55.  The Government stated that the State authorities had complied with their positive obligations under Article 2 as they had put in place a legal framework governing the transportation of dangerous goods, the effectiveness of which the applicant had not challenged, and they had also carried out an  <mask> into the accident in a prompt manner. The Government emphasised in that connection that the obligation to conduct an effective investigation was not an obligation as to results but as to means, and that, in any event, the civil proceedings in respect of the applicant’s claims were still ongoing.


72.  The applicants complained that they and their deceased relatives had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, and that there had been no  <mask> of their complaints, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. They further cited Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The applicants further alleged that the violations they had suffered as a result of the brutal incident at issue had been predominately due to their Romani ethnicity. They therefore considered that there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with the above Articles and with Article 2 of the Convention under its substantive limb.


64.  The Government submitted that the legal remedies at the domestic level had afforded appropriate redress for the applicants' complaints under Article 2 of the Convention. They further asserted that the national authorities had conducted an  <mask> into the applicants' complaints. In their opinion, both the civil and administrative courts had taken a protective approach towards the applicants when establishing their victim status and granting them redress for their grievances. The courts had awarded the applicants sufficient compensation and these judgments had been executed by the authorities. They added that, following the impugned incident, the Kızılay had decided to give the first applicant a scholarship in order to support his education.


42.  The Government accepted the argument that the applicant’s son had not taken part in the demonstrations in question and had found himself by chance between the demonstrators and the security forces. They further admitted that Tarık Ataykaya had been struck by a cartridge fired from a weapon used by the security forces during their intervention against the demonstrators. They argued, however, that the  <mask> in the present case had been compliant with the law, namely section 16 of Law no. 2559 and section 6 appended to that law, and that the fatal incident had been unforeseeable.


207.  The Government argued that the formulation of the law of self-defence in England and Wales struck an appropriate balance between permitting the  <mask> to prevent lethal attacks on the public and ensuring that any individuals who may be exposed to a real and immediate risk to life by any operational measures were protected. In doing so, it recognised that it was not for the courts, with the benefit of detached reflection, to substitute their own opinion for that of a police officer required to act in the heat of the moment.


136.  The Government did not dispute that the applicants’ injuries had been sufficiently serious as to amount to ill-treatment within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. However, in the Government’s view, the responsibility of the State could not be engaged in the current case since the domestic investigation had concluded that the  <mask> had been justified and that the State agents had acted in self-defence.


67.  The Government submitted that the police had used firearms as a means of last resort to arrest Mr Todorov with a view to enforcing his custodial sentence, and had never had the intention of killing him. Their actions had been proportionate, because Mr Todorov had been convicted of a number of serious offences, had been armed and dangerous, and had fired at the police first. The authorities had tried to resolve the situation by peaceful means, calling in psychologists and relatives of Mr Todorov and persistently trying to negotiate with him. However, Mr Todorov had fired at the police, putting their lives at serious risk. The rocket propelled grenades had been fired at the lower storey of the house to avoid hitting Mr Todorov; the aim had been solely to make an opening in the wall of the house for the assault party, not to harm Mr Todorov. Given that he had been armed and dangerous, the police could not allow him to escape and possibly harm others. It had therefore been imperative to attack the house. The next morning the police had entered the house without using firearms. The entire operation, and in particular the participation of the special anti‑terrorist squad, had been fully in line with the relevant rules on the  <mask>, and had been based on the written orders of the Minister of Internal Affairs.


30.  The applicant argued that the force used by the gendarmerie officers against him had been unlawful. He maintained that the excessive nature of the  <mask>, as a result of which he had become disabled, showed that the security forces had in fact intended to kill him. He further contended that the security forces had not warned him and his brother to stop and that he had not attempted to escape, as the members of the security forces had alleged. According to the applicant, the security forces had actually seen him and his brother carrying torches, and not weapons, before firing but had fired anyway, since they had thought that he and his brother were terrorists.


51.  The applicants submitted that Mr Mihaylov’s killing was the result of a clear ab <mask>. As the domestic courts observed on a number of occasions, the forensic evidence indicated that Mr Mihaylov was shot from behind, in a position that gave the policeman full control over him. The relevance and significance of these findings was not altered by the fact that, in its final judgment, the Military Court of Appeal upheld the prosecutor’s decree exonerating the policeman. The Court of Appeal’s ruling lacked any analysis of its own concerning the necessity of the killing; it merely reproduced the partial reasoning of the prosecutor’s office which had been declared inadequate and false a number of times previously by more critical and independent-thinking judges of the same court and of the lower court. Moreover, the Military Court of Appeal, in upholding the prosecutor’s decision to exonerate the police officer, applied a legal test which was not in compliance with Article 2 of the Convention. Domestic law during the period in question did not require a test of absolute necessity to justify recourse to lethal force by the police. The Court had been critical of this same legal framework in a number of judgments, for example Karandja v. Bulgaria, no. 69180/01, 7 October 2010 and the national authorities had themselves recognised that the law was in need of reform and had taken steps to amend it (see paragraph 41 above). The fact that the domestic courts on a number of occasions, even applying the more lenient national law standard as it then applied, found that the killing was unjustified made it all the more clearer that the use of force was in breach of the more rigorous requirements of Article 2.


202.  The applicants disagreed with the Government. Firstly, they maintained that the entire operation had not been conducted in a way that minimised the risk to Mr Shchiborshch’s life. The operation had been neither well-planned nor controlled. Whereas under the applicable law, involuntary hospitalisation had to be carried out by psychiatric emergency services personnel, with police officers providing assistance if necessary, in this case the police acted on their own. Furthermore, the special police unit stormed the kitchen without any grounds for applying such drastic force and still in the absence of psychiatric assistance, which was on its way. Moreover, given that it was not the first time that Mr Shchiborshch had had to be subjected to involuntary hospitalisation, the police could have foreseen his reaction and planned the operation in such a way as to make it less traumatic for him, which had not been done. Secondly, the  <mask> was disproportionate. Even though Mr Shchiborshch was armed with a knife, he was only trying to hide in the flat and did not try to attack anyone. Furthermore, being of slender build and exhausted by his condition, he could hardly have posed any real danger to police officers wearing bullet-proof vests, helmets and Kevlar gloves and equipped with shields. The applicants further pointed out that neither the regular police nor the special police had been trained to deal with mentally unstable persons and thus had not been able to act appropriately in the situation, especially in the absence of any qualified medical personnel. The applicants also argued that the use of rubber truncheons by the police had been unlawful. At the same time the police failed to even consider using other special tools, such as electroshock or tear gas, which might have minimised the damage caused to Mr Shchiborshch. In particular, no evidence was submitted to show that they had actually checked the possibility of using tear gas. Overall, in the applicants’ view, the State was responsible for their son’s death.


102.  The Government conceded that Beslan Arapkhanov had been deprived of his life by State agents. They argued, however, that the use of lethal force against him had been proportionate and justified. Beslan Arapkhanov kept an assault rifle at home, as well as a considerable number of cartridges and several grenades. None of the applicants were eye‑witnesses to the actual shooting. Beslan Arapkhanov opened fire at the servicemen attempting to arrest him. The FSB servicemen acted in a rapidly changing situation to stop the unlawful actions of Beslan Arapkhanov armed with a gun and to protect their own lives. In so doing, they acted in accordance with domestic law. The domestic authorities were carrying out an investigation to establish whether the  <mask> was necessary and proportionate.


201.  The Government contested that allegation. Relying on Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus (9 October 1997, § 171, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VI), they argued that the  <mask> by the police was compatible with Article 2 of the Convention, which allowed the use of force which could lead to the unintentional deprivation of life. It was likewise in accordance with section 14 of the Law on Police, which authorised the police to use force and special tools in particular situations. As it had been established that at the time of the events Mr Shchiborshch had posed a danger to himself and others, and had resisted the lawful demands of the police, the use of force had been justified. Furthermore, it had also been established that a number of his injuries, including those leading to his death, had been self-inflicted either intentionally or negligently through actions resulting from his mental state.


116.  The applicants submitted that Mr Dimitrov had been killed intentionally, and had died as a result of a  <mask> which had not been absolutely necessary and in the course of a police operation which had not been planned with a view to minimising any risk to his life. They pointed out that he had died in the presence of no one but five police officers and in the course of a police operation involving violence on the part of all three groups of officers entrusted with carrying it out. The way in which the operation had unfolded showed that the police were not seeking to gather evidence against Mr Dimitrov but to inflict retribution on him. For instance, the group dispatched to his family’s hotel had stopped the search for narcotic drugs after learning that Mr Dimitrov had died. The applicants contended that the authorities had not given a plausible explanation of how Mr Dimitrov had lost his life. The ruling of the Supreme Court of Cassation that his death had been accidental did not correspond to the findings of the lower courts or the evidence in the case. The use of force against Mr Dimitrov had not at all been necessary. He had not been convicted, had on all previous occasions cooperated with the police, was unarmed and not physically prepared for resistance, and was not doing anything illegal at the time when he encountered the five officers. He did not put up any resistance – a fact established by all courts which had dealt with the case – and was alone against five experienced, well-armed and trained officers. His arrest should have been carried out without any force. The violence unleashed against him – especially after he was handcuffed – had therefore contravened the requirements of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Act 1997 and the terms of any briefing or order given to the officers. Indeed, the Sofia Military Court and the Military Court of Appeal had both, on four consecutive occasions, found that the officers had intentionally murdered him; their findings differed only in respect of the medical cause of death. Even if it were to be accepted that the death had occurred in the manner impermissibly established the Supreme Court of Cassation, it still engaged the respondent State’s responsibility under Article 2 of the Convention.


50.  The Government of Cyprus observed that Turkey's version of the facts was contradicted by the UN Secretary-General's report, based on the direct witnessing of Stelios Kalli Panayi's murder by UNFICYP officers, who had been able to see the incident clearly. They endorsed the applicants' version of the facts in substance and argued that Turkey had made false submissions in order to avoid responsibility for a distressing murder committed in cold blood. Seeking to prevent someone from entering an area could not be regarded as a purpose recognised by Article 2 § 2 of the Convention. In any event, the  <mask> had not been proportionate to the purported aim: the victim had not posed a direct armed threat to the Turkish soldiers and the area was constantly patrolled by UNFICYP. The ambulance and the UN personnel who came to help Stelios Kalli Panayi did not find any weapon on him and Turkey had failed to produce the rifle which he had allegedly been holding. Moreover, there had been no legitimate purpose in preventing UNFICYP from entering the area. The UN personnel had not posed any threat to the Turkish troops and the explanations given by Turkey on this point were wholly false and unconvincing.


63.  The applicant further maintained that the State agents had deliberately and unlawfully prevented timely medical aid from being given to her and her husband, despite the serious injuries they had suffered. Due to the Government’s failure to provide the entire criminal investigation file to the Court, the burden of proof shifted from the applicant to the State to demonstrate that its agents were not responsible for the death of the applicant’s relative and her own injuries (see Özalp and Others v. Turkey, no. 32457/96. 8 April 2004, § 35). The deprivation of the life of her husband was arbitrary as it did not result from “the  <mask> which is no more than absolutely necessary” according to Article 2 of the Convention.


50.  The applicants argued that the force used by the soldiers against their two relatives had not been absolutely necessary and that the excessive nature of the  <mask> showed that the soldiers had in fact intended to kill them. Indeed, the conclusion reached by the three experts appointed by the military prosecutor, i.e. that “the soldiers had carried out their duty satisfactorily”, was another indication of the existence of an intention to kill their relatives in violation of Article 2 of the Convention.


34.  The applicant complained that Police Officer Apostolidis had used a weapon during the course of his arrest. He also complained, under the same provision, that the investigative and prosecuting authorities had failed to launch a prompt, comprehensive and effective official investigation into the legitimacy of the  <mask> by Police Officer Apostolidis. He argued that there had been a breach of Article 2 of the Convention, which provides:


284.  The Government relied on the findings of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. That court had found that Moravia Ramsahai had threatened Officer Brons with a lethal weapon – a cocked pistol with a round chambered – and had thus himself created the situation in which the  <mask>, even lethal force if need be, became no less than an absolute necessity.


34.  The applicant submitted that Article 2 § 1 of the Convention imposed a positive duty on States to protect human life. In particular, national law must strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a person may be deprived of his life by agents of the State. The State must also give appropriate training and instructions to its agents who may carry weapons and use force. However, at the time of the event, the necessary regulatory framework was lacking. The law regulating the use of weapons by Greek police officers was enacted in 1943. It was commonly agreed that it was anachronistic and incomplete and did not afford general protection to society against unlawful and excessive  <mask> by the police. Therefore, the Greek State had not taken all the preventive measures that Article 2 demanded for the protection of human life.


66.  The Government argued that the  <mask> against Bülent Karataş and the tenth applicant had been lawful under the relevant domestic legislation. They submitted to that end that the soldiers who had wanted to stop the two men had fired a warning shot in the air but had then come under fire themselves. They had therefore had to respond in order to protect their lives. In any event, it was clear from the locations of the two men’s injuries that the soldiers had not opened fire on them with the intention to kill; Bülent Karataş had died as a result of the loss of blood sustained whilst hiding. That indicated that the soldiers had used their weapons in circumstances in which it had been absolutely necessary to do so. After the incident the military personnel had taken all necessary precautions in the area in accordance with the applicable international standards expected of security officials who use firearms. They had administered first aid to the two injured men and had had them taken to hospital in a helicopter.


37.  The Government acknowledged that Article 201 of the Statute of Garrison and Sentry Service, in force at the material time, had not indicated that the  <mask> had to be absolutely necessary. However, that legal norm had indicated that deadly force could only be used in specific cases and as a measure of last resort. The Government observed that the wording of Article 201 of the Statute had afforded the same level of protection of the right to life as Article 2 of the Convention. They further noted that in assessing the circumstances of the case the Court should not overlook the fact that the events in question had occurred in the army, a very specific setting characterised by extreme limitations on the rights and freedoms of individuals performing military service. The specific responsibilities of servicemen to respect discipline and the regulations of the Statute of Garrison and Sentry Service, as well as the fact that military service was inherently characterised by unquestionable compliance with orders of higher-ranking officers, had justified the use of deadly force against a serviceman to prevent his escape.


43.  The Government submitted that the police officers had acted on receipt of information that there were terrorists in the flat in question and that the operation had been planned in order to minimise the use of lethal force. They noted that the police had used firearms acting in self-defence and in accordance with the requirements of the Law and Regulation on Duties and Powers of the Police. In their view, the death of Taşkın Usta resulted from a  <mask> which was no more than absolutely necessary. It was also established by the domestic courts that the police officers had started firing only after the deceased had opened fire and in order to protect themselves. Furthermore, the authorities had carried out an adequate and effective investigation into the impugned events.


43.  The applicants complained under Article 2 of the Convention that the  <mask> by the security forces against Murat Bektaş and Erdinç Arslan had been disproportionate and had resulted in their unlawful killing. They further maintained under the same head that the investigation and the criminal trial had been flawed and ineffective. They contended in this connection that the acquittal of Nurettin Bülbül, Fevzi Mustan and Muammer Topaç, and the deferral of the execution of the sentences imposed on Nurettin Bülbül, Haydar Erol, Eyüp Yalçınkaya and Ali Erdurucan, had undermined the deterrent role of the judicial system in preventing violations of the right to life.


86.  The Government also referred to McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom (cited above), in which the Court had found a violation based, inter alia, on the fact that the authorities had not taken into account that the information gathered might have been erroneous; nor had they had an alternative plan of action if the intelligence had proved to be false. In the present case, there existed pre-approved plans of action for the operation, regulations on the use of firearms, an established chain of command and a clear operational structure. All the actions had been authorised by senior officers. No rank-and-file police officers had acted on their own, nor had any unnecessary force been used despite J.'s continuous actions and threats aimed at those present at the scene. Over a period of two nights and two days, the  <mask> by the police had been limited to three shots aimed at J., all of which had been fired during the last hour of the siege. One shot had been aimed at J.'s foot and the other two shots had been fired in the final moments of the siege when he had been leaving the building with two long-barrelled guns in his hands. In addition, the police had thrown several canisters of tear gas into the house before J. had set it on fire.


42.  The Government contested that argument. They submitted that the applicant’s brother had died of acute coronary insufficiency and ischemic decease exacerbated by alcohol withdrawal syndrome, whereas Article 2 of the Convention covered only the deprivation of life by  <mask>. Accordingly, the applicant’s complaint should be dismissed as incompatible with the relevant Convention provisions. As regards the ensuing investigation, the Government considered that the national authorities had promptly investigated the circumstances of Mr Timin’s death. The investigators had questioned the staff of the temporary detention centre and medical practitioners, and had commissioned forensic evidence. The authorities had examined the circumstances of the case thoroughly and had established the cause of Mr Timin’s death, which excluded any criminal liability on the part of the staff of the temporary detention centre or medical practitioners.


53.  The Government denied that there was any inconsistency in the witness statements prepared during the investigation. In particular, they emphasised that Chief Sergeant S and the other witnesses had given consistent evidence that Mr Mihaylov had put up armed resistance through the use of a knife. It was also indisputable that the gun was taken out as a result of the fight between the two men but was not prepared in advance. The three security guard witnesses confirmed during their initial interrogation that after the fight and the gunshot, when Mr Mihaylov fell to the ground, a knife fell out of Chief Sergeant S’s hand. This witness evidence was confirmed by the forensic evidence. In particular, the medical examination of Chief Sergeant S found that he had sustained grazes consistent with an attack by a blunt instrument. The evidence supported the view that there had been an assault involving the  <mask> and a weapon against the police officer.


51.  The Government argued that when the applicant’s son had pointed his pistol towards the police officers, the police chief, D.Ö., had shouted and warned him to “stop, police, surrender!”. However, the applicant’s son had pointed his pistol towards the police officers again and fired two rounds. Then D.Ö. had fired a single shot and injured the applicant’s son. In the opinion of the Government, the security forces resorting to the  <mask> in the instant case had become absolutely necessary and the degree of force had been proportionate to the aim pursued. Thus, the conditions “to protect someone against illegal violence or to ensure that a person is apprehended in line with the procedures specified in Article 2 § 2 (a) and (b) of the Convention” had been met in the present case.


47.  The applicant maintained her complaint. She denied the Government’s allegations that her son had belonged to an illegal armed group. She submitted that her son had been abducted and killed by State agents. In her opinion, at the time of his death he had been in the State’s custody and it had been impossible for him to offer active armed resistance to the federal forces. Furthermore, the fact that only one bullet shell had been found at the crime scene refuted the Government’s allegation of an exchange of gunfire between her son and the State agents. Nor did the photographs of Batyr Albakov’s body taken by her family confirm the Government’s allegations as regards the injuries sustained by her son or the time of his death. The applicant also rejected the Government’s argument that the  <mask> against her son had been lawful. She noted that they had not put forward any argument capable of justifying the use of lethal force against the deceased. Lastly, she argued that the domestic authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances of her son’s death. In particular, she pointed out the following deficiencies and omissions on the part of the authorities: the investigation into her son’s abduction had been delayed; the investigator had failed to take any measures in order to establish Batyr Albakov’s whereabouts, to identify the alleged perpetrators or the vehicles used by them; and the authorities had done nothing to establish whether the use of lethal force employed by law-enforcement agents against the deceased had been justified or to question the witnesses to the shooting. The applicant had not been afforded any procedural status and had been excluded from the investigation. As a result, she had been unable to obtain access to certain materials until after her present application had been communicated to the Government for observations.


22.  The Government submitted that the police had used firearms acting in self-defence and in accordance with the requirements of the Law and Regulations on the duties and powers of the police. In their view, the death of Ayşe Gülen Uzunhasanoğlu had resulted from a  <mask> which had been no more than absolutely necessary. They stressed that the domestic courts had established that the police officers had only fired their guns in order to protect themselves after the deceased had opened fire. The Government contended that the authorities had carried out an adequate and effective investigation into these events.


59.  The applicant explained that her grounds for complaining of the  <mask> against her father were solely connected with the immobilisation technique, known as a “double-seated embrace”, to which he had been subjected while in the police vehicle during his transfer to the police station. She took the view that it had not been “absolutely necessary” to use this technique; the police officers in the vehicle could have arrested him and called for back-up, which would have been adapted to the offence in question – resistance and rebellion – and would have put an end to the risk, especially as the police station was nearby. Referring to the judgment in Taïs v. France (no. 39922/03, 1 June 2006), she observed that the Government had not provided any means of establishing that the use of this technique was proportionate in the light of the circumstances (her father’s age, the offence for which he had been arrested, his level of aggressiveness, the fact that he was already handcuffed). She pointed out that the burden of proof was on the authorities, who were required to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation. She observed, moreover, that the use of this technique had given rise to much controversy. She referred in this connection to the report entitled “order and force, investigation into the use of force by law-enforcement officers in France” published on 14 March 2016 by the ACAT (see paragraph 47 above), according to which that technique was capable of causing postural asphyxia and had been responsible for several deaths. The practice had thus been banned in France in the context of deportations. She further referred to a note from the National Police Inspectorate of 8 October 2008 (IGPN/BAD/SA/08-1577-D), which stated that any compression had to be for the shortest time possible and released as soon as the individual was constrained by the appropriate regulatory means, and that any face-down immobilisation had to be kept to a minimum, especially if the person was already handcuffed.


200.  The applicants complained under Article 2 of the Convention that the police had been responsible for the death of their son. In particular, although they were called in precisely to deal with a mentally disturbed person, they had not been trained for such a situation, nor were they accompanied by a specialist, such as a psychiatrist; and their excessive and unjustified  <mask> led to Mr Shchiborshch’s death. Article 2 of the Convention reads as follows:


167.  The applicant also referred to the third party submissions made in the cases of Isayeva v. Russia, Yusupova v. Russia and Bazayeva v. Russia (nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00), in which Rights International, a USA-based NGO, summarised for the Court the relevant rules of international humanitarian law governing the  <mask> during attacks on mixed combatant/civilian targets during a non-international armed conflict.


80.  The Government did not dispute the facts as presented by the applicant. Without referring to a particular provision of Article 2 § 2, they argued that the attack and its consequences resulted from a  <mask> that had been absolutely necessary for the protection of the population of Katyr‑Yurt and that of neighbouring villages, as well as members of the security forces, in the face of unlawful violence. They referred to the conclusions of the criminal investigation that the use of lethal force had been prompted by the active resistance of the illegal armed groups, whose actions had posed a real threat to the life and health of servicemen and civilians, as well as to the general interests of society and the State. This threat could not have been eliminated by other means and the actions of the operation’s command corps had been proportionate to the resistance put up by the fighters.


40.  The applicant submitted that his serious injuries were the result of the unnecessary and disproportionate  <mask> by the police officers involved in the incident. He also complained about the failure of investigating and prosecuting authorities to proceed with a prompt, comprehensive and effective official investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of the police officers responsible.


53.  The Government maintained that the various expert reports and second opinions had stated that there had been no causal link between M.B.’s death and the force used, had ruled out mechanical asphyxia and concluded that there had been heart failure. Lastly, the Government submitted that the police officers had complied with the positive obligation to protect M.B.’s life and adjusted their intervention to his behaviour by requesting, less than five minutes after they had arrived on the scene, the assistance of the emergency services (fire brigade and emergency medical service), while informing them that M.B. was in a highly agitated state. The officers, after unsuccessfully attempting to reason with M.B., and faced with his highly agitated state and his mental disorder, had attempted to restrain him by using techniques they had been taught and had followed the recommendations issued by the National Police Inspectorate in a note of 8 October 2008 on the legal rules and professional ethics governing the  <mask>.


125.  The Government claimed that the force use on 30 August 1996 by the duty officers had been only enough to stop Mr Bekirski from escaping and to subdue his aggressive behaviour. Once they had succeeded and had handcuffed him, the duty officers had immediately stopped applying such force. Thus, they had acted in complete accordance with Article 12a of the Criminal Code of 1968 which permitted the  <mask> in such situations.


92.  The Government contended that the  <mask> had been absolutely necessary within the meaning of Article 2 § 2 (a) of the Convention. They emphasised that the use of force had been justified, on account of the aggressiveness of the crowd. The State agents had no intention of killing anyone as they had only used defensive weapons, such as paralysing sprays and grenades, bats, and hunting weapons with rubber bullets. They argued that the context of the operation should also be taken into account when analysing the State agents’ acts, namely that two people had been accused of beating up a police officer and had to be summoned for investigation. Even so, the State agents had discharged their duties whilst minimising to the greatest extent possible the risk to life, by using verbal warnings and firing warning shots in the air before shooting at the crowd. They also pointed out that special forces officers had also been seriously wounded in the incident.


193.  The Government did not dispute the facts as presented by the applicants concerning the deaths and injuries sustained as a result of the counterterrorist operation in Katyr-Yurt between 4 and 7 February 2000. They argued, without referring to a particular provision of Article 2 § 2, that the attack and its consequences resulted from the  <mask> which was absolutely necessary for the protection of the population of Katyr-Yurt and that of neighbouring villages from unlawful violence. They referred to the conclusions of the criminal investigation that the use of lethal force had been motivated by the active resistance of the illegal armed groups, whose actions had posed a real threat to the life and health of servicemen and civilians, as well as to the general interests of society and the State. This threat could not have been eliminated by other means and the actions of the operation's command corps had been proportionate to the resistance put up by the fighters.


78.  The applicant maintained that the  <mask> had not been absolutely necessary. The operation had been aimed at arresting J. and taking him to hospital but he had been shot dead intentionally, or executed as Dr T. had put it when examined as a witness during the criminal proceedings. Shooting someone at six metres' range with nine millimetre lead shots could not be justified on any grounds, as there had been no indication that J. posed a threat to anyone. Senior Constables A. and L. had been safe inside the armoured vehicle. Neither had any evidence been produced during the court proceedings to the effect that anyone else at the scene had been in danger. J., already injured, had been in the process of crawling out of the house when he had been shot in the head. At that time he had not posed a danger to anyone and had not been about to exit the cordoned area. The barrels of his shotguns had been pointing inwards. The guns had not even been cocked. J. had been making his way out of a burning house, blinded by the sudden change from intense light to darkness. His mobility had been reduced as a result of the injuries to his leg and hand. The shooting had been in violation of the principle of proportionality.


52.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> by the police officers had been absolutely necessary and strictly proportionate. They argued that the intervention by the police officers had been justified by the need to protect the physical integrity of everyone present at the scene in view of the dangerous behaviour of M.B., who suffered from psychological disorders. They submitted that the police officers had attempted to restore calm and had requested M.B. to leave the pharmacy, but he had vehemently refused to do so and had then become extremely agitated.


109.  The applicants further complained that the authorities had not investigated effectively the circumstances in which Mr Dimitrov was ill-treated and lost his life. They alleged that the investigation had not applied a standard comparable to that required under the Convention. They also drew attention to attempts to stifle the investigation and influence the ensuing judicial proceedings, as well as to a number of omissions in the initial gathering of evidence and in the conduct of the investigation and of the judicial proceedings. They also pointed out that no attempts had been made to investigate higher-ups, or to verify whether the operation for Mr Dimitrov’s arrest had been adequately planned or whether the officers who took part in it had been adequately briefed. Lastly, they alleged that in acquitting the officers the Supreme Court of Cassation had disregarded facts established by the lower courts, had not thoroughly examined whether the officers had complied with the rules governing the  <mask> and auxiliary means by the police, had paid no heed to the ill-treatment to which the officers had subjected Mr Dimitrov – with the result that that ill-treatment remained completely unpunished –, and had not sought to clarify whether there had been alternative ways to arrest Mr Dimitrov.


70.  The Government submitted that the force used had been “absolutely necessary”. The police officers had initially had no intention of using firearms but had been forced to do so by the exigencies of the situation. The police officers had had to take a speedy decision as there had been a real and immediate threat to police officer H.Gev.’s life, and also taking into account the unpredictability of Seyran Ayvazyan’s behaviour because of his mental illness. The police officers, having assessed all the risks, had considered the  <mask> to be reasonable and necessary to eliminate any danger posed by him. Even though Seyran Ayvazyan’s knives had been homemade, four persons had sustained injuries of medium severity. The police actions had therefore been in compliance with the domestic law, namely the Police Act. Moreover, the circumstances of this case had been similar to those of Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus (9 October 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VI), in which a great deal of fire power had similarly been used but no violation had been found.


155.  The Government pointed out that an investigation into the fourth applicant’s brother’s death was commenced by the Special Investigation Branch on 29 August 2003, five days after the shooting on 14 August. The Special Investigation Branch recovered fragments of bullets, empty bullet cases and the vehicle, and took digital photographs of the scene. They interviewed the doctors who treated the deceased and took statements. Nine military witnesses involved in the incident were interviewed and had statements taken and four further witnesses were interviewed but had no evidence to offer. The investigation was discontinued on 17 September 2003 after the Brigade Commander expressed the view that the shooting fell within the rules of engagement and was lawful. However, the decision to discontinue was taken by a Special Investigation Branch senior investigating officer, who was independent of the military chain of command. The investigation was reopened on 7 June 2004 and completed on 3 December 2004, despite the difficult security conditions in Iraq at that time. The case was then referred to the Army Prosecuting Authority, which decided not to bring criminal charges as there was no realistic prospect of proving that the soldier who shot the fourth applicant’s brother had not been acting in self‑defence. The Attorney General was notified and he decided not to exercise his jurisdiction to order a prosecution. In the Government’s submission, the investigation was effective, in that it identified the person responsible for the death and established that the laws governing the  <mask> had been followed. The investigation was reasonably prompt, in particular when regard was had to the extreme difficulty of investigating in the extraterritorial context. If the halting of the initial investigation gave rise to any lack of independence, this was cured by the subsequent investigation and the involvement of the Army Prosecuting Authority and the Attorney General (see Gül v. Turkey, no. 22676/93, §§ 92-95, 14 December 2000; see also McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, §§ 157 and 162-64, Series A no. 324).


74.  The applicant insisted that her deceased relatives had been civilians, who had posed no danger to servicemen. She further submitted that her relatives had been driving from Gekhi to Roshni-Chu early in the evening, when it had still been light out; that the left side of the lorry cab had contained numerous bullet holes, which demonstrated that the gunfire had been intense and that it had been opened to kill the driver and the passengers; that after the shooting Petimat Aydamirova and her minor son Ibragim Suleymanov had been alive and screamed for help but had been killed by the servicemen; that the holes in the ground and the remains of the brain tissue had clearly indicated that a final shot had been fired into the applicant's relatives' heads; that the servicemen had attempted to eliminate the evidence and get rid of the corpses; and that the fact that the domestic authorities had opened a criminal investigation into the events demonstrated the unlawfulness of the actions of the military. She contended therefore that the  <mask> by State agents which had led to the loss of her relatives' lives had been clearly disproportionate in the circumstances of the case and could not be regarded as justified under Article 2 § 2 of the Convention. The applicant stressed that the Government had not submitted any convincing arguments or documentary evidence to the contrary.


53.  The applicant claimed that his wife had been killed by an artillery shell fired by the security forces. The shell was fired either intentionally in order to kill the villagers or recklessly and with disregard for life. In any event, the  <mask> used by the security forces was more than absolutely necessary. The firing of artillery shells into a village at 3 a.m. amounted to an indiscriminate attack on civilians which could not be justified in the circumstances.


170.  The Government argued that the attack and its consequences were legitimate under Article 2 § 2 (a), i.e. they had resulted from the  <mask> absolutely necessary in the circumstances for protection of a person from unlawful violence. The use of lethal force was necessary and proportionate to suppress the active resistance of the illegal armed groups, whose actions were a real threat to the life and health of the servicemen and civilians, as well as to the general interests of society and the state. This threat could not have been eliminated by other means and the actions by the operation's command corps had been proportionate. The combat weapons were specifically directed against previously-designated targets.


81.  The applicant submitted that the killing had not been based on any plan and had been in flagrant violation of the instructions on the  <mask>. In fact, the decision to shoot had been taken by the individual police officers of the Special Task Force without weighing up the alternatives. They had subsequently explained that the shooting had been an act of self-defence. It was clear from the audio tape that seven seconds had passed from the moment that J. appeared in the doorway until the firing of the fatal shots. Further, the recording also revealed that when the commander of the Special Task Force, Superintendent H., had ordered that J. be shot immediately in the legs, Senior Constables A. and L. had just fired their shotguns, hitting J. in the head with 9 x 9 millimetre lead shots. The order to shoot him in the legs had been valid only in the event of his trying to break through the cordon situated fifteen metres from the house. The visibility from the armoured vehicle had been completely clear.


245.  The applicant explained that he had waited until 18 June 2001 before lodging a criminal complaint with regard to his experiences during the night of 13 to 14 June 1990 on account of the scale of the repression conducted by the authorities at that time, of which he among more than a thousand others had been a victim. He considered that the investigation in issue here did not concern ordinary incidents of unlawful  <mask> by State agents, but rather mass violations of human rights, orchestrated by the highest State authorities.


46.  The Government did not accept the applicants' claim that their relatives had been killed by an excessive or unjustified  <mask>. They submitted that Seyit Külekçi and Doğan Altun had been armed terrorists. The Government contended that the deceased had taken part in an armed clash with the security forces and that, therefore, the use of force had been unavoidable and absolutely necessary. The Government further maintained that, following receipt of the applicants' petition to the public prosecutor, an investigation had been initiated and criminal proceedings opened under Article 178 of the Criminal Code.


31.  The applicants complained that the force used by the gendarmerie officers against their daughter had not been absolutely necessary and that the excessive nature of the  <mask> showed that the officers had in fact intended to kill her. They further added that the investigation into the killing of their daughter had neither been impartial nor adequate for the purposes of the requirements of Article 2 of the Convention.


80.  The applicants submitted first that no real attempt had been made to capture their relatives alive. In this connection, they contended that the police officers had known the identity of the victims when they arrived at the café and that there was a premeditated plan to kill them rather than to effect their lawful arrest. They further maintained that there were several indications of this aim, such as the facts that the police officers had been wearing bullet-proof vests and that the bullets followed a downward trajectory within the victims' bodies. They further contended that the security forces' claim that there had been an armed clash was unsubstantiated as neither of the police officers had been injured. The applicants maintained that their relatives had been killed as a result of  <mask> which was not absolutely necessary.


117.  The applicants went on to argue that the police operation against Mr Dimitrov had not been adequately planned. There was no evidence that the officers who took part in that operation had been properly briefed. Contrary to what appeared to be suggested by the written plan of the operation, it had in fact had been planned with the expectation that Mr Dimitrov would put up resistance. There were other discrepancies as well, such as the failure of the investigator to join the five officers and carry out any investigative steps, although the plan envisaged the gathering of evidence of Mr Dimitrov’s alleged criminal activities. In fact, none of the three groups of officers who took part in the operation tried to gather such evidence, contrary to the written plan. The instructions in the plan on the  <mask> had also been flagrantly disregarded, with the result that an unarmed person who had not put up any resistance had lost his life. Another discrepancy was the lack of any suggestion in the written plan that Mr Dimitrov might be aggressive or armed. Contrary to the expectations of the police officers, as described by the Government, there was no evidence that Mr Dimitrov was engaging in drug trafficking or pimping at the time of his arrest, or that he was armed, dangerous or under the influence of cocaine. Having reviewed the evidence, the domestic courts had found that Mr Dimitrov had not had on him any narcotic drugs.


82.  The Government submitted, in reply, that the death of the applicants' relatives resulted from a  <mask> which was no more than absolutely necessary. They maintained that it was established by the domestic courts that the police officers had started firing only after the deceased had opened fire and in order to protect themselves. They contended that, as was stated in the Istanbul Assize Court's judgment of 7 February 2002, the deaths had resulted from self-defence and in accordance with Article 16 of Law no. 2559 on the duties and legal powers of police.


199.  The applicant submitted that the existing domestic legal framework in itself failed to ensure proper protection of civilian lives. She made reference to the only disclosed legal act on which the conclusions of the military experts based their report, namely, the Army Field Manual. The Court agrees with the applicant that the Government's failure to invoke the provisions of any domestic legislation governing the  <mask> by the army or security forces in situations such as the present one, whilst not in itself sufficient to decide on a violation of the State's positive obligation to protect the right to life, is, in the circumstances of the present case, also directly relevant to the Court's considerations with regard to the proportionality of the response to the attack (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned McCann judgment, § 156).


218.  The applicant claimed that the authorities’ real intent had nothing to do with those legitimate aims. They alleged in their observations that the main goal of the authorities had been to kill the terrorists, and not to save the hostages. The Court has taken note of the phrase in the prosecutor’s decision stating that the  <mask> was intended to prevent “the erosion of the prestige of Russia on the international arena”. However, in itself this is insufficient to uphold the allegations of bad faith. Everything suggests that one of the authorities’ main concerns was to preserve the lives of the hostages. The Court will base its further analysis on the assumption that in this case the authorities were pursuing simultaneously all three legitimate aims specified in Article 2 § 2 of the Convention, and that the “defence of any person from unlawful violence” was the predominant one, as provided by section 2 of the Russian Suppression of Terrorism Act.


78.  The Government referred to the legal rules under which the police officers had acted. However, they did not explain how the rules concerning the  <mask> were implemented in practice and what controls were in place to ensure that they were respected. It appears that the system in place did not give law‑enforcement officials clear guidelines and criteria governing the use of force when carrying out arrests of dangerous suspects in peacetime. Thus, it was almost unavoidable that the authorities responsible for the planning of the operation to effect the arrest of the suspects enjoyed an excessively wide autonomy of action and took unconsidered initiatives.


87.  The applicant submitted that her husband was intentionally killed. The vehicle driver deliberately struck, at speed, the hoarding behind which Dermot McShane was standing in order to cause serious injury or death to those using it as a shield. Alternatively, she submitted that the death of her husband was the result of an unnecessary and disproportionate  <mask> by the security forces. It was obvious that there must have been persons sheltering behind the hoarding and the action of using an armoured vehicle to demolish it was disproportionate. Other courses of action were open to the security forces, including the withdrawal or the slow advance of a line of vehicles. Further, it appears that there was a breakdown in command structure, in that it was an RUC officer who instructed the driver of the APC, who was alone, to take action, while the military commander was preparing another vehicle for action. The use of the APC without an observer, where the driver had limited vision, could not be regarded as proper practice.


26.  The Government argued that the  <mask> by the soldiers had been justified under paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Convention and lawful under the national legislation because the soldiers had thought that they had encountered members of a terrorist organisation and had returned fire to apprehend the terrorists and to protect themselves from the fire opened by the terrorists.


67.  The applicants complained, under Article 2 of the Convention, that the  <mask> employed by the security forces against İsmet Erdoğan and Elmas Yalçın was disproportionate and resulted in their unlawful killing. They further complained, under the same head, that the investigation and the subsequent criminal proceedings brought against the four police officers were fundamentally flawed and, as a result, were not capable of being effective, in violation of the procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention. They further complained, under Article 6 of the Convention, that the proceedings in question were not concluded within a reasonable time.


36.  The Government further submitted that the applicant’s detention and his subsequent placement in a disciplinary cell had been lawful, having complied with the provisions of national law laying down responsibility for disciplinary offences committed by servicemen. The  <mask> by Mr L. had been absolutely necessary to prevent the escape of the applicant’s son, who had been lawfully detained. Thus, Mr Putintsev’s loss of life could not be regarded as having been in contravention of the Convention, being covered by the exception in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2 to Article 2 of the Convention. The Government insisted that, having decided to abscond and having refused to comply with the order to stop, Mr Putintsev had himself placed his life in imminent danger. He had been warned and he had fully understood the consequences of his actions. The deadly force had been used for a lawful purpose and had been a measure of last resort. The Russian Federation could not therefore be held responsible for Mr Putintsev’s death.


11.  The applicant complained about the test for prosecution in cases of putative self-defence. Under English law, a prosecution will be brought only if a conviction is “more likely than not” (see paragraphs 164 and 265 of the judgment). The majority refer in the reasoning to an interesting comparative-law report on this issue (see paragraphs 176 and 269 of the judgment). We note in this connection that the analysis of comparative-law data leads to the conclusion that the test applied under English law for prosecution is clearly more stringent than in other States Parties to the Convention. Such a stringent test may prevent the prosecution and conviction of a person who has committed an offence if the prospects of success are not correctly assessed by the prosecutor. There is a serious risk that borderline cases will escape independent judicial assessment. As a result, certain acts involving excessive  <mask> by the police may be covered by a de facto immunity from prosecution. In our view, for the sake of efficient protection of the right to life, if there are serious doubts concerning the legitimacy of lethal force used by the police in actual or putative self-defence, the final decision on the question of criminal liability should be left to the courts.


68.  The applicant further submitted that four different types of combat weapons had been used during the arrest, in spite of the fact that Seyran Ayvazyan had been armed only with homemade knives. The grenade had been found only after the incident and could not justify the  <mask>, as Seyran Ayvazyan had never threatened to use it. The police officers had not been sufficiently trained to use such special means as helmets and protective shields in order to be able to arrest him without using combat weapons and threatening his life. They had possessed none of this equipment and had had to use a small table as a protective shield. Furthermore, the police had known that he was suffering from a paranoid type of schizophrenia and had been hospitalised on numerous occasions. Therefore, they should have invited a psychiatrist to neutralise him with special measures. The argument that they “invited a doctor but he did not come” could not justify the “absolute necessity” of depriving him of his life. The number of shots fired at Seyran Ayvazyan could not be considered as self-defence either. In sum, the deprivation of life had not been “absolutely necessary” within the meaning of Article 2.


32.  The Government submitted that it had been absolutely necessary for the gendarmes to resort to  <mask> against the applicant, because he had attempted to escape from the gendarmes at a checkpoint. They further considered that the force used had been proportionate, because the gendarmes, who were equipped with heavy machine guns and hand grenades, had only used their firearms. They further pointed out that the gendarme officers had been trained in human rights and that there had been no flaw in the conduct of the operation.


80.  The Government pointed out that J. had been shown to pose a serious threat to those present at the scene. He had previously been involved in a siege situation and in other violent crimes. He was known to have acted violently towards the police and even towards members of his own family, having shot at his own brother previously, and was also known to have had mental health problems. In addition, the circumstances at the scene were extremely difficult due to the weather and other conditions. The applicable law was in conformity with Article 2 of the Convention. The police could interfere with a person's constitutional rights only if it was permitted by law. In the present case, as noted by the domestic courts, the police officers in question had had justifiable reasons for believing that J. had made an illegal threat and committed an assault and possibly a robbery. In addition, J. had been proven to be dangerous to the public at large and especially to those present at the scene. This entitled the police to apprehend him and take him into custody. The Government made reference to Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus (judgment of 9 October 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VI, p. 2107, § 192) and McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324, p. 58, § 200), in which the Court had stated that the  <mask> may be justified where it is based on an honest belief which is perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time but which subsequently turns out to be mistaken. In the present case the situation during the operation fulfilled the requirements of Article 2 § 2 (a) and (b). The police officers had been trying to effect a lawful arrest while protecting themselves, the other persons at the scene and the residents of the island. As concluded during the pre-trial investigation and the consideration of the charges and also during the proceedings before the domestic courts, had J. been allowed to escape armed, the lives of even more people would have been in danger. Therefore, the perception of the situation and the actions taken in the present case had not been proved to be mistaken.


59.  The Government maintained that the original investigation lasted from 4 October to 30 December 2000, i.e. about three months. During that period evidence was heard from 75 witnesses and a substantial number of expert reports were submitted. They stated that, in view of the final outcome of the proceedings, there was no obligation on the State to investigate any  <mask> or other actions.


45.  The applicants alleged that the killing of their son had been the result of deliberate acts by members of the Turkish armed forces. The circumstances of the case strongly suggested that the persons who shot Stelios Kalli Panayi had intended to kill him. Moreover, even assuming that this had not been the case, the  <mask> had not been “absolutely necessary” within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention. In this connection the applicants emphasised the following:


86.  The applicants insisted that their deceased relatives had been civilians, had not used firearms or any unlawful violence and posed no danger either to the civilian population or to servicemen. The applicants strongly denied that any weapons could have been hidden in the boot of the “Niva” car, and argued that, even assuming they were, their relatives could not have threatened the servicemen, as the weapons allegedly found in the boot would have been covered with a large amount of vegetables collected in the field. The applicants further denied that the authorities had ever given any explanations as to how civilians were expected to behave within the area of the counter-terrorist operation. They contended therefore that the  <mask> by the State which had led to the loss of their relatives’ lives had been clearly disproportionate in the circumstances of the case and could not be regarded as justified under Article 2 § 2 of the Convention. The applicants stressed in this respect that the Government had not submitted any convincing arguments or documentary evidence to the contrary.


120.  The applicants thus contended that the  <mask> by the State which had led to the deprivation of their relatives’ lives had been clearly disproportionate and could not be regarded as justified under Article 2 § 2 of the Convention. They also claimed that the special operation carried out on 6 August 2000 had not been properly planned and controlled by the authorities so as to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force (see McCann v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324, § 194).


50.  The applicant submitted that his son’s death was the result of the unnecessary and disproportionate  <mask> by the police officer involved in the incident. Relying on previous case-law (Makaratzis v. Greece, Celniku v. Greece, and Karagiannopoulos v. Greece) he complained that the legislation on the use of weapons by agents of the State was obsolete and inadequate. The applicant also complained about the failure of investigating and prosecuting authorities to proceed with a prompt, independent, comprehensive and effective official investigation into his son’s death.


87.  The Government emphasised that the measures taken during the operation had been the result of a careful weighing-up of the situation and the various options for ending the siege as peacefully as possible without causing unnecessary harm to anyone. Several alternative actions, such as a house search and the use of a dog for the arrest, had been abandoned for appropriate and thoroughly considered reasons. The  <mask> had been proportionate and absolutely necessary taking into account J.'s actions, the fact that he had tried to leave the house with loaded guns pointing towards those present at the scene, giving no grounds for believing that he would surrender, and the other relevant facts.


75.  The Government pointed out that France had an up-to-date legal basis and code of professional ethics regarding intervention techniques, their safety and regulating the  <mask>: the note of 8 October 2008 issued by the National Police Inspectorate, and recently updated in a note of 4 November 2015 setting out the principles governing the use of force or coercion to restrain a person in a highly agitated state; the Code of Professional Ethics of 16 March 1986; and the Practical Guide to Professional Ethics revised in 2001.


54.  The applicants also contested the domestic authorities’ conclusions as to the danger posed by the actions of RM. They expressed their doubts as to whether the car driven by RM had indeed hit officer RZ. They alleged that such a conclusion had not been corroborated by any evidence. RZ had suffered only very slight injuries: a slightly swollen left calf and several scratches on the fingers of his left hand and his left elbow. The applicants referred in this connection to the evidence in the criminal proceedings against the driver (which has not been submitted to the Court). The applicants argued that those injuries could have been inflicted at any moment during the chase – for example, by manoeuvring the police vehicle or trying to take out the gun. By contrast, had RZ been hit by the car, thrown onto the bonnet and then the ground, as he had submitted during the inquiry against SG, he would have suffered much more serious injuries. Moreover, the Ford Escort bore no signs of such an impact. The applicants concluded that the version of hitting the policeman had been fabricated simply to make the  <mask> appear more appropriate to the circumstances.


193.  The applicant contended that as the investigating authorities were applying a lower standard than that required by the Court, they were prevented from considering whether the  <mask> by Charlie 2 and Charlie 12 was or was not justified in the circumstances within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention. In other words, the extent to which the domestic authorities were able to submit the actions of State agents to careful scrutiny was undermined, with the consequence that the State’s investigation was unable to secure accountability through a prosecution for a violation of Article 2 (see, for example, Vasil Sashov Petrov v. Bulgaria, no. 63106/00, § 52, 10 June 2010).


65.  The applicants thus concluded that their son had not committed suicide but had died as a result of force used by the police. In this respect, they argued that that force had been disproportionate. They contended that the police operation of 6 June 1999 had lacked adequate planning and that no clear instructions had been issued as to when the  <mask> was permitted.


92.  The applicants alleged that the circumstances in which the late Petros Kakoulli had met his death suggested that those who had shot him had intended to kill him. In their opinion, the acts which had caused the death of Petros Kakoulli went far beyond anything which might have been justified under Article 2 § 2 (a), if indeed any  <mask> at all could have been “absolutely necessary” in those circumstances.


202.  The applicants observed that the relevant provisions on the  <mask> by law-enforcement personnel were Article 53 of the CC and Article 24 of the Public Safety Code (see paragraphs 143 and 146 above). Those provisions, enacted in 1930 and 1931, during the Fascist era, were not compatible with more recent international standards or with liberal legal principles. They were symptomatic of the authoritarianism that had prevailed at that time. In particular, the concepts of “necessity” legitimising the use of weapons and “use of force” were not equivalent to the principles developed by Strasbourg case-law, which was based on “absolute necessity”.


236.  The Government thus insisted that in the circumstances the  <mask> by the federal forces was no more than absolutely necessary in order to eliminate danger to the local population emanating from the illegal armed groups and that it was impossible to eliminate that danger by any other means. In particular, the use of ground troops would have led to unacceptable losses on the part of the federal armed forces. In the Government’s submission, the actions of the relevant military personnel had fully complied with the Suppression of Terrorism Act, and the investigating authorities had reached a well-founded conclusion that those actions had been justified in the circumstances.


82.  The applicant submitted that the police's subsequent diverging explanations showed that there had been a lack of proper planning and direction of the police forces. The police operation had been limited to the siege, the use of gas and the demonstration of the police's superiority in terms of equipment and numbers. Apart from the instructions regarding the  <mask>, there had been no other plans to apprehend J. The negotiator could hardly be called a professional and J.'s brother and police officer S.K., who were familiar to J., had been denied the chance to speak to him when they arrived at the scene. The police had failed to search the house and to use the police dog. The closing of the telephone lines could hardly be characterised as giving J. a night's rest. Public order and safety had not been jeopardised because all the residents of the island and other people on the island apart from the authorities had been evacuated. Using gas, breaking windows and bringing in armoured vehicles cannot be characterised as a peaceful means of trying to apprehend a psychologically disturbed person and hospitalising him. The police had no other plans to rescue J. from the burning house.


3.  The applicant in the present case alleged that the extreme brutality with which the victim had been treated was partly due to his Roma origin. The Chamber indeed found a violation of Articles 2 (in both aspects, substantive and procedural) and 3. As to the latter, the Court concluded that the victim had been subjected to torture. The circumstances in which the young and healthy 27-year-old man died at the hands of State authorities, as established by the Court (see paragraphs 111-125), are particularly grave. In the circumstances of the Nachova case, the Grand Chamber noted at least two reasons for the obligation to investigate possible racist motives to arise: the alleged racist language and the highly disproportionate  <mask>. It is true that in the case at hand there is no information about any racist language used by the police officers. It is, however, so obvious that the force used and the absolute lack of investigation into an evidently suspicious death were absolutely disproportionate to the circumstances of the case involving a young Roma man who had allegedly committed a robbery.


89.  The Government did not accept the applicant's claims under Article 2 of the Convention that her husband was deprived of his life intentionally or by any excessive or unjustified  <mask>. Indeed, in this case, there was no question of force being used against the applicant's husband. The events which led to his death were simply a tragic accident. It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Convention that Article 2 would come into play wherever there happened to be an accident which was allegedly caused by a person who was acting in an official capacity at the time. Article 2 was therefore not engaged.


23.  The applicant complained under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention that the force used by the gendarmerie officers had not been absolutely necessary, that the excessive nature of the  <mask> had shown that the officers had in fact intended to kill him, and that he had suffered bodily harm as a result of the shootings. He further complained under Articles 2, 6 and 13 of the Convention that the domestic authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances of his wounding.


244.  The Government found the amounts claimed exaggerated. They also pointed out in respect of the claims by the first, second, third, fifth and sixth applicants, that their relatives had been members of illegal armed groups and had been killed as a result of the  <mask> that had been no more than “absolutely necessary”. As regards the claims by the seventh, eighth, tenth and eleventh applicants, it was not established that the authorities had been involved into their relatives’ disappearance.


171.  The Government thus insisted that in the circumstances the  <mask> by the federal forces was no more than absolutely necessary in order to eliminate danger to the local population emanating from the illegal armed groups and that it was impossible to eliminate that danger by any other means. In their submission, of all available methods, the military authorities had opted for pinpoint air strikes, which had enabled the federal forces to minimise the risk of civilian casualties while causing considerable losses to illegal fighters who, as a result, had subsequently, on 7 and 8 December 1999, surrendered the town without resistance, with the result that there had been no casualties among the federal armed forces. In the Government’s view, the present case could be distinguished from the cases of Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia (nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00, 24 February 2005) and Isayeva v. Russia, (no. 57950/00, 24 February 2005), since in the present case the military targets in Urus-Martan, their danger to the residents and the necessity of their destruction were obvious, and the consequences of the attack in question were less serious than those in the above-cited cases.


295.  The applicants alleged that the procedural aspect of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention had been breached in this case. They considered that the duty to investigate of their own motion contained in those Convention provisions was incumbent on the authorities under both domestic and international law. That duty was all the stronger in that the present case did not concern ordinary incidents of unlawful  <mask> by State agents, but a conflict which was fuelled by the authorities then in power and which set various groups of the population – including ethnic groups – against one another.


36.  The applicant alleged that the death of his son had been caused by an excessive  <mask>. In his view, domestic law did not regulate, in a manner that was compatible with the Convention, the use of firearms by State agents. The latter had allegedly been authorised to use lethal force against his son without it being absolutely necessary. He further complained that the authorities had not carried out an effective investigation into the death. He relied in this connection on Article 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


75.  The applicants considered that the  <mask> by the prison officers to restrain their son had been neither necessary nor strictly proportionate to the latter’s conduct. They pointed out that regard should be had not only to the actions of the prison officers but also to all the surrounding circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination (see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, § 150, Series A no. 324). In that connection, they argued that in the present case regard should be had to their son’s particular vulnerability in the context of his detention and to his mental condition, of which the officers had been aware. They alleged that the methods used by the officers to restrain Michael Tekin had been completely disproportionate to his behaviour and that dialogue had at no stage been considered. In view of the officers’ knowledge of Michael Tekin’s psychiatric problems, they should have prepared their intervention in anticipation of a probable negative reaction on his part to the notification of new stricter security measures. In the present case, the officers should have treated their son as if he had been a person in full possession of his mental faculties. In the absence of appropriate training, they had not known how to react to Michael Tekin.


51.  The Government submitted that the deaths of the applicants' two relatives had resulted from the  <mask> which was no more than absolutely necessary in order to effect their arrests. In particular, the security forces had done all that was necessary to apprehend the two persons alive and had ordered them, both in Turkish and Kurdish, to surrender and had also fired warning shots. The only reason to throw a hand grenade at the two men had been to eliminate the risk of a booby-trap.


98.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> during both of the demonstrations was proportionate and necessary. They stated that the demonstrators, who were attacking the police officers with fire bombs and stones, had first been verbally warned to disperse, then pressurised water and sticks had been used and, as a last resort, the police officers had fired warning shots in the air. According to the Government, the demonstrators had been stirred up by members of an illegal organisation. The police officers, who had a duty to maintain public safety, were under great stress and psychological pressure as the incidents lasted for almost two days. Finally, the Government referred to the ballistics reports which indicated clearly that the bullets recovered from the bodies of the deceased did not match the bullets obtained from the weapons of the security forces.


29.  The applicants made a twofold complaint under Article 2 of the Convention. They contended firstly that the State had failed to comply with their  <mask> in order to prevent the deaths of M.T. and V.T. and secondly that the State had failed to conduct a thorough investigation into the possible responsibility of their agents for the deaths of M.T. and V.T.


116.  The applicants complained that the authorities had failed to comply with their  <mask> to take appropriate measures to mitigate the risks to their lives against the natural hazards. The first applicant complained that the domestic authorities were responsible for the death of her husband in the mudslide of July 2000. She and the other applicants also complained that the domestic authorities were responsible for putting their lives at risk, as they had failed to discharge the State's positive obligations and had been negligent in the maintenance of the dam, in monitoring the hazardous area and in providing an emergency warning or taking other reasonable measures to mitigate the risk and the effects of the natural disaster. They also complained that they had had no redress, in particular they had not received adequate compensation in respect of their pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. They relied on Article 2 of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, provides:


54.  The applicants submitted that to comply with its  <mask> under Article 2 of the Convention the State had to do more than adopt laws mandating the investigation and punishment of homicide. It also had to carry out effective official investigations of all instances of homicide. The investigation in the case at hand had not been effective; on the contrary, it had been tainted by a number of grave omissions, which had completely undermined its ability to establish both the exact circumstances in which Mr Ivaylo Zashev had been killed and the identity of the persons responsible for his death. The most serious error had been the loss of the cartridges impounded from the crime scene, as well as the failure to provide protection to Mr V.K., which had been both possible and indispensable, and the lack of which had led to his changing his statements several times. Other deficiencies had been the substandard inspection of the crime scene, the belated conducting of interviews with the neighbours, the belated commissioning of DNA and ballistic expert reports, and in general the excessive length of the investigation, which had lasted almost eight years. The applicants also criticised the passive conduct of the prosecution during the trial, in the course of which it had made only one – poorly substantiated – request for further evidence to be gathered. In addition, in its appeal against the acquittal the prosecution had not raised any additional arguments and had not made further evidentiary requests; nor had it sought later to appeal on points of law.


82.  The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to meet their  <mask> and conduct an effective investigation into the car accident. He also complained that the compensation awarded in his favour had been insufficient. He relied on Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention. The Court will examine the complaint under Article 2, which reads in so far as relevant:


122.  The applicants submitted that the situation they had experienced had been contrary to Article 3 of the Convention as interpreted by the Court in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above (§ 263). The state of extreme poverty and material and psychological want in which the authorities had placed them, in full knowledge of their vulnerability as asylum-seekers and as a family with young children including a severely disabled young daughter, had reached the threshold required by Article 3. The obligation to provide for the applicants’ basic needs as asylum-seekers had also been one of the  <mask> of the Belgian State under European law and more particularly the Reception Directive, which provided that Dublin asylum-seekers had to continue being provided with reception facilities until they were actually transferred to the responsible State, as had been confirmed by the CJEU in Cimade and Gisti, cited above (§ 58) (see paragraph 105 above), and the revised European Social Charter (see paragraphs 108-09 above).


45.  The Government submitted firstly that the applicant had failed to properly exhaust the available domestic remedies. Referring to the Court’s case-law on the subject of the State’s  <mask> under Article 2 of the Convention, they argued that the criminal-law avenue was not the one to be pursued by the applicant. On this point the Government admitted that within the framework of criminal proceedings the applicant had brought a civil action, and had been recognised as a civil claimant who had suffered pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. However, in each of the subsequent decisions to discontinue the criminal investigation of the death of the applicant’s son the prosecutors suggested that she bring a separate civil claim against the Vilnius city municipality under Article 6.266 of the Civil Code. Moreover, by a decision of 3 July 2008 and subsequent decisions the prosecutors established that the Vilnius city municipality had been the de facto owner of the derelict building the collapse of which had caused the death, and that it thus had absolute liability. Referring to the practice of the Lithuanian courts (see paragraphs 40-42 above), the Government thus insisted that Article 6.266 of the Civil Code was an effective remedy the applicant should have pursued. Whilst noting that the pre-trial investigation did not establish physical persons liable for the accident, the Government also argued that the applicant could have alternatively claimed redress for the damage on the basis of Article 6.271 of the Civil Code, which sets forth a more general provision, namely liability to compensate for damage caused by unlawful actions of institutions of public authority. Again, the applicant could have relied on the prosecutor’s conclusion that the Vilnius city municipality, which had learned about the poor state of the building in question in 2004, did not act promptly enough to eliminate the threat. Even so, the applicant had never lodged any separate civil claim under the rules of civil procedure in respect of the damage caused by her son’s death.


55.  The Government stated that the State authorities had complied with their  <mask> under Article 2 as they had put in place a legal framework governing the transportation of dangerous goods, the effectiveness of which the applicant had not challenged, and they had also carried out an effective investigation into the accident in a prompt manner. The Government emphasised in that connection that the obligation to conduct an effective investigation was not an obligation as to results but as to means, and that, in any event, the civil proceedings in respect of the applicant’s claims were still ongoing.


30.  The Government further maintained that in the present case, unlike in the case of Osman v. the United Kingdom (28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑VIII), the State authorities had not known of the existence of a real and imminent risk to the life of the applicants’ relatives. Moreover, D. had not been acting in his official capacity. Although the internal investigation had established “some flagrant violations and shortcomings in the organisation of the working processes of the relevant police department”, the national courts had not established any causal link between these shortcomings and D.’s actions. Therefore, the Government considered that in the present case the State had complied with its  <mask> under Article 2 of the Convention.


66.  The Government argued that the Chamber’s conclusion that “all situations of unintentional death” came within the scope of Article 2 had given rise to an unprecedented extension of the  <mask> inherent in that provision. In their submission, the Chamber’s reasoning departed from the position adopted by the Court in recent cases on the subject, such as Mastromatteo v. Italy ([GC], no. 37703/99, ECHR 2002-VIII), and was not supported by the cases to which it had referred, in particular Osman v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII) and Calvelli and Ciglio (cited above), in which no violation of Article 2 had been found.


84.  The applicant argued that, according to the Court’s case-law, the  <mask> under Article 2 of the Convention imposed a primary duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person and backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions. She submitted that this could also imply in certain circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life was at risk from the criminal acts of another individual (she referred to Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, § 115, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑VIII, cited in Kontrová v. Slovakia, no. 7510/04, § 49, 31 May 2007). She concluded that in the present case the Italian State had not taken the necessary measures to protect her life and that of her son.


98.  The Government accepted that the positive obligation to protect patients from the danger they might represent to themselves or to third parties applied both in the case of patients who were hospitalised voluntarily and those hospitalised involuntarily. However, they submitted that in the case of patients who were hospitalised following a judicial order, and therefore involuntarily, such  <mask> assumed a special intensity and nature.


57.  The applicant complained that the State authorities had not discharged their  <mask> under Article 2, as they had failed to effectively and diligently determine the criminal liability arising in connection with the circumstances in which his son had been killed. As a result of the inordinate length of the judicial proceedings and the authorities’ inability to conduct the proceedings properly, the criminal liability of I.K. had become time-barred and the perpetrators of the crime had gone essentially unpunished.


94.  The applicant believed that the time wasted on 7 July 2009, immediately after she had alerted the district prosecutor to her son’s detention in the hospital, had resulted in a missed opportunity to immediately confront the captors and obtain the release of Mr Apti Zaynalov. The Government admitted that the reaction of the prosecutor’s office had been inadequate and contributed to the criminals’ escape (see paragraph 84 above). The Court will consider this allegation as a complaint that the State had failed in its  <mask> to protect Mr Apti Zaynalov’s life.


164.  The Government claimed that the investigation into the disappearance of the applicants' relatives met the Convention requirement of effectiveness, as all measures envisaged in national law were being taken to identify the perpetrators. They argued that the decisions to adjourn and to reopen the investigation signified that the authorities had continued to take steps in order to resolve the crime. They also noted that the investigation had been opened on the same day as the kidnapping, and that on that day a large number of witnesses had been questioned, that the prosecutor's office had forwarded numerous information requests to various bodies, trying to check the applicants' version of the events. The absence of results could not be treated as a breach of the  <mask> under Article 2, which entailed an obligation to use particular means.


35.  The Government submitted that the “TRNC” authorities had been fully justified under paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Convention in taking all necessary precautions and using necessary force in order to avert the danger and protect the lives of others. An assembly of 150 persons throwing missiles at a patrol of soldiers to the point that they risked serious injury had been considered a “riot” by the Commission in the case of Stewart v. the United Kingdom (no. 10044/82, Commission decision of 10 July 1984, Decisions and Reports (DR) 39, p. 162). In that case, the Commission had also pointed out that the authorities had no obligation to retreat when quelling a riot. In any event, as no death had occurred in the present case, there could be no question of a violation of Article 2. The  <mask> arising from this provision entailed protecting “by law” the right to life, and there was no allegation that the laws of the “TRNC” failed to afford such protection.


101.  The Government drew attention to the minimum threshold bringing Article 3 of the Convention into play, which in their view had not been reached, and to the limited extent of the State’s  <mask> under that Article. They pointed out that there had been no intention to deny the applicants access to safe medicinal products. The experimental product that they wished to use had not been authorised in any country, and had not undergone clinical trials. Its safety and efficacy had not been established. Not being given the opportunity to use it could not therefore be regarded as inhuman treatment. On the contrary, its use, which would have amounted to a medical experiment, might have resulted in a breach of Article 3.


99.  The Government pointed out that Bulgarian law made provision for “compassionate use” of unauthorised medicinal products. However, they emphasised that such products carried serious risks, which required them to be carefully regulated. The State was entitled to refuse permission for the use of an unauthorised medicinal product, and this did not breach the right to life, but safeguarded it. The  <mask> under Article 2 of the Convention had limits, and could not exceed what was reasonable. The applicants had been given conventional medical treatment. There was no further duty to allow them to use a product which was not authorised in any member State of the European Union or had not been subjected to a clinical trial. A State could not be obliged to make available all possible drugs, let alone products whose contents and origins were not clearly known, and which had not been authorised in developed countries with strong health care systems. The product at issue did not comply with the requirements for “compassionate use” under Article 83 of Regulation (EC) no. 726/2004. If its producer met the applicable requirements, the authorities could envisage allowing its use in the future. In that sense, the applicants were not left with no hope at all.


51.  The applicants noted that they were seeking damages arising from death and grievous bodily harm which were not the result of normal torts such as a traffic accidents but which were a result of the Government’s failure to fulfil their  <mask> under the Convention, namely to safeguard a person’s life, to investigate properly any death or harm for which the State was responsible, to provide information about any risk to life or health, and to identify the persons responsible for the violation. It followed that they were also entitled to compensation for non-pecuniary damage.


188.  The applicants asserted that the authorities had failed to discharge their  <mask> stemming from Article 2 as they had not secured the investigation's independence and had failed to investigate the allegations against the Chief Public Prosecutor and other high-ranking officials with whom Mr Kolev had been in conflict, despite serious indications that this was the most obvious line of inquiry to be pursued. This had been the result of structural deficiencies of the Bulgarian legal system, which did not provide for the possibility of conducting a meaningful criminal investigation against the Chief Public Prosecutor or against other persons whom he sought to protect. Against this background, the steps undertaken in the investigation, although necessary, were clearly not sufficient in a case of contract killing.


58.  The Government asserted that that remedy had been effective and adequate in terms of the  <mask> under Article 2 of the Convention (see Calvelli and Ciglio, cited above) and that the applicant had, through her own inaction or negligence, deprived herself of a remedy which had nonetheless been available to her for four years from the time when the damage had occurred, and in respect of which she could have received advice from her lawyers. In Calvelli and Ciglio there had been no doubt that Article 2 of the Convention was applicable to a newborn child. In the instant case, in which the applicability of Article 2 was questionable, there were therefore additional reasons for considering that the possibility of using civil or administrative remedies to establish liability was sufficient. In the Government’s submission, such an action for damages could have been based on the taking of the life of the child the applicant was carrying, since the relevant case-law of the administrative courts did not appear thus far to preclude the possibility of affording embryos protection under Article 2 of the Convention (Conseil d’Etat (full court), Confédération nationale des associations familiales catholiques et autres, judgment of 21 December 1990 – see paragraph 47 above). At the material time, in any event, the issue had not been clearly resolved by the Conseil d’Etat.


55.  The applicant made a twofold complaint under Article 2 of the Convention. He contended firstly that the State had failed to comply with its  <mask> in order to prevent the death of his son whilst the latter had been in prison. Secondly, the applicant argued that the State had failed to conduct a thorough investigation into the circumstances of his son’s death and that the culprits had remained unpunished.


88.  The applicant further maintained that there were no effective remedies that he was required to exhaust in order to challenge the GPO of Ukraine's decision to extradite him to Kazakhstan. In particular, the applicant stated that he had complained on various occasions to the domestic courts about the unreasonable length of his detention and its unlawfulness, the unlawful inactivity of the Governor of Kharkiv SIZO no. 27, who refused to release him, and about the  <mask> decision itself. The proceedings concerning these complaints and their unfavourable outcome showed that there were no domestic remedies available to the applicant.


95.  The applicant complained under Article 2 § 1 of the Convention that there was a real risk that he would be liable to capital punishment in the event of his  <mask> to Kazakhstan. He alleged that the assurances given by the Government of Kazakhstan were insufficient as the moratorium imposed on capital punishment could be lifted at any time and the charges against him could be reclassified. This provision reads as follows:


81.  The applicants alleged that they had not had a fair hearing in the criminal court that had ruled on the request for their  <mask>, in that they had been unable to gain access to all the material in the case file or to put forward their arguments concerning the characterisation of the offences they were alleged to have committed.


60.  The applicant submitted that he was being sought on the capital charge of murder by the Chinese authorities. The Russian authorities had initially envisaged extraditing him to China but the  <mask> proceedings had eventually been abandoned. An attempt to remove him to China through administrative removal proceedings had proved unsuccessful because the domestic courts had refused to order his administrative removal. The Russian authorities had then initiated exclusion proceedings, which were purely administrative in nature and did not require approval by a court. Although an exclusion order could be challenged in court, the judicial review proceedings did not have suspensive effect. The domestic authorities relied explicitly on the charges brought against him in China as grounds for finding that he presented a security risk justifying an exclusion order.


96.  The Government contested that argument. They stated that in the event of the applicant's  <mask> to Kazakhstan he would not be liable to capital punishment as the indictment in his case related to a criminal act under Article 96(1) of the Criminal Code and involved the offence of murder, not punishable by capital punishment. Furthermore, they stated that there had been a moratorium on capital punishment in Kazakhstan, that capital punishment was applied only in exceptional circumstances and that this sentence could not be enforced, even if one assumed that such a sentence would be passed in relation to the applicant.


64.  The Government argued that Article 3 was not to be construed in a way that would engage the extraditing State’s responsibility indefinitely. The State’s responsibility should end once the extradited person had been found guilty and had started to serve his or her sentence. It would be straining the language of Article 3 intolerably to hold that by surrendering a suspect in accordance with the terms of an  <mask> agreement, the extraditing State had subjected him to the treatment or punishment he received after his conviction and sentence in the receiving State. Such a decision would interfere with rights under international treaties and conflict with the norms of international judicial process, as it would entail adjudication on the internal affairs of foreign States that were not Parties to the Convention. There was a risk that it would cause serious harm to the Contracting State by restricting its ability to cooperate in the fight against international terrorism and organised crime.