67.  The applicant submitted that his  <mask> had been breached. In his view, the domestic courts had violated his defence rights because they had disregarded the evidence of the following witnesses: D.I., M.A., J.G., M.F., A.K.-N., M.Ł., H.D., D.T., D.C. and R.M. The Court of Appeal referred to this point in its judgment of 9 December 2003 and stated that the trial court in its judgment of 27 May 2003 had failed to address the evidence of those witnesses. In addition, when examining the case for the second time the trial court had failed to take into account the instructions of the first judgment of the Court of Appeal to admit supplementary evidence. This amounted to a violation of certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Articles 5 § 2, 7 and 442 § 3). Furthermore, the same trial court had failed to address the evidence concerning the lack of the applicant’s fingerprints on the gun.


43.  The applicant complained of a violation of his  <mask>. He argued that the domestic authorities and, in particular, the Kúria had not taken due account of the EU law provision which should have governed his case and which placed certain obligations on the national courts in respect of references for preliminary rulings, including an obligation incumbent on national courts of last instance to provide reasons for not making a reference.


45.  The Government claimed that the applicants had not exhausted all remedies provided for by Polish law with reference to the complaint concerning restrictions on their access to the case file, as they had failed to lodge a constitutional complaint. Had they considered that the regulation on access to classified material was contrary to their  <mask>, they should have challenged the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the Protection of Classified Information Act and of the relevant Ordinance of the Minister of Justice of 18 June 2003.


137.  The applicant company complained in application no. 33571/06 that the Constitutional Court had violated its  <mask> by failing to communicate to it the submissions of the High Prosecutor of 20 January 2006, which the court itself requested and which were crucial for its decision. It opined that the information submitted by the High Prosecutor had been untrue and that it had been obvious to all authorities that the investigation could not have finished in mid-2006.


29.  The Government observed that the applicant had benefited from an examination of his case at two instances by ordinary courts with full jurisdiction to assess the relevant facts and law. He further availed himself of an extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Court. For the Government there had been no appearance of a violation of the applicant's  <mask> in the impugned proceedings.


110.  The Government again contended that the failure to hear evidence from the applicant's wife did not concern the applicant's  <mask>. It could not be assumed that the funds deposited by his wife as bail were jointly owned by the couple, because the applicant had not submitted any evidence of this either to the domestic courts or in his application to the Court. On the contrary, he had claimed that his wife had personally borrowed the money.


30.  The applicant was of the opinion that the admission of the evidence conflicted with his  <mask> because the violation of his right to respect for his home was of a severe nature. In this regard, he alleged that the search warrant was arbitrary and a lawful search of his flat had not been possible because the initial suspicion that he might have committed the offence of copyright piracy had been too vague. The applicant stressed that the hashish found during the unlawful flat search was the only evidence. His statement regarding his exclusive use of the room in the flat where the hashish had been found could not be regarded as evidence as it was not related to the hashish found. Lastly, he maintained that the public interest in prosecution could not outweigh his right to respect for his home as the offence had been of minor consequence for the public, and the breach of his basic rights severe. His case could therefore be compared to the case of Jalloh v. Germany ([GC], no. 54810/00, §§ 94-96, ECHR 2006‑IX).


64.  The Government also considered it necessary to establish that a “contestation” does not begin until a “claim for compensation” has been lodged. In this respect the Court notes that the  <mask> holds so prominent a place in a democratic society that there can be no justification for interpreting Article 6 § 1 restrictively: conformity with the spirit of the Convention requires that the word “contestation” should not be construed too technically and that it should be given a substantive rather than a formal meaning. Besides, it has no counterpart in the English text of Article 6 § 1 (see Moreira de Azevedo, cited above, pp. 16-17, § 66). Moreover, if the making of a civil-party complaint amounts to the same thing as making a civil claim for indemnification, it is immaterial that the victim may have failed to lodge a formal claim for compensation: by acquiring the status of civil parties, victims demonstrate the importance they attach not only to the criminal conviction of the offender but also to securing financial reparation for the damage sustained (ibid., p. 17, § 67).


22.  The applicants complained that their  <mask> under Article 6 of the Convention had been violated as the Appeal Court had convicted the first applicant and ordered the forfeiture of the profit gained by the applicant company without holding an oral hearing and the Supreme Court had upheld this judgment. Due to the lack of an oral hearing, the applicants had not been able to present all evidence in the case.


15.  The applicant maintained that he had been deprived of his  <mask> and effective access to a court on the grounds that the Supreme Military Administrative Court had dismissed his additional claim for compensation for being out of time. He alleged that the procedural rule which prevented a claimant from amending his or her initial claim in military administrative proceedings had operated so as to restrict his right to bring an action before he was aware of the true extent of the pecuniary damage he had suffered.


26.  The applicant disputed that objection. He argued that the claim referred to by the Government could only be lodged in respect of acts and actions, and only when no other judicial proceedings were possible. There was an established practice whereby breaches of procedural rules had to be claimed in the proceedings in which they had allegedly been committed. He referred to the case-law of the Supreme Court, in particular its decision of 13 December 2007 (Up 726/2007). In that decision, the Supreme Court had upheld the Administrative Court’s rejection of a claim of violation of human rights lodged under section 4 of the Administrative Disputes Act in which the claimant had complained that the judge in her civil case had not been appointed in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court had found that the claimant had had judicial protection at her disposal within the main proceedings before the ordinary courts. It pointed to the established case-law of the higher courts and the Supreme Court. The case-law indicated that the courts of general jurisdiction should decide on matters of violation of the right to an impartial tribunal within their system of ordinary remedies. A reference was also made to the practice of the Constitutional Court which required the remedies available in the proceedings under general jurisdiction to be exhausted before a constitutional appeal concerning the  <mask> allegedly violated therein could be lodged.


32.  The applicant further claimed that the labour court not only disregarded the final acquittal and found that the applicant had committed the offence of incitement, but that in doing so it also relied on the self-incriminating statements given by the applicant to the police in the absence of her lawyer. The Court notes in this context that it has already found that the use as evidence for a criminal conviction of statements given by the accused to the police without the assistance of a lawyer may amount to a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391/02, §§ 56-62, ECHR 2008). The Government have not commented on the applicant’s claim that her statements to the police were used as evidence in the civil case. The Court further notes that the labour court in its judgment referred to the fact that the applicant’s employer had relied on the fact that the applicant had confessed to inciting M.G. into committing the crime, and that the labour court explicitly stated that it had examined the entire criminal investigation file (see paragraph 14 above). Thus, the facts of the case seem to indicate that the statements given by the applicant to the police without the assistance of a lawyer were relied on by the labour court, and the Court does not rule out that reliance by a court on such statements in civil proceedings may raise an issue under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. However, having regard to the fact that the labour court’s reasoning and the wording used violated the applicant’s right to presumption of innocence, the Court does not find it necessary to also assess if the labour court in reaching its conclusion relied on evidence in violation of the  <mask>.


43.  The applicant complained that on 23 January 2002 the Riga Regional Court had examined his appeal in his absence, thereby depriving him of his  <mask>. He further complained that the Latvian procedure for disputing a refusal of security clearance did not correspond to the requirements of the Convention, since persons to whom such clearance had been denied were unable to find out the reasons for the refusal or to dispute the refusal before a “tribunal”. He relied on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. The applicant’s complaints were communicated to the respondent Government under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


13.  The applicant complained that the quashing under supervisory review procedure of the judgments of 10 July 2000 and 14 March 2001 as well as the decision of 27 September 2000 violated his  <mask> guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. These Articles, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:


26.  The applicant complained that the quashing on 29 February 2000 of the final judgment of 10 March 1999 by way of supervisory review violated his  <mask> guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


41.  The applicants disagreed with the Government: the case-law on which the Government relied was incomplete, as, in an attempt to have the application declared inadmissible, they had only cited the judgments of the Constitutional Court that supported their case. The applicants said that the various divisions of the Constitutional Court had expressed relatively divergent opinions as to which decision started the sixty-day period running, a state of affairs which they considered was contrary to the principle of equality before the law and, consequently, infringed the  <mask>.


57.  The applicant sought (1) ISK 28,522,474 (approximately 340,000 euros (EUR) in compensation for pecuniary damage, which corresponded to the award made by the District Court under this head. She asked for this amount to be increased by amounts of interest which she specified. The applicant further claimed (2) ISK 10,000,000 (approximately 116,000 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage on account of suffering and distress occasioned by the violation the Convention. She maintained that after the District Court had ruled in her favour and ordered the State to pay her compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, the Supreme Court had deprived her of her award by quashing that ruling in a procedure that had violated her  <mask> before an independent and impartial tribunal. Had it not been for the fact that the Supreme Court had obtained and attached decisive weight to the SMLB's opinion, in breach of the Convention, it would most probably have reached the same conclusion as the District Court. There was thus a causal connection between the violation of the Convention and her damage.


47.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention that he had not had a fair trial. In particular, he complained that at no stage of the criminal proceedings against him had he been afforded an opportunity to examine Mr Sh., the key prosecution witness. As the requirements of Article 6 § 3 are to be seen as particular aspects of the  <mask> guaranteed by Article 6 § 1, the Court will examine the applicants' complaints under those two provisions taken together (see, among many other authorities, Samoshenkov and Strokov v. Russia, nos. 21731/03 and 1886/04, § 72, 22 July 2010). Article 6 in the relevant part reads as follows:


57.  The applicant also complained that the quashing of the final judgment in his favour by the Presidium of the Astrakhan Regional Court on 27 December 2000 violated his  <mask> guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


22.  The applicant alleged that there had been a violation of his  <mask> in the context of the proceedings to determine compensation before the expropriations judge and the Expropriations Division; he complained that the principle of equality of arms had been breached as a result of the priviliged position enjoyed by the Government Commissioner, and that there had been a breach of the adversarial principle. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides:


25.  The applicant submits that the  <mask> in which a lawyer can defend the accused in his or her absence – and therefore without fear of arrest – is an integral part of the right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention. Referring to the Court’s findings in Lala and Pelladoah v. the Netherlands (judgments of 22 September 1994, Series A nos. 297-A and 297-B), the applicant argues that, in weighing the State’s interest in securing the appearance of accused at their trial against that of defendants in exercising their right to be defended by counsel, the latter interest should prevail.


32.  The applicant claimed that the domestic courts and, in particular, the Presidium of the Supreme Commercial Court had misdirected themselves in law. She submitted that the judgment of the Federal Commercial Court had clearly stated that it was not amenable to further appeal and she could not have reasonably foreseen the institution of supervisory-review proceedings. In any event, her observations on the supervisory-review application had not been examined and she had not been informed of the hearing date before the Presidium. She considered that her  <mask> was breached.


73.  The applicant submitted in reply, with reference to Article 131 (f) of the Constitution and the practice of the Constitutional Court, that in order to exhaust all domestic remedies individual complaints had to be lodged with the Constitutional Court if and when they alleged a breach of the  <mask>. Moreover, he relied on the admissibility decision of the Court adopted in Balliu v. Albania (dec.), no. 74727/01.


27.  The applicant complained that the use at his trial of the evidence obtained in the execution of an invalid search warrant had been in breach of his rights under the Convention. He relied on the  <mask> (Article 6 § 1) and the right to respect for his private life (Article 8). The Court considers that the applicant’s complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention alone which, as far as relevant, reads as follows:


15.  The applicant stated that the restriction on his right to legal assistance while in police custody had breached his  <mask>. He maintained that he was illiterate and therefore he did not know what was written in his statement taken by the gendarmes. He also stated that this statement was not read out to him and that he was forced to put his thumbprint on the statement to authenticate it.


92.  The applicant company disagreed and argued that the quashing of the judgment of 27 October 1999 had violated its  <mask> as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention. The letter of the Prosecutor General's Office of 8 June 2004 had not disclosed any “new and essential facts or circumstances which were unknown and could not have been known earlier” in the sense of Article 449(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The submissions made by the Prosecutor General's Office in that letter, namely that Oferta Plus had not presented enough evidence concerning the electricity supplied, had already been made by the Ministry of Finance and by the Prosecutor General's Office and had been dismissed by the Supreme Court of Justice in its judgments of 7 February 2001 and 7 May 2001.


25.  The applicant complained that his  <mask> and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing had been violated as his appeal in the Appeal Court had been discontinued due to the fact that he had not attended the hearing on 28 February 2005 but was represented by his counsel. He claimed, referring to the Court’s case-law, that the provision on the basis of which his appeal was discontinued, namely Chapter 26, section 20, subsection 1, of the Code of Judicial Procedure, was contrary to the requirements of the Convention.


56.  The applicant complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that the use of unlawfully obtained evidence by the Ankara State Security Court in convicting him had violated his  <mask>. He further complained, under the same head, that the refusal by the same court to provide him with a copy of the audiotapes of his alleged telephone conversations had been in breach of the principle of equality of arms.


151.  The applicants complained that the temporary suspension of and amendments to the Denationalisation Act and the Act on Implementation of Penal Sanctions, the State Bonds Act and the Constitutional Court's decisions of 16 July 1998 and 22 February 2001 violated their  <mask> guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, since they constituted an unfair interference by the State in the pending proceedings to which the State was a party. They also invoked Article 6 § 1 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, alleging that the challenged Acts discriminated against those claimants for the restitution of forfeited property, whose restitution proceedings were still pending before the courts when the challenged legislation entered into force and introduced a less favourable restitution regime. The applicants further complained that the challenged Acts and the unreasonably long restitution proceedings breached their right to property as guaranteed under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, arguing that from the moment the criminal judgments were quashed, they had a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining the full restitution of property forfeited by the judgments, which, until the present day, had not occurred. In addition, they claimed that the challenged Acts violated their right to full compensation for wrongful conviction as guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 7. Finally, the applicants invoked Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, alleging that the challenged Acts deprived them of their property on a discriminatory basis, since before the challenged legislation entered into force, the successful claimants were entitled to full restitution.


47.  The Government argued that there was no causal link between the alleged pecuniary damage and the alleged breach of the Convention. With regard to the claim for non-pecuniary damage, they asked the Court to rule that the acknowledgment of the violation of the applicant’s  <mask> represented in itself just satisfaction. In any event, they argued that the amount claimed by the applicant was speculative, excessive and not proven.


86.  The applicant alleged that he did not have a fair trial and complained of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c). The Court first notes that the guarantees in paragraph 3 of Article 6 are specific aspects of the  <mask> in criminal proceedings as set forth in paragraph 1 of the same Article. Accordingly, the applicant’s complaint will be examined under these provisions taken together (see, among other authorities, Poitrimol v. France, 23 November 1993, § 29, Series A no. 277‑A; Benham v. the United Kingdom, 10 June 1996, § 52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑III; Krombach v. France, no. 29731/96, § 82, ECHR 2001‑II; Kulikowski v. Poland, no. 18353/03, § 55, 19 May 2009; Sakhnovskiy v. Russia [GC], no. 21272/03, § 94, 2 November 2010; Zagorodniy v. Ukraine, no. 27004/06, § 52, 24 November 2011; and Neziraj v. Germany, no. 30804/07, § 45, 8 November 2012).


26.  The applicants contended that the judgments of the lower courts which they had challenged before the Constitutional Court undoubtedly concerned their civil rights guaranteed under the Constitution and the Convention. They pointed out that no provision of the relevant domestic law excluded their right to lodge a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court concerning breaches of their  <mask> by the appellate courts. Thus, it could not be said that the judgment of the Zagreb County Court was not liable to a review before the Constitutional Court. In the applicants’ view, this had been so given that the practice of the courts had been evolving and it had always been possible for the Constitutional Court to take their complaint into examination. The applicants considered that by refusing to do so the Constitutional Court had acted contrary to the Constitution and the Convention and had allowed a manifest breach of the right to a fair trial to persist. The applicants also pointed out that, given these circumstances, they would have risked their complaint being declared inadmissible by the Court if they had not first allowed the Constitutional Court to deal with the alleged breaches of their rights.


29.  The applicant complained that his  <mask>, guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, had been infringed by the use of the confession extracted from him as a result of coercion in police custody, during which he had been denied access to a lawyer. He further contended that his conviction had been based on statements that had been taken unlawfully from him and the other co-accused H.K. despite the fact that they had later been retracted. Furthermore, the applicant complained that the Adana Assize Court had not taken any steps to test the veracity of these statements. Lastly, he argued that the length of the criminal proceedings had been excessive. The Court will examine his complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c), which, in so far as relevant, provides:


78.  The applicant raised numerous complaints under Article 6 of the Convention about the criminal proceedings against him. He complained that there had been a violation of his defence rights regarding the examination of the undercover witness, that the judges had been biased, had not given reasons for their decisions and had rejected his requests for the admission of evidence. He further alleged that his conviction had been based on inadmissible evidence obtained by using special investigative techniques and that the witness whose statement had served as the main evidence against him had been involved in the operation as an agent provocateur. He complained also that the documents in the case file had not been translated into a language that he understood. The Court considers that these complaints should be analysed under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, the latter concerning particular aspects of the  <mask> guaranteed by Article 6 § 1, which, in so far, as relevant, read as follows:


26.  The applicant complained that his  <mask>, as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, had been violated by the failure to enforce the final judgment in his favour. He also complained of a violation of his right guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention as a result of the same failure to enforce.


77.  The Government submitted that, in any event, the applicant’s  <mask> under Article 6 of the Convention had not been violated. The Court of Appeal had taken evidence in compliance with the requirements of that provision. Pursuant to Article 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in particular, the same rules for the taking of evidence applied both to the prosecution and the defence. Under the German Code of Criminal Procedure, it was for the criminal courts themselves to investigate the truth of their own motion. Even though the investigation into offences committed abroad raised considerable procedural problems, the defendants were protected by the rules on criminal procedure and by having the benefit of the doubt.


29.  The Government asked the Court to declare the application inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. In the Government’s view, the applicant had not invoked his rights under the Convention before the domestic courts or argued, even in vague or general terms, that a refusal to suspend or adjourn the proceedings in question would violate his  <mask>; his submissions before the domestic courts had been based exclusively on domestic legislation. His application to suspend or adjourn the trial could not be said to equate with an allegation of a violation of the right to a fair trial. Even if the domestic courts had been able to examine the case proprio motu in the context of the Convention, the applicant could not be relieved of his obligation to invoke the Convention before those courts, or at least to draw their attention to matters he intended to raise subsequently before the Court.


18.  The applicant argued that his  <mask> and in particular his right to be represented by a legal representative of his own choosing in the criminal proceedings against him had been violated in so far as the trial court conducting the proceedings had denied his request that the concluding hearing be adjourned on account of the sudden illness of his counsel. He explained that his counsel had fallen ill a day before the hearing and that he had duly informed the trial court about it on the morning of the hearing by telephone. He argued that according to the relevant provisions of the Croatian Code of Criminal Procedure the trial court was under duty to adjourn a hearing when the defence counsel informed that court about his inability to attend for a good reason. The applicant further emphasised the importance of the concluding hearing in the criminal proceedings as it was the only opportunity for the defence to orally present their view of the results of the proceedings before a trial court and to present their own conclusions and arguments as regards the evidence of the case. He also stressed that the case had concerned complex issues of law, in particular whether his acts could be seen as illegal, and that such arguments could only have been adequately presented by a qualified lawyer.


39.  The Government considered that the criminal proceedings against the applicant, taken as a whole, had been fair. In particular, the Government pointed out that the applicant had participated effectively in the proceedings, that he had been legally represented, and that he had had every opportunity to present all his evidence and arguments before the trial court and object to the evidence of the prosecution. He had also had access to all relevant materials from the case file and an opportunity to question all the witnesses against him. In the Government’s view, all the decisions of the domestic authorities had been sufficiently reasoned and had not disclosed any arbitrariness. As regards the applicant’s complaints that the trial court had not heard his witnesses, the Government pointed out that the trial court had carefully examined whether the questioning of witnesses was necessary and after it had found that all relevant facts had been sufficiently established it had dismissed the request for those witnesses to be questioned. The domestic courts had provided sufficient reasons for their decisions, and there had been no breach of the applicant’s  <mask> in this respect.


27.  The applicant contended that the judgment of the Administrative Court she had challenged before the Constitutional Court had undoubtedly concerned her civil rights guaranteed under the Constitution and the Convention; it thus could not be said that the judgment of the Administrative Court had not been amenable to review before the Constitutional Court. She considered that by refusing to examine her complaint, the Constitutional Court had acted contrary to the Constitution and the Convention and had allowed a manifest breach of the  <mask> to persist.


24.  The applicant contested the Government's arguments. He claimed that he had expressly stated in his application to the Supreme Court that the Appeal Court had violated his  <mask> under Article 6 when it had convicted him without even mentioning his name in the judgment. It had not been advisable for the applicant to request leave to appeal on the basis of a lack of a possibility to submit additional comments in the Appeal Court.


34.  The applicant argued that all the applications lodged by him had been done in good faith and that half of them had related to guaranteeing his  <mask>. In contrast, the prosecutor had failed to appear in court on a number of occasions without any good reason and the presiding judge had also adjourned the case many times for reasons unconnected to this case. Almost a half of the 136 adjournments had been due to the repeated non-appearance of victims and witnesses, most of which had been called by the prosecutor. Securing their appearance had clearly been the responsibility of the State. Moreover, the trial had to be restarted from the beginning after one year and three months since the powers of the first presiding judge had been suspended. Also the modifications of the charges had had the same delaying effect.


58.  The applicant submitted that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in that he had been deprived of the  <mask> by an impartial tribunal. He submitted that the judges sitting in the Regional and Supreme Medical Courts had not been independent, as those bodies had been composed of doctors, members of the Regional Medical Council, and thus represented the interests of the doctors’ lobby. Only one of the five members of the Supreme Medical Court was a professional judge, delegated from the Supreme Court. However, such a judge would often follow the conclusions of the majority. Moreover, the applicant’s case had not been heard at the later stage by an impartial tribunal as the domestic law did not provide for a right to appeal to a court against the decision of the Medical Court when it had imposed a penalty taking the form of a reprimand.


37.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the judgment of 2 October 2003, as upheld on 26 February 2004, by means of the legality review procedure had violated his  <mask> under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read:


42.  The applicants submitted that Law no. 296/2006 had the explicit aim of avoiding the disbursement of millions of euros in order to enforce a multitude of judgments resulting from the cases pending before the domestic courts. The outcome of those cases, namely that they would be favourable to the claimants, had been foreseeable given the constant jurisprudence. Indeed, the legislature had approved a law defined as interpretative (di interpretazione autentica), but which was in reality innovative, with the scope of influencing the relevant judicial determinations, thereby reversing the consolidated interpretation given to the laws at issue by the domestic courts. By so doing the State had acted contrary to the rule of law and in breach of the  <mask>, which provided that disputes over civil rights and obligations were to be determined by a tribunal and not the legislature


58.  The applicant also argued that his  <mask> had been violated as he had not had the prior opportunity to prove the truthfulness of his allegations against C.T., which had constituted the basis of his conviction. However, the Court observes that the domestic courts’ task in those proceedings was to examine whether the applicant had committed the offences of false accusation, perjury and slander and eventually to reject the accusations made against C.T. by the applicant. In order to do so, they had to examine if the allegations made by the applicant against C.T. were true, a matter closely linked with the charges against him, as the applicant himself admitted. The applicant was given the opportunity to examine witnesses, adduce documents, be represented by a lawyer and be heard by the domestic courts which examined his case. At the various stages of the proceedings he was able to submit the arguments he considered relevant to his case and an oral hearing was held both before the first-instance court and the Court of Appeal, which had full competence to assess all the relevant facts and evidence. The applicant was therefore afforded all the guarantees of a fair trial in the proceedings against him and had had a real opportunity to defend himself and be acquitted.


16.  The Government submitted that in the retrial phase of the instant case, the competence of the Békés County Regional Court had been rather limited. It had not been called on to examine anew all facts of the case or make a full assessment of the applicants' guilt. Instead, its task had been to verify the Gyula District Court's order denying retrial, an order which itself had concerned only the probative value of new evidence. The applicants did not face the risk of a new sentence or the aggravation of the sanction. Indeed, the case was orally heard at public hearings before three court instances in the principal proceedings as well as before the first-instance court in the retrial. The latter hearings had essentially concerned a question of law, namely whether objects with cultural and historical, rather than commercial, value could be the object of the offence of embezzlement. In the Government's view, if an appeal court decides only on questions of law, the court's failure to hear the applicant in person or to hold a public hearing does not amount to a violation of the  <mask>. In the present case, no special circumstances had existed requiring the applicants to be heard in person by the appeal court, since their credibility, intentions or motive had not been decisive for the matter at hand. It could not therefore be argued that the proceedings before the appeal court in the retrial had constituted a full review governed by the same rules as a principal trial on the merits.


23.  The applicant submitted that the decision of the Director of the National Security Service to revoke his right to hold a security clearance permit had resulted in his automatic dismissal. Given that this decision was not amenable to any judicial review in itself, he was placed in a situation that was in breach of Article 6 offering him a  <mask>.


44.  The applicant stressed that he had not requested a reclassification of his offence. The reduction of his sentence had not negated the fact that he had not been afforded an opportunity to participate effectively in the supervisory review hearing. Thus, he had not had sufficient time to prepare his comments on the prosecutor's application; in any event, although he had submitted them both to the prosecutor's office and the Presidium court, they had disregarded them which had been evident from the decision of 3 October 2001, which had not referred to any of his arguments. In the same vein, all his requests to attend the hearing had been disregarded, which had deprived him of an opportunity to attend the hearing and to defend his position. In his opinion, the decision, delivered after a hearing where he had not been able to present his arguments in person or through some form of legal representation, had breached his  <mask> and the principle of equality of arms.


139.  The applicant averred that the proceedings, which had lasted three years and eight months, had not progressed steadily. There had been lengthy periods when the domestic authorities were either completely passive or were correcting their procedural mistakes. In particular, on four occasions the trial court had remitted the case file to the investigation authorities to eliminate serious flaws which precluded examination of the case. The applicant further noted that the complexity of the case could not serve as justification for the length of the proceedings, particularly as the investigation had been completed within a few months and the proceedings had subsequently been pending for more than three years before the courts at two instances. Having addressed his own behaviour during the criminal proceedings, the applicant stressed that he had been detained throughout the proceedings and therefore had been within the State's full control. He had never failed to participate in investigative actions or attend hearings. As to the alleged abuse on his part of the right to defence, the applicant argued that the majority of his requests had been dismissed by the trial court. However, those which had been accepted, such as his request for a change of legal-aid counsel, were valid and well-founded. By accepting those requests the trial court had demonstrated that the applicant's  <mask> could have been violated if it had refused to rule in his favour.


55.  The applicants reiterated their position that the procedure followed by the domestic courts constituted a denial of their  <mask>. They stated that the refusal of the courts to produce the evidence, on the basis of which they were convicted (balaclavas), was in breach of the domestic provisions. They also contested the regularity of the identification procedure that was used by the domestic authorities.


104.  The applicant complained, under Article 6 of the Convention, of the unfairness of the Hague Convention proceedings, in particular that the interlocutory judgment of 13 April 2009 had been missing from the domestic case file and that the domestic authorities had failed to send him a copy of the final judgment of 25 March 2010. In respect of the divorce‑and‑custody proceedings instituted against him by his wife, after the case had been communicated to the Romanian Government he complained under the same Article that the domestic courts’ refusal to hear foreign witnesses on his behalf through the international rogatory commission proceedings or to expedite the said proceedings, and the fact that he had had to incur high financial costs in order to submit the relevant testimonial and documentary evidence, had amounted to a breach of his  <mask> and prevented him from defending his rights.


34.  The Government observed that the applicant had benefited from an examination of his case at two instances by ordinary courts with full jurisdiction to assess the relevant facts and law. He further availed himself of an extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Court. For the Government there had been no appearance of a violation of the applicant’s  <mask> in the impugned proceedings. They stressed that, when challenging the judgments in the case, the applicant had not referred to the issue of restrictions on access to the case file. Neither had he alleged that the rights of the defence had been infringed on account of the procedure applied by the courts. The Government concluded that there had been no breach of Article 6 § 1 in the present case.


17.  The applicant company complained of a violation of its  <mask>, contrary to Article 6 of the Convention. In particular, it complained that the courts had failed to apply the statute of limitations and that it had not been summoned to the hearing before the Supreme Court of Justice. The relevant part of Article 6 reads as follows:


15.  The applicant submitted that the Supreme Court on 19 April 2006, by deciding his appeal on points of law on the merits, had accepted that it had been admissible but then, on 21 September 2011, had declared it inadmissible, without giving any reasons for departing from its previous decision. Thus, it had violated his  <mask>.


13.  The applicant complained that he had been deprived of his  <mask> and effective access to a court on the ground that the Supreme Military Administrative Court had rejected his case as being out of time. In his application form, he relied on Articles 2, 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


71.  The applicant alleged that he did not have a fair trial and complained of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c). The Court first notes that the guarantees in paragraph 3 of Article 6 are specific aspects of the  <mask> in criminal proceedings as set forth in paragraph 1 of the same Article. Accordingly, the applicant’s complaint will be examined under these provisions taken together (see, among other authorities, Benham v. the United Kingdom, 10 June 1996, § 52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑III; and Kulikowski v. Poland, no. 18353/03, § 55, 19 May 2009).


53.  The applicants contended that the right to remain silent and the right not to incriminate oneself are absolute rights and that to apply any form of direct compulsion to require an accused person to make incriminatory statements against his will of itself destroys the very essence of that right. The Court is unable to accept this. It is true, as pointed out by the applicants, that in all the cases to date in which “direct compulsion” was applied to require an actual or potential suspect to provide information which contributed, or might have contributed, to his conviction, the Court has found a violation of the applicant’s privilege against self-incrimination. It does not, however, follow that any direct compulsion will automatically result in a violation. While the  <mask> under Article 6 is an unqualified right, what constitutes a fair trial cannot be the subject of a single unvarying rule but must depend on the circumstances of the particular case. This was confirmed in the specific context of the right to remain silent in Heaney and McGuinness and, more recently, in the Court’s judgment in Jalloh, in which the Court identified the factors to which it would have regard in determining whether the applicant’s privilege against self-incrimination had been violated.


44.  The Government raised an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They argued that the applicant could have challenged the Kúria’s judgment before the Constitutional Court under Article XXVIII of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, which guaranteed the  <mask>. They referred to decision no. 7/2013 (see paragraph 33 above) in which the Constitutional Court examined, in the light of both Article XXVIII of the Fundamental Law and Article 6 of the Convention, the fairness of a high court’s final judgment, with particular regard to the question of whether the high court had observed its obligation to give appropriate reasons for its decision. In the Government’s view, the Constitutional Court’s decision demonstrated that the applicant could have brought his complaint relating to the unfairness of the proceedings and, in particular, the lack of appropriate reasoning, before the Constitutional Court – a legal avenue of which he had not availed himself.


27.  The Government submitted that under Article 336 of the CCP the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation had given notice of the date of an appeal hearing only to those participants in proceedings who had made a request to that effect when lodging their appeal. Since the applicant had made no such request, the Supreme Court, in examining the applicant’s appeal in his absence and in the absence of his lawyer, had acted in full compliance with the legislation on criminal procedure. The Constitutional Court’s decision of 17 October 2001 had been adopted after the applicant’s appeal proceedings. Therefore, the applicant’s  <mask> guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 had not been violated.


130.  The applicants complained with regard to the civil proceedings which ended by the final judgments of 5 February 2004 and 1 June 2005 that their  <mask> had been infringed as a result of the dismissal by the domestic courts, mainly on account of Ms M.’s religious affiliation and the prosecutor’s decision not to indict D.C., of the actions brought by Ms M. against D.C. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention both taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14.


43.  The Government further argued that the applicant had failed to lodge a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court. Had the applicant been of the opinion that the legal provisions on which the courts had based their decisions or their interpretation – namely Articles 100 § 5 and 156 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in conjunction with section 52 § 2 of the Lustration Act – had breached his rights, in particular his right to a fair hearing enshrined in Article 45 of the Constitution, he should have lodged a constitutional complaint. In particular, the applicant should have requested the Constitutional Court to examine whether the rules imposed by those provisions had violated his  <mask>. The Government also maintained that the applicant could have requested the Constitutional Court to give a so-called “interpretative judgment” (orzeczenie interpretacyjne) which would indicate the correct way of construing the relevant provisions which, in turn, would have to be taken into consideration by the courts applying them.


94.  The applicant pointed out that, while the Belgian Court of Cassation’s case-law had evolved favourably, taking account of the Salduz judgment, that court had never reached the conclusion that the legislation in itself entailed a violation of the  <mask>. Moreover, it was only after the judgment of 15 December 2010 (see paragraph 70 above), and thus subsequent to the applicant’s case, that the Court of Cassation had struck down judgments of the trial courts based on self-incriminating statements made during the initial interviews without a lawyer being present.


104.  The Government submitted that during the proceedings the applicant had never complained about the composition of the trial bench nor had he ever requested that Judge Z.Č. be disqualified from sitting in the case. Moreover, he had not alleged a lack of impartiality of the trial bench in his appeal but only in the constitutional complaint. Thus, in the Government’s view, it could not be said that the alleged lack of impartiality of Judge Z.Č. had affected the applicant’s  <mask>.


72.  The applicants further complained under Article 6 § 3 (d) that the trial court, in the proceedings concerning the charge of robbery, had not secured the attendance and examination of the witnesses Ms E., Mr B. and Mr U., garage employees, the investigators Ms K. and Ms P., or the forensic expert Mr Ku. As the requirements of Article 6 § 3 are to be seen as particular aspects of the  <mask> guaranteed by Article 6 § 1, the Court will examine the applicants' complaints under those two provisions taken together (see, among many other authorities, Van Mechelen and Others v. the Netherlands, 23 April 1997, § 49, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-III). Article 6 § 3 (d) reads as follows:


76.  The applicant further maintained that he had been tortured by the police officers who had forced him to confess, and even when he had ceased to be subjected to the torture, the psychological and physiological effects of that torture had lasted beyond its actual application, particularly given that he had been under the constant threat of being subjected to torture again if he acted contrary to the police’s interests. He considered that the after-effects of the torture and the threats of further ill-treatment had to be taken into account in assessing the nature and degree of compulsion used to obtain the confessions. He also noted that he had not had a proper opportunity to challenge the admissibility of the evidence obtained through coercion, and his complaints of torture and forced confession had never been properly examined. He went on to note that, in assessing his allegations of coercion, the domestic court had shifted the burden of proof of the alleged ill-treatment to him, having required that he prove beyond reasonable doubt that he had been ill-treated. In these circumstances, he had not been able to effectively challenge the authenticity of the evidence and oppose its use. He also averred that the police records drawn up between 13 and 19 January 2000 had not been signed with his real signature, and even assuming that he had signed it but in a different way than normal, this would also speak to his unwillingness to sign the records. He concluded that in the circumstances of the case, the use of his confessions for his conviction had breached his  <mask>.


37.  The Government submitted that even if Article 6 would apply to the proceedings at issue, there was no breach of Article 6 because, in the particular circumstances of the case, an  <mask> before the Administrative Court was not necessary. In his complaint to the Administrative Court the applicant had not raised any question of fact or law which could not have been dealt with adequately on the basis of the file.


33.  The Government argued that this complaint was manifestly ill-founded since the case concerned a civil matter amenable to out-of-court settlement where the District Court had held an  <mask>. They further claimed that an oral hearing was clearly unnecessary since there were no new circumstances or new evidence that had to be examined before the Court of Appeal and that the outcome before the appellate court was not dependent on the credibility of the oral evidence invoked. Moreover, the Government observed that the applicant had had ample opportunity to put forward his case and conclude his actions in writing.


54.  The Government disputed that the refusal violated Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In this regard, they argued that, as it appeared from its decision of 17 March 1998, the Supreme Administrative Court, in accordance with the applicable national law, found that it could examine the application without holding an  <mask>, having regard to the nature of the matter to be determined and the extensive written information that was available in the case. Under the 1988 Act, its examination had primarily been aimed at establishing whether the challenged decision had been contrary to any legal rule, which was what the applicant had argued.


55.  The Government pointed out that, in finding that the law relied upon by the applicants had been incompatible with the Constitution, the Court of Appeal had provided an answer to their allegations of discrimination. The Government further reiterated that, at the relevant time, the CCP had not made it an obligation for the courts to hold a separate hearing on the merits when allowing an extraordinary appeal. Consequently, it was open to the Court of Appeal to decide at the same time on both the extraordinary appeal and the ordinary appeal against the initial action. In any case, the parties had the possibility to get acquainted with the submissions in the file (see paragraph 16 above) and chose not to participate in the  <mask> (see paragraph 17 above).


11.  The Government stated that Law no. 466 did not foresee hearings in compensation cases, in order to provide a speedy means of dealing with applications. As a result, in their view, the applicant, who had a legal representative in the domestic proceedings, should have known by 23 January 2003 at the latest that there would be no  <mask>. Since the application was lodged on 2 July 2004, in the Government's view the application should be rejected for non-compliance with the six months rule under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.


96.  The applicant further stressed that, as had been confirmed by the Government, hearings with the parties had taken place in several comparable cases before the Administrative Court. As the Court had confirmed in its judgment in the case of Kugler (cited above), it was necessary to hold an  <mask> and to take evidence in an adversarial manner in urban planning cases before the only genuine court instance capable of assessing the case in its entirety, which, in the present case, had been the Administrative Court. The applicant further argued that the witnesses which she had named should have been heard by the Administrative Court.


19.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 of the Convention inter alia that the Court of Appeal was biased, in that the Chairman of the Court of Appeal made a comment which displayed actual or apparent bias in favour of the prosecution; that it failed to conduct a full  <mask>, re-hearing only eight of the witnesses heard in the District Court, that its judgment misinterpreted the evidence, failed to address critical elements of the offences charged and contained serious misapplications of Finnish law; as well as convictions for offences inappropriate to the facts. These factors he relied upon as violations of Article 6 as well as supporting his allegations concerning lack of impartiality and lack of a full oral hearing. He invoked Article 6 § 3(a), alleging that he was convicted of offences the details of which were never supplied to him and in respect of which he had no opportunity to defend himself, Article 7 (prohibition of retrospective penalties) alleging that he was convicted of offences that were not offences at the time of the events in question and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, alleging that he was convicted of more than one offence based on the same conduct.


20.  The applicant maintained that his right to a fair and public hearing was breached on three counts: firstly, he was never afforded an  <mask> in the determination of his compensation claim; secondly, he was never given an opportunity to reply to the Public Prosecutor's written opinion submitted to the Bergama Assize Court and to the written opinion of the Principal Public Prosecutor submitted to the Court of Cassation on the merits of his appeal and, thirdly, on account of the low amount of compensation awarded to him in respect of non-pecuniary damage.


25.  The Government pointed out that all district court judgments could be appealed against to the appeal courts but the latter could decide, under Chapter 26, section 2, of the Code of Judicial Procedure, that the consideration of an appeal was not to be continued on the grounds expressly laid down in the said provision. The appeal courts were required to apply the provisions concerning the filtering procedure in a way that met the requirements of basic and human rights (see the Constitutional Law Committee’s opinion 35/2002 concerning the government bill HE 91/2002). The Supreme Court had also, in some difficult cases, decided not to apply the filtering procedure as it had not been clear that the district court judgment had been free from errors. The domestic legislation thus guaranteed the right to an  <mask> as well as the legal protection of an individual, by taking into account at the same time the right to a trial within a reasonable time.


58.  The applicant also argued that his right to a fair trial had been violated as he had not had the prior opportunity to prove the truthfulness of his allegations against C.T., which had constituted the basis of his conviction. However, the Court observes that the domestic courts’ task in those proceedings was to examine whether the applicant had committed the offences of false accusation, perjury and slander and eventually to reject the accusations made against C.T. by the applicant. In order to do so, they had to examine if the allegations made by the applicant against C.T. were true, a matter closely linked with the charges against him, as the applicant himself admitted. The applicant was given the opportunity to examine witnesses, adduce documents, be represented by a lawyer and be heard by the domestic courts which examined his case. At the various stages of the proceedings he was able to submit the arguments he considered relevant to his case and an  <mask> was held both before the first-instance court and the Court of Appeal, which had full competence to assess all the relevant facts and evidence. The applicant was therefore afforded all the guarantees of a fair trial in the proceedings against him and had had a real opportunity to defend himself and be acquitted.


45.  The Government maintained that the Administrative Court of Appeal’s assessment of written medical evidence had to be considered as rather technical in nature and it could be adequately resolved on the basis of the parties’ written submissions. An  <mask> would not have provided any new information. The judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal had been unanimous. Moreover, the proof required in the present case had been very high, which meant that the burden of proof could not be met if there were profound differences in the experts’ opinions. Even though the applicant had not been represented by counsel, his interest had been properly presented and protected and he had been given ample opportunity to put forward his case in writing.


24.  The Government submit that the present case must be distinguished from previous cases by the Court concerning the same issue, in particular the case of Cooke v. Austria (no. 25878/94, 8.2.2000). Unlike Mr Cooke the applicant had been represented by the same defence counsel throughout the proceedings and, again unlike Mr Cooke, he had at no time expressed his wish to participate in the Court of Appeal’s hearing. Thus, the Court of Appeal was not obliged to display particular diligence either but could assume that the applicant had waived his right to attend in person the  <mask>.


26.  The Government maintained that, while the issue of fairness under Article 6 § 1 ought to be considered in the light of the entirety of the proceedings, there was nothing to indicate that those before the District Court were in any way unfair. Furthermore, the Supreme Court proceedings included a public and  <mask> at which both parties, the prosecutor and counsel for the defence, were allowed to speak twice. In accordance with its consistent practice, the Supreme Court relied on the District Court's transcripts, which included the full testimony of both defendants and all the witnesses, and had been prepared on the basis of the tape recordings of the hearing. In this respect the present case differed clearly from that of the above-mentioned Botten v. Norway invoked by the applicant. In addition, the Supreme Court's case-file included all the other evidence submitted in the District Court proceedings.


43.  The Government did not object to the hourly rate but considered the number of hours claimed excessive. In the domestic proceedings, only costs referable to the  <mask> issue should be reimbursed and should not be reimbursed beyond SEK 4,000. In so far as costs before the Court were concerned, the Government considered 3 hours' work by Mr Antal and 17 hours work by Mr Jacobson to be reasonable. Thus, an award of SEK 28,500, V.A.T. included, would be reasonable in their view.


60.  The Government considered that the applicant had waived his right to an  <mask> before the County Administrative Court since he had not requested one before that instant. Moreover, they noted that the Supreme Administrative Court only determined whether or not to grant leave to appeal and, as a consequence of its refusal to do so, did not make a full examination of the applicant’s case. The applicant did, however, have an opportunity to finalise his submissions. Therefore, the Government contended that the matter could be adequately resolved on the basis of the case-file and the written submissions and that, accordingly, the absence of an oral hearing before the Supreme Administrative Court had been justified.


58.  The Government noted that at the material time the Civil Procedure Law provided for an  <mask> before the appellate court. However, the parties’ attendance at appeal hearings was not compulsory, and courts were free to proceed with the examination of cases in the absence of one or both of the parties, unless the parties had not been adequately informed of the time and the place of the hearing or had given valid reasons for their absence (sections 156 and 209 of the Civil Procedure Law cited at paragraph 42 above). The Government argued that the Court had previously found that similar provisions in Russian law were not, in themselves, incompatible with the fair trial guarantees of Article 6 § 1 (citing Yakovlev v. Russia, no. 72701/01, § 20, 15 March 2005).


31.  The applicant submitted that an  <mask> could be dispensed with only if the person concerned had explicitly waived the right thereto and there were exceptional circumstances which justified not holding a hearing. He stated that the case had not concerned purely medical issues but had rather concerned the amount of the applicant’s extra costs. This amount could not be derived from the opinions given in the medical certificates. Rather, the applicant had been the only one to give that kind of information and an account of his personal situation. It had therefore been indispensable to hold a hearing in order to complete the case file in these respects. Moreover, the County Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal disagreed on the issue whether the applicant’s costs were such that he was entitled to the disability benefits requested. Thus, his case had been of a borderline nature which had further emphasised the need for an oral hearing.


95.  The applicant claimed MTL 723.33 (approximately EUR 1,736) for the costs incurred at the domestic level. He produced a tax-inclusive bill in this respect, issued by the Registrar of the Courts. He further claimed a total sum of MTL 2,353.04 (approximately EUR 5,648), to which EUR 368 should be added, for the proceedings before the Court, these sums covering both his lawyers’ fees and the costs of their attendance at the  <mask> of 24 May 2005. The total sum claimed for costs and expenses was thus EUR 7,752.


39.  The Government maintained that the application was inadmissible as the applicant had not exhausted the domestic remedies in respect of the lack of an  <mask>. They referred to the Swedish Supreme Court’s decisions of 9 June 2005, 4 May 2007 and 21 September 2007 in which the court had awarded individual compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage concerning the violation of different Articles of the Convention. In the Government’s opinion, Swedish law provided a remedy in the form of compensation for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in respect of any violation of the Convention, including violations consisting of the lack of an oral hearing within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The first of these Supreme Court judgments had been delivered more than a year before the present application was lodged with the Court. Accordingly, the legal position under domestic law had to be considered to have been sufficiently clear at the time when the present application was introduced before the Court. In this connection, the Government pointed out that the existence of mere doubts as to the prospects of success of a particular remedy, which was not obviously futile, was not a valid reason for failing to exhaust domestic remedies. The compensatory remedy which existed at the time of the introduction of the application to the Court had been available to the applicant at that point in time as the limitation period in respect of such a claim was ten years from the point in time when the damage occurred. Thus it had been open to the applicant to take full advantage of that remedy when she had filed her application with the Court. In any event, the said remedy was currently available to the applicant.


33.  The applicant claimed that it would have been possible, without any difficulty, to arrange for the applicant and his counsel to put questions to R. during the proceedings. It had been the duty of the authorities, under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention, to provide him with that opportunity, if not in the  <mask> before the court, then by some other means. As to the Government’s submission that he had not requested an opportunity to put questions to R. in the District Court, the applicant found it irrelevant, as he had made a request to that end in the appellate proceedings.


34.  The applicant maintained that the Court of Appeal should have held an  <mask> since there were no exceptional circumstances which justified dispensing with a main hearing in the present case. He had insisted that an oral hearing be held in order to rehear the witnesses from the District Court and thereby clarify certain obvious contradictions and misunderstandings between the testimonies. Moreover, he had wanted to be heard under oath. Thus, it was clear that the oral evidence was of great importance for the settlement of the case and that a main hearing before the Court of Appeal had been necessary to comply with Article 6 of the Convention.


21.  The Government stated that the Tarsus Magistrates’ Court had used its discretionary power under section 28 § 4 of the Misdemeanours Act and examined the applicant’s objection without holding a hearing. They argued that the assessment of the applicant’s objection had not required an  <mask> and could adequately be done by the domestic court on the basis of the case file, as the mining operations conducted by the applicant outside of its licenced area had been a purely technical matter, established by an expert report and supported by sketch maps. They further noted that in his statements to the police, the president of the applicant company had also accepted that his company had acted in violation of the mining permit, although for a smaller area than that indicated in the inspection report. Consequently, the Government considered that, in the absence of additional information which could be obtained by means of hearing the applicant’s legal representative or witnesses, and taking account of the concerns for efficiency in the handling of such cases, the lack of a hearing had not caused prejudice to the applicant’s right to a fair hearing.


28.  The applicant contested the Government’s view. He maintained that the special features of the case at issue required that an  <mask> be conducted by the Administrative Court, even more so because jurisdiction over his appeal against the District Administrative Authority’s decision had passed on to the latter court. In particular, all questions of law had already been determined by that court’s decision of 6 May 1996. In the subsequent proceedings it only had to establish the relevant facts for the assessment whether or not the applicant’s project met the preconditions for granting the requested permission under the Landscape Protection Act. In the applicant’s view, theses were rather simple questions of fact.


47.  The applicant maintained that the lack of an  <mask> before the Administrative Court of Appeal had violated her rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It was true that she had not requested an oral hearing before the County Administrative Court but that was simply because she had expected the court to examine fully whether her need for assistance amounted to one hour per day as she had maintained. However, the court had not made such an examination.


34.  The Government pointed out that Article 55 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court did not specify the cases in which the court was required to hold a public and  <mask> (see paragraph 24 above). Accordingly, it was within its discretion to decide whether an oral hearing was necessary for the establishment of disputed facts. Since 2001 the Constitutional Court had held only four oral hearings in proceedings in respect of individual constitutional complaints.


59.  The applicant emphasised that it was not the lack of an  <mask> per se that was being criticised before the Court. What was being questioned was whether the proceedings considered as a whole, including the way in which evidence was taken and used, were fair. In the light of the Court of Appeal judgment the essence of the application as regards fairness was the lack of an oral hearing or any hearing at all of the parties before the Court of Appeal. Both the applicant and the prosecutor were equally surprised at the grounds and justifications given by the Court of Appeal in the first set of proceedings. In such circumstances, the reservation made by Finland was not the key element as the reservation could not be interpreted, as suggested by the Government, as a general reservation regarding the fairness of the Court of Appeal proceedings. Since it decided not to hold an oral hearing, the Court of Appeal was under an obligation to secure the fairness of the proceedings by other means. The applicant was convicted on the basis of evidence that had not been relied upon by the prosecutor in the District Court nor by the Court of Appeal. Fairness required the Court of Appeal at least to invite the parties' observations on R.'s and K.'s statements in the pre-trial investigation.


20.  The Government disagreed, arguing that the proceedings in their entirety had been fair. They referred to Fejde v. Sweden (judgment of 29 October 1991, Series A no. 212‑C), submitting that, as in that case, the Court of Appeal had considered that the appeal did not raise any question of fact or law which could not be adequately resolved on the basis of the case file. The actions of the applicant outside the building were undisputed: all that was disputed was the applicant’s intention in raising the hammer, and the Court of Appeal had been able to determine the facts on the basis of the case file. The Government also pointed out that other considerations, including the right to a trial within a reasonable time and the related need for the expeditious handling of the courts’ case-load, had to be taken into account in determining the need for an  <mask> at second instance. Finally they argued that it followed from the domestic legislation that persons, who had no information material to the case, need not be called as witnesses. Considering S.H.’s evidence at the pre-trial stage, it was highly improbable that hearing S.H. would have changed the appellate court’s assessment of the case or that it would have been beneficial to the outcome of the applicant’s appeal.


32.  The applicant argued that he had requested an  <mask> on the following grounds. The tax inspector had misinterpreted testimonies given in a pre-trial investigation and the applicant’s view regarding the contents of those testimonies differed from that of the inspector and the tax authority. In the applicant’s view, it was clear from the pre-trial statements of Mr J.J., Mr H.S, Mr R.K and Mr M.V., the managing director who had ordered the sub-contracting work, that Mr J.J. and Mr H.S were liable to pay tax. The applicant had also asked the Administrative Court not to examine the case until the conclusion of the criminal case or at least until the consideration of charges had been completed. Furthermore, an oral hearing had been necessary to clarify the case and the applicant’s right to due process required that the case should not be decided solely on the basis of pre-trial testimonies since the reliability of those had to be ascertained by further questioning before the court.


28.  The applicant further submitted that, as certain technical issues were involved, an  <mask> where she could plead in person was indispensable for the correct and fair examination of her case. Moreover, had she been allowed to address orally the Supreme Court, she could have shown better that the participation of the respondent company's representative without proper authority was a grave procedural violation and justified the quashing of the appellate judgment. Finally, agreeing with the Government that the CCP did not oblige the cassation court to forward the respondent's reply to the appellant in cassation, she claimed that this “procedural shortcoming”, coupled with the absence of a hearing, had undermined her rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.


51.  The Government maintained that the lack of an  <mask> before the administrative courts did not violate the applicant’s right to a fair and public hearing within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The right to an oral hearing was not absolute. Social security disputes were generally rather technical, their outcome usually being dependent on written opinions given by medical doctors, and many such disputes were better dealt with in writing than in oral argument. The administrative courts had to have regard also to the demands of efficiency and economy: systematic holding of oral hearings could be an obstacle to the particular diligence required in social security cases.


42.  The Government maintained that the lack of an  <mask> before the administrative courts did not violate the applicant’s right to a fair and public hearing within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The right to an oral hearing was not absolute. Social security disputes were generally rather technical, their outcome usually being dependent on written opinions given by medical doctors, and many such disputes were better dealt with in writing than in oral argument. The administrative courts had to have regard also to the demands of efficiency and economy: systematic holding of oral hearings could be an obstacle to the particular diligence required in social security cases.


18.  The applicant complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that the Supreme Court of Georgia had dispensed with an  <mask> in her case. She further challenged the outcome of the proceedings, claiming that the appellate and cassation courts should have endorsed the judgment of the first instance court. The invoked provision, in its relevant part, reads as follows:


29.  The applicant stated that he had explicitly requested an  <mask> before the Appeals Commission and before the Constitutional Court. He defined the question to be answered in the appeal proceedings as being how much the applicant’s actual work had changed in the new post, which needed to be considered as a question regarding the facts and the law.


39.  The applicant was thus in principle entitled to a public  <mask> before the first and only tribunal examining his case, unless there were exceptional circumstances which justified dispensing with such a hearing. The Court has accepted such exceptional circumstances in cases where proceedings concerned exclusively legal or highly technical questions (see Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 24 June 1993, § 58, Series A no. 263; Varela Assalino v. Portugal (dec.), no. 64336/01, 25 April 2002; and Speil v. Austria (dec.) no. 42057/98, 5 September 2002).


17.  The Government argued that there had been no breach of the applicant's right to an  <mask> before a tribunal as the special features of the proceedings constituted “exceptional circumstances” which justified the absence of a hearing. They noted in this regard that in her submissions to the Administrative Court the applicant had not substantiated her complaint relating to the fulfilment of the conditions required for a key worker or made out a valid case in support of her request for an oral hearing. Furthermore the other questions at issue had exclusively been questions of law, so that the Administrative Court had been able adequately to decide the case on the basis of the case file.


34.  The applicant submitted that an  <mask> could be dispensed with only if the person concerned had explicitly waived the right thereto and there were exceptional circumstances which justified not holding a hearing. She claimed that an oral hearing had been indispensable in her cases, as the investigation made by the Office had been inadequate and had led to erroneous assessments and the information available to the courts thus had been insufficient. It is true that she did not propose that any witnesses or experts be heard. However, an oral hearing would have given her the opportunity to describe her medical problems and resulting difficulties in resuming her work. Also, she would have been able to show, for example, how much her income had decreased due to her industrial injury.


116.  The Government considered the number of hours of work stated by the applicant to be excessive. They pointed out that much of the work performed related to both the present case and Västberga Taxi Aktiebolag and Vulic v. Sweden (no. 36985/97, 23 July 2002). The  <mask> held by the Court, however, justified a larger award for costs in the present case. The Government accepted the hourly rate claimed for the assistant lawyer but found that an hourly rate of SEK 1,500 would suffice for the applicant's counsel, bearing in mind that the rate currently applied within the Swedish legal-aid system is SEK 1,221 inclusive of VAT.


16.  The applicant complained that the Local Court had automatically confirmed the personal observations of the police officers which were the sole basis for his conviction for the minor offence. According to him, the domestic court could not have properly assessed the facts of the case without conducting an  <mask>. In particular, the proposed hearing of Y, who was the only witness present on the scene, was not in any way an attempt to delay the proceedings.


37.  The Government argued that this complaint was manifestly ill-founded as the Court of Appeal had expressly stated that it upheld the District Court's judgment in full, and had appended the lower court's judgment to its own. They stressed that this technique of drafting and presenting the judgment was in accordance with Swedish legislation and legal tradition. Moreover, they claimed that it had not hindered the applicant company from appealing in an effective way against the judgment, as was evident from its submissions to the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the fact that the Court of Appeal did not mention the new evidence invoked by the applicant company was clearly because it had no bearing on the outcome of the case. Thus, the Government considered that the proceedings had been fair, noting that the applicant company had had the benefit of adversarial proceedings, including an  <mask>, and had been able to present all the arguments and evidence which it considered relevant to the case.


58.  The applicant also complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, about the lack of an  <mask> before the Administrative Court and about the outcome and length of the proceedings. She further complained under Article 13 of the Convention of a lack of effective remedies against the Administrative Court’s judgment. She additionally complained under Article 14 of the Convention that she had been discriminated against on the grounds of her Serbian origins. Finally, she complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that she had been deprived of her severance pay.


22.  The applicants complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention about the lack of a fair hearing as they were not allowed to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on their behalf as the identity of the police officers who had been at the place of the events at issue was not revealed to them by N. during the District Court proceedings, and as the Court of Appeal refused to hold an  <mask> or to refer the case back to the District Court.


23.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted the domestic remedies available to him as he had not invoked in his application for leave to appeal or in the appeal to the Supreme Court the fact that no possibility to submit additional comments was given to him when the Appeal Court had decided not to hold an  <mask>. Accordingly, this complaint should be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 and 4 of the Convention.


81.  The applicant argued that the reservation made by Liechtenstein in respect of the publicity of proceedings did not extend to holding an  <mask> with the parties alone, including the questioning of witnesses. Article 6 § 1 guaranteed three distinct rights, namely the right to a controversial oral hearing, the right to a public hearing and the right to a public pronouncing of the judgment. Under the Court’s case-law, reservations had to be interpreted in a restrictive manner (the applicant referred, inter alia, to Schmautzer, cited above). Liechtenstein’s reservation only concerned the publicity of the hearing and the public pronouncing of judgments. It did not cover oral hearings, be it in camera, with the parties alone being present.


20.  The applicant complained that the Supreme Court had dispensed with an  <mask> of his cassation claim. He called into question the outcome of the domestic proceedings, claiming that the domestic courts had incorrectly assessed certain evidence and the circumstances of the case. The applicant invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in its relevant part, reads as follows:


42.  The Government maintained that if the offence had been committed after 1 June 2005, that is to say, after the entry into force of the Misdemeanours Act and the recent Code of Criminal Procedure, the fine would have been imposed directly by the relevant official authority, without any court proceedings. They stated that the domestic court had taken the new provisions into account in the applicant’s favour and had sentenced him to an administrative fine, which could not be converted into imprisonment and had not been registered in the criminal records. They argued that the outcome of the proceedings could therefore hardly be considered important for the applicant. They further argued that in the present case the relevant law had been clear and the facts undisputed, leaving little room for judicial discretion. The case file included many witness statements and an official report proving that the applicant’s hotel was being used for prostitution purposes. Moreover, the applicant had been heard by the authorities during the preliminary investigation stage and had been able to submit his written arguments to the court during the course of the proceedings. The Government concluded that the imposition of an administrative fine without the holding of an  <mask> did not contravene Article 6 of the Convention, in particular taking into account the requirement for efficiency and expediency in the administration of justice.


43.  The applicant stressed that no provision is made in Law no. 466 for an  <mask> to be held either before the assize court or, on appeal, before the Court of Cassation. However, a hearing was warranted in his case. He was unlawfully deprived of his liberty and had had to spend three days in police custody, during which time he was ill-treated. He was never given the opportunity to explain orally to a court in the context of an adversarial procedure the injustice which had been done to him and to his family. According to the applicant, had he been given the opportunity to state his case to the domestic courts, they would have been persuaded of the reality of the suffering which he and his family endured and of the harm caused to his reputation. In the event, he was awarded a derisory amount of compensation.


24.  The applicant submitted that the Administrative Court had unlawfully dismissed his request to hold an  <mask>, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to discuss the expert opinions in the context of a public hearing. Since an oral hearing could have elucidated the facts of the case, the Court's refusal to hold one was in breach of Article 6 of the Convention.


36.  The Government pointed out that the assessment made by the Supreme Court of the applicant’s possibilities to influence IT purchases did not differ from that made by the Court of Appeal. Instead, the Supreme Court had made a different legal assessment of the case, which had not been dependent on the extent to which the applicant had de facto influenced the business relationship in question. The Supreme Court’s assessment was thus a pure legal assessment. Moreover, it appeared that the applicant had only wanted to have an  <mask> if the assessment of evidence by the Supreme Court were to differ from that made by the Court of Appeal. However, according to Finnish law, such a conditional request for an oral hearing was not possible. There had been no dispute over facts as the Supreme Court had not reassessed the evidence presented in the Court of Appeal. The different outcomes had been due to a different legal interpretation by the Supreme Court of the essential elements of the offence and their application to the facts already established by the Court of Appeal.


27.  The applicant replied that Article 408 § 3 of the CCP lacked clarity and foreseeability, as it did not specify the circumstances under which the cassation court could dispense with an  <mask>. She further complained that the above provision did not oblige the cassation court to give reasons for such a decision or provide for an appeal. Moreover, none of the provisions of the CCP obliged the cassation court to give notice of its decision to dispense with an oral hearing prior to the delivery of a final decision in the case. The alleged shortcomings of Article 408 § 3 resulted in the Supreme Court's practice to dispense with oral hearings in an arbitrary manner, as in her case.


48.  The applicant particularly contested the Government’s argument that the documentary evidence submitted by the parties had been sufficient for the domestic court to fully establish the facts of the case (see paragraph 51 below). In his view, the mere fact that the proceedings before ordinary courts had lasted three years suggested that those courts had been unable to establish all the relevant facts with the required degree of certainty. In the same vein, he criticised the Government’s argument (see paragraph 54 below) that, while asking that an  <mask> be held (see Adžić, cited above, § 29), he had not specified what evidence should be taken at that hearing. For the applicant, requesting a hearing had implied that he wanted to be heard before the court. What is more, he had explicitly suggested that the recordings of his conversations via Skype with his son (see Adžić, § 27) be played and examined at a hearing.


63.  The applicant company was thus in principle entitled to a public  <mask> before the first and only tribunal to examine its case, unless there were exceptional circumstances which justified dispensing with such a hearing. The Court has accepted such exceptional circumstances in cases where proceedings concerned exclusively legal or highly technical questions (see Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263, p. 19-20, § 58; Varela Assalino v. Portugal (dec.), no. 64336/01, 25 April 2002; Speil v. Austria (dec.) no. 42057/98, 5 September 2002).


37.  The Government submitted that, although in exceptional circumstances domestic law afforded convicted persons appealing to the Court of Cassation a partial right to conduct their own defence, that right did not entail any possibility of their taking part in the oral stage of the proceedings unrepresented. The very specific nature of appeals to the Court of Cassation served to explain the special features of the procedure followed by that court, the desirability of using specialist lawyers and, conversely, the limited importance given to oral hearings. The ordinary procedure in both civil and criminal appeals to the Court of Cassation entailed in principle compulsory representation by a member of the Conseil d'Etat and Court of Cassation Bar, a rule that did not in any respect contravene the provisions of the Convention. However, as an exception to that rule, French law did not make representation compulsory for the written stage of appeals to the Court of Cassation by persons appealing against conviction. Such persons were entitled to sign the notice of appeal and to lodge a signed pleading in person in accordance with the statutory rules. Regard being had to the essentially written nature of the procedure, all appellants therefore had the same rights to put forward their arguments, whether they were acting in person, or were assisted, either by a member of the ordinary bar or by a member of the Conseil d'Etat and Court of Cassation Bar. In addition, whether drafted by an appellant in person or signed by a member of the Conseil d'Etat and Court of Cassation Bar, the written submissions crystallised once and for all the arguments that could be made against the impugned decision, such that no further points could be added orally. It was neither necessary nor usual for members of the Conseil d'Etat and Court of Cassation Bar to make oral submissions: since oral submissions were optional under Article 602 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, members of the Conseil d'Etat and Court of Cassation Bar did not even attend hearings, save in the very rare instances when they wished to address the court at hearings in which the argument was always highly technical and largely incomprehensible to the layperson. Although appellants to the Court of Cassation could nevertheless make an application under an ordinance of 15 January 1826 for permission to appear in person, without being represented by a member of the Conseil d'Etat and Court of Cassation Bar, such applications were very rarely granted, as they were of no real benefit to an appellant lacking the requisite knowledge of the law governing appeals to the Court of Cassation or of the techniques used in such appeals. Offering appellants the right to make oral representations at the hearing would therefore only create an appearance that the adversarial principle was being observed, whereas that principle constituted a right that was intended to be concrete and effective, not purely formal. Moreover, in Voisine, cited above, the Court had acknowledged that the special nature of the procedure before the Court of Cassation could justify the monopoly of the right to make oral representations being reserved to specialist lawyers, notwithstanding its finding of a violation of Article 6 for the failure to communicate the advocate-general's submissions. Indeed, in Reinhardt and Slimane-Kaïd (judgment of 31 March 1998, Reports 1998-II, p. 666, § 106) the Court had said that the practice currently used, whereby advocates-general informed the parties' lawyers prior to the hearing of the tenor of their submissions and the parties' lawyers were entitled in cases where there was an  <mask> to reply to them, afforded the parties an opportunity of apprising themselves of the advocate-general's submissions and of commenting on them in a satisfactory manner. In the Government's submission, only a practice of that type could guarantee an effective debate. Incidentally, statistical data for the year 2000 clearly showed that unassisted appellants were four times less likely to be successful in an appeal to the Court of Cassation than parties assisted by a member of the Conseil d'Etat and Court of Cassation Bar. That was a reflection of the difficulty experienced by unrepresented appellants in formulating valid points of law.


63.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the evaluation of charges had been carried out by a disqualified prosecutor. He claimed that the new prosecutor had not evaluated the charges anew, begun a new trial or preferred a new charge. He further complained, under Articles 6 § 1 and 7 of the Convention, that the provision concerning the charge of a bribery violation in the Penal Code was so unclear that an official could not know beforehand whether his activities to collect money for an association would be assessed as criminal. Lastly, he complained that he had been discriminated against on grounds of his official rank because, if the charge had been dealt with by the District Court, an  <mask> would have been held before the appellate court, namely, the Court of Appeal. Because of his capacity as a high-ranking government official, the case had first been heard by the Court of Appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court had been the first appellate court. In addition, the way in which the applicant had been treated during the national procedure violated the principle of equality.


107.  The applicants claim costs and expenses incurred, domestically and before the Court, in respect of themselves, their solicitors and counsel. These include a sum of GBP 2,616 for the applicants' own costs of postage and travel together with estimated costs of GBP 1,500 for attendance at any hearing and GBP 1,000 for expenses incurred in pursuing domestic remedies; the sum of GBP 14,702.30 for solicitors' costs and expenses, including estimated costs of attendance at an  <mask>; and the sums of GBP 17,654.38 for junior counsel and GBP 1,175 for leading counsel. This amounts to a total of GBP 33,531.68, inclusive of value-added tax (VAT).


52.  The Government maintained that the applicant had waived her right to an  <mask> before the County Administrative Court as she had not requested an oral hearing to be held before that court. As to the proceedings in the Supreme Administrative Court, in the Government’s view the applicant had not made a request for an oral hearing before that court either. The applicant had only requested that the Administrative Court of Appeal’s judgment be annulled and that the case be remitted to that court for further proceedings as her request for an oral hearing had been rejected and an oral hearing was considered necessary to clarify the matter to be decided upon. Therefore, the Government considered that the applicant had waived her right to an oral hearing also before that court. In any event, the Supreme Administrative Court had only determined whether or not leave to appeal should be granted and, as a consequence of its refusal to grant leave to appeal, had not made a full examination of the applicant’s case. The Government contended that the case could be adequately resolved on the basis of the case file and written submissions and, accordingly, that the absence of an oral hearing before the Supreme Administrative Court had been justified.


57.  The applicant further argued that the Supreme Administrative Court should have granted him a hearing since the Administrative Court of Appeal had refused him one and it was in the interest of the fairness of the proceedings that he be granted one. In his view, an  <mask> would not have been unnecessary and there had been no particular reasons against holding a hearing in his case. Furthermore, the appellate courts had in several other cases granted a hearing to determine whether or not to grant leave to appeal and so, by rejecting his request for a hearing, they had deprived him of his right to a fair procedure, in breach of Article 6 of the Convention.


31.  The applicant submitted that the domestic courts had not adduced or assessed any of the evidence that he had proposed nor had they provided any reasons for failing to do so. The Government’s own conclusions in that respect had been wrong (see paragraph 32 below). The examination of P.K. and V.P. had been requested in order that they could provide oral evidence about the reliability of the documentary evidence on the basis of which the Commission had established that he had collaborated with the security bodies. Owing to the absence of an  <mask> during the proceedings, the applicant had been prevented from presenting his defence and challenging the authenticity and veracity of the evidence against him. Whether there had been collaboration with the former security bodies was a fact to be determined in each case separately on the basis of concrete evidence and facts. Accordingly, no general approach, as the Government seemed to have suggested (see paragraph 32 below), could have been applied. He further reiterated his arguments that the impugned decisions had lacked sufficient reasoning. The additional evidence (see paragraph 16 above) confirmed that his lustration had been politically motivated and had violated his rights.


19.  The applicant was thus in principle entitled to a public  <mask> before the first and only tribunal examining her case, unless there were exceptional circumstances which justified dispensing with such a hearing. The Court has accepted such exceptional circumstances in cases where proceedings concerned exclusively legal or highly technical questions (see Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 24 June 1993, § 58, Series A no. 263; Varela Assalino v. Portugal (dec.), no. 64336/01, 25 April 2002; and Speil v. Austria (dec.) no. 42057/98, 5 September 2002).


25.  The Government accepted that the late fixing of the applicant’s tariff was a violation of Article 6. They emphasised however that the delay had not affected the applicant’s eventual release date as he was unlikely to be released for some time because of the risk which he presented to the public. In any event, the tariff had been fixed by the Secretary of State in accordance with the judicial view. They submitted that as the applicant’s tariff had expired it was no longer relevant to have an  <mask> in regard to the tariff.


36.  The Government submitted that the Administrative Court had found an  <mask> manifestly unnecessary having regard to the tax inspection report, the other documents on the file and the fact that the applicant, Mr M.V., Mr H.S. and Mr E.N. had made statements on these issues during the pre-trial investigation. The reasons for the decision referred, inter alia, to the pre-trial statements of the applicant, Mr H.S, Mr M.V., Mr E.N. The applicant held Mr H.S. and Mr J.J., who were heard as suspects in the pre-trial investigation, fiscally and criminally responsible. The applicant further considered that, due to the lack of an oral hearing, the reliability of the pre-trial statements could not be checked. The Government observed that in his application the applicant submitted that, in the pre-trial investigation, he as an active partner as well as H.S. had been heard as suspects and M.V. and E.N. as witnesses.