83.  The applicant maintained that he had been charged with, defended himself against and been convicted of a possession offence committed on the evening of 8 September 1996. In finding that he had been involved in offences connected with the shipment of cannabis even before the narcotics had arrived in the country on the morning of 8 September 1996, the Supreme Court had violated the  <mask>. It had regarded his guilt as having included the shipment's import, viz. smuggling and the related arrangements which must have been involved given that he had been considered guilty of acts committed on and before 6 September 1996. Narcotics smuggling, in particular when it was linked to participation in an organisation formed for that purpose, was an offence essentially more serious than the possession of which he had been accused. In the proceedings against him the Court of Appeal had assumed the role of the prosecutor when it replied to his demands that the incitement be taken into account by stating that he had committed the offence on or before 6 September 1996. The applicant had not been afforded an opportunity to demonstrate that he had not been involved in the shipment before 8 September 1996. The Supreme Court's judgment of 22 November 2000 had been based on a prohibited presumption of guilt.


114.  The Government disputed that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 2 in the present case. Section 133 of the 1988 Act did not offend the  <mask>, as it did not call into question the correctness of the acquittal or the applicant’s entitlement to be presumed innocent. The cases to which the applicant referred, such as Rushiti, cited above, could not be interpreted as justifying an extreme interpretation of Article 6 § 2 to the effect that once a person had been acquitted she must be treated always as positively innocent for all purposes. That, the Government submitted, would not be compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 or with the Court’s case‑law on the compatibility with Article 6 § 2 of civil proceedings arising out of the same facts (referring to Y v. Norway, cited above).


68.  The Government contended that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies with respect to his complaints about a breach of the  <mask> and lack of impartiality of Judge Sh. In particular, he could have requested her removal from the proceedings at the trial stage; raised a relevant complaint in his cassation appeal or instituted separate civil proceedings demanding rectification of the newspaper article and damages.


43.  The applicant argued that an excessive period of detention, such as the period in the present case, was in itself incompatible with Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, given the principle of the  <mask>. He maintained that however strong had been the suspicion against him, it could suffice as a basis for holding him in custody only in the early stages of the proceedings.


24.  The applicant maintained that the Court of Appeal's refusal to hear G. as a witness prior to the principal hearing had also violated the  <mask> and had shown that the court had prejudged his guilt. He had been given to understand that the court was not going to admit the documents in question to the case file. However, the Court of Appeal's judgment had taken him by surprise in that the court had based its judgment on those very documents.


47.  The Government argued that the impugned statements had not violated the  <mask>. According to the Government, account must be taken of the context in which the statements were made, namely, the fact that the applicant had been apprehended while committing an offence, and the sufficiency of evidence which might justify lifting the applicant’s parliamentary immunity and instituting criminal proceedings. The impugned statements must be interpreted as explaining to the public the need to bring criminal proceedings against the applicant, and not as declaring him guilty of an offence. Furthermore, the statement of the Chairman of the Seimas on 6 October 1998 referring to the applicant as a bribe-taker did not breach the presumption of innocence because the applicant had not been charged with an offence of bribery.


86.  The applicants complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a), (b) and (d) that the materials in the investigation file had been made available to them only at the end of the investigation, that they had not had an opportunity to question the witnesses for the defence and the victim and that the trial judge had been biased and had dismissed their challenges. They further claimed that the length of the criminal proceedings against them had been excessive. Finally, they alleged a breach of their  <mask> guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the Convention in that the prosecution authorities had closely cooperated with the mass media during the trial. The relevant parts of Article 6 read as follows:


91.  The applicants submitted that the investigator Mr Kurbatov and other employees of the prosecutor’s office had not only granted Ms Temeyeva unrestricted access to the criminal case file but had also actively participated in the television show. The showing of the front cover of the case file in the opening sequence of the television show demonstrated that it had been made physically available to the journalist. The show had been recorded before the case had been referred for trial; it had been extensively advertised with the sensationalist line “Slavery in Glazov at the end of the twentieth century” and aired at such times as to precede the adjourned trial hearings and the appeal hearing. Article 139 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure could not be interpreted as justifying an encroachment on the applicants’  <mask>. Their right to be presumed innocent until found guilty had been further damaged by the statements made by the journalist Ms Temeyeva, the prosecutor Mr Zinterekov, the investigator Mr Kurbatov and the prosecutor Mr Nikitin during the television show. In addition, the prosecution had also granted access to the case file to the journalist Ms M., the author of the article “The Land of Slaves”, which had also been highly prejudicial to the applicants. The applicants insisted that the extensive press coverage of their case and the statements by high-ranking prosecution officials had led the public to believe them guilty.


52.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 that he had not been summoned to certain hearings in which the court examined his remarks on the minutes of previous hearings and that the court had wrongly established the facts in his case; under Article 6 § 2 that  <mask> in his respect had been violated by certain statements of the Department of Education of Orel; under Article 6 § 3 (b) and (c) that in the first round of proceedings he had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defence, nor had he had legal assistance because of dismissal of his request to grant time to his lawyer to study the case file; under Article 6 § 3 (d) that in the first round of proceedings the courts had refused to obtain the attendance of witness K; under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 that the obligation not to leave his place of residence imposed on him had been disproportionate.


77.  The applicant also submitted that, in general, a taxpayer had an almost insurmountable burden of proof when claiming that a tax surcharge should not be imposed or should be remitted. He said that the case-law showed that orders for the remission of surcharges were made only rarely. Moreover, the enforcement measures, including the bankruptcy proceedings, had prejudiced the applicant's position in the ongoing tax assessment proceedings. Such measures, if taken before a determination by a court, thus conflicted with the legal safeguards afforded by the Convention. For those reasons, the principle of  <mask> had not been upheld in the tax assessment proceedings. Rather, it was the applicant's contention that there had been a presumption of guilt with regard to the tax surcharges.


46.  The applicant contended that the criminal limb of Article 6 was applicable to both domestic cases, on account of the generally binding nature of the relevant provisions of the CAO, which were not designed to apply only to a specific group of people. The proceedings had been instituted by a public authority. Following conviction of the applicant for administrative offences the court ordered mandatory penalties, which had a punitive and deterrent character. The procedural guarantees, such as the  <mask>, are indicative of the “criminal” nature of the procedure. In any event, the fine imposed on the applicant, which could also entail imprisonment in case of non-payment, was sufficiently severe to make the sanction criminal in nature.


37.  The applicant complained under various Articles that: (a) his detention between 18 and 22 September 2011 had been unlawful; (b) the Constitutional Court’s decision lacked reasoning with regard to his complaint that the decision of 22 September 2011 contained no signature or stamp; and (c) the  <mask> had been breached by the High Court’s decision of 22 September 2011.


26.  The Government argue further that when examining whether or not there has been a breach of the  <mask> in the present case, the Court should not have regard to its judgment in the Rushiti v. Austria case, because, at the time the Austrian courts decided on the applicant’s compensation claim in 1996, that judgment had not yet been given.


27.  The Government observed that the right to silence and the  <mask> were closely connected and that they would therefore address both issues jointly. They noted at the outset that in the present case the applicant had not been convicted of failure to disclose the identity of the driver, as the proceedings regarding that offence had been discontinued. The applicant had been convicted of the underlying traffic offence, namely speeding, on the basis of evidence which had been freely evaluated by the authority.


43.  The Government submitted that the domestic courts had examined whether recourse to physical force and special means by the police during the applicant’s arrest had been justified and lawful. The courts had made no findings as to whether the applicant had indeed committed an administrative offence or a crime. The applicant’s allegations of a violation of his right to the  <mask> were therefore unsubstantiated. The fact that the applicant was unhappy with the result of the trial did not mean that the domestic courts had not been diligent when examining his complaint.


53.  The applicant submitted that during the pre-trial proceedings the police had tortured A.D. and V.P. to make them incriminate him. With regard to the Government’s argument that the applicant and his lawyer had had an opportunity to challenge their evidence, the applicant submitted that, in line with the principle of  <mask>, it had fallen to the prosecution to prove his guilt and that he had not had to prove his innocence.


61.  The Government noted that the Court had found in its partial decision in the present case that the information disclosed by the Public Prosecutor’s Office had been a short summary of a factual nature that had concerned a matter of general interest and that the applicant’s right to respect for private life had not been infringed (see Shuvalov v. Estonia (dec.), nos. 39820/08 and 14942/09, 30 March 2010). This finding was also important from the aspect of the  <mask>.


35.  The applicant complained separately under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he was deprived of a fair and impartial hearing in that his procedural requests were denied and his conviction had allegedly been based solely on the testimony of one witness and the co-accused M.M. He challenged the courts' examination of the depositions by D.K. and S.N. and the credibility of the depositions by his co-accused M.M. Under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, the applicant alleged that the  <mask> was violated as a consequence of the unfair trial. The Court considers that these complaints all fall to be examined under Article 6 § 1 cited above (paragraph 12).


47.  The applicant further complained that the appellate courts violated Article 6 § 2 of the Convention when they did not remit the tax surcharges after Mr Nitschke's death but transferred them to his estate. In its view, the inheritance of the guilt of the dead was not compatible with the  <mask> and the standards of criminal justice.


34.  The Government submitted that the Regional Court’s decision that the late accused’s necessary expenses should not be borne by the treasury did not breach the  <mask>. It did not constitute a penalty or similar measure, nor did it contain a finding or attribution of guilt. The Regional Court had, in accordance with domestic law, made a prognosis based on an assessment of the remaining state of suspicion and had legitimately referred to the trial judgment which constituted a reliable basis for such prognosis. The Regional Court was competent to make this prognosis under domestic law, given that the case file had not yet been received by the Federal Court of Justice. It was not required to assess the grounds advanced by the defence for the appeal on points of law when making the prognosis as to the existence of a significant state of suspicion against the late accused. Even if the Federal Court of Justice had been competent, it would not have been required to engage in a full assessment of the appeal on points of law either, as the decision on the accused’s necessary expenses was an auxiliary one and only required a comprehensible and soundly founded prognosis, which was clearly distinguishable from a conclusive finding of guilt.


24.  The applicant complained that he was convicted of three counts of murder solely on the basis of hearsay evidence of a witness suffering from emotional instability and histrionic personality disorder and that the conviction was completely arbitrary and ran contrary to the guarantees of a fair trial, the right to the  <mask> and the principle of the equality of arms.


55.  The applicant did not raise the complaint under Article 6 § 2 of lack of  <mask> in his grounds of appeal, nor did he bring a civil action against the alleged offenders. It follows that this complaint also must be rejected on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.


46.  The Government further submitted that the language used in the media articles and statements by officials had not contained declarations about the applicant’s guilt. The Government argued that the statements by the President, the Minister of the Interior and other officials had to be seen in a political context, and that they had discussed political liability for the shortcomings within the police system, not the applicant’s criminal liability for the accident. As for the President’s statement (see paragraph 12 above), the Government submitted that it had aimed to demonstrate his determination to demand a responsible attitude from leading police officers and the executive in response to the problems within the police system, and that it had highlighted the need to investigate offences committed by police officers with due diligence and to ensure effective deterrence. Invoking the Court’s judgment in G.C.P. v. Romania (no. 20899/03, 20 December 2011), the Government argued that statements by politicians made in a political context should be allowed “a certain degree of exaggeration and liberal use of value judgments”. The Government also argued that the words used by State officials in respect to the applicant’s case could not be compared to those which the Court had considered as contrary to the  <mask> in the cases of Lavents v. Latvia (no. 58442/00, 28 November 2002) or Butkevičius v. Lithuania (no. 48297/99, ECHR 2002‑II (extracts)).


219.  The applicants submitted that no effective remedies existed in practice in respect of their complaint alleging a breach of the  <mask>. Even if such remedies existed in theory, they did not offer any reasonable prospects of success in their particular case, as the domestic authorities had “clearly shown their tolerance towards the persistent and blatant violations” by the prosecution authorities of the applicants’ Convention rights. They maintained that the provisions of the Criminal Code and the CCrP mentioned by the Government were irrelevant to this particular type of complaint and noted that there existed no court decisions in domestic judicial practice concerning a violation of the right to presumption of innocence.


37.  The applicant disputed the Government’s submissions and maintained that the narrow interpretation of the principle of the  <mask> by the Government and Federal Constitutional Court was not in line with the Court’s case-law establishing that the scope of application of Article 6 § 2 was not limited to situations where a person’s guilt had been determined by means of a formal judicial decision (he cited Minelli v. Switzerland, 25 March 1983, § 37, Series A no. 62; Allenet de Ribemont v. France, 10 February 1995, § 35, Series A no. 308; and Borovský v. Slovakia, no. 24528/02, § 45 et seq., 2 June 2009).


36.  The Government submitted that the period to be taken into consideration for examining the alleged breach of the applicant’s right to the  <mask> was between 10 April 1997 and 23 December 2002, the dates when the applicant was charged and when the criminal proceedings initiated against him ended, respectively. They argued that, consequently, all statements made by the authorities in respect of the applicant’s case prior to 10 April 1997 could not be taken into consideration because they fell outside the framework of the criminal proceedings initiated against the applicant.


38.  The Government argued that the power under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1998 (“the 1998 Act”) to obtain an answer to the question who was driving a car when a suspected motoring offence was committed and to use that answer as evidence in a prosecution or, alternatively, to prosecute a person who failed to provide information was compatible with Article 6. There were very good reasons why the owner should be required to identify the driver: driving offences are intended to deter dangerous conduct which causes risk to the public and deterrence depended on effective enforcement (research showed that speed cameras, etc., had reduced crashes by up to 28%), there was no obvious generally effective alternative to the power contained in section 172 and without such a power it would be impossible to investigate and prosecute traffic offences effectively, and the simple fact of being the driver of a motor car was not in itself incriminating. Nor did section 172 breach the  <mask> as the overall burden of proof remained on the prosecution. It provided for the putting of a single question in particular circumstances and all the usual protections against the use of unreliable evidence or evidence obtained by improper means remained in place, while the maximum penalty was only a fine of GBP 1,000.


135.  The applicant further claimed that the principle of  <mask> protected a person's right not to be considered a criminal in the eyes of the public until his guilt had been proved. The Court of Appeal should have refrained from any actions which could give the public the impression that he was guilty. However, the Court of Appeal decided to keep him in a metal cage, in spite of the fact that this could actually create such an impression, since persons kept in the cage were commonly identified with serious criminals.


15.  The applicants complained that they were not tried by an independent and impartial tribunal within a “reasonable time.” They asserted that, since they were detained during the trial, their right to the  <mask> was breached. They further asserted that their consultations with their lawyer were subjected to very strict regulations which hindered the preparation of their defence. They claimed that they were not allowed to consult a lawyer during their police custody, before the public prosecutor or the first time they appeared before the trial court. They finally claimed that they could not put questions to the main prosecution witnesses. With respect to their complaints, the applicants invoked Article 6 §§ 1, 2, and 3 (b), (c) and (d) of the Convention, which in so far as relevant read as follows:


182.  The Government claimed that the grounds on which the Erebuni and Nubarashen District Prosecutor decided on 30 August 2004 to terminate the proceedings against the applicant, as prescribed by Article 37 § 2(2) of the CCP, were compatible with the requirements of Article 6 § 2. This was a procedural decision which did not make a finding of guilt of the accused. Similarly, when a person is arrested on suspicion of having committed an offence or when the prosecutor brings charges and later defends them in court, such measures do not imply that the accused is guilty and do not violate the  <mask>. The decision to terminate the criminal proceedings against the applicant which, moreover, could be contested before the courts, merely expressed the prosecutor’s unwillingness to take the case to court and did not contain any statement of the applicant’s guilt. With reference to the judgment in the case of Salabiaku v. France, the Government argued that presumptions of fact or law operated in every legal system and the Convention did not prohibit such presumptions in principle (see Salabiaku v. France, 7 October 1988, § 28, Series A no. 141‑A).


26.  The applicant complained that her dismissal had been unfair and that the refusal of the administrative courts to reinstate her in her post had been in breach of her right to the  <mask>. She also submitted that her repeated attempts to find employment as a teacher were still being blocked by the authorities, who were claiming that their refusals were based “on the offence she had committed”. In support of this latter submission the applicant referred to the documents summarised above (see paragraphs 14-15).


51.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted all available and effective domestic remedies in respect of the impugned joint statement of the law-enforcement authorities and, in any event, had not complied with the six-month rule. In this regard, the Government submitted that the applicant could have made use of the procedure concerning appeals against the actions or decisions of prosecution authorities set out in Articles 449-451 of the CCrP or lodge a criminal action for defamation. As to the domestic proceedings instituted by the applicant under Articles 449-451 of the CCrP, the Government argued that the applicant had failed to appeal to the Court of Appeal in the context of these proceedings and, even if there was an appeal and subsequently a relevant decision of the Court of Appeal in that respect, it would take place in 2005, well before the applicant lodged his application with the Court. For this reason, the complaint was incompatible with the six-month rule. The Government further submitted that the applicant could have complained of a violation of his  <mask> by bringing a separate court action for defamation under Article 147 of the Criminal Code.


98.  The Government contested that argument, denying the State’s responsibility for the publications in private media. They accepted that officials of the prosecutor’s office of St Petersburg may have given out information to the press during the interviews and did not contest the accuracy of the statements published by the media and referred to by the applicant. However, the Government did not consider that these statements disclosed any appearance of a violation of the applicant’s right to  <mask>.


146.  The applicant complained that the testimony of the then Minister of Justice, who hinted at the applicant’s guilt, breached the  <mask> as guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. Furthermore, the domestic courts presumed him guilty on the basis of witnesses M.’s and A.L’s testimonies, which had been considered contradictory and unreliable. Article 6 § 2 of the Convention reads as follows:


26.  The applicant submitted, first of all, that the domestic remedy the Government referred to was not effective. In particular, he argued that almost all the judicial decisions it had produced only concerned the civil liability of journalists for defamation. He pointed out that none of the decisions submitted to the Court acknowledged the liability of a member of the Government for infringement of the  <mask>. One of the judgments adduced even concerned a case where the exemption of members of the Government from personal civil liability had been found by the domestic courts to be constitutional, which confirmed his allegations. Lastly, he argued that there was no available remedy by which he could have asked the criminal court concerned to acknowledge that there had been a breach of the presumption of innocence in his case.


73.  The applicant complained of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (d) of the Convention. He alleged that on all seven occasions the proceedings in which he was convicted of an administrative offence fell short of the fair hearing guarantees, in particular the principles of equality of arms, adversarial proceedings, independence and impartiality of the tribunal, and the  <mask>. Article 6 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads:


56.  The applicant, relying on Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention, further complained of lack of impartiality of the trial judge, lack of reasoning, errors of facts and law in the assessment of evidence and lack of adequate time and facilities to prepare the defence. He also alleged a violation of the  <mask>.


112.  The applicants concluded that the Government had failed to submit evidence that the security risks invoked by them had actually existed and that the applicants might have absconded or resorted to violence. There had been no serious grounds to fear unlawful behaviour on their part in the courtroom. Their placement in a metal cage during the hearing of their case by the Magadan Regional Court had therefore not been justified by security considerations and had amounted to degrading treatment in breach of Article 3. Such treatment, comparable to the treatment of wild animals kept in metal cages in a circus or zoo, had intimidated the applicants and humiliated them in their own eyes and in those of the public and aroused in them a sense of fear, anguish and inferiority; it had also undermined the principle of the  <mask>. The recently initiated process of replacing metal cages in courtrooms with glass cabins showed in itself Russia’s acknowledgment that the use of metal cages had constituted a breach of human rights.


218.  The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust available domestic remedies, as they had not taken any proper steps to bring this complaint to the attention of the relevant authorities. In particular, the Government argued that, under domestic law, the applicants could have lodged a criminal complaint alleging defamation under Article 147 of the Criminal Code and Chapter 27 of the CCrP, or a civil action for damages, against the public officials who had allegedly violated their  <mask>.


35.  The Government further argued that the Regional Court’s judgment did not bind the courts or the prosecution authorities as regards criminal proceedings pending or to be instituted against the applicant in the future. The principle of the  <mask> precluded any prejudgment of the applicant’s guilt by the trial court conducting the proceedings against him and under no circumstances could a possible future conviction be based on the impugned statements in the judgment previously rendered against his co-accused. On the contrary, the trial court would be under an obligation to impartially assess all available evidence submitted by the prosecution authorities in the applicant’s own proceedings. Hence, the impugned passages of the Regional Court’s judgment, which were of no legal relevance for the applicant’s subsequent trial, only affected him in an indirect de facto manner as a result, for instance, of the media coverage of the proceedings.


139.  The applicant complained that, in the decisions ordering and extending his pre-trial detention, the domestic courts had breached his right to be presumed innocent by prejudging his guilt before he had been proved guilty following a criminal trial. He further complained that the joint statements made by the Prosecutor General’s Office, the MNS and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the press on 20 and 21 October 2005 had amounted to an infringement of his right to the  <mask>. Article 6 § 2 of the Convention provides as follows:


29.  The Government lastly considered that the present case had to be distinguished from that of Fressoz and Roire (cited above). The secrecy of the judicial investigation and respect for the  <mask>, which protected collective and public interests, could not be placed on the same footing as confidentiality in tax matters, which protected purely private interests. Moreover, the French courts had adduced sufficient reasons in support of their decisions after a precise examination. The public's right to information on the “Elysée eavesdropping” affair had not been impaired, the publication of the book had continued and no copies had been seized. The public had, moreover, continued to be informed extensively by the media. In addition, the applicants had been given a “token sentence”, far less than the statutory maximum.


137.  The Government maintained that the  <mask> guaranteed under this head had been respected. The fact that the court had stated that what had been said constituted contempt prima facie and had invited representations on the matter could not be considered contrary to Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. It had been open to the court to form a preliminary view and to invite representations from the applicant as to why he had not been guilty since the facts had been before the court itself and it had direct knowledge of the issue. If the applicant had produced a good explanation for his apparent misconduct, the result would have been a finding that he had not been in contempt.


25.  The applicants, referring to Hibbert v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 38087/97, 26 January 1999), pointed to the distinction made in the Court's case-law between statements which reflected the opinion that the person concerned was guilty and statements which merely described a state of suspicion. The former infringed the  <mask> while the latter did not. Since the statements at issue fell within the first category, Article 6 § 2 had been violated.


29.  The applicant also complained that the proceedings for compensation were unfair, particularly as the belated communication of the submissions of 22 June 2000 infringed the principle of ‘equality of arms’. Moreover, he submitted that the decisions declaring his claim for compensation time-barred, and part of his claims for damages unfounded, were wrong. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, cited above, and paragraph 2 of the same provision which ensures the  <mask>.


72.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the Appeal Court had not re-assessed the evidence in her case and under Article 6 § 3 (d) that her witnesses had not been given the possibility to testify and that, if they had, their testimonies had not been reflected in the Appeal Court's judgment. Moreover, she complained under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention that the  <mask> had been violated as the public prosecutor could not prove her calculations wrong or her to be guilty. Finally, the applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention that she had not had an effective remedy as the other parties to the proceedings had been civil servants.


89.  The applicants also submitted that, in general, a taxpayer had an almost insurmountable burden of proof when claiming that a tax surcharge should not be imposed or should be remitted. They said that the case-law showed that orders for the remission of surcharges were made only rarely. Moreover, the enforcement measures, including the bankruptcy proceedings, had prejudiced the applicants' position in the ongoing tax assessment proceedings. Such measures, if taken before a determination by a court, thus conflicted with the legal safeguards afforded by the Convention. For those reasons, the principle of  <mask> had not been upheld in the tax assessment proceedings. Rather, it was the applicants' contention that there had been a presumption of guilt with regard to the tax surcharges.


21.  The applicants asserted that section 93-3 of the 1982 Act established an irrebuttable presumption of the publishing director's responsibility, which was automatically and necessarily inferred from his function, notwithstanding any evidence to the contrary he might seek to adduce, relating to his conduct or the conditions in which information was published or broadcast. The domestic courts had thus inferred the second applicant's criminal responsibility from the existence of a repeated statement and his status as publishing director. In the applicants' submission, that had infringed the right to the  <mask>, guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the Convention in the following terms:


177.  The Government submitted that Mr Allahverdiyev had not exhausted domestic remedies and that, in any event, the applicants’  <mask> had not been breached and that the applicants had failed to present copies of any statements they had referred to or any other “documents proving the fact that their presumption of innocence [had been] violated by the public authorities”.


25.  The applicant complained that the Regional Court had violated the  <mask> when determining his penalty as it had taken into account, as an aggravating element, sexual offences of which he had not been found guilty as the proceedings against him for those offences had been discontinued. He relied on Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


63.  The applicant alleged the face-to-face confrontation could not be considered as an effective opportunity to examine S. since the applicant’s lawyer had not been given notice to attend. The applicant affirmed that he had refused to sign the record. Furthermore, the authorities had not taken reasonable steps to secure S.’s presence at the trial. The Government had provided no evidence to prove that any summons had been issued or measures taken. According to the applicant, S. had incriminated the applicant in exchange for release from custody. Moreover, S.’s testimony was unreliable since he had changed his deposition several times before the trial, in particular regarding the identity and number of persons involved in the thefts. In view of the above, the trial court’s reliance on S.’s pre-trial statement in finding the applicant guilty on two counts of theft had been unlawful and in breach of the  <mask>.


78.  The Government submitted that when suspects and accused people who faced detention on remand as a preventive measure were escorted to courthouses they were placed before the court on benches “behind a barrier (metal enclosure/cage)” measuring 355 cm in length, 225 cm in height and 115 cm in width. The metal enclosure was primarily intended to enforce the restrictions associated with the custodial measure, that is, to exclude the risk of flight, influencing witnesses or otherwise obstructing the administration of justice. The applicant’s confinement in the metal cage had not violated the principle of equality of arms and the  <mask>. The applicant had been able to communicate freely with the court, his lawyers, the victim and other participants at the trial and exercise his procedural rights without restrictions. When the applicant had not wanted to communicate with his lawyer in the presence of the escort, the court adjourned. Under no circumstances had the applicant’s confinement in the metal cage meant that the court had been predisposed to deliver a finding of guilt. The Government further submitted that the applicant’s confinement in the metal cage in the courtroom had not amounted to a violation of the applicant’s right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, because the measure in question had been a reasonable and indispensable restriction applied within the framework of the criminal procedure existing in Russia and had not reached the minimum level of severity to attain the threshold of Article 3 of the Convention.


39.  The Government contested the allegation, arguing that prior to the main hearing the Court of Appeal had, on the occasion of assessing the necessity of evidence offered, to establish which matters were material to the outcome of the case. This naturally did not imply that the Court of Appeal would have violated the  <mask> by deciding not to hear G.'s testimony.


53.  The Government submitted that despite the court’s phrase in the Baroness judgment to the effect that it found the applicant to be the very image of a receiver of stolen goods, it transpired from the judgment as a whole that the court was not in any manner attributing criminal responsibility to the applicant. Indeed, the court made it clear that its conclusions were based on the fact that the claimants had managed to prove that the silver bullion was made of melted-down silverware belonging to them, and the applicant had not presented any evidence to challenge that. In all three cases the courts limited themselves to the finding of responsibility in the civil sphere, without in any way pronouncing themselves on criminal liability, and only after having considered evidence over and above that which had been available during the criminal trial. It followed that, in the Government’s view, there could not be any violation of the Convention (see, a contrario, Y. v. Norway, cited above), as the language used by the domestic courts was limited to a finding of civil responsibility and did not demonstrate a lack of respect for the  <mask>.


14.  The applicant complained that he had been unable to defend himself in person or through legal assistance, as there had been no public hearing in his case. He further alleged that the principle of the  <mask> had also been violated in the present case. He invoked Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (c) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


29.  The applicant submitted that she had already, in her initial statement of application dated 5 October 2005, expressly complained that the lustration proceedings were unfair. She had also argued then that the procedural violations complained of had included, inter alia, a violation of the  <mask>. Her subsequent submissions were by way of supplementing and refining the substance of the complaint. They did not constitute a new complaint and did not extend the scope of the original one.


107.  The applicants’ confinement in a cage, as if they were dangerous criminals who had already been found guilty, had served as an instrument of unlawful influence upon the jury, in breach of the rules governing jury trials, which prohibited any actions capable of undermining the  <mask> and, in particular, any submissions which might cause jurors to be prejudiced against defendants, by referring for example to defendants’ previous convictions or to the fact that they were chronic alcoholics or drug addicts, unless that information was necessary for establishing the elements of the offences of which they were accused. In view of the foregoing, the applicants could not have a fair trial respecting the principle of the presumption of innocence. They had never pleaded guilty and it had been necessary to overcome the jury’s prejudice in order to prove their innocence. Being held in a cage before their judges who were to decide their fate, the applicants had felt helplessness, inferiority and anxiety during the entire trial. Such harsh treatment had had an impact on their power of concentration and mental alertness during the proceedings concerning as they did such an important issue as their liberty.


48.  The applicant contested the Government’s submissions, claiming that the statements at issue had violated the  <mask>. He noted that the Government had accepted the authenticity of the impugned statements which amounted to declarations of his guilt for offences with which he had or had not been charged. In the applicant’s view, the wording of those declarations could not be justified by the need to inform the public about probable or pending criminal proceedings.


89.  The applicant disputed the argument that Article 6 § 2 only applied where there was a close link to the criminal proceedings. She pointed to the Court’s finding in Šikić v. Croatia (no. 9143/08, § 47, 15 July 2010) and Vanjak v. Croatia (no. 29889/04, § 41, 14 January 2010) to the effect that when criminal proceedings were discontinued, the  <mask> had to be preserved in “any other proceedings of whatever nature”. She submitted that this must be all the more true in cases of acquittal, where the protection afforded by Article 6 § 2 was even stronger.


27.  The applicants' acquittal of attempted manslaughter had not been called into question. In fact, in deciding whether or not to award compensation for pre-trial detention, the Court of Appeal had found that the facts as established, while not amounting to attempted manslaughter, could have led to a successful prosecution on a different charge. However, the Court of Appeal had not been called upon to give a decision on this basis, and the  <mask> was therefore not at issue. It had concluded, as it was fully entitled to in light of the Court's Masson and Van Zon v. the Netherlands judgment (28 September 1995, Series A no. 327-A) and its Leutscher v. the Netherlands judgment (26 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II), that there were no reasons in equity to order the payment of compensation to the applicants.


160.  The applicant bank complained that the  <mask>, which resulted in the seizure of a substantial amount of money from its account (see paragraphs 20-68 above, hereafter: “the enforcement proceedings”), had given rise to several violations of its rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant bank’s complaints under that Article were focused primarily to the part of those enforcement proceedings concerning the so-called third attempt to continue the enforcement (see paragraphs 42-66 above), and in particular to the decision of 3 October 2003 (see paragraphs 44-45 above) and the instruction of 28 October 2003 (see paragraph 61 above). Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads as follows:


45.  The applicant admitted that the case had been complex. However, its complexity was not a consequence of its subject-matter but rather of the envisaged scheme according to which he had first been required to institute administrative proceedings before the local authorities, which had then been entitled to institute civil and, subsequently,  <mask> for eviction. In the applicant's view, that doubled the procedural steps to be taken and the length originating from the complexity of the case was therefore attributable to the State.


38.  The applicant, relying on Articles 8, 10, 13 and 14 of the Convention as well as Article 1 of Protocol  No. 1 to the Convention, complained, in essence, that as a result of the proceedings in his case he became a homeless person, that his appeal and cassation appeal had been dismissed, that he had been discriminated against and that he had been deprived of his property due to the actions of the domestic courts. He also appeared to complain about the ineffectiveness of the  <mask> against his former wife.


49.  The Government maintained that the State could not be held responsible for the debts of the Company, since the latter was a separate legal entity and the State had a minor share in it. Moreover this share had been reduced from 25% to 19.99% in December 2002. Therefore, the Forced Sale of Property Moratorium Act no longer protected the debtor’s funds from the  <mask>. They further maintained that the applicant had not exhausted the remedies available to him under the domestic law.


27.  The applicant also complained, relying on Articles 6 § 1 and 13 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, that due to the allegedly unlawful actions of the authorities in the course of the injunction and the  <mask>, notably the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation to return the guarantee to the defendant company (see paragraph 11 above), she had been deprived of the full amount of the damages and interest awarded to her in the domestic proceedings and that she had not had effective remedies in that respect.


18.  The Government maintained that the responsibility of the State in this situation was limited to the organisation and proper conduct of  <mask> and that the length of the enforcement proceedings had been caused by the critical financial situation of the debtor company and the energy sector of the Ukrainian economy in general. The Government contended that the Bailiffs’ Service performed all necessary actions and cannot be blamed for the delay. The regularity of the enforcement proceedings in the present case was confirmed by the domestic courts. The Government argued that the State could not be considered responsible for the debts of its enterprises and that the State annually allocated substantial amounts from its budget to cover part of the disability allowances and other compensatory payments to the workers in the mining industry.


40.  The applicant argued that the  <mask> instituted against her had concerned telephone calls she could not have made, since she had been in prison at the relevant time and her telephone had been taken away from her. The applicant further argued that the first enforcement order had never been served on her and therefore could not have become final. The applicant also argued that all of her arguments from the appeal to the second enforcement order were erroneously declared inadmissible as lodged out of time, since the Koprivnica County Court had deemed her appeal to have been lodged on 6 December 2006, while it had in fact been lodged on 4 December 2006. According to the applicant, the County Court’s error was an obvious one, but that court had failed to rectify it even after her intervention. In the applicant’s view, the domestic courts had acted unfairly and had deprived her of access to court.


45.  The applicant put in doubt the willingness of the Bailiffs to enforce the decisions in his favour. He maintained that the  <mask> were barred first by the bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor and then by the Law “on the Introduction of a Moratorium on the Forced Sale of Property”. The applicant submitted that the steps taken by the State were insufficient to ensure his right to have court decision given in his favour enforced without undue delay.


280.  The applicant bank also complained that it had no remedy in the Croatian legal system to recover the sum seized from it in the  <mask>, despite the fact that it had managed to prove that this enforcement had had no basis in law. It relied on Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto. Article 13 reads as follows:


72.  The Government invited the Court to reject the application for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They submitted that the applicant could have lodged a constitutional complaint under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act. In support of their argument, the Government produced a copy of the Constitutional Court decision of 2 February 2005 (see paragraph 66 above) in which that court had found a violation of the complainant's right to a hearing within a reasonable time on account of lengthy  <mask>.


661.  The applicant company argued that the circumstances of the tax assessment and  <mask> as well as the allegedly “political” motivation behind the prosecution of Mr M. Khodorkovskiy and other owners and senior officials of the applicant company showed that the proceedings against it, taken as a whole, were abusive in that the State clearly wanted to destroy the company and to take control of its assets.


15.  The Government maintained that the length of the  <mask> had been caused by the critical financial situation of the debtor company and the large number of proceedings against it. The Government further maintained that the debtor was a separate legal entity and therefore the State’s responsibility extended no further than the performance of the Bailiffs’ Service. The latter, in the Government’s opinion, performed all necessary actions and could not be blamed for the delay. Finally, they submitted that the length of the enforcement proceedings was reasonable.


100.  The applicant, for his part, would not appear to have contributed in any way to the delay complained of. In this regard, the Court observes that an attempt was made to serve the decision to stay the  <mask> on the applicant in person, contrary to the relevant domestic provisions given that he would appear to have been duly represented by a lawyer at the time, as it was only in September 2009 that the applicant asked the domestic court to communicate directly with him (see paragraphs 11, 18 in fine, 19 and 37 above). Once the applicant learned that the enforcement proceedings had been stayed he immediately sought that they be continued (see paragraphs 20 and 22 above). Therefore, the Court considers that the period between 31 October 2006 and 9 September 2009 cannot be attributed to the applicant either.


94.  The Government indicated that the first applicant could have returned the photocopier or paid the amount awarded voluntarily but he had failed to do so, therefore, L. had been forced to initiate  <mask>. The Government further contended that the national courts had recognised breaches in the enforcement proceedings and the seizure orders for the first applicant's and his company's property had been removed. Furthermore, the first applicant has failed to appeal in cassation against the decision of 20 September 2004 and against the decision of 14 December 2004, therefore his complaint should be rejected for failure to exhaust effective domestic remedies.


54.  The applicants claimed a total of AMD 7,439,000 (approx. EUR 13,642) in respect of pecuniary damage which represented the losses that the second applicant had allegedly incurred in the course of the  <mask> and the income which they would not have allegedly lost, had the domestic courts granted their claims. They also requested to restore the situation by returning the land and cattle which allegedly belonged to them. The applicants did not claim any non-pecuniary damage.


30.  The Government also argued that the applicants failed to exhaust all domestic remedies. They submitted that, once the applicants failed to recover the judgment debts, there were a number of options available to them under Turkish law. They could have initiated criminal proceedings against the municipality for failure to comply with court judgments, filed fresh cases to seek temporary remedies such as a stay of execution, or applied for a certificate of insolvency (aciz vesikası) which would allow them to resume  <mask> at any time in the future. Furthermore, some of the applicants failed to initiate any enforcement proceedings whatsoever.


17. The Government did not raise any objection as to the admissibility of the “reasonable time” complaint. The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint concerning his right of access to a court is in fact restatement of his complaint about the length of the  <mask> and will be considered accordingly. In that context, it finds that the “reasonable time” complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.


77.  The Government stated that the authorities had taken all possible measures with a view to reaching a solution to the conflict relative to the custody of the applicant's child. The authorities had solicited the help of experts who had acted professionally. In the Government's view the applicant had contributed to the delay in the  <mask> as she had filed numerous unfounded complaints to various institutions. Also, the domestic court's decision of January 2004 to transfer custody of the child to her father had been based on a thorough examination of all relevant factors, with due emphasis on the interest of the child.


14.  The Government maintained that the judgment in the applicant's favour was enforced in full. The Government argued that the State could not be considered responsible for the debts of its enterprises. They further maintained that the responsibility of the State in this situation was limited to the organisation and proper conduct of  <mask> and that the length of the enforcement proceedings had been caused by the critical financial situation of the debtor company. The Government contended that the Bailiffs' Service had performed all necessary actions and could not be blamed for the delay.


627.  The Government pointed out that, in the course of the  <mask>, there had been no restrictions on the company’s production cycle or the sale of petroleum and mineral oils and that the applicant company had remained fully operational. In view of the State’s wide margin of appreciation in the fiscal sphere and the applicant company’s abusive conduct, illustrated by its attempts to hinder enforcement action by hiding the register of the shareholders of its three largest subsidiary companies, the Government were of the view that the fair balance between the private and public interests had been struck.


17.  The Government contended that the applicant had failed to re-submit the writ of execution and thus the State was not responsible for non‑enforcement of the judgment. The Government further maintained that the length of the  <mask> was not excessive, that the Bailiffs' Service performed all necessary actions and that the applicant's entitlement to the award was not disputed.


15.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings before the Bogorodchansky District Court in 2001 had been unfair and that their outcome had voided the  <mask>, since the debtor continued its financial operations through the unfrozen accounts and avoided the fulfilment of its financial obligations towards the applicant. She further complained that the higher courts had failed to quash this decision under the extraordinary appeal procedure. She finally complained about the lengthy non-enforcement of the judgment in her favour, invoking in substance Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. These provisions, in so far as relevant, read as follows:


19.  The Government maintained that the judgment in the applicant’s favour was enforced in full. They further maintained that the responsibility of the State in this situation was limited to the organisation and proper conduct of  <mask> and that the length of the enforcement proceedings had been caused by the critical financial situation of the debtor company and the energy sector of the Ukrainian economy in general. The Government contended that the Bailiffs’ Service performed all necessary actions and cannot be blamed for the delay. The regularity of the enforcement proceedings in the present case was confirmed by the domestic courts. The Government argued that the State could not be considered responsible for the debts of its enterprises and that the State annually allocated substantial amounts from its budget to cover part of the disability allowances and other compensatory payments to the workers in the mining industry. The Government finally maintained that the length of the enforcement was one year eleven months and fifteen days which cannot be considered as unreasonable.


15.  The Government further contended that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as he had not appealed against that judgment with the aim of changing the defendant/debtor in the  <mask>. They maintained that it had been the responsibility of the State Court Administration, and not of the Ministry of Finance, to pay the special retired judges’ allowance. They therefore proposed that the application be declared inadmissible.


33.  The Government maintained that the Bailiffs’ Service had taken all the necessary steps to enforce the ruling of 4 March 2002 given in the applicant’s favour. The Government further contended that the length of the  <mask> in respect of that ruling was not unreasonable and had been caused by the difficult financial situation of the debtor company. They made no observations on the merits in respect of the applicant’s complaints about the non-enforcement of the rest of the judgments given in his favour.


19.  The Government contended that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as he had failed to lodge with the Bailiffs' Service an application, or an execution writ, for the initiation of  <mask> in respect of the judgment of the Kupyansk Town Court of 24 September 2003. They further stated that the State was not responsible for the enforcement of that judgment.


19.  The Government submitted that the length of the  <mask> should be calculated from 25 November 1999 when the bailiffs had received the writ of execution, to 27 January 2003 when the three flats had been offered to the applicant and his family. From that length they deducted the six months, during which the enforcement had been stayed pursuant to the decision of 10 March 2000, and a further period starting from 28 February 2001 when the proceedings had been adjourned sine die and until that decision had been quashed on 30 December 2002. The Government accepted their responsibility for an overall period of non-enforcement of six months.


619.  The applicant company complained that the  <mask> in its case had been unlawful, disproportionate and arbitrary. In particular, it argued that the authorities ought to have allowed the company to settle the debt and that it had been wrong to sell off its main production unit at auction with such speed. The company complained that the courts ought to have intervened and corrected the assessment of this matter by the bailiffs. The authorities should have first considered and accepted its offers of shares in OAO Sibneft, and/or allowed the company to make deferred payments over a prolonged period. As regards such deferred payments, the company submitted that the domestic law and practice gave priority to such a solution and that OAO Rosneft was able to obtain such a deferral in respect of the tax debts of OAO Yuganskneftegaz following the auction of 19 December 2004. The company argued that it could have repaid the debt, entirely or in part, had it not been for the attachment imposed by the court. It further criticised the authorities’ failure to act during the twenty-two months following the auctioning of OAO Yuganskneftegaz, as well as the imposition of an unlawful and disproportionate enforcement fee.


50.  The applicant maintained that the proceedings had to be considered in their entirety, that was to say including the  <mask> and the proceedings on the costs and expenses. She considered that the subject matter of the proceedings was in fact not particularly complex but that it had been made complex artificially by the uncompromising privatisation of the State company.


34. The Government lastly submitted that there had been delays in the execution of the judgments in the applicants’ favour owing to lack of funds. They maintained that in 2001 and 2002 about a thousand judgments had been issued against the regional internal-affairs department awarding the claimants about 10,000 Russian roubles each, the aggregate of which was a substantial amount in their view. The regional internal-affairs department had not possessed sufficient funds to pay those awards and had had to apply to the Russian Government and the Ministry of Finance for additional financial resources. It had not been until 2004 that the financial resources requested had at last been allocated to the regional internal-affairs department. The Government also submitted that the applicants’ conduct had contributed to the length of the  <mask>, since after the writs of execution were returned for lack of funds some of them had re-submitted the writs to the competent authorities with a substantial delay.


26.  The applicant complained about the unreasonable delay of the  <mask> and his inability to recover his debt. The Court considers that those complaints concerned the non-enforcement of the applicant’s civil judgment debt and that, accordingly, they fall to be considered under Articles 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:


27.  The Government asked the Court to declare the application inadmissible as an abuse of the right of petition, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. They alleged that the applicant company had omitted to indicate in the application form the existence of the proceedings for opposition to enforcement and the appeal that it had lodged with the Court of Appeal in those proceedings. They further submitted that the applicant company had failed to inform the Court of the fact that the  <mask> had been discontinued in September 2014.


19. The Government submitted that the period which elapsed before the entry into force of the Convention in respect of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia should not be taken into consideration. They further stated that the applicant had not demonstrated any interest in the  <mask> and had failed to request their expedition in a proper manner (see paragraph 8 above).


62. The Government submitted that the case had in fact been of a complex nature as it had required determination of difficult legal issues: the applicant's capacity to act; whether other  <mask> had already been pending between the same parties at the time when the undertaking had requested enforcement of the 1994 settlement; and whether the latter should be regarded as an enforcement order.


248.  The applicant bank also submitted that the seizure of a substantial amount of money from its account was the result of  <mask> in which the domestic courts, as plainly demonstrated above (see paragraphs 160-162, 164, 169-172, 190-195), had committed multiple procedural errors. In particular, the Commercial Court’s decision of 3 October 2003 and instruction of 28 October 2003 had been rendered without a proper adversarial procedure. The applicant bank argued that in those circumstances those proceedings had not offered the necessary procedural guarantees enabling the domestic courts to adjudicate its case effectively and fairly, as required by the State’s positive obligation under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


22.  The applicant put in doubt the willingness of the Bailiffs to enforce the decisions in his favour. He maintained that the  <mask> were barred first by the Law “on the Introduction of a Moratorium on the Forced Sale of Property” and then by the bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor. The applicant submitted that the steps taken by the State were insufficient to ensure his right to have the court decisions given in his favour enforced without undue delay.


23.  The Government invited the Court to reject the application for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They submitted that the applicant could have lodged a constitutional complaint under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act. In support of their argument, the Government produced a copy of the Constitutional Court decision of 2 February 2005 (see paragraph 18 above) in which that court had found a violation of the complainant's right to a hearing within a reasonable time on account of lengthy  <mask>.


16.  The applicant complained that the length of the  <mask> had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. After that complaint has been communicated to the respondent Government, the applicant also complained that the protracted length of the enforcement proceedings had denied him the right of access to a court. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


18. The Government admitted that the  <mask> had been too long, but considered that they had been conducted in accordance with the law, and that the length had not been due to failures to act on the part of State institutions. The parties had been in dispute about the proportion of their financial contribution for the construction of the wall. They further stated that the applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings. In that latter context, they maintained that he had failed to pay the costs for the on-site examination of the wall constructed by the defendant, which fact had led to the suspension of the proceedings for nearly a year and three months (see paragraphs 9 and 10, above).


16.  The Government maintained that the applicant's right to have the judgments in his favour enforced had been never questioned. The Government further argued that the State could not be considered responsible for the debts of its enterprises and the responsibility of the State in this situation was limited to the organisation and proper conduct of  <mask>. The length of the enforcement proceedings had been caused by the critical financial situation of the debtor companies and the Bailiffs' Service had performed all necessary actions and could not be blamed for the delay. The Government further submitted that the judgments of 26 October 2000 and 13 February 2002 had been enforced in full and the judgments of 10 February 2003 and 30 July 2003 – in part.


14.  The Government submitted that the applicant is not a victim of a violation of Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention, as the length of the  <mask> in the applicant's case had been caused by the critical financial situation of the debtor enterprise and the pending bankruptcy proceedings against it. The State authorities could not therefore be held responsible for this delay in the proceedings. The Government noted that the applicant had challenged the alleged omissions and inactivity of the Bailiffs before the domestic courts. The courts, however, found that the Bailiffs were not responsible for the delay in execution.


22.  The Government contended that the period to be taken into consideration began no earlier than 12 January 1995 when the applicant lodged his petition for enforcement. They considered that the enforcement stage of the proceedings was an autonomous procedure which had to be viewed separately and without a reference to the procedure that had preceded it. They maintained that neither at the domestic level nor before the Court did the applicant actually challenge the length of the court proceedings, as opposed to the  <mask>.


33.  The applicant maintained that the company’s debt was attributable to the State. The company had performed a public function, since it had operated a car pound under the strict control of the State authorities, which had determined both its operation procedures and the applicable tariffs. The company had been unable freely to plan its activities, since it had fully depended on the Road Inspectorate’s instructions in its day-to-day activities. Furthermore, the town administration had unlawfully registered the company in excess of its competence. The town administration was the company’s only founder and owner, controlled the company’s activities and gave instructions as to the assets management, namely, it ordered the transfer of property operated by the company to a different company. When the assets were transferred, the company did not have any debts; otherwise, under Articles 61 § 4 and 65 § 1 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 28 above), liquidation would have been possible only pursuant to a court decision, whereas there was no such decision in the present case until 2001. Moreover, after having ordered the transfer, the municipal authorities had not wound the company up. While the other municipal company, “the Housing Exchange Bureau”, benefited from having economic control over the transferred assets, the Arsenal company, which formally continued to exist, was supposed to bear the respective expenses for cleaning, maintenance and electricity. As a result, the company accumulated a debt which it was unable to cover, in the absence of available assets. That permitted the Tax Service to apply to the commercial court with a request for the company’s liquidation. The applicant further alleged that the  <mask> had been defective and, in particular, his request for an injunction had been dismissed.


23.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> had been conducted with due diligence. The delays were attributable partly to the debtor’s indigence and partly to the applicant, who had made a proposal that the enforcement proceedings be continued against the debtor’s immovable assets only on 3 June 2008 and had failed to abide by the court’s orders of 16 April and 8 June 2009. In addition, the Government argued that the present case was complex because of the death of the debtor and the fact that the applicant lived abroad.


20.  The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted the effective remedies available to her. She should have challenged the bailiff’s decision of 2 July 2012 on the discontinuation of the  <mask> before the Administrative Court, a remedy which was both available and effective. As she did not do so, her application should be declared inadmissible under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.


44.  The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. In particular, when the writ of execution was returned to the Narimanov District Court on 10 May 2002 due to impossibility to reinstate the applicant to the same position, the applicant was informed of his right to lodge an application with the court for re-initiation of the  <mask>. This avenue of redress was provided for in Article 23.7 of the Law on Execution of Court Judgments. However, the applicant failed to make use of this remedy. The Government also argued that, taking into account the fact that his position at the Ismayilli Region Forestry had been liquidated, he had a right to apply to the court asking for “modification of the method and procedure of execution” of the judgment in accordance with Article 231.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).


18.  The Government maintained that the judgment in the applicant's favour was enforced in full. They further maintained that the responsibility of the State in this situation was limited to the organisation and proper conduct of  <mask> and that the length of the enforcement proceedings had been caused by the critical financial situation of the debtor company and the energy sector of the Ukrainian economy in general. The Government contended that the Bailiffs' Service had performed all necessary actions and could not be blamed for the delay. The regularity of the enforcement proceedings in the present case was confirmed by the domestic courts. The Government argued that the State could not be considered responsible for the debts of its enterprises and that the State annually allocated substantial amounts from its budget to cover part of disability allowances and other compensatory payments to the workers in the mining industry.


19.  The applicant submitted that the domestic courts had not conducted the  <mask> in an efficient and diligent manner. Despite the seizure orders of 1993, no movable assets had ever been confiscated from the defendant. He further contested the Government’s argument that some delays were attributable to him and stated that the proceedings had never been suspended. On the contrary, his case had been archived for some time as the courts had wrongly regarded it as finished. In addition, the enforcement proceedings aimed at execution of a final court decision – their purpose was not, as argued by the Government, to settle any dispute between the parties. Finally, he maintained that six different judges sat in his case.


12.  The Government argued that this complaint was manifestly ill-founded. The authorities had done their best to enforce the judgment. They had started soliciting a at for the applicant even before the  <mask> had begun. The at had not been immediately available because there had been no funding. A bailiff had several times ﬁned the applicant’s commander for the non-enforcement. The court had several times extended the period of enforcement. The applicant had refused the at in Taganrog.


16.  The applicant doubted the willingness of the Bailiffs to enforce the decisions in her favour. She maintained that the  <mask> were barred first by the Law “on the Introduction of a Moratorium on the Forced Sale of Property” and then by the bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor. The applicant submitted that the steps taken by the State were insufficient to ensure her right to have the judgments enforced without undue delay.


15.  The Government maintained that the judgments in the applicant's favour were enforced in full. They further maintained that the responsibility of the State in this situation had been limited to the organisation and proper conduct of  <mask> and that the length of the enforcement proceedings had been caused by the critical financial situation of the debtor company and the energy sector of the Ukrainian economy in general. The Government contended that the Bailiffs' Service had performed all necessary actions and could not be blamed for the delay. The regularity of the enforcement proceedings in the present case was confirmed by the domestic courts. The Government argued that the State could not be considered responsible for the debts of its enterprises and that the State annually allocated substantial amounts from its budget to cover part of disability allowances and other compensatory payments to the workers in the mining industry.


13.  The Government maintained that the right of the applicant to have a judgment in her favour enforced has been never questioned. The Government further maintained that the limitations of this right in the present case were aimed at the protection of the public interests and did not breach the very essence of the right in question. The Government argued that the State could not be considered responsible for the debts of its enterprises and, consequently, the responsibility of the State was limited to the organisation and proper conduct of  <mask> only. The Government contended that the Bailiffs' Service had performed all necessary actions and could not be blamed for the delay. The Government finally maintained that the length of the enforcement in the present case was caused by a difficult financial situation of the debtor enterprise.


36.  The Government did not dispute the fact that the applicant had been in prison at the time of the service of the first enforcement order. It is also clear from the acknowledgment of the acceptance of service of the first enforcement order that the Krk Municipal Court failed to serve it on the applicant through the prison authorities, as prescribed by section 137 of the Civil Proceedings Act. Instead, it was served on a certain M.K. This error of the Krk Municipal Court leaves the Court with no other choice but to accept the applicant’s allegations that she had learned about the  <mask> only after the second enforcement order had been served on her. It follows that the applicant was unable to appeal against the first enforcement order in time, or to subsequently request the restoration of the proceedings to the status quo ante within the three-month statutory time-limit (see paragraph 20 above).


28.  The applicant submitted that he and his representative had been completely unaware of the fact that the debt had been paid. If it had been paid, the Government had omitted to explain why the applicant had not received any payment and how such non-payment could constitute enforcement of a judgment. The  <mask> had been suspended until 13 February 2012, meaning that the judgment had thus only been “enforced” after seven years of non-enforcement when the case had been communicated to the Government by the Court.


26.  The applicant averred that he could not be blamed for not lodging the warrant of execution with the bailiffs' service until 28 April 2002, because no order had been issued to him before that date as all parties were awaiting the outcome of separate litigation in which a third party had tried to challenge his title to the saw-mill. He further submitted that after the bailiff's decision of 8 January 2003 to discontinue the  <mask> he was not required to apply for a fresh enforcement order. Finally, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the delays in the enforcement of the judgment, saying that by the time the judgment was eventually complied with his property had been ransacked and its condition had deteriorated.


29. The Government did not address the issue of the length of the  <mask> after 25 July 1995. The Court recalls that according to its established case-law, Article 6 § 1 secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal; in this way it embodies the “right to a court”, of which the right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect (see the Philis v. Greece judgment of 27 August 1991, Series A no. 209, p. 20, § 59). However, that right would be illusory if a Contracting State’s domestic legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party. It would be inconceivable that Article 6 § 1 should describe in detail procedural guarantees afforded to litigants – proceedings that are fair, public and expeditious – without protecting the implementation of judicial decisions; to construe Article 6 as being concerned exclusively with access to a court and the conduct of proceedings would be likely to lead to situations incompatible with the principle of the rule of law which the Contracting States undertook to respect when they ratified the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, the Golder v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, pp. 16-18, §§ 34-36). Execution of a judgment given by any court must therefore be regarded as an integral part of the “trial” for the purposes of Article 6; moreover, the Court has already accepted this principle in cases concerning the length of proceedings (see Hornsby v. Greece, judgment of 19 March 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑II, §§40-45, the Di Pede v. Italy and Zappia v. Italy judgments of 26 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, pp. 1383-1384, §§ 20-24, and pp. 1410-1411, §§ 16-20, respectively).


80.  The applicants complained under Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about an interference with their property rights, notably about not having been issued with a building permit for a shopping centre in the first set of proceedings. They also complained about: (a) the length of the administrative proceedings related to the completion of the urban plot of land (see paragraphs 17-23 above) and lack of an effective domestic remedy in that regard, and (b) the length of the  <mask> pursuant to the Commercial Court’s judgment of 7 April 2006 (see paragraph 31-39 above), and lack of an effective domestic remedy in that regard.


15.  The Government indicated that the execution writ issued by the Krasnoarmeyskiy Town Court should have been enforced by the Saratov branch of the Federal Treasury. For some reason it was lost on its way to the bailiff’s office. The applicant knew that the  <mask> were not initiated, however, he failed to lodge a request with the competent court in order to obtain a duplicata of the execution order. In their further submissions the Government also indicated that the applicant did not submit to the Ministry of Finance the application form with his banking information and the writ of execution, as required by Government Decree No. 666, and, consequently, the execution order could not be enforced. Therefore, the applicant’s complaint should be rejected as manifestly ill-founded.


43.  The Government further submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust all domestic remedies, as it had not applied to the State Bailiffs Service for execution of the decision of 26 June 1997 under sections 3 and 18(1) of the  <mask> Act. They noted that the applicant had been informed about this by letter of the Ternopil Regional Administration of 20 December 2000 and the ruling of the Kyiv City Commercial Court of 23 October 2001, but had failed to seek execution. They referred to the relevant case-law of the Court in respect of non‑exhaustion (see Konyukhov v. Ukraine, no. 1858/03, § 20, 17 January 2006) and concluded that the applicant had not given the State bodies any opportunity to remedy the situation over the use of the church premises.


60.  The Government argued that, in so far as the applicant could be said to be wishing to challenge the  <mask> under Article 6 of the Convention, his complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the requirements of the Convention and its Protocols. Moreover, as regards all of these remaining complaints, they raised an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies: a properly formulated constitutional complaint.


18.  The Government argued that the application was inadmissible. The applicant could not claim to be a victim of a breach of the Convention since the courts had ultimately acknowledged that the Military Pensions Office had erred in not complying with the final and valid decision given on 25 August 1995 by the Social Insurance Authority. Furthermore, the applicant had in the end been paid the amounts in arrears, together with statutory interest. They further argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust the relevant domestic remedies. He should have lodged a separate civil action in tort, claiming damages against the State Treasury under Article 417 of the Civil Code for the losses which he had incurred. He could also have instituted  <mask> governed by the Administrative Enforcement Act.


43.  The Government contended that they were not obliged to pay the above debt due to the applicant, as he had neither appealed against the Bailiffs' decision of 22 April 2004 not to open the  <mask>, nor re-submitted the writ of execution at a later date. They further contended that the applicant's claim for non-pecuniary damage was exorbitant and unsubstantiated, and that the finding of a violation would constitute sufficient just satisfaction in the case.


25.  The applicant sought reparation for the pecuniary damage he had sustained, which he put at 82,015,340 Italian lire (ITL) [42,357.39 euros (EUR)], the sum of ITL 70,000,000 [EUR 36,151.98] being the loss of rent for the period from 2 April 1985 (the date when the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice and ordered that the premises be vacated) to 24 March 1996 (when the applicant recovered possession of his flat), the sum of ITL 12,015,340 [EUR 6,205.41] for the costs of the  <mask>.


96.  The Government contested the first applicant’s complaint. They submitted that the  <mask> had lasted only for 15 days and that the Agency had complied fully with the Commercial Court’s judgment. The fact that the first applicant refused to sign the accompanying contract was irrelevant, and the additional changes requested by it had not been within the Agency’s competence. Therefore every further delay in that regard was the first applicant’s fault.


58.  The Government argued that the three sets of proceedings were not related. According to them, the period to be taken into consideration should be that of each set of proceedings. They submitted that, having regard to the length of each set of proceedings, the instances involved, the complexity of the case and the number of claimants who alleged that they had proprietary interests in the property in question, the overall length of the proceedings had not exceeded a reasonable time as required by Article 6 § 1. They furthermore submitted that the applicants’ conduct had caused part of the delay. This was particularly due to their willingness to initiate parallel sets of proceedings based on different qualifications of their claims and to their failure to co-operate with the authorities and to submit the necessary documents during the  <mask>.


27.  The Government, with reference to the information from the Savings Bank of Russia, admitted that the payment received by the applicant in May 2003 had not constituted enforcement of the judgment of 16 January 2001 and stated that the Savings Bank of Russia was ready to pay the amount due pursuant to that judgment on the applicant's first demand. They also argued that on 31 March 2004 a domestic court had ruled that the amount specified in the judgment of 16 January 2001 should be recovered according to the procedure established by the Law on  <mask>, and that the applicant had not applied to the bank or bailiffs for the enforcement.


56.  The applicants argued that the order for their eviction issued by the Poreč Municipal Court had amounted to an interference with their right to respect for their home, notwithstanding the fact that they had not yet been evicted. They accepted that the interference in question was in accordance with the law, but argued that it was not necessary in a democratic society. They maintained that their house should have been exempted from the  <mask> since it had been satisfying their basic housing needs.


26.  The Government argued that the applicant’s complaint was incompatible ratione materiae. According to them, Article 6 did not apply and the applicant did not have a legitimate expectation amounting to a possession since the judgment in his favour had been quashed on 2 September 2004, and he had omitted to appeal against the later decision. Further, he had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies, since he had not applied for an index-linking of the initial award. The award in the part concerning the lump sum had been executed on 21 January 2003. As regards the recalculation of the pension, the period between 31 October 2002 and 9 April 2003 had been justified by the suspension of the  <mask> on 13 February 2003, and the period between 22 December 2003 and 7 April 2004 by another suspension order pending the determination of the pension fund’s complaint against the bailiffs concerning an allegedly unlawfully imposed fine. In any event, the delay in enforcement was justified because, first, the initial judgment had been based on an incorrect application of the domestic pensions law. Second, the non‑enforcement was justified by the quashing of the initial award which, in its turn, had not breached the legal certainty principle. Indeed, the Constitutional Court’s ruling constituted a new circumstance. The annulment was necessary to ensure a uniform application of the domestic law. Therefore, in any event, the complaint was manifestly ill-founded.


91.  The Government submitted that the first applicant had failed to exhaust all effective domestic remedies. In respect of the complaints related to the length of the administrative and  <mask> it had not made use of a request for review and an action for fair redress provided by the Right to the Trial within a Reasonable Time Act (see paragraph 78 above). Even though a request for review is effective only as of 4 September 2013, the Government considered that the first applicant had been required to avail itself thereof, especially with regard to the proceedings for completion of an urban plot, which were still ongoing. Had it made use of it, it could also have made use of an action for fair redress and obtained compensation. In any event, it could have made use of a constitutional appeal.


70.  The applicant disagreed. He stated that the enforcement of judgments against legal entities that were not bankrupt was a matter for the State bailiffs. Once the entity at issue was declared bankrupt, the bailiffs had to refer the writs of execution to the liquidation commission for the relevant company. That did not mean that the  <mask> were to be terminated. The liquidation commission in the present case had been set up by a resolution of the Zaporizhzhia Regional Arbitration Court on 20 August 1997 (see paragraph 9 above). However, it had not existed in reality for almost four years, so it had been impossible to appeal against its actions or inactivity (see paragraphs 17 and 35 above). He maintained that there had been a delay on the part of the bailiffs and the domestic courts in failing to oversee effectively the procedure for liquidating the IBF and in paying compensation for its debts. He had complained of this delay to the domestic courts, which had acknowledged it but had made no reparation for the infringement of his rights. He further claimed that, notwithstanding the fact that it was not his duty to supervise the liquidation commission’s work, he had nevertheless tried to complain to it about the failure to enforce the judgments of 24 February 1998. However, he had received no response to his complaints from the de facto chairman of the liquidation commission, and the Regional Commercial Court had not examined his complaints on the merits.


29.  The Government seem to implicate that the lengthy non-enforcement was not imputable to the State authorities because the enforcement had to be suspended in view of the pending appeal proceedings. The Court notes the reasons advanced by the respondent Government for not having filed copies of the judge’s letter of 26 September 2001 (see paragraph 17 above) nor of any formal ruling on the suspension of the  <mask>, pursuant to Article 34 § 6 of the 1999 Law “on Enforcement Proceedings”, as in force at the material time. In any event, the Court considers that the Government did not explain the lengthy delay in the said appeal proceedings which were limited to rather simple admissibility questions, the Zmiyivskyy Court having found as early as on 10 July 2001 that the appeal had been lodged out of time.


12.  The Government contended that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as he had not appealed against that judgment with the aim of changing the debtor in the  <mask>. They maintained that it had been the responsibility of the State Court Administration, and not of the Ministry of Finance, to pay the special retired judges’ allowance. They therefore proposed that the application be declared inadmissible.


74. The Government claimed that the delay in enforcement had been caused by the applicant’s failure to submit by the applicant himself the writ of execution to the Ministry of Finance. However, the fact that the judgment debt was ultimately paid to the applicant demonstrates that submission of the writ of execution to the Ministry of Finance was not a necessary element of the  <mask>. Therefore the Court is not persuaded that the delay was attributable to the applicant.


34.  The applicant maintained that the failure to enforce the judgment of 30 July 2008 had constituted a violation of her Convention rights. By its judgment of 30 July 2008, the Administrative Court had obliged the Mayor’s office to conclude the agreement mentioned in the decision of 10 October 2002 no. 1785-A with the applicant. The domestic authorities had had no right to deviate from this clear judgment. The other plots of land offered to the applicant had been unacceptable since they had been located elsewhere than at the specific address identified in the judgment and they had been in an area where business would have been less profitable than at the address indicated in the judgment. The applicant had proposed nine different acceptable new locations but they all had been refused by the Mayor’s office. Although the applicant had taken all possible steps for its enforcement, the judgment had remained unenforced for more than eight years. By discontinuing the  <mask>, the domestic authorities had violated the applicant’s right under Article 6 of the Convention.


64.  The Government commented that the applicant had included surcharges in respect of the publication of the judgment which it had failed to justify. Moreover, the amount of EUR 21,400 imposed as a fine by in separate  <mask> was not to be reimbursed since it had been caused by the applicant’s failure to publish the judgment properly. Finally, they argued that the costs reimbursed to Mr Stadler were excessive and were not properly itemised.


70.  The applicants did not challenge any of the loan agreements before the national courts in appropriate proceedings. For example, they could have instituted proceedings seeking to have the contract declared null and void (ništav) or voidable (pobojan) (see sections 322 and 330 of the Obligations Act, paragraph 47 above).  This implies that the applicants freely entered into those agreements and freely stipulated that the loans could be secured using their house as collateral. The applicants must therefore have been aware that their house would be sold to secure the payment of any outstanding debts after the time-limit set for the repayment of the loan had expired. When the enforcement order for the sale of their house was issued, the applicants did not challenge that order by means of an appeal, as provided for under section 11 of the Enforcement Act (see paragraph 42 above). By not objecting to the enforcement order, which specifically concerned the sale of their house, the applicants tacitly agreed to its sale in the  <mask>.


28.  The applicants put in doubt the willingness of the Bailiffs to enforce the decisions in their favour. They maintained that the  <mask> were barred first by the Law “on the Introduction of a Moratorium on the Forced Sale of Property” and then by the bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor. The applicants submitted that the steps taken by the State were insufficient to ensure their right to have court decisions given in their favour enforced without undue delay.


44.  The applicants regretted that the judgment of 21 November 2001 had not been enforced and pointed out that in the ten years during which the  <mask> had been pending the bailiffs had taken no steps to force the Company to comply with the judgment and the Government had not been able to point to any such measures having been taken. They further noted that, as a result of their claim against the Company not being included on the list of creditors, a chance to have the judgment enforced had been missed as a result of negligence. Given that the bankruptcy proceedings had been opened in respect of the Company precisely in view of its inability to pay its debts to those creditors who had been put on the list, it was absurd to expect that the Company would retain any funds by the end of the bankruptcy proceedings to cover debts falling outside the list of its creditors.


55.  The applicants maintained their complaints. In particular, Mr Nazarov stated, as regards the housing owned by him since 1999, the authorities and the first-instance court issuing the initial judgment in his favour had been aware of that circumstance and took it into account. As regards the share in a flat in August 2009-2011, that circumstance arose after the judgment and was largely due to the authorities’ failure to enforce the judgment of 13 January 2009 within the two-month time-limit set in the domestic law. In any event, the judgment in his favour had not been cancelled or amended and was to be enforced, as confirmed by the domestic courts’ findings in 2014 and 2015. The courts on two occasions examined the arguments raised by the Government and rejected them as irrelevant. The 2016-2017 proceedings, brought by the defendant in military courts, were unfair, the decision to discontinue the  <mask> had been taken in disregard of the earlier courts’ findings on the same matter, and the final judgment in his favour still had to be executed.


22.  The applicant contested the Constitutional Court's finding as (i) in his opinion, the  <mask> had been unlawful, (ii) in his constitutional complaint, and contrary to the Constitutional Court's reasoning, he had duly specified the harm suffered and (iii) the Constitutional Court had failed to examine a part of the proceedings complained of without providing any reasons for doing so. The applicant further alleged that the Constitutional Court's finding lacked both a compensatory and an accelerating effect. In view of the above, the applicant argued that he was still a victim and that he was not obliged to lodge a fresh constitutional complaint.


29.  The applicants each requested that the State be ordered to pay, from its own funds: (i) the sums awarded by the final judgments rendered in their favour, as well as the costs of the  <mask>; and (ii) 2,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. They did not ask for reimbursement of the costs incurred before the Court.


43.  The applicant argued that he had exhausted all possible remedies capable of providing redress. He had challenged the bailiff’s decision on the termination of the  <mask> before the Administrative Court. The Government had failed to explain how the return of the writ of execution to the District Court could have provided redress for the non‑enforcement issue. Even if he had obtained a judgment favourable to him, it would only have meant having another writ of execution to enforce. Moreover, the applicant pointed out that another position would not have been offered to him had he not lodged an application with the Court which was then communicated to the Government.


35.  The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to reintroduce the writs of execution returned to them in 2001, which therefore meant that the applicants had lost interest in the enforcement of the judgment at issue. The Government further maintained that the applicant had not applied to the Court in order to be recognised as the successor to his deceased wife. They also contended that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies as they had not lodged a claim with the domestic courts to challenge the inactivity of the State Bailiffs’ Service or sought to expedite the  <mask> in his case. They proposed therefore to declare this application inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded or for non-exhaustion.