17.  The applicant alleged in particular that he had been denied a fair hearing on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Ankara State Security Court which tried and convicted him. He further complained that the national courts had based their decisions on his police statement which had been taken under duress. Finally, he argued that the criminal proceedings against him had not been concluded within a  <mask>. In this respect he invoked Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention.


32.  The Government averred that the proceedings had been fair. The applicant had been granted access to court as his case had been examined by both the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court, which were both independent and impartial courts established by law. The Administrative Court had conducted the proceedings within a  <mask> and in accordance with the relevant procedural law. That court had addressed all the arguments presented by both the applicant and the Government of Croatia, and rendered a reasoned judgment based on the legislation in force. In particular, the Government argued that the principle of equality of arms had also been respected in the applicant’s case and that he had had the opportunity to present his arguments to the Administrative Court under the same conditions as the opposing party.


56.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention that in the decisions of the national courts in the civil proceedings he was treated as having committed a criminal offence. He further complained, under Article 5 §§ 3 and 5 of the Convention, that his pre-trial detention had exceeded a  <mask> and that he had no right to compensation. Lastly, he invoked Article 7 of the Convention but without further elaboration.


78.  The applicant submitted that his pre-trial detention had not been based on sufficient reasons and had been in contravention of the  <mask> requirement provided for in Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. In his view, the Government’s assertion that he might have absconded, if released, was contrary to the circumstances of the case. In particular, when released on bail, he had duly appeared in court for the trial hearings. Nor had there been any evidence before the domestic judicial authorities that he had put undue pressure on witnesses. The prosecutor’s allegation that he was the holder of a foreign passport had not been confirmed by any evidence.


39.  The applicant argued that he could not have known that the decision of the Administrative Court of 16 January 2003 concerned his administrative action of 31 December 2001. That was because he had withdrawn the civil action he had lodged with the Pula Municipal Court, which had later been transferred to the Administrative Court, and not his administrative action. He had never received any decision or notification from the Administrative Court that these two actions had been merged - if indeed they had been – or that the Administrative Court would decide to examine them together. Therefore, he had complained to the Constitutional Court that he had not received the decision of the Administrative Court concerning his administrative action within a  <mask>. The applicant also argued that he could not have brought an action under section 67 of the Administrative Disputes Act or a civil action for damages against the State since he had not known that there had been an unlawful act until he had been so informed by the decision of the Constitutional Court.


67.  The Government submitted that the judgment of 7 December 2000 was fully enforced between October 2000 and February 2001, that is, within a  <mask>. The applicant did not submit the writ of execution to the liquidation commission and did not make a complaint against the insolvency manager to a court. The insolvency manager in her letters informed the applicant that her claims under the judgment had been included in the registry of the creditor’s claims by mistake.


136.  The applicants submitted that the case ought to have been given priority, as required also by the domestic legislation. Nonetheless, the proceedings concerning the interim order as well as the first applicant's claim to be granted custody and contact were not conducted within a  <mask>. In addition, the applicants claimed that despite the fact that O.Č. had been preventing contact between the applicants, the court had failed to enforce the interim order.


41. The Government alleged that the domestic courts had, in general, complied with the  <mask> requirement as they had made it possible for the expert examinations to be carried out promptly, had cooperated in collecting evidence from the witnesses and had even twice taken measures to discipline the applicant's representatives, that is by discontinuing the civil proceedings. At the same time, the Government acknowledged that on several occasions one of the defendants, a State authority, had defaulted in attending the court hearings. They stated, however, that having regard to the overall length of the proceedings, the delay of approximately five months thereby incurred was negligible.


17.  The applicants both complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of the non-communication of the written opinions submitted by the public prosecutors to the Supreme Administrative Court concerning their appeal requests, which had denied them the opportunity to reply and had thus infringed the principle of equality of arms. The applicants also maintained under the same provision that they had been denied a trial within a  <mask>.


26.  The Government next observed that that there were two sets of proceedings in the applicant's case: contentious and administrative proceedings. As to the contentious proceedings, they ended on 29 November 1999, more than six months before the application was lodged with the Court. As to the second set of proceedings, the Government considered that their length did not exceed a  <mask> within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, because it amounted to one year and four months. They considered therefore that these complaints should be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded.


56. The applicant disagreed, stating that the complexity of the case was not sufficient to discharge the State of its obligation to observe the  <mask> requirement. He noted, in particular, that the case had been suspended before the Kaunas City District Court for almost five years. The applicant conceded that he had been under an obligation to inform the court when his relative’s state of health would allow her to participate in the proceedings. Nonetheless, he argued that it was the court which was primarily responsible for the swift resolution of the case. The applicant further observed that after the decision of the Supreme Court of 12 September 2000, by which the case had been returned to the first-instance court for a fresh examination, the Kaunas City District had only given its decision on 18 February 2004. Consequently, the length of these proceedings had been excessive.


16.  The Government pointed out that the case comprised three separate pre-trial investigations with related facts and one additional investigation. During these investigations the police had conducted a search and seized a large amount of material. After the pre-trial stage, the case file comprised some 1,200 pages. That stage of the proceedings, including the consideration of charges, took two years and some two and a half months, which the Government considered normal in cases concerning comprehensive business offences. The Government contended that the case was complex and that the time taken before the trial courts, one year and some five months for the District Court and two and a half years for the Court of Appeal, could therefore not be considered excessive. The proceedings before the Supreme Court had lasted less than four months. In the Government’s view there had been no unnecessary delays in the proceedings on the part of the authorities. As to the conduct of the applicant, the Government pointed out that the Court of Appeal had extended the time-limit for lodging an appeal at his request. The Government concluded that the proceedings had been conducted within a  <mask>.


19.  The Government expressed the view that the first applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a hearing within a  <mask>. They argued that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged such a violation, had ordered the Zvolen District Court to act and had awarded adequate just satisfaction. Additionally, the case was transferred to the Lučenec District Court shortly after the Constitutional Court's judgment and the first applicant did not exhaust domestic remedies in respect of the period of the proceedings before that court, as well as before the Regional Court.


15.  The Government argued that there was no breach of the  <mask> requirement of Article 6 § 1. The Government did not submit that the proceedings were particularly complex but argued that they could not be viewed as straightforward: the applicant's damages claims required a ten-day trial period due to extensive and expert evidence adduced by the applicant and the proceedings had resulted in a lengthy judgment and an appeal. In addition, a substantial proportion of the delay in the proceedings was caused by the applicant himself. In particular, he was responsible for an initial two year delay in serving the summons. He had pursued a motion for judgment in default even after the defence had been served and failed to serve his list of documents until five months after it was due to be served. The applicant's solicitors had been expected to set down the case for trial within 28 days of 25 October 2000 but had not done so by 19 January 2001. The applicant had failed to provide adequate disclosure of documents in 2001 and failed to comply with the revised timetable then given by the court. Finally the applicant was responsible for further delays while he produced a further expert's report, leading to the postponement of the trial for six weeks.


28.  The Government argued that in view of the Constitutional Court’s judgment (nález) of 29 April 2004 the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, of a violation of his right to a hearing within a  <mask>. They pointed out that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged the infringement of the applicant’s right of which he complained before the Court. The Constitutional Court further provided the applicant compensatory redress. The Government considered this redress adequate and sufficient and maintained that it was compatible with the relevant principles and practice of both the Constitutional Court and the Court.


26.  The applicant contested the Government’s arguments. He submitted that no effective remedy existed in relation to his complaint. This was evident from the lack of case-law in respect of violations by the State of the right to trial within a  <mask>. The case of Yiallouros was a civil action where damages had been sought for the violation of constitutional rights between individuals and not between individuals and the State as in the instant case. In any event, according to the applicant, it was inappropriate for the judicial authorities, against which a length of proceedings complaint would be directed, to judge the issue.


27.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s case had required no special diligence but had been rather complex. Moreover, in order to give a decision in the applicant’s case, the Constitutional Court had to decide first on the constitutional challenges to the applicable substantive law. In the Government’s view, the delay resulting thereof did not appear excessive because an obligation to hear cases within  <mask> could not be construed for the Constitutional Court in the same way as for an ordinary court, due to its special role as a guardian of the Constitution. In arguing so they relied on the Court’s case-law (see Tričković v. Slovenia, no. 39914/98, § 63, 12 June 2001; and Đuričić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 67399/01, 9 October 2003). The applicant contested those arguments.


78.  The applicant disagreed, noting, in particular, the small amount of compensation and the lack of its connection with the length of the proceedings. He emphasised that a federal law of 30 April 2010, which introduced the possibility of obtaining compensation for a violation of the right to a hearing within a  <mask>, had come into force after the rehabilitation proceedings.


34.  The applicant submitted that the proceedings she had been required to undertake had not been decided within a  <mask>. The property was taken in 1958 and the Government only initiated compensation proceedings eighteen years later, in 1976. Pending the outcome of those proceedings, which she did not consider effective, as they could never have resulted in an adequate award of compensation, the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings in 1996, which were concluded in 1999 at first instance and in 2007 on an appeal filed by the Government. Subsequently, the taking having been found to be null and void, proceedings before the LAB became in her view superfluous and were abandoned. Thus, after fifty years, during which Malta was under the protection of the Convention (prior to Malta's ratification, the United Kingdom had extended the protection of the Convention also to Maltese territory), the applicant had still not been awarded compensation for the taking.


32. The applicant complained that his appeal had not been examined on the merits, given that the Court of Appeal had wrongly considered it as submitted out of time. He also complained that his case had not been heard within a  <mask>. The Court considers that these complaints fall to be examined under Article 6 of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


48.  The Government felt it important to explain the criteria used in Italian law and pointed out that the finding of a violation was independent of the existence of non-pecuniary damage. The Court of Cassation had asserted, though, that non-pecuniary damage was a normal consequence of a breach of the reasonable-time requirement that from then on did not have to be proved by the applicant. According to the Court of Cassation, it was up to the State to prove the contrary, that is, provide proof that in a particular case an inordinately long wait for a judgment had not occasioned the applicant any anxiety or distress but had been advantageous or that the applicant had been aware of having instituted or contested proceedings on the basis of erroneous arguments (Court of Cassation 29.3-11.5.2004 no. 8896), for example where they had been well aware from the outset that they had no chance of winning. Furthermore, under Article 41 the Court awarded just satisfaction if such was appropriate, so a finding of a violation could suffice. Accordingly, the Court should not be the only institution able to vary the amounts it awarded to the point of awarding nothing. They reiterated that, under Italian law, it was only the years beyond the  <mask> that had to be taken into account when assessing the damage.


25.   The Government indicated that the applicant association’s right to a court had not been breached. First, the supervisory review had been instigated within a  <mask> after the decision of the Federal Commercial Court. Second, the Presidium of the Supreme Commercial Court had acted in compliance with the Code on Commercial Procedure and, thus, the applicant association had not been unprepared for such a development. Finally, the supervisory review had aimed at remedying a fundamental defect of the proceedings before the lower courts, namely the lack of jurisdiction of the commercial courts to decide on that category of disputes.


65.  The Government maintained that Article 13 required the existence of a systemic opportunity to achieve redress, regardless of problems which could appear under specific circumstances when exhausting remedies and which could possibly relieve the applicant of the obligation to make use of an existing and usually effective remedy (see, mutatis mutandis, Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 32704/04, § 136, 17 December 2009). Not even the fact alone that in the specific case and on the basis of a remedy which is otherwise effective the applicant was not provided redress at all, or to an extent that would not relieve him of the status of a victim of a violation of the right to a hearing within a  <mask>, could lead to the conclusion that an effective remedy of violation of the said right was not available to the applicant (see Gordon-Krajcer v. Poland, no. 5943/07, §§ 32-34, 7 July 2009, and Tekiela v. Poland, no. 35785/07, §§ 33-35, 13 January 2009).


78.  The Government contested that argument and considered the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant compatible with the “ <mask> requirement” set out in Article 6 of the Convention. They acknowledged that the applicant’s conviction had been quashed twice on appeal, and that the trial court had returned the case file to the prosecutor, which had contributed to the length of the proceedings. The Government further submitted that the applicant’s lawyers and the interpreter had failed to appear in court on several occasions, which had also protracted the proceedings. Lastly, they pointed out that the hearing of the case had been adjourned on one occasion in view of the applicant’s counsel’s request to study the material in the case file.


43.  The applicant disagreed and maintained his complaints. He submitted, in particular, that despite two judicial orders under Article 250t of the CCP, there had been no actual acceleration of the administrative proceedings in question. Resorting to that remedy for the third time would have had no better chances of genuine success. In response to his second action under Article 250t of the CCP, the Regional Court had imposed a fine on the Land Office, but in the absence of any accelerating effect this had had no benefit for him since the fine had not been payable to him but to the State. The constitutional judgment in his favour had not been concerned with the alleged violation of his right to a hearing within a  <mask> by the Land Office, as complained of in the present case, but with the violation of his right to a fair hearing by the Regional Court. On a careful reading, the precedent relied on by the Government (see paragraphs 34 et seq. and 40 above) actually disproved the effectiveness of the remedy under the State Liability Act. It was true that the domestic law had enabled him repeatedly to use various remedies, but the reality was that the domestic courts dealing with those remedies were not capable of actually resolving his problem. Lastly, in so far as the Government could be understood as attaching some responsibility for the length of the proceedings to his procedural behaviour, the applicant strongly denied any such responsibility.


123.  The Government submitted that the overall duration of the proceedings against the applicant had not exceeded the  <mask> requirement under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In the course of the trial the court had dealt with a considerable number of requests filed by the participants to the proceedings; it had examined extensive material from the case file (four co-defendants and over twenty witnesses had been questioned and over fifteen expert examinations had been carried out); on a number of occasions the hearings had been adjourned owing to the non-attendance of witnesses, jurors or defendants.


32.  The Government further argued that the delays caused by the changes in the composition of the Town Court should be attributed to the applicant because he had successfully petitioned for them. Bearing in mind the prominent place which the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal holds in a democratic society (see, inter alia, De Cubber v. Belgium, judgment of 26 October 1984, Series A no. 86, p. 16, § 30), the Court considers that the State should bear the responsibility for a delay incurred through a successful challenge of the trial bench by a party to the proceedings. If a court accepts a party's motion for a change in the composition of the bench, it inevitably means that the fears of that party as to the impartiality and independence of the tribunal were justified. The Court further reiterates that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention imposes on Contracting States the duty to organise their judicial system in such a way that their courts can meet the obligation to decide the cases within a  <mask> (see, among other authorities, Löffler v. Austria, no. 30546/96, § 57, 3 October 2000). Therefore, the responsibility for an aggregated delay of approximately twelve months caused by the changes in the composition of the Town Court rests ultimately with the State (cf. Marchenko v. Russia, no. 29510/04, § 39, 5 October 2006).


36.  The applicant argued that the proceedings concerning a plot of land had lasted between 1996 and 2007. He stated that the proceedings had not been complex, that he had not contributed by his conduct to their prolongation and that the domestic courts had caused delays incompatible with the  <mask> requirement guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.


68.  The applicant argued that the case-law relied upon by the Government could not be applied when the complaints concerned the overall length of proceedings, which was the situation in the present case. In his view the principles from the Lazić case were applicable only in respect of the complaints concerning a new violation of the right to a hearing within  <mask> which had taken place in the period after the first domestic court’s decision on that matter. Therefore, he considered that, by lodging his complaint about the overall length of proceedings with the Constitutional Court, he had exhausted domestic remedies.


68.  The Government argued that the applicant had sufficient time to prepare his defence. Referring to the case of Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium (judgment of 10 February 1983, Series A no. 58, pp. 20-21, § 41), they argued that “sufficient time” was to be assessed in view of the circumstances of the case, including the complexity of the case and the stage of the trial. The applicant was brought to the police station at 17h30, while the court hearing took place at 19h30. During this time he failed to avail himself of his procedural rights, despite all the efforts of the police officers. The applicant was familiarised with the materials of the case against him and informed about his right to lodge motions and challenges, which he failed to do. The applicant signed the record of an administrative offence voluntarily and, by doing so, he agreed with its content and in essence admitted his guilt. Taking into account that the applicant signed the record, refused to have a lawyer, did not lodge any motions and did not avail himself of other procedural rights, the police officers considered two hours to be sufficient for the preparation of the applicant's defence. Furthermore, the applicant had the right to request an adjournment of the examination of his case, which he also failed to do. By failing to request such an adjournment, the applicant admitted that he had had ample time to prepare his defence. Finally, by immediately presenting the case to the court, the police officers ensured that the trial took place within a  <mask>.


150.  The applicant was of the view that the proceedings had exceeded a  <mask>. In particular, the first hearing had been held more than three months after the institution of the proceedings. The arbitrary re‑qualification of the action as one under the general tort law, made by the Plovdiv District Court on 23 January 1998, had unduly delayed the proceedings until 2 November 1998. The adjourning of the case on 4 February 1999, which had occurred because of the absence of the prosecutor, had led to a further delay of fifty‑five days. The second, completely unwarranted attempt of the Plovdiv District Court to discontinue the proceedings had occasioned a further delay of eleven months. The delay in the examination of the “complaint about delays” by the chairperson of the Plovdiv Regional Court had caused the adjourning of the hearing listed for 8 May 2000. The Plovdiv Regional Court had taken more than six months to hold a hearing pursuant to the applicant’s appeal. Likewise, the Supreme Court of Cassation had listed a hearing for more than fourteen months after the lodging of the appeal on points of law.


28.  The Government submitted that the present restitution case had been complex. They further submitted that the applicants had contributed to the length of the proceedings as they had not properly specified their action in time, had failed to excuse their absence at the hearing on 4 June 1996 and had not tried to accelerate the proceedings. While the District Court, Supreme Court and constitutional jurisdiction had examined the applicants’ case within a  <mask>, the Government acknowledged that there had been some delays in the proceedings before the Regional Court, caused by staffing and technical conditions.


40.  The applicants claimed jointly 8,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, referring to the Court's case-law. They stated that the anxiety suffered by them had been exacerbated by the fact that at the relevant time inflation had run high and with the passage of time the applicants had practically lost the value of their claim. In the applicants' view, where a State had chosen – as Bulgaria had done – to apply, in court judgments, low interest rates fixed by law in disregard of the inflation, the judicial authorities of such a State must undertake special measures to secure the right to a trial within a  <mask> as any failure to do so undermined the very essence of the right to a court.


79.  The Government explained that under section 15(1) and (2)(a) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 48 above), individuals had standing to lodge a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court claiming a breach of their Convention rights. Having regard to the Constitutional Court’s new practice of granting compensation or redress in the form of an award of costs to a complainant in cases in which it found that the proceedings had lasted unreasonably long, a constitutional complaint had to be classified as an effective remedy to assert the right to a hearing within a  <mask> under Article 6 § 1.


24.  The Government raised an objection that the applicant cannot be considered a “victim”, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, of a violation of his right to a hearing within a  <mask>. The Court notes that this issue falls to be determined in the light of the principles established under the Court's case-law (Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 69‑107, ECHR 2006‑... and Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 178‑213, ECHR 2006 - ...).


34.  The Government disputed this allegation, submitting that the proceedings at issue had not exceeded a  <mask>. They submitted that the applicant's case was a complicated inheritance dispute. There were three parties to the case: the applicant, the Treasury and the Darülaceze. There were other proceedings pending at the same time concerning the same inheritance (paragraphs 11 and 13). The domestic court had to wait for the outcome of these proceedings.


58.  The Government argued that the applicant had had sufficient time to prepare her defence. Referring to the case of Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium (judgment of 10 February 1983, Series A no. 58, pp. 20-21, § 41), they argued that “sufficient time” was to be assessed in view of the circumstances of the case, including the complexity of the case and the stage of the trial. On 7 April 2003 the applicant was brought to the police station at 7.30 p.m., while the court hearing took place at about 9.30 p.m. On 9 April 2003 the respective hours were 2.30 p.m. and 5 p.m. During both periods she failed to avail herself of her procedural rights, despite all the efforts of the police officers. The applicant was familiarised with the materials of the cases against her and informed about her right to lodge motions and challenges, which she failed to do. On both occasions the applicant signed the record of an administrative offence voluntarily and, by doing so, she agreed with its content and in essence admitted her guilt. Taking into account that the applicant signed the records, refused to have a lawyer, did not lodge any motions and did not avail herself of other procedural rights, the police officers considered these periods to be sufficient for the preparation of the applicant’s defence. Furthermore, the applicant had the right to request an adjournment of the examination of her cases, which she also failed to do. By failing to request such an adjournment, the applicant admitted that she had had ample time to prepare her defence. Finally, by immediately presenting the cases to the court, the police officers ensured that the trials took place within a  <mask>.


37.  The Government submitted that the total amount awarded by the Chamber was exorbitant and inconsistent with the spirit of Article 41, which provided only for the award of just satisfaction for the damage sustained. They added that, when examining other cases concerning Greece in which it had found more serious violations than that of the right to a hearing within a  <mask>, the Court had awarded smaller sums. In their opinion, in cases concerning the length of proceedings, the Court should vary the application of Article 41 depending on the number of individuals involved. In particular, they considered that the costs of proceedings and the legitimate interests in issue were completely different according to whether the litigants had applied to the courts collectively or individually. The same was true in respect of the possible frustration experienced as a result of undue delay in judicial proceedings. Turning to the impugned proceedings, launched by an application to have a decision set aside, the number of applicants could have had no impact on the eventual outcome. The Government concluded that the Grand Chamber should reduce the total amount awarded by the Chamber in respect of non-pecuniary damage.


30.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted all effective domestic remedies available to him. In particular, he had failed to lodge a request for review and an action for fair redress provided by the Right to a Trial within a  <mask> Act (see paragraph 21 above). He had also failed to make use of a constitutional appeal (see paragraphs 16-20 above).


20.  The Government disagreed, arguing that the proceedings in their entirety had been fair. They referred to Fejde v. Sweden (judgment of 29 October 1991, Series A no. 212‑C), submitting that, as in that case, the Court of Appeal had considered that the appeal did not raise any question of fact or law which could not be adequately resolved on the basis of the case file. The actions of the applicant outside the building were undisputed: all that was disputed was the applicant’s intention in raising the hammer, and the Court of Appeal had been able to determine the facts on the basis of the case file. The Government also pointed out that other considerations, including the right to a trial within a  <mask> and the related need for the expeditious handling of the courts’ case-load, had to be taken into account in determining the need for an oral hearing at second instance. Finally they argued that it followed from the domestic legislation that persons, who had no information material to the case, need not be called as witnesses. Considering S.H.’s evidence at the pre-trial stage, it was highly improbable that hearing S.H. would have changed the appellate court’s assessment of the case or that it would have been beneficial to the outcome of the applicant’s appeal.


80.  The Government submitted that the fact that the time-limit of ten days laid down by the Prison Administration Act had been exceeded could not be regarded as a breach of the obligation to conduct a judicial review. The court responsible for the execution of sentences had always ruled within a  <mask> given the time needed to investigate cases. In the instant case the delay in responding had not resulted in the applicant’s being denied access to a court.


10.  The applicant alleged that the length of the administrative proceedings exceeded the  <mask> requirement, in breach of Article 6 of the Convention. He further maintained, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, that the default interest paid on the compensation awarded by the İstanbul Administrative Court was insufficient. The Government submitted that the case had been complex and that there had been no delay in the proceedings which could be attributed to the authorities. The Government further submitted that the amount of compensation paid to the applicant had sufficiently compensated him for the damage he had suffered.


37.  The applicant argued that the domestic courts had not decided her case within a  <mask>. She denied causing any delay in the proceedings. Regarding the delay of more than four years before replying to the second defendant’s request for further and better particulars (see paragraph 13 above), she noted that the second defendant had not reiterated the initial request, nor sought an order from the High Court directing her to reply. She pointed out that in mid-2005 the second defendant changed solicitor, retaining the same firm that was already representing the first defendant. She inferred that, having already received further and better particulars in relation to the claim against the first defendant, the solicitors no longer required further details from her regarding the claim against the second defendant. It could not therefore be said that this had delayed the hearing of the case in the High Court.


81.  The applicant’s complaint concerns the detention pending trial, in respect of which this Court has constantly held that the presumption under Article 5 is in favour of release. As established in Neumeister v. Austria (27 June 1968, § 4, Series A no. 8), the second limb of Article 5 § 3 does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to trial within a  <mask> or granting him provisional release pending trial. Until conviction, he must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once his continuing detention ceases to be reasonable (as confirmed in McKay, cited above, § 41).


38.  The applicant argued that the overall duration of the proceedings was not in line with the requirement that proceedings be concluded within a  <mask>. The different sets of proceedings had been brought between 2 February 1998 and 6 October 1998, and had lasted until 29 November 2005, thus more than seven years and nine months for the longest, and seven years and a little more than one month for the shortest. The case came before three levels of jurisdiction. The applicant also maintained that no complex question of law or fact had had to be determined.


22.  The Government concurred with the Constitutional Court in that the length of the proceedings in this case had been unreasonable. However, they expressed the view that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a hearing within a  <mask>. They argued that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged such a violation and the amount of just satisfaction awarded had not been manifestly inadequate in the circumstances of the case.


86.  The applicant complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that both the Ankara State Security Court and the public prosecutor who had brought the charges against him had not been impartial and had infringed a number of procedural requirements of a fair trial. He also submitted under the same head that the criminal proceedings against him had not been concluded within a  <mask>. Lastly, the applicant alleged, under Article 6 § 3 (b) of the Convention, that the Chief Public Prosecutor’s submissions to the Court of Cassation had never been served on him, thus depriving him of the opportunity to put forward any counter-arguments.


35.  The applicants contested the above argument and argued that although they had turned to the Constitutional Court, the latter's decision had not provided them with any redress. Pointing to the quoted judgments of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 13 above) the applicants argued that termination of the proceedings in those two cases had not been an obstacle to finding a violation of those applicants' right to a hearing within a  <mask>.


22.  The Government maintained that the period to be taken into consideration had begun on 11 September 1997 when the Convention entered into force in respect of Ukraine. In their view, the applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings by requesting adjournment of hearings, by failing to appear before the courts on several occasions and by introducing procedural requests and appeals, and that there had been no significant periods of inactivity attributable to the domestic authorities. The Government argued that the proceedings, including the enforcement stage, had been completed within a  <mask>.


81.  The Government pointed out that in the judgment of 13 July 2006 the Constitutional Court had admitted that in proceedings no. E 182/98 the Bardejov District Court had violated the applicant’s right to a hearing within a  <mask>. They also drew the Court’s attention to the reasons for which the Constitutional Court decided not to award any just satisfaction to the applicant. As to the duration of the proceedings concerning the applicant’s requests for enforcement of 25 May 1998 and 10 June 1998, the applicant’s complaint was not manifestly ill-founded.


21.  The Government objected that, in respect of the proceedings examined by the Constitutional Court, the applicants could no longer claim to be victims of a violation of their right to a hearing within a  <mask>. They argued that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged such a violation, had ordered the District Court to avoid further delays and the amount of just satisfaction awarded was not manifestly inadequate in the circumstances of the case.


16.  The applicant complained that his detention on remand exceeded the  <mask> requirement. He also contended that he had no effective remedy to challenge the lawfulness of his detention on remand. In respect of his complaints the applicant relied on Articles 5 § 3 and 13 of the Convention. However, the Court considers that the applicant’s second complaint should be examined from the standpoint of Article 5 § 4, rather than Article 13.


40.  The Government submitted that the Zalaegerszeg High Court was a “tribunal established by law” as being part of the ordinary court system in Hungary. The reassignment of a case from a court with general territorial competence to another was a well-known legal institution both in Hungarian and other European laws. Reassignments were to be applied only in exceptional cases as a temporary measure with a view to alleviate the serious regional imbalances between the workloads of courts and to eliminate excessive backlogs hindering the conclusion of judicial proceedings within a  <mask>. They took place between courts and not between judges. The assignment of a case to a judge (or to a judicial formation) at the assignee court remained subject to the generally applicable rules governing the allocation of cases, determined by the president of the assignee court in accordance with the law. Therefore, due to the designation of the assignee court in accordance with the law and due to the subsequent allocation of the case to the assignee judge in accordance with the generally applicable rules, the judge having actually proceeded in the applicant’s case became a “lawful judge” for the purposes of domestic law.


59.  The applicant complained of the fact that the Tax Authority's decisions concerning additional taxes and tax surcharges had been enforced prior to a court determination of the disputes. In particular, he maintained that the tax assessment proceedings had not been determined within a  <mask> and that he had been unable to obtain a fair hearing in those pending proceedings. Moreover, he had been deprived of his right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. He relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which, in so far as is relevant to the complaint, provides:


99.  The Government pointed out that in the judgment of 7 May 2003 the Constitutional Court had acknowledged that the District Court had violated the applicant’s right to a hearing within a  <mask>. The Constitutional Court had ordered the District Court to avoid further delays in the proceedings and to reimburse the applicant’s costs. In view of the applicant’s conduct that decision provided appropriate redress to the applicant in the circumstances. The Government concluded that the applicant had lost the status of a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention.


125.  The applicants did not agree that the case was of any particular complexity. They argued, in particular, that the length of the pre-trial investigation (one year and seven months) had been unreasonable and resulted from the remittal of the case on two occasions for additional investigation, the responsibility for which lay entirely with the domestic authorities. As a result, the proceedings had been delayed by over six months. The applicants further submitted that the length of the proceedings before the court had amounted to one year and nine months. It had taken the trial court two months to prepare the record of the trial (in contrast to the three-day time-limit set out in domestic law) and another three months to submit the case to the Supreme Court for examination on appeal. Moreover, it had taken the appeal court six months to start its examination of the case (in contrast to the maximum of two months set out in domestic law). In view of the foregoing, the applicants contended that the domestic authorities had failed to process their case within a  <mask> and had therefore breached the relevant requirement of Article 6 § 1of the Convention.


49.  The applicant reminded the Court that, in its judgment in Davies v. the United Kingdom, no. 42007/98, 16.07.2002, it carried out an assessment of the reasonableness of the length of these same proceedings up to January 1988, and found them to have been too long. The period held by the Court in Davies to have violated the  <mask> guarantee included a year’s delay, between May 1995 and May 1996, when Mr Davies appealed against the decision to admit the Secretary of State’s late evidence: this delay could not be attributed to the present applicant. The proceedings against Mr Eastaway lasted three years and five months longer than those against Mr Davies. Although the Government criticised him for bringing proceedings for judicial review and under the Human Rights Act, the applicant was obliged to exhaust his domestic remedies and bring his Convention complaints before the domestic courts in the manner provided for by the law as it stood at the time.


29.  The Government argued that in view of the Constitutional Court's judgment of 21 July 2004 the applicant had lost his status as a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention of a violation of his right to a hearing within a  <mask>. They pointed out that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged the violation of the applicant's right, that it had ordered acceleration of the proceedings and that this order had been effectively implemented. Furthermore, they considered that the reasons relied on by the Constitutional Court in its ruling dismissing the applicant's claim for just satisfaction and compensation in respect of costs and expenses were sufficient.


28.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing within a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of the military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court. He further alleged that he had been denied a fair hearing before the domestic courts since his conviction was not based on concrete evidence. The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


19.  The Government objected that, in respect of the proceedings examined by the Constitutional Court, the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of its right to a hearing within a  <mask>. They argued that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged such a violation and the amount of just satisfaction awarded was not manifestly inadequate in the circumstances of the case. As to the period subsequent to the Constitutional Court’s judgment, the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies by lodging a fresh complaint with the Constitutional Court.


101.  The Government submitted that the problems illustrated by the two sets of criminal proceedings at issue in the present case were not such as to call for the adoption of a pilot judgment. The mere fact that there had been many judgments in which the Court had found Bulgaria in breach of its obligation to provide applicants with proceedings within a  <mask> did not show the existence of a systemic problem. It had to be borne in mind that the two applications concerned proceedings which had taken place between 1996 and 2009. The assessment whether they were indicative of a structural problem called for the consideration of the reform of the criminal justice system which had taken place during that period. Many of those reforms, which had started in 1999, had been a result of rulings made by the Court. The increasing incidence of adverse rulings against Bulgaria and the high number of pending applications evinced not only problems with the Bulgarian criminal justice system, but also the increasing popularity of the Court. Another fact showing the lack of a structural problem was that the Committee of Ministers had not adopted an interim resolution in relation to the group of Bulgarian cases concerning length of proceedings. More time was therefore needed to assess the effect of the ongoing reform of the judicial system and the impact of the newly adopted rules of procedure.


36.  The applicant complained of a violation of her right to a fair hearing within a  <mask> and also that she had been a victim of discrimination on grounds of sex. She further alleged that she had been unable to obtain redress for the violation of her fundamental right as acknowledged by the Constitutional Court. She relied on Articles 6 § 1 and 14 of the Convention, which read as follows:


47.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies since she had not availed herself of the complaint provided for by the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a  <mask> (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki – “the 2004 Act”).


25.  The Government invited the Court to reject the application on the ground that the applicant had not exhausted all domestic remedies as required under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They maintained that for the period following the Constitutional Court's decision the applicant could have lodged a request for the protection of the right to a hearing within  <mask> with a higher court and a constitutional complaint against a higher court's decision, which he had failed to do.


24.  The Government contested that argument. As regards the first proceedings, they claimed that the applicant could not be regarded as a victim for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention. In this respect they pointed out, that the domestic courts not only accepted that the proceedings exceeded a  <mask> but they significantly reduced his sentence solely on this ground. As regards the second proceedings, the Government submitted that they ended with the service of the final decision more than six months prior to the introduction of the application. As to the third proceedings, they claimed that the applicant contributed to the protraction of the case to a great extent.


71.  The Government argued that the non-enforcement of the judgment in question had not been intentional but had resulted from the administration of public funds within a State authority. The Ministry of Finance had kept the applicant company informed as to the progress of the enforcement proceedings and taken all the necessary steps in order to enforce the judgment within a  <mask>.


71.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that their right to a fair hearing within a  <mask> had been violated, that the District Court judges involved were not impartial and that the way in which the case had been processed amounted to a denial of justice. The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 reads as follows:


28.  The Government submitted that the period to be taken into consideration began on 26 July 2000 when the applicant’s appeal became pending before the Accident Board. The Court points out that in civil matters the  <mask> may begin to run, in certain circumstances, even before the issue of the writ commencing proceedings before the court to which the plaintiff submits the dispute. This is the situation, inter alia, when the applicant cannot seize a competent court before having the lawfulness and the expediency of impugned administrative acts examined in preliminary proceedings before an administrative authority (see König v. Germany, 28 June 1978, § 98, Series A no. 27).


104.  The Government submitted that some adjournments of the proceedings had been caused by circumstances beyond the parties' control (the illness of the defendants and their representatives) and some by circumstances beyond the control of the domestic authorities (such as the replacement of representatives by the defendants and review of the case file by the defendants' newly appointed representatives). The applicant and the other defendants had made full use of their procedural rights and should have been aware that this would result in the protraction of the proceedings. There had therefore been no fault attributable to the domestic authorities and no violation of the applicant's right to have her case heard within a  <mask>, as provided for in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.


19.  The Government invited the Court to reject the application for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They submitted that the applicant could have lodged a constitutional complaint under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act. In support of their argument, the Government produced a copy of the Constitutional Court decision of 2 February 2005 (see paragraph 15 above) in which that court had found a violation of the complainant's right to a hearing within a  <mask> on account of lengthy enforcement proceedings.


22.  The Government argued that the Constitutional Court had examined the applicants’ complaint on the merits, had found a violation of their right to a hearing within a  <mask>, and had ordered the District Court to proceed with the matter (see paragraph 11 above). It had also awarded the applicants compensation which was appropriate considering the particular circumstances of their case. The violation complained of had therefore been remedied at the domestic level and as a result, the applicants had lost their victim status.


36.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to comply with the six-month rule because he had erroneously believed that the constitutional complaint that he had lodged against the Supreme Court’s decision of 6 June 2011 (see paragraphs 27-28 above) had constituted an effective remedy to be exhausted for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and had thus been capable of interrupting the running of the six-month time-limit prescribed in that Article. They explained that after the entry into force on 29 December 2009 of amendments to the relevant legislation providing a remedy for the excessive length of judicial proceedings, a constitutional complaint could no longer be lodged in respect of Supreme Court decisions rendered in proceedings for protection of the right to a hearing within a  <mask>. According to the Government, the Constitutional Court had already adopted that view in its decision no. U‑IIIVs-3669/2006 of 2 March 2010, which was published in the Official Gazette on 19 March 2010. The applicant, who had been represented by an advocate, should have been aware of that. Consequently, the final decision, within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, for the purposes of calculating the six-month time limit in the applicant’s case was not the Constitutional Court’s decision of 12 December 2012 (see paragraph 29 above) but the Supreme Court’s decision of 6 June 2011 (see paragraph 27 above). However, the applicant lodged his application with the Court on 16 April 2013 (see paragraph 1 above), that is to say more than six months later.


14.  The Government argued that this complaint was inadmissible. Any delay in the enforcement of the judgment of 13 August 2002 had been caused by the workings of the federal budget. The authorities had not idled; they had paid the award as soon as funds had become available. The other three judgments had been enforced within a  <mask>. The applicant had abused his right of petition, because he had impertinently accused the authorities of falsity.


15.  The applicants complained that they were not tried by an independent and impartial tribunal within a “ <mask>.” They asserted that, since they were detained during the trial, their right to the presumption of innocence was breached. They further asserted that their consultations with their lawyer were subjected to very strict regulations which hindered the preparation of their defence. They claimed that they were not allowed to consult a lawyer during their police custody, before the public prosecutor or the first time they appeared before the trial court. They finally claimed that they could not put questions to the main prosecution witnesses. With respect to their complaints, the applicants invoked Article 6 §§ 1, 2, and 3 (b), (c) and (d) of the Convention, which in so far as relevant read as follows:


23.  The Government invited the Court to reject the application for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They submitted that the applicant could have lodged a constitutional complaint under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act. In support of their argument, the Government produced a copy of the Constitutional Court decision of 2 February 2005 (see paragraph 18 above) in which that court had found a violation of the complainant's right to a hearing within a  <mask> on account of lengthy enforcement proceedings.


19.  The Government also referred to the judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia of 22 September 2005 in the case U-I-65/05. In that judgment, the Constitutional Court found that the Administrative Disputes Act, in the part governing the right to a trial within  <mask> for the proceedings which had already been terminated, is not in conformity with the Constitution. The Constitutional Court ordered the legislator to right this unconstitutional situation within one years' time.


34. The applicant argued that the overall duration of the proceedings was not in line with the requirement that proceedings be concluded within a  <mask>. The different sets of proceedings had been brought on 7 September 1998 and 5 October 1998, and had lasted until 29 November 2005, thus between seven years and a little more than two months for the longest and seven years and a little more than one month for the shortest. The case came before three levels of jurisdiction. The applicant also maintained that no complex question of law or fact had had to be determined.


45.  The Government reiterated that the domestic courts had correctly declined to consider the applicant's request for the protection of the right to a hearing within  <mask> since the criminal proceedings complained of did not involve a criminal charge against the applicant or determination of his civil rights and obligations. In their view, the applicant should have availed himself of this remedy in respect of the two sets of the civil proceedings initiated in 2003 and 2004, which he had not done.


34.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the courts that had dealt with her case had not been impartial and that she had not had a fair trial. She also considered that her claims for compensation had not been decided within a  <mask> by the courts and that the final decision had not been pronounced publicly, as it had taken more than eight months for her to get a copy of that decision.


51.  The Government submitted that, under Georgian law, the primary role of the Supreme Court in cassation was to review the lawfulness of appellate decisions (Article 408 § 3 of the CCP; paragraph 26 above). Thus, where the cassation court could not inquire into the circumstances of the case and was only called upon to assess the already established facts from a legal point of view, the parties' participation at an oral hearing might not always be necessary. This rule could be justified by such legitimate considerations as the right to a hearing within a  <mask> and the demands of economy.


10.  The Government argued that in view of the Constitutional Court's judgment of 23 August 2006 the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a hearing within a  <mask>. They expressed the view that, as the applicant had lodged a fresh constitutional complaint, his complaint as to the period of the proceedings after the Constitutional Court's judgment of 2006 was premature.


19.  The Government expressed the view that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a hearing within a  <mask>. They argued that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged such a violation and had awarded the applicant sufficient just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage suffered. The applicant should have lodged a fresh constitutional complaint in respect of the subsequent period in the inheritance proceedings as well as in respect of the related civil proceedings (file no. 6 C 156/04).


50.  The Government submitted that the applicants had not exhausted all effective domestic remedies available to them. Primarily, they failed to “seek inspection” of the impugned proceedings. Further, they failed to lodge a request for review and an action for fair redress provided by the Right to a Trial within a  <mask> Act (see paragraph 30 above). In this respect the Government referred to Grzinčič v. Slovenia, no. 26867/02, ECHR 2007‑V (extracts). Lastly, the applicants had not made use of a constitutional appeal (see paragraphs 26-29 above).


35.  The Government stressed that, as regards administrative criminal proceedings, Austrian law provided for very short periods of prescription within which the authorities have to act (see §§ 21-26 above). This regulation ensured that a decision is taken within a  <mask>. Moreover, the Government asserted that the authorities determining the sentence had to take into account the duration of the proceedings.


44.  The Government averred that the proceedings had been fair. The Administrative Court had conducted the proceedings within a  <mask> and in accordance with the relevant procedural law. That court had rendered a reasoned judgment based on the legislation in force. In addition, the Government argued that the principle of equality of arms had also been respected in the applicant’s case. The applicant could at any time have sought access to the case file and had in fact subsequently submitted comments on the Municipal Office’s response to her claim. Moreover, the Government argued that the Municipal Office had not raised any new material facts in its response, but had simply reiterated its arguments from the impugned decision.


42.  The Government accepted that it was incumbent on the State to organise its legal system so as to allow the courts to comply with the requirements of Article 6 § 1, including the right to have a hearing within a  <mask>. Yet, in their submission, the authorities had discharged that duty in the present case by increasing gradually, that is to say from 1993 up to the present, the budgetary spending on the judiciary and, especially, on the Warsaw Regional Court, which was the most overburdened court in Poland.


44.  The Government submitted, first, that the applicant was legally aided until May 1996, and so his costs up until that date had already been reimbursed. Once his legal aid certificate was discharged the applicant acted in person and did not, therefore, incur any legal costs. In any event, any legal costs and expenses incurred by the applicant during the domestic proceedings were not caused by the alleged violation of the Convention, and would have been incurred whether or not the proceedings had been determined within a  <mask>.


13.  The Government objected that, in respect of the proceedings examined by the Constitutional Court, the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of its right to a hearing within a  <mask>. They argued that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged such a violation and the amount of just satisfaction awarded and paid without undue delay was not manifestly inadequate in the circumstances of the case. As to the period subsequent to the Constitutional Court’s judgment, the applicant company had not exhausted domestic remedies by lodging a fresh complaint with the Constitutional Court.


16.  The applicant complained that the length of the civil proceedings was incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, she complained that the amount of compensation she had been awarded for the breach of her right to a hearing within  <mask> was not adequate and that the impugned proceedings are still pending. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads as follows:


122.  The Government submitted that the applicant was promptly and adequately informed of the charges against him. His lawyer’s request for additional time to study the bill of indictment was granted by the trial court. While a number of his requests were granted by the domestic courts, the request for the conduct of expert reports was rejected because his involvement in the crime was beyond doubt. The testimonies of witnesses Ç. and M. were obtained in accordance with domestic law. The applicant had voluntarily left the hearing room on 29 October 2001 and had stated that “no one dares take up my defence”. In response to the trial court’s request to provide an ex officio lawyer, the Albanian Bar Association was unable to assist with the request, having regard to the constraints imposed by Articles 49 § 6 and 51 § 1 of the CCP. Faced with such limitations and the obligation to conduct a trial within a  <mask>, the trial court had decided to proceed with the hearing.


24.  The Government argued that the application should be dismissed for the applicant’s failure to exhaust effective domestic remedies in respect of his grievances. In their opinion, it had been open to him to complain to the Judicial Qualifications Board or a prosecutor’s office about the violations allegedly committed by the judge. Those bodies had authority to institute criminal or  <mask> against a judge.


36.  The Government argued that a separate investigation had been conducted by the disciplinary bodies in the present application. They had heard the applicant, the witness and related parties, and had considered the evidence before them to be sufficient to conclude that the applicant’s conduct had been incompatible with that expected in the civil service, as provided for under section 125. The Government pointed out that the standard of evidence and burden of proof applicable in  <mask> were different from those applicable in criminal proceedings.


36.  The applicant submitted that in the light of the established case‑law of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, a refusal to prepare a cassation appeal could not by itself be regarded as negligence giving rise to an action for damages before a civil court. Hence, the lawyers’ refusals could not be seen as a valid ground for either a complaint about their conduct, either to be pursued in  <mask> or giving rise to civil liability on the lawyers’ part. In any event, the opinions prepared by legal-aid lawyers in the present case had been detailed enough. It could not therefore be said that they had failed in their duty to properly examine the applicant’s cases.


24.  The Government further argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. In particular, they maintained that the applicant could have instituted  <mask> against the judge who had dealt with his case. They further submitted that the applicant could have instituted criminal proceedings against the judge and then lodged a civil claim seeking compensation. Lastly, they alleged that the applicant was not interested in consideration of his cassation appeal since he had lodged his complaint only in 2001.


43.  The applicant argued that the  <mask> against him had run foul of the requirement of fair trial because the statement he had given to the police had been obtained illegally. He further argued that two other statements, also given to the police, by B.J. and H.Ć. had been relied on in the judgments of the disciplinary courts although these statements had never been communicated to him, nor had their content been revealed.


65.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 of Convention that the  <mask> against him had been conducted unfairly. He submitted that the Disciplinary Council’s decision was based on the facts established in the criminal proceedings, and that those proceedings had also been unfair. In particular, he complained that the Disciplinary Council had failed to hear his secretary, who had allegedly erroneously transferred ATS 20,000,000, which sum was the subject of the trusteeship agreement. She had not been heard as a witness in the second set of criminal proceedings for fraudulent conversion. The applicant, relying on Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, also complains that the sanction imposed on him, namely being struck off the register, was excessive.


50.  The applicant maintained that three members of the National Judicial Council had expressed bias against him in the interviews published in the national newspapers at a time when the  <mask> against him had not yet been concluded. Although the NJC had already adopted its first decision when the interviews in question were published, that decision had subsequently been quashed by the Constitutional Court and in the resumed proceedings before the NJC all three of the members in question had again participated.


37.  The applicant argued that there were several periods of inactivity on the part of the authorities. Although on 7 April 2006 the Ministry of Economics and Labour had ordered his compulsory retirement as from 1 May 2006 on the grounds that he was suffering from a personality disorder, it took the domestic authorities more than three years to arrive, eventually, at the same conclusion. He pointed out that, despite the precise orders given by the Appeals Commission in its decisions of 14 December 2006 and 2 December 2008, the Disciplinary Council had committed the same procedural errors again and its decisions constantly failed to assess the evidence correctly. Furthermore, the right to prosecute him had already become time-barred in 2009, but the Disciplinary Prosecutor nonetheless insisted on continuing the  <mask> against him. Finally, given that his monthly pension was EUR 1,526.52, any reduction of this amount would have seriously affected his economic existence.


25.  The applicant complained that he had been denied access to court in relation to an order suspending him in the exercise of his mandate as a judge pending the outcome of  <mask> against him. In that respect, he alleged a violation of his rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:


896.  The applicants submitted that the restrictions imposed upon their fair trial rights in the course of their trial and appeal were specifically linked with “other reasons”, contrary to Article 18. There were many breaches of their rights which showed bad faith on the part of the authorities. Similarly, the decision that the applicants should be sent to the Chita Region and to the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region to serve their sentences, thereby greatly impeding their contact with their families and lawyers, was taken for improper reasons. Whilst at the penal colonies the applicants had been targeted with illegal, unfair, disproportionate and discriminatory  <mask> designed to affect their prospects of release on parole. The applicants further gave an account of what they called “the consistent pattern of harassment and intimidation of the ... lawyers”.


46.  The applicant reasoned that the proceedings were unreasonably long. The issues in the case were not particularly complex. Only eight witnesses were heard and the volume of the case files merely resulted from numerous documentary evidence (that is copies of fees imposed by the applicant for issuing copies of arrest warrants and protocols). Furthermore, he did not contribute to the length of the proceedings. Thus the remedy provided for by Article 61 § 1 of the Code (see paragraph 31 above) was not open to him during the stay of proceedings between 29 November 1990 and 21 May 1995. After that period he could not avail himself of this remedy as he had never been advised of the legal remedies available to him (Rechtsbehelfsbelehrung). In any event that remedy would have been unsuccessful as the Administrative Court of Appeal considered, even on 1 July 2003, that the delays in the proceedings were irrelevant. Moreover, his requests to hear evidence were all rejected and his complaints for bias were decided within a few weeks so that they did not delay the proceedings. According to the applicant, the length of the proceedings is mainly attributable to the German authorities who waited three and a half years before continuing the  <mask> after the parallel criminal proceedings had ended and then took three years to file the indictment with the Administrative Court. Finally, the applicant emphasised that the delay in the proceedings had a severe effect on his employment and financial situation.


50.  The Government, relying on the Court’s decision in the case of Banfield (cited above) pointed out that the State’s entitlement to bring  <mask> against the applicant in addition to criminal proceedings was not in question: the criminal proceedings related to the breaches of criminal law and the disciplinary proceedings to the applicant’s breach of the relationship of trust which must exist between all employees and their employer. They observed in this respect that the situation in the present case had been the same as in Banfield: the applicant had benefited from procedural protection, and the penalty imposed on him had been a discretionary one.


57.  The applicant submitted that the  <mask> against him had been a drastic step. By their very nature and consequences a “right” in the sense of Article 6 of the Convention had been created. Any public‑law features of a disciplinary nature in the case did not exclude the proceedings from the scope of Article 6 since their outcome had been severe and far-reaching: the applicant had been dismissed from his post, affecting his career and professional activities. The fact that Articles 12 § 5 and 30 of the Constitution, which contained equivalent guarantees to Article 6 of the Convention, had been applicable to the disciplinary proceedings were indicative of the civil nature of the right at stake.


57.  The applicant claimed 88,789 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage. This amount consisted of various allowances, a prospective salary increase and a bonus, all of which the applicant claimed to have been deprived of as a result of his suspension. Moreover, he claimed EUR 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, referring to the repercussions on him of the  <mask> against him and statements of the then President of the Supreme Court about him.


70.  The Government observed that there was no question of any lack of subjective impartiality on the part of Judge J.M. and that it was therefore necessary to determine whether the circumstances of the case were such as to raise serious doubts regarding the Court of Cassation’s objective impartiality. Referring to the effect of the statement made in July 2000 by Judge J.M., who at the time had been serving on the Paris tribunal de grande instance, they pointed out that the statement, made many years before the hearing of the Criminal Division, concerned a different case from the present one and that the terms used reflected a personal position which related only to the conditions in which  <mask> against a fellow judge had become known. The Government concluded that those remarks, which were limited in scope and had been made a long time before, were not sufficient to establish that, in his capacity as judge of the Court of Cassation, J.M. lacked objective impartiality.


157.  The applicant argued that the penalty imposed was disproportionate with regard to any legitimate aim, and that it had a substantial impact on his family, as he was supporting two minor children. In his view, the sanction should have concerned exclusively the supplementary part of his pay, which related to his role as President of the Supreme Court, but not his remuneration as a judge. The sanction was disproportionate also in view of the range of pecuniary penalties under the Criminal Code and the restrictions in law in respect of judges suspended from office pending the outcome of  <mask>.


47.  The Government argued that by virtue of section 131 of the Public Service Act,  <mask> were conducted independently and were distinct from criminal proceedings. The Government also drew the Court’s attention to section 127 of the Public Service Act, which prescribed time-limits for the commencement of disciplinary proceedings. In this respect, the Government noted that it was possible for disciplinary proceedings to be suspended until criminal proceedings were concluded, as long as the time-limits permitted. However, the Government argued that where existing evidence was found to be sufficient a disciplinary decision may nevertheless be taken.


34.  The Government argued that issues arising from civil service employment concerning material and financial matters, such as salary arrears and other forms of compensation, were to be dealt with by the ordinary courts in civil proceedings, whereas issues concerning the existence and the nature of the civil service, such as termination of employment within the civil service or  <mask>, were to be dealt with by the administrative courts. This was clearly provided by the relevant provisions of the domestic law and the Supreme Court’s case-law. Furthermore, on 15 December 2008, prior to the applicant bringing his administrative action, the Civil Division of the Supreme Court had adopted an opinion stating that the ordinary civil courts had subject-matter jurisdiction over disputes concerning the salaries of civil servants. The applicant, being represented by a qualified lawyer, should have been aware of this. Therefore, instead of bringing an administrative action before the High Administrative Court, he should have brought a civil action in a municipal court. Further to this, the applicant had had the possibility to lodge an appeal on points of law against the Slavonski Brod County Court’s judgment of 12 August 2013; such an appeal was possible when the case-law of domestic courts had to be re-examined in the light of changes in the domestic legal system. Moreover, he could have lodged a constitutional complaint against the Slavonski Brod County Court’s judgment of 12 August 2013.


23.  The Government submitted that Article 6 of the Convention did not apply to the proceedings at issue because, at the time of the events, the Court's judgment in the case of Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland ([GC], no. 63235/00, ECHR 2007‑IV), had not yet been given and under the Pellegrin test (Pellegrin v. France [GC], no. 28541/95, § ..., ECHR 1999‑VIII) Article 6 would not have been applicable to  <mask> against a civil servant such as the applicant.


79.  The Government lastly asked the Court to declare the complaint inadmissible because the applicant had lost his status as a victim as required by Article 34 of the Convention. In its judgment of 20 May 2014 the Supreme Court had reduced the additional disciplinary penalty by half, explicitly mentioning that the length of the  <mask> and the length of the maintenance of the interim measure constituted a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 6 of the Convention.


28.  The applicant considered that the courts were responsible for most of the delay in the proceedings. He pointed to, for example, a fourteen-month delay between the High Court hearings (May 1992) and the delivery of its judgment (July 1993). He had delayed in lodging his books of appeal because of the pending and relevant  <mask> against SC (see paragraph 15 above). He also alleged that KC had attempted to engineer delays and was obstructive about discovery.


75.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 5 of the Convention on account of his detention in excess of the maximum forty‑eight-hour period permitted by the domestic law prior to being brought before a judge, because the domestic courts had already acknowledged the violation of his right. The Government further pointed out that  <mask> had been instituted against the police officers, including the investigators and the deputy head of the Police Office, who had violated his right to liberty. In support of their argument, they submitted a letter dated 8 September 2010 from the Minister of Internal Affairs containing information that the disciplinary responsibility of the police officers had been established in respect of the applicant’s unlawful detention on 6 and 7 March 2010.


32.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 that the discontinuation of  <mask> infringed his right to a fair trial, because no decisions on the merits of the cases were rendered. Under the same provision he also complained that the disciplinary panel was not impartial, because it refused to open proceedings against Dr K., President of the Vienna Bar Chamber, whose law firm had lodged a disciplinary complaint against the applicant in the proceedings.


28.  The Government submitted that the applicant, who was represented by counsel, had failed to request a hearing in his complaints with the Constitutional Court and Administrative Court and must therefore be deemed to have waived his right thereto. In any event a hearing before these courts had not been necessary. Moreover, since matters subject to official secrecy are as a rule discussed in  <mask> and as the civil servant charged with a disciplinary offence is not restricted in his defence by the duty of official secrecy, the exclusion of the general public from an oral hearing was therefore justified.


34. The Government argued that this complaint should be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae since Article 6 of the Convention was not applicable to  <mask> under either its civil or criminal head. They referred in particular to the Court's case-law in Eskelinen Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, § 62, ECHR 2007‑...), which, they argued, suggested that Article 6 of the Convention merely applied to ordinary labour disputes such as those relating to salaries, allowances or similar entitlements. Disciplinary proceedings must be excluded from the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 as the relationship between civil servants and the state was not comparable to that between employees and their employers.


27.  The applicant disagreed and submitted that the  <mask> underlying his suspension were not related to any action undertaken or omission made in the course of his judicial activity but rather had been instituted on account of his exercise of his freedom of expression. In addition, he argued that the actions ascribed to him had not been capable of attracting the penalty of removal from office and that, consequently, the disciplinary charges against him could not serve as a basis for his suspension. The applicant further submitted that, during the period of his suspension, not only had a part of his salary had been withheld from him and he had been unable to exercise his judicial mandate, but at the same time he had continued to be subject to restrictions applicable to judges, such as not being able to conduct business, engage in political activities, or be gainfully employed. He contended that the disciplinary proceedings themselves had been lengthy, which had amplified the repercussions of the suspension for him, and that the withheld part of his salary had only been restored to him in July 2012, even though the disciplinary proceedings themselves had effectively already been terminated in September 2011.


164.  The applicant argued, in particular, that (i) unlike in the case of other judges including those of the Constitutional Court, he had not benefited from two levels of  <mask>, (ii) the Constitutional Court had reached a different conclusion than in proceedings PL. ÚS 97/07, which concerned a similar issue, without giving relevant reasons, and (iii) the way the Constitutional Court had interpreted and applied by analogy the provisions of the Judges and Assessors Act 2000 which govern disciplinary proceedings against judges was discriminatory.


48.  The Government noted that disciplinary bodies were allowed to resort to the criminal investigation file and admit evidence that was otherwise inadmissible in criminal proceedings, and to come to a different assessment of the facts than the criminal courts. The Government also noted that  <mask> were subject to judicial review by the administrative courts, which could revoke an administrative decision if it did not comply with the law or if the proceedings had been unfair.


54.  The applicant submitted that the  <mask> were of no particular complexity. However, they had been pending for almost nine years when the Disciplinary Council held a hearing in February 2005. In his view the disciplinary authorities should have proceeded with the case diligently, without waiting for the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him. The applicant also underlined that the proceedings were of particular importance for him, as the temporary ban on practising as a lawyer remained in force throughout almost the entire period.


36. The applicant argued that in its Eskelinen judgment the Court had not restricted the matters to disputes concerning salaries, allowances and similar claims, but rather expressly based its decision on the general presumption that Article 6 was applicable to disputes to which a civil servant was a party. Furthermore Hessen disciplinary law did not exclude access to the courts for civil servants but provided the possibility of appealing against the decisions of the Administrative Court in  <mask> and thus satisfied the Eskelinen test.


30.  The applicant complained that the disbarment proceedings which ended with the judgment of the Arkhangelsk Regional Court on 16 August 2004 had been unfair. In particular, he claimed that any judge in the Arkhangelsk Region would have been biased against him on the basis that the  <mask> against him had been initiated by the President of the said court. He referred to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


56.  The Government contested that Article 6 applied to the proceedings concerning the interim measure. Referring to the Court’s case law in Müller-Hartburg v. Austria (no. 47195/06, 19 February 2013) it stated that  <mask> would give rise to a “dispute over civil rights” but not involve the determination of a “criminal charge” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. However, this provision would not be applicable for proceedings for an interim measure. The aim of the preliminary proceedings was not to impose sanctions upon the person concerned but to avoid serious damage especially in regard to the interests of the public and the reputation of the profession. An order for an interim measure did not deal with the alleged offences in themselves but exclusively with the question of whether in view of the nature and seriousness of the alleged disciplinary offence an interim measure was needed to avoid serious damage to the public interest or the reputation of the legal profession and those who need representation before the courts and other authorities. The Disciplinary Council only examined such a measure if the preconditions set out in section 19(1) of the Disciplinary Act had been fulfilled. At this stage, it was not the task of the Disciplinary Council to examine the evidence of the criminal proceedings.


18.  The applicant complained that his case had not been heard by an impartial tribunal as the same three judges – Mr K.K., Mr G.Ch. and Mr I.K. – had taken part in the first and appellate  <mask>. He further complained that the composition of the Disciplinary Council that examined his case at the appellate level on 4 August 2005 could not be considered to have been established in accordance with the law because two members – Mr K.K. and Ms N.K. – had allegedly lacked the professional qualifications required under Section 25(1) of the Disciplinary Proceedings Act.


116.  The applicant’s contentions of personal bias on the part of certain members of the HCJ should also be considered as regards the activities of the Chairman (S.K.) of the Parliamentary Committee on the judiciary, who was also a member of the HCJ. Firstly, his role in refusing[6] to allow the applicant to take the oath of office as a member of the HCJ should not be overlooked. Secondly, his opinion published in the official parliamentary gazette on 14 June 2007 suggested that he strongly disagreed with the interlocutory court decision in the case concerning the unlawfulness of the parliamentary resolution on a temporary procedure for appointing presidents and deputy presidents of the local courts. Even though S.K. did not directly criticise him, it is evident that he disapproved of the actions of the applicant, who had been a claimant in that case. The Court is not convinced by the Government’s claim that this public statement was made much earlier, before the  <mask> commenced. Given that the time between the two events, as alleged by the Government, was about six months, this period cannot be considered sufficiently long to remove any causal connection in this respect.


208.  The applicant submitted that the CSM and the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court never held public hearings in  <mask> (see paragraph 168 above). In that connection the Court reiterates that, notwithstanding the technical nature of some discussions and depending on what is at stake in the proceedings, public scrutiny may be viewed as a necessary condition for transparency and for the protection of litigants’ rights. It is true that it has previously found that holding disciplinary proceedings in private with the consent of the person concerned is not contrary to the Convention (see Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, cited above, § 59). However, in the present case the applicant had requested a public hearing. She should therefore have had the possibility of obtaining a public hearing before a body with full jurisdiction for the purposes of the Convention (see, for example, Martinie, cited above, §§ 43-44, and Vernes v. France, no. 30183/06, § 32, 20 January 2011). Such a hearing would have allowed for an oral confrontation between the parties (see, mutatis mutandis, in a criminal-law context, Grande Stevens and Others, cited above, § 123).


26.  The applicant made the following complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention: that three members of the National Judicial Council had not been impartial; that the exclusion of the public from the proceedings had not been justified; that the  <mask> against him had been unfair; and that the length of proceedings had exceeded the reasonable time requirement. The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention provides:


34.  The Government maintained that Article 6 § 2 was not applicable since the  <mask> against the applicant could not be regarded as proceedings concerning the determination of a criminal charge against the applicant. The proceedings at issue had examined the applicant's responsibility for disciplinary offences in performance of his duty as a policeman and concerned his dismissal from a public official post.


53.  The Government also maintained that the public was, in principle, excluded from hearings held in  <mask> against any high-ranking State official. Furthermore, the NJC had decided not to make an exception from that principle in the proceedings against the applicant, on the ground that the exclusion of the public had been necessary for the protection of the applicant and the judiciary as such; in the Government’s view, those reasons were justified and compatible with the requirements of Article 6. In addition, the public had not been completely excluded, since the NJC had allowed representatives of international organisations for the protection of human rights to be present at the oral hearings.


47.  The Government acknowledged that the extremely long duration of the proceedings had exceeded the “reasonable time” requirement as set out in Article 6 § 1. However, the proceedings were unusually complex as demonstrated by the voluminous case file (48 volumes) and the comprehensive judgment (47 pages). Extensive investigations were necessary to determine the large number of misdemeanours committed over a long period of time by the applicant. Furthermore the applicant contributed significantly to the length of the proceedings in that he failed to apply for a court decision to challenge the suspension of the  <mask> in accordance with Article 14 § 4 of the Code (see paragraph 30 above) and to make use of the remedy provided for by Article 61 of the Code (see paragraph 31 above) to accelerate the proceedings between 21 May 1995 and 21 January 2000. As to the alleged unlikelihood of success, it would be mere speculation as to what decision the Administrative Court might have reached if the applicant had in fact availed himself of that remedy. Furthermore the applicant delayed the proceedings by lodging two wholly unsubstantiated requests to hear two witnesses and by challenging the President of the Frankfurt Court of Appeal twice for bias.


31.  The Government argued that the applicant's complaint was inadmissible, as the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. In particular, she had not challenged the decision of 27 November 1998, by which the Lokhvytskiy District Court had suspended the hearing until the full investigation of the criminal case. They further maintained that the applicant had a possibility to institute  <mask> against the judges who dealt with her case.


21.  The Government also submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They stated that the applicant should have applied to the Constitutional Court of Georgia and requested that the impugned provisions of the  <mask> Act, which allowed for the same judges to sit both at first instance and at appeal, be repealed as being unconstitutional.


209.  The applicant claimed 300,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He argued that the fact that he had been imprisoned for such a long time while innocent had caused him severe mental suffering, equivalent to cruel torture, and physical suffering. He asserted that the authorities had taken every step to obtain his conviction, in particular by ensuring that the case had been heard by the “right” jury composition, and subsequently to make him serve his sentence in harsher conditions, namely by placing him in prisons in remote regions in breach of the relevant legislation, which had inevitably hindered his contacts with his family and affected his emotional state, and by artificially creating circumstances – in bringing  <mask> against him for keeping a mobile phone – which had ultimately prevented the applicant’s pardon by the President of the Russian Federation in 2007. The applicant also referred to his deteriorated health and his hospitalisation in February 2008.


48.  The Government argued that the applicant had not only been dismissed from the police force because he had had sexual intercourse with S.K., but because his conduct had been considered as an abuse of authority. In their view, the wording of the administrative court judgment of 4 July 2003 did not impute criminal liability to the applicant but was founded on the premise that the applicant had had sexual intercourse with a woman by abusing his position as a police officer while he was on duty. The Government argued that the administrative court judgment did not contain any statement that explicitly accused the applicant of rape. The Government further argued that the  <mask> had been autonomous from the criminal proceedings and could therefore not be regarded as having infringed the applicant’s right to be presumed innocent in those other proceedings.


151.  The applicant further submitted that the only remedy against excessively lengthy civil proceedings was the “complaint about delays” introduced in 1999. In his view, however, it was not effective, because it could not lead to the acceleration of the proceedings or to a compensation for their excessive length. The only possible consequence was the opening of  <mask> against the judge concerned. However, thus far no judge had been disciplined under this provision.


34.  The applicant further complained under Article 2 § 1 of the Convention on account of the outcome of the proceedings instituted in 1996. Under the same heading, she alleged a violation on account of the events that allegedly took place on 13 September 1995 and 15 April 1997. Additionally, she claimed a violation of Articles 5 § 1 and 17 of the Convention as regards the latter event. Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, she also complained on account of the criminal prosecution brought against her. Under Article 4 § 1 of the Convention, she complained that she was unlawfully dismissed from work. She further alleged a violation of Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention in respect of the courts’ assessment of evidence and interpretation of the national law challenging the outcome and reasonableness of length of all the proceedings. Additionally, relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, she complained of the Supreme Court’s refusal to examine her second appeal in cassation. The applicant further complained, referring to Articles 14 and 17 of the Convention, that no  <mask> were instituted against unspecified persons. Lastly, relying on Article 14 of the Convention, she complained on account of not being redeployed to another post in 1996.


24.  The applicant firstly complained that the  <mask> against him were unfair, and in particular that the disciplinary courts had relied in their judgments on the statement he had made to the police, which was illegal evidence, as well as on statements given to the police by several persons, which statements had not been communicated to him, nor these persons heard in the proceedings. The applicant relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention.


2.  The applicant is a former pastor of the Hungarian Calvinist Church. His remuneration was set out in an appointment letter issued by the parish presbyters. He was removed from service, as a disciplinary measure, by the first-instance ecclesiastical court. (The fact that the applicant was removed from service allegedly for, inter alia, telling the media that State subsidies had been paid unlawfully to a Church establishment, could merit separate consideration, but the applicant raised this issue neither before the domestic courts nor before this Court.) The removal was upheld by the ecclesiastical court of second instance, which terminated the applicant’s service more than ten months after the  <mask> had been initiated against him. Even prior to the removal, the applicant’s service had been suspended pending a decision on the merits, for a maximum of sixty days, and the applicant had been informed that he was entitled to only a half of his service allowance during the period of his suspension.


93.  The applicants endorsed this approach and conclusion of the Chamber. While certain offences are characteristic of a disciplinary system as their very existence depends on the status of the person as a prisoner, other charges are “mixed” in that they belong simultaneously to the criminal and disciplinary spheres, which factor tends strongly in favour of treating those charges as criminal for the purpose of Article 6. In this latter respect, the applicants reminded the Court that the offences with which they were charged were of a general character; the elements of the offences were precisely the same as those of the equivalent criminal offences; the conduct alleged could have been the subject of criminal prosecution outside the prison; the proceedings were adversarial in character; the burden and standard of proof adopted in  <mask> were the same as in a criminal court; and the penalties imposed were both punitive and preventative in nature, purpose and effect.


29.   The Government further argued that the applicant had not been entitled to access to a court, since section 26 § 3 of the National Judicial Council Act expressly excluded judicial protection in connection with  <mask> against judges. However, they agreed that the National Judicial Council itself satisfied all criteria to be regarded as a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.