37.  The Government pointed out at the outset that the Court was not empowered to examine questions linked to the  <mask> itself, such questions clearly being beyond its jurisdiction ratione temporis. In the Government’s submission, it was the lack of any payment of compensation for expropriation which constituted an interference with the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. The applicants agreed with that submission and complained that, in depriving them of any compensation, judgments nos. 3156/1995 of the Salonika Court of Appeal and 1302/1997 of the Court of Cassation had imposed an excessive burden on them.


63.  The applicants contended that there was, however, one significant difference between Amato Gauci and the present cases, which should have a decisive bearing as regards the applicable rule. Whereas in Amato Gauci there was uncertainty as to when the forced extension of the lease would end, in the present case there was no such uncertainty because the extension of the lease would never end – the lease was extended in perpetuity. Consequently, it was in reality not a restriction on the lessors’ rights but rather a  <mask>.


50.  The Government considered that the case did not concern  <mask> because the Sozopol agricultural land commission’s decision of 23 May 1992 had not created title to property for the applicants. The Government argued that the applicants could not have legitimately expected to have their property restored, given that the land they claimed had been within the boundaries of the Duni resort. They pointed out that Duni, later Duni AD, had not participated in the restitution procedure and had not had an opportunity to present its claims.


106.  The applicants challenged the legitimacy of the aim pursued by the impugned expropriation. In this connection, the Court reiterates that, because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is “in the public interest”. Under the system of protection established by the Convention, it is thus for the national authorities to make the initial assessment as to the existence of a problem of public concern warranting measures of  <mask>. Here, as in other fields to which the safeguards of the Convention extend, the national authorities accordingly enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. Furthermore, the notion of “public interest” is necessarily extensive. In particular, the decision to enact laws expropriating property will commonly involve consideration of political, economic and social issues. The Court, finding it natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one, will respect the legislature’s judgment as to what is “in the public interest” unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation (see Former King of Greece and Others (merits), cited above, § 87; James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 46, Series A no. 98; and Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, § 112, ECHR 2000‑I).


232.  The Government did not contest the losses sustained by the third applicant, nor the amount. They argued that the  <mask> was in compliance with the second sentence of part 1 of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, because it was done “in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law”. The criminal investigation into the attack concluded that no crime had been committed, and the applicant could have sought compensation in civil proceedings.


21.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> was an instantaneous act and did not produce a continuing situation. They pointed out that it was the former Yugoslav legislation that allowed for the applicants’ property to be expropriated without at the same having determined or awarded them compensation. The subsequent 1994 Croatian legislation amended those rules, but could not have changed the applicants’ situation. In any event, all of these facts having occurred prior to Croatia’s ratification of the Convention, i.e. 5 November 1997, the Court is not competent ratione temporis to entertain the present application.


49.  The Government submitted that the determining question in the case, in the light of the Court’s case-law concerning similar complaints on forfeiture or loss of pension, was whether a fair balance had been struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirement of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. They noted that, in line with the Court’s case-law, the forfeiture of a retirement pension fell to be considered under the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, since it acted neither as a control of use nor as a  <mask>. In the Government’s view the required fair balance had not been exceeded.


42.  The Government submitted that the fuel had been seized for inspection under Article 178 of the CCrP (see paragraph 26 above). The above measure amounted to lawful control of use rather than a  <mask>. The Government contended that the commercial court had rejected the applicant’s claim for lack of jurisdiction because claims against officers of the Ministry of the Interior, including claims arising out of the alleged unlawful seizure of property in the framework of criminal proceedings, were to be examined by the courts of general jurisdiction. The commercial court had indicated that the applicant should have directed his claims against the military unit rather than the Ministry of the Interior. The storage contract was regulated by Article 84 of the CCrP and Article 906 of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 24 and 25 above). It was incumbent on the military unit under Article 902 of the Civil Code to pay damages for any loss caused to the applicant’s property.


278.  The applicant company G.I.E.M. S.r.l. submitted that the confiscation measure constituted a  <mask>. It argued that, by allowing, through a general formulation, the extension of such confiscation beyond the land directly concerned by the unlawful development, section 19 of Law no. 47/1985 infringed Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. That Article allowed legitimate interference only on the basis of a law that was accessible, precise and foreseeable. The applicant company took the view that section 19 should have indicated in greater detail the limits within which it was possible to decide on confiscation in relation to the established facts, by indicating, according to a principle of reason and proportionality, the extent of the land that could be confiscated in relation to the buildings erected thereon and the unlawful conduct as established in material and mental terms. It explained that the lack of clarity and precision of the national law, and of the regional law, which had been regarded by the Court as “obscure and poorly worded” in its Sud Fondi S.r.l. and Others judgment (merits, cited above), had made it possible to confiscate land of an area that was three times as large as that covered by the planning permission issued by the Bari municipal authority. An even more serious consequence was that this had also affected the applicant company’s property even though the company had not been involved in the acts in respect of which the criminal proceedings had been brought.


21.  The applicants reiterated their arguments that the  <mask> had been arbitrary. They contended that no adequate compensation was available to them as the compensation procedure had been delayed for years. This delay was attributable to the authorities who had failed to notify the applicants of any developments following the order of the regional governor of 17 April 2001.


14.  The Government argued that the applicants had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies, because they had not sought to be accommodated in a municipally-owned dwelling or to be allowed to buy such a flat at a regulated price. In addition, the Government considered that the applicants’  <mask> had not been arbitrary, but governed by strict rules meant to find a balance between the interests of pre‑nationalisation and post-nationalisation owners. They argued that the applicants had had a possibility to receive adequate compensation through compensation bonds.


26.  The Government submitted that the restitution laws adopted after the fall of communism had had the aim of restoring justice. In the applicants’ case, the courts had applied the relevant law correctly. The requisite fair balance had not been upset because the applicants had benefited from the use of the apartment and had received compensation through bonds. Referring to the case of James and Others v. the United Kingdom (21 February 1986, Series A no. 98), the Government argued that in cases of  <mask>, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 did not require full compensation.


32.  The applicants stated, inter alia, that they had been the victims of an arbitrary and unlawful  <mask> which had been disproportionate to the legitimate aims of the Restitution Law. The applicants had suffered an excessive burden. In particular, the bonds compensation scheme which the applicants did not use did not secure adequate compensation because at the relevant time they could not obtain more than the equivalent of approximately EUR 12,300 – 20% of the value of the apartment as assessed in accordance with the applicable law.


57.  The Government acknowledged that the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions had been limited by the fact that the local development plan, as amended in 1994, had prevented them from constructing on their plots. However, the interference had been justified by the  <mask> of the community, namely by the need to build a roadway which would serve local transport needs. Moreover, it had been consistent with the principles of legal certainty and non-retroactivity of laws. By adopting these provisions, the legislature had given the local government authorities time to adjust local development plans to the new needs of their municipalities, without being obliged to compensate individual owners for the consequences of local development plans adopted before 1989, when the transformation of the legal and economic system of the State had been undertaken.


98.  The Government submitted that the confiscation of the items taken from R. had had a legal basis in Article 63 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which the property received as a result of a criminal offence, the legal owner of which could not be identified, was to be confiscated. It had also had a legitimate purpose – confiscation of criminally acquired property operated in the  <mask> in combating criminal activities and as a deterrent to those considering engaging in criminal activities.


36.  The Government considered that the applicant had not been deprived of his possessions; nor had there been a de facto expropriation. The requisition order and the rent-control measure were matters of housing and social policy, which constituted a control of use of property in the  <mask> aimed at ensuring a just distribution and use of housing resources as well as a better use and preservation of old houses in a densely populated and small country where land available for construction was severely limited in relation to demand.


41.  The Government further argued that under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 Contracting States had a right to enact such regulations as they deemed necessary to control the use of property in accordance with  <mask>. This provision left a wide margin of appreciation to the national authorities. In the Government’s view, the relevant domestic law concerning car registration pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining the safety of road traffic.


46.  The applicant company complained of an infringement of its right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions. Noting that a trade mark constituted a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, it said that it had been deprived of that possession by the application of a bilateral treaty that had come into force after it had filed its application to register the mark. It argued that the Supreme Court’s decision had to be regarded as an expropriation (as it had prevented the applicant company from enjoying the protection of its intellectual property right), but had not been effected in the  <mask>. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 reads as follows:


25.  The Government further submitted that due to the size of the Zenica-Doboj Canton’s public debt, postponement in the enforcement was justified as otherwise macroeconomic stability and fiscal sustainability would be jeopardised. The cantonal government was willing to enforce all the final judgments against it and all the measures taken to that end were designed to strike a fair balance between the demands of the  <mask> of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. In 2014 the cantonal government provided BAM 400,000 in its budget for that purpose. Moreover, in the same year 38 settlements were concluded.


27.  The Government pointed out that the only ground for eviction in the present case was that the lease had expired, a factor that did not warrant the applicant’s being given any priority in the provision of police assistance. The present case was indistinguishable from the case of Spadea and Scalabrino v. Italy (see the judgment of 28 September 1995, Series A no. 315-B), in which the Court held that there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of her property was therefore consistent with the relevant legislation. The Government concluded that the burden imposed on the applicant had not been excessive. The Government pointed out that the statutory measures had been taken in the  <mask> to protect tenants, regard being had to the inner-city housing crisis and the difficulty in providing adequate housing for low-income tenants who have been evicted. The Government added that a large number of leases had expired in 1982 and 1983 and that the simultaneous execution of repossession orders in respect of all the premises concerned would have resulted in severe social unrest. The purpose of the measures in issue had therefore been to maintain order. It had been necessary to stagger the provision of police assistance because it was impossible to guarantee everyone assistance at the same time.


70.  The Government submitted that the enactment of and the authentic interpretation given to Law no. 326/03 was justified on the basis of compelling  <mask> reasons. On that issue, the Constitutional Court had delivered judgment no. 274 of 2006, holding that the impugned law did not minimise the role of the judiciary or violate the principle of confiance legitime (sic). It considered that the impossibility of cumulating such benefits had been one of the possible interpretations of the law as from the start. That interpretation had immediately been followed by the INPS, but was then contradicted by the Court of Cassation ten years later. Such a situation had created uncertainty and it had therefore been reasonable to intervene by means of a law of authentic interpretation. The Government further submitted that it had been necessary to enact Law no. 326/03 to re‑establish the original interpretation of the applicable legal norms which had been applied consistently for ten years by the INPS but which had been given a different meaning by the domestic courts the first time the issue was brought before them (final judgment no. 14227 of 27 October 2000).


11.  The Government did not succeed in establishing, in a satisfactory manner, the  <mask> said to justify the enactment of the legislation. In calling into question the protection of shareholders who believed they were sheltered by the very structure of a limited liability company, can this measure be regarded as serving the common interest? Can the unconditional protection of creditors be seen as an “overriding reason of general interest” (see paragraph 50 of the judgment)? This cannot be so, especially as any analysis of the proportionality of the measure was not a statutory requirement and was not carried out at the domestic level, where the case was considered only in terms of Article 6, without it being examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. As we have already said, there were far less drastic measures at the State’s disposal in order to “force” bona fide shareholders to wind up dormant companies or to punish them in a proportionate manner for not doing so.


69.  The Government submitted that there had been no breach of the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions and that the State’s responsibility had not been engaged on account of the refusal by the courts to order the tenants’ eviction. They declared that the impugned judicial decisions had been based on facts attributable to the applicants, namely their failure to comply with the statutory procedure for notification of tenants provided for by Article 10 § 1 of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 40/1999, which had led to the automatic extension of the existing tenancy agreements pursuant to Article 11 § 1 of that Ordinance. Referring to Robitu v. Romania (no. 33352/96, Commission decision of 20 May 1998, unreported), they considered that the statutory extension of tenancy agreements – provided for in the Ordinance and noted in the present case by the domestic courts which entertained the applicants’ eviction actions – pursued an aim that was in the  <mask>, namely the protection of tenants’ interests in a situation characterised by a shortage of cheap housing. This statutory extension, in the Government’s view, struck a fair balance between the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of individuals’ fundamental rights.


32.  The Government disputed the applicant’s submissions. It was clear that the legislative amendments in question were the logical and necessary consequences of the financial position of the Pension Fund at the material time. Their aim was to serve the  <mask> of its members and the amendments had been made in accordance with the law. The Government emphasised that the decision to adopt new criteria for the assessment of disability applied in an objective manner to all those who were in the same position. The changes made had been instigated by the Fund’s Board, composed of representatives of employers and employees, including those of the employees’ organisation of which the applicant was a member.


33.  The applicants stressed that in 1964 at the time when the land in question was obtained by them, forests and woodland did not enjoy a legal status comparable with the special status which they enjoy after the enactment of the 1975 Constitution, as systematically interpreted by the courts from 1980 onwards. Thus, they had every reason to believe that they could build their homes on the land in question. This was all the more so as in 1966 the Royal Decree of 6 May had included the land in the revised urban development plan and in 1974 Legislative Decree no. 303/1974 had declassified the land from being reafforestable. Hence, when the new Constitution entered into force, their land was already a residential area in the process of being developed. However, the State had unlawfully reversed their rights without paying them any compensation and without even granting their request to exchange their land for new land of equal value or to expropriate it. Moreover, their funds diverted to their housing projects were now lost, since the value of land in this particular part of Athens, if one could not secure planning permission for building purposes, was close to zero. The applicants asserted that the interference with their property rights had not taken place by means of any law and had not respected the fair balance which should be struck between the demands of the  <mask> of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.


53.  The Government submitted that a possible, more favourable amount of pension could not constitute an already established possession. Thus, at the time the first applicant’s only possession was that awarded by the INPS under the impugned law. Moreover, on the basis of the reasons argued above, there had been no violation of the said provision, particularly in view of the  <mask> invoked, namely the need to ensure the economic and financial stability of the Italian welfare system.


25.  The applicants referred to the conditions laid down in Article 17 § 2 of the Constitution as to the award of full compensation in advance, and submitted in conclusion that they had suffered a significant pecuniary loss upsetting the fair balance that should be struck between the protection of the right of property and the requirements of the  <mask>.


60.  The Government submitted that the measures complained of had pursued the legitimate aim of securing land for the implementation of the local development plan. The impugned measures had served the  <mask> as they had been intended to resolve the communications and environmental problems of the municipality of Milanówek. As the Court has acknowledged on many occasions, such matters correspond to the general interest of the community.


46.  The applicant submitted that the limitations imposed on the use of his land by the Federal Hunting Act were disproportionate. The German legislature had failed to strike a fair balance between his interest in enjoying the use of his property and the alleged  <mask> in the practice of hunting. As he was the only landowner within the hunting association who was opposed to the practice of hunting, he was materially unable to prevent the leasing of the hunting rights.


16.  The applicant complained that the confiscation of his goods had been a disproportionate measure, bearing in mind that the ingots had been lawfully acquired and that he had also been fined for the same offence. He also alleged that the proceedings which he had initiated afterwards had failed to establish a fair balance between the  <mask> and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.


35.  The Government argued that, although the new rules of schoolbook procurement might have indirectly interfered with the applicant companies’ financial interests, such interference had complied with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No 1. The measure complained of was lawful; it allowed sufficient time for the applicant companies to adjust their business practice to the new circumstances, and did not interfere with the existing contracts between the applicant companies and their clients. Furthermore, as to the existence of a  <mask>, the Government stressed that the New Regulations’ legislative objectives could be clearly identified from the legislature’s explanation attached to the amendment proposals (see paragraph 14 above). The Government argued that the schoolbook market had been a distorted one where the end-consumers (that is, the pupils or their parents) did not freely select the product and the product was not paid for by the schools or the teachers who actually selected them.


31.  The Government claimed that the interference with the applicant’s property rights had been lawful and justified. In particular, divesting the applicant of her right to the early-retirement pension had been provided for by law and was in the  <mask>. There was also a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the interference and the interests pursued. Moreover, the applicant remained unemployed only for 82 days after the revocation of the pension thus the burden placed on her had not been excessive.


38.  The Government maintained that the interference was necessary as there was a reasonable suspicion that the assets originated in criminal activities of the former manager of the applicant company and that it was proportionate even considering its length due to the importance of the  <mask> at stake and the very complex and extensive nature of the crime that had to be investigated. The Government further argued that a violation should be found only were the procedure manifestly arbitrary or the duration of the seizure manifestly unreasonable.


40.  The Government noted that the judgment in the applicant's favour had been quashed after it had become final and enforceable. Accordingly, there was an interference with the applicant's right to receive the funds awarded to him by that judgment. However, they maintained that the interference did not have any consequences for the applicant's right to receive those funds as it merely changed the procedure for recovering the indexed deposit. They further maintained that there are other people with deposits at the State Savings Bank who are also not entitled to retrieve their money. Therefore the interference with the applicant's rights was in accordance with the  <mask> and complied with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


34.  The applicant submitted in reply that, by quashing the final and binding judgment in her favour, the State failed to strike a “fair balance” between the  <mask> and her property rights. She indicated, inter alia, that the average price per square meter of housing in the Podolsky District of Kyiv was approximately USD 1,000, and that the current design of the corridor impeded her access to the room in the house which she occupied.


34.  The Government submitted that under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, States were entitled to control the use of property in accordance with the  <mask> by applying relevant laws. States had a wide margin of appreciation in that connection. The geographical location of Bulgaria as a route for drug trafficking in the Balkans and the country’s European Union obligations were determinative for the State policy on fighting this illicit trade. The high degree of danger for society from drug smuggling explained the extension of civil liability associated with the crime of smuggling to property belonging to third persons. The application of Article 242 § 8 of the Criminal Code in the present case was lawful, justified and proportionate to the aim pursued.


15.  The Government specified that in their view the application concerned only the part of building no. 38 which had been sold, without the appurtenant land and without the flat where the applicant lives, emphasising that the applicant could also have claimed compensation for this part. Then the Government dwelt on the difficulties connected with the legislative evolution in the field of property and on the new developments which had occurred after 1989. In this respect, they considered that the latest reform regarding property, namely the Law no. 247/2005, had aimed at restitutio in integrum of immovable property wrongfully seized by the State during the communist regime and, when the property could not be returned, at granting compensation. Law no. 247/2005 grants compensation at market value in the form of participation in a common system of placing for movable securities, organised in the form of a joint stock company, Proprietatea. The persons having a right to compensation will receive securities at face value which will be transformed into shares once Proprietatea is listed on the stock market. The Government considered that the compensation granted once Proprietatea is put in place is in accordance with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and that the delay in the effective payment does not impinge upon the fair balance that must be struck between the demands of the  <mask> of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights.


30.  The Government stressed that the main aim of Legislative Decree no. 1195/1942 was to serve the  <mask> by preventing banks, limited companies and other legal entities from collecting the capital or income from securities when the holders of the securities had remained inactive; this was due in most cases to their having died without descendants or having decided to renounce their claims.


62.  The applicant companies relied on the Court’s principles regarding access to court and legislative intervention under Article 6 of the Convention, and referred in particular to the Court’s judgment in Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) ([GC], no. 36813/97, ECHR 2006‑V). They considered that there existed no legitimate reasons or compelling  <mask> reasons which could allow the Italian legislator to legitimately intervene in pending proceedings by enacting a law with retroactive effect concerning facts which had already come to be and proceedings which had already been initiated, thus usurping the function of the judiciary and violating the applicants’ right to a fair trial as well as impairing the very essence of the their right to a court. Indeed, the only reason behind the intervention had been financial, namely to avoid payments in a number of judgments, at first‑instance and on appeal, which had found in favour of the applicant companies and other companies in the same position. This was clear even from the name of the law – Urgent dispositions to favour development and to adjust the trend in public finances (Disposizioni urgenti per favorire lo sviluppo e la correzione dell’andamaneto dei conti pubblici). Without the intervention, and in accordance with the established case-law arising from a multitude of cases including judgments of the Court of Cassation, the applicant companies’ claims would have succeeded. However, the intervention ensured that, contrary to what had already been established, the INPS would be successful.


85.  The Government further argued that the impugned measure was in accordance with the  <mask>. The official data taken into account in the preparation of the FOCA revealed that, as at 28 February 1999, 6,587 companies had accounts frozen for more than a year, their debts amounted to SIT 84,452,000,000, and 6,083 of them (namely, 92%) had no employees. The only solution available to the Slovenian authorities at that time was to start winding-up proceedings of their own motion, but that would have taken 30 years and would have cost the State around SIT 900,000,000. The Constitutional Court held that the impugned measure was indeed in the general interest: for the protection of creditors and the security of legal transactions in general (see paragraphs 48 and 50 above).


64.  The applicants have thus had to bear an individual and excessive burden which has upset the fair balance that should be maintained between the demands of the  <mask> on the one hand and protection of the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions on the other. There has therefore been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


32.  The Government submitted that the authorities had complied with the national legislation and that their refusal to issue a plan of the applicant’s plot before 2006 had not been unjustified, seeing that the plan of newly formed plots for the area had not been approved. They stated that the applicant’s restitution procedure had been completed after the approval of the plan of newly formed plots in 2006 and that the applicant had received a plan of his property. They further noted that the State had introduced such laws as it had deemed necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the  <mask>. Finally, they stated, without elaborating further, that the proportionality requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been complied with.


56.  The Government accepted that the amount awarded to the applicant company by the domestic courts constituted a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and that there had been interference with its right of property on account of the non-enforcement. Nevertheless, they maintained that the provision had not been breached since the interference was reasonably justified and pursued a legitimate aim in the  <mask>.


38.  The Government further argued that entitling M.V. to use the applicant's flat had been a measure to control the use of property. The resultant interference had been based on law, namely section 5 of the Takeover Act and, later on, the Termination Act and the 2002 Amendments. Moreover, the impugned measure had been in accordance with the  <mask> as it had pursued a legitimate aim. The aim of these statutes and the ensuing measure had been: (a) to protect from deterioration and devastation the property which had been abandoned by its owners, (b) to enable the persons whose homes had been destroyed in the war to solve temporarily their housing needs, (c) to secure repossession of property of persons who had left Croatia but were subsequently returning, and, at the same time, (d) to protect those refugees and displaced persons who had been placed in the abandoned houses and flats.


54.  The applicant in the present case was the lawful owner of the electronic devices which the investigator removed from his flat and kept as physical evidence in a criminal case. This situation falls to be examined from the standpoint of the right of a State to control the use of property (see Smirnov, cited above, § 54). The decision to retain the devices was based on the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and could be considered necessary in the interests of proper administration of justice, which is a “legitimate aim” in the  <mask> of the community (ibid., § 57).


54.  The Government submitted that the measures complained of had pursued the legitimate aim of securing land for the implementation of the local development plan. The impugned measures had served the  <mask> as they had been intended to resolve the communication and environmental problems of the municipality. As the Court acknowledged on many occasions, such matters corresponded to the general interest of the community and the measures taken in the present case had been dictated by the difficult situation concerning the communications network in the municipality.


24.  The Government submitted that the measures applied in the applicant’s case flowed directly from the relevant rules of the domestic law as amended and pursued the  <mask> of rationalising the system of disability benefits. They stressed that the change in the amount of the benefit received by the applicant had resulted from a real change in her state of health, rather than from the change in the methodology and the restructuring of the disability benefit system. They pointed out that with her current state of health, she would no longer have been entitled to any benefit had the new system not been put in place. The benefit she was currently receiving should be compared with that scenario, rather than with the amount received under the old regime of benefits.


6.  The Government argued that, by subjecting the sale of duty-free goods to a system of licences, the Moldovan legislation took measures to implement the national policy in this field. This was in line with Moldovan economic policy generally, the objective of which was to control the use of merchandise in the  <mask>. It is further argued that the amendment to the Customs Code in April 2002 was designed in the general interest to contribute to the reduction and elimination of violations of the law of a financial and fiscal character.


93.  The Government concluded that the rent-control scheme met the  <mask> of society and was compatible with the interests of house and flat owners as (i) the maximum level of rent chargeable had been regularly increased, (ii) the number of houses to which the rent-control scheme was applicable after 2011 had been reduced, (iii) a legal framework for resolving the housing shortage and ending the rent-control system had been devised, and (iv) the legislation were amended to support modernisation of houses including those which are owned by the applicants.


142.  The applicants did not contest that the abolition of the specially protected tenancy and the restitution of nationalised property might have been regarded as pursuing a legitimate aim and as being in the  <mask>. They considered, however, that the same could not be said of the absence of compensation for the loss of their occupancy rights and for the abolition of the right to purchase.


73.  The Government indicated that the aim of the interference arising out of a demolition order made on the basis of town and country planning legislation was to protect the environment. That was a legitimate aim, in accordance with the  <mask> for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as the Court had already affirmed in Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others v. Ireland (29 November 1991, § 57, Series A no. 222). The applicant could not claim any legitimate expectation on the basis of the age of the building. She had inherited a property which was in contravention of the law and had immediately carried out acts which themselves required planning permission, without making any attempt to apply for that permission or to ascertain whether or not the building could be made compliant. She could not therefore claim any tolerance on the part of third parties that had prejudiced her own rights. The measure complained of was therefore in no way disproportionate.


48.  The Government further observed that the applicant had refused a proposal for a friendly settlement consisting of paying him a sum representing 80% of his claim (see paragraph 13 above). They inferred from this that it had been the applicant himself who had chosen not to collect his debt, while the State, faced with the exceptional situation of an insolvent municipality, had rapidly sought to protect the rights of creditors. They referred to the case of Bäck v. Finland (no. 37598/97, ECHR 2004-VII), in which the Court had found no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in spite of the annulment, without compensation, by retrospective legislation, of the applicant’s claim against an individual in the context of a social policy. They explained that, in the present case, the law on insolvent local authorities was not directed at a specific dispute, but was necessary for budgetary reasons and in pursuance of economic and social policies and that, as it had concerned a municipality and not an individual, it was in accordance with the  <mask>. They further submitted that the very substance of the applicant’s right had not been impaired, and that there had been only a slight reduction in relation to his claim.


16.  The Government, after specifying that in their view the application concerned flat no. 1 only, dwelt on the difficulties connected with the legislative evolution in the field of property and on the new developments occurred after 1989. In this respect, they considered that the latest reform regarding property, namely the Law no. 247/2005, had aimed at restitutio in integrum of immovable property wrongfully seized by the State during the communist regime and, when the property could have not be returned, at granting compensation. Law no. 247/2005 grants compensation at the market value in the form of participation in a common system of placing for movable securities, organised in the form of a joint stock company, Proprietatea. The persons having right to compensation will receive securities at face value which will be transformed into shares once Proprietatea is listed on the stock market. The Government considered that the compensation granted once Proprietatea will be put in place is in accordance with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and that the delay in the effective payment does not impinge upon the fair balance that must be struck between the demands of the  <mask> of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights.


59.  The applicants were of the view that the circumstances of the case amounted to a breach of their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. Their land had been designated for expropriation at an undetermined future date and this state of affairs had lasted for a long period of time, despite the fact that no funds had been available throughout this period to finance the planned investment. The public authorities, while they were obviously entitled to take appropriate measures to implement their spatial planning policies, should have also eliminated uncertainty concerning the future fate of the properties affected by such policies. The applicants stressed that uncertainty – whether originating from legislative or administrative sources or arising from practices applied by the authorities – is a factor to be taken into account in assessing the State’s conduct. Indeed, where an issue in the  <mask> is at stake, it is incumbent on the public authorities to act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner (see Vasilescu v. Romania, judgment of 22 May 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III, p. 1078, § 51; Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, §§ 110 in fine, 114 and 120 in fine, ECHR 2000‑I; Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, no. 48553/99, §§ 97‑98, ECHR 2002‑VII).


59.  The Government argued that neither the provisions of Polish law nor of Protocol No. 1 imposed on the Polish authorities an obligation to change the character of use of land by individual owners. Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 States had a right to enforce such laws as they deemed necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the  <mask>. The applicant had bought a property designated for agricultural use and should have been aware that his ownership right had not encompassed the right to build a house on this land. He had been entitled to use or dispose of his plot only within the limits prescribed by the law, the principles of reasonable social co-operation and the socio-economic purpose of ownership. The applicant's situation was therefore different from that in the case of Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden (judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, § 11) in which the restrictions were imposed on the property in the centre of the capital.


29.  The Government pointed out that the interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his property was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. They concluded that, taking into consideration the interests of both the landlord and the tenant, the burden imposed on the applicant had not been excessive. The Government pointed out that the statutory measures had been taken in the  <mask> to protect tenants, regard being had to the inner-city housing crisis and the difficulty in providing adequate housing for low-income tenants who have been evicted. The Government added that a large number of leases had expired in 1982 and 1983 and that the simultaneous execution of repossession orders in respect of all the premises concerned would have resulted in severe social unrest. The purpose of the measures in issue had therefore been to maintain order. It had been necessary to stagger the provision of police assistance because it was impossible to guarantee everyone assistance at the same time.


45.  The Government agreed that the amount awarded to the applicants by the domestic courts constituted a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They acknowledged that the non-enforcement of the judgments could be considered an interference with the applicants' rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. However, the Government claimed that the interference was justified in the  <mask>, namely the need to control the export of contaminated materials from the Chernobyl area. The large number of creditors of the company required the liquidation commission and the State to develop comprehensive measures in order to satisfy all the various claims.


25.  The Government pointed out that the interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of her property was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. They concluded that, taking into consideration the interests of both the landlord and the tenant, the burden imposed on the applicant had not been excessive. The Government pointed out that the statutory measures had been taken in the  <mask> to protect tenants, regard being had to the inner-city-housing crisis and the difficulty in providing adequate housing for low-income tenants who have been evicted.


65.  The Government admitted that the compulsory lease of the land under sections 3 et seq. of Law no. 64/1997 constituted an interference with the applicant's rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It reflected the legislator's position, according to which it was in the  <mask> that the rights of persons using the land for gardening purposes should prevail over the rights of the owners of the plots of the land in garden colonies. The work the gardeners had done had considerably increased the value of the land, which at the time the colonies were established had generally been unusable and of low quality. The Government argued that a fair balance had been struck between the general interest and the rights of the original land owners. Given the margin of appreciation which the Contracting States had in similar cases, the interference in issue with the applicant's right to peacefully enjoy her possessions was not contrary to the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


155.  The applicant considered that no public interest could possibly justify the State's persistent failure to resolve the problem of the Bug River claims, which had been recognised by Polish law for nearly sixty years. He stressed that under the Republican Agreements the State had taken upon itself the obligation to return to the Bug River owners, without any conditions or financial or other limitations, the value of the property they had had to abandon. While it might be acceptable that the implementation of that obligation should, on account of the  <mask> of the community, be achieved over a period of time, nothing could explain the adoption of legislative policy that for several decades had completely disregarded the obligations towards the Bug River claimants.


100.  The Government also argued that any interference with the applicant company’s rights could only be regarded as a “control of use” of possessions, that had been applied in the  <mask>. In the present case, the general interest was clear, namely the protection of the environment in accordance with the requirements of EU law. As the Court had repeatedly recognised in its case-law, this was a weighty consideration, which was of growing importance for contemporary society. In support of their argument the Government referred to a series of cases decided by this Court, notably: Depalle v. France [GC], no. 34044/02, ECHR 2010; Malfatto and Mieille v. France, nos. 40886/06 and 51946/07, 6 October 2016; Matczyński v. Poland, no. 32794/07, 15 December 2015; Alatulkkila and Others v. Finland, no. 33538/96, 28 July 2005; and Posti and Rahko v. Finland, no. 27824/95, ECHR 2002‑VII. The pursuit of this aim was not confined to the applicant company’s particular circumstances, but extended to all aquaculture operators based in designated locations around the coastline.


63.  The Government further argued that, should the Court find that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights, such interference was in the  <mask> within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The applicant had not been penalised for the fact that she had been a collaborator with the secret police. Rather, the purpose of the 1997 Lustration Act was to castigate those persons holding public office who had made untrue lustration declarations. Collaboration itself had not barred citizens from access to public office; only the truthfulness of the lustration declaration was in issue in the lustration proceedings. The principle of the protection of the citizen’s confidence in the State and law also militated in favour of the solution adopted in the applicant’s case. The requirements of social justice, guaranteed by Article 2 of the Constitution, had made it necessary to draw a distinction between judges who had made true declarations and those who had not. Trustworthiness was one of the values which deserved special protection by the State, especially in respect of judges.


103.  The Government maintained that the interference was necessary as there was a reasonable suspicion that the assets originated in criminal activities of the former manager of the applicant company and that it was proportionate even considering its length due to the importance of the  <mask> at stake and the very complex and extensive nature of the crime that had to be investigated. The Government further argued that a violation should be found only where the procedure was manifestly arbitrary or the duration of the seizure manifestly unreasonable.


49.  The Government considered that the length of the proceedings had no bearing on the lawfulness of a building under the town and country planning requirements laid down in the  <mask>. The applicant had been prosecuted for maintaining an unlawful building, which constituted a continuing offence not subject to limitation. For such time as the offence continued without the building being demolished, the remedial measure could not be excluded by way of compensation for loss incurred as a result of the reasonable time having been exceeded. It should also be pointed out that even if the domestic court had, by way of a penalty for exceeding the reasonable time, declared the proceedings inadmissible, there would have been nothing to prevent the planning inspector or the municipal council from applying for demolition in the civil courts.


91.  The Government considered that the interference complained of was lawful, pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate in the circumstances of the case. They submitted that the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions was not absolute and that certain restrictions were permissible. The restrictions in the present case were based on the  <mask>, namely protection of the natural environment. The Government further submitted that the property in question had been classified as “farmland” when the applicant bought it and that it had never been designated for construction purposes, even before the creation of the Wigry National Park and the adoption of the local development plan of 1994. Consequently, the Government invited the Court to find the present application manifestly ill‑founded.


59.  The Government argued that neither the provisions of Polish law nor of Protocol No. 1 imposed on the Polish authorities an obligation to change the character of the use of land by individual owners. Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, States had a right to enforce such laws as they deemed necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the  <mask>. The applicant had bought a property designated for agricultural use and should have been aware that his ownership right had not encompassed the right to build a house there. He had been entitled to use or dispose of his plot only within the limits prescribed by the law, the principles of reasonable social co-operation and the socio-economic purpose of ownership. The applicant's situation was therefore different from that in the case of Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden (judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, § 11) in which restrictions were imposed on property in the centre of the capital city.


84.  The Government maintained that neither the provisions of Polish law nor of Protocol No. 1 imposed on the authorities an obligation to change the character of use of land by individual owners. Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 States had a right to enforce such laws as they deemed necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the  <mask>. The applicant had acquired a property designated for agricultural use and should have been aware that his ownership right had not encompassed the right to build a house on this land. He had been entitled to use or dispose of his plot only within the limits prescribed by the law, the principles of reasonable social co-operation (zasady współżycia społecznego) and the socio-economic purpose of ownership (społeczno-gospodarcze przeznaczenie prawa).


20.  The Government submitted that even if Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 were applicable, the applicant had not sustained any interference with his rights under that provision, since there was no basis in domestic law for him to claim the continuous payment of an unchanged disability benefit, no matter how the circumstances evolved. Moreover, even assuming the existence of an interference, the measures applied in the applicant’s case flowed directly from the relevant rules of the domestic law as amended and pursued the  <mask> of rationalising the system of disability benefits. They could by no means be considered as disproportionate since (i) the impugned period had lasted only eighteen months; (ii) the applicant had been in receipt of a benefit even during that time; (iii) the amount of that benefit had exceeded one-third of his previous benefit and almost equalled 60% of the minimum subsistence income relevant in the years 2012 and 2013; and (iv) the 2014 amendment, consisting in an equitable adjustment of the law, had resulted in partial compensation for the applicant.


89.  The Government submitted that the authorities had searched the vessel on suspicion of organised arms smuggling into Turkey. The arms cargo had thus been seized in accordance with section 12 of Law no. 6136 and Article 36 of the former Turkish Criminal Code as well as Articles 2 and 25 of the Montreux Convention and Article 19 § 2 and Article 39 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982. The above-mentioned provisions of the Montreux Convention and the Convention on the Law of the Sea empowered the Government to limit the transit passage of commercial vessels through the Straits if the vessels posed a threat to the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the State or in any other manner violated the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. In this connection, arms smuggling was a threat to international peace and order and in violation of the principles of international law and customs. Thus, the provisional seizure of the arms cargo was necessary for the prevention of crime and the protection of public safety in accordance with the  <mask>.


48.  The Government contended that, if Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was at all applicable, what had occurred in the present case had to be considered as a control of the use of property falling within the scope of its second paragraph. They left it to the Court to decide whether an interference giving rise to State responsibility had occurred. They submitted, however, that the alleged interference had been lawful. Furthermore, the wage monitoring system that followed from the Construction Agreement, and the costs to which the applicants were compelled to contribute, served not only the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, but also pursued the  <mask> of the community, namely to uphold the legitimacy of the Swedish approach in the area of industrial relations.


102.  The Government further submitted that, if the Court were to find that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions in the present case, that interference had been lawful and necessary to control the use of property in the  <mask>. It had also been proportional as it had achieved a fair balance between the general interest of the community and the protection of the applicant’s property rights.


56.  The Government claimed that the interference with the applicant’s property rights had been lawful and justified. In particular, divesting the applicant of her right to the early-retirement pension had been provided for by law and was in the  <mask>. There was also a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the interference and the interests pursued. In the Polish social security system only retirement pensions granted under the general scheme were, in principle, permanent and irrevocable. All other benefits based on conditions subject to change were subject to verification and possible revocation.


76.   The Government further asked the Court not to take cognisance of the allegations of discrimination in so far as they had not been raised before the domestic courts. In conclusion they considered that the interference had been necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the  <mask>, namely that of an environmental nature and, in the circumstances of the present case, it had not imposed an excessive individual burden.


125.  The applicants had neglected the principles of spatial development and insisted on their interests. If this were accepted, that would mean that from the moment a location was granted the State would be tied by interests of the investor, and that in each change of DUP private interest would have a priority over the public interest. However, when adopting planning documents the State had an “imperium position”, and individual and legal persons had to tolerate the decisions reached by the authorities, provided these were in accordance with principles of protection of human rights. The Government submitted that the States had a wide margin of appreciation in this regard and that the Court must respect the domestic legislature’s assessment as to what was in the  <mask>, unless that assessment was manifestly without reasonable foundation.


62.  The Government admitted that there had been an interference with the applicant's right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions when the domestic authorities had allowed V.P. to use his property. They argued that this measure amounted to control of use of property and that it was not disputed that the interference had been based on law and had been in the  <mask>. As to proportionality, the State had been amending the relevant legislation as the circumstances and the need for the control of possessions had been changing. Namely, the legislation granting rather extensive powers to temporary occupants at the beginning had been amended over time to benefit the owners. Therefore, the interference had met the conditions of the extraordinary post-war situation and had not placed an excessive individual burden on the applicant.


73.  The applicant organisation maintained that by having been ordered to enter into a licence agreement with terms of remuneration which did not compensate the authors for the use of their works, the domestic courts had manifestly breached the balance between the right to receive remuneration for the use of musical works and the  <mask>. They also argued that the above restriction had not been justified by any public interest because the defendant in the first set of proceedings had been a commercial broadcaster and had transmitted authors’ work to gain profit. They added that in any event any public interest to have access to musical works could have been satisfied by those broadcasters in Latvia which had concluded a licence agreement with the applicant organisation. In reply to the Government’s argument that by the contested measures the domestic courts had solved a long-running dispute, the applicant organisation contended that the resolution of the case had not been in favour of the authors. In this connection they argued that before the contested proceedings the broadcasters had used the musical work without any licence and that the applicant organisation had done everything to reach an out-of-court settlement in the dispute with them.


44.  The applicants submitted that they had suffered a violation of their property rights as acknowledged by the domestic courts. They pointed to the fact that while a legitimate aim may have existed at the start, none existed twenty years later as shown by the fact that the tenants had abandoned the property. Moreover, the difference between the rent paid to them under the applicable law and that on the market was substantial (the rent payable according to law was one seventeenth of the market value). Thus, the State had failed to strike a fair balance between the demands of the  <mask> and those of the applicants. Moreover, the state in which the property was returned to them caused them a further burden.


29.  The applicant disputed that he could have insisted on a longer lease term as argued by the Government. It was uncontested in the domestic proceedings that he had negotiated for such a term and refused it. He stated that the deprivation of his possessions which he has suffered is wholly disproportionate as the loss caused to him as a result of failure to grant or enforce the option outweighs any real or perceived benefit to the  <mask> in applying the ultra vires principle, and that of corporate incapacity, on the facts of this case. He points to the lack of any compensation payable and to the passing of legislation which now permits local authorities to grant such options.


41.  The Government submitted that they were entitled to take that social measure. They contended that the fact that rent restriction provisions for commercial leases had to be made was also in the  <mask>, as it safeguarded the stability of businesses and the public services such businesses provided. The measure also sought to protect the employment of those persons who depended on the activity of those businesses and safeguarded against property owners taking advantage of the economic activity of a tenant.


75.  The Government argued that the interference had been based on law and pursued legitimate aims of protecting the property rights of others, namely those of the municipality of Třebíč, and legal certainty. It had also been proportionate. The procedural requirements of the national law, for example, that a person must ask for the restitution of property according to rules set out in the restitution laws, including certain time limits, could not in general be considered disproportionate. The requisite “fair balance” between the demands of the  <mask> of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights had been observed even in the particular circumstances of the present case.


33.  The Government submitted that the interference complied with the law and served the  <mask>, i.e. in securing the correct application of the law. The Government stated that the applicant's case was not terminated by the supervisory court but was remitted to the first instance court for an examination of the merits. They further maintained that the size of the disputed part of the house was miniscule and thus the interference did not place an excessive burden on the applicant.


17.  The Government disputed this claim, submitting that there was no evidence whatsoever of the applicant's ownership of property, particularly regarding the land in Sysklipos. Those plots of lands belonged to another person, Mrs Anastassia Christodoulou, with the exception of plot no. 368 (sheet/plan XI/47), which belonged to a certain Irini Hj. Christofi. In any event, the situation regarding the applicant's present inability to have access to property in northern Cyprus was the inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the inviolable United Nations Buffer Zone; until an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem, Convention rights were, of necessity, restricted in the  <mask> envisaged by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


57.  The Government submitted that the measure had been lawful and in the  <mask>, namely an important social aspect which forms part of the cultural identity of citizens. The Constitutional Court had referred to the social and cultural aim to stimulate the local musical talents and this general interest persisted even though such a service was given by a private entity. The Government admitted that the applicant had suffered a violation of her property rights up to the judgment of the Constitutional Court. They considered, however, that the violation had not continued thereafter, given that in 2010 the rent increased to EUR 185, and would continue to increase every three years. The rent reform also imposed certain obligations on tenants relative to maintenance of the premises.


66.  The Government noted that the domestic courts had established that the apartment at 33 Punane Street had been acquired through crime. It had been confiscated on the basis of Article 83 § 3 (2) and Article 83-1 § 2 (2) of the Penal Code. The confiscation measure had been effected with a view to preventing the illicit acquisition of property through criminal activities, and thus pursued a legitimate aim in the  <mask>. The Government considered that a fair balance had been struck between the public and individual interests in the present case. They pointed out that the applicant had received the apartment at 33 Punane Street free of charge, and argued that the fact that V. had later sold the applicant’s apartment at 9 Mahtra Street was of no relevance and could only give rise to a claim by the applicant against her mother V. The Government also noted that the applicant was not living in the apartment at 33 Punane Street, either at the time of the attachment or in 2011, so the confiscation had not resulted in the applicant’s losing her home.


54.  The Government conceded that the obligation to tolerate hunting, which ran counter to the applicant’s convictions, had interfered with his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Nevertheless, they pointed out that in Germany – in contrast to the situation in France and Luxembourg, where hunting rights were transferred completely to the hunting associations – the landowner remained the holder of the hunting rights and was thus not deprived of any possessions. He merely had to cede the right to practise hunting. Privately owned land, which was limited in quantity, had a particular social relevance which entitled the legislature to limit its use in the  <mask>.


69.  The Government argued, were the Court to find that the applicant had possession, that the interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was lawful.  The judgment ordering the applicant to repay the unemployment benefits had had its legal basis in section 210 of the Civil Obligation Act, which had been clear, foreseeable and publicly available. Further to this, it had been in the  <mask> for the unduly received benefits to be paid back.


44.  The Government submitted that although the applicants had suffered a violation of their property rights resulting from the fact that the rent did not increase over the years during which the property had been subject to a requisition order, the applicants could no longer complain once they had been compensated by the domestic court. They considered that that compensation was sufficient: while the applicants’ architect had estimated the rental value in 2007 as being EUR 6,990 annually, according to the Government a more realistic rental market value for the property was EUR 1,500 annually. The Government further noted that the requisition had been issued in the  <mask> namely social housing, and that the applicant’s appeal, which had only concerned the amount of compensation, had not referred to this matter.


75.  The Government submitted that the sums claimed were excessive and did not take into consideration the fact that the legislature had a right to control the amount of rents in the  <mask>. Moreover, even if the premises had never been requisitioned, the applicant would have received a rent established by the Rent Regulation Board, which would have been equal to the rent paid in 1984 by any other tenant. In the Government's view, no interest was due to the applicant since he had failed to claim interest by judicial letter, as required by domestic law.


42.  The Government argued that under the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention ownership was not ius infinitum. A State had the right to enact such laws as it deemed necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the  <mask>. The forfeiture of the arms held without a licence had amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. It had served the public interest as it had been ordered in order to safeguard public safety and to control the possession of arms by individuals. All States were entitled to control access to weapons as a fundamental power vested in them on the strength of their sovereignty. They were also under a positive obligation to ensure safety by way of licensing the possession of weapons. The States enjoyed a margin of appreciation in this regard. Under the Court’s case-law the scope of this margin varied depending on the issue concerned in a case. The State’s margin of appreciation in issues concerning arms control was particularly wide. A requirement to obtain a licence to possess weapons fell within the State’s margin of appreciation and could not be regarded as imposing an excessive individual burden on the applicant. The licensing system would be illusory if it was not attended by criminal sanctions or by the possibility to order forfeiture of illegally possessed arms.


32.  The Government in their submissions confirmed that the amount awarded to the applicant by the domestic court constituted a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They acknowledged that the non-enforcement of the judgment in favour of the applicant could be considered to be an interference with the applicant's right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. However, the Government claimed that such interference was justified in the  <mask>, namely the need to control the export of contaminated materials from the Chernobyl area. The large number of creditors of the liquidated company required the liquidation commission and the State to develop comprehensive measures to satisfy all claims.


41.   The Government argued that the state was entitled to enact laws and to give administrative decisions necessary in order to control the flow of merchandise into its territory. The decisions given in the present case had therefore pursued the  <mask>. As to the proportionality of the interference, they first argued that the applicants' business activities had involved storing of goods which were entering the territory of the state and leaving it. Moreover, the authorities had been under an obligation to supervise whether the applicants' business activities were in accordance with international agreements entered into by Poland. The lack of any control whatsoever performed by the customs authorities could have led to substantial losses in the state budget.


80.  The Government agreed with the findings and reasoning of the Chamber judgment (see paragraphs 68-70 above). In their opinion the expropriation of the applicants’ land had been carried out “in the public interest” and “subject to the conditions provided for by law”, and a fair balance had been struck between the requirements of the  <mask> of the community and the demands of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.


57.  The Government admitted that confiscation of the property belonging to the applicant could be considered as an interference under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In any event, the confiscation of part of the family’s property had been in accordance with domestic law (Article 72 § 3 of the Criminal Code) and amounted to a justified control of the use of property in the  <mask>. Referring to the Court’s case-law (Raimondo v. Italy, 22 February 1994, Series A no. 281-A), the Government contended that, in the interests of crime prevention, the State had a wide margin of appreciation in controlling property obtained by unlawful means or used for unlawful purposes. Referring to the decision of the Court of Appeal of 25 October 2004 and the applicant’s conviction on 30 June 2005, the Government considered that a fair balance between the public and individual interests had been achieved in the present case, particularly as the applicant, with her knowledge of her husband’s criminal activities, must have known full well that the property in question had been obtained from money gained unlawfully.


78.  The Government maintained that the relevant legislation regulating the use of prisoners’ money was compatible with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They argued that that provision did not impair the right of States to adopt such laws as they deemed necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the  <mask> or to secure the payment of taxes and other contributions or penalties.


18.  The Government admitted that the confiscation of the two ingots had amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right of property. However, that interference had been lawful and had pursued a legitimate aim. In particular, the Government argued that the confiscation, as a sanction for the administrative offence in question, had been prescribed by Romanian Customs Regulations, which had been sufficiently clear, accessible and foreseeable. The Government further submitted that the confiscation had had a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the  <mask> of checking certain goods prior to their entry into commercial circulation and ensuring a functioning customs regime, which entailed the adequate collection of taxes and other contributions. As to proportionality, the Government stated that Romania’s geographical position at the border of the European Union called for strong enforcement of border crossing legislation as an obligation flowing from its status as a Member State. Referring to the legal framework applicable in the case (see paragraphs 12 above), the Government contended that once the commission of an offence had been uncovered, the authorities had no other choice but to apply a fine and to confiscate undeclared goods. Nevertheless, the authorities had applied the minimum fine provided for by law in the current case.


24.  The Government pointed out that the interference with the applicant's right to the peaceful enjoyment of his property was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. They concluded that, taking into consideration the interests of both the landlord and the tenant, the burden imposed on the applicant had not been excessive. The Government pointed out that the statutory measures had been taken in the  <mask> to protect tenants, regard being had to the inner-city housing crisis and the difficulty in providing adequate housing for low-income tenants who have been evicted. The Government added that a large number of leases had expired in 1982 and 1983 and that the simultaneous execution of repossession orders in respect of all the premises concerned would have resulted in severe social unrest. The purpose of the measures in issue had therefore been to maintain order. It had been necessary to stagger the provision of police assistance because it was impossible to guarantee everyone assistance at the same time.


69.  The Government submitted that, in accordance with the Italo-Swiss Convention, the INPS paid out pensions after taking into consideration the working period in Switzerland and contributions paid there, in order to avoid the above-mentioned advantage. In the case of individuals who had not contested the amounts paid by the INPS, the latter was the final decision in respect of the amount of pension. Those who opted to contest that amount could only hope for a favourable outcome. However, the practical effects of Law 296/2006 were that the judicial decisions of the pending proceedings confirmed the original amount awarded by the INPS. Thus, there had been no discrimination, particularly because Law 296/2006 aimed to establish a homogenous situation while eliminating unjustified privileges for persons who had worked abroad. In the Government’s subsequent observations, referring to a report prepared by the INPS, they submitted that any favourable treatment enjoyed by persons whose pensions had already been liquidated was an inevitable situation, in view of the necessity of the Government to regulate possessions in the  <mask>.


43.  The applicant company complained that the domestic authorities had failed to strike a fair balance between the  <mask> and the applicant company’s interest. When it had purchased the land, it had not known that the motorway would be routed across the quarry. The chosen route across the quarry, by not bypassing it, had saved costs for the general public but imposed an excessive burden on the applicant company.


48.  The Government contended that a mere finding of guilt without any penalty constituted, having regard to the Court’s case-law, an acceptable consequence of the finding that the reasonable time had been exceeded. Reparation of loss incurred as a result of the time-limit having been exceeded could not preclude reparation of the loss arising, for the  <mask>, out of acts constituting an offence.


67.  The Government contended that the confiscation of the applicants’ property had been in accordance with domestic law and had amounted to a justified control of use of property in the  <mask>. Referring to the Court’s findings in the cases of Gogitidze and Others and Silickienė (both cited above) as well as in Phillips v. the United Kingdom (no. 41087/98, ECHR 2001-VII), they submitted that the Convention did not oppose the application of confiscation measures to family members of persons directly accused of offences or of extended confiscation, the measure carried out in the current case. They held that the applicants had benefited from qualified legal representation and had had reasonable opportunity to present their position before the authorities.


44.  The applicants submitted that the expropriation had pursued no public interest, but rather the commercial interest of the company which had obtained the title to it. Furthermore, there had been no relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued, nor had a fair balance been struck between the demands of the  <mask> and the interests of the owners of the plot in question. Referring to section 4 of the Act and the Constitutional Court’s decision, the applicants stated that a less restrictive measure could have been applied in their case, as they had unsuccessfully claimed in the impugned proceedings. Their arguments in this respect remained unaddressed. Lastly, they argued that the compensation awarded to them was below the market value of the plot.


82.  The applicant also submitted that the measure was disproportionate. Referring to Agrotexim and Others v. Greece (24 October 1995, § 66, Series A no. 330 A) and a number of later decisions, the applicant pointed out that according to the Court’s case-law, the lifting of the corporate veil was only justified in exceptional circumstances. In his view, there were no such circumstances in the present case. Referring to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 21 October 2010 in Idryma Typou AE v. Ypourgos Typou kai Meson Mazikis Enimerosis (C‑81/09, EU:C:2010:622), he argued that the impugned measure was likewise contrary to the fundamental principles of company law in the European Union. He invited the Court to apply the Vaskrsić jurisprudence (Vaskrsić v. Slovenia, no. 31371/12, 25 April 2017) and find a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, despite the fact that he had been relatively passive with regard to the destiny of L.E. and its outstanding debt. In the applicant’s view, what was crucial was that he had not acted in bad faith. In this connection, he pointed out that he had attempted to have L.E. dissolved by instituting winding-up proceedings, but his attempt had failed because L.E. was not able to cover the related costs. The applicant further maintained that a fair balance between the  <mask> and his property rights was upset by imposing on him the onus of demonstrating his “passive” status. In any event, he emphasised that he had held a managerial position in company L.E. for only a couple of years. This was not sufficient, in his opinion, to hold him liable for debts of the company. The applicant concluded that the impugned measure was profoundly unfair because the Slovenian Railways had fully realised its claim, whereas he had been left with nothing. He had, therefore, been made to bear an excessive burden.


47.  The applicant company further argued that the interference in question had not been proportionate, as it had failed to strike a fair balance between the demands of the  <mask> of the community and its own right to protection of its property rights. In particular, although it agreed with the Government that States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in implementing fiscal legislation, their discretion in that respect could not be considered to be limitless. In that connection it argued that it had had to bear an individual and excessive burden which upset the fair balance that had to be maintained between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the right of property. In particular, although the applicant company had complied with its VAT reporting obligations fully and in time, because of its supplier’s failure to discharge its VAT reporting obligations in the same manner (a) it had still been denied the right to deduct the input VAT of BGN 3,610 (EUR 1,851); (b) it had then been ordered to pay the VAT of BGN 3,610 (EUR 1,851) a second time, but this time to the State budget; (c) it had additionally been ordered to pay interest of BGN 200.24 (EUR 102) on that amount; (d) the VAT it had paid to its supplier had not been recognised as a tax-deductible expense and corporate income tax had then been charged on it; (e) it had incurred additional court fees and expenses in challenging the tax assessment; (f) it had thus been unduly and severely sanctioned for an infringement by the supplier, which had in fact discharged its VAT reporting obligations, but with a slight delay; and (g) general uncertainty had arisen in the fiscal affairs of the applicant company because all its VAT supplies could similarly be compromised by the failure of a supplier to discharge its VAT reporting obligations. Moreover, the applicant company would have no knowledge of this until such time as the tax authorities refused to recognise the right to deduct the input VAT relating to a particular transaction.


53.  The Government argued that neither the provisions of Polish law nor of Protocol No. 1 imposed on the Polish authorities an obligation to change the character of the use of land by individual owners. Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, States had a right to enforce such laws as they deemed necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the  <mask>. The applicants had bought a property designated for agricultural use and should have been aware that their ownership right had not encompassed the right to build a house there. They had been entitled to use or dispose of their plot only within the limits prescribed by the law, the principles of reasonable social co‑operation and the socio-economic purpose of ownership. The applicants’ situation was therefore different from that in the case of Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden (judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, § 11) in which restrictions were imposed on property in the centre of the capital city. The applicants’ ownership had therefore not become precarious.


25.  The Government pointed out that the interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of her property was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. They concluded that, taking into consideration the interests of both the landlord and the tenant, the burden imposed on the applicant had not been excessive. The Government pointed out that the statutory measures had been taken in the  <mask> to protect tenants, regard being had to the inner-city housing crisis and the difficulty in providing adequate housing for low-income tenants who have been evicted.


14.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to protection of property had been based on law and pursued the  <mask> of securing the collection of outstanding tax debts. It had moreover been necessary and proportionate in that the share held by the applicant had been attached for want of other seizable assets. In their view, the applicant had not been able to show that the attachment, in its value, had significantly exceeded the amount it had owed; therefore, the measure could not be regarded as excessive.


37.  The Government considered that the case was comparable to that of OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France (nos. 42219/98 and 54563/00, 27 May 2004), where the Court had found no violation because the interference was aimed at ensuring respect for the original will of the legislator, and where the Court had also given weight to the aim of re-establishing equal treatment between teachers in private and public establishments. In the present case too, the purpose of the legislature’s intervention in enacting Law no. 296/2006 had been to ensure respect for the original will of the legislator, and to coordinate the application of the Italo-Swiss Convention and the new method of calculation which had come into force in 1982 and created an imbalance in the relevant evaluations. It followed that the interference was justified for a compelling  <mask> reason.


60.  The Government submitted that the measures complained of had pursued the legitimate aim of securing land in connection with the implementation of the local land development plan. As the Court acknowledged on many occasions, this corresponded to the  <mask> of the community. The impugned measures had served the general interest as they had been intended to resolve the communications and environmental problems of the municipality of Milanówek.


64.  The applicant maintained in particular that the interference complained of could not be justified in the  <mask> of a democratic society as it placed the gardeners at an advantage without any justified reason. The owners had been unable to use the land for forty years and the relevant law had impaired their situation in that it had allowed the gardeners to continue benefiting from the land on conditions which were detrimental to the owners. In particular, the applicant alleged that the rent which the gardeners had been obliged to pay for the use of her land was negligible compared with the market rent which could be received for the land.


34.  The Government claimed that the interference with the applicant’s property rights had been lawful and justified. In particular, divesting the applicant of his right to the early-retirement pension had been provided for by law and was in the  <mask>. There was also a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the interference and the interests pursued. In particular, the Government further submitted that the applicant had not been forced to resign from work in order to receive the EWK pension because he had been unemployed at the relevant time and that he undertook employment six days after the EWK pension had been revoked.


86.  The Government reiterated the criteria set out by the Court for a measure to be qualified as State interference with the use of property, and stressed the State’s considerable margin of appreciation. Concerning the legality of the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996, they submitted that the task of interpreting and applying domestic law lay primarily with the national courts, although the Court could intervene in cases of manifest abuse, a description which did not apply to the applicant’s case. As to the legitimate aim of the measure, the Government asserted that the UAR’s decision had been designed to promote the  <mask>, having been intended to ensure that all the decisions concerning admission to and exclusion from the legal profession were made by the same competent body under the relevant legislation.


61.  The applicant further submitted that the interference was not proportionate to the  <mask>. While it could be maintained that it had been in the general interest to provide accommodation for refugees, displaced persons or persons whose property had been destroyed in the war, these considerations were not applicable in the present case since V.P. did not fall within these categories. Rather, he had been awarded to run a restaurant in the applicant's property and, unlike the applicant, had been in no need for accommodation.


31.  The applicants have not argued that the interference with their “possessions” was not in accordance with the law, or that it did not pursue a legitimate aim in the public interest. The salient question is therefore whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the  <mask> of the community and the applicants’ rights (see Yavashev and Others, cited above, § 62).


45.  The Government indicated that fourteen families had lived in the hostel. They had all belonged to socially unprotected groups of the population, for example, G., a single mother. The Government noted that Article 8 of the Convention imposed  <mask> on the State, that is to say to take measures to protect an individual’s rights to respect for private life and in particular housing (the Government cited mutatis mutandis, Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, and Menteş and Others v. Turkey, 28 November 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VIII). The applicants had tried to create unsuitable living conditions in the hostel (for example, by cutting off the electricity) in order to evict the occupants. The prosecutor’s office had concluded that the applicants had breached the occupants’ right to respect for their homes, as indicated in its complaint to the court and its appeal against the decision of 23 January 2006. By having awarded the applicants adequate compensation, the courts had balanced their rights against the public interest. The Government further noted that the applicants had been deprived of their property in accordance with the law.


116.  The applicants complained that the authorities had failed to comply with their  <mask> to take appropriate measures to mitigate the risks to their lives against the natural hazards. The first applicant complained that the domestic authorities were responsible for the death of her husband in the mudslide of July 2000. She and the other applicants also complained that the domestic authorities were responsible for putting their lives at risk, as they had failed to discharge the State's positive obligations and had been negligent in the maintenance of the dam, in monitoring the hazardous area and in providing an emergency warning or taking other reasonable measures to mitigate the risk and the effects of the natural disaster. They also complained that they had had no redress, in particular they had not received adequate compensation in respect of their pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. They relied on Article 2 of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, provides:


78.  The Government admitted that the State might have an obligation to assist creditors in recovering their money from an insolvent debtor. However, it had fulfilled its  <mask> by establishing an appropriate legal framework for insolvency procedures. Thus, special legislation (the 1992 and 1998 Acts) had been enacted in order to protect the interests of creditors. The legislation provided for the distribution of the assets of an insolvent company on a pari passu basis. Those Acts (sections 31 and 21 respectively) guaranteed the right of the creditor to complain to the court about actions or omissions on the part of the liquidator. The liquidator was personally accountable for his acts to the creditors. The 2002 Act went even further by requiring mandatory professional insurance for liquidators. The Government referred to the practice in several other member States where the liquidator was personally liable vis-à-vis the creditors of an insolvent company.


66.  The Government argued that the Chamber’s conclusion that “all situations of unintentional death” came within the scope of Article 2 had given rise to an unprecedented extension of the  <mask> inherent in that provision. In their submission, the Chamber’s reasoning departed from the position adopted by the Court in recent cases on the subject, such as Mastromatteo v. Italy ([GC], no. 37703/99, ECHR 2002-VIII), and was not supported by the cases to which it had referred, in particular Osman v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII) and Calvelli and Ciglio (cited above), in which no violation of Article 2 had been found.


157.  The applicant considered that the State had failed to provide him with access to information in violation of his rights under Article 8. The Court observes that, in addition to the primarily negative undertakings in Article 8 of the Convention, there may be  <mask> inherent in effective respect for private life. In determining whether or not such a positive obligation exists, it will have regard to the fair balance that has to be struck


34.  The applicant noted that the State had  <mask> under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Kotov v. Russia [GC], no. 54522/00, §§ 109-113, 3 April 2012). He further asserted that the failure to adopt the necessary legal mechanisms with a view to implementing section 43 of the Mining Act had constituted an interference with his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions because his right to be exempt from electricity and gas payments had been breached.


76.  The applicants contested these arguments, considering that the measures referred to by the Government had had no practical effect on their situation. Furthermore, they argued that the Sofia City Court had interfered with MTFU’s corporate affairs in an arbitrary manner and in blatant disregard of the applicable legal provisions and of the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention for it to be fair, independent and impartial, and to uphold the rule of law. After that, the courts and the authorities had not only made possible, but had also tolerated and sanctioned – at one point in breach of the interim injunction issued by the Sofia District Court – the unlawful actions of the new management of the company, which had, amongst other things, resolved to cancel all existing shares and MTFU’s company register and had thus extinguished the applicants’ shareholdings in the company. Despite the numerous complaints lodged by the applicants, neither the prosecuting nor any other authorities had intervened to prevent that from happening. As for the courts, instead of reacting swiftly to the legal challenges brought by the applicants, they had taken an unreasonably long time to examine them, disregarding the very high stakes involved. Those developments had had a negative effect on MTFU, which had been a successful, growing company before July 1999. As a result of the actions of the new management, it had, in fact, stopped functioning. As of 2010 it had retained only two employees and had declared losses. All of that had amounted to a serious breach of the State’s negative and  <mask> under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


47.  The Government further argued that if each creditor had been allowed to act individually in order to collect his or her debt, that would inevitably have led to the insolvent local authority becoming paralysed and to a haphazard situation where only the most powerful or best assisted creditors could collect their debt. In the Government’s submission, the difficulty in collecting the debt had not been attributable to the authorities’ action, but to a purely factual situation beyond the State’s control, resulting from the financial failure of the local authority. The State, in intervening through the insolvency procedure, had sought to secure to all creditors an equal treatment in the collection of their debts and therefore to fulfil its  <mask>.


75.  The Government further argued that the decision to sell the applicant’s share in the property had not been disproportionate given the circumstances, having particular regard to the rights of the enforcement creditor I.M. and related  <mask> the State owed him on the one hand, and the applicant’s conduct during the enforcement proceedings on the other. In this connection, they first highlighted that I.M.’s claims against the applicant stemmed from final judicial decisions (see paragraphs 7-9 above) and as such represented possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. It was the State’s obligation under the Convention to make use of all available legal means at its disposal in order to enforce those decisions. In discharging that positive obligation, the State had been faced with disruptive conduct on the part of the applicant, who had done everything to avoid, or at least delay paying the debt as long as possible. That was evident from the fact that he had only commenced settling the debt after the first public auction had been scheduled, that is, three years after the enforcement proceedings had been instituted (see paragraphs 10 and 15-16 above). The Government found it implausible that during those three years the applicant had not had enough means to settle the debt and then, when the enforcement had reached its final stages, and when it had become certain that his share in the property would be sold, he had suddenly paid a large portion of the debt within a few months. Even when he had started settling the debt, the applicant had not respected the self-imposed time-limits, but had spread out the payments so that they had occurred after the enforcement court had already undertaken the next step in the proceedings, closer to the full satisfaction of the creditor’s claim. The crucial proof of this bad faith was that only after his share in the property had been sold had the applicant paid off the debt in full, save for the costs of the proceedings (see paragraphs 21-23 above).