24.  The applicant noted that there was no dispute over whether there had been an interference with her right to freedom of expression. She agreed that the interference had been prescribed by law, even if she contended that Chapter 24, section 8, of the Penal Code failed to meet the standards of the Court’s case-law. The applicant also claimed that the interference had not been  <mask>. There had to be a pressing social need for the interference.


33.  The applicants complained that their right to freedom of expression had been violated in that the courts had allowed G. T.’s claim concerning content published in Pravoye Delo on 19 September 2003. They stated that the interference had neither been in accordance with the law nor  <mask>. The applicants relied on Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


16.  The applicant newspaper agreed that the interference was prescribed by law and had pursued a legitimate aim. However, it was not  <mask> because the impugned article had merely disseminated statements made by a third party and had been part of a debate on an issue of public interest. The impugned statement was a quote from an open letter sent to the President of the country, the Prime Minister, the Council of Europe, the OSCE Mission in Moldova, the Moldovan Centre for Human Rights and the United States Embassy in Chişinău. Beside Mr V.S., the letter referred to at least five other judges and prosecutors involved in the criminal case. Mr V.S. had never asked the newspaper for a retraction of the statement or for a right to retort. The article had been written on the basis of detailed research. The journalist had contacted the author of the open letter and interviewed her. The journalist had also obtained a legal opinion from a lawyer and studied the verbatim record of a debate in Parliament on the criminal proceedings against Ms Duca. Mr V.S. had indeed been dismissed from his position in June 2002 and appointed as a simple prosecutor. The reasons for the demotion had never been made public; however, the investigation conducted by the journalist and the fact of the demotion of Mr V.S. could have reasonably made the journalist believe that the information in the open letter was reliable.


77.  The applicant also complained that the interference with his right to freedom of expression had not pursued any legitimate aim and had not been  <mask>. He argued that it was important for the public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards unlawful peaceful gatherings (he referred to Nurettin Aldemir and Others v. Turkey, nos. 32124/02 and 6 others, 18 December 2007). Consequently, it was also important to show the same degree of tolerance towards articles published on the Internet about preparations for such peaceful gatherings. The Russian authorities had shown zero tolerance in his own case, however. Furthermore, by blocking access to his VKontakte account, they had blocked access to other material published thereon which had not been found to be illegal. The judicial review of the blocking decision had been superficial: the domestic courts had not applied the “proportionality” or the “necessity in a democratic society” tests.


50.  The applicant disagrees with the Government’s arguments. He submits that his conviction amounted to an interference with his right to be free to exercise his religion together with all those who turned to him for spiritual guidance. He further considers that his conviction was not prescribed by law. In this respect he affirms that the Treaty of Peace of Athens remains in force. The Greek Prime-Minister accepted that at the Diplomatic Conference leading to the 1923 Treaty of Peace of Lausanne. Moreover, the Court of Cassation has recently confirmed the continued validity of the Treaty of peace of Athens and legal scholars hold the same view. The Muslims had never accepted the abrogation of Law no. 2345/1920. The applicant lastly contends that his conviction was not  <mask>. He points out that the Christians and Jews in Greece have the right to elect their religious leaders. Depriving the Muslims of this possibility amounts to discriminatory treatment.


47.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression had been prescribed by law. They referred to the Advocacy Act and the Advocate's Code of Professional Conduct. It had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of the judiciary and had been  <mask>. The penalty imposed on the applicant had not been severe. It had been proportionate to the disciplinary offence committed by the applicant.


29.  The applicant submitted that the injunction issued by the Austrian courts was not  <mask>. In particular, the Austrian courts wrongly qualified the impugned statement as a statement of fact, when it was a political value judgment criticising the plaintiff in the injunction proceedings and contributing to a political debate on a question of general importance. It was in the public interest to point out the dangerousness of a politician like Mr Haider who had proposed contemptible measures in an opinion poll against immigration (“Österreich zuerst” – “Austria first”). As a value judgment and not a statement of fact, its truth did not require proof. To require proof of a value judgment would itself be a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.


27.  The Government submitted that the interference had been in accordance with the law, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been  <mask>. The judgments of the Austrian Courts had likewise pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the rights and reputation of others. Moreover, the interference had been proportionate to its aim and the reasons adduced had been relevant and sufficient. The conviction had been based on Article 111 taken in conjunction with Article 117 (5) of the Criminal Code.


34.  The applicants submit that the injunction was not  <mask>. The impugned article was not intended to inform the public in detail of the specific offices held by Mr Graff, but to explain that, in the author’s view, certain political functions were incompatible with professional activities outside politics. Although Mr Graff as chairman of Parliament’s Legislative Committee did not de jure exercise any public powers, he had a decisive political influence on the making of laws. Since the party of which Mr Graff was a member was represented in the Government, his position was comparable to that of the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs. The criticism of Mr Graff’s attitude, although harsh and polemical, did not constitute a gratuitous personal attack. Rather it constituted an objectively understandable evaluation of Mr Graff’s attitude and the use of expressions like “immoral” or “disreputable” in that context were therefore appropriate.


25.  The Government conceded that the contested decisions constituted an interference with the applicant company's right to impart information under Article 10 § 1 of the Convention. It was, however, justified under Article 10 § 2. The order was prescribed by law, namely by the relevant provisions of the Media Act and Sections 111 §§ 1 and 2 of the Penal Code, it pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of others, and was  <mask> for the following reasons.


44.  The Government considered the reasons given, particularly by the District Court, to be relevant and sufficient. As to the sanction imposed, it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. They concluded that the interference had been  <mask> in that it had complied with a pressing social need and had been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.


49.  The applicants complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the restrictions on their right to freedom of expression had not been prescribed by law and had not been  <mask> for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.’s name had not fallen within the protection of private life as the national courts had not declared any parts of her criminal case file secret. She had been an active participant in the incident of 4 December 1996 and had subsequently been sentenced to a fine. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest, especially in this type of case where the person concerned had been a defendant in a high-profile criminal case. Moreover, the information in the articles had been correct in every respect. The Appeal Court had not even tried to indicate on what grounds freedom of expression could have been restricted in this case. In any event, the restrictions imposed on the applicants had been grossly disproportionate, especially in view of their obligation to pay very substantial damages in the case.


40.  The applicant complained that she had been compelled to disclose information that had enabled a journalistic source to be identified, in violation of her right to receive and impart information as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. In her submission, the interference with her freedom of expression was not prescribed by law, did not pursue a legitimate aim and was not  <mask>. The applicant further asked the Court to clarify the duties of the State under this provision in these circumstances. Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows:


23.  The applicant argued in essence that his statements were value judgments, not susceptible to proof, with sufficient factual basis. They were made in the press, in the course of a public debate on an issue of significant public interest, which had not been properly discussed before. In his view, freedom of debate on issues of significant public interest – as with political debate – was at the very core of the concept of a democratic society. The plaintiff was actively involved in a debate of public concern with strong political implications and he had laid himself open to scrutiny when entering that arena. In recent years, right-wing extremism had become stronger in Hungary, free debate over such questions had gained crucial importance, and in such discussions, strong criticism and harsher language should be accepted. In sum, it could not be argued that the measure was  <mask>; all the more so, since – although only civil-law sanctions had been ordered – the obligation to arrange for a public rectification was a disproportionately severe sanction for him, as his credibility as a historian was at stake.


32.  The Government submitted that Article 8 was not applicable in the present case as that provision did not guarantee a right to retain employment or to choose a profession. They further stated that, in any event, the application of the Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of protecting national security and was  <mask>. According to the Government, the Act constituted no more than a justified security screening measure intended to prevent former employees of a foreign secret service from working not only in State institutions but also in other spheres of activity which were important to the State's national security. The Act itself did not impose collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. It provided for individualised restrictions on employment prospects by way of the adoption of “the list” of positions in the former KGB which warranted application of the restrictions under Article 2 of the Act. The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in Article 3 of the Act showed that there existed a well-founded suspicion that the applicants lacked loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Given that not all former employees of the KGB were affected by the Act, Article 14 of the Convention was not therefore applicable. Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 8 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.


33.  The Government further argued that the measure complained of had been  <mask>. Invoking the margin of appreciation that the domestic courts are allowed to have in the assessment of disputes between private parties, the Government contended that the applicant’s defamatory statements had referred to the private life and private actions of R.M., and not to his actions as a politician. Furthermore, the veracity of the statements, which were quite serious, had never been proved, even though the courts had given the applicant the opportunity to do so.


18.  The Government accepted that the criminal conviction had interfered with the applicant’s freedom of expression. However, they submitted that this interference had had a legal basis in Article 185 of the Criminal Code, which had served to protect Prof. Dr B.’s personality rights and reputation and had been  <mask>. The domestic courts had, after analysing the text of the press release, reasonably interpreted the statements as an implication that the stem-cell research carried out by Prof.  Dr B. had been equivalent to the human experiments performed by scientists during Nazi times. After weighing up the interests of the applicant against the rights of Prof. Dr B, the courts had ultimately found that priority should be given to protecting the personality rights of Prof. Dr B. In the undertaken balancing exercise the courts had taken into account that the applicant’s press release had been protected by the right to freedom of expression, that he had had a right to express insulting criticism and that he had been contributing to a public debate. However, they had also considered the historical and social context of the comparison, the severity of the violation of Prof. Dr B.’s personality rights and the fact that the applicant could have made an equally important or noteworthy contribution to the debate without referring to the professor in question by name. The Government argued that the courts had therefore taken adequate account of the applicant’s right and that the decision had not fallen outside the margin of appreciation as granted by the Court to domestic authorities.


68.  The Government submitted that in democratic societies, in which several religions coexisted within one and the same population, it was necessary to place restrictions on the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs were respected. Rules in this sphere could vary from one country to another in accordance with national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order. Accordingly, the choice of the extent and form such regulations took had to be left up to a point to the State concerned, as it depended on the specific domestic context. They referred in this context to Leyla Şahin v. Turkey ([GC], no. 44774/98, §§ 106-09, ECHR 2005‑XI). The Government interpreted the cases of Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France ([GC], no. 27417/95, § 84, ECHR 2000‑VII) and Wingrove v. the United Kingdom (25 November 1996, § 58, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V) to mean that where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions were at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society might differ widely, the role of the national decision-making body had to be given special importance. Given that Said Nursi’s books incited religious discord and proclaimed religious superiority and could therefore provoke serious religious clashes with unpredictable negative consequences, the ban on their publication and dissemination had pursued the aims of protecting territorial integrity and public safety in Russia, public order and the rights of others. Moreover, it had been  <mask>, taking into account the tense ethnic situation in the country and the possible negative impact of those books on non-religious citizens.


35.  The applicant also complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the restrictions on his right to freedom of expression had not been  <mask> for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.'s pictures and the facts mentioned in the articles had not fallen within the protection of private life. She had not been an innocent bystander but had actively participated in the incident of 4 December 1996. A conviction was public information that could not fall within the scope of private life. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest. The applicant had only written the articles, and he had had no say in the manner in which they had been published. No intent had been shown. Moreover, the information in the articles had been in every respect correct. The courts had failed to strike a proper balance between the protection of private life and freedom of expression in the manner required by the Convention.


16.  The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. They submitted at the outset that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies, as he had failed to raise his Convention grievances before the domestic authorities. As regards the merits of the applicant’s complaint, the Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting national security, public safety and territorial integrity, as well preventing disorder and crime. The Government further submitted that the slogans chanted had incited violence and that the concert had turned into a meeting of a terrorist organisation. The Government also noted that the applicant had been on the concert’s organising committee, and not simply a member of the audience. According to the Government, the applicant had had a responsibility to prevent disorder and to protect public safety: a responsibility which he had failed to discharge, as he had manipulated the crowd by chanting slogans. Noting that the applicant’s conviction had been based on his participation in a propaganda event in favour of the DHKP/C ‑ a terrorist organisation that had committed heinous acts – and on his chanting slogans in favour of that organisation, the Government concluded by stating that the applicant’s conviction had responded to a pressing social need and had therefore been  <mask>.


28.  The applicant argued that the materials found in the party building did not contain any call for violence or any remarks inciting others to rebellion; thus, the penalty imposed did not pursue a legitimate aim and was not  <mask>. The applicant further maintained that, had the national courts intended to take proportionate measures, they could have imposed a judicial fine instead of imprisonment.


27.  The Government admitted that imposing a fine for contempt of court amounted to an interference with the applicant’s freedom of speech. However, they argued that the interference had been in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and had been  <mask>. The decision to fine the applicant had been based on section 110 of the Civil Procedure Act and sought to maintain the authority of the judiciary.


31.  The applicants maintained that there had been an interference with their right to freedom of expression. Even though the domestic law allowed such an interference, it had not been  <mask>. The applicants considered that it was not only the media’s right but also its duty towards citizens to disclose a problem of public interest such as the lack of cooperation between the police and the tax authorities in the present case. In the television programme two separate cases were discussed which had both attracted considerable publicity. It was unusual that in those cases the tax authorities had declined the police’s request to conduct a tax inspection, and this issue was revealed in the programme. It was undisputed that the information in the programme had been true and correct.


32.  The applicant company maintained that the interference with its right to impart information had not been  <mask>. The article in question had constituted a contribution to an ongoing public debate on an issue of public concern, namely the conditions in accommodation facilities for asylum seekers such as the Traiskirchen Reception Centre and the treatment of asylum seekers therein. The article had concentrated on one particular facet of this discussion, namely the treatment of asylum seekers before the courts. It submitted further that the impugned statements had been value judgments which, as such, were not susceptible to being proved true. Therefore, the Regional Court should not have asked the applicant company to prove the truth of the impugned statements. However, in any event, there had been a sufficient factual basis for the statements made in the article.


33.  The applicant further disputed the view that the impugned remark could be interpreted as insinuating that Mrs X was guilty of criminal conduct. In the applicant’s view, the Supreme Court judgment lacked reasoning on why the remark was considered defamatory and why the interference was considered  <mask>. It had not mentioned the kind of criminal conduct the said remark referred to. The applicant argued that the remark was merely a value judgment, reflecting Ms A’s opinion about the presence of Mrs X in a primary school.


34.  The Government agreed that the facts of the case disclosed an interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. This interference was nevertheless justified under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The applicant was ordered to pay non-pecuniary damages for defamation on the basis of Articles 7 and 7/1 of the Civil Code. The interference was thus “prescribed by law” and the law was accessible and foreseeable. It served the legitimate aim of protecting the dignity of a police officer and furthermore the measure was  <mask>.


38.  The applicant complained that her criminal conviction had not been  <mask> and had been disproportionate. There was no pressing social need justifying the restriction imposed on her right to freedom of expression. In this respect, the applicant emphasised that the declaration had been submitted within the framework of a political debate on issues of public interest. Furthermore, the boundaries of what was to be regarded as permissible criticism were wider with respect to Government activities as opposed to those of criticism directed against individual persons. Governmental actions and omissions had to be subject to an open public debate in a democratic society; this was particularly relevant for the applicant, who, as a non-national, was excluded from participating in the electoral process.


63.  The Government maintained that even supposing that the search amounted to an interference with the second applicant’s rights under Article 8, it had been justified under paragraph 2 of that provision. The interference was in accordance with the law and pursued a legitimate aim, namely the prevention and punishment of criminal offences. Lastly, it had been  <mask>. The search warrants had been drafted in narrow terms covering only the search for and seizure of a single document. The offences that had triggered the search were serious ones, as they called into question the very functioning of the State institutions, a factor that justified the investigating judge’s taking any measure which he considered would assist in establishing the truth.


84.  The Government argued that there had been no interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression under Article 10. They claimed in this connection that the petitions that had been the subject matter of the criminal proceedings in the instant case had been submitted as part of a collective action organised by the PKK, a terrorist organisation, as could be seen from their virtually identical wording and the timing of their submission. In these circumstances, the criminal investigation initiated in relation to those petitions had been prescribed by law and  <mask> in the interests of the prevention of disorder. They also argued that even if an interference were to be found on the facts, the applicants had been acquitted at the end of the criminal proceedings and there had therefore been no violation of their right to freedom of expression.


67.  The applicant stated that by denying him access to the TEC’s premises, and by refusing to provide him in good time with information about the progress of the electoral process, the authorities had interfered with his right to collect such information. He further submitted that this interference had not been lawful, had not pursued a legitimate aim and had not been  <mask>.


40.  The applicants maintained that the interference constituted by section 36 of the Act of 29 July 1881 could not be regarded as  <mask> or, consequently, to have a legitimate objective, as its sole purpose was to prohibit any criticism of a head of State, even if it related only to his policies and whether or not it was founded. To accept the Government’s arguments that the aim pursued was legitimate would be tantamount to recognising that heads of foreign governments were entitled to a veritable privilege affording them immunity from any criticism of their conduct and actions in office, however blameworthy they might be, since such criticism was insulting by definition, as it attacked their character and reputation. The offence was made out even if the remarks proved accurate, since the relevant case-law precluded evidence of the truth of the allegations as a defence to a charge under section 36, in order to avoid embroiling the head of State in a debate that would undermine the respect due to his or her office. Under section 36 freedom of communication on matters of general interest was counterbalanced by the prestige of office and title, with the latter taking precedence.


65.  The Government submitted that Article 10 was not applicable in the present case. In any event they stated that the application of the KGB Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of the protection of national security and was  <mask> in view of the applicants’ lack of loyalty to the State. The applicants had not been punished for their views, be they views which they hold at present or views that they might have held in the past. The KGB Act had not imposed a collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in section 3 of the KGB Act showed that there had been a well-founded suspicion that the applicants had been lacking in loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Accordingly, there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.


35.  The applicants' conviction was not  <mask>. There was no German law which prohibited linking criticism to a particular person. This case had to be seen against the background of the broad social debate on the laws ruling abortions, which must not be compromised one-sidedly by the Government for the purpose of preserving other concepts and notions. The Government could not rely on the Court's decision on the second applicant's previous complaint (compare Annen v. Germany (dec.), no. 2373/07 and 2396/07, 30 March 2010), as the instant case concerned criminal convictions which weighed more heavily than the convictions to desist which formed the subject matter of the aforementioned proceedings.


30.  The Government, while acknowledging the essential role played by the press as a “public watchdog”, referred to the Court’s case-law that when assessing whether and to what extent any interference was  <mask>, the national authorities enjoyed a certain margin of appreciation. The national courts had applied standards that were in accordance with the principles enshrined in Article 10 and they had based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the facts. In contrast with the article examined by the Court in Standard Verlags GmbH (cited above), the material at issue could not be qualified as a contribution to a current debate of public interest. It had essentially confined itself to describing the bank’s speculative losses and to related suspicions of criminal acts. The theme of the intertwining of politics and the speculative losses had only been discussed as a side issue. Even if it had been in the public interest to be informed about the events connected to the speculative losses, that had not justified disclosing the claimant’s name. Moreover, the claimant had to be protected against a “trial by the media” as the report had been published at a very early stage in the criminal proceedings, namely only five days after the information gathered by the Financial Market Authority had arrived at the public prosecutor’s office, which had been around six weeks prior to the institution of judicial investigation proceedings. The sanction imposed on the applicant company, compensation of EUR 3,000, was extremely moderate, taking into account the legal upper limit of EUR 20,000 and the magazine’s high circulation.


24.  The applicant submitted that his conviction pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 had been in breach of Article 10 because his speech had not contained any elements of incitement to violence. He contended that his prosecution and conviction on account of the use of the expressions “the leader of the Kurdish people” and “guerrilla” had not been  <mask>. The applicant argued that the national courts had failed to review the context of his speech as a whole. He noted that he had made the speech as a politician and it had concerned demands for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue and about Abdullah Öcalan’s prison conditions. As regards the slogans chanted during his speech, the applicant noted that they had demonstrated the importance of Abdullah Öcalan to the crowd and that they had not constituted an offence. In that regard, the applicant referred to the Court’s judgment in Bahçeci and Turan v. Turkey (no. 33340/03, 16 June 2009). Lastly, the applicant submitted that his sentence had not been proportionate as he had been sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment and had also been prevented from taking part in political life as a result of that sentence.


42.  The Government submitted that the applicants had made discriminatory speeches based on religious beliefs, encouraged violence, and had provoked hostility and hatred among different segments of Turkish society. Furthermore, certain segments of Turkish society were invited to make an armed rebellion. In the Government’s opinion, the interference in the present case was  <mask> and the sentences were proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.


15.  The applicant complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings brought against him under section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713, and his subsequent conviction, had constituted a violation of his right to freedom of expression. Referring in particular to the Court’s judgments in Savgın v. Turkey (no. 13304/03, 2 February 2010) and Gül and Others v. Turkey (no. 4870/02, 8 June 2010), the applicant claimed that his conviction had not been  <mask>.


38.  The applicant company contested the submission that the Court of Appeal’s judgment had been  <mask>. It contended that the impugned statements constituted value judgments which had a factual basis. The comment concerning the “citizens’ web” was a clear expression of an opinion. The comment concerning the refusal to pay the fee of one of the auditors out of vengeance was also a value judgment based on the fact that the auditor had not been paid. With regard to the articles about the use of public funds by Mr Bruck, the applicant company argued that the public had a right to receive this important information. In conclusion, the applicant company’s convictions were disproportionate and not necessary in a democratic society.


29.  The applicant company submits that the injunction was not  <mask>. The public has an interest in being informed about politicians and their conduct and, in particular, about politicians like Mr Posch who was not just a local politician of limited importance but a member of the Austrian Parliament, as well as a member of the European Parliament. The report did not concern issues relating to that politician’s private sphere but a matter which was directly connected to his public functions, as the article criticised the fact that he received at the same time salaries from different functions and sources. Informing the public of such issues is an essential task of the media and, in this context, a politician should accept that his picture be published.


22.  The Government submitted that, pursuant to Article 152 of the Civil Code, it was incumbent on the applicant to show that the information had been true, and he had failed to satisfy the burden of proof. They conceded that there had been an interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression and that the article had concerned the governor's relations with the press, a subject which could be considered a matter for political debate. However, they maintained that the contested statement had referred to Mr Shamanov's personality rather than to his political activities and that the applicant could have couched his criticism in different terms without resorting to the defamatory assertion that Mr Shamanov had “no shame and no scruples”. The Government considered that the interference had been justified and  <mask> for the protection of the reputation and rights of others.


22.  The Government argued that the interference was justified under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. It was prescribed by law, namely by Section 6 of the Media Act and Section 111 of the Criminal Code. It pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the reputation or rights of others, protecting in particular Mr Paarhammer’s reputation and the rights of the Salzburg Roman Catholic population against attacks on their religious beliefs and institutions. It was also  <mask> for the following reasons: Eight years after the election of the Salzburg archbishop there was no strong public interest in receiving the information at issue. The Government, referring to the case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria (judgment of 26 April 1995, Series A no. 313), argued that the margin of appreciation accorded to Contracting States was a wide one and that church-related matters were not part of a general political debate. The domestic courts had correctly found that the applicant company had not submitted facts proving the truth of the allegations at issue. It had failed to comply with the ethics of journalism, had not acted in good faith as it had not verified the origin of that document, nor had it given the person concerned an opportunity to comment. In balancing the conflicting interests, namely the applicant company’s interest in the publication of the statements in question and that of the general public in receiving this information, on the one hand, and Mr Paarhammer’s interest and that of the Catholic population in protecting the reputation of a dignitary of the Church, on the other, the Austrian courts had given priority to the interests of the latter. Since the applicant company was ordered to pay a moderate amount of approximately EUR 2,180, the interference was not disproportionate either.


27.  The Government submitted that the measures were  <mask> and the Austrian courts gave sufficient and convincing reasons for their judgments. In particular they found that the impugned statements constituted untrue statements of fact, namely the reproach against the judge that he had failed to take into account fundamental procedural guarantees and that he had violated the principles of impartiality and an adversarial hearing. The allegations were not admissible value judgments either as they lacked a sufficient factual basis. In particular, it did not emanate from the article at issue that the judge had conducted the proceedings in an objective manner, relying on the existing facts, and that only one passage of the reasoning was intended to be criticised. Moreover, the details of the impugned judgment and the circumstances underlying the previous criminal proceedings were certainly not known to the general public to an extent required for such serious accusations against a judge, including an attack on the reputation of the judiciary. When balancing the parties' interests, namely the applicants' interest in disseminating information and ideas on matters of public interest on the one hand, and the interest of the judge concerned in protecting his reputation and the standing of the judiciary in general on the other, the courts found in favour of the latter interests. Furthermore, in the light of the case as a whole and the economic situation of the applicants, the sanctions imposed were also proportionate.


28.  The applicant company complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the restrictions on its right to freedom of expression in its case had not been prescribed by law as the Penal Code provision applied had not defined adequately the scope of private life. Nor had the restrictions been  <mask> for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. B. had not been an innocent bystander but had participated actively in the incident of 4 December 1996. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest, especially since the case had been very newsworthy. Moreover, the information in the articles had in every respect been correct.


62.  The applicants furthermore maintained that physical force had been used against them by police, and that that force had not been  <mask> and had in any event been disproportionate to whatever legitimate aim the Government had claimed to be pursuing. While reiterating the Court’s reasoning in the case of Bukta and Others v. Hungary (no. 25691/04, § 37, ECHR 2007‑III), they submitted that the public authorities should have shown a certain degree of tolerance towards their peaceful gatherings at the University. Lastly, in their view, the imposition of administrative fines had only served to punish them for their having exercised their rights under Article 10 and Article 11 of the Convention and had been intended to have a “chilling effect” upon anyone who might have been willing to protest against the Government’s reforms in the educational sphere.


28.  The applicant submitted that the interference with his right to freedom of expression was not  <mask> as it was not justified by a pressing social need. He emphasised that the present case should be interpreted with particular regard to the fact that the applicant was punished for assisting in the dissemination of statements made by another person in an interview. He relied on the Jersild v. Denmark judgment (23 September 1994, Series A no. 298) and submitted that the Government had not pointed to any “particularly strong reasons” which could justify punishing the publisher.


32.  The Government conceded that the liability to pay damages and the conviction, although the sentence had been waived, amounted to an interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression. It had a basis in section 10(1) of the then Constitution Act, Chapter 27, Articles 1 and 2, of the Penal Code and Chapter 5, section 6, of the Tort Liability Act. Their interpretation in the present case had in no way been arbitrary. The interference aimed to protect the rights of the boy's father. Taking into account the margin of appreciation left to the Contracting States, the national authorities were, in the circumstances of the case, entitled to interfere with the exercise of the applicant's right to freedom of expression (compare Tammer v. Estonia, no. 41205/98, § 69, ECHR 2001‑I), and this interference was  <mask>. The impugned measures, the waived sentence and the modest non-pecuniary damages and costs were “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” and the reasons adduced by the courts to justify them were “relevant and sufficient” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2.


41.  The Government maintained that there had been no interference with the exercise of the applicants’ right to freedom of expression. They submitted, however, that even if the Court were to consider that there had been such interference, it had been in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 10. In that connection the Government submitted that the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression had been based on sections 58 and 151 of Law no. 298 and that it had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public order. As to whether the interference in question had been  <mask>, the Government, quoting various passages from the Court’s case-law on Article 10, submitted that the domestic courts had examined the cases carefully and that their findings had been relevant and sufficient. It considered that the domestic courts’ decisions in the instant cases fell within the State’s margin of appreciation.


20.  The Government argued that the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression had been in accordance with the law, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been  <mask>. The applicants’ convictions had been based on Article 215 of the Criminal Code and had been justified by the need to protect national security, public safety and to prevent disorder and crime. The Government further considered that the interference had been proportionate to its aims, as the applicants had received minor fines and the second applicant’s sentence had subsequently been suspended for five years.


40.  The Government argued that the exercise of the right of freedom of expression demanded from the user some duties and responsibilities, which could be subject to restrictions and penalties as were prescribed by law and  <mask> in the interests of – with respect to the present case – public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others or for maintaining the authority of the judiciary. The statements made by the applicant were broadly reported by the mass media to whom he gave a press conference.


23.  The applicants also considered that the plaintiff company had not incurred any material damage, and even if the good name of the company had suffered it had been more as a consequence of the ill-considered advertising campaign than their publication. The applicants concluded that the reasons adduced by the domestic authorities had not been relevant or sufficient to show that the resulting judicial decision had been  <mask>. The domestic courts had failed to achieve a balance between the two interests at stake – that of the freedom of the press and protection of the reputation of the company.


51.  The applicant was of the view that this requirement could not possibly be seen as being  <mask>. It gave too much leeway to the interviewed persons, allowing them to distort and change what they had actually said in interviews. Disclosing information to the press and giving interviews was a special form of public activity, particularly in the case of persons holding public office. The mere requirement to obtain the interviewee’s authorisation threatened the essence of an interview as one of the fundamental tools of journalism. It was difficult to imagine an interview in any form other than the questions asked and the answers given. The public could legitimately be interested not only in the mere content of the interviews, but also in the personal style of public figures as reflected in the way they spoke.


27.  The applicant submitted that his trial, which had lasted for more than seven years and which had resulted in his being convicted under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, had amounted to an interference with his right guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention. He also claimed that the interference in question had not been  <mask>. In that respect, he submitted that the book in question was like an historical novel and that, read in its entirety, it did not incite violence.


30.  The Government submitted that the applicants, together with other members of the National Bolsheviks Party, had effected a forcible and unauthorised entry into the premises of the President’s Administration, had held an unauthorised assembly there, had voiced unlawful demands for the President’s resignation, had hampered the normal functioning of the President’s Administration and had destroyed State property there. Their protest had not been peaceful and had amounted to a criminal offence of mass disorder. They had been therefore lawfully prosecuted for participation in mass disorder involving destruction of State property. Their arrest, detention and conviction had pursued the legitimate aim of investigating criminal offences and punishing those responsible and had been  <mask>.


68.  The applicant argued that the interference with her freedom of expression had been disproportionate within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention in view of the minor threat posed by the publication to the interests of the Lithuanian State or any ethnic groups living in Lithuania or the neighbouring countries. In this connection the applicant emphasised that “Lithuanian calendar” had been edited and officially distributed by her for 6 years in the whole territory of Lithuania, attracting no great attention from the public or from State institutions. Similarly, the 2,000 edition of “Lithuanian calendar” had been released in a very limited print run of 3,000 in the second half of the year 1999, and for the following five months had caused no significant interest or exaggerated reactions, up until the State authorities' intervention in January 2000 after they received a note from the embassy of the Russian Federation. The applicant likewise noted that the Prosecutor General had refused to start criminal proceedings against her as the publication had not had the elements of the criminal offence of instigation of ethnic or racial hatred. She also observed that the information published in “Lithuanian calendar 2000” had already been made public in other historical documents. The applicant also relied on the fact that the publication had contained mainly the expression of her own opinions on and assessment of various historical events, and the State had presented no evidence proving the necessity of such a serious interference. As a result of the proceedings, she had not only received an administrative penalty in the form of a warning, but had also lost the main source of her income, in view of the confiscation and destruction of all the unsold items of “Lithuanian calendar 2000” and her resultant inability to continue editing the publication she had created. The applicant further submitted that the authorities could have pursued means other than halting the distribution of the calendar, such as giving her the opportunity to make certain rectifications or announcements, if necessary, on the cover of the remaining, unsold, versions of the publication. Finally, the domestic courts' finding of a lack of intent on the part of the applicant, as well as the minor danger which the publication represented, were also to be taken into account in discarding the argument that the interference had been  <mask>.


20.  The applicants submitted that the interference with their right to freedom of expression had not been  <mask> as it had not been justified by a pressing social need. They maintained that what was at stake in the present case was not purely commercial interests but participation in a general debate. In such cases the existence of particularly strong reasons for restricting the freedom of the press in a democratic society was necessary and the national margin of appreciation was limited.


28.  The applicants contested that the Austrian courts' judgments had been  <mask>. They contended that the impugned statements constituted value judgments which had a factual basis, namely the reasoning of the judgment concerned. This factual basis was also known to the readers because it had been published on several occasions, including by “Der Standard” in its issue of 1 September and another article on 2 September 1998 which explicitly referred to the commentary at issue on page 32. Further, the domestic courts as well as the Government had disregarded that the article was earmarked as a “commentary”, thus, indicating to any knowledgeable reader that it contained a critical assessment by the author. In the applicants' view, the courts had also ignored that the impugned statement only concerned the judgment of the private prosecutor and not the way in which he had conducted the proceedings. Therefore the applicants did not share the argument of the Government and the findings of the domestic courts that they had reproached the judge with not having observed the principle of an adversarial hearing or with having been partial. Moreover, they considered the Government's view to be inconclusive and overstepping the requirements of this Court's case-law in respect of Article 10 of the Convention that their critical remarks should have contained the fact that the proceedings had been (otherwise) conducted in a fair manner. In conclusion, the applicants' convictions were disproportionate and not necessary in a democratic society.


33.  The Government concluded that the interference complained of had been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and thus  <mask> to protect the reputation of others. The penalty, a symbolic payment to a charity and an order to apologise to A.W., was a lenient one and did not constitute a conviction. Although a notice of the proceedings against the applicant is revealed in the National Crime Record, the information is removed after a successful expiry of the probation period. They submitted that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.


26.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim, as the proceedings against him had become time-barred. They therefore argued that there had been no interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. Alternatively, they submitted that the applicant had been prosecuted pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, and thus the interference, if any, had been prescribed by law. They further submitted that the domestic authorities had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting public order and national security. The Government lastly submitted that the interference had been  <mask>, given that the content of the book in question had promoted hatred, hostility, the use of arms, militancy and revenge.


113.  The applicant company submitted that it had been unable to broadcast television programmes despite having been granted a licence to do so following a public tendering procedure. This infringement of its rights resulted from various legislative, administrative and judicial measures by the Italian State, acting through different bodies and instruments. The interferences with its right to freedom of expression had been neither justified nor  <mask>.


19.  The applicant complained that the District Court judgment of 29 November 2012, in respect of which leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Court on 25 February 2013, entailed an interference with his right to freedom of expression that was not  <mask> and thus violated Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


42.  The Government accepted that the requirement for the applicants to pay damages constituted an interference with their right to freedom of expression. However, as the protection of the reputation or other rights of any physical or moral person could not be excluded from the scope of Article 10 § 2, the protection of the reputation of a Local Council could legitimately form the basis of an interference with this right. Moreover, the impugned interference was prescribed by law and was  <mask> for the purpose of responding to the pressing social need of protecting the reputation of others in terms of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.


57.  The Government argued that the information contained in the disputed article had in fact suggested that the plaintiffs had committed crimes and there was thus a pressing social need to protect the plaintiffs and to prevent the careless use of such serious allegations. The Court can accept this argument in principle as it has repeatedly attached particular importance to the  <mask> of those who avail themselves of their right to freedom of expression, and in particular, of journalists (see Jersild, cited above, § 31, and Prager and Oberschlick, cited above, § 37). However, in the circumstances of the present case the Court finds no indication of such deliberate carelessness on the part of the applicant. It rather appears that Mr E.P.'s statements did not constitute a gratuitous personal attack as they were made in a particular political situation in which they contributed to a discussion on a subject of general interest such as the use made of budgetary funds (see, mutatis mutandis, Unabhängige Initiative Informationsvielfalt v. Austria, no. 28525/95, § 43, ECHR 2002‑I).


69.  The Government argued that Article 10 of the Convention had not been violated. According to them it is of essential importance that the freedom of expression not only stipulates the right to hold opinions, but also imposes  <mask>, and therefore cannot be interpreted as allowing the promotion or dissemination of the ideas of ethnic hatred, hostility and the superiority of one nation vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. The Government admitted that by imposing an administrative punishment there was interference with the applicant's freedom of expression; however it had been justified by the necessity to protect the democratic values on the basis of which Lithuanian society is based. Stressing the sensitivity of the questions related to national minorities and territorial integrity after the re-establishment of independence on 11 March 1990, the Government submitted that “Lithuanian calendar 2000” was clearly promoting the extreme ideology of nationalism, which rejected the idea of the integration of civil society, incited ethnic hatred and intolerance, and questioned territorial integrity and promoted national superiority, which had been proved by the notes sent by the embassies of the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation. By withdrawing the publication from distribution and imposing an administrative warning on the applicant, the authorities had sought to prevent the spreading of ideas which might violate the rights of ethnic minorities living in Lithuania as well as endanger Lithuania's relations with its neighbouring countries. In view of the clear threat to these legitimate interests posed by the publication, as well as the minor nature of the penalty ordered against the applicant, the Government considered that the interference had been compatible with the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention.


162.  The Government maintained that any interference was justified and proportionate. It was confined to preventing certain conduct by reason of its adverse impact, or potentially adverse impact, on others and on the public order, in a public context. They further emphasised that any person who exercised freedom of expression undertook  <mask> that included the obligation to avoid expressions which were offensive to others and which did not contribute to any form of public debate capable of furthering progress in human affairs. The Government were of the view that the applicant had failed to act consistently with this principle.


30.  The Government claimed that the applicants had neglected their  <mask>, which consisted of providing accurate and reliable information on matters of public interest. In their view, in the present case there had been a “pressing social need” to protect the reputation of the State officials of the Penza Region because the applicants had disseminated information alleging that they had committed criminal offences. The interference had been proportionate to the legitimate aim because the courts had clearly identified defamatory statements and granted the claim in part. The Government concluded that the necessity of the interference had been “obvious” and that the applicants' complaint was manifestly ill-founded.


40.  The Government considered that the interference could be deemed “necessary in a democratic society” in order to pursue the above-mentioned aims. They did not accept the conclusions drawn by the intervener, noting that they were based only on a small sample of legal systems, some of which were non-European. The exercise of the freedom of expression carried with it certain  <mask>, as also emphasised in Recommendation (2000) 21 to Council of Europe member States. The applicant's statements had been made in her capacity as defence counsel and not with the intention of generally imparting information and ideas. Not being a member of the Bar, the applicant was not subject to possible disciplinary proceedings within that institution. Not applying the Penal Code to her would therefore have placed her in a preferential position compared with members of the Bar.


29.  The Government argued that the interference was proportionate to the aim pursued, as the publisher had objectively caused the spreading of the defamatory statements to a wider public. According to the Government, the provision at issue was part of an overall concept under the Austrian Media Act concerning  <mask> of media owners resulting from the connection between the liability of media owners for defamation offences committed in their medium, on the one hand, and, on the other, from the duty to publish the court's decision (section 34) and the right to make a counter-statement (section 13). The Government also endorsed the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, laying down the arguments of shared responsibility of the media owner irrespective of the question of guilt, and carefully weighing it against the protection of the victim of a media offence. Without such shared financial responsibility, a victim, who had no influence on the issue of what and whose statements were published in the medium, would run the risk of not recovering the procedural costs after winning a case. Also, a victim's right to protection of their honour would be impaired if, for economic considerations, he/she had to renounce the enforcement of the right to private prosecution because the incriminated statement was made by a destitute author. In the present case, the applicant company had been free to report on the two private prosecutors and their experiences in Monaco. Neither was the author who had written up the article held responsible under criminal law nor was the applicant company sentenced to pay damages. Considering the financial benefit it had achieved from the publication of the impugned statement with an eye-catching title and that the applicant company's newspaper had the highest circulation in Austria, the measures corresponded to a “pressing social need” and constituted the least severe means to require media owners to take over some responsibility for media offences.


35.  The Government argued that the freedom of expression enshrined in Article 10 of the Convention was not absolute. Paragraph 2 of Article 10 formulated certain conditions and restrictions concerning its exercise. Journalists, in order to comply with the  <mask> referred to in that provision, were obliged to act in good faith and to provide accurate and reliable information to the public.


107.  The Government agreed with the domestic courts' assessment of the statements made by the applicant in “The Aliyevs Go to War”. They noted that this article, which concerned possible attacks on various facilities in Azerbaijan, had appeared at a time of rising tension between Iran and a number of other members of the international community, which had led to widespread reports about possible military operations against Iran, Azerbaijan's geographical neighbour. In that context, the applicant had published a number of unverified and inaccurate statements of fact. He had failed to comply with the  <mask> which went hand in hand with journalistic freedom and had failed to act in good faith and in compliance with the ethics of journalism in order to provide accurate and reliable information. The information published by the applicant had been obtained from various, sometimes unidentified, sources which the applicant had not verified by independent research.


43.  The Government submitted that the German courts, being aware that the present case concerned a report on a political issue of significant public interest, had given due consideration to the importance of freedom of expression in the case, but had found that the applicant company had not fulfilled its journalistic  <mask>. In their submission, the offending passage was to be construed as a factual allegation even if it had been presented in the form of a question. The daily newspaper published by the applicant company had not sought to find an answer to Mr Thiele’s question, but rather to convey his view that Mr Schröder’s envisaged move to the private sector might have been a decisive factor in triggering early elections. In any event, even if Mr Thiele’s comments were to be found to amount to a genuine question or a value judgment, they would nevertheless still be unlawful as they lacked a sufficient factual basis.


34.  The applicant company argued that awarding S.P. EUR 10,000 in damages had not been necessary in a democratic society, as the author and thereby the applicant company itself had based the passage at issue on official reports and had thus fulfilled their journalistic  <mask>. In particular, it submitted that the part of the book at issue conveyed that there had been a suspicion that S.P. was a member of the ‘Ndrangheta. There had been sufficient reliable sources for that suspicion, including official reports of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation, which had been identified as a source in the book. Since the report had come from an official and reliable source, the author was justified in refraining from further corroborating the information. The Court of Appeal had also neglected to take into account the fact that the author had researched the mafia for several years and interviewed a multitude of prosecutors, criminal investigators and other insiders, as well as the fact that the court had refused to hear the witnesses put forward by the applicant company. In addition, the applicant company had not been required to give S.P. an opportunity to be heard, as he had already denied his alleged membership when interviewed for a television report in 1997. The mere fact that S.P. had erroneously been described as a Calabrian had not constituted such a grave violation of his personality right as to justify the damages awarded to him.


35.  The Government further contended that the requirement for civil servants to obtain authorisation from their supervisors before leaving their city of residence was designed to ensure the smooth functioning of the public service; in practice, it was a purely formal requirement. Civil servants had  <mask> and the applicant, on entering the public service, had accepted the statutory provisions concerning civil servants.


40.  The Government argued that the exercise of the right of freedom of expression demanded from the user some  <mask>, which could be subject to restrictions and penalties as were prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of – with respect to the present case – public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others or for maintaining the authority of the judiciary. The statements made by the applicant were broadly reported by the mass media to whom he gave a press conference.


43.  The applicant argued that the importance of a free press in a democratic society dictated that the  <mask> of journalists should not be enforced by means of the criminal law. The Press Act had been adopted in 1984, in a pre-democratic political context. Its provisions, applied in a democratic system, were capable of hindering the exercise of the freedom of expression, in particular as they imposed on journalists legal obligations which should normally be reserved for professional codes of conduct.


29.  The applicants further contended that they had complied with the  <mask> incumbent on them in the circumstances at hand. They relied on decision no. 51/2007 of the Swiss Press Council, which had held that covert research was permitted if the information concerned was in the public interest and could not be obtained by any other means. The subject of the programme, which had aimed to draw public attention to malpractice in the field of private insurance in Switzerland, was of considerable public interest. Moreover, journalists were free to choose the methods they wished to employ to carry out their investigations. A realistic portrayal of the situation had been necessary in this particular case; otherwise, the broker could have successfully brought a civil claim against the journalists. The deterrent effect of the judicial decisions in issue was extremely significant, bearing in mind the absolute nature of the Federal Court’s findings. The applicants pointed out that they had given the broker the opportunity to respond to the criticisms after the recording and before the broadcast, and that he had refused to do so.


44.  The applicants complained in particular that the charges against them had been altered at the last hearing of their trial. They had initially been accused of separatism and undermining the integrity of the State but on the day of the judgment, 8 December 1994, the  <mask> Court had asked them on the spot to prepare their defence against a new charge, namely belonging to an illegal armed organisation. It had then dismissed their application for additional time to prepare their defence against the new charge. The applicants submitted that they had not been able to defend themselves properly and present their evidence against the new charge.


124.  The Government responded that the applicants had not specified the particular ideas or matters of conscience which they wished to express. Accordingly, this aspect of the case was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. They had been convicted under Articles 68 and 70 of the Criminal Code for their anti-state activities not because of any manifestation of their beliefs. If there had been an interference under these Convention provisions, it was justified for the protection of  <mask>, public order and the rights and freedoms of others, as well as for the prevention and punishment of crime. The applicants were not prosecuted for their political beliefs or communist party affiliations, but for their anti-state activities, in contravention of Article 17 of the Convention, against which the young democracy of Lithuania had been entitled to defend itself (cf. the aforementioned Ždanoka case, § 100).


19.  The Government contested his argument. They submitted that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression had been prescribed by law, and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining  <mask> and territorial integrity and prevention of disorder. The Government further contended that the interference had been necessary in a democratic society. They noted that in the article in question Abdullah Öcalan was referred to as “the ideological and political leader of the Kurdish movement” and the HPG, the PJA and the KONGRA-GEL were described as “facilitators of the military, political and ideological development formed under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan”. According to the Government, the publication of a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan holding a weapon demonstrated that the purpose of the publication of the article was to advocate and propagate terrorism. The Government lastly noted that the PKK was considered to be a terrorist organisation by a number of states and international organisations, such as the United Nations, NATO and the United States of America, and thus represented a serious threat not only to the internal security of Turkey but also to the international public order.


15.  The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. They submitted that he had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as he had not raised his Convention grievances before the domestic authorities. As regards the merits of the applicant’s complaint, the Government submitted that the interference with his right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting  <mask>, public safety and the rights of others, as well as preventing disorder and crime. Noting that the applicant’s conviction had been based on his participation in an illegal demonstration which had turned into a propaganda event in favour of the PKK and on the fact that he had acted together with and led the other demonstrators, the Government claimed that the present case was different from the case of Faruk Temel v. Turkey (no. 16853/05, 1 February 2011). They concluded that the applicant’s conviction had responded to a pressing social need and had therefore been necessary in a democratic society.


27.  The Government submitted that the first applicant had been prosecuted under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and thus any interference had been prescribed by law. They further submitted that the domestic authorities had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting  <mask> and public order as well as preventing crime. As to the necessity of the interference in a democratic society, the Government stated that by referring to the security forces’ struggle against terrorism as a “war” in the title of the exhibition, the first applicant had disseminated propaganda in favour of the PKK. The Government further noted that members of the PKK were defined as “guerrillas” by persons who had connections with or supported the PKK, and that by referring to the deceased members of the PKK as guerrillas the first applicant had considered them heroes. The Government submitted that the first applicant had not defined the persons whose photographs had been displayed as members of a terrorist organisation. The Government also argued that the exhibition had not reflected any sociological work, and that the content of the visitors’ book showed that the first applicant had encouraged the public to participate in the terrorist organisation. The Government lastly noted that the exhibition had been held in Diyarbakır, where the authorities had to be alert to acts capable of fuelling violence.


34.  The Government submitted that Article 8 was not applicable in the present case as that provision did not guarantee a right to retain employment or to choose a profession. They further stated that, in any event, the application of the KGB Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of protecting  <mask> and was necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, the KGB Act constituted no more than a justified security screening measure intended to prevent former employees of a foreign secret service from working not only in State institutions but also in other spheres of activity which were important to the State’s national security. The KGB Act itself did not impose collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. It provided for individualised restrictions on employment prospects by way of the list of positions in the former KGB which warranted application of the restrictions under section 2 of the KGB Act (see paragraph 27 above). The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in section 3 of the KGB Act showed that there existed a well-founded suspicion that the applicants lacked loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Given that not all former employees of the KGB were affected by the KGB Act, Article 14 of the Convention was not applicable. Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 8 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.


15.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of  <mask> and territorial integrity and the prevention of disorder and crime. They further submitted that the TKP/ML was a terrorist organisation, and that slogans praising that organisation had been chanted during the public gathering in question. Submitting that section 7 of Law no. 3713 had been amended in 2013, the Government left the issue of the necessity of the interference in a democratic society to the Court’s discretion.


82.  The Government maintained that the interference pursued one or more legitimate aims: the prevention of crime, in so far as the first applicant’s own safety was concerned by the bomb threats, and the interests of  <mask> with regard to all the applicants. In each case the interference was moreover “necessary” for the achievement of the legitimate aim or aims pursued.


25.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had been prescribed by law. They noted that the applicant’s conviction had been based on section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. The Government further contended that the interference in question had pursued the aims of protecting  <mask>, territorial integrity and public safety as well as the prevention of disorder or crime.


83.  The Government submitted that they were at a loss to understand the reason why the first applicant should claim at all that the Security Police’s registration and filing of information concerning threats against her were not in her best interests but, on the contrary, entailed a violation of her rights under the Convention. The information that had been released to the other four applicants was highly varied in nature. Most of it appeared to have been found in the public domain, such as the media. The Government were unaware of the origins of each and every piece of information, and therefore could not comment on that particular aspect. They noted, however, that from today’s perspective the information seemed either fairly old or quite harmless and that the interference was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, namely the protection of  <mask>.


113.  The Government alleged that in view of the temporary and transient nature of the “detention”, there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to her private life or home. In any event, any interference by the authorities had been in accordance with the law and necessary in the interests of  <mask>, public safety, and for the prevention of disorder or crime. The authorities had not transgressed the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.


26.  The Government asserted that the interference with the applicant's freedom of expression was prescribed by law, namely by Article 11 (e) of Law no. 2935 dated 25 October 1983, and that it pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and crime and protecting  <mask> as permitted by Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. They maintained that the measure taken against the newspaper was within the authorities' margin of appreciation and that it was justified given the specific circumstances of the case. They submitted in this connection that vital interests of the State were at stake and that the decision to ban was in response to a pressing social need and was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.


46.  The applicant also submitted that subjecting a programme, which posed no threat to  <mask>, did not undermine the protection of the personal rights of others, did not entail a criminal offence and did not breach the legislation on unfair competition, to particular scrutiny in order to ensure its “objectivity” was tantamount to rendering Article 10 § 2 devoid of purpose and imposing a legal requirement to toe the government line on a television broadcaster which necessarily had a monopoly on the provision of information at national level.


24.  The Government contested the applicant’s argument. They claimed at the outset that the applicant did not have victim status, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, given that the pronouncement of his conviction had been suspended. They further claimed that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, given that the proceedings against him had ended with the suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment. The Government submitted that should the Court conclude that there had been an interference, that interference had been prescribed by law and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining  <mask>, territorial integrity and public safety, as well as preventing disorder and crime. The Government claimed that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression had been necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, as a politician, the applicant had showed his support for a terrorist organisation’s activities by chanting the slogans noted in the first-instance judgment. Taking into account the necessity to fight against terrorism, the Government contended that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had corresponded to a pressing social need and had been proportionate.


47.  The Government argued for their part that the  <mask> Court could not be criticised for making use of its right to reclassify the offences with which the applicants had been charged to arrive at a characterisation that was less serious for the applicants than the charge initially preferred by the prosecution. They pointed out that the offences covered by Article 125 of the Criminal Code carried the death penalty whereas those covered by Article 168 carried prison sentences. In their view, it was wrong in the instant case to talk of a recharacterisation of the offence in so far as Articles 125 and 168 appeared in the same section of the Criminal Code entitled “Crimes against the State”. Article 168 was a “common provision” relating to all the other provisions in that section and covered anyone who “form[ed] an armed gang or organisation … with the intention of committing any of the offences defined in Article 125 ...”. Article 125 defined a crime in terms of the ends pursued, requiring a serious prejudice, whereas Article 168 defined a crime in terms of the means deployed to achieve those ends. The truth was that the applicants’ conviction on the basis of Article 168 of the Criminal Code rather than that of Article 125 had been the result of the criminal courts’ assessment of the evidence and their consideration of the defence’s arguments.


65.  The Government submitted that Article 10 was not applicable in the present case. In any event they stated that the application of the KGB Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of the protection of  <mask> and was necessary in a democratic society in view of the applicants’ lack of loyalty to the State. The applicants had not been punished for their views, be they views which they hold at present or views that they might have held in the past. The KGB Act had not imposed a collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in section 3 of the KGB Act showed that there had been a well-founded suspicion that the applicants had been lacking in loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Accordingly, there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.


39.  The applicant emphasised that the self-declarations did not advocate the use of violence against the State or against individual persons. As the Government themselves had confirmed, the PKK's activities had been largely peaceful at the relevant time. The national courts did not establish a real threat to public order or safety by the PKK in general or the self declaration campaign, nor did they examine or find any proven actual impact of the PKK on the  <mask> or public safety. None of the decisions reviewed the legality of the ban on the PKK or questioned its necessity in a democratic society. Insofar as the Government relied on the European Union's list of terrorist organisation, the applicant submitted that these listings, according to the case-law of the European Court of Justice, were unlawful and could not be the basis for criminal consequences on individuals. The national courts had failed to determine whether the interference with freedom of expression reflected a pressing social need in the individual case. Regardless of necessary considerations on other levels, for instance the determination of the penalty, they had ruled that freedom of speech had to generally take second place and there was no weighing on this stage.


33.  The applicants submitted that the  <mask> courts were special courts. They asserted that the military judges who sat on those courts were dependent on the executive, being appointed by a joint decree of the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister, subject to the approval of the President. The assessment, promotion and security of tenure of those judges were within the control of the executive branch and, in turn, the army. The ties binding them with the executive and the army made it impossible for them to discharge their functions on the bench in an independent and impartial manner.


31.  The applicants complained that the criminal proceedings before the Ankara  <mask> Court were unfair, that that court was not independent and impartial, and of infringements of their freedom of expression and freedom of association; they also asserted that in the enjoyment of the rights thus breached they had been the victims of discrimination on the ground of their political opinions.


33.  The applicants contested the Government's submissions. They complained in particular that they had lost their private-sector jobs, and that they had furthermore been deprived of the possibility to seek employment in various private-sector fields until 2009 as a result of their statutory status as “former KGB officers”. The applicants submitted that they had not been given any possibility under the Act either to present their personal cases in the evaluation and establishment of their loyalty to the State, or to avoid the application to them of the employment restrictions prescribed by Article 3 of the Act. In particular, the applicants stressed that they had left the KGB almost a decade before their dismissals. Furthermore, the applicants contended that their jobs in the private sector had not constituted any threat to the  <mask> of Lithuania. However, the domestic courts imposed the employment restrictions solely on the ground of their former employment in the KGB. Finally, the applicants submitted that, as a result of the negative publicity caused by the adoption of the “KGB Act” and its application to them, they had been subjected to daily embarrassment on account of their past.


16.  The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. They submitted at the outset that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies, as he had failed to raise his Convention grievances before the domestic authorities. As regards the merits of the applicant’s complaint, the Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting  <mask>, public safety and territorial integrity, as well preventing disorder and crime. The Government further submitted that the slogans chanted had incited violence and that the concert had turned into a meeting of a terrorist organisation. The Government also noted that the applicant had been on the concert’s organising committee, and not simply a member of the audience. According to the Government, the applicant had had a responsibility to prevent disorder and to protect public safety: a responsibility which he had failed to discharge, as he had manipulated the crowd by chanting slogans. Noting that the applicant’s conviction had been based on his participation in a propaganda event in favour of the DHKP/C ‑ a terrorist organisation that had committed heinous acts – and on his chanting slogans in favour of that organisation, the Government concluded by stating that the applicant’s conviction had responded to a pressing social need and had therefore been necessary in a democratic society.


19.  The Government contested their argument. They claimed at the outset that the applicants did not have victim status, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, given that the pronouncement of their conviction had been suspended. They further submitted that the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression had been prescribed by law, and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining  <mask> and public safety as well as the prevention of disorder and crime. The Government claimed that the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression had been necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, by referring to Abdullah Öcalan as a “leading figure” and an interlocutor for the State of Turkey, the applicants had conveyed to the public the idea that their client was still active. Moreover, their statements contained expressions referring to the strategy of a terrorist organisation. Noting that the applicants had not been imprisoned or subjected to any other restrictions, the Government contended that the interference in question had therefore not been disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.


20.  The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. They submitted that the interference with her right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of  <mask> and public order, as well as the prevention of disorder and crime. The Government further submitted that in her speech the applicant had legitimised the PKK and called for a moment of silence for the terrorists who had died during the conflicts with the Turkish Armed Forces. Besides, following her speech, the crowd had made a “V” sign. The Government took the view that, having regard to the content of her speech and to the fact that the applicant was not a politician, her speech could not be protected as political discourse. They further submitted that the first-instance court had assessed the circumstances of the event as a whole and had had regard to the other speakers’ speeches and the slogans chanted by the crowd when it had convicted the applicant. The Government also contended that the investigation against the applicant had not only been based on her acts during the event of 21 March 2007 but also on the books and documents found in her house. They lastly noted that the applicant had been sentenced to imprisonment of only one year, the minimum possible sentence under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. In sum, the Government considered that the applicant’s conviction had been necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.


42.  The Government conceded that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. They submitted that the retroactive classification of the documents in question pursued the legitimate aim of  <mask>, in which field States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. Moreover, it was the applicant’s own fault that the study in question had not been accomplished since, intransigently, he had insisted on having completely unrestricted access. The applicant contested these views.


26.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim, as the proceedings against him had become time-barred. They therefore argued that there had been no interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. Alternatively, they submitted that the applicant had been prosecuted pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, and thus the interference, if any, had been prescribed by law. They further submitted that the domestic authorities had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting public order and  <mask>. The Government lastly submitted that the interference had been necessary in a democratic society, given that the content of the book in question had promoted hatred, hostility, the use of arms, militancy and revenge.


61.  The Government asserted that the witnesses concerned had not been listed among those that the applicants had asked to be examined during the hearing in the  <mask> Court. They added that the court had also taken account of other evidence when establishing that the applicants belonged to the PKK. Its refusal to examine some of the witnesses for the prosecution had been justified by the threats that had been made against them, not excluding their physical elimination by the PKK, as had happened to a witness against one of the applicants’ co-defendants, killed in prison by other inmates who were members of the PKK.


98.  The Government noted that the material that had been seized from the applicant had been likely to promote racist and anti-Turkish propaganda and promote ill-will between the two communities on the island. Any limitation of the applicant’s rights had been prescribed by law and was justified under the second paragraph of Articles 9 and 10 as being necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order and for the safeguarding of  <mask> and/or territorial integrity.


34.  The Government emphasised the need to have particular regard to the  <mask> context in Turkey when the decision was taken to establish national security courts, pursuant to Article 143 of the Constitution. In view of the experience of the armed forces in the anti-terrorism campaign, the authorities had considered it necessary to strengthen those courts by including a military judge who was supposed to provide them with the necessary expertise and knowledge to deal with threats to the security and integrity of the State. The Government asserted that the impartiality and independence of military judges sitting on national security courts had been guaranteed by the Constitution.


20.  The Government argued that the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression had been in accordance with the law, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been necessary in a democratic society. The applicants’ convictions had been based on Article 215 of the Criminal Code and had been justified by the need to protect  <mask>, public safety and to prevent disorder and crime. The Government further considered that the interference had been proportionate to its aims, as the applicants had received minor fines and the second applicant’s sentence had subsequently been suspended for five years.


25.  The Government acknowledged the existence of an interference in the instant case but submitted that it was justified under the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention. The interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression had been based on Article 6 of Law no. 3713 as well as Additional section 2 of Law no. 5680. The interference had been in the interests of  <mask>, territorial integrity and the protection of the rights of others owing to the disclosure of the identities of certain public officials.


34.  The Government argued that the applicants’ dismissal pursued a legitimate aim, namely the aim of guaranteeing the neutrality of civil servants, including diplomatic corps. The restriction provided in section 44, subsection 1, point (c), of the Diplomatic Service Act had the legitimate aim of establishing a professional diplomatic service which would not be politically loaded, would not endure impact from any political force and would not depend on internal political developments and changes in political conjuncture. The aim was thus to uphold democracy and to protect  <mask> in a newly independent country.


28.  The Government maintained that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression was compatible with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 10. The interference was based on Article 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the applicant’s conviction was necessary in order to maintain  <mask> and public safety. The Government also stressed that the applicant’s speech contained provocative views.


31.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim as the proceedings against him had ended, due to being time-barred. They therefore considered that there had been no interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. Alternatively, they submitted that the applicant had been prosecuted pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and thus the interference, if any, was prescribed by law. They further submitted that the domestic authorities had pursued the legitimate aims of protection of  <mask>, territorial integrity and public safety as well as prevention of crime. As to the necessity of the interference in a democratic society, the Government stated that they were aware of the Court’s case-law in that field. They nevertheless noted that the applicant had been convicted of generating propaganda in favour of the PKK, an organisation which was considered to be a terrorist organisation by a number of international organisations and states, such as the United States of America, the United Nations, the NATO and the European Union.


19.  The Government contested the applicant’s argument. They submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting  <mask>, public safety and territorial integrity, as well preventing crime. The Government further submitted that the applicant had intended to encourage the public to engage in violence and resistance against the Turkish authorities and to manipulate the crowd. Besides, following his speech, the crowd had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK. The Government further submitted that the first-instance court had applied the principles embodied in Article 10, basing itself on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts. They lastly noted that the applicant had been sentenced to prison only for ten months and he had served part of that sentence. In sum, the Government considered that the applicant’s conviction had been necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.


32.  The Government submitted that Article 8 was not applicable in the present case as that provision did not guarantee a right to retain employment or to choose a profession. They further stated that, in any event, the application of the Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of protecting  <mask> and was necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, the Act constituted no more than a justified security screening measure intended to prevent former employees of a foreign secret service from working not only in State institutions but also in other spheres of activity which were important to the State's national security. The Act itself did not impose collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. It provided for individualised restrictions on employment prospects by way of the adoption of “the list” of positions in the former KGB which warranted application of the restrictions under Article 2 of the Act. The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in Article 3 of the Act showed that there existed a well-founded suspicion that the applicants lacked loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Given that not all former employees of the KGB were affected by the Act, Article 14 of the Convention was not therefore applicable. Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 8 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.


25.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had been  <mask>. They noted that the applicant’s conviction had been based on section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. The Government further contended that the interference in question had pursued the aims of protecting national security, territorial integrity and public safety as well as the prevention of disorder or crime.


40.  The applicant argued that the interference complained of was not  <mask>. Investigation in defamation cases was normally instituted by way of a private prosecution. The investigation in the applicant’s case had been instituted ex officio, but the prosecutor had failed to provide reasons for which he had considered that the public interest required an investigation of the case.


25.  The Government conceded that the contested decisions constituted an interference with the applicant company's right to impart information under Article 10 § 1 of the Convention. It was, however, justified under Article 10 § 2. The order was  <mask>, namely by the relevant provisions of the Media Act and Sections 111 §§ 1 and 2 of the Penal Code, it pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of others, and was necessary in a democratic society for the following reasons.


36.  The Government accepted that the applicants’ arrest at the site of the public event and their administrative convictions had constituted an interference with their right to freedom of peaceful assembly and their right to freedom of expression. Such an interference constitutes a breach of Articles 10 and/or 11 of the Convention unless it is  <mask>, pursues one or more legitimate aims under paragraph 2 of each Article, and is “necessary in a democratic society”.


21.  The applicants complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the restrictions on their right to freedom of expression had not been  <mask> and had not been necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.'s name had not fallen within the protection of private life as the national courts had not declared any part of her criminal case file secret. She had been an active participant in the incident on 4 December 1996 and had subsequently been sentenced to a fine. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest and the information in the article had in every respect been correct. The Appeal Court had not even tried to indicate on what grounds freedom of expression could have been restricted in the present case. In any event, the restrictions imposed on the applicants had been grossly disproportionate, especially in view of their obligation to pay very considerable damages


25.  The Government admitted that the domestic courts’ decisions had amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. They submitted, however, that the interference had been justified under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. It was  <mask>, namely Article 212 of the Criminal Code, and pursued a legitimate aim: the protection of the “reputation or rights of others”.