of statements given by the accused to the police without the assistance of a lawyer may amount to a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391/02, §§ 56-62, ECHR 2008). The Government have not commented on the applicant’s claim that her statements to the police were used as evidence in the civil case. The Court further notes that the labour court in its judgment referred to the fact that the applicant’s employer had relied on the fact that the applicant had confessed to inciting M.G. into committing the crime, and that the labour court explicitly stated that it had examined the entire criminal investigation file (see paragraph 14 above). Thus, the facts of the case seem to indicate that the statements given by the applicant to the police without the assistance of a lawyer were relied on by the labour court, and the Court does not rule out that reliance by a court on such statements in civil proceedings may raise an issue under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. However, having regard to the fact that the labour court’s reasoning and the wording used violated the applicant’s right to  <mask>, the Court does not find it necessary to also assess if the labour court in reaching its conclusion relied on evidence in violation of the right to a fair trial.


102.  The Government submitted that the principles of  <mask>, adversarial procedure and equality of arms had been applied throughout the proceedings. Russian law contained sufficient guarantees in respect of impartiality of judges. The absence from the hearing of the official who had drawn up the report on the administrative offence or of other prosecuting authorities or officials had not therefore meant that the domestic courts had assumed the role of proving the accusation against the applicant. The domestic courts had not collected the evidence for the prosecution: the evidence had been collected and submitted to the courts by competent officials and by the defence; the courts’ role had been limited to assessing that evidence. Given that administrative-offence cases were usually simple, it was not necessary for the prosecutor to participate in the oral hearings. However, if the judge considered that the prosecution’s evidence was incomplete or defective, it returned the case to the competent officials for corrections. The courts had therefore had a purely judicial, rather than prosecuting, role.


138.  The applicant argued that the domestic courts had violated the  <mask> because in their decisions ordering and extending his detention they had repeatedly stated that the defendants had engaged in trafficking in illegal drugs, showing persistence and resolve in committing the criminal offence in question. Furthermore, the national courts had repeatedly stated that there was a risk of reoffending because he had already been convicted of the same offences. However, there was no final conviction against him. They had also considered the fact that two other sets of criminal proceedings were pending against him as a relevant factor in assessing the risk of his reoffending, thus implying that he was guilty of the offences that were the subject of those two sets of proceedings.


29.  The Government submitted that the criminal case could not have been comprehensively examined if the reference to the individual who had managed the criminal enterprise had been omitted. Such an omission would have made impossible the determination of the roles which each member of the gang had played. In the Government’s view, this reference did not amount to a breach of the  <mask>.


58.  The Government maintained that the High Court had given sufficient reasoning for its decision to award civil compensation to the children. As regards the applicant’s submission that the High Court should have discussed the counter evidence, namely the possibility of alternative perpetrators (two such perpetrators had at an earlier stage been charged but were not indicted), the Government argued that such a detailed account would inevitably challenge the  <mask>. Whilst a Norwegian court would give extensive reasoning for its decision in an ordinary civil case, in joint proceedings such as the present, a high court sitting with a jury would by tradition state its reasons succinctly in order to avoid making statements that could be viewed as being inconsistent with the jury’s acquittal.


50.  The Government did not dispute the fact that the disciplinary investigation against the applicants had been conducted on the basis of the criminal investigation file. However, they submitted that other evidence, such as witness statements, had been collected during the disciplinary investigation. They argued that the disciplinary authorities, on the basis of a less strict burden of proof, had reached the conclusion that the applicants should be held liable in terms of disciplinary law for their conduct which had given rise to a criminal investigation. In the case of the first applicant, they argued that the grounds for his dismissal had been disturbing the peace and order of the work environment and not membership of an illegal organisation and, therefore, the decision could not be considered to be contrary to the applicant’s right to the  <mask>. They argued in that connection that the findings of the disciplinary and judicial authorities had only concluded that the applicant had a link with the illegal organisation without suggesting that he had been aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation from a criminal law perspective. In the case of the second applicant, they contended that since the Mardin Administrative Court in its judgment of 24 November 2009 had limited its reasoning to the disciplinary sphere by expressly indicating that the criminal charges against the applicant had been discontinued, it could not be said that that court’s reasoning ran contrary to the presumption of innocence. Lastly, they argued that where there were serious suspicions against civil servants, the disciplinary bodies should not have to await the outcome of criminal proceedings, which could take years to finalise. In the face of serious allegations such as those in the present cases, it would be contrary to the public interest if the disciplinary authorities were required to await the outcome of the criminal proceedings.


20.  The applicants submitted that the Court of Appeal’s decision of 4 October 2012, by which it declared their appeal against the decision of the Regional Court of 5 April 2012 inadmissible for lack of standing, was in plain contradiction to the Court’s judgment in the case of Nölkenbockhoff v. Germany (25 August 1987, Series A no. 123). In that case, the Court had recognised the victim status of a widow in respect of the  <mask>, as guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, concerning, inter alia, statements relating to her late husband in connection with the discontinuation of criminal proceedings against him by reason of his death. It did not remedy this manifest breach of the applicants’ right of access to a court that the Court of Appeal went on to state that their appeal was, in the alternative, ill-founded.


25.   The applicant complained that the  <mask> as guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the Convention had been violated and submits that the Independent Administrative Panel had applied a reversal of the burden of proof. The applicant further complained about the Austrian authorities’ failure to hear J. Z. in the proceedings before the Independent Administrative Panel as a witness. The applicant complained that no prosecuting authority participated in the proceedings before the Independent Administrative Panel and that therefore the member of the Independent Administrative Panel acted both as judge and prosecutor. He submits that, therefore, he did not have a fair hearing by a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. Finally, the applicant complained about the lack of an oral hearing before the Administrative Court.


45.  The applicants submitted that in the reasoning given for its judgment base on Article 341 CPP, the Court of Cassation had observed that the reopening procedure was independent and distinct from the initial proceedings. They therefore considered that they should have been tried as “accused” rather than “convicted” persons. Furthermore, they should have benefited from the  <mask> until the judgment delivered with regard to them had become final.


102.  The Government submitted that being an ordinary measure introduced about twenty years ago and applied to all defendants in custody, the “security barrier” used in the applicants’ case could not have influenced the jury at their trial or undermined the  <mask>. Besides, the presiding judge had drawn the jurors’ attention to the fact that the applicants’ remand in custody did not constitute evidence of their guilt. Furthermore, the first applicant had been acquitted on all the charges and the second applicant on most of the charges brought against him.


127.  The applicant further complained that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair in that the courts had not been impartial, he had not been afforded adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence and he had not been able to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing, in particular in view of the poor conditions of his detention, which had prevented him from preparing his defence. He also complained that the statements of some high-ranking State officials to the media ran counter to the  <mask>.


43.  The Government pointed out that the charges against the applicant had concerned several serious sexual crimes which had been committed in co-operation with other persons. Some of the crimes had been committed with extreme cruelty and involved minors. The applicant faced a heavy sentence and there existed, in the Government's opinion, a genuine public-interest requirement which, notwithstanding the  <mask>, outweighed the rule of respect for individual liberty and justified the applicant's continued detention. They noted that the applicant was eventually sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment and temporary deprivation of his civic rights.


312.  The applicant emphasised that the Court of Cassation had not merely impugned the mistake of law committed by the Court of Appeal. In his view, by substituting its own ruling for that of the court below in a non‑customary manner, the Court of Cassation had established the existence of all the necessary elements for the offence of unlawful site development to be made out, that is, in both its material and mental elements. The applicant explained that, according to the Court of Cassation, the change in use of the buildings was proved by the statements of third parties and by the documents in the file. In that court’s view, according to the applicant, the unlawful nature of the development was not in doubt. This decision thus clearly breached the principle of the  <mask> enshrined in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.


28.  The Government submitted that Law No. 4616 did not contain a provision to prevent national courts from expressing their opinions regarding the merits of cases when suspending them. In the view of the Government, such opinions expressed by national courts do not amount to definitive judgments. In the present case, although the Istanbul Assize Court had been of the opinion that the applicant had committed the offence with which he had been charged, it had confined itself to Law No. 4616 and suspended the proceedings. According to the Government, assessment by a national court of the evidence and its probative value and expressing an opinion by that court regarding the merits of the case, could not and should not be considered to be in breach of the right to the  <mask> within the meaning of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.


51.  The Government accepted that State authorities which had to take decisions concerning the applicant after, and on the basis of the Regional Court’s impugned judgment could only refer to the operative part of that judgment acquitting the applicant. The  <mask> precluded them from referring to the Regional Court’s statements on the applicant’s guilt in its reasoning. In contrast, the sentencing Regional Court itself had not been precluded from making such findings in its reasoning (the Government referred to Tendam, cited above, § 36 to support its view). In so far as the applicant complained that the family courts, in subsequent proceedings, had excluded contacts with his daughter by reference to the Regional Court’s reasoning, he had, however, failed to appeal against that decision.


26.  The applicant maintained that his conviction violated Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention. He submitted in particular that apart from the fact that he was the registered keeper of the car which had been recorded speeding on 26 February 2003, the authorities did not have any evidence against him. The fact that he had been found guilty of speeding merely because he had refused to disclose the identity of the driver violated his right to silence on the one hand and the  <mask> on the other. In addition, he asserted that the registered keeper's obligation to disclose the identity of the driver of the vehicle pursuant to section 103(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act in itself violated the right to silence.


31.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention that his right be presumed innocent had been breached since he had not been allowed to examine witnesses on his behalf. The applicant, however, failed to provide the Court with any evidence in support of these allegations. Furthermore, it is not clear how the applicant’s  <mask> could have been breached based on the alleged refusal of the domestic courts to hear certain witnesses.


54.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention of a violation of the  <mask>. In this respect he alleged that during the proceedings the burden of proof had been unfairly shifted to the defence a number of times and that the Supreme Court had failed to examine all the appeal grounds or issue a judgment with sufficient reasoning.


45.  The Government noted that in the case of Garlicki v. Poland (no. 36921/07), currently pending before the Court, a question concerning the effectiveness of a remedy under Articles 23 and 24 of the Polish Civil Code was raised with respect to the alleged violation of the  <mask>. The Government submitted that if such remedy was considered effective by the Court in the above-mentioned case, the applicant should, in consequence, be required to make use of it before lodging an application with the Court.


20.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention that his right to the  <mask> had been breached, as the domestic court assumed from the start that the applicant was guilty. He argued under Article 6 §§ 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention that he had been denied a fair hearing as the decision of the Court of Cassation, as well as the decision on the request for rectification of the judgment, had lacked reasoning. He maintained finally under Articles 6 § 1 and 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention that the first-instance court had failed to hear the crucial witness, A.S.


27.  The Government did not dispute the fact that the applicants' conviction for the offence of handling information protected by the secrecy of a judicial investigation or by a duty of professional confidence constituted interference with their right to freedom of expression. In their opinion, that interference was prescribed by law, namely by Articles 226-13 and 321-1 of the Criminal Code, which fulfilled the conditions of accessibility and foreseeability required by the Court (see Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, ECHR 1999‑I). The Government considered, however, that the interference constituted a measure that was necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others and for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Without disputing the fact that the aim of the applicants' work had been to inform the general public about an affair of state that was of interest to public opinion, they considered that it prejudiced the  <mask> in respect of G.M. The publication of the book just a few days after the death of François Mitterrand had given it a certain commercial and media impact, thereby increasing the prejudice sustained by G.M. Moreover, the affair had been a very sensitive one and the book had contained precise reproductions of a number of documents from the case file.