119.  The Government further submitted that a thorough investigation was necessary not only to determine if the alien in question has adequately established that he can expect to be subjected to treatment prohibited by Article 3 upon returning to his country of origin but also because it was necessary to ensure that the State is not simply forced to resign itself to the alien's presence which may represent a threat to the fundamental rights of its citizens, particularly in cases like the present one where national security was at stake. Relying on the Court's considerations in the cases of Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom (30 October 1991, § 111, Series A no. 215), Pranjko v. Sweden ((dec.), no. 45925/99, 23 February 1999) and Taheri Kandomabadi v. the Netherlands ((dec.), nos. 6276/03 and 6122/04, 29 June 2004), the Government considered that the guiding principle here was that the “mere possibility of ill-treatment” is insufficient to assume that  <mask> is incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention.


92.  The applicants argued that their detention was not only arbitrary but did not serve the purpose of ensuring the applicants’  <mask>. According to the applicants their detention was based on a xenophobic attitude towards Georgian nationals. Moreover, they submit that they had no practical opportunity to challenge the legality of the action taken against them, since they were denied the right to obtain legal advice and were deported without having the opportunity to challenge the court decisions, with which they were not provided and which were based on deeply flawed proceedings.


227.  The Government did not accept that Article 5 could be relied in an  <mask> case (the Court had doubted that it could be in Tomic v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 17837/03, 14 October 2003). Even if it could, no issue arose in the present case because the applicant would not be detained for a lengthy period before being brought before a court. SIAC had found that it was likely he would be brought before a “judicial authority” within 48 hours, even if this were only a prosecutor with judicial status. The report of Mr Al-Khalili and Mr Najdawi confirmed that the Public Prosecutor was a judicial officer; they had also reported that the 48 hour period in which the police had to notify the legal authorities of any arrest had been reduced to 24 hours (see paragraphs 95 and 96 above). SIAC had also found that extensions of detention up to fifty days were unlikely to be sought (see paragraph 41 above). Both of SIAC’s findings had been upheld by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. In the House of Lords, Lord Phillips had also found that 50 days’ detention fell far short of a flagrant breach of Article 5 (see paragraph 58 above) and, although they did not accept that detention for fifty days was likely, the Government relied upon his conclusion.


61.  The applicants maintained that their claims that they would be ill-treated if expelled to Guinea were arguable given the general situation in that country. They also noted that since no domestic authority had reviewed their claims, the Government could not maintain that they were not arguable. In response to the objection of the Government on the ground that they had not challenged the binding opinions of the Ministry of the Interior that there had been no obstacle to them leaving the country, they held that there had been no reason to do so, since those opinions had only dealt with their possible  <mask> to Portugal, which would not have been a problem.


64.  The Government submitted that the applicant was apprehended on 22 October 2006 by officers of the Department of the Interior of the Kuzminski district of Moscow and was brought before the Kuzminskiy District Court on 23 October 2006. The court fined the applicant for not observing the applicable registration procedure and ordered the applicant’s  <mask>. The Government also stated that neither the Federal Migration Service nor the Department of the Ministry of the Interior had any records or information about any subsequent detention of the applicant and that the applicant was not forcibly removed from the Russian Federation, but left on his own on 24 October 2006.


81.  The Government submitted that the circumstances of Y.C.’s death had also been the subject of ensuing administrative proceedings, namely to examine the question of whether Y.C.’s death had been caused by a lack of adequate medical treatment while in detention pending  <mask>. The IAP had based its decision on findings which had relied on the results of two oral hearings during which the police officers concerned, a further medical expert and the detainee sharing a cell with Y.C. had been questioned extensively about the course of Y.C.’s hunger strike and his medical treatment. Moreover, the Human Rights Advisory Board had carried out an independent review of the police investigation and published the results in a report (see paragraph 27 above).


120.  The applicants Vaja Berdzenishvili (application no. 14594/07), Tengiz Kbilashvili (application no. 14597/07), Abram Givishvili (application no. 14976/07), Liana Nachkebia (application no. 14978/07), Eka Chkaidze, David Jaoshvili (application no. 15221/07) and Inga Gigashvili (application no. 16706/07) further complained that their  <mask> decisions were based on unfair trials, not complying with the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


117.  The applicants contended that they had not been notified that they were to be deported and that the Government had not provided any evidence to the contrary. Nor had the Government submitted any evidence that they had contacted the Ukrainian Consul following their refusal to depart from Cyprus. Lastly, the applicants stated that they had not been given sufficient information about the reasons for their arrest and detention. In this connection, they submitted that they had not been served with any document justifying their arrest and  <mask>.


115.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been able to challenge the order for his  <mask> in judicial review proceedings, in the course of which he had been able to acquaint himself with all documents in the case file and seek to rebut the assertions of the authorities. In judicial review proceedings, the courts reviewed whether the administrative decision had been issued by a competent authority, in due form, and in compliance with the rules of administrative procedure and substantive law. In the applicant’s case, the Supreme Administrative Court had done just that. It had examined the arguments of the parties and had given reasons for finding against the applicant. It is true that the question whether the applicant faced a risk of ill‑treatment upon expulsion had been raised before that court. However, since the proceedings concerned the lawfulness of the expulsion order, the court had deemed that question to be irrelevant. Domestic courts could review only specific administrative decisions. The applicant did not claim that there existed a tacit or an express refusal to stay the enforcement of the order for his expulsion by reference to section 44a.


56.  The applicant submitted that he was not questioning before the Court the lawfulness of his detention in the extradition proceedings, from 22 February to 23 May 2013, or that in the criminal proceedings, from 6 June to 17 September 2013. As regards the detention imposed in the  <mask> proceedings, he claimed that the authorities had become aware of the fact that he was using a false passport when he was arrested, on 22 February 2013. However, it was not until three months later that the prosecutor instituted expulsion proceedings against him. The applicant claimed that the real purpose of the expulsion proceedings was to keep him under the authorities’ control for two more years without a possibility of periodic review. Such a long stay in detention significantly exceeded the maximum custodial sentence under the Code of Administrative Offences and his detention pending expulsion was of a punitive, rather than preventive, nature.


107.  The applicant further argued that in examining his case the Russian authorities had disregarded his specific submissions concerning his religious and political persecution and relevant reports by independent NGOs, and had relied solely on “official sources of information”. The courts' conclusion that the applicant had voluntarily left Tajikistan was at variance with his consistent submissions that he had fled because of his persecution on religious grounds and the ill-treatment sustained in custody. Referring to other cases against Russia concerning  <mask> and extradition and pending before the Court, the applicant insisted that the Russian courts consistently adopted the same formalistic approach in dealing with such complaints, which showed that the remedies suggested by the Government were ineffective in practice.


97.  The Government pointed out, as stressed by the Aliens Appeals Board in its judgment of 27 November 2010 (see paragraph 46 above), that a stay of execution could also be obtained by means of a different combination of remedies. This involved first an application to set aside and a request for a stay of execution under the ordinary procedure to be lodged within thirty days of notification of the impugned decision, followed by a request for interim measures as a matter of extreme urgency once the alien concerned was made the subject of a coercive measure. The Aliens Appeals Board then had a statutory duty to examine simultaneously, within seventy‑two hours, the request for extremely urgent interim measures and the ordinary request for a stay of execution that had already been lodged. The request for extremely urgent interim measures, once lodged, automatically suspended enforcement of the  <mask> measure.


73.  The Government further claimed that the use by the French authorities of specific flights to transport a number of aliens to their countries of origin was based on practical considerations and could not be analysed as a practice of collective  <mask> within the meaning of that provision. The introduction of such flights had been made necessary by the difficulty, and even impossibility, of obtaining seats on scheduled flights towards certain destinations, especially to countries to which there were few scheduled services from French airports.


51.  The Government argued that the applicant had first complained about his fear of being subjected to ill-treatment in his appeal against the decision ordering his  <mask>. However, he had failed to furnish “indisputable and objective evidence” to support those allegations. In any event, the appellate court had had no realistic opportunity to examine those submissions because a complaint against an administrative expulsion order was to be examined within twenty-four hours of its submission. Moreover, the alleged risk of ill-treatment in case of expulsion was not a legally relevant fact and the court examining such a complaint was under no obligation to ascertain it. At the same time, the domestic authorities had carefully examined and correctly dismissed that argument in the asylum proceedings initiated by the applicant. They had arrived at the reasoned conclusion that his application for asylum had been motivated in reality by his fear of criminal prosecution and eventual punishment in Uzbekistan because he had not sought refugee status immediately after his arrival in Russia.


126.  The Governments observed in that connection that whilst Contracting States could obtain diplomatic assurances that an applicant would not be subjected to treatment contrary to the Convention, the Court had held in the above-mentioned Chahal case that Article 3 required examination of whether such assurances would achieve sufficient practical protection. As had been shown by the opinions of the majority and the minority of the Court in that case, identical assurances could be interpreted differently. Furthermore, it was unlikely that any State other than the one of which the applicant was a national would be prepared to receive into its territory a person suspected of terrorist activities. In addition, the possibility of having recourse to criminal sanctions against the suspect did not provide sufficient protection for the community. The individual concerned might not commit any offence (or else, before a terrorist attack, only minor ones) and it could prove difficult to establish his involvement in terrorism beyond reasonable doubt, since it was frequently impossible to use confidential sources or information supplied by intelligence services. Other measures, such as detention pending  <mask>, placing the suspect under surveillance or restricting his freedom of movement provided only partial protection.


37.  The applicant disagreed with the Government’s assertion that the domestic authorities had given due consideration to his arguments about the high risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan. As regards the removal proceedings, the Code of Administrative Offences contained no provision that would require the decision-making body to consider allegations of a serious risk of ill-treatment and that remedy was therefore ineffective, even in theory. Contrary to the Government’s claim, nothing in the  <mask> order of 23 May 2013 had indicated that the risk of ill-treatment had somehow been taken into account. Nor had the appeal judgment of the Omsk Regional Court mentioned any arguments relating to that risk. In the refugee-status proceedings, neither the FMS nor the courts had addressed the applicant’s arguments about the risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan. The authorities had thus failed to consider the Article 3 issues.


196.  The Government submitted that the present case had to be distinguished from the cases cited by the applicants. Firstly, the applicants had never been removed since they had themselves decided to return to Serbia. Secondly, the decision taken by the authorities following their asylum application, even if it only concerned the determination of the responsible State and accordingly ruled out any examination of the application on the merits, aimed to ensure their transfer to France, a country in which they had not presented an arguable claim that they would be victims of treatment contrary to Article 3 and not be provided with the conditions necessary to have their fears examined. Where foreign nationals did not show that their return would have potentially irreversible consequences, it was not imperative, in order for a remedy to be effective, that it should have automatic suspensive effect but only that they should have an effective possibility of challenging the  <mask> order and of having the relevant issues examined with sufficient procedural safeguards and thoroughness by an appropriate domestic forum offering adequate guarantees of independence and impartiality (see De Souza Ribeiro v. France [GC], no. 22689/07, § 83, ECHR 2012), which was not disputed by the applicants in the present case.


125.  The Governments of Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia and the United Kingdom observed that in the Chahal v. the United Kingdom judgment (15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V) the Court had stated the principle that in view of the absolute nature of the prohibition of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, the risk of such treatment could not be weighed against the reasons (including the protection of national security) put forward by the respondent State to justify  <mask>. Yet because of its rigidity that principle had caused many difficulties for the Contracting States by preventing them in practice from enforcing expulsion measures.


62.  The Government submitted that the detention pending  <mask> had been lawful, as it had been ordered by a court, and that even though no time-limit for the applicants’ detention had been set, the maximum duration of an administrative penalty was two years. The applicants could seek supervisory review of the expulsion and ensuing detention orders in the event of a significant change in their circumstances.


68.  The applicants alleged a breached of Article 3 of the Convention on account of their forced  <mask> from their village. They had mentally suffered as a result of the actions of the members of security forces, who had burned their family houses. Under Article 8 of the Convention, they complained about the destruction of their property. Furthermore, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, they maintained that the destruction of their houses and their forced eviction from the village had violated their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. The provisions of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention are set out above at paragraph 59, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides, insofar as relevant, as follows:


213.  The Government noted that the applicant had provided a breakdown of the work performed by his representatives, but had submitted no agreement concerning legal assistance, or other documents setting out their hourly rates. Furthermore, as the applicants’ representatives specialise in cases involving extradition and  <mask> to the CIS States, the Government expressed doubts as to whether the present case required research and preparation to the extent claimed by the applicant.


72.  The applicant complained under Article 6 that he did not understand the charges against him during his deportation. The Court notes that there were no judicial proceedings concerning the applicant’s removal from the territory of Ukraine and that any such proceedings would fall outside the scope of Article 6 of the Convention (see Maaouia v. France [GC], no. 39652/98, § 40, ECHR 2000‑X). Despite its findings that the applicant’s  <mask> has appearances of extradition in disguise (see paragraph 58 above), the Court considers that this does not preclude it from examining the question of whether the removal of the applicant from the territory of Ukraine, which was formally presented as expulsion, complied with the Convention requirements. Being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, the Court decides to examine the problem raised by the applicant under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7, which reads as follows:


84.  The applicants complained that their  <mask> to Syria, if carried out, would be in breach of their right to life and the prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, as provided in Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. They also stressed that they had no effective domestic remedies in respect of these violations, in breach of Article 13. The provisions read as follows, in so far as relevant:


70.  The Government attached crucial importance to the judgment by the Supreme Court of 25 August 2006 convicting the applicant of twenty-six counts of drugs-related offences involving 2.68 kg of heroin and cocaine, for which he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. Hence the offences were extremely serious, a fact which had led the Court in numerous cases to find an  <mask> justified by weighty interests of public order (see, inter alia, Lagergren v. Denmark (dec.), no. 18668/03, 16 October 2006, and Mccalla v the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 30673/04, 31 May 2005).


65.  The Government stressed the fact that the decision of the Ruzskiy District Court of the Moscow Region had only concerned the first applicant and that no  <mask> decision had been delivered in regard to the second, third, fourth and fifth applicant. Beyond that the Government referred to the findings of the Court in its judgment Georgia v. Russia (I) (cited above, § 178) finding a violation of inter alia Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.


40.  The applicant submitted that Russian law does not provide for any possibility to obtain a meaningful judicial review of the detention of an individual who is detained pending administrative  <mask> (he referred, by way of comparison, to Tabesh v. Greece, no. 8256/07, § 62, 26 November 2009). Such detention may last up to two years but there is no periodic judicial review of it. His applications for review were dismissed in a summary fashion first by the Sestroretsk Town Court and later by the Krasnoselskiy District Court. In both cases, the St Petersburg City Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions.


156.  The Government asserted that because the file did not contain the original or a certified copy of the judgment against the applicant given in Tunisia it was impossible to check whether the information he had supplied was correct. They further submitted that an  <mask> could engage the responsibility of the Contracting State under Article 6 only in exceptional circumstances, in particular where it was apparent that any conviction in the receiving country would amount to a “flagrant” denial of justice, which was not the position in the present case. On the other hand, a Contracting State was not required to establish whether proceedings conducted outside its territory satisfied each of the conditions laid down in Article 6. To rule otherwise would run counter to the current trend, encouraged by the Court itself, of strengthening international mutual assistance in the judicial field.


160.  The Government submitted that Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 was not applicable in the instant case. They argued that the guarantee provided by that provision came into play only in the event of the  <mask> of persons on the territory of a State or who had crossed the national border illegally. In the instant case, the measure in issue was a refusal to authorise entry into national territory rather than “expulsion”.


171.  The Government recalled that in March 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court had found that no family life within the meaning of Article 8 had existed between the applicant and E. Any interference with such family life on account of the applicant’s  <mask> order and the enforcement thereof was, and would be, grounded on the Aliens Act and further a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 8 § 2.


129.  The applicant did not claim that the general circumstances obtaining in Iran would on their own preclude his return to that country. Moreover, the Court notes that a general situation of violence will not normally in itself entail a violation of Article 3 in the event of an  <mask> to the country in question (see H.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997, §41, Reports 1997‑III). However, the Court has never excluded the possibility that the general situation of violence in a country of destination may be of a sufficient level of intensity as to entail that any removal to it would necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the Court would adopt such an approach only in the most extreme cases of general violence, where there is a real risk of ill-treatment simply because the individual concerned will be exposed to such violence in that country (see Sufi and Elmi, cited above, § 218 and NA. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 115).


47.  The applicant submitted that the Russian authorities had not conducted the  <mask> proceedings with due diligence. This lack of due diligence on their part was exemplified in several ways. Firstly, no effort had been made to contact the Uzbek authorities in the first four months and eleven days of his detention. Secondly, the Russian authorities had sent no fewer than four letters to the Embassy of Uzbekistan in Moscow, but a first reply was received more than one year and two months after the despatch of the first letter. Thirdly, there had been no justification for the applicant’s detention after 5 February 2013, when the Russian authorities had become aware that he was not an Uzbek national. Finally, the applicant pointed out that he had been kept in detention pending expulsion: thus, there had been no complex extradition proceedings and the only issue to be determined had been whether at least one State was willing and able to receive him.


279.  The Government averred in their oral observations before the Grand Chamber that even in the present circumstances the applicant ran no risk of  <mask> to Afghanistan at any time as the policy at the moment was not to send anyone back to that country by force. The forced returns by charter flight that had taken place in 2009 concerned Pakistani nationals who had not applied for asylum in Greece. The only Afghans who had been sent back to Afghanistan – 468 in 2009 and 296 in 2010 – had been sent back on a voluntary basis as part of the programme financed by the European Return Fund. Nor was there any danger of the applicant being sent to Turkey because, as he had been transferred to Greece by another European Union member State, he did not fall within the scope of the readmission agreement concluded between Greece and Turkey.


75.  The applicant emphasised that the Austrian authorities, when examining the decision to lift his asylum status and to expel him, in respect of a possible interference with his right to respect for family life overlooked the fact that his wife and the two children, born in 2004 and 2007, had independent asylum status in Austria. In those asylum decisions, the Independent Asylum Panel explicitly stated that the applicant’s wife had a well-founded fear of independent persecution if she returned to the Russian Federation. It followed that the applicant’s wife and children could not reasonably be expected to follow the applicant to the Russian Federation to maintain family life; in fact, an  <mask> of the applicant to the Russian Federation would render any effective family relations impossible.


73.  The Government acknowledged that the applicant’s  <mask> would amount to an interference with his right to respect for his family life. However, such an interference was in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society. During the period of his residence in the Russian Federation, the applicant had been convicted twice of criminal offences. In particular, on 18 November 1999 the Shuya Town Court of the Ivanovo Region had found him guilty of extortion committed by a group of persons (a serious crime) and theft of a passport (a minor offence) and sentenced him to three years and one month’s imprisonment. On 26 April 2005 the Town Court had found him guilty of theft (an offence of medium gravity) and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. The Government stressed that the fact that the applicant committed the theft shortly after having served his first prison sentence should not be overlooked, as it showed his firm propensity to commit crimes against property. Furthermore, on 19 June 2007 and 8 July 2010 the applicant had been held administratively liable for failing to have his residency in Russia duly authorised. According to the information from the police, the applicant was a member of an organised criminal gang, was actively involved in drug dealing and was a drug addict himself. He was unemployed and did not support his wife and children. Accordingly, his expulsion would not have any bearing on his family’s financial situation. His wife had been aware of his convictions prior to marrying him. She had never met her parents-in-law in person. She maintained contact with them by telephone or via the internet.


97.  The applicant contended under Article 2 of the Convention that his deportation to Iran had exposed him to various deadly hazards, such as being kidnapped by people smugglers and being shot by border guards. The applicant further complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been ill-treated by security forces during his deportation to Iran on 12 September 2008. He claimed under Article 8 of the Convention that his deportation had infringed his right to respect for private and family life. He complained under Article 14 that he had been discriminated against by the State authorities because of his nationality. Lastly, he contended under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 that he and the other Uzbek asylum seekers had been deported collectively and in breach of the procedural safeguards relating to the  <mask> of aliens.


49.  The applicant’s detention had also been necessary for the speedy examination of his asylum request, and because he had posed a danger to public order and security under Article 13 § 2 (b) and (c) and Article 13 § 4 of Presidential Decree no. 114/2010. The Government drew the Court’s attention to the fact that, in accordance with the national law, lodging an asylum request suspends the enforcement of an  <mask> decision but not the enforcement of a detention decision. They referred to a series of judgments against Greece in which the Court had considered that lodging an asylum request did not render detention arbitrary. In any event, the applicant had been released on 13 November 2013, twenty-six days after filing an asylum request. In view of the factors mentioned above, the Government submitted that the domestic authorities’ good faith in relation to the issuance of the decisions on the basis of which the applicant had been detained could not be disputed.


57.  The Government submitted that whilst they considered that the applicant indeed had a family life with his son, the envisaged  <mask> of the applicant would not constitute an interference with that family life. The Government stated that after the applicant's residence permit had been revoked, the dependent residence permits held by his ex-wife and son were revoked as well. As a result, the applicant's ex-wife and son did not have lawful residence status in the Netherlands either and were also obliged to leave the country. As all three were nationals of the DRC, the Government concluded, there were no reasons why they should not return to the DRC to continue their family life there.


95.  The applicant claimed that his detention, which commenced on 28 January 2015, had been arbitrary and thus unlawful from the outset. In any event, it would have ceased to be lawful once the  <mask> proceedings had been suspended. The CAO did not establish any time-limits for detention of persons awaiting administrative removal; the domestic courts had failed to specify any time-limits in their judgments; accordingly, the applicant could not foresee the length of his detention. Noting that his detention had largely exceeded the maximum penalty in the form of deprivation of liberty under the CAO and referring to the case of Azimov v. Russia (no. 67474/11, §§ 172-73, 18 April 2013), the applicant claimed that his detention pending expulsion was of a punitive nature rather than of a preventive one. The applicant also noted that the Appeal Court had failed to analyse his allegations of the breach of his right to liberty. Lastly, the applicant reiterated that he had had no possibility to initiate judicial review of the lawfulness of his prolonged detention as required by Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.


36.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been residing in Russia illegally since 1 September 2013, using his brother’s passport, and he had not taken any steps to legalise his status in the country for several years. His complaint under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. In particular, he had not appealed against the removal decision issued by the court on 12 May 2015, even though his right to appeal had been explicitly noted in the text of the decision. Furthermore, the applicant’s arguments concerning his poor knowledge of the Russian language and his lack of understanding of the  <mask> proceedings were inaccurate and contradictory, since he had been assisted by an interpreter during the expulsion hearing, had resided and worked in Russia since 2013, and his application for temporary asylum had been submitted in Russian. Moreover, even assuming that a lawyer had assisted him in submitting his request for temporary asylum, that lawyer could also have asked to restore the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the expulsion decision at that time. However, he had only done so on 12 February 2016 and the appeal court had refused his request, stating that the expulsion decision had been served on the applicant on the day when it had been issued, and the lack of any action on the part of the applicant was unjustified. Moreover, the applicant had not appealed against the immigration authorities’ refusal to grant him temporary asylum. Lastly, his request for refugee status had been ongoing at the time of his application to the Court.


45.  The applicant argued that his detention had been unlawful for a number of reasons: firstly, the domestic authorities had showed bad faith when they had put him in detention, as his removal to Syria had been and remained impracticable; therefore there had been no purpose to be achieved. The domestic authorities had been aware of this fact, as proved also by the circular order issued by the Hellenic Police earlier that year stating that Syrians should not be detained and that those who were already in detention should be released. On the contrary, in his case, the domestic authorities had applied their practice of almost automatic detention, even though his  <mask> had not been feasible, therefore rendering his detention arbitrary. That practice of the domestic authorities had been noted and criticised by many national and international organisations. The applicant had reiterated those arguments on many occasions, before the head of the police station in which he had been detained and before the administrative courts with which he had lodged his objections against his detention. In addition, even though initially he had not had his identity documents with him so as to prove his nationality, the domestic authorities had never doubted that he came from Syria. The applicant relied on the Court’s judgment in Tabesh, cited above, whose conclusions he considered directly applicable to his case. He also argued that, in accordance with the detention order, he had been detained on public order grounds that had not been specified, which was a further element of arbitrariness.


66.  The Government of Georgia reiterated the arguments submitted in Georgia v. Russia (I) (cited above) and referred to the reports of international organisations referred to in the judgment. It further maintained that the  <mask> of Georgian nationals at that time had been based on their national and ethnic origin and not on their situation under the immigration rules of the Russian Federation.


47.  The applicant emphasised that the domestic authorities had failed to properly examine his allegations of the risk of ill-treatment in Kyrgyzstan. He noted that the Code of Administrative Offences did not stipulate an obligation to assess a risk of ill-treatment in the course of  <mask> proceedings. The Appeal Court had refused to examine in detail the allegations made in the appeal statement referring to territorial jurisdiction; thus, the applicant’s serious claims of risk of the proscribed treatment had been left unscrutinised. Nor had these claims been analysed in the course of the proceedings relating to the application for refugee status.


89.  The applicant emphasised that his wife had been a recognised refugee in Austria since 2004 and that his two children, who were both born in Austria, also had resident status under the asylum law. He claimed that removal to Russia would mean de facto permanent separation from his core family in Austria, and alleged that the Austrian authorities had not sufficiently balanced the conflicting interests involved in the decision. With regard to his criminal convictions, the applicant contended that since his last conviction in 2008 he had not been implicated in any other criminal or police investigations and had a very good future prognosis.  <mask> would therefore be at variance with his right to respect for his family life.


117.  The applicant agreed with the Government in so far as the periods from 24 to 30 July 2013 and from 31 July to 5 August 2013 were concerned. He maintained, in respect of the entire period of his detention pending administrative removal as from 31 July 2013, that administrative‑removal proceedings had been initiated only when the authorities had faced the need to release him. He argued that the authorities had abused their powers by ordering his detention within the framework of administrative proceedings solely with a view to ensuring his return to Uzbekistan, notwithstanding the refusal of the extradition request. The applicant considered that his detention pending administrative removal had in any event been unlawful, as the Code of Administrative Offences set no time-limit for such detention, and no such time-limit was given by the domestic courts. He argued that the Russian law on detention pending  <mask> was not sufficiently clear and foreseeable. Referring to Azimov (cited above, §§ 172-73), the applicant argued that detention pending expulsion must not exceed the maximum term for detention as an administrative penalty, as otherwise it constituted a punitive rather than a preventive measure.


36.  The applicant complained that his detention pending  <mask> had been in breach of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention on account of its excessive length and the obvious impossibility to enforce the order for his expulsion to Uzbekistan. He further complained under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that he had been unable to obtain a judicial review of his detention. The relevant parts of Article 5 provide as follows:


59.  The Government argued that the applicant's claim appeared to be connected with the parts of the application relating to Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, which had already been declared inadmissible by the Court. As the applicant's  <mask> had not yet taken place, the Government further found it difficult to understand how damage resulting from a potential violation of Article 2 or 3 could already have been sustained by the applicant.


98.  The applicant finally complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 that she had not been allowed to exercise the procedural safeguards against her extradition. The Court notes that, according to Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 7, this provision uses the concept of  <mask> “in a generic sense as meaning any measure compelling the departure of an alien from the territory but does not include extradition” (ETS no. 117, § 10). Since in the present case the applicant was subject to extradition proceedings, Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 finds no application. It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.


63.  The applicant maintained that he was still a victim because the  <mask> had been enforceable and had only been prevented by his unsuccessful suicide attempt and then the Court’s interim measure. That violation of Article 3, which had already occurred, had not been recognised by the domestic authorities. Furthermore, he had not been granted asylum but only temporary subsidiary protection.


77.  The Government of Georgia reiterated the arguments submitted in Georgia v. Russia (I) (cited above) and referred to the reports of international organisations mentioned in the judgment. It further maintained that the  <mask> of the present applicants had been based on their national and ethnic origin and not on their situation under the immigration rules of the Russian Federation.


22.  The applicants maintained in reply that they had not been notified of the decision to deport them prior to their  <mask>. They further contended that, even if they had been served with deportation orders, application to the administrative courts for the annulment of a deportation decision did not automatically have a suspensive effect and therefore did not constitute an effective remedy.


110.  The applicants further complained that because of their hasty  <mask> they had been denied the possibility of claiming damages from the authorities for the latter's unlawful actions. In this connection, they complained under Article 6 and, with the exception of the third applicant, Ms Stankova, Article 13 of the Convention. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention, this being the lex specialis in the case of proceedings for compensation for unlawful detention. It reiterates in this connection that once a case has been duly referred to it, it is entitled to examine every question of law arising in the course of the proceedings and concerning facts submitted to its examination in the light of the Convention and the Protocols as a whole (see, inter alia, Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, § 44, Reports 1998-I, and Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24). Article 5 § 5 of the Convention reads as follows:


173.  The Government submitted, with a reference to Alim v. Russia, no. 39417/07, § 54, 27 September 2011, that administrative removal constituted “expulsion” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. They further pointed out that under Article 3.10 § 5 of the Code of Administrative Procedure a judge could place a person subject to administrative removal in custody in a special detention centre, where the person was detained pursuant to section 34 § 5 of the Foreigners Act until the execution of the decision on administrative removal. The Government also noted that according to the Constitutional Court’s decision no. 6-R of 17 February 1998, a person subject to administrative-removal proceedings could be detained without a court order for up to forty-eight hours. As on 17 September 2012 the applicant had been arrested on the ground of having committed an administrative offence punishable by administrative removal, and on 19 September 2012 the Meshchanskiy District of Moscow had found him guilty of that offence and ordered his administrative removal and detention in a special facility pending the execution of the decision, the applicant’s detention had fully complied with the domestic law. Moreover, when the Court had applied Rule 39, instructing the Russian Federation to suspend the applicant’s  <mask> to Uzbekistan, the competent authorities had taken measures to comply with the Court’s request.


62.  The applicant emphasised that both the Zyuzinskiy District Court and the Moscow City Court had failed to consider his arguments relating to Article 5 of the Convention and that no time-limit for his detention had been stipulated in the  <mask> order. With reference to the Court’s previous findings (in particular, in the case of Azimov, cited above, §§ 153‑54), he maintained that Russian law did not provide for a periodic review of the lawfulness of detention following a decision on administrative expulsion.


157.  The applicant argued that the Russian law on detention pending  <mask> was not sufficiently clear and foreseeable. In particular, the applicant complained that his arrest for the purposes of expulsion had been ordered to circumvent the requirements of the domestic law, which established a maximum time-limit for detention pending extradition. On the contrary, detention pending expulsion was not limited in time under Russian law. He noted that administrative removal proceedings had been initiated only when the authorities faced the need to release the applicant. In addition, since the application of Rule 39 by the Court, the applicant’s detention pending expulsion had no legitimate purpose and was therefore arbitrary, since he could no longer be expelled.


119.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Firstly, he had failed to lodge a further appeal with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State in the proceedings on his application for asylum. Secondly, an appeal lay against the dismissal of his objection against the manner of his  <mask> which, as far as the Government were aware, the applicant had not used.


36.  The Government submitted that the decision on the applicant’s administrative removal from Russia was well-reasoned and proportionate. The courts took into account that he had used false identity documents, had minor children in Uzbekistan and had no family members, place of residence or stable income in Russia. The  <mask> order did not specify that the applicant was to be taken to Uzbekistan, but merely stated that he was to be removed from the territory of the Russian Federation. As to the applicant’s allegation that he risked ill-treatment in Uzbekistan, the Government pointed out that Uzbekistan had ratified various international human-rights treaties, that it was making democratic improvements, and that the habeas corpus procedure had been implemented in January 2008. They further argued that the case-law of the Court gave no examples of individuals who had been ill-treated in Uzbekistan following their extradition from Russia. The Government were sceptical about the NGO reports concerning the situation in Uzbekistan referred to by the applicant; in the Government’s view, they contained general allegations that were uncorroborated by specific factual information. The applicant’s allegations that he risked ill-treatment were too generic and insufficient to demonstrate that the human-rights situation in Uzbekistan was so poor that all extraditions to that State should be stopped.


29.  The applicant further submitted that there existed the administrative practice of substituting  <mask> for extradition which was based on an unpublished order of the Moscow Region prosecutor, no. 86/81 of 3 July 2009, which provided that in every case of release of a detained individual because his extradition was impossible, it was mandatory to decide on his administrative expulsion from Russia. The applicant therefore maintained that his expulsion had been ordered to secure his rendition to the Uzbekistani authorities, that is to prevent him from being released and to secure either expulsion or extradition, as the case might be, and that his allegations of the risk of ill-treatment had not been thoroughly examined in the administrative expulsion proceedings.


33.  The applicants maintained their complaint. They submitted that the  <mask> proceedings had been instituted by Russian authorities in order to circumvent the effect of the refusal to extradite them. They asserted that torture and ill-treatment of prisoners were a common practice of Uzbek law-enforcement and security forces. In this connection they relied on the data published by international human rights NGOs and the US Department of State about the situation in Uzbekistan. They further referred to the Court’s earlier findings in a number of extradition cases against Russia that the ill‑treatment of prisoners who, like themselves, were charged with membership of an extremist religious organisation, was a pervasive and enduring problem in Uzbekistan. As regards the Government’s referral to Uzbekistan’s ratification of the UN Convention against Torture, they referred to the Court’s earlier finding that the existence of domestic laws and accession to international treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights in principle were not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where reliable sources have reported practices resorted to or tolerated by the authorities which are manifestly contrary to the principles of the Convention (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, § 147, ECHR 2008).


96.  The applicant further maintained that the three-day time-limit for lodging an appeal against the Prague 10 District Court’s decision of 25 October 2010 cancelling the suspension of his  <mask> (see paragraph 39 above) had been too short and made that legal avenue ineffective. He had been detained while awaiting his expulsion on Friday 5 November 2010 when he received the decision, written in what was for him a foreign language. The deadline for appeal had expired on Monday 8 November 2010. Owing to the restrictions on making a phone call (it was necessary to make a special written request in order to use the telephone), he had been unable to contact his lawyer in due time. Moreover, a return call could not be directly transferred to the applicant without a prior written request. He had therefore forwarded the decision to his lawyer by regular post, but the lawyer had received it only on 9 November 2010. Even though the lawyer had lodged the appeal on the same day, it had been considered belated.


158.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s detention pending  <mask> had been lawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (f). The applicant was detained with a view to enforcement of the court order for his administrative removal from the country under Article 18.8 § 1 of the CAO. Referring to the reasons given by the courts for the applicant’s expulsion and detention, the Government argued that the expulsion proceedings had nothing to do with the extradition proceedings. The law on detention pending expulsion was sufficiently clear and foreseeable.


55.  The applicant averred that his submissions concerning the risk of ill‑treatment had not been properly, if at all, considered by the domestic authorities either in the  <mask> or the asylum proceedings. In the former proceedings the courts had had no obligation to consider the issue of the risk of ill-treatment and, given the expedited nature of the court’s examination of the expulsion matter, the applicant had been deprived of a meaningful opportunity to state his case. Likewise, in the asylum proceedings, although the courts had not been formally prevented from assessing the matter of the risk of ill-treatment, they had chosen to disregard the applicant’s submissions in that respect and the information from independent sources provided by him. Moreover, in view of the expulsion of the applicant in the Muminov case despite pending asylum proceedings and also the insufficiently clear wording of the relevant provisions, it could not be argued with certainty that a pending application for asylum had a suspensive effect in the event of an expulsion being ordered. Lastly, the applicant alleged that his expulsion would be, in reality, a disguised extradition and that the migration authorities and the courts had been influenced by the FSB, who wished to expel him from the country because of his presumed membership of HT.


40.  The Government objected that the second applicant had not submitted a power of attorney for the representative that had lodged the present application on his behalf which, consequently, had to be declared inadmissible as incompatible ratione personae. Alternatively, they maintained that since the applicant had not contacted his counsel at any time after his  <mask>, he must be deemed to have lost interest in pursuing his application, which thus had to be struck out of the list of cases under Article 37 § 1 (a) or (c) of the Convention.


331.  The Government of the United Kingdom emphasised that the Dublin Regulation afforded a fundamental advantage in speeding up the examination of applications, so that the persons concerned did not have time to develop undue social and cultural ties in a State. That being so, it should be borne in mind that calling to account under Article 3 the State responsible for the asylum application prior to the transfer, as in the present case, was bound to slow down the whole process no end. The Government of the United Kingdom were convinced that such complaints, which were understandable in cases of  <mask> to a State not bound by the Convention, should be avoided when the State responsible for handling the asylum application was a party to the Convention. In such cases, as the Court had found in K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom (cited above), the normal interpretation of the Convention would mean the interested parties lodging their complaints with the courts in the State responsible for processing the asylum application and subsequently, perhaps, to the Court. According to the United Kingdom Government, this did not absolve the transferring States of their responsibility for potential violations of the Convention, but it meant that their responsibility could be engaged only in wholly exceptional circumstances where it was demonstrated that the persons concerned would not have access to the Court in the State responsible for dealing with the asylum application. No such circumstances were present in the instant case, however.


105.  The applicant maintained that on 12-13 March 2013 he had not in fact been released from detention, and that his detention had constituted an uninterrupted period from 13 September 2012. He argued that administrative‑removal proceedings had been initiated only when the authorities had faced the need to release him and the administrative detention had been aimed solely at keeping him under the authorities’ exclusive control after the expiry of the term of his detention pending extradition. Further, after 9 April 2013, the date of the formal refusal of his extradition to Uzbekistan, he had been kept in detention so that the authorities could organise his removal to the requesting country. He further argued that the Russian law on detention pending  <mask> was not sufficiently clear and foreseeable. In particular, he submitted that his arrest for the purpose of expulsion had been ordered in order to circumvent the requirements of the domestic law, which prescribed a maximum time‑limit for detention pending extradition. In contrast, detention pending expulsion was not limited in time under Russian law.


144.  The applicants stressed that the court decisions did not stipulate the maximum length of this detention. Other than the requirement that the  <mask> order be executed within the two-year time-limit, the Code of Administrative Offences did not contain any provisions governing the length of detention pending expulsion, and therefore lacked legal certainty. Moreover, there was a conflict between the position of the Federal Bailiff Service, which was of the opinion that the expulsion could not be carried out and sought to amend the relevant court decisions, and the court decisions confirming the validity of the measure ordered (see paragraphs 15-17 above). Lastly, the applicants claimed that such a long stay in detention significantly exceeded the maximum custodial sentence permissible under the Code of Administrative Offences, and that their detention pending expulsion was of a punitive rather than preventive nature.


91.  The applicant replied that the Government failed to say anything about the risk that he faced in Lebanon. As for their reliance on section 44a, there existed no mechanism to ensure its effective application. The only opportunity for him to invoke that provision to prevent his  <mask> to Lebanon had been in the proceedings for judicial review of the expulsion order. However, the Supreme Administrative Court had held that the point was irrelevant. In any event, the only procedure in which the applicant could prove that he risked death or ill‑treatment were asylum proceedings. When examining his asylum request, the State Refugees Agency had found that risk to be real, based as it was on the applicant’s personal circumstances and the general situation in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. On that account it had granted him humanitarian protection. The risk could therefore be regarded as established. However, he could not benefit from such protection, as he fell within the exclusion clauses of sections 4(4) and 67(3) of the Asylum and Refugees Act of 2002.


85.  The Government emphasised that the disappointments suffered by the applicant did not amount to a violation of Article 3. They could not be described as  <mask> (they cited Kotälla v. the Netherlands, no. 7994/77, Commission decision of 6 May 1978, Decisions and Reports 14, p. 238). Although the applicant might have cherished the hope of being released, particularly following the entry into force of the Law of 15 June 2000, the disappointment caused by the refusal of his application for release on licence could not constitute a violation of Article 3. Unless there were special circumstances attributable to the authorities, which had not been established in the instant case, the applicant’s anguish did not amount to suffering beyond the threshold required for Article 3 to apply.


91.  The Government submitted that the complaint under Article 2 was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, because that Article could not be construed as requiring the State to allow access to unauthorised medicinal products. The same was true for the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. The refusal to allow the applicants access to the experimental product MBVax Coley Fluid, whose safety and efficacy had not been established, could not be regarded as  <mask>.


117.  The Government maintained that the investigation had been effective in that the factual circumstances of the case had been clarified to the maximum extent possible and all possible investigative steps had been taken. It was only logical that the complaint had been investigated as the criminal offence of causing bodily harm and not  <mask> because there had been no intentional offence and the offender, if any, could only have been someone from the medical staff and not a State authority, local self-governing authority or a court.


52.  The Government argued non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They submitted that for the 21 June 2001 incident the applicant should have used the appeal introduced by Article 2781 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, effective since 1 January 2004. Furthermore, for the complaint concerning the alleged ill-treatment in detention, the conditions of detention and the alleged lack of adequate medical treatment the applicant could have lodged a criminal complaint for abusive behaviour, illegal arrest, abusive investigation and  <mask> and torture, crimes prohibited by the Criminal Code, or a complaint under the provisions of the Emergency Ordinance no. 56/2003.


84.  The Government acknowledged that the applicant had been detained in a cell for smokers even though she had informed the detention centre medical service that she was a non-smoker. They also acknowledged that the treatment she had been subjected to should have been avoided. However, they argued that she had not been subjected to a level of stress that had gone beyond what had been inherent to detention. She had been detained in a cell for smokers for only twenty-four hours. Furthermore, the domestic authorities had not been aware of her condition, which would have rendered her detention in a room for non-smokers mandatory. In addition, the applicant had not provided any evidence in support of her allegations that the  <mask> she had allegedly been subjected to had affected her health or the development of her pregnancy.


119.  The applicants complained that they had serious grounds to believe that Amkhad Gekhayev and Zalina Mezhidova had been subjected to torture and  <mask> before having been murdered and that no effective investigation had been conducted in that respect. They also submitted that they had suffered severe mental distress and anguish in connection with the killing of their relatives and on account of the State’s failure to conduct a thorough investigation into the events concerned. The applicants referred to Article 3 of the Convention, which states as follows:


122.  The Government also submitted global arguments as regards the overall period of the applicant's detention. They argued that the conditions of the applicant's detention had not amounted to  <mask> within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. They maintained that he had had adequate cell space and that he had been able to have at least two hours' fresh air daily. As regards the working opportunities and leisure activities, the Government submitted that during his detention after conviction the applicant had had a possibility to work and it had depended on him to benefit from it. He had also been able to undergo computer training, watch television or read.


58.  The Government considered that the mere fact of detention in one cell of a number of inmates exceeding the designed capacity of that cell was not in itself a ground for finding a violation of the applicant's rights under Article 3 of the Convention, since other aspects of his detention had been in compliance with the requirements of the Convention. In particular, during his detention the applicant had been provided with an individual sleeping place and bedding. Moreover, overcrowding in remand prisons was a common problem for many member States of the Council of Europe. In the Russian Federation the overcrowding was due to a high level of criminality and limited capacity of remand prisons. The remand prison administration had not had any intention to humiliate the applicant. The Government considered that the overcrowding of the cells in which the applicant had been detained could not in itself be a ground for drawing a conclusion about  <mask> of the applicant. In sum, the conditions of the applicant's detention in remand prisons nos. 52/1 and 77/3 had complied with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.


47.  The applicant pointed out that the Russian authorities had failed to assess the risks of ill-treatment in the course of the extradition and refugee status proceedings. In the domestic proceedings he had relied on reports by UN bodies and reputable international NGOs, which had demonstrated that in Kyrgyzstan ethnic Uzbeks who, like him, were suspected of involvement in the violence of June 2010 in Osh, were at increased risk of ill-treatment while detained, and that it was common practice not to investigate instances of torture or  <mask> in the requesting country. The applicant claimed that the migration authorities and domestic courts either examined such reports only formally or failed to address them at all.


182.  The Government recalled that the applicants were suspected of terrorism and the Council of Europe Guidelines on human rights and the fight against terrorism had recognised that such persons could be subjected to more severe restrictions than those applied to other prisoners (see paragraph 114 above). The Court had also recognised that prohibitions on contact and communication for security reasons did not of themselves amount to  <mask> or punishment. The Government accepted that such restrictions could not amount to complete sensory isolation and could not be imposed indefinitely. However, in assessing the nature of solitary confinement, factors to be taken into account included the physical conditions of confinement and the possibility of visits.


76.  The Government submitted that the applicant had actively resisted his arrest on 20 August 2003. The police had lawfully used physical force against him, which thus could not have amounted to a form of degrading or  <mask>. Later on, the applicant had been interviewed in the presence of a lawyer and had made no complaints about his health. All circumstances relating to the arrest had been subject to a through inquiry, which had included the collection of depositions (from the police officers, other public officials, the lawyer and others) and medical evidence such as a forensic examination.


58.  The applicants referred to the prison’s disconnection from the utilities as causing standards to drop to a level which should be considered  <mask>, notably due to the lack of hygiene, the poor quality of the food and their inability to have their diseases properly treated (both applicants were ill with tuberculosis at the relevant time). They submitted that in total they had spent twenty-four and seventeen months respectively in inhuman conditions in prison no. 8.


108.  The Government submitted that the first applicant could not claim to be the victim of the alleged violation of the Convention since the authorities had never intended and did not intend to deport him to Afghanistan. The authorities were conscious of the requirements of the Convention and other international instruments and would not expose Mr M. to any risk, however slight, of  <mask>.


95.  The applicant maintained his claims, arguing that he had been subjected to  <mask> on both occasions. Despite the fact that there had been witnesses to the ill-treatment among the inmates and that his injuries had been observed by the human rights activists and had been recorded in his medical history, the authorities had turned a blind eye on his complaints, dismissing his claims as unreliable and fully accepting the warders’ version of events. He further stated that the investigators had delayed his expert medical examination and only performed it at the request of his counsel and almost three months after the events, by which time it had been virtually impossible to establish the facts. The investigators’ indifference towards his complaints had been demonstrated in their decisions not to institute criminal proceedings against the warders.


60.  The applicant further submitted that the Russian authorities had failed to assess the risks of ill-treatment in the course of the extradition and refugee status proceedings. In the domestic proceedings he had relied on reports by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and respected international NGOs, which had demonstrated that, in Kyrgyzstan, ethnic Uzbeks who, like him, were suspected of involvement in the violence of June 2010 in the Jalal-Abad area, were at an increased risk of ill-treatment while detained and that it was common practice not to investigate instances of torture or  <mask> in the requesting country. The applicant claimed that the migration authorities and domestic courts either examined such reports formally or failed to address them at all. He argued that the migration authorities and domestic courts had placed on him a disproportionate burden to prove with indisputable evidence that he would be persecuted if extradited to Kyrgyzstan.


93.  The applicant submitted that from 11 December 2007 and, at least, until 19 September 2008 he had been constantly handcuffed to his bed while in the hospital – with one hand during the day and with both hands during the night. He further noted that he had been constantly guarded by three SIZO officers and had been in a ward with a barred window, which significantly reduced the likelihood of his escaping. Moreover, neither in the SIZO nor in the hospital had the applicant attempted to escape or behaved aggressively. Therefore, in the applicant's opinion his handcuffing to the bed had not been justified and constituted  <mask> in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.


44.  The applicant complained that, taking into account the conditions created in the punishment cell in Grīva Prison while he was under the disciplinary penalty imposed on him on 5 September 2000, he had been subjected to  <mask> and torture. He furthermore alleged that there had been no effective investigation in that respect. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


34.  The applicants complained that the treatment to which they were subjected by the prison authorities and gendarmes on 20 July 1995 in Buca Prison amounted to torture and  <mask>, in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. In their observations dated 11 May 2006 the applicants further complained, without any elaboration, that the incident at Buca prison and subsequent developments also violated their rights under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention.


58.  The Government submitted that the domestic courts had examined the applicant’s argument that his deportation to China would expose him to the risk of being subjected to the death penalty and receiving  <mask>. Those arguments had been rejected because the aim of the domestic proceedings against him had been to declare his presence in Russia undesirable rather than to extradite or deport him to China. The exclusion order would not automatically entail his deportation to China; the applicant could still leave Russia for another country using his Chinese passport.


93.  The Government submitted that the award made by the Skopje Court of Appeal had been appropriate and sufficient redress for the wrongful detention and incorrect treatment of Mr S. Selami at the hands of the police. Referring to the relevant parts of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, they maintained that “the domestic courts had not disregarded the physical injuries and emotional suffering of Mr S. Selami due to his treatment in police custody when calculating the award of non-pecuniary damages ... Notwithstanding that the award had been made in respect of the unjustified deprivation of liberty, in substance, it had included an award of non‑pecuniary damage for the physical, that is to say  <mask> to which Mr S. Selami had been subjected while in police custody.”


146.  The applicants relied on Article 3 of the Convention, submitting that, as a result of their relative’s disappearance and the State’s failure to investigate it properly, they had endured mental suffering in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. They also argued that they had serious grounds to believe that Mr Ali Khadayev had been subjected to torture and  <mask> when in detention and complained that no effective investigation had been conducted in this respect. Article 3 reads:


128.  The applicant claimed USD 50,000 (EUR 40,923.20) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. He maintained that he had been subjected to physical and mental suffering as a result of deliberately cruel and  <mask>. He also submitted that his normal way of life had been disrupted and his career opportunities had been affected by his sentence and that it was not possible for him to support his elderly parents. The applicant mentioned that the failure to provide him with the necessary medical treatment during his detention had led to a deterioration in his health. He also alleged that his suffering while in detention had had negative effects on his parents, wife and son.


128.  The applicant argued that if he were deported to northern Somalia there was a real risk that he would be subjected to torture or to cruel and  <mask> because he belonged to the Reer Hamar minority group. Not having any clan or family ties in the “relatively safe” areas, there was every possibility that he would be forced to live in a camp for IDPs; conditions in these camps had been described as inhumane. In the applicant's opinion, national policy based on the country reports prepared by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs paid only lip service to the position paper issued by UNHCR (see paragraph 100 above). An analysis of the November 2004 country report carried out by the Dutch Refugee Council (see paragraphs 81-83 above) had undermined that report's validity and highlighted its inadequacies. Nevertheless, from an anthropological point of view it gave a useful insight into the position of the Reer Hamar in Somalia, a position with which the applicant's personal circumstances were completely in line.


83.  The applicant referred to the fact that she had been unable to find out what happened to her husband. She complained that having to live with his disappearance constituted  <mask>. She referred to the lack of information given to her by the authorities in answer to her enquiries and to the prolonged period of uncertainty over A.T.'s fate, which kept her imprisoned in a cycle of unfounded hope and despair.


50.  The applicant submitted that there was no remedy available to him in this regard. He argued that, although the domestic law expressly prohibited torture and  <mask> by prison officials and provided avenues for redress against such ill-treatment, there was no specific legal regulation of other types of ill-treatment such as the general conditions of detention. The applicant also noted that, in any event, in the light of the apparent ineffectiveness of the official investigation into his claims of torture in custody, any attempt to seek redress for the conditions of his detention would also be ineffective.


68.  The applicants complained that it was very likely that Abdulkasim Zaurbekov had been subjected to torture and  <mask> and that no effective investigation had been conducted in this connection. They also submitted that they had suffered severe mental distress and anguish in connection with their relative’s disappearance and on account of the State’s failure to conduct a thorough investigation into the matter. The applicants referred to Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


153.  The applicant further submitted that, regardless of whether the method of interrogation was to be classified as torture or as  <mask>, the Convention (he referred, in particular, to the Court’s judgment in Jalloh, cited above) and provisions of public international law (in particular, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 15 and 16 of the United Nations Convention against Torture) warranted the exclusion of all evidence obtained by means of a violation of the absolute prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment. Contrary to the view taken by the domestic courts and by the Chamber, protection of the absolute right under Article 3 could not and should not be weighed against other interests, such as the satisfaction of securing a conviction. As a matter of principle, the exclusion of the evidence in question was essential for removing all incentives for engaging in torture or ill-treatment and thus for preventing such conduct in practice.


34.  The applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention at the Armavir Temporary Detention Facility amounted to  <mask> within the meaning of Article 3. The Government's account of the conditions of his detention lacked detail and contained only general assertions. As to the alleged improvements introduced in the penitentiary system, it was not clear whether these had taken place before or after the applicant's detention.


38.  The applicant complained that the refusal to grant him drug substitution therapy in prison, which had made him suffer considerable pain and had caused damage to his health, and the refusal to have the necessity of drug substitution therapy examined by an external medical expert amounted to  <mask>. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


49.  The applicant maintained that her initial detention in a cell with adult inmates for about two months constituted  <mask>. She further complained of the material conditions of detention in her cell in the juvenile female offenders’ section, including the lack of personal space, prison overcrowding, the absence of daily walks, a malfunctioning water tap causing humidity, and poor ventilation. The applicant maintained that her detention in the section for juvenile female offenders, in the absence of a separate detention facility for juvenile female offenders, constituted inhuman treatment.


113.  The applicants rather claim that the refusal by the authorities to allow them access to an experimental product which, according to them, was potentially life‑saving, amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment for which the State was responsible, as it thereby failed to protect them from the suffering resulting from the final stages of their illness. However, as in Pretty (cited above, § 54), the Court considers that this claim puts an extended construction on the concept of inhuman or degrading treatment that it cannot accept. It cannot be said that by refusing the applicants access to a product – even if potentially life‑saving – whose safety and efficacy are still in doubt, the authorities directly added to the applicants’ physical suffering. It is true that the refusals, inasmuch as they prevented the applicants from resorting to a product which they believed might improve their chances of healing and survival, caused them mental suffering, especially in view of the fact that the product appears to be available on an exceptional basis in other countries. However, the Court does not consider that the authorities’ refusal reached a sufficient level of severity to be characterised as  <mask> (see, mutatis mutandis, A, B and C v. Ireland, cited above, §§ 163‑64). It notes in this connection that Article 3 does not place an obligation on the Contracting States to alleviate the disparities between the levels of health care available in various countries (see, mutatis mutandis, N. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 44). Lastly, the Court does not consider that the refusals can be regarded as humiliating or debasing the applicants.


154.  The applicant further submitted that the force used by the escorts had in any event been excessive. Firstly, the defendants had been handcuffed in twos, their hands fastened behind their backs. They did not therefore present any danger for the escorts, who had been armed with rubber truncheons and who had moreover outnumbered the defendants (eight escorts to five defendants). Secondly, force had been used against the applicant despite the fact that he was seriously ill. The escorts had administered numerous and random blows to the applicant, who had shown no resistance, those blows provoking an epileptic fit and causing a head injury. Accordingly, the applicant maintained that he had been subjected to  <mask> contrary to Article 3.


114.  The applicant referred to Article 3 of the Convention, claiming that her son had been beaten when being apprehended and that she had serious grounds to believe that he had been subjected to torture and  <mask> in detention. She further complained that no effective investigation had been conducted into the matter. Under this heading the applicant also submitted that she had suffered severe mental distress and anguish in connection with her son’s disappearance and on account of the State’s failure to conduct a thorough investigation into the matter. The respective Article reads as follows:


57.  The applicant, first, complained under Article 3 of the Convention that she had been subjected to torture and  <mask> during her detention. In this respect the applicant stated, particularly, that she had been threatened with death, kept standing for long periods of time and blindfolded. She further claimed that the area of the cell in which she had been detained was six square metres, that there was no ventilation and that the lights were on twenty-four hours a day. Secondly, the applicant claimed that the circumstances in which she had been subjected to a gynaecological examination on 24 October 1997 constituted a breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In this connection the applicant claimed that the examination had been performed by a male doctor during which the gendarmes took her clothes off, made her lie down and touched every part of her body and that she had not consented to it.


61.  The applicant further argued that neither the Interior Ministry which had issued the exclusion order nor the domestic courts which had carried out the judicial review thereof had assessed the risks of being subjected to the death penalty and receiving  <mask> which his forcible return to China would entail. He disputed the Government’s assertion that the exclusion order would not entail automatic deportation to China. He pointed out that the exclusion order mentioned explicitly that if he did not leave Russia before the stated deadline he would be deported. Indeed, the Entry and Exit Procedures Act provided for an automatic deportation of any foreign national who failed to leave Russia as required (see paragraph 49 above). Given that his passport had been seized by the authorities and he did not have any other identity documents, he could not leave Russia for another country. The only option open to him was therefore forcible removal to China by the Russian authorities.


20.  The applicant complains that the searches of her house on 10 April 2001 and 30 May 2002 and the related incidents, in particular that involving the spray-inhaler, amounted to  <mask> in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and/or an infringement of her right to respect for her private life, in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.


29.  The applicant submitted that the interference with his right to peaceful assembly had been unjustified. He noted that the police had unlawfully prevented the reading out of the press release prepared by the Human Rights Association and had used disproportionate force to arrest him and a fellow demonstrator. In this connection, the applicant maintained that he had been beaten by the police because he had taken part in a demonstration and had intervened when a fellow demonstrator was being arrested. He further claimed that, despite a cursory examination, the medical report still noted his head injury, which demonstrated in itself that he had been subjected to torture and  <mask>.


88.  The applicants complained that Isa Zaurbekov had been subjected to torture and  <mask> while being apprehended. The applicants further claimed that they had serious grounds to believe that he had also been ill-treated in custody. They also complained that they had suffered severe mental distress and anguish in connection with their relative’s disappearance. The applicants referred to Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


98.  The applicant, referring to the chronology of the attacks against pro‑Kurdish politicians submitted by him (see paragraph 93 above), further argued that there was overwhelming and compelling evidence that in the mid-1990s acts of torture and  <mask>, disappearances and extra‑judicial killings were widespread and systematic. His brother, who had been an active local politician, had also been subjected to ill-treatment during his detention and had been the victim of continuous harassment and intimidation by State officials, in particular by the Governor and the Mayor of Elbistan. He had constantly been followed by plain-clothes police officers.


116.  The applicant complained that the investigation had not been initiated on the authorities’ own motion. He had complained to the hospital authorities but they had not forwarded his complaint to the prosecuting authorities. Furthermore, it had not been effective either in law or in practice as the prosecuting authorities had not made a serious attempt to find out what happened and base their decision on established facts. The investigation had concerned only the crime of causing bodily harm and not  <mask>, and the investigating authorities had failed to establish the person responsible for his injuries even though the police had found out that the restraints had been used unlawfully. He had been unable to be present when the witnesses had been questioned or to suggest gathering additional evidence. The investigation had not been independent or speedy, as the investigating authorities had heavily relied on the explanations of the hospital staff, the police had taken twenty-two days to question the applicant and it had commissioned a forensic report only three months and nineteen days after the receipt of the criminal complaint.


56.  The Government argued that it had not been demonstrated that the applicant was known to the Sri Lankan authorities as an opponent of the regime or that he was regarded with suspicion by those authorities. The killing of his father by the Sri Lankan army in 1991 because he was suspected of assisting the LTTE, did not adequately justify the applicant's fear of  <mask>. The Government also considered it improbable that, because of his brother's membership of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan authorities were likely to assume that the applicant himself had links with that organisation and would therefore detain him for longer than 48 to 72 hours. The fact that, after his alleged arrest in January 1991, the applicant had been released after only two weeks – albeit with an obligation to report to the authorities regularly – strongly suggested that he was not regarded as being involved in the LTTE. In addition, the applicant had not decided to leave his country of origin as a direct result of the killing of his father in 1990 or of his arrest in 1991. Instead, he had left Sri Lanka in 1994.


28.  The applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention in both prison no. 3 and no. 15 had amounted to  <mask>. In particular, the food served had been inedible and he had been denied his normal quota of fish, meat and dairy products. He had been held in poor sanitary conditions, the cell having been infested with vermin. Furthermore, the toilet had been situated only 1.5 metres from the dining table and had given off a foul odour because there had been no products to clean it with.


177.  The applicant said that he had been “abducted” in Kenya by Turkish officials and that his abduction necessarily constituted a violation of his right to respect for his physical integrity. He added that the circumstances in which the arrest had been effected also amounted to degrading and  <mask>. In his submission, the fact that he had been abducted for political reasons was in itself capable of constituting a breach of Article 3.


34.  The Government argued that the applicant had had effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaint of ill-treatment under Article 3 of the Convention, as required by its Article 13, but he had not availed himself of those remedies. In particular, they contended that he could have challenged the decisions of 11 September 2003 and 1 March 2004 before a court, in accordance with Article 125 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, but he had never used that remedy. They also argued that the applicant would be able to receive compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in criminal or civil proceedings if the guilt of those responsible for  <mask> in his respect was established by a final and binding court decision.


38.  The Government argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 3 because the decisions of the domestic courts had acknowledged a violation of his personal rights and awarded him appropriate compensation. In particular, in its judgment of 14 December 2010 (upheld on 5 April 2011 by the Koszalin Regional Court) the Koszalin District Court had expressly held that the applicant’s placement in overcrowded cells for a period of 309 days of his detention had constituted degrading and  <mask> within the meaning of domestic law and the Convention and had awarded the applicant PLN 5,000 in compensation.


74.  The applicant maintained that the response of the investigative authorities to the death of her son constituted degrading treatment on account of the one-sided and perfunctory nature of the investigations. In particular, the unwillingness of the authorities to start a criminal investigation had been groundless, as the courts’ and prosecutors’ decisions indicated. Furthermore, she was appalled by the unfounded conclusion that her son had committed suicide because of his family problems, which discredited the applicant and her family. Additionally, the prosecutors, depriving her of any possibility to defend her rights, had unlawfully made the materials of the inquiry confidential. Hence, the applicant despaired of ever finding the circumstances of her son’s death and suffered from  <mask> as an aggrieved party in the proceedings.


55.  The applicant submitted that the Russian authorities had failed to assess the risks of ill-treatment in the course of the extradition and refugee status proceedings. He further claimed that the general human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan had not improved since the examination of the Makhmudzhan Ergashev case (cited above). In the domestic proceedings he had relied on reports by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and respected international NGOs which had demonstrated that, in Kyrgyzstan, ethnic Uzbeks who, like him, were suspected of involvement in the violence of June 2010 in the Jalal-Abad area, were at an increased risk of ill-treatment while detained and that it was a common practice not to investigate instances of torture or  <mask> in the requesting country.


83.  The applicants disputed the Government’s initial allegation that they had not had any health problems until 15 September 2003. The applicants contended that on 15 September 2003 the second applicant had received insufficient medical assistance, whereas on 17 September 2003 she had not received any medical assistance. Finally, their representative emphasised that given the second applicant’s health complaints, transporting her to the border in an old minivan should be held to amount to  <mask>.


124.  The Government contested the first applicant’s arguments. They noted that, in the first place, the extradition request of 29 December 2010 had contained assurances that in Tajikistan the first applicant would not be subjected to  <mask> or punishment or persecuted on political or religious grounds and that he would only be prosecuted for the offences in respect of which the extradition request was granted. The Russian courts had examined the first applicant at the hearing and had studied the relevant materials; the first applicant’s lawyer had also been given an opportunity to present his position in the case. Furthermore, the first applicant had been living in Russia illegally for a long period of time. He had never applied for either a resident permit or a work permit, had not been in gainful employment, had not registered as a taxpayer and had only applied for temporary asylum on 15 December 2011. According to the Government, when deciding on the applicant’s extradition to Tajikistan all his arguments concerning the risk of ill-treatment had been duly examined by the Russian authorities and courts and found to be unsubstantiated. Therefore, his extradition would not be in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.


101.  The Government drew attention to the minimum threshold bringing Article 3 of the Convention into play, which in their view had not been reached, and to the limited extent of the State’s positive obligations under that Article. They pointed out that there had been no intention to deny the applicants access to safe medicinal products. The experimental product that they wished to use had not been authorised in any country, and had not undergone clinical trials. Its safety and efficacy had not been established. Not being given the opportunity to use it could not therefore be regarded as  <mask>. On the contrary, its use, which would have amounted to a medical experiment, might have resulted in a breach of Article 3.


37.  The Government submitted that the applicant had received the special treatment his health and his violent and antisocial personality warranted. He had been admitted to the RPU and to a psychiatric hospital as often and for as long as the medical corps deemed necessary. On seven occasions he had been admitted to the Edouard Toulouse Hospital Centre in Marseilles. And when in prison he had been admitted on numerous occasions to the RPUs of the various prisons he was in, as well as to a secure interregional hospital unit. The Government disputed the idea that alternating periods in the various psychiatric and prison establishments might be considered as  <mask>. On the contrary, it was proof of how seriously the doctors took the applicant's mental condition. The Government added that on a somatic level the applicant had been given the necessary medical treatment: consultation with a lung specialist and an ophthalmologist in 2007, dental extractions and consultation with a dermatologist in June 2008. Together these elements showed, in the Government's submission, that the medical treatment the applicant had received was in keeping with the European Prison Rules (paragraphs 43.1, 43.3 and 46.1).


132.  The applicant submitted that the failure to provide him with adequate medical care, such as proper examination and treatment of his diseases, concealment of his true state of health, as well as his arbitrary discharge from the hospital and forced attendance at the court hearings despite his poor state of health, all proved that there had been a breach of the Government’s positive obligation to prevent prisoners’ suffering which exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention. The failure of the Government to provide him with adequate medical care proved that he had received  <mask> and the intention of the Government was to create feelings of despair and inferiority in him and to humiliate and belittle him, as well as to prove his vulnerability. Such treatment of the applicant is in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.


139.  The applicant complained that on 23 October and 7 November 2001 and 21 January 2002 he had been subjected to treatment incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention and that the authorities had not carried out an effective investigation of those events, amounting to a breach of Article 13. The Court will examine this complaint from the standpoint of the State's negative and  <mask> flowing from Article 3.


58.  The applicant argued that in view of the severity of the attack against him and the injuries he had sustained, Article 3 was applicable to the present case. As to the compliance of the State with its  <mask> under Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant argued that real and effective protection from the act of ill-treatment required effective investigation and prosecution. In this connection he stressed that the State’s positive obligation could not be limited to merely conducting an investigation. An investigation did not serve any purpose on its own, nor, alone, did it provide any protection against and redress for ill-treatment where it was not accompanied by effective follow-up. He maintained that the State authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into his case and that they had also failed to apply the relevant criminal-law mechanisms in an adequate manner. The investigating authorities had failed to act effectively and numerous mistakes and delays had occurred, causing the prosecution to become time-barred. In the applicant’s view, the time-barring itself amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. Although the assailants had admitted in their interviews with the police that they had hit the applicant, the State Attorney’s Office had brought a criminal prosecution against only one of them, B.B.


62.  The Government submitted that the respondent State had fully complied with its  <mask> under Article 3 of the Convention, as the relevant authorities had not spared any effort to provide the applicant with due care in prison. In support, they stated that the applicant had been provided with comprehensive in-patient medical treatment in the prison hospital, which included various relevant medical tests, repeated consultations with medical specialists, the necessary medication and so on, on three occasions, between 8 July and 4 November 2006, 11 August and 18 August 2007 and 29 January and 3 April 2008 (see paragraphs 14-16, 18-21, 25-26 and 28-31 above). As regards the periods the applicant spent, between those dates, in Rustavi prison, the Government, relying on excerpts from his medical file, submitted that he continued to receive the prescribed medication on an out-patient basis, under the supervision of a doctor, a general practitioner, attached to that prison. The Government also emphasised that the applicant was continuing to be treated in the prison hospital since his fourth admission there on 30 October 2008 and to date. They further underlined that all the necessary medication and other types of medical treatment were being provided to the applicant exclusively at the expense of the prison authority; the State duly ensured that the necessary drugs were always in sufficient quantity in its pharmaceutical stock.


166.  The Government further submitted that they strongly disagreed with the reasoning adopted by the Court in its judgment in the case of Tysiąc v. Poland, concerning the potential threat to the pregnant woman’s health caused by pregnancy and by the refusal of termination. However, even if the present case were to be assessed from the point of view of the principles developed in that judgment, no support could be found therein for the applicant’s position. The question of voluntary termination of pregnancy for eugenic reasons, concerned in the present case, could not be derived from the State’s  <mask> to provide adequate medical care.


31.  The Government firstly submitted that the  <mask> under Article 3 of the Convention did not encompass an obligation on States to conduct compulsory screening for the presence of tuberculosis. They claimed in this connection that the first time the applicant had voiced his grievances concerning possible infection with TB was in January 2010, and by February 2010 he had been provided with all the required medical examinations and treatment. Hence, the examination for TB was not belated.


63.  The Government argued that in a situation such as the present one, where the applicant claimed, on the basis of the same circumstances, a violation of her right to trial within a reasonable time before the domestic authorities and a violation of the State’s  <mask> under Article 3 of the Convention, it was necessary to examine whether the complaint had already been appropriately addressed by the competent domestic authorities and whether the applicant had already been granted just satisfaction. Recalling that the applicant had been awarded and paid compensation for non-pecuniary damage before the domestic courts, the Government emphasised that in deciding the applicant’s claim, the domestic courts had taken account of the particular circumstances of the criminal proceedings, emphasising that the applicant, then a minor, had been a victim of a series of offences over a long period of time, and that during the criminal proceedings she had been required to repeatedly testify and relive the abuse she had suffered. In its judgment, the competent local court had considered the whole duration of the proceedings and the way in which their particular circumstances had affected the applicant. The court had evaluated all these circumstances in relation to the activity expected of the competent authorities.