13.  The applicants complained in the first place that they had not received a fair trial by an independent and  <mask> due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Izmir State Security Court. They further alleged that the national courts had convicted them on the basis of the statements that they had made to the police and to the investigating judge. The applicants finally maintained that they had been deprived of their right to defend themselves by a lawyer. In this connection, they invoked Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


41.  The applicant did not agree with the contention that her petitions challenging the participation of the judges had unduly prolonged the proceedings. She pointed out that those petitions had related to the fact that one of the participants’ daughter was a judge in the court conducting the proceedings and by lodging those petitions she had exercised the right to a fair hearing by an  <mask>. The applicant observed that only five years after her first challenge the case had been transferred to another court. In her opinion, this showed that the delay in the examination of the case had been caused not by her, but by the courts.


16.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Izmir State Security Court which tried them. They submitted that they had been convicted on the basis of their statements in police custody which had been taken under duress and that they had been denied the assistance of a lawyer at the initial stages of the proceedings. They complained that the domestic court had refused their request for a further investigation. Finally, they maintained that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter-arguments. They relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) of the Convention, which in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


36.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> since he had been tried by a military court. He maintained that he had been convicted on the basis of tape‑recorded telephone conversations which had been unlawfully obtained. He also alleged that the court had failed to hold a public hearing and to secure the attendance of a witness who was important for his defence. In this connection, he relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which provides as relevant:


28.  The applicant submitted that Judge M.G., who had been the president of the trial panel of the Zagreb County Court which had convicted him and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment, had also been part of a three-judge panel of the same court which had on 2 September 2004 extended his pre-trial detention in a decision worded in a manner that had expressed the judge’s prejudice as to the applicant’s personality and propensity to commit criminal offences. Therefore, in the applicant’s view, the fact that Judge M.G. had been the president of the trial panel which had convicted him had violated his right to a fair trial before an  <mask>. The applicant also stressed that he had never asked for Judge M.G. to be disqualified because he had considered that that would not have been an effective avenue to pursue in his case.


31.  The Government contended that the application for supervisory review had been introduced in accordance with Russian law, and that the supervisory-review proceedings had met the requirements of the Convention for a fair trial by an  <mask>. The Government claimed that in the Russian legal system, especially in commercial litigation, judicial decisions became binding and enforceable only upon completion of the supervisory-review proceedings. In the instant case there existed continuity of the proceedings because the application for supervisory review was made in June 2000, that is four months after the Federal Commercial Court of the Volga Region had issued its judgment. The Government also pointed out that the applicant had been duly informed of the hearing.


41.  The Government, whilst remaining convinced that respect for the right to an  <mask> had to be examined according to the actual circumstances of each case, drew attention in the instant case to the repeated attempts by the applicant to hinder the progress of the proceedings (by putting pressure on witnesses, absconding, changing lawyer, having hearings adjourned). It was precisely for that reason that his appeal was severed from that of his co-defendants. The question therefore arose whether, in those circumstances, the national authorities could reasonably have been expected to proceed in such a manner as to leave no doubt concerning the impartiality of the court, even if that had been conceivable.


14.  The applicant complained that he had not received a fair trial by an independent and  <mask> due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court, which tried and convicted him. He further alleged that he had been denied a fair hearing before the domestic courts since his conviction was not based on concrete evidence. The applicant invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


25.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that they had not had a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> as one of the Court of Appeal judges, P.L., had represented the respondent in earlier proceedings brought by the applicants. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


36.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 of the Convention that she had been convicted on the basis of statements extracted from her under duress and alleged that she had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the State Security Court which tried her. The applicant also complained about the assessment of evidence by the domestic courts and the lack of a hearing before the Court of Cassation.


15.  The applicants complained that they were not tried by an independent and  <mask> within a “reasonable time.” They asserted that, since they were detained during the trial, their right to the presumption of innocence was breached. They further asserted that their consultations with their lawyer were subjected to very strict regulations which hindered the preparation of their defence. They claimed that they were not allowed to consult a lawyer during their police custody, before the public prosecutor or the first time they appeared before the trial court. They finally claimed that they could not put questions to the main prosecution witnesses. With respect to their complaints, the applicants invoked Article 6 §§ 1, 2, and 3 (b), (c) and (d) of the Convention, which in so far as relevant read as follows:


72.  The applicants complained under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention that they had not had a right to compensation in respect of the length of their detention in police custody and pending trial.  They further alleged under Articles 6 §§ 1 and 2 that the İzmir State Security Court had not been an independent and  <mask> in that it had relied on unlawful evidence, such as the illegal recording of their telephone conversations and statements which had been taken from them under duress, added to the case file by the public prosecutor, and that it had convicted them without awaiting the judgment of the Aydın Criminal Court. They submitted under Article 6 § 3 (b) and (d) of the Convention that their detention in Aydın prison had deprived them of the opportunity to contact their lawyer easily and that the State Security Court had not given them the opportunity to comment on the illegal telephone recordings submitted by the prosecution. The applicants further alleged under Article 7 of the Convention that their conviction had been unlawful as it had been based on insufficient evidence.


46.  The applicant further complained under the same provision that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the different rules of procedure applicable in the proceedings before the State Security Courts and the fact that judges were appointed by the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors in Turkey. In his observations dated 8 August 2008, the applicant claimed under Article 34 that his right of individual petition had been infringed because the judgment of the Court of Cassation was never served on him.


16.  The applicant complained, in the first place, that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> in violation of Article 6 § 1 as the Supreme Military Administrative Court had been composed of military judges and that it had acted as a first and only instance court. He further maintained under this provision that the decision of the Supreme Military Administrative Court had lacked reasoning and that it had not been possible to know in advance which chamber of this court would examine the case. Lastly, he alleged a violation of Articles 13, 17 and 18 of the Convention.


16.  The applicant complained in the first place that he had not received a fair trial by an independent and  <mask> due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court, which tried and convicted him. He further alleged that he had been denied a fair hearing before the domestic courts since his conviction was based on his statement obtained under duress in the course of his detention in police custody. Finally, he claimed that he was deprived of his right to a lawyer during his detention in police custody. The applicant invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


24.  The applicant complained that he had been deprived of his right to a hearing by an  <mask> because his constitutional complaint had been decided by a panel of judges that included Judge M.V., when both he and subsequently his daughter had previously represented the applicant's opponents. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention the relevant part of which reads as follows:


28.  The Government disputed the applicants' submission that they were not afforded a fair hearing by an  <mask> in the appeal proceedings before the High Court. They submitted that it was beyond doubt that no element of subjective bias had existed on the part of Judge G. or juror W. or any other members of the High Court.  Nor had the applicants any objective reason for fearing lack of impartiality.


24.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court which tried and convicted him on 15 April 1997. He invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:


18.  The applicant complained that she had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court which tried and convicted her. She maintained that her right to the presumption of innocence had also been breached since there was no concrete evidence to secure a conviction other than her statements obtained under duress by police officers. The applicant further claimed that she had been denied the assistance of a lawyer during the initial stages of the criminal proceedings and that she had not been informed promptly of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. She finally contended that the State Security Court had heard the witnesses against her, but had refused to hear the witnesses who would testify for her. She relied on Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (a), (c) and (d) of the Convention, which read as follows:


28.  The applicant complained that, because of the close financial relationship between, on the one hand, Mrs Justice Guðrún Erlendsdóttir of the Supreme Court sitting in his case and her husband and, on the other hand, the National Bank of Iceland, his case brought against the bank had not been heard by an independent and  <mask> as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read:


35.  The applicant complained that he had not received a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of the military judge sitting on the bench of the trial court. He also complained that the length of the criminal proceedings against him had been in breach of the reasonable time requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Finally, he claimed that the domestic court had convicted him on the basis of a false document and the statements of his co-accused, despite the fact that he had never accepted the accusations against him. The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention provides as follows:


26.  The applicant disputed that objection. He argued that the claim referred to by the Government could only be lodged in respect of acts and actions, and only when no other judicial proceedings were possible. There was an established practice whereby breaches of procedural rules had to be claimed in the proceedings in which they had allegedly been committed. He referred to the case-law of the Supreme Court, in particular its decision of 13 December 2007 (Up 726/2007). In that decision, the Supreme Court had upheld the Administrative Court’s rejection of a claim of violation of human rights lodged under section 4 of the Administrative Disputes Act in which the claimant had complained that the judge in her civil case had not been appointed in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court had found that the claimant had had judicial protection at her disposal within the main proceedings before the ordinary courts. It pointed to the established case-law of the higher courts and the Supreme Court. The case-law indicated that the courts of general jurisdiction should decide on matters of violation of the right to an  <mask> within their system of ordinary remedies. A reference was also made to the practice of the Constitutional Court which required the remedies available in the proceedings under general jurisdiction to be exhausted before a constitutional appeal concerning the right to a fair trial allegedly violated therein could be lodged.


20.  The applicant complained that the General Staff Court which tried him could not be regarded as an independent and  <mask>, given that it was composed of two military judges and an officer, all of whom were bound by the orders and instructions of the Ministry of Defence and the general staff which appointed them. In that connection he submitted that, as a civilian, he should not have been tried in a military court. The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


15.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the İzmir State Security Court which tried and convicted them. They alleged that they had been convicted solely on the basis of their statements taken under duress in police custody. They maintained that they were denied the assistance of a lawyer during the initial stages of the criminal proceedings. They submitted that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter-arguments. Finally, they complained that Turkish law does not give the possibility to cross-examine witnesses, thereby, depriving them of their right to confront the witnesses. They relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


43.  The applicant complained that his action could not be considered as having been determined by an  <mask> on the ground that the Supreme Court Chamber which had determined his appeal on points of law had included judge S. who had before been a member of the City Court Chamber that had dismissed his appeal in the proceedings concerning his dismissal of 1982. He also complained that he had not had a fair hearing in his rehabilitation proceedings in that the courts had failed to communicate to him the opposing party’s written observations on his appeal on points of law and in that they had erroneously interpreted and arbitrarily dismissed his action. The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides as follows:


17.  The applicant alleged that the participation of Judge J.B.L. in the proceedings he had brought against the University of Castilla-La Mancha while the judge was also associate professor at that university at the time had affected the fairness of the hearing and in particular had infringed his right to an independent and  <mask>. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.


36.  The applicant alleged that the General Staff Court which tried him could not be regarded as an independent and  <mask>, given that it was composed of two military judges and an officer, all of whom were bound by the orders and instructions of the Ministry of Defence and the general staff, which appointed them. In that connection he submitted that the mere fact of being required, as a civilian, to stand trial before a court composed exclusively of military personnel constituted in itself a violation of Article 6. The applicant further complained that he had not been provided with a copy of the opinion of the Principal Public Prosecutor attached to the Military Court of Cassation. He argued that this had constituted a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:


92.  The Government noted that, in Morris, the Court had rejected the applicant's general argument (as had the House of Lords) that service tribunals could not try service personnel on criminal charges consistently with Article 6 of the Convention. The core question in Morris and the present case was not whether military tribunals were acceptable under Article 6 in times of peace or war but rather whether the applicant had obtained a fair trial by an independent and  <mask> within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and the Government maintained that he had.


28.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of the military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court. He further alleged that he had been denied a fair hearing before the domestic courts since his conviction was not based on concrete evidence. The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


13.  The applicants complained in the first place that they had not received a fair trial by an independent and  <mask> due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Ankara State Security Court. The applicants further maintained that the principle of equality of arms had been violated since they had not been notified of the public prosecutor’s observations at the appeal stage. In this connection, they invoked Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


32.  The applicant first complained that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Ankara State Security Court which tried and convicted him. Secondly, he claimed that the court had been influenced by the Army since the proceedings against him had been prompted by the request of the Second Chief of the General Staff. Finally, he maintained that he had been convicted solely on the basis of the statements of the journalist who had a personal interest in incriminating him. The applicant relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


17.  The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that she was denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Izmir State Security Court which tried and convicted her. She further complains under the same heading that the Izmir State Security Court had limited jurisdiction and that it based its judgment on statements made by her which she had withdrawn. She finally submits under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention that she was denied the right to examine one of the witnesses against her.


27.  The applicants complained that they had been denied the assistance of a lawyer while in police custody. The first applicant further complained that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court which had tried him and that the length of the criminal proceedings against him had been too long. They relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads:


37.  The applicant claimed that the professional and financial relations between Judge Sa. and the university that had brought the criminal proceedings against him had infringed his right to an independent and  <mask>. He argued that Judge Sa. was an associate professor at the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Philosophy and that, in that capacity, he was functionally dependent on the rector of the university. Besides his teaching activities as an associate professor, Judge Sa. also directed the Tomás y Valiente Chair (Cátedra) of La Laguna University; he was Secretary of the Law Sciences department and a member of the committee of the Erasmus scholarship programme of the Canary Islands Government.


31.  The applicants complained under Article 3 of the Convention that they were ill-treated under police custody. They further complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention about the excessive length of their police custody and subsequent detention on remand. They also submitted that they were denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court which tried them. Lastly, they referred to the different procedural rules applied before state security courts and ordinary criminal courts and invoked a violation of Article 14 of the Convention.


31.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the Supreme Court had not afforded her a fair hearing before an  <mask> in that: (1) it had decided of its own accord to take evidence without any involvement of the parties; (2) without giving the parties an opportunity to comment on the measure; (3) and with the aim of overturning the expert conclusions reached at first instance thereby favouring the applicant's adversary, the NUH; (4) it had based its findings on the opinion of the employees of the respondent party; and (5) decided the issue of disqualification on the basis of the wrong standard, namely that it had not been demonstrated that extraneous considerations had influenced the Board's opinion.


58.  The applicant submitted that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in that he had been deprived of the right to a fair trial by an  <mask>. He submitted that the judges sitting in the Regional and Supreme Medical Courts had not been independent, as those bodies had been composed of doctors, members of the Regional Medical Council, and thus represented the interests of the doctors’ lobby. Only one of the five members of the Supreme Medical Court was a professional judge, delegated from the Supreme Court. However, such a judge would often follow the conclusions of the majority. Moreover, the applicant’s case had not been heard at the later stage by an impartial tribunal as the domestic law did not provide for a right to appeal to a court against the decision of the Medical Court when it had imposed a penalty taking the form of a reprimand.


57.  The applicant sought (1) ISK 28,522,474 (approximately 340,000 euros (EUR) in compensation for pecuniary damage, which corresponded to the award made by the District Court under this head. She asked for this amount to be increased by amounts of interest which she specified. The applicant further claimed (2) ISK 10,000,000 (approximately 116,000 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage on account of suffering and distress occasioned by the violation the Convention. She maintained that after the District Court had ruled in her favour and ordered the State to pay her compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, the Supreme Court had deprived her of her award by quashing that ruling in a procedure that had violated her right to a fair trial before an independent and  <mask>. Had it not been for the fact that the Supreme Court had obtained and attached decisive weight to the SMLB's opinion, in breach of the Convention, it would most probably have reached the same conclusion as the District Court. There was thus a causal connection between the violation of the Convention and her damage.


158.  The applicant complained that his trial court had not been “an independent and  <mask> established by law” in view of the change in the composition of the court by way of reassigning the case from Judge Sh. to Judge K., the selection of the candidate jurors from an unpublished list of jurors and in a way that allegedly impeded verification of its lawfulness, and in view of Y.’s participation in the trial as a juror.


16.  The applicant complained that the General Staff Court which tried him could not be regarded as an independent and  <mask>, given that it was composed of two military judges and an officer, all of whom were bound by the orders and instructions of the Military of Defence and the general staff which appointed them. In that connection he submitted that, as a civilian, he should not have been tried in a military court. The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


18.  The applicants complained that they had not received a fair trial by an independent and  <mask> due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Malatya State Security Court. They further maintained that they were not informed promptly and in sufficient detail of the nature and cause of the accusation against them and that the public prosecutor’s indictment was not communicated to them prior to the court hearing. In respect of their complaints, they invoked Article 6 §§ 1, 3 (a) and (b) of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


14.  The applicant complained that the length of his detention on remand exceeded the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. He further alleged that he was not tried by an independent and  <mask> within a “reasonable time”, contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. He asserted that, since he was detained during the trial, his right to the presumption of innocence, guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, was breached. He further alleged that he could not put questions to the main prosecution witness, contrary to Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention.


28.  The applicant averred that he could not be blamed for being absent at thirteen hearings because he had not been summonsed. He provided the Registry with copies of lists of summonses issued by the Novocherkassk Town Court and included in the criminal case-file. He further noted that there was no evidence (copies of summonses, envelopes, acknowledgement of receipt cards, etc.) showing that the summonses had, in fact, been sent to him even when the Town Court's registrar had included them in the lists. The applicant also argued that he had been forced to challenge the composition of the bench because he had had the right to the determination of his case by an  <mask>. However, the Town Court had been composed in breach of the Russian law.


11.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court which tried them. The applicants further complained that the length of the criminal proceedings brought against them was in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.


14.  The applicant alleged a number of violations of his rights enshrined in Articles 6 § 1, 17 and 18 of the Convention. He complained, in the first place, that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> as the Supreme Military Administrative Court had been composed of military judges and officers and that this court had acted as a first and only instance court. He further maintained that he had not had access to the classified documents submitted by the administration to the Supreme Military Administrative Court. Lastly, he alleged violations of Articles 17 and 18 of the Convention.


77.  The applicants complained in the first place that they had not received a fair trial by an independent and  <mask> due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court. The applicants further maintained that the principle of equality of arms had been violated since they had not been given the opportunity to put questions to all the witnesses. They also contended that the domestic authorities violated their right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. In this connection, they invoked Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


12.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the Commission could not be considered an independent and  <mask> and that, since no appeal lay against its decision, they had been refused access to a court. On the same grounds they argued that they had been denied the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention.


19.  The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that she was denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of the military judge on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court which tried and convicted her. She further submits under the same heading that the Court of Cassation had based its decision on witness statements taken at the police station, which the witnesses subsequently rejected as having been made under duress. The applicant finally contends under Article 6 § 1 and Article 6 § 3 (c) and (d) that the Court of Cassation did not respect the principles of an adversarial procedure or respect for equality of arms and did not hold a hearing.


37.  The applicant complained that he had not received a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the İzmir State Security Court. He further alleged under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention that the İzmir State Security Court had sentenced him on the basis of statements obtained in his absence, which he could not challenge during the proceedings against him and that, despite his requests, the court had not heard any witnesses in his favour.


37.  The applicant maintained that she had been deprived of access to court to challenge her dismissal from the judiciary since the courts did not examine the lawfulness of the President’s decree concerning her dismissal relying on Article 160 § 1 of the CCP which the Constitutional Court later found to be unconstitutional. The applicant argued that the Council of Justice with its composition at the material time could not be considered as an independent and  <mask> established by law which would satisfy the criteria under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, before the major judicial reforms following the Constitutional amendments of 2005, the Council of Justice was presided over by the President of Armenia, the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice and was therefore fully dependent on the executive.


16.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had been denied a fair trial by an independent and  <mask> on account of the composition of the Supreme Military Administrative Court. He maintained that the failure of the Ministry of Defence to inform him of the charges against him amounted to a breach of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention and that the terms and conditions of his expulsion from the military academy violated his rights under Article 6 § 2. He lastly complained under Article 13 of the Convention that the Supreme Military Administrative Court failed to state explicitly what means of redress against its decision were available.


59.  The applicant complained that he had not had a fair trial before an independent and  <mask>. He claimed, among other things, that his rights to be presumed innocent, to be informed in detail of the nature and cause of the accusations against him and to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence had been breached and that the Court of Impeachment’s appointment of defence counsel for him had been made too late.


12.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the İzmir State Security Court which tried and convicted them. They maintained that the domestic court relied on statements given by them under duress in police custody and failed to take into account their arguments presented during the criminal proceedings. They further complained that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter‑arguments. They relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


15.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> as the Supreme Military Administrative Court had been composed of military judges and officers. He maintained under Article 6 § 3 (a) and (d) of the Convention that this court had refused to hear his witnesses and under Article 6 § 2 that it had failed to postpone the proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal case filed against him. Lastly, he claimed that his expulsion from the armed forces on account of his debts violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 4.


131.  The applicant alleged under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had not received a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask>. In this respect, he pointed out that there had been a military judge sitting on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court until June 1999 and that the judges of the State Security Courts were attached to the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors. The applicant further maintained under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention that he had been presented to the press as a criminal by the Istanbul Police Director and the General Director of Police following his arrest. He finally submitted under Article 6 § 3 of the Convention that he did not have the assistance of a lawyer while in police custody.


18.  The applicant complained that his case had not been heard by an  <mask> as the same three judges – Mr K.K., Mr G.Ch. and Mr I.K. – had taken part in the first and appellate disciplinary proceedings. He further complained that the composition of the Disciplinary Council that examined his case at the appellate level on 4 August 2005 could not be considered to have been established in accordance with the law because two members – Mr K.K. and Ms N.K. – had allegedly lacked the professional qualifications required under Section 25(1) of the Disciplinary Proceedings Act.


17.  The applicant complained in the first place that he had not received a fair trial by an independent and  <mask> due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Ankara State Security Court. The applicant further maintained that the principle of equality of arms had been violated since he had not been notified of the public prosecutor’s observations at the appeal stage. In this connection, he invoked Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


15.  The applicant complained under Article 3 that he had been subjected to psychological torture in police custody. Relying on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, he further complained that he had been held in police custody for a long time. Under Article 6, the applicant alleged that the State Security Court which had tried and convicted him was not an independent and  <mask>. He also complained about the length of the proceedings. Finally, the applicant alleged that his conviction, which was based on his visit to Iran, had been in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


32.  The Government submitted that the tariff had been fixed by the Secretary of State in accordance with the judicial view. As the applicant’s tariff had expired it was no longer relevant to have an oral hearing in regard to the tariff. They pointed out that he was now able to have a review of his continued detention by an independent and  <mask>, namely the Parole Board, which had the power to direct his release.


31.  The applicant complained that he had not received a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court. He alleged further that his conviction had been based solely on the confessions extracted from him under duress.


67.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court which tried him. The Court notes that although at the initial stage of the proceedings the applicant was tried before the Diyarbakır State Security Court whose composition included a military judge, in 1999 the Constitution was amended and the military judge sitting on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court was replaced by a civil judge. While the proceedings were pending, the State Security Courts were abolished and the criminal proceedings against the applicant were transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court, which subsequently convicted him. The applicant’s complaint concerning the independence and impartiality of the Diyarbakır State Security Court should be therefore rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention (see, among others, Osman v. Turkey, no. 4415/02, § 17, 19 December 2006).


165.  The applicants submitted that, in the light of the Court’s judgments in Procola (cited above) and McGonnell v. the United Kingdom (no. 28488/95, ECHR 2000-II), the Administrative Jurisdiction Division cannot be regarded as an independent and  <mask> within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In Procola, the Court indicated that, by reason of the combination of different functions within the Luxembourg Conseil d’Etat, this “institution’s structural impartiality” could be put in doubt. The applicants further submitted that the perception of appellants had to be regarded as decisive where it concerned a tribunal’s objective impartiality. Any doubts by appellants – based on reasonable and objectively justified grounds – as to the impartiality of a tribunal had to be dispelled.


15.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the İzmir State Security Court which tried and convicted them. They further submitted that they were convicted on the basis of their statements in police custody which were taken under duress and that the court refused their demands for a supplementary investigation. They maintained that they were denied the assistance of a lawyer during the initial stages of the criminal proceedings and that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter‑arguments.


31.  The applicant complained that the administrative proceedings leading to the imposition of a fine on him had been unfair and that the relevant decisions had been arbitrary. He also complained that his right of access to a court had been breached in that he was unable to have the administrative decisions reviewed by an independent and  <mask>. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in its relevant parts, reads as follows:


13.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Izmir State Security Court which tried and convicted them. They further complain that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter‑arguments. They relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


27.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court which tried and convicted him. He further submitted that he had been deprived of his right to the assistance of a lawyer during his police custody. Finally, he claimed that the length of the criminal proceedings brought against him was excessive. The applicant relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


63.  The applicant alleged a violation of his right to a fair hearing in connection with the two sets of proceedings in the Constitutional Court, concerning Decree no. 40 and the merits of the impeachment charges against him. He submitted that because of collusion between the court's President and the member of the Seimas who had initiated the proceedings against him, the Constitutional Court could not be considered an independent and  <mask>, and noted that that court had subsequently issued a public response to his accusations of bias on its part; in a supplement to his application, dated 30 November 2006, he added that the Constitutional Court's endorsement of the conclusions of the declaration of 25 March 2004 by the Seimas showed that it had been put under considerable pressure by Parliament as a result of such collusion. He further submitted that he had been unable to defend himself effectively and that, in the impeachment proceedings, his lawyers had not had access to certain classified documents which the special investigation commission had examined and the Constitutional Court had exceeded its powers by making findings as to the facts and the issue of “guilt”. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) of the Convention, which provides:


20.  The applicant alleged a number of violations of his rights enshrined in Articles 6 § 1, 8, 13, 17 and 18 of the Convention. He complained, in the first place, that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> as the Supreme Military Administrative Court had been composed of military judges and officers, that this court had acted as a first and only instance court and that it had not been possible to know in advance which chamber of this court would examine the case. He further maintained that he had not had access to the classified documents submitted by the administration to the Supreme Military Administrative Court. Lastly, he alleged violations of Articles 8, 13, 17 and 18 of the Convention on the basis of the above‑mentioned facts, without further substantiation.


31.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the State Security Court which tried and convicted him. He further submitted that he was convicted on the basis of his statements extracted under torture. Finally, the applicant maintained that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on him, thus depriving him of the opportunity to put forward his counter-arguments. The applicant relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


18.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and  <mask> on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court which tried them. They further submitted that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation had never been served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter-arguments. Moreover, the applicants also claimed that they had been denied the assistance of a lawyer during the initial stages of the criminal proceedings. They relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides:


19.  The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the proceedings concerning her initial dismissal were unfair. She stated in particular that the District Court, when hearing her case in the second set of proceedings, was, contrary to domestic law, composed of the same single judge as in the first set. The applicant claimed to have suffered a violation of her right to have her case heard by an “independent and  <mask> established by law” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


48.  The applicant also complained that the public prosecutor lacked impartiality. The fact that the proceedings had been brought by the public prosecutor rather than by the President did not guarantee the appearance of an independent and  <mask>. Having regard to the relationship of dependence between a public prosecutor who was subordinate to the executive, and a civil party who was the head of the executive, the defendant could not be sure to have a fair trial. In the present case, the use of unusual investigative means, the rapidity of the judicial pre-trial investigation, and the manifestly zealous attitude of the public prosecutor in making submissions at the court hearing in support of the admissibility of the President’s civil-party intervention, could only be attributed to the identity of the victim.


11.  The applicant complained that he had not had access to the classified documents and information presented by the Ministry to the Supreme Military Administrative Court, nor to the responses submitted by the Ministry to the questions posed by this court in its interim decision, which infringed the principle of  <mask> and the right to adversarial proceedings as safeguarded in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.


19.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement. He further maintained under the same provision that the principle of  <mask> had not been respected during the criminal proceedings against him as the written opinion submitted by the Principal Public Prosecutor to the Court of Cassation had not been communicated to him, depriving him of the opportunity to submit his counter-arguments.


46.  The applicants contended that they had not been given a fair hearing. They complained that the court had refused to call and examine the witnesses they had requested and, in the first applicant’s case, had refused to accept the video recordings of their arrest as evidence. Furthermore, the court had not respected the principle of  <mask> in that it had rejected the testimony of the applicants as false while giving weight to that of the two police officers. In addition, the applicants complained that the hearing in the first applicant’s case had not been open to the public, that their right to mount a defence had been violated and that they had not been given adequate time to prepare their defence.


53.  The applicant also contended that the proceedings had not respected the  <mask> principle. Firstly, he had not been allowed to cross‑examine a main witness (Ms Z., who had been present during the robbery and had been one of the plaintiffs) whose testimony had been of particular relevance in the light of the multiple inconsistent statements made by her husband. Moreover, despite her having been present at the scene, her written testimony had made no reference to the “buckets of gold”, a crucial element in finding the applicant responsible. However, the court had accepted the ex parte doctor’s statement to the effect that she could not testify without appointing an independent doctor to examine the witness and her condition or ability to do so. Nevertheless, his application not to allow her statement had been refused.


66.  The applicant further argued that, as regards  <mask>, the provision of ad hoc pro bono legal assistance was no substitute for competent and sustained representation by an experienced lawyer familiar with the case and the relevant law (citing Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01, §§ 69-70, ECHR 2005‑II). This was all the more important in his case where both G. and the curator ad litem had been granted legal aid. Thus the fact that counsel and solicitors acted for him pro bono in the proceedings before the Supreme Court did not remove the significant imbalance that existed between the parties. He emphasised, first, that he had no protection from an adverse costs order while the other parties to the appeal enjoyed such protection. Second, while court fees were waived, he was still required to present documentation in accordance with the relevant Practice Directions and did not have adequate resources to do so. The costs were met by senior counsel and his wife. Third, counsel had to fit their preparation for his case into their remunerating practice. Fourth, the applicant had to rely on additional assistance with the preparation of his case from senior counsel’s wife. Fifth, his legal advisers had to pay their own travel and subsistence fees in respect of the appeal before the Supreme Court in London. Finally, although the applicant had enjoyed the assistance of senior counsel, the latter had no experience in family law matters.


23.  The applicant argued that the Berlin Tiergarten District Court was obliged to appoint, of its own motion, defence counsel for him in the first‑instance criminal proceedings, in which he was convicted of libel and two counts of assault, sentenced to a fine, and ordered to pay damages to the victim. The victim was represented by counsel as the private accessory prosecutor and with regard to his civil claims. Thus, the applicant was confronted with two lawyers, the public prosecutor and counsel for the victim. In this scenario, the District Court was obliged to appoint counsel for him ex officio and free of charge in order to respect the principle of  <mask>, bearing in mind that he lacked sufficient means to pay for counsel himself. He had neither been informed about the possibility to apply for free legal assistance nor had he been asked about aspects speaking in favour of granting him legal assistance.


53.  The Government submitted that the administrative proceedings with respect to the applicant in both cases had been in line with national legislation. In the first case the Government noted in particular that the time-limit for lodging an appeal with the Court of Appeal against the decision of the first-instance court was ten days, so the applicant had had adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence. They also submitted in general terms that during the court proceedings the principle of  <mask> had been respected. In the second case the Government argued in particular that the administrative-offence case had not been complex and the applicant had therefore been able to prepare his defence. In addition, the applicant had been present personally at the hearing of the first-instance court and had not objected to being represented by a State-funded lawyer. Lastly, he had been represented by a lawyer of his own choice before the Court of Appeal.


68.  The Government submitted that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been fair. They had been public and adversarial and in compliance with the principle of  <mask>. The applicant had been questioned by the investigator in the presence of her lawyer and had been advised of her right not to incriminate herself. During the trial, she had had ample opportunity to present her case and to challenge the admissibility of the evidence presented by the prosecution. The trial court had thoroughly examined the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment in police custody and the authenticity of the evidence against her.


89.  The Government submitted that the first detention hearing had been conducted in compliance with the procedural requirements of Article 5 § 3. This Article could not be interpreted as guaranteeing a right to adversarial proceedings and  <mask>. The main purpose of that Article was to afford individuals deprived of their liberty a procedure of a judicial nature designed to ensure that no one was deprived of his liberty arbitrarily and that any such deprivation of liberty was kept to the minimum. An accused was entitled to have access to all the materials of the case file only after the completion of the investigation. Thus, the fact that the applicant and his lawyers were not allowed to familiarise themselves with the materials submitted by the investigator in support of his motion of 10 October 2005 did not violate either the domestic law or Article 5 § 3.


73.  The Government submitted that the administrative proceedings with respect to the applicant had been in line with the national legislation. In particular, the time-limit for lodging an appeal with the Court of Appeal against the decision of the first-instance court was ten days, so the applicant had had adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence. The Government also submitted in general terms that during the court proceedings the principle of  <mask> had been respected.


56.  The Government submitted that the hearing of 4 December 2007 had been held in the absence of the applicant’s lawyer because, although he had been duly informed of the proceedings, he failed to appear in court. To ensure the  <mask> and secure the applicant’s interest, the latter was provided with the effective legal assistance of a lawyer appointed by the court.


41.  The Government conceded that on 10 January 2008 the District Court had retrospectively authorised the applicant’s pre-trial detention from 27 October 2007 onwards, but that the authorisation had not been in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Russian law, a fact which had been brought to the attention of the domestic courts by the Deputy Regional Prosecutor in a supervisory review application in 2013 (see paragraph 29 above). The Government did not inform the Court of the outcome of the proceedings in question. As regards the applicant’s pre-trial detention from 28 April to 6 May 2008, they considered it to be lawful. The appellate court had been competent to rule on his detention. The fact that the prosecutor had not been present had no bearing on respecting the principle of  <mask>. According to the rules of criminal procedure, the court could decide a defendant’s pre-trial detention of its own motion. Given that the appellate court had adjourned the hearing, it could not have delved into the reasons underlying the applicant’s pre-trial detention. To do otherwise would have amounted to impartiality on its part.


64.  The applicant further complained under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention of the lack of impartiality and independence of the Medical Board, which had provided crucial expert evidence in the proceedings, given that its conclusions had been adopted in their entirety by the domestic court, and about the lack of disclosure of certain documents (for example, the full report of the applicant’s fitness-for-service examination; the report by the commander in Lecce requesting a specialised assessment) which had meant that he had not been able to properly participate in the proceedings and had been denied  <mask> during the proceedings. The proceedings had, moreover, been tainted by the fact that he had been unable to contest the findings of the report. Despite the fact that the expert report had only been submitted at the appeal stage, the Supreme Administrative Court (“CS”) had considered that, in its limited powers of judicial review of administrative acts, it could not examine the merits of that report. The relevant parts of Article 6 and 13 read as follows:


49.  The Government submitted that the Lithuanian courts had carefully reviewed the circumstances of the case. On the basis of all the collected evidence, including the classified information, the courts had taken into account the fact that criminal proceedings had been instituted against the applicant and they had adopted reasoned decisions finding that the data on the applicant had been lawfully recorded in the operational file. The applicant had been able to submit evidence, present his arguments, make submissions and participate in the decision-making process as far as had been possible without revealing to him the classified material, whose secrecy the courts had sought to maintain in the public interest. The Government stressed that the applicant had not complained that the Lithuanian courts had not been impartial or objective. As to the information in the operational records file, it had constituted a State secret. The interest in protecting State secrets was paramount. Consequently, it had been legitimate not to disclose that information to the applicant in the course of the judicial proceedings. Nonetheless, the fair-balance principle had been maintained, given that non-disclosure had been chosen in order to protect the proper administration of justice and to guarantee existing public needs and the safety of Lithuanian society. The State had had the legitimate aim of maintaining the secrecy of police criminal investigation methods, whilst at the same time ensuring that the courts themselves had been able to assess all the relevant materials in the course of the judicial proceedings in order to adopt a lawful and reasoned decision. In sum, a fair balance had been maintained between the general interests of society and the applicant's fair trial guarantees, in that the principle of  <mask> had been compromised in proportion to the aims sought.


24.  The applicant submitted that the principle of  <mask> required that he be given an opportunity to evaluate the relevance of the statement and its withdrawal, and to comment if he considered it proper to do so. The Court of Appeal was not free to set aside this fundamental principle of fair proceedings. In the applicant’s opinion the Court of Appeal simply chose to uphold one version of the testimony of a wholly unreliable witness, whereas it should have excluded that witness’s testimony entirely. The applicant’s representative further claimed that the affidavit was made entirely voluntarily on the part of the applicant’s then wife.


32.  The applicant emphasised that he had not only wished to challenge the validity of the findings of the relevant expert report. Since the report dealt with a technical subject, M.M.K. should have had to reply orally in court to the questions raised in the separate report by the expert D.K., who had been instructed by the applicant himself. The attendance of M.M.K. had been important in terms of  <mask>; her report had generated considerable publicity in favour of the prosecution authorities, and M.M.K. had in reality been a “witness for the prosecution”.


70.  The applicants complained under Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (d) of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against them had been arbitrary and unfair, in particular on account of the failure to comply with the principles of adversarial proceedings and  <mask> when the evidence and witnesses had been admitted and examined. They complained about their conviction for acts which had not fallen under the legal classification assigned to them. They also alleged that they had been deprived of having the judgment against them delivered in public because the date of delivery had been moved to prevent attendance by the public and press and because only the operative part of the judgment had been delivered at the hearing. Article 6 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


73.  The applicant complained of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (d) of the Convention. He alleged that on all seven occasions the proceedings in which he was convicted of an administrative offence fell short of the fair hearing guarantees, in particular the principles of  <mask>, adversarial proceedings, independence and impartiality of the tribunal, and the presumption of innocence. Article 6 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads:


29.  The Government submitted that the principle of  <mask> had been respected in the instant case and that the fact that M.H. had not been heard by the trial court in the presence of the applicant had not breached his rights under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3. The Government stated that the applicant had been represented by counsel. His case was examined at a public hearing, in an adversarial procedure, during which he had had the opportunity to adduce evidence and request that new witnesses be heard. The applicant had had access to his case file and had been able to challenge the statements made by the principal witness, M.H.


30.  The applicant does not dispute the fact that he was duly informed of the hearing scheduled for 28 January 2004 and he indeed appeared at that hearing. Therefore, what is at stake in the current case is whether the applicant was given the possibility to effectively participate in the proceedings and to enjoy  <mask> with the opposing party.


30.  The applicant complained that he had not had a fair trial. In support of this he maintained firstly that the domestic courts had wrongly assessed the court-appointed expert’s opinion. He further complained that the refusal to admit the private expert opinion to the proceedings as evidence and the refusal to allow the private expert and B.S., J.H. and A.U. to testify as witnesses violated the principle of  <mask> as provided in Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, which reads as follows:


15.  The applicant complained in the first place that he had not received a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Ankara State Security Court. The applicant further maintained that the principle of  <mask> had been violated since he had not been notified of the public prosecutor’s observations at the appeal stage. In this connection, he invoked Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


77.  The applicants complained in the first place that they had not received a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court. The applicants further maintained that the principle of  <mask> had been violated since they had not been given the opportunity to put questions to all the witnesses. They also contended that the domestic authorities violated their right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. In this connection, they invoked Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


31.  The Government contested the applicant's allegations. In their view, the proceedings in question had been fair. The decision of the Council of the Regional Bar Association had been subjected to review by impartial domestic courts at two levels of jurisdiction. The proceedings had been adversarial and in compliance with the principle of  <mask> and other procedural safeguards within the notion of a fair hearing. The fact that the initial complaint against the applicant had been brought by the President of the Regional Court was of no relevance. The President had been responsible for the organisation of the work of the court only and had been in no position to influence the decisions delivered by the judges of the court. They further pointed out that the applicant had failed to provide any evidence in support of his allegations that the President of the Regional Court had exerted any pressure on the judges involved in the proceedings in question. Nor had the President exercised any function in the said proceedings. It had been open to the applicant to challenge the composition of the court which had considered his case. However, he had not done so before the District Court. As regards the hearing in the Regional Court, it had not been open to the applicant to challenge the partiality of the whole court. He should have challenged only the judges appointed to consider his case.


39.  The applicant contended that the principles of  <mask> and adversarial proceedings required the submissions of the prosecution to be forwarded to the defence, who then had discretion to choose whether to reply to them or not. In the applicant’s view, the relevant domestic law was deficient as no provision was made for forwarding the opinion of the immediately superior State Attorney’s Office – in the present case, the State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia – to the defence to allow them, should they so wish, to reply to the opinion before the second-instance decision was adopted.


129.  The applicant submitted that the principle of  <mask> was infringed where one of the parties to administrative proceedings had not had an opportunity to fully acquaint him or herself with all the evidence that had served as the main basis for an unfavourable decision. He conceded that in some circumstances State security interests defined by law took precedence over the interests of a person seeking protection from the courts in proper adversarial proceedings. He observed that in the present case, however, his right to a fair trial or to a position of equality before the law should not have been restricted because the statutory conditions under Czech law for such a procedure to be followed had not been met. The author of document no. 77, which the applicant had not been allowed to consult, had classified the report and the information contained in it in the lowest category of secrecy, namely, “restricted”. In the light of section 3(5)(e) of Law no. 412/2005, the author of the report had considered that information thus classified compromised certain intelligence operations in progress. However, under section 133(3) of that Law, in order for the courts to be able to exclude part of a document from examination by a party, there had to be a risk of interference in the activities of the intelligence services and that interference had to pose a major risk, as evidenced by the terms “endanger or seriously compromise”, which, by virtue of the law, required it to be classified at least in the “secret” category. According to the applicant, the legislature had sought to limit the application of the special procedure strictly to situations in which facts were referred to that had to be kept secret. In his view, the statutory conditions for limiting his procedural rights indicated in section 133(3) of Law no. 412/2005 had not been met because the information appearing in the report could not be such as to justify recourse to the special procedure.


27.  The applicants contended that the Federal Court's express refusal to admit observations in reply to the tendentious and largely incorrect statements by the lower court constituted a breach of the principle of the  <mask>. The lower court was able to pronounce itself twice: in its judgment, and later in its observations to the Federal Court. The applicants were only allowed one set of submissions. As such, there was no real difference between the present case and that of Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland (see the judgment of 18 February 1997, Reports 1997-I, p. 101 et seq.). In the applicants' submissions, the powers of examination of the Federal Court were irrelevant here.


30.  The Government submitted that the applicant had received a fair trial in the court proceedings before the first-instance court. He and his lawyer had participated in all the first-instance hearings. As to the hearings before the Court of Appeal, the Government submitted that in the present case the Court of Appeal had decided to examine the merits of the appeal without a “court investigation” and there had been no possibility of the worsening of the applicant’s situation as a result of his appeal. In such circumstances, under Article 392.2 of the CCrP, the Court of Appeal “had the right to hear the case” in the applicant’s absence. Furthermore, the applicant’s lawyer had been present at the hearing on the merits and had been given the opportunity to present arguments on the applicant’s behalf. In particular, in accordance with Article 394.3 of the CCrP, the defence counsel had made submissions in support of the appeal. The Government concluded that  <mask> had been fully ensured in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal.


31.  The applicant submitted that the presence of a lawyer before the appellate court could not be regarded as equivalent to the defendant’s personal presence. He emphasised that under Polish law it had been possible for the court of appeal to accept new evidence. He referred to the Court’s Belziuk v. Poland judgment, referred to above (paragraph 19). He further argued that he had expressly requested to be brought to the hearing before the court of appeal and that the principle of  <mask> had been breached because the prosecutor had attended that hearing in his absence.


58.  The applicant maintained his complaint. In his view, it was essential for compliance with the principle of the  <mask> that he attended the hearing. The domestic judicial authorities' failure to ensure his presence in court had deprived him of the opportunity to make effective use of his procedural rights. He had been unable to produce and examine evidence, to lodge requests and to argue his case. He did not have the financial means to retain a lawyer to represent him. In any event, the nature of his claims was such that his personal presence was indispensable for proper examination of his claims.


18.  The applicant complained about the unfairness of the lustration proceedings, the infringement of his right of defence and the lack of  <mask>. In particular, he alleged that the material in his case had been classified as confidential, which had limited his right of access to it. Before the institution of the proceedings he had had no access to the case file prepared by the Commissioner. After the lustration proceedings had been instituted by the Warsaw Court of Appeal the applicant could consult the documents only in the secret registry of the lustration court. The limitations on access were not applicable to the Commissioner of the Public Interest. Thus, the applicant was placed at a significant disadvantage vis‑à‑vis the Commissioner who had unlimited access to the file in his secret registry. The applicant invoked Article 6 of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads:


56.  The applicant complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that the use of unlawfully obtained evidence by the Ankara State Security Court in convicting him had violated his right to a fair trial. He further complained, under the same head, that the refusal by the same court to provide him with a copy of the audiotapes of his alleged telephone conversations had been in breach of the principle of  <mask>.


63.  The applicants complained that they had not been allowed adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence and that they had not had a fair hearing because they had not had access to all the evidence in the case against them. They submitted in particular that they had been denied access to the documents of the case as well as to a list of documents, during both the investigation and the trial at both instances. They maintained that no one had reviewed the prosecution’s cherry-picking of the documents submitted to the court and that they had been denied the possibility of searching using the electronic system applied. In their view, the principle of  <mask> required that they should have had the same opportunities as the prosecution to access and select evidence from the collection of documents gathered by the police during the investigation. They relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(b) of the Convention, which is so far as relevant read as follows:


27.  The applicant made several complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention that the proceedings against her were unfair. In particular, she submitted that (1) the principle of  <mask> was violated, because she was in an unequal position in comparison to the prosecution; (2) the court was biased; (3) it heard primarily witness testimonies which supported the police's version of events; (4) it failed to give adequate reasoning in its judgment and did not perform a thorough analysis of the presented evidence; (5) she was not informed promptly and in detail of the nature and cause of the accusation against her; (6) she did not have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of her defence as a result of the proceedings having been organised very quickly and in view of the fact that after her arrest she had been held in isolation at the police station; (7) she was not provided the opportunity to retain an attorney of her own choosing; and, (8) she was denied the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against her even though she indicted she could do this on several occasions during the court hearing of 8 September 1999.


45.  The applicant argued that the lustration proceedings had been unfair, that the principle of  <mask> had not been respected, and that he had not been able to defend himself properly. Moreover, he had been placed at a significant disadvantage vis-à-vis the Commissioner of the Public Interest given that the State had access to all the archives and had at its disposal the technical and financial means to examine the necessary materials and to choose those that were to be included in the file. Most of the documents were considered secret and lifting the confidentiality of materials was in itself arbitrary. The applicant further argued that the lustration court had failed to examine the case diligently and that he had not been allowed to challenge the evidence adduced by the Commissioner or call independent experts.


31.  The applicant company complained about the quashing of the resolution of the Review Panel of 11 March 1999, stating that the latter had been the final and binding decision given in its favour. It alleged that the procedure before the Plenary Court had been incompatible with the principles of legal certainty,  <mask> and a public hearing. The applicant invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:


24.  The applicant complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention that the domestic courts had refused to examine Mr G.A., the only witness, whose letter served as key evidence on which his conviction rested. He also complained that the principle of  <mask> had been violated since the trial court had ordered that his attendance at the trial be secured by force, which had not been the case with Mr G.A., who had also refused to appear in court. Lastly, he alleged that he had not been allowed to inspect the case file. Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


79.  The applicants complained about the courts’ refusal to obtain, admit and give weight to exonerating evidence, contrary to the principles of  <mask> and adversarial proceedings. Such evidence had included, in particular, financial documents and receipts proving provenance of the applicants’ funds and other documents relating to the functioning of GPA and affiliated companies; a letter from Yves Rocher Vostok stating that it had not sustained any damage; and a statement from Russian Post that there were no grounds to impose any disciplinary penalty on the second applicant in relation to his activity concurrent with his employment at Russian Post. They also alleged that in its judgment the court had relied on evidence which had not been examined, or not properly examined, during the court hearing and that defence attempts to challenge the admissibility of certain evidence had not been given a proper assessment. Applications from them had been rejected on the grounds that the court had already heard sufficient evidence proving their guilt.


66.  The Government submitted that the principles of an adversarial hearing and  <mask>, as developed in the Court’s case-law, applied only to parties to the proceedings. However, the applicant in the present case had not been a party to the proceedings before the Constitutional Court. This was so because the proceedings before the Constitutional Court were sui generis proceedings in which there were no two opposing parties but a complainant who contested a decision of a judicial, administrative or other public authority alleging that his or her constitutional rights had been violated. In those proceedings, pursuant to section 69 of the Constitutional Court Act, a copy of the constitutional complaint was sent to interested persons and they were invited to respond to it only if necessary (see paragraph 25 above).


72.  The applicant submitted that since his claim was based on various aspects of his personal experience (such as medication and treatment, lack or presence of certain documents) his personal testimony before the civil court was the decisive, if not the main, tool for ensuring the  <mask>. The above-mentioned consideration acquired even more importance, given the unavailability of the applicant’s medical file and the prosecutor’s participation in the proceedings. Neither the Code of Civil Procedure nor the Code of Criminal Procedure contained any explicit provision which made it possible for detainees to participate in civil court proceedings. No such provision was present in the Code of Execution of Sentences. The applicant also submitted that he had no means to retain counsel. He was not entitled to free legal advice under the Advocates Act or any other statute.


46.  The Government argued that throughout the criminal proceedings the applicant had been in an equal position to the State Attorney: he had presented evidence, had examined witnesses, including the expert witness, and he had never made any objection in respect of the  <mask>. As to D.D.’s report of 13 July 2007, the Government pointed out that it had not contained any new relevant information and that the applicant had had an opportunity during the proceedings to comment on D.D.’s findings. As to the additional documents submitted by the police, the Government argued that the Osijek Municipal Court had not relied on those documents in its judgment. Finally, the Government stressed that the State Attorney had also become aware of the expert witness’s written observations and the documents submitted by the police at the final hearing and that the prosecutor had therefore been in the same position as the applicant, which excluded the possibility of any violation of the principle of adversarial proceedings and of the equality of arms.


63.  The applicant’s complaint about the breach of the principle of  <mask> appears to be unsubstantiated. Indeed, the applicant failed to explain in what way the non-disclosure of his son’s address negatively influenced or reduced his chances of success in the proceedings before the United Kingdom courts in circumstances in which the decisive factor in those proceedings was the interpretation of Romanian family law. Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must therefore be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


56.  The Government considered that the guarantees of a fair trial had been respected in the present case. They maintained that the specific issue of the non‑communication to him of the defendant’s observations in reply to the applicant’s appeal on points of law raised mainly a question of  <mask> which had to be answered in the light of the proceedings as a whole. The Government further pointed out that the special character of the proceedings on appeals on points of law had to be taken into account. In particular, they submitted that such proceedings were based on the principle of cassation (Article 243b of the Code of Civil Procedure) and that the scope of the Supreme Court’s examination of appeals on point of law was in principle limited to the grounds of appeal as submitted by an appellant and certain aspects which are examined ex officio (Article 242 § 1 in conjunction with Article 237 of that Code). Such grounds were restricted to points of law and conformity with procedural requirements (Article 241 § 1 of that Code). Appeals on points of law were determined on the basis of the contents of the case‑file and the Supreme Court normally did not take any evidence (Article 243a § 2 of that Code) or consider any newly introduced factual or legal assertions. The Government concluded that the applicant’s lack of awareness of the defendant’s observations had no detrimental effect on him and that knowing of them would not have been of any advantage to him. They further added that it had been open to the applicant and his lawyer whose obligation had been to exercise due professional diligence to learn of the observations by inspecting the respective Supreme Court case‑file.


44.  The Government averred that the proceedings had been fair. The Administrative Court had conducted the proceedings within a reasonable time and in accordance with the relevant procedural law. That court had rendered a reasoned judgment based on the legislation in force. In addition, the Government argued that the principle of  <mask> had also been respected in the applicant’s case. The applicant could at any time have sought access to the case file and had in fact subsequently submitted comments on the Municipal Office’s response to her claim. Moreover, the Government argued that the Municipal Office had not raised any new material facts in its response, but had simply reiterated its arguments from the impugned decision.


101.  The applicants emphasised that the summons had mentioned their right to appear in person before the civil court. However, since they were deprived of their liberty, the exercise of that right had been conditional on the court’s decision to have them transferred to the local investigative unit. They pointed out that Mrs Khuzhina had left the court, protesting against the court’s decision to refuse them leave to appear. They maintained that the principle of  <mask> had been breached because they had not been present or represented in the proceedings.


99.  The Government argued that the principles of fairness and  <mask>, as secured by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, were not breached in the applicant’s case. They pointed out that under relevant national legislation the applicant was under an obligation to submit evidence in support of her claims, and, in particular, to prove that she had sustained damage, that it had been caused by the defendant, and that there was a causal link between the defendant’s actions and the infliction of damage. The Government also submitted that under relevant national law the court explained to the parties to the proceedings their procedural obligations and rights, including their right to seek the court’s assistance in collecting and obtaining evidence. They further argued with reference to the transcript of the hearing of 3 December 2001 (see paragraph 65 above) that the applicant had received explanations concerning her procedural rights, and that neither she nor her legal counsel had filed any motions to request the court’s assistance in obtaining evidence. The Government thus argued that the applicant could not be said to have been placed under an excessive burden of proof in the proceedings for compensation.


30.  The applicant alleged, in a general manner, that he was disadvantaged because he was not represented by counsel despite facing two parties, the public prosecutor and S., the latter being represented by a lawyer. However, it does not follow from either the principle of  <mask> or the right to free legal assistance that free legal assistance has to be provided in each and every case to a party whose opponent is represented by counsel. The applicant did furthermore not argue that he had not been given the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed by either the public prosecutor or S. in the proceedings before the District Court. In fact, it is not in dispute that he was given access to the file and that he made submissions on multiple occasions (see paragraphs 7, 9 and 11 above).


25.  The Government submitted that, in accordance with Article 419 of the Code of Civil Procedure, obvious errors may be corrected if the decision to be corrected appears not to comply with the court's true intention. Under that provision the court may act, without involving the parties, ex-officio. Nevertheless the court may be notified about any mistake by a third person. Therefore the proceedings in the instant case cannot be compared to appeal proceedings on a cost order in domestic law pursuant to Article 521a § 4 of the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure. In the present case the Supreme Court in its decision merely clarified that not only the decisions themselves but also the cost orders of the first-instance decisions were reinstated and gave no decision on the amount of the costs. Since the decision did not affect the actual content of the judgment and alter its legal effect, but merely added part of a phrase which had inadvertently been omitted, there was no need to hear the parties. Therefore the  <mask> principle had not been violated.


37.  The Government further submitted that the applicant had been present and represented at all hearings before the first-instance court. He had been informed on 3 October 2001 of the court’s refusal to bring him to the hearing scheduled for 28 November 2001, so he had had ample time to ask the court to reconsider its decision. He could also have asked his lawyer for advice. It had not been shown that he had done that. His lawyer had been present at the hearing before the appellate court and could have submitted the applicant’s arguments. As the prosecution had not appealed against the judgment, the principle of  <mask> had not been breached. The court had not obtained any supplementary evidence. Hence, the applicant’s presence had not been necessary and his absence had not limited his defence rights.


20.  The applicant maintained that the domestic courts’ refusal of his request to examine several witnesses on his behalf had been in violation of the principle of  <mask> and had breached his rights under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention. As a result, he claimed, he had been prevented from proving his alibi. Hence, his case had been treated in a one‑sided and flawed manner. He noted that at the hearing of 30 April 2008 he had had a newly appointed lawyer who had not had time to prepare for that hearing (see the Government’s argument in paragraph 21 below) and therefore could not have filed a request for the examination of the witnesses by that date. Subsequently, she had filed the request on the basis of Article 475 of the CCP (see paragraph 17 above) but it had been unlawfully rejected. As for the appeal proceedings, the applicant maintained that the procedural application had been duly filed as part of his appeal but the appeal court had erroneously dismissed it.


57.  The Government submitted that, as a matter of law, the applicant, who had been serving a prison sentence at the time, did not have the right to be personally present at the court hearing concerning determination of his civil rights and obligations or to be entitled to free legal assistance. Nor did the interests of justice require that he be provided with legal aid. Accordingly, the domestic courts' decision to hear the case in the applicant's absence had been in compliance with applicable domestic laws. The courts had duly advised the applicant of the date and time of the court hearings and of his procedural rights, including the rights to appoint a representative to plead the case on his behalf and to ask the court to procure evidence. The applicant, however, had chosen not to avail himself of them. The courts had thoroughly examined the applicant's claims and the submissions made by the respondent parties in accordance with the rules of civil procedure. In the Government's opinion, the fact that the applicant had not been present in court was not decisive for the outcome of the proceedings. Nor had the principle of the  <mask> been infringed.


84.  The applicant, who was ordered to pay Mr Sarkozy just one euro in damages, together with court costs, has not provided any concrete evidence to show that he could have had an objectively justified fear that the judges of the Nanterre Criminal Court and the Versailles Court of Appeal were under the President’s influence. The Court observes in this connection that the case before the judges did not bear any relation to the political duties of Mr Sarkozy, who had neither brought the prosecution nor provided any evidence to establish the applicant’s guilt. In addition, the Court notes that it was on 15 June 2012 that the Court of Cassation delivered its judgment, in which it examined the applicant’s complaints about the  <mask> and about the independence and impartiality of the tribunal, at a date when Mr Sarkozy no longer chaired the CSM. The Court points out that, after the judgment of the Versailles Court of Appeal of 8 January 2010, the reform of the French Constitution (brought about by the Law of 23 July 2008) came into force. The chairmanship of the CSM was thereby transferred from the President of the Republic to the President of the Court of Cassation, in order to secure the independence of the judicial system.


21.  The applicant complained that the decision of the District Court not to appoint, of its own motion, defence counsel for him for the first-instance proceedings before it, breached his right to a fair trial, in particular the principle of  <mask> and the right to free legal assistance. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a) and (c) of the Convention alone and taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Wetjen and Others v. Germany, nos. 68125/14 and 72204/14, § 44, 22 March 2018, with further references), finds it appropriate to examine this complaint solely under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


55.  The applicant maintained that the refusal by the Supreme Court of his request to take part in the cassation hearing had breached his right to defence and violated the principle of  <mask>. He submitted, in particular, that by rejecting the said request as lodged belatedly, the Supreme Court had interpreted the applicable law with excessive formalism and had in any event acted unfairly. In particular, it had not taken account of the fact that the request had been lodged within the one-month time-limit from the date on which the applicant had received the final rectified version of the trial court’s judgment, or of the crucial importance of the hearing for him. Finally, the applicant pointed out that he had no longer been legally represented by the time of the cassation proceedings. However, the cassation hearing had been attended by the prosecutor, who had given oral submissions. Therefore, his own absence had seriously undermined the equality of arms between the parties.


33.  The Government referred to the Court’s case-law which recognised that the need to protect the public interest may justify withholding certain evidence from the defence in criminal proceedings (amongst others, Edwards and Lewis v. the United Kingdom, nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98, § 53, 22 July 2003). In this respect, they underlined that in the instant case all evidence had been disclosed to the applicant. The only difficulty for the applicant had been related to the fact that part of the evidence had been classified. However, the rules applied by the domestic courts regarding arrangements on access to the case file had respected the principle of  <mask>.


114.  The Government argued that the proceedings in the applicant’s civil cases had been respectful of the principle of  <mask>. First, the courts had duly considered all the applicant’s arguments contained in his written submissions. Second, the court obtained the applicant’s personal file from the colony and examined a witness, a colony official. Third, the applicant received all court documents, including the transcripts of the hearings and the documents submitted by the defendants. The applicant’s absence had been objectively justified by the fact that he had been serving his prison sentence in a correctional colony and that it had been impossible to transport him to the hearings. He was informed of his procedural rights, including the right to be represented, of which he did not make use.


73.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been duly notified of the hearing dates and had received copies of all procedural documents. He had had an opportunity to make written submissions or to appoint a representative. The Government also argued that the applicant had not expressed a wish to participate in the appeal hearings which had been held in the absence of both parties, so the principle of  <mask> had not been breached.


54.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 that her right to  <mask> was infringed, because the Supreme Land Reform Board denied her the right to consult specific parts of the court files. Under the same provision she complained that the Regional and Supreme Land Reform Board were not independent and impartial because of the participation of civil servants as expert members of these boards. Under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 and Article 1 Protocol No.1 she complained that the rules under which transfer of the grazing right to he had been refused, namely the residence clause, were discriminatory.


188.  The applicant also complained that the proceedings had not been decided speedily and that the principle of  <mask> had been infringed. Having found that the scope and nature of the judicial review afforded to the applicant by the domestic courts did not satisfy the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, the Court does not need to examine whether other requirements of the same provision were also breached.


40.  The Government firstly, argued that the principle of  <mask> should not extend to the present case because the punishment for contempt of court was, essentially by its nature, imposed by the court proprio motu, without there being any parties to the proceedings. The applicant’s own disruptive behaviour forced the court to deliver the impugned decision in another courtroom and in his absence. The Government further submitted that on 19 January 2012 the applicant had been served with the impugned first-instance decision which indicated the penalty imposed on the applicant and the court’s reasons, and that he had subsequently obtained from the appellate court a fresh examination of the merits of the charge. The Government referred to the Rule 80 (B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence common for the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and to Rule 170 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, which authorise the court to order the removal of a person for his or her disruptive conduct and to continue the proceedings in the person’s absence.


101.  The applicant submitted that there had been no prosecuting party in the administrative-offence proceedings against her. The police officers who had drawn up the administrative-offence report had not been present at the hearings and, in any event, it was not their role to support charges against the accused. In the absence of a prosecuting party in the administrative‑offence proceedings, the trial and appellate courts had assumed the role of proving the accusation against her. That situation had breached the principles of impartiality,  <mask> and adversarial proceedings. Referring to Karelin v. Russia (no. 926/08, §§ 22-37, 20 September 2016), the applicant argued that the Court had already found that the absence of a prosecuting party, stemming from the domestic legislation and judicial practice, violated the impartiality requirement under Article 6 of the Convention. In the present case, the trial court had proprio motu reformulated the charges against the applicant and had corrected factual and legal mistakes contained in the administrative arrest report, thereby performing a task normally performed by a prosecuting party.


40.  The applicant disagreed with the argument that by leaving the courtroom his counsel had deprived himself of the opportunity to put questions to NA. He observed in this respect that the principle of  <mask> would not have been respected at the hearing owing to his defence counsel’s lack of knowledge of the evidence against him. Lastly, the applicant submitted that after the hearing of NA on 11 April 2002, the witness had not appeared in response to the summons of the court. Thus, there was no possibility to challenge NA or his statements at the trial.


75.  The Government stated the Supreme Court of Cassation did not hold hearings in pre-trail detention cases as that would slow down the proceedings considerably. However, the Supreme Court of Cassation had before it the full case file and the applicant’s appeal. He was free to offer additional submissions. On that basis the Government invited the Court to accept that the  <mask> principle had not been breached. The Government also submitted that the courts had analysed all elements relevant under domestic law.


50.  The applicants, for their part, argued that the proceedings concerning the administrative offences had failed to comply with the guarantees of a fair and public hearing, alleging that the principle of  <mask> had not been secured in that the witnesses for the defence had not been called, and that the public had been excluded from the trial of the first applicant.