47.  The applicant maintained his complaint. He submitted that he had spent approximately 23 hours at the police station following his arrest on 10 January 2007. He argued that there had been no grounds for his arrest and detention and that they had been carried out in the absence of any  <mask> that he had committed a crime. The Government had not shown any proof that the “operative” information referred to by the police officers, and allegedly giving rise to his arrest, had ever existed.


28.  The Government considered that the applicant’s pre-trial detention satisfied the requirements of Article 5 § 3. It was justified by “relevant” and “sufficient” grounds, in particular the existence of a  <mask> throughout the entire period of the applicant’s pre-trial detention that he had committed the offences he had been charged with. Moreover, the Government considered that the applicant’s protracted detention pending trial was justified by the complexity of the case, a genuine public interest requirement, namely the fact that the applicant had been charged with serious offences and was facing a lengthy prison sentence. Finally, the Government noted that the applicant’s pre-trial detention was justified by the risk that he would obstruct the proceedings and tamper with evidence.


24.  The applicant complained that his detention between 3 March and 27 April 2015 had not been lawful and/or based on a  <mask> that he had committed a criminal offence or on relevant and sufficient reasons, as required by Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention. Article 5 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


47.  The Government submitted that on 19 April 2007 the National Bolshevik Party had been recognised as an extremist organisation by a Russian court and had been banned. Since the party no longer existed, the applicant could not continue to be a member of it. They further argued that the decisions to remand the applicant in custody had been lawful and justified. He had been charged with a serious offence, had absconded from the crime scene and had been arrested a month later in the attic where he had been hiding. He had been armed with a gas gun and had offered resistance to the police. The Government disputed the applicant's allegation that he had been arrested at the assembly of the National Bolshevik Party. In their view, after the party had been dissolved it could no longer hold assemblies. Moreover, at the time of the arrest no criminal proceedings had been pending against the applicant, he had not been formally recognised as a suspect and therefore had not enjoyed the rights that suspects enjoyed under domestic law. Once the applicant had been brought to the police station a witness had identified him as one of the perpetrators of the assault. That had raised a  <mask> that the applicant had committed a criminal offence, so he had been remanded in custody.


218.  The Government of Cyprus, as the third-party intervener, maintained that the first applicant had not been arrested on “ <mask> of having committed an offence” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1, as alleged by the respondent Government, but had been abducted from within SBA territory, in violation of both international law and the law of the SBA. He had then been remanded on fabricated charges in order to procure the release of Mr Tekoğul by the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus.


57. The Government submitted that the applicant's detention, throughout its entire length, was based cumulatively on all the prerequisites of detention listed in the Code of Criminal Procedure as applicable at the material time. Throughout its entire period the measure in question had been justified by “relevant” and “sufficient” grounds, in particular the existence of a  <mask> that he had committed the offences he had been charged with. Moreover, the Government considered that the applicant's protracted detention pending trial was justified by the gravity of the charges which the applicant was facing and the severity of the anticipated penalty, as well as the fact that the case involved numerous co‑accused and witnesses. As a consequence, there was a risk that the applicant, if released, would attempt to induce them to give false testimony.


120.  The Government argued that throughout the applicants’ detention there had been a  <mask> that they had committed the offences with which they had been charged. Their detention had initially been based on the grounds of a risk of collusion and the gravity of the charges. The assessment of the risk of collusion had been based on the possibility that they might try to influence the witnesses and thus hinder the proper conduct of the proceedings. However, once the witnesses had been questioned, the applicants’ detention was no longer extended on that ground.


41.  The Government submitted that the applicant's pre-trial detention satisfied the requirements of Article 5 § 3. They stressed that the applicant's detention had been justified by the persistence of a  <mask> that he had committed the offences in question and by the complexity of the case as demonstrated by the volume of evidence obtained in the investigation, the number of accused and the gravity of the charges against them.


69.  The applicant said that on 29 November 2000 he had been detained in the absence of any  <mask> of him having committed an offence. The fact that he had gone to the police station voluntarily did not mean that he had surrendered his right to liberty. What made the situation particularly grave was his position as a lawyer.


61.  The Government submitted that the applicant's arrest had been lawful and justified under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCrP) on account of A.'s statement and the evidence seized at the applicant's home. The  <mask> against him concerned an offence falling within the scope of Article 122 of the CCrP and was thus covered by Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention. A record of his arrest had been drawn up and the prosecutor had been notified. The duration of the applicant's detention had complied with the requirements of the CCrP. The Government indicated that the registers of arrested persons kept by the police station and the detention centre had been destroyed in November 2002 after the expiry of the retention period. As investigator S. had explained in 2007, the record of the applicant's arrest had been lost. There had been no malice or bad faith on S.'s part. The applicant should not have waited for nearly two years before bringing proceedings in the national courts; he had thus made it difficult, if not impossible, to establish the relevant circumstances.


51.  The Government further submitted that the allegation that the burden of proof of the lawfulness of the arrest was placed on the applicant was unfounded. The applicant’s allegation was based on the expression used by the court – “the court, having heard the parties, and in view of the fact that nothing was brought to the notice of this court which would enable this court to say that the person charged was brought before it without his arrest being justified” – and not on any real procedural defect. As transpires from the minutes of the proceedings, the court took its decision after hearing both parties, whose views regarding the warrant were subsidiary to their main arguments regarding the justification of the arrest. Moreover, the Government contested the applicant’s interpretation of domestic case-law (see paragraph 47 above) and stated that it was clear that the existence of a  <mask> had to be shared by the magistrate too.


24.  The Government maintained that in the present case, all the criteria for the application and extension of pre-trial detention had been met. The applicant’s detention had been justified by the  <mask> that he had committed the offences with which he had been charged, the serious nature of the offences and the severity of the anticipated penalty. The Government indicated that the applicant had been accused of acting as a re‑offender.


56.  The applicant complained that there was no  <mask> on which to arrest him and that his detention was unlawful. He contended that the incriminating statements of the two members of PKK dated back to 1992, over three years before his arrest. These statements were subsequently withdrawn by the suspects before the trial court since they were given under duress. Moreover, the applicant alleged that he was interrogated by the police despite the circular of the Ministry of Justice dated 14 February 1994, which required that any investigation of alleged criminal conduct on the part of a lawyer had to be carried out by a public prosecutor.


31.  The applicants complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that their detention by the police had not been based on  <mask> that they had committed criminal offences, and under Article 5 § 2 that they had not been informed of the reasons for their detention. They complained that while in custody they had not been allowed to contact their lawyers. Relying on Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention, the applicants also complained that they had had no means at their disposal to challenge speedily the lawfulness of their detention and obtain release. They considered that the judicial review proceedings initiated by them had been unfair because the national courts had reached wrong conclusions. The applicants also referred to Article 6 §§ 2 and 3 (a) and (c) of the Convention.


22.  The applicant submitted in particular that, as the investigation progressed, the  <mask> against him should have become more substantiated – which, however, had not been the case. His individual circumstances, rendering his absconding implausible, had not been duly considered; and the prolongations of his detention had taken place in a rather automatic manner. This was particularly striking after the conclusion of the investigation and the applicant's indictment, when the danger of collusion had virtually lost relevance. Nevertheless, his arguments, presented with a view to being placed under house arrest rather than in pre-trial detention, had remained largely unanswered by the courts. Although between the termination of the investigation and his actual release, nothing changed in his circumstances in the context of the danger of his absconding, he was only released on 30 November 2006 against the consignment of a large sum of money as bail.


30.  The Government submitted that the substantive conditions for the applicant’s detention on remand under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention had been met. There had been a  <mask> that he had aided the commission of aggravated fraudulent conversion, corruption, corruption in commercial practice and aggravated tax evasion, and there had been a risk that he might abscond. They noted that the review proceedings had commenced on 24 October 2014, when the prosecution authorities had applied to the Court of Appeal for the continuation of the applicant’s detention on remand, which was therefore less than three months after the Court of Appeal’s decision of 28 July 2014. The running of time had been suspended under domestic law from that moment. There was no fixed time‑limit under domestic law or the Convention for the Court of Appeal to render its decision.


104.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s detention pursuant to the court’s decision had been justified by the  <mask> that he had committed a crime, the fact that he had been convicted in the past and that, if released, he might abscond in order to avoid trial or obstruct the investigation. They thus considered that the applicant’s detention had been in compliance with Article 5 of the Convention.


103.  The Government submitted that the extension of the applicant’s detention on remand after 10 November 2002 was not contrary to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. They further argued that the Court ought to give due consideration to the fact that for part of the time he had been remanded in custody in connection with the second criminal case, the applicant had also been deprived of his liberty in the framework of the first set of criminal proceedings against him. The Government relied on the principle set out in the case of Kudła v. Poland that “in view of the essential link between Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and Article 5 § 1 (c), a person convicted at first instance cannot be regarded as being detained “for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on  <mask> of having committed an offence”, as specified in the latter provision, but is in the position provided for by Article 5 § 1 (a), which authorises deprivation of liberty “after conviction by a competent court” (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 104, ECHR 2000‑XI, and B.  v. Austria, 28 March 1990, § 36-39, Series A no. 175).


41.  The Government claimed that the applicant's pre-trial detention was compatible with the “reasonable time” requirement. The applicant was arrested on the basis of a  <mask>. Furthermore, he had been charged with several serious crimes and, if released, could have put pressure on other defendants and witnesses, abscond or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice. Those grounds for the applicant's detention had persisted throughout the whole period he had been in custody.


17.  The Government submitted that when the bail decision was made, the Court of Appeal was fully apprised of the facts and circumstances of the applicant’s case. It took into account that the applicant had been on bail prior to her conviction and had honoured her conditions of bail. However it also took into account the applicant’s conviction and subsequent detention. It also considered the fact that the conviction had been quashed due to a material irregularity in the trial judge’s direction to the jury and that a prompt retrial was envisaged. It was significant that the applicant had been convicted by a jury since this suggested the case against her was a strong one and she knew that if convicted at the retrial she faced a sentence of life imprisonment with a likely minimum period of fifteen years’ imprisonment. In addition there was a persistence of a  <mask> that the applicant had committed a serious offence and she had also been in custody for 17 months prior to the bail hearing. In the Government’s view, these factors were sufficient to provide good reason to believe the applicant might abscond if granted bail. It was irrelevant that the third trial judge granted bail since the Court of Appeal made its decision on the basis of the facts before it at the time. Equally, it was irrelevant that the prosecution did not object to bail since according to Article 5 § 3, the decision to grant or refuse bail was for a ‘judge or other officer’. The Court of Appeal had therefore properly exercised its discretion and correctly concluded that there were relevant and sufficient reasons to justify the applicant’s detention pending her retrial.


51.  The Government submitted that, in accordance with the Constitution, as amended in 2012, there had been no requirement for Parliament to issue authorisation for the GPO to institute criminal proceedings against members of parliament. Such prior authorisation was only required for, inter alia, placing members of parliament under arrest or in detention. Further, the Government stated that the GPO had acted in compliance with Article  5  §  1  (c) of the Convention. The arrest of the applicant had been lawful, considering that there had been a  <mask> of a risk of flight and that the applicant had been charged with criminal offences punishable by at least two years’ imprisonment. The reasonable suspicion had been supported by evidence. In conclusion, according to the Government, the applicant’s placement under arrest had been in full compliance with Article 229 of the CPC and Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention.


107.  The applicant complained that the detention hearing of 12 December 2006 had not been adversarial and had failed to ensure equality of arms. Furthermore, his arguments concerning the lack of a  <mask> had not been adequately addressed. Lastly, the Court of Appeal had refused to examine his appeal of 27 January 2007. He invoked Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


17.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his detention by the police had not been based on a  <mask> that he had committed a criminal offence. He considered that the judicial review proceedings as to the lawfulness of his detention had been unfair because the national courts had reached the wrong conclusion. The applicant also complained under Article 5 § 2 of the Convention that he had not been informed of the reasons for his arrest. Relying on Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention (although not explicitly on Article 5 § 4), he complained that he had not had any means at his disposal to challenge speedily the lawfulness of his detention and to obtain release. Lastly, without raising any separate complaints, he referred to Article 6 §§ 2 and 3 (a) and (c) of the Convention.


101.  The applicant submitted that at the time of his arrest he had had a permanent residence, an established business, a network of family and social contacts. There had been no indication that he would abscond, commit an offence or impede the course of justice. Moreover, he had returned from the United States of America knowing that criminal proceedings had been opened against him. At the time of his arrest there had existed no relevant and sufficient reasons for his placing in custody other than the  <mask> that he had committed an offence. The lack of such reasons was apparent from the reasoning of the prosecution authorities which had denied his requests for release. In particular, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office had been very laconic and had expressly relied on Article 152 of the CCrP. Referring to the Court’s judgments in the cases of Nikolov v. Bulgaria (no. 38884/97, 30 January 2003) and Shishkov (cited above), the applicant concluded that his detention had not been justified. It was therefore unnecessary to examine whether the authorities had acted diligently in the case against him.


23.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his detention was imposed in the absence of a  <mask> that he had committed an offence. Moreover, the applicant argued that the prolongation of his detention was unlawful because the prosecutor's request for prolongation of 4 October 2006 had been time-barred. The relevant part of Article 5 reads as follows:


54.  The applicant argued that there had been neither any legal basis nor practical need for her arrest. Given the vague wording of Article 297 of the Criminal Code, it was far from obvious that her actions amounted to desecration of a tomb. Accordingly, her arrest could not be regarded as based on a  <mask> that she had committed a crime.


146.  The applicant was apprehended on suspicion of participating in multiple acts of organised armed robbery. The Court is satisfied that this suspicion was reasonable. For an initial period at least, its existence justified the applicant's detention. However, the Court reiterates that the persistence of  <mask> that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, but with the lapse of time this no longer suffices. Thus, the Court must establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty (see McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, § 44, ECHR 2006‑...). Where such grounds were “relevant” and “sufficient”, the Court must also be satisfied that the national authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings.


46.  The Government maintained that the applicant's detention between 9 August and 19 November 2006 had been motivated by a  <mask> that he had committed offences set out in Articles 195/2 and 328/3 (d) of the Criminal Code, on the ground that he had sent the Ministry of Finance the letter of 25 March 1998 asking it to issue a Treasury bond in Oferta Plus's favour while knowing that the energy supplied to Moldtranselectro with the latter's participation had not been consumed by state institutions. The Government further submitted that the applicant's detention had had no other purpose than that provided for in Article 5 § 1 (c), that is to bring him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence.


52.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s detention had been based on specific facts related to his specific case. The existence of  <mask> against the applicant had always been examined and supported by evidence. Likewise, the possibility of applying less stringent measures had not been overlooked, and as soon as they had been found sufficient, their application had been ordered. The applicant’s health condition had not excluded his detention, since it could be properly treated in the penitentiary institution.


32.  The Government asserted that the applicant's arrest had been based on the presence of a  <mask> that he had committed an offence. Furthermore, the Izmir Assize Court had dismissed the applicant's claims of compensation for the allegedly unlawful deprivation of liberty given that the circumstances of the applicant's case had not been prescribed by Article 1 of Law no.466. Accordingly, the applicant's arrest and detention and the domestic courts' refusal to grant him compensation complied with Article 5 §§ 1 and 5 of the Convention.


88.  The applicant complained under Article 3 that he had not been provided with adequate medical care in relation to the cyst found in his salivary gland. He alleged, under Article 5 § 1, that no written order had been issued for his arrest on 2 July 1999 and that his arrest had not been justified by well-reasoned decisions establishing a  <mask> against him. Relying on Article 5 § 3 he complained that upon his arrest he had not been brought promptly before a judge.


51.  The Government argued that the authorities had been justified in placing the applicant in pre‑trial detention. Their decisions had been based on a  <mask> of his having committed a very serious offence and the existence of the other prerequisites for remanding him in custody. In all their decisions rejecting his requests for release they had had regard to the continuing risk that he would flee, hinder the investigation or commit an offence. They had also acted with the utmost speed possible under the circumstances.


41.  The applicant’s detention was subsequently supervised by the courts at regular intervals. In their decisions prolonging the detention the domestic authorities further relied on a  <mask> that the applicant had committed the offences concerned and on the severity of the likely penalty. However, they also took into account new elements that emerged in the course of the proceedings as well as the conduct of the trial court. In particular, the courts pointed to the risk of trickery and obstruction of the proceedings by the applicant, who had influenced the testimony of a witness in another case. Finally, the applicant’s aggressive attitude during the subsequent hearings and the persistent risk of collusion and unlawful obstruction of the proceedings justified the courts’ findings that no other preventive measure would sufficiently secure the proper conduct of the proceedings.


23.  The applicant submitted that he had been held in detention without a judicial decision for more than seventy-two hours and the prosecuting authorities had brought him to court after the above maximum period of detention without a court order allowed under domestic law had already expired, in violation of the Convention and the domestic law. Therefore he considered the court’s decision on his arrest to be unlawful. He further maintained that there had been no  <mask> or other grounds for holding him in custody.


64.  The Government contended that the applicant’s detention had been in compliance with the domestic legislation. Having regard to the circumstances of his apprehension on 6 January 2006, the Government noted that there had been a  <mask> to justify the applicant’s arrest as a criminal suspect on 9 January 2006. As to his detention from 9 to 12 January 2006, which was not covered by any court order, they submitted that under the Ukrainian Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure, no such order was obligatory for the first seventy-two hours following arrest.


55.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 that his arrest and detention had not been based on a  <mask> that he had committed an offence. He further complained that his detention on 22 June 2007 between 12.15 p.m. and 4 p.m. after the expiry of the 72 hours' period of detention without a warrant as required by the Constitution should also be considered unlawful. He further alleged that he had been unlawfully detained since 22 June 2007 as his status as a suspect had ceased on that date, whereas the indictment had been filed on 28 June 2008. He further maintained that his detention had been unlawfully prolonged since between 17 September and 14 December 2007 the proceedings had been suspended and during that period the courts could not adopt any decision in his respect. The relevant part of Article 5 reads as follows:


47.  The Government further submitted that the applicant had been protected from arbitrariness. They stated that there had been no bad faith on the part of the domestic authorities, and that the applicant’s arrest had been based on a  <mask> that she had committed a crime. The Government also submitted that at the time of her apprehension the applicant had not been suffering from any serious illnesses and that her age alone could not have been a barrier to arrest. They noted that domestic law provided the applicant with safeguards against arbitrariness: her rights had been explained to her, she had had the assistance of a lawyer and the possibility to complain against the decision to arrest her, as well as to claim damages. Lastly, relying on the Court’s case-law, the Government submitted that the subsequent discontinuation of the investigation against the applicant had not made that investigation and the applicant’s arrest arbitrary.


43.  The Government stated that the applicant's pre-trial detention was based on the  <mask> that he had committed the murder of 2 December 1997. They further contended that the authorities had acted as diligently as possible in the present case and that the length of the detention was the result of a number of objective factors. In particular, the case was extremely complex and required the examination of numerous witnesses, commissioning of various experts' opinions, performing DNA tests and conducting a crime-scene experiment. Thus, the Government considered that there were no unreasonable delays attributable to the authorities.


37.  The Government submitted that the applicant's detention had been duly justified over the entire period. They argued that, apart from the  <mask> that he had committed the offences concerned, the applicant's detention had been justified by the severity of the anticipated penalty, the fact that he had been a recidivist offender and the risk that he would obstruct the proceedings. The Government emphasised in the latter respect that following his release under police supervision he had failed to appear at 4 out of 6 hearings and that the applicant had apparently changed his place of residence without having notified the authorities. That, in their view, confirmed that detention on remand had been the only remedy that could secure the proper conduct of the proceedings.


22.  The applicants complained that there had been no  <mask> justifying their arrest and that their detention in police custody lasted too long. Moreover the first applicant complained about the length of his detention on remand which lasted for almost five months and about the fact that his detention on remand was not reviewed speedily by the Istanbul State Security Court. They invoked Articles 5 §§ 1(c), 3 and 4 of the Convention.


138.  The applicant argued that the domestic authorities and the Government had failed to furnish sufficient facts and information to found a  <mask> that he had committed any criminal offence. He claimed that his detention was justified by vague assertions and, in reality, was motivated by political considerations. As to Mr Yusifov's statements, the applicant appeared to argue that they had been false or misinterpreted and claimed that, later in the course of the criminal investigation, Mr Yusifov had retracted some of his statements.


35.  The Government argued that there had been valid reasons for holding the applicant in detention for the entire period in question. They stressed that the applicant’s detention had been justified by the persistence of a  <mask> that he had committed the numerous offences at issue and by the gravity of the charges against him, which attracted a heavy sentence. They also referred to the fact that the offences with which the applicant had been charged concerned activities of a group of persons in a significant area of the country. The Government further argued that there had been a risk that the applicant, if released, might obstruct the proceedings or go into hiding. The continued detention of the applicant was aimed at preventing the possibility of collusion and of exerting pressure on P.S., a co-defendant who had incriminated other defendants.


231.  The applicants contended that Article 6 was the lex specialis of the fair-trial guarantee. The regime under consideration represented the most serious form of executive measure against terrorist suspects adopted within the member States of the Council of Europe in the post-2001 period. It was adopted to enable the United Kingdom to take proceedings against individuals on the basis of  <mask> alone, deriving from evidence which could not be deployed in the ordinary courts. That alone warranted an analysis under Article 6. The proceedings were for the determination of a criminal charge, within the autonomous meaning adopted under Article 6 § 1, and also for the determination of civil rights and obligations. The use of closed material gave rise to a breach of Article 6.


180.  The applicant alleged that his arrest and detention were not based on a  <mask> of his having committed an offence, arguing that the charges against him had not been substantiated with any facts or evidence and that the police had initiated a clash with peaceful demonstrators, as a result of which activists like himself were taken to police stations, criminal cases were trumped up against them and the courts ruled unjustly on their detention.


47.  The applicant referred to domestic case-law which showed that, domestically, the only questions which had to be addressed by the Court of Magistrates at the first hearing were whether the prosecution had a  <mask>, whether what was alleged was according to Maltese law an arrestable offence and whether the person charged had been brought promptly before such court. It followed that the reasonable suspicion did not have to be shared by the magistrate. The applicant noted that in the cases of Aquilina v. Malta (see GC judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III) and T.W. v Malta (see GC judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III) the Court found a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention on the ground that the Court of Magistrates had no power to establish whether the deprivation of the individual’s liberty was justified and to order release. The Maltese law had consequently been amended, but the practice before the Court of Magistrates as a Court of Criminal Inquiry had remained substantially the same, as shown by the events in his own case. Appearing before a duty magistrate was a ritual and a mere formality. Indeed, the applicant failed to see how such a fundamental issue as jurisdiction could be considered as having no impact on the lawfulness of the arrest, given that an arrest not justified by jurisdiction was clearly unlawful. If there was no jurisdiction, then the courts lacked competence, and if the issue of jurisdiction was postponed then the element of promptness required by Article 5 § 3 would be disrespected.


52.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s detention had been lawful within the meaning of the domestic law and had been justified by the  <mask> that he had committed a crime. They added that there had been “adequate” and “sufficient” grounds for the applicant’s continued detention. They thus considered that his detention had been in compliance with Article 5 of the Convention.


41.  The applicant alleged that there had been no  <mask> that he had committed a criminal offence, and that the domestic authorities had failed to furnish sufficient facts and information to found a reasonable suspicion that he had committed any criminal offence. In this connection, he submitted that on the day of his arrest, 10 November 2007, there had been no reliable evidence that he had caused V.H.’s injuries, because the forensic report of V.H. dated 9 November 2007 had been unreliable. For this reason, on 10 November 2007 the investigator himself had ordered a new forensic examination of V.H.


30.  The applicant agreed that his initial detention might have been justified by the  <mask> of his having committed serious crimes. However, after the completion of the pre-trial investigation and submission of the case for trial the reasons advanced by the domestic court for his continued detention up to his conviction on 17 February 2006 had no longer been sufficient. Factors that ran counter to the presumption that he would reoffend were: the applicant’s personality, his having a permanent place of residence and employment, his having a family, including two dependent children, his advanced age, his heart condition, and the absence of any previous criminal record. The detention orders of 15 September and 15 November 2005 had been very brief; they had failed to address the applicant’s situation in any detail and had mostly relied on the gravity of the charges against him. Further, it did not appear from the text of these detention orders that the domestic court had considered the possibility of applying an alternative preventive measure. The applicant drew the Court’s attention to the fact that on 17 February 2006 he had been convicted and given a suspended sentence of four years’ imprisonment, which confirmed the argument that he had never posed any serious danger to society.


64.  The applicant also considered that his detention had been contrary to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention as there had been no legal basis for his detention pending trial and he had been arrested in the absence of a  <mask> that he had committed a crime. Article 5 § 1, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


133.  The applicants submitted that their detention had not been based on a  <mask> of their having committed an offence. The law at the material time did not prescribe an offence for unauthorised abandonment of the place of alternative service, which was also confirmed by the General Prosecutor who found that their actions lacked corpus delicti. Thus, their detention was in violation of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention.


45.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been arrested on the basis of the investigative measures taken following the institution of criminal proceedings. The investigation was able to collect initial evidence proving the applicant’s participation in the misappropriation of a large amount of money and tax evasion in the amount of AZN 19,000 (approximately EUR 17,850 at the material time). That material and information had been further corroborated by the expert opinions and testimonies of other defendants in the criminal case, which had been sufficient to justify the applicant’s arrest under domestic law. In this connection, the Government referred to documents, dated 16 December 2013 and 19 March 2014, indicating that various expert opinions had been passed on to the applicant by the investigation. Accordingly, the Government argued that there had been sufficiently specific information to justify a  <mask> that the applicant had committed an offence.


69.  The applicant complained that he had been beaten up by police officers during his arrest, that he had been arrested in the absence of a  <mask> that he had committed the criminal offence he was charged with and that he had not been provided with a lawyer on the same day; also that he had not been promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest or brought promptly before the prosecutor. As regards his pre-trial detention, the applicant complained that his counsel had not attended the hearing concerning the extension of his detention on 8 October 2003 and that he had been unable to appeal against the detention order of 14 August 2003. He further alleged that the investigator had presumed him guilty and had refused to examine certain witnesses for his defence, and that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair and unreasonably long. He complained that his numerous complaints had received no response from the authorities; that the administration of remand prison no. 77/1 had destroyed some of his written complaints, and that an officer at remand prison no. 77/6 had forced him to stop complaining about the conditions of his detention. Lastly, he submitted that he had been detained in appalling conditions from 13 to 20 August 2003 and from 18 to 31 May 2005. The applicant relied on Articles 3, 5, 6 and 13 of the Convention.


57.  The applicant disagreed and argued that he had complained about the lack of  <mask> for his arrest and detention in relation to the whole remand proceedings. He argued that the period between 19 and 28 June 2007 should be considered as a whole, in light of the fact that this period was covered by the investigating judge's detention order of 22 June 2007.


96.  The Government argued that the applicant’s arrest was warranted by a  <mask> that he had organised an assault in the context of a financial conflict that had existed between him and the victims. The courts’ decisions to remand the applicant in custody and subsequently to extend his detention were based on valid considerations, such as the applicant’s personal history, his criminal record, his ties to the criminal underworld, his financial resources, and so on. The courts correctly concluded that the applicant was liable to reoffend, abscond and obstruct the investigation. In the Government’s opinion, the Russian courts carried out an effective exercise of balancing the applicant’s right to liberty and the interests of justice, having also carefully studied his medical history and having been satisfied that he was receiving the necessary medical assistance in detention.


41.  The applicant maintained that he had been detained on 13 November 2008 in Kharkiv, had been escorted to Kyiv and then questioned. He argued that his further detention between 14 and 24 November 2008 pursuant to the decisions of the investigator and court was not based on  <mask>; it was unlawful, arbitrary and contrary to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


362.  The applicants claimed that almost the entire male population of Ormaniçi had been arbitrarily taken into detention in that, except in the case of those villagers who were taken to Şırnak, there had been no  <mask> that they had been personally involved in any crime, as required by Article 5 § 1. They further considered that it had been established that there had been a violation of Article 5 on account of the length of time the apprehended villagers had spent in custody before they were brought before any judicial authority; the absence of custody records in Güçlükonak and the inaccuracy of the custody records in Şırnak, together with the lack of any evidence of authorisation from the public prosecutor for the detention of any of the villagers; the length of the unacknowledged custody of those men who were transferred to hospital while still in custody; and the duration of the pre-trial detention of Mehmet Nuri Özkan and Ali Erbek. The applicants further claimed that, in violation of Article 6 of the Convention, the domestic authorities had failed to undertake any investigation into the circumstances surrounding the attack on Ormaniçi in February 1993 or to institute any proceedings on the basis of the complaints raised before the Eruh public prosecutors in relation to the detention of the villagers in Güçlükonak and Şırnak and their treatment during that time.


44.  The applicant's detention had been justified by the  <mask> that he had committed the offences with which he had been charged and the fact that the charges against him attracted a heavy sentence. The domestic courts had also relied on the risk that the applicant might interfere with the proper course of the proceedings. In this respect, they referred to the applicant's leaving the country and the need to issue an international arrest warrant for him.


651.  The applicants claimed that no evidence had been provided by the Government as to the reasons for the decisions to apprehend them. The evidence on which the Government relied did not disclose any  <mask> against them. The true motive of the measure was the authorities' hostile attitude to the applicants' work as defence lawyers before the State Security Court and their role in assisting individuals to denounce human rights abuses in Turkey. The authorities demonstrated flagrant bad-faith and a desire to intimidate the applicants as a result.


42.  The applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder and robbery following a search of his flat and the seizure of evidence (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above). Moreover, he made admissions in connection to the above criminal offences. The Court is satisfied in the circumstances that the suspicion against the applicant was a reasonable one and that the existence of this suspicion justified the applicant's arrest and the initial period of detention. The jury verdicts were quashed on appeal. In the Court's view, the appeal court, having full knowledge of the case, could be said to have made its decision on both occasions on the basis of the facts before it, that there was still a case for the applicant to answer and one sufficient to warrant a retrial. The persistence of  <mask> may therefore be said to have derived from the same basis as the decision to order a retrial. It has not been alleged that this suspicion was dispelled at any point in the subsequent proceedings or ceased to be “reasonable” on account of any change in the relevant circumstances. The Court finds no reason to reach a different conclusion.


30.  The Government considered that the applicants’ pre-trial detention satisfied the requirements of Article 5 § 3. It was justified by “relevant” and “sufficient” grounds, in particular, the existence of a  <mask> throughout the entire period of the applicants’ pre-trial detention that they had committed the offences they had been charged with. Moreover, the Government considered that the applicants’ protracted detention pending trial was justified by a genuine public interest requirement, namely the fact that the applicants had been charged with serious offences and were facing a lengthy prison sentence. The Government also emphasised that the authorities had relied on the serious risk that the applicants would abscond, particularly since they had gone into hiding immediately after they had committed the offences and had been sought pursuant to a “wanted” notice. Finally, the Government noted that the applicants’ pre-trial detention was justified by the risk that they would obstruct the proceedings and tamper with evidence, especially in view of the facts that the victim was a minor, a number of witnesses had been coerced into providing the defendants with false alibis, there were as many as four suspects in the case and that the identity and whereabouts of one of them had remained unknown until the final stage of the investigation.


118.  The Government contended that the applicants’ complaint of a lack of a  <mask> that he had committed an offence of abuse of official authority was manifestly ill-founded in so far as the items of evidence that had been collected at the early stage of the investigation had been more than enough for the domestic courts to confirm the need to keep the applicant in pre-trial detention. They also stated that the court decisions in question had been properly reasoned.


70.  The applicant contended that his pre-trial detention in the period between 10 December 2010 and 5 July 2012 had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons as there was nothing in the domestic courts’ decisions showing that his release from detention would run counter to an important public interest or that it would threaten public order. This was particularly true given his impaired state of health, which the domestic courts had not properly assessed or taken into account when ordering and extending his pre-trial detention. Moreover, in the applicant’s view, there was never a  <mask> that he had committed the offences at issue, and throughout the proceedings he had been exposed to a virulent media campaign.


49.  The applicant was charged with murder. The Court accepts that the  <mask> against the applicant of having committed a serious offence could initially warrant his detention. The Court notes that the latter was amplified by the fact that during the domestic proceedings the applicant admitted to having committed the offence he had been charged with. It was therefore reasonable to believe for the authorities extending the applicant’s pre-trial detention that a severe sentence could be imposed on him.


46.  The Government contended that the deprivation of the applicant’s liberty had been compatible with the Convention, there being a  <mask> that he had committed the criminal offence of aggravated fraud. The authorities ordering the applicant’s custody and pre-trial detention had found that there had existed a “reasonable suspicion” against the applicant, supported by concrete information emerging in the investigation, in particular the fact that the applicant had used a false identity during the hand-over of the goods, which had gone missing following that hand-over.


55.  The Government submitted that on 12 June 2004 the District Court had taken a decision to remand the applicant in custody in view of a  <mask> of his involvement in the commission of a particularly serious criminal offence and having concluded that the applicant might abscond or otherwise obstruct the proceedings. In coming to such a conclusion the District Court took into account that previously, on 23 October 2001, the applicant had been convicted of attempted bribery and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, suspended for three years. By the same judgment the applicant, a former officer of the criminal investigations department in police operational work, had also been deprived of the right to work in the police force for three years. The custodial measure in respect of the applicant was chosen and extended by the competent domestic authorities in compliance with the procedure established by domestic law and in accordance with the guarantees of Article 5 of the Convention. On each occasion the court took into account circumstances which gave grounds to believe that, if released, the applicant might obstruct the course of justice by putting pressure on victims and witnesses. The Government particularly emphasised the fact that the grounds warranting the choice of custodial measure had remained unchanged throughout the proceedings. They concluded that the applicant’s remand in custody had been based on relevant and sufficient reasons and had been in line with the requirements of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.


41.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been arrested and detained in police custody in compliance with the law and on account of  <mask> that he had committed an offence. In this latter respect, they referred to the scope of the work and terms of appointment of the Director of the Intelligence Service which, they said, served as an irreversible presumption that the latter had had “certain operative indications” about the applicant's alleged involvement in committing the offence. They further maintained that the gun found in the applicant's possession had confirmed those allegations initially. They noted, too, that the applicant had been released when the police failed to find any evidence of his involvement in the commission of an offence.


30.  The Government submitted that they wished to refrain from taking a position in respect of the merits of the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. At the same time they underlined that the applicant’s detention had been justified by the  <mask> that he had committed the serious offences with which he had been charged and the fact that the charges against him attracted a heavy sentence. The Government also stressed that the authorities had displayed special diligence in the conduct of the criminal proceedings against the applicant.


82.  The Government submitted that the High Court had given relevant and sufficient reasons for the applicant’s detention. In particular, it had taken into account the  <mask> that he had committed the criminal offence at issue, the circumstances, gravity, and the consequences thereof, the manner in which it had been committed, as well as the principle of subsidiarity. All these reasons justified detention, as accepted by the Court in its case-law. The Government relied on Letellier v. France, 26 June 1991, Series A no. 207, in this regard. All these decisions were upheld on appeal. The Government also submitted that the length of the applicant’s detention had not been excessive in view of all the circumstances of this complex case related to international organised crime.


63.  The Government stated that the applicant’s pre-trial detention had been based on a  <mask> of him having committed serious and violent criminal offences. Furthermore, there had been no specific facts excluding the presumed danger of his absconding or committing offences if released. In the Government’s view, the applicant had failed to prove before the national courts that there had been no danger of him absconding or committing offences.


87.  The applicant submitted that the Supreme Court of Cassation's judgment should not be taken into account in the present proceedings, as doing so would allow the national authorities to prevent rulings on the merits of the complaints brought before the Court by using stratagems such as ruling on issues not properly before them in actions brought by the applicants before the domestic courts in respect of other matters, as had happened in the instant case. The judgment did not mirror the cause of the applicant's action, which was different from the length of his pre-trial detention and the duration of the criminal proceedings against him. Despite being a welcome development, it was an isolated incident and did not represent the established case‑law of the Bulgarian courts in respect of claims relating to  <mask> or of criminal proceedings. One could not deduce from it that there existed effective remedies in respect of such violations. On the contrary, it could be used to bar the successful prosecution of a claim under section 2(2) of the State Responsibility for Damage Act of 1988 on res judicata grounds. It failed to specify how much money was awarded in respect of each of the breaches of the applicant's rights identified in it. In any event, the sum total of the award was clearly inadequate in view of the gravity of the violations which it was intended to redress. The applicant would therefore not try to obtain the payment of this award by the authorities.


23.  The applicant complained under Articles 3 and 5 §§ 1, 2 and 3 of the Convention that both the length of his detention in police custody and the length of his pre-trial detention had been excessive. He further complained under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention that his right to be presumed innocent had been violated because he had been detained on remand for an excessive length of time. The applicant maintained that the postponement by Law no. 5320 of the date of enforcement of Article 102 of the new CCP, which regulates the maximum authorised  <mask>, to 31 December 2010 for certain types of offences including his own, violated Article 14 of the Convention. He claimed under Article 13 of the Convention that there had been no effective remedy for his grievance under Article 14. The Court deems it appropriate to examine all these complaints from the standpoint of Article 5 § 3 alone as they mainly concern the length of the applicant's pre-trial detention (Ayhan Işık v. Turkey (dec.), no. 33102/04, 16 December 2008, and Can v. Turkey (dec.), no.6644/08, 14 April 2009).


18.  The applicant submitted that the Constitutional Court had authoritatively found that the relevant provisions of the 2001 Act had not ensured the real and effective independence of assessors. In the light of the relevant jurisprudence of the Court there was also no doubt that the assessor who had ordered the applicant to be detained on remand had not offered the guarantees of independence from the executive and the parties as required under Article 5 § 3. The applicant further referred to the Court’s finding in the case of Kauczor v. Poland (no. 45219/06, § 60, 3 February 2009) that “for many years, at least as recently as in 2007, numerous cases have demonstrated that the excessive  <mask> in Poland revealed a structural problem consisting of a practice that was incompatible with the Convention”. In his view, the breach of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention was exacerbated by the fact that in his and in the majority of cases the decisions imposing detention on remand had been taken by assessors who lacked adequate professional and life experience.


71.  The Government submitted that the number of cases against Russia in which the Court had found a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, on account of an excessive  <mask>, was not indicative of a structural or systemic problem. They further noted that the Russian rules of criminal procedure contained a strict and exhaustive list of circumstances which permitted the detention of a suspect or accused. Under Russian law, remand in custody during criminal proceedings was an extraordinary measure which could be imposed only if alternative preventive measures could not be applied. In recent years, the Russian Federation had adopted a series of measures aimed at liberalisation of criminal policy. In particular, the amendments to the Criminal Code made it possible to reduce the list of charges that would allow the application of remand in custody. The courts were applying alternative preventive measures on a wider scale.


29. The Government submitted that the applicant failed to exhaust domestic remedies. The Court refers to its earlier case law, where it has dismissed identical preliminary objections raised by the Government, and established that at the time when the present complaint was invoked the applicant did not have effective remedies with respect to excessive  <mask> (see, amongst, other, Estrikh, cited above, §§ 95-104; Vogins v. Latvia, no. 3992/02, §§ 25-35, 1 February 2007). Therefore the Government’s objection as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.


47.  The applicant was held in custody from 23 November 2003 to 31 January 2007 when he was released on bail. Such a  <mask> – over three years and two months – is a matter of grave concern for the Court. It observes that until January 2007 the domestic authorities never considered whether the length of his detention had already exceeded a “reasonable time”. The fact that the maximum time-limits permitted by the domestic law were not exceeded may not be a decisive element for the Court's assessment. The calculation of the domestic time-limits depended solely on the gravity of the charges which was decided upon by the prosecution and was not subject to a judicial review (see Shcheglyuk v. Russia, no. 7649/02, § 43, 14 December 2006, and paragraphs 35 and 36 above). The Court reiterates that the Russian authorities were required to put forward very weighty reasons for keeping the applicant in detention for such a long time (see Korchuganova v. Russia, no. 75039/01, § 71, 8 June 2006).


59.  The applicant was held in custody from 21 March 2002 to 14 September 2004 when he was released on an undertaking not to leave the town. Such a  <mask> – over two years and six months – is a matter of grave concern for the Court. It observes that until 14 September 2004 the domestic authorities never considered whether the length of his detention had already exceeded a “reasonable time”. The fact that the maximum time-limits permitted by the domestic law were not exceeded may not be a decisive element for the Court’s assessment. The calculation of the domestic time-limits depended solely on the gravity of the charges which was decided upon by the prosecution and was not subject to a judicial review (see Shcheglyuk v. Russia, no. 7649/02, § 43, 14 December 2006, and paragraphs 49 and 50 above). The Court reiterates that the Russian authorities were required to put forward very weighty reasons for keeping the applicant in detention for such a long time (see Korchuganova v. Russia, no. 75039/01, § 71, 8 June 2006).


45.  The applicant was held in custody from 17 January 2005 to 31 January 2007 when he was released on bail. Such a  <mask> – over two years – is a matter of grave concern for the Court. It observes that until January 2007 the domestic authorities never considered whether the length of his detention had already exceeded a “reasonable time”. The fact that the maximum time-limits permitted by the domestic law were not exceeded may not be a decisive element for the Court's assessment. The calculation of the domestic time-limits depended solely on the gravity of the charges which was decided upon by the prosecution and was not subject to a judicial review (see Shcheglyuk v. Russia, no. 7649/02, § 43, 14 December 2006, and paragraphs 33 and 34 above). The Court reiterates that the Russian authorities were required to put forward very weighty reasons for keeping the applicant in detention for such a long time (see Korchuganova v. Russia, no. 75039/01, § 71, 8 June 2006).


105.  The applicant was held in custody from 18 August 1999 to 12 July 2002 when he was released on bail. Such a  <mask> – over two years and ten months – is a matter of concern for the Court. It observes that at no point in the proceedings did the domestic authorities consider whether the length of his detention had already lasted beyond a “reasonable time”. The fact that the maximum time-limits permitted by the domestic law were not exceeded may not be a decisive element in the Court’s assessment. As the Court has previously found in other Russian cases, the calculation of the domestic time-limits depended solely on the gravity of the charges, which was decided upon by the prosecution and was not subject to judicial review (see Shcheglyuk v. Russia, no. 7649/02, § 43, 14 December 2006, and Khudoyorov, cited above, § 180).


58.  The applicant submitted that his detention between 1 and 4 May 2005 had been contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine, which only permits detention without a court order for up to seventy-two hours in view of the urgent necessity to prevent or stop a crime from being committed, but which does not permit such detention in respect of an administrative offence. Therefore, his detention under Article 263 of the Code of Administrative Offences had been unconstitutional and thus contrary to Article 5 of the Convention. In any event, the purpose of a person’s detention under Article 263 of the Code of Administrative Offences is to wait for the results of an examination of the seized substance, which is not among the exceptions to the  <mask> listed in Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


89.  The applicant complained that his initial pre-trial detention and its continuation were arbitrary. He argued that there had been no evidence grounding a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence necessitating his pre-trial detention. Furthermore, he complained that he had been kept in pre-trial detention despite the Constitutional Court’s finding of a violation of his  <mask> in its judgment of 11 January 2018. He also contended that the duration of his pre-trial detention was excessive and that insufficient reasons had been given for the judicial decisions ordering and extending the detention. He complained that in those respects there had been a violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:


86.  The Government were convinced that following the Prague 4 District Court’s judgment of 10 November 2011, the applicant had had a new opportunity at the domestic level to have the merits of his complaint that his involuntary placement in a social care home had violated his  <mask> of person reviewed. Had he not succeeded before the ordinary courts, he could have resorted to the Constitutional Court. Since he would have met the requirement of a previous lodging of a plea of nullity, the Constitutional Court could have been expected to examine the merits of his appeal. The Government referred in this connection to Constitutional Court opinion no. Pl. ÚS-st. 25/08 of 6 May 2008 (see paragraph 79 above) from which it can be deduced that the Constitutional Court would have reversed the ordinary court’s judgment if it concluded that it had violated the applicant’s right to liberty and personal security, despite the fact that at the time of the Constitutional Court’s decision, the applicant would no longer have been in the social care home.


110.  The applicant complained that his initial pre-trial detention and its continuation were arbitrary. He argued that there had been no evidence grounding a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence necessitating his pre-trial detention. He also complained that insufficient reasons had been given for the judicial decisions ordering and extending his detention. The facts on which the suspicions against him had been based were linked to his criticisms of the country’s leaders. Furthermore, he had been kept in pre-trial detention despite the Constitutional Court’s finding of a violation of his  <mask> in its judgment of 11 January 2018. He complained that in those respects there had been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:


21.  The Government submitted that the Convention permitted deprivation of liberty only in those cases which were enumerated in Article 5 and only in accordance with a  <mask>. Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention provided for the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court. This category of permissible detention concerned any prisoner serving a sentence where “the lawful detention” was based on “conviction by a competent court”. This normally referred to a prison sentence, although that was not specifically indicated in the text. The Government further observed that the execution of a prison sentence was, as a rule, dependent on a further decision which was not a matter for the courts but for the prosecution or prison authorities. The actual order to serve the sentence might not therefore emanate from a “competent court” but the detention would still be lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a). This would be so even where a prisoner's conditional release was revoked for a breach of the conditions, entailing re-imprisonment for the remaining term.


116.  The Government submitted that the applicants’ administrative detention was imposed under Article 5 § 1 (a) and was compatible with the requirements of that provision. Their cases were examined by a court of first instance, which was the sole competent authority to do so. The sentences were imposed in a  <mask> and in compliance with the relevant procedural rules.


74.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant's initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied her liberty in circumstances which did not follow a  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities' failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


37.  The Government argued that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty had been decided by a competent court in accordance with the  <mask>. As the applicant had been dangerous, the court had issued a temporary injunction before hearing the applicant and appointing a lawyer to represent her. Thereafter, a lawyer had promptly been appointed for her and she had been heard at the earliest opportunity that her condition had allowed. According to a forensic psychiatric examination report which had been ordered in the course of the criminal proceedings and which had been drawn up on 17 November 2006 – that is, between the court ruling on the applicant’s admission (8 November 2006) and her hearing by the court (23 November 2006) – the applicant had been mentally incompetent and unable to participate in the pre-trial investigation, give evidence in court or serve a punishment. Accordingly, the Government argued that the applicant’s mental disorder had not allowed hearing her earlier.


102.  The applicant complained that his detention on remand in connection with the second criminal case had been unlawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as it had been extended beyond 10 November 2002, the expiry of the statutory time-limit for detention on remand, by decisions of the lower courts based on general grounds. The applicant argued that by doing so, the domestic courts had not acted in accordance with a  <mask> and, alternatively, that the procedure itself had not been sufficiently precise and foreseeable.


18.  The applicant maintained that his compulsory treatment had been subject to a review pursuant to section 200 of the Health Care Act. The reasoning of the court decision to prolong his psychiatric detention had been very superficial and insufficient to show that his conduct had been dangerous for the purposes of paragraph 1 of that provision. As such, therefore, it had been inadequate to meet the requirements of a  <mask> within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


64.  The applicant further submitted that his detention had not been “lawful” under domestic law and that the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court had not been rendered in accordance with the  <mask>, as had been convincingly shown in the dissenting opinion attached to that court's judgment. His continued detention could not be based on the Federal Constitutional Court's judgment alone. It did not make a difference for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 whether the Bavarian (Dangerous Offenders') Placement Act had been declared void or had been considered incompatible with the Basic Law by the Federal Constitutional Court, as in both cases his detention was not “lawful” for the purposes of Article 5 § 1.


53.  The Government claimed that the applicant’s rights under Article 5 of the Convention had not been violated. As to the placement of the applicant in a psychiatric hospital, the Government indicated that the  <mask> was duly followed by the authorities. The applicant’s placement was authorised by the judge at the request of the prosecutor and based on the medical report. The applicant’s interests were represented by the lawyer and his guardian was duly notified of the hearings. They also submitted that although Article 435 of the CCrP did not provide the exact type of the psychiatric institution the detained person can be transferred to, it was the court’s task on a case by case basis to specify a concrete type of the psychiatric institution suitable for an accused relying on the facts and the expert reports provided before it.


242.  The Government contested the applicants’ allegations of ill‑treatment. They argued that on 19 and 20 April 2004 the applicants had been at military outposts and their identities had been unknown to the investigating team until 21 April 2004 when a necessity arose to invite and question them as witnesses. On that date, before being placed in a disciplinary isolation cell, the applicants were thoroughly examined by doctor S. and found to be “practically healthy”, as was noted in the relevant Isolation Notices. On 24 April 2004, after the applicants were arrested as suspects, they were subjected to physical (medical) examinations and appropriate records were drawn up, namely the records of examination of a person’s body. The physician made notes in the records that no injuries had been detected on the applicants’ bodies. The records were drawn up at the military police arrest facility in accordance with a  <mask>, namely Paragraph 13 of Annex 14 of the Regulations for the Garrison and Sentry Services in the Armed Forces of Armenia. The applicants signed their respective records without making any comments or objections. Had the applicants been subjected to ill-treatment, their injuries would undoubtedly have been revealed and recorded by the examining doctor. In any event, the applicants did not substantiate their allegations of ill‑treatment with any evidence or submit any evidence refuting the results of the above examinations. Furthermore, they showed inactivity by failing to request a forensic medical examination or request the authorities to summon a doctor, despite this possibility being specifically mentioned in the Military Prosecutor’s letter of 10 June 2004. The first applicant did not raise any complaints about his health at the time of his admission to Nubarashen pre-trial detention facility on 6 July 2004.


56.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s judicial-review complaint against the refusal to approve the location of her public event had been examined before the planned date of that event and had been allowed in part. The domestic courts had found, in particular, that the town administration had failed to provide her with a well-reasoned proposal to change the location of the event. Moreover, no writ of execution had been issued. The Government further submitted that the domestic courts had had to assess whether the contested decision had been lawful and well-reasoned, and whether the  <mask> for adopting it had been complied with. However, the courts had no competence to examine the “reasonableness” of any proposal to change the location.


26.  The Government maintained that the applicant's detention was ordered in accordance with a  <mask> and that it was covered by Article 5 § 1 (b). They submitted that the detention was imposed in accordance with section 755, subsection 1 cf. section 750 of the Administration of Justice Act, since the applicant had refused to disclose her personal data, which is a specific and concrete obligation.


67.  The Government further argued that the applicants’ detention had been lawful and in accordance with a  <mask>. It had been based on section 55(1), paragraph 2 (a), of the PSOA. The detention of the second applicant, who had been arrested in 2002 on suspicion of dangerous interference with rail traffic, had been based, in addition, on section 55(1), paragraph 2 (c), of the PSOA.


65.  The Government also took the view that the applicant had been deprived of his liberty lawfully and in accordance with a  <mask>. His detention had complied with Article 66b § 2 of the Criminal Code. Moreover, given the very high risk confirmed by the experts that the applicant would commit further serious sexual offences, possibly including the killing of his victims, on his release, the State had had a positive obligation under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to protect potential victims from the applicant.


138.  The applicant submitted, in particular, that the authorities who arrested his son had not acted in accordance with a  <mask>. He further argued that the authorities' failure to create, maintain and produce adequate documentation in relation to his son's arrest amounted to a violation of the lawfulness requirement inherent in Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


80.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant's initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied her liberty in circumstances which did not follow a  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities' failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


72.  The applicants further maintained that their deprivation of liberty had not followed a  <mask> and had therefore not been “lawful” within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention. More specifically, referring to the preparatory notes on the Police Act, the applicants submitted that section 5(3) of the Act did not authorise administrative detention for a period exceeding six hours, unless the period was exceeded in connection with police actions involving the detention of a large number of individuals, when the time spent on transfer to the police station and registration and identification of detainees rendered it impossible, in practice, to observe the six-hour rule. In the present case, however, the first applicant had been the only one detained from a large group, and the second and third applicants had been detained together with three or four others from a large group; thus, their situation had not involved the detention of a considerable number of persons. Lastly, the applicants maintained that it would have been possible, in practice, to release them within the six-hour limit, as verified by the testimony of Chief Inspector P.J. (see paragraph 24 above).


42.  The Government contended that the applicants had acted unlawfully by holding a public event without the authorities’ approval. Its dispersal had therefore been lawful and justified. They disputed that the event held by the applicants could be qualified as genuinely spontaneous. The date of the examination of the draft law had indeed been announced two days before, making it impossible to submit a notification within the statutory time-limit. However, on that date the State Duma had examined the draft law at the second reading, while three readings were necessary for a law to be adopted. There had been sufficient time to organise a public event in accordance with the  <mask> before the third and final reading of the draft law by the State Duma. The facts of the present case had not disclosed special circumstances such as would warrant an immediate demonstration as the only adequate response. The applicants had therefore been lawfully fined for participating in a public event held without prior notification. The amount of fines had been reasonable.


28.  The applicant argued that his detention from 4 to 13 January 2005 had not been authorised by a proper authority in accordance with the  <mask>. He submitted that the lawful term of his detention had ended on 4 January 2005 when the five-day period for the remedying of the violations by the prosecutor had expired. On 13 January 2005 the Town Court had authorised the detention during the disputed period retroactively, in violation of the domestic law of criminal procedure.


57.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant’s initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied her liberty in circumstances which did not follow a  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities’ failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


50.  The Government noted that the detention order of 10 September 2016 specifically stated that it was being issued on the ground that the elements on which the applicant’s application for international protection was based could not be determined in the absence of detention in particular due to the risk of absconding. This was in line with Regulation 6(1) (b) of the Reception Regulations (see Relevant domestic law above), and the order was issued, and detention undertaken, in accordance with a  <mask> (Regulation 6(3) of the Reception Regulations). They noted that in the applicant’s case, given his allegations about his stay and status in Armenia, the documents requested were indeed relevant and required by law (Regulation 9(3) of the Procedural Standards Regulations). As to the risk of him absconding, the Government noted that the applicant had intended to go to Italy, via Malta, as shown by the flight tickets he carried with him.


68.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant’s initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied her liberty in circumstances which did not follow a  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities’ failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


24.  The applicant argued that Article 344 of the 2006 CCP was applicable only to orders amenable to appeal, while the order of 18 September 2006 was not subject to judicial review. She further stated that she had not tried to contest the order, as she had had the intention to comply with it and to appear at the hearing of 19 October 2006, had she been given the chance. She maintained that her detention had not been carried out in accordance with a  <mask> and had not been necessary, because her presence at the trial had not been mandatory. Finally, she stated that her detention on the day before the hearing had been clearly disproportionate.


58.  The applicant complained that his detention could not have been justified under Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention because he was not a person of unsound mind of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement. He stated that his detention had been neither lawful nor in accordance with a  <mask>. He had been detained on the basis of retrospective consent given by his guardian, who had never met him and had showed no interest in his hospitalisation. In his view, the Convention did not allow guardians to decide on questions of such fundamental importance without court approval and thus his detention could not be lawful as there had been no safeguards against his detention. The guardian’s powers were total and unchecked.


84.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant's initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied his liberty in circumstances which did not follow a  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities' failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


103.  The applicant complained that his prosecution following the amnesty of 3 March and 7 July 1998 was not permissible under Slovakian law and that, therefore, his detention on remand in this context had not been in accordance with a  <mask>. He relied on Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:


167.  The applicants complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention that there had been no grounds for their arrest, that it had been unlawful and effected in breach of a  <mask>. They also relied on Article 5 § 2 of the Convention stating that they had not been promptly informed of the reasons for their arrest and detention. The applicants further complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that there had been no grounds for their continued detention and that they had been denied a right to be released pending trial. They also complained that they had been unable to have the lawfulness of their detention reviewed by a court, as they had been held incommunicado and had had no contacts with their lawyer, in breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. Moreover, they had been under constant threat of facing severe ill-treatment if they had complained. Lastly, the applicants complained under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention that they had been deprived of an opportunity to seek compensation for their detention. That Article, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:


127.  The applicant maintained that the requirements of Article 5 § 1 did not dispense the State from fulfilling its international obligations regarding extradition, since such a ground for detention was clearly provided for in Article 5 § 1(f), which only required the detention to be in accordance with a procedure prescribed by the domestic legislation. The applicant submitted that the Minsk Convention did not provide for such a procedure. He further stated that his detention, from the moment of his apprehension on 23 August 2004 until the present date, lacked a legal basis, had been groundless and in breach of the  <mask>. He stated that his detention until 16 September 2004 should fall within the ambit of Article 5 § 1(c) of the Convention and after that date – it should be examined under Article 5 § 1(f).


94.  The Government submitted that by organising an unauthorised public event, the applicant had committed an administrative offence. The police had warned her that the public event had been unlawful and had demanded that it be stopped. She had not complied. She had also refused to go to the police station. Her escorting to the police station and her administrative arrest had therefore been justified by the need to stop the administrative offence and to hold her liable. Both the escorting and the arrest had been performed in accordance with the  <mask>. She had been released as soon as all the requisite procedural documents had been drawn up. The length of her arrest had been within the statutory limits: it had lasted for four hours and fifteen minutes, which had subsequently been deducted from her penalty.


37.  The Government submitted that the Sofia Prison authorities had not arbitrarily refused to release the applicant but rather had established that his prison term had been miscalculated, and had alerted the public prosecutor’s office accordingly. The Government maintained that the applicant had withdrawn his appeal against decision no. 394, which had led to its becoming final. Despite that erroneous decision, the authorities had nonetheless released the applicant on 8 December 2005. Later, when the proceedings were re-opened, the whole period of the applicant’s detention was deducted from the remainder of his sentence. He had thus not been detained unlawfully but in accordance with a  <mask>, within the meaning of the Convention.


69.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant's initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied his liberty in circumstances which did not follow a  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities' failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for his arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


169.  The Government argued that the applicants had been detained on a lawful basis and in accordance with a  <mask>. In particular, they insisted that the applicants had first been apprehended, pursuant to Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on 17 April 2000 and that their arrest had then been authorised by a decision of a competent prosecutor on 19 April 2000. The Government stated that the applicants had been duly notified of all the procedural decisions concerning their arrest and detention as well as of their procedural rights, this fact being confirmed by the applicants' signatures on the respective documents submitted by the Government. The Government further contended that the applicants had been promptly notified of the reasons for their arrest: on 20 April 2000 formal charges had been brought against them and their rights had been explained to them, and they had signed a relevant document to that effect. The Government also argued that the decisions ordering the extension of the applicants' detention had been taken by competent officials in accordance with procedural legislation, and that the applicants had had an opportunity to appeal against their arrest and extension orders in court. In this latter respect the Government stressed that since 25 April 2000 the applicants had been assisted by a lawyer and had been provided with legal information. The Government also contended that following the applicants' release it had been open to them to seek compensation for their detention if they had considered it unlawful.


98.  The Government claimed that at about 6.30 p.m. on 31 December 2010 the applicant had been arrested in accordance with Article 27.3 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. He was then taken to the police station as required by Article 27.2 § 1 of the Code to draw up a report on the administrative offence. His subsequent detention pending trial did not exceed the forty-eight hour time-limit set forth in Article 27.5 § 3 of the Code. They considered that the police had fully complied with the  <mask>. They further pointed out that the applicant had been able to challenge his detention before the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow and that on 12 January 2011 it had dismissed the applicant’s appeal, including the point concerning the lawfulness of his detention.


83.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant's initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied her liberty in circumstances which did not follow a  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities' failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


31.  The applicant complains under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that the decision to prolong his TBS order was not given in a  <mask> in that during the period from 4 September to 6 October 1995 there was no judicial decision authorising his detention. The applicant further complains that the decision to prolong the TBS order was not taken speedily as required by Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.


67.  The applicant complained that her right to trial within a reasonable time or  <mask> had not been respected and that the gravity of the offences she had been charged with could not be regarded as a relevant and sufficient reason for the domestic courts repeatedly to extend her detention. She relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:


70.  The Government contended that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as they had not appealed against any of the decisions extending their detention on remand. They further stated that the applicants had lodged their requests for  <mask> only after the transfer of the criminal case from the investigators to the District Court – that is, after 29 October 2000. These requests could have been examined by the court only during the hearing of the criminal case. However, the examination of the case had been adjourned from 11 October 2000 to 20 February 2001 owing to the need to conduct an additional expert assessment. Therefore, the applicants’ complaints lodged between 29 October 2000 and 20 February 2001 had not been examined by the District Court. The Government also pointed out that the applicants had failed to lodge requests for release pending trial during the hearing of their criminal case on 11 October 2000 and the hearings conducted from 20 February 2001 to 2 March 2001.


43.  The applicant’s complaint concerns the detention pending trial, in respect of which this Court has constantly held that the presumption under Article 5 is in favour of release. As established in Neumeister v. Austria (27 June 1968, § 4, Series A no. 8), the second limb of Article 5 § 3 does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to trial within a reasonable time or granting him provisional  <mask>. Until conviction, he must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once his continuing detention ceases to be reasonable (as confirmed in McKay, cited above, § 41).


81.  The applicant’s complaint concerns the detention pending trial, in respect of which this Court has constantly held that the presumption under Article 5 is in favour of release. As established in Neumeister v. Austria (27 June 1968, § 4, Series A no. 8), the second limb of Article 5 § 3 does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to trial within a reasonable time or granting him provisional  <mask>. Until conviction, he must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once his continuing detention ceases to be reasonable (as confirmed in McKay, cited above, § 41).


71.  The Government averred that after 21 July 2000 the applicant had not appeared in connection with investigative measures. On 24 November 2000 the prosecutor had ordered his arrest. On the basis of the order the applicant had been arrested on 14 April 2001. After the arrest the criminal file in the applicant’s case had been transmitted to the court on 14 May 2001. In accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure then in force, the court had authorised his detention at the directions hearing on 23 May 2001. The application of the preventive measure had subsequently been upheld by the rulings of the Moskovskiy District Court of Tver of 18 June, 24 September and 24 December 2001. On 26 February 2002, after the case had been referred back for additional investigation, the prosecutor had extended the term of the applicant’s detention. The applicant’s application for  <mask> had been dismissed on 26 March 2002. The Government specifically stated that the decision of 26 March 2002 had related to the applicant’s application for release lodged in the course of the preliminary investigation and had not constituted an authorisation of his detention pending trial. They further noted that in the relevant period the domestic courts had not been required to rule on the term of the applicant’s detention pending trial. On 12 July 2002, after the case had again been referred back for additional investigation, the Moskovskiy District Court of Tver had extended the applicant’s detention until 6 August 2002. On 5 August 2002 the case had been referred to the court, and on 4 December 2002 the applicant’s continued detention had been reviewed by a judge. Accordingly, between 5 August and 4 December 2002 the applicant’s pre-trial detention had been within the jurisdiction of the Moskovskiy District Court of Tver.


136.  The Government’s argument that the charge against the accused could theoretically be changed to a milder charge and thus make it possible for him to obtain  <mask> cannot be accepted by the Court. In the first place, the Court notes that such a change cannot be effected by the investigating judge who issues and prolongs the detention warrant, but only by a trial judge after the criminal case-file is transmitted to the court for the examination of the merits (see paragraph 67 above). Secondly, and most importantly, follows from S.B.C. that the right to release pending trial cannot in principle be excluded in advance by the legislature.


36.  The applicants complained under Article 5 §§ 3, 4 and 5 of the Convention that their detention on remand was unreasonably long, and that their requests for  <mask> received no serious consideration by the court. Moreover, they contended that they were prevented from working whilst on remand, as a result of which they incurred financial loss. Article 5 of the Convention provides as relevant:


55.  The applicant contended that the requirement in section 22(3) of the 1985 Act (see paragraph 46 above) that the prosecution conduct itself with “all due diligence” amounted to the same requirement as “special diligence” in the context of Article 5 § 3. He recalled the need to interpret the provisions of the Convention in a manner which was practical and effective and not theoretical or illusory. It was open to Judge Norris, on 7 June 2002, to find that there had been prosecutorial delay but that this had not impacted on the ability to try the applicant within a reasonable time. The applicant pointed out that under the applicable domestic law at the time, it was clear that not every finding of a lack of diligence would result in the domestic courts refusing to extend the custody time limits (citing R (Quereshi and Others) – see paragraph 49 above). He submitted that in that case, Lord Bingham CJ's reference to the requirement for due diligence operating as a protection for defendants by ensuring that they were not kept in custody pending trial for longer than was justifiable was identical to the requirement in Article 5 § 3 that a defendant is entitled to trial within a reasonable time or  <mask>. The applicant argued that this must have been the approach adopted by Judge Norris on 7 June 2002 and that his refusal to extend the custody time limits must therefore have been due to his conclusion that the lack of due diligence by the prosecution had adversely impacted upon the possibility of his trial taking place within a reasonable time.


126.  The applicant contested the Government’s submissions on a number of grounds. He noted that the Government had provided no information concerning the examination of his complaints lodged between 13 July and 21 November 2001. As regards his complaint of 25 April 2001, it could not have been examined on 18 June 2001, because, according to the decision given on that date, the Moskovskiy District Court had dismissed the application for  <mask> lodged by the applicant at the hearing. The complaint lodged by the applicant on 2 January 2002 had been examined on 14 February 2002, after a delay of one month and twelve days, which was not compatible with Article 5 § 4. The applicant’s appeal against the decision of 12 July 2002 had not been examined “speedily” either. Likewise, the time taken to examine the applicant’s complaint lodged on 28 February 2002 was in breach of Article 5 § 4.


91.  The applicant complained that his right to trial within a reasonable time or  <mask> had not been respected and that the reasons relied on by the national authorities for ordering and extending his detention could not be regarded as relevant and sufficient. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:


59.  The applicants complained under Article 5 §§ 3, 4 and 5 of the Convention that their detention on remand was unreasonably long, and that their requests for  <mask> received no serious consideration by the court. Moreover, they contended that they were prevented from working whilst on remand, as a result of which they incurred financial loss. Article 5 of the Convention provides as relevant:


192.  The applicant's pre-trial detention infringed his right to be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power (see paragraph 167 above), his right to trial within a reasonable time or  <mask> (see paragraph 175 above) and his right to take proceedings by which all elements relevant to the lawfulness of detention could be decided by a court (see paragraph 187 above).


91.  The Government submitted that the applicants’ complaints and requests for  <mask> had not been examined by the courts because from 11 October 2000 to 20 February 2001 the examination of the applicants’ case had been adjourned owing to the need to obtain additional evidence. They further contended that the applicants had not lodged any requests for release during the hearing of 11 October 2000 and the hearings conducted between 20 February and 2 March 2001.


47.  The Government submitted that the applicant's pre-trial detention had been authorised by a proper authority. In particular, as regards the period between 5 June and 6 December 2002, on 5 June 2002 the bill of indictment and the case file had been transmitted to the Leninskiy District Court, which had received them on 10 June 2002 and fixed a hearing for 24 June 2002. On the date of the hearing the applicant had filed an application for  <mask>, which had been dismissed by the court. On 6 and 28 November 2002 the Leninskiy District Court had refused two other applications for release pending trial made by the applicant. On 6 December 2002 the same court had extended the applicant's detention until 10 January 2003. Her appeal against both rulings had been dismissed on 18 December 2002 by the Penza Regional Court. As regards the period between 28 February and 23 May 2003 the Government submitted that the applicant had been detained because her case had been pending before the court and the issues concerning her detention had been decided in accordance with the legislation on criminal procedure.


84.  The applicant reiterated his complaint and argued that it was arbitrary and irrational to continue detaining him rather than order his  <mask>, if necessary conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. He contended that there had been no risk that he would abscond or seek to interfere with the criminal proceedings and that, even if there had been such a risk, non-custodial preventive measures should have been considered.


85.  The applicant complained that his request for  <mask> had been arbitrarily refused; that the lawfulness of his detention had not been decided “speedily” and the decision of 26 July 2004 had been wrongfully taken by a bench of three judges instead of a single judge. He relied on Article 5 § 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention.