38.  The Government acknowledged in general terms that there had been interference with the applicants’ right to  <mask> under Article 8 of the Convention. They submitted that the lawfulness and necessity of the decision to annul the first applicant’s residence permit had been duly examined by the domestic courts. The numerous administrative infractions by the first applicant had provided grounds for his exclusion. The domestic courts had found that he “had not demonstrated loyalty to Russian law and order, had violated Russian laws, and had systematically and intentionally committed administrative violations, including those representing danger to third persons; [such behaviour] had shown that the decision to annul the residence permit had been justified, fair, proportionate and had not contradicted the case-law of the European Court”. The first applicant had committed eighteen administrative infractions during the last three years that he had been living in Russia. The Government stressed that the procedural guarantees under Article 8 of the Convention had been complied with, which had been “verified by [an] independent court”.


40.  The applicant alleged that the proceedings before Baden District Court, which ended with the decision of 17 February 2006, had, in a number of ways, breached his right to  <mask>, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. He claimed in particular that the court had clearly exceeded the six-week time-limit for reaching a decision on the child's return, as provided for by Article 11, second paragraph, of the Hague Convention, especially because it had merged the proceedings concerning the child's return with the divorce proceedings. He further claimed that the domestic courts had obliged him to prove, contrary to the clear wording of Article 13, first paragraph, of the Hague Convention, that he had not consented to the child's retention in Switzerland. He thus relied on Article 8 of the Convention, of which the relevant part reads as follows:


17.  The applicant complained that the denial of his access rights in respect of his son had been based on his adherence to the religious denomination Hit Gyülekezete, amounting to a differential treatment in respect of the enjoyment of his right to  <mask>. He claimed in this respect a violation of his rights under Article 8 of the Convention, both taken alone and read in conjunction with Article 14.


50.  The Government argued that termination of parental status was compatible with the Convention where it had been proved that a child’s “legal” father was not the biological father. According to the Court’s case-law,  <mask> required that biological and social reality should prevail over a legal presumption of paternity (the Government cited Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, 27 October 1994, § 40, Series A no. 297‑C, and Shofman v. Russia, no. 74826/01, § 44, 24 November 2005). Furthermore, the decision to terminate the applicant’s parental status in respect of A. had had a basis in domestic law, namely Article 52 § 1 of the Family Code (see paragraph 40 above), which did not set any time-limit for bringing an action contesting the paternity of a child.


26.  The Government excluded the latter possibility, contending that the guarantee of the right to  <mask> under Article 8 presupposed the existence of a family (see Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31). Although the case-law did not require cohabitation between the various members of the “family”, there had to be at the very least close personal ties. The existence of ties demonstrating an emotional relationship between two beings and a desire to pursue that relationship was essential so far as the Convention institutions were concerned. The Convention institutions had even held that in the absence of close personal ties between those concerned a mere biological link was insufficient to constitute family life within the meaning of Article 8. Thus, the Commission had expressed the opinion that the situation in which a person donated sperm only to enable a woman to become pregnant through artificial insemination did not of itself give the donor a right to respect for family life with the child (see M. v. the Netherlands, no. 16944/90, Commission decision of 8 February 1993, Decision and Reports 74, p. 120). In the instant case, the Government maintained that no family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention existed between the applicant and her natural mother, as the applicant had never met her mother, while the latter had at no point expressed any interest in the applicant or regarded her as her child. The applicant's natural mother had expressly manifested an intention to abandon the applicant and had agreed to her adoption by others. Only the applicant's family life with her adoptive parents could come within the scope of Article 8.


190.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been arrested in Russia following the extradition request by the Uzbek authorities, which had wanted him on criminal charges. The Government argued that extraditing the applicant, who had no Russian nationality, would not breach his right to  <mask>, as it was aimed at the fulfilment by Russia of its international obligations under the Minsk Convention in matters of extradition. Thus, execution of the extradition order would be justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


27.  The applicants complained that their right to  <mask> had been violated by their separation from their child, that their right to moral and physical integrity under the private life aspect had been violated, that their right to reputation had been violated, affecting their right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and that they had been deprived of the right to have inherent procedural safeguards in place and observed to ensure the protection of the above rights. Article 8 of the Convention provides as relevant:


22.  The Government submitted that the adoption of the applicant's daughter by S.A. had been carried out in accordance with pertinent provisions of the Family Code. The applicant had not been involved in the upbringing of his daughter; he had, of his own will, moved far away from her. Thus, he had himself created the circumstances under which his consent for adoption had not been necessary. S.A. had been supporting and taking care of the applicant's daughter for about three years by the time the court rendered its judgment allowing adoption. A close relationship had developed between S.A. and A., the latter thinking of S.A. as her own father. The severance of these ties would have led to a violation of their right to  <mask>, guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. The adoption had been in the best interest of the child. In the Government's submission the courts had legitimately given priority to the child's interests over the interests of the applicant.


90.  The applicant replied that he had been applying to different institutions, such as the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry, to help him to gain access to his daughter. Given that the national authorities had failed to enforce the contact order issued by them, he had seen no other possibility than to apply to the Court. Moreover, in his view, the domestic authorities had for fifteen years continuously violated his right to  <mask>. The applicant claimed that a civil action for damages would only have added to that period another ten years of additional litigation. Lastly, he pointed out that the Court had frequently stressed the need to apply the exhaustion rule with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism.


25.  The applicant submitted that the first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act, read in conjunction with section 235(1)(2) of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code, and the decisions of the domestic courts had infringed her right to  <mask> as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, which provides:


32.  The Government acknowledged that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to  <mask> under Article 8 of the Convention. They submitted that the lawfulness of the decision and the necessity to revoke the applicant’s residence permit had been duly examined by the domestic courts, which had found that the measure had been imposed by the proper authority and that the relevant procedure had been complied with. The interference had been lawful, had had a legitimate aim and had been necessary and proportionate; the public interests had been duly balanced against the private interests of the applicant. The Government illustrated the proportionality of the interference, referring to the case of Lupsa v. Romania (no. 10337/04, § 10, ECHR 2006‑VII), and stating that the five-year re-entry ban which could have been imposed on the applicant did not appear unreasonable in comparison with the ten-year ban imposed on the applicant in Lupsa on similar grounds.


33.  The Government submitted that the limitation on the number of prison visits had been based on section 18 of the Pre-Trial Detention Act and had been proportionate to the legitimate aim of the prevention of disorder and crime because the applicant had been held in custody on account of the gravity of the charges against him and his capacity for obstructing the establishment of the truth. Glass partitions were fitted in accordance with the Rules of Internal Order in Remand Prisons and served to prevent any objects from being passed between detainees and visitors and also to protect visitors from spontaneous dangerous acts on the part of detainees, as well as for the reasons of hygiene, to stifle the spread of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis. In the Government’s view, removal of partitions would require a greater number of supervising officers and a closer monitoring of detainees and visitors. This would probably reduce the privacy available to them and bring about a more serious interference with their right to  <mask>.


115.  The applicant did not assert that the decisions by the authorities to take her two minor children into care had not been based on a provision of statute law or had not pursued a legitimate aim. There is no indication in the case file that the first of these requirements, as interpreted in the Court’s case-law, was not satisfied. Neither is there any evidence that the measures taken were not designed to achieve a legitimate aim, namely the  <mask> or of the rights and freedoms of others.


56.  The Government acknowledged that the use of closed overalls amounted to an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life. The interference had a basis in national law, especially in Section 9d of the Act on Execution of Sentences and in other orders and rules in force at the relevant time, and it pursued the legitimate aims of public safety, prevention of disorder or crime and  <mask> and rights and freedoms of others.


29. The Government submitted that the decision to deport the applicant was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, namely, the  <mask> and morals and the prevention of disorder and crime. The Government relied on the Court’s jurisprudence, which had recognised the serious nature of drugs offences and found that they were capable of justifying “great firmness” on the part of the State (El Boujaïdi v. France, 26 September 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VI; Baghli v. France, no. 34374/97, ECHR 1999‑VIII; Dalia v. France, 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I).


60.  The Government replied that the reason for the refusal to record the particulars of the US birth certificates in the French register of births, marriages and deaths was that this would have given effect to a surrogacy agreement, which was formally forbidden under a domestic public-policy provision and constituted a punishable offence if performed in France. French law accordingly reflected ethical and moral principles according to which the human body could not become a commercial instrument and the child be reduced to the object of a contract. In their submission, the “legitimate aims” of the interference were the prevention of disorder or crime, the  <mask> and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. They added that the reason the public prosecutor’s office had requested that the particulars of the birth certificates of the third and fourth applicants be recorded was precisely to enable it to request subsequently that these entries be annulled. In doing so it had complied with Article 511 of the general circular on civil status of 11 May 1999, which prescribed automatic registration where public policy was concerned, particularly where it was necessary to annul a civil-status document concerning a French national that had been drawn up abroad in accordance with local procedures.


46.  The Government acknowledged that the impugned measures interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life but submitted that they were “in accordance with the law” and pursued the  <mask> and morals of the children in question, namely to provide them with stable and safe living conditions and secure their development. They further submitted that the measures were necessary in a democratic society. They pointed out that the national authorities had the benefit of contact with the persons concerned and that a parent was not entitled under Article 8 to have measures taken which would harm a child’s health or development.


207.  The Government accepted that the forced medication of the applicant had interfered with her right to respect for her private life. It had, however, pursued the legitimate aim of  <mask> and the rights and freedoms of others. The impugned measure had been based on law, namely section 8 of the Mental Health Act, which had been both accessible and foreseeable. The Government also contended that the impugned measure had been necessary in a democratic society and that it fell, in any case, within the margin of appreciation accorded to the State.


27.  The applicant challenged the submission that the ban in question satisfied the condition laid down in paragraph 2 of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention of necessity in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the prevention of disorder, the  <mask> or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. With regard to the aim of “living together” in a democratic society, it was the opposite reasoning – that of openness and tolerance – which should take precedence in a pluralist democratic society as was evidenced by the tolerance that there had always been of dress codes rejecting the living together principle. At best, it could be regarded as a praiseworthy political objective, but one that could not be achieved by some stigmatising by-laws that were contrary to the Convention. In her submission, the factors justifying the ban on safety grounds had been advanced exclusively with regard to the full-face veil, were non-existent and the real aim being pursued by the by-laws was the prohibition of the full-face veil in public places. She argued, lastly, that the issue of dignity and gender equality was irrelevant to justification on grounds of “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” since the exercise of the freedom and wishes of women themselves was hindered.


43.  The Government argued that, by carrying out the actions in dispute, the State had fulfilled its positive obligation under Article 8 in pursuing the legitimate aim of the  <mask> and rights of its citizens. The authorities had acted in full compliance with the legislation then in force, which provided that the Ministry of Healthcare was entitled to request material from the Committee for Healthcare of the Administration of St Petersburg, and the Committee had a corresponding duty to submit to the Ministry detailed information in response. The Government referred to: the Regulations on the Ministry of Healthcare, approved by decision no. 284 of 9 April 2002 of the Government of the Russian Federation (see paragraph 28 above); the Regulations on the Committee for Healthcare, approved by order no. 46-r of the Governor of St Petersburg of 23 December 1996 (see paragraph 29 above); decree no. 2534-VII of 12 April 1968 of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR on the examination of complaints lodged by individuals (see paragraph 30 above); and the Regulations on the System of Departmental Control over the Quality of Medical Treatment, approved by joint order no. 363/77 of the Ministry of Healthcare and the Federal Compulsory Medical Insurance Fund of 24 October 1996 (see paragraph 31 above).


55.  The Government argued that the interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life was justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. It was prescribed by law, namely by Sections 176 and 176a of the Civil Code, and it pursued legitimate aims, namely the  <mask> or morals and of the rights and freedoms of the second applicant.


113.  The Government emphasised that, in order to safeguard the public interest in the  <mask> and life, one of the primary tasks of the State was to ensure and maintain a certain standard and quality of health care, regardless of whether it was provided on a public or private basis. The State should not therefore be forced to allow a form of health care which they did not consider safe.


71.  The Government contested that argument. They submitted that the applicant’s circumstances were not capable of coming within the ambit of private life under Article 8 of the Convention as the provision did not provide a right to choose the country in which a person sought to reside and work without regard to that country’s immigration laws. Even assuming that the applicant had established private life in the United Kingdom and that it had been interfered with, such interference was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim, namely the maintenance and enforcement of immigration control, inter alia, for the preservation of the economic well‑being of the country, the  <mask> and morals and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and was proportionate in the circumstances.


32.  The Government accept that there has been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life as guaranteed by Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. However, the measure was justified under Article 8 § 2, being in accordance with the law - Section 176 of the Civil Code - and having pursued the legitimate aims of the  <mask> or morals and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Government further contend that the measure was necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 and that the Austrian authorities have not overstepped their margin of appreciation.


98.  The applicant also complained that Z. had unlawfully moved into the house which she had constructed and that the authorities had failed to evict and prosecute Z. for the alleged fraud. She also complained about the supervisory review proceedings of 13 September 2001, arguing that they breached her rights to  <mask> under Article 8 of the Convention.


73.  The Government stated that the interference complained of in the present case had been in accordance with the law. The right to  <mask> was recognised by the Constitution as a fundamental right and the Criminal Code envisaged substantial sanctions for those acting in violation of that right. The interference in question in the present case had been based on sections 139-47 of the Tax Procedure Act, which regulated in detail the search of business premises within the context of tax evasion and the procedure to be followed during and after such a search.


28.  The applicant noted that there had clearly been an interference with her right to  <mask> and correspondence, and that that interference had had a basis in Finnish law. However, the quality of that law was problematic. There existed no legal safeguards whatsoever in this respect. Since very strict limits were called for as regards the conduct of searches without a warrant, the law in question did not fulfil the “in accordance with the law” requirements, as established by the Court. When searches were conducted in law offices, the safeguards against arbitrariness had to be particularly strong. It did not make any difference whether the applicant herself was suspected of an offence or not. Professional secrecy applied to all material in a lawyer's possession regardless of the capacity in which he or she had obtained it. The fact that the search had been conducted in an attorney's office only made the need for effective legal safeguards against abuse and arbitrariness more apparent.


46.  The applicant disagreed. She submitted that the authorities had been obliged to take positive measures to protect her against interferences with her right to  <mask> and referred to the Court’s findings in López Ostra v. Spain, judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303‑C and McMichael v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 24 February 1995, Series A no. 307‑B. In the circumstances of the case it was the task of the public administration to act as an arbiter and find, by way of taking necessary active steps provided for by law, the proper balance between the applicant’s interests and those of her neighbour, taking also into consideration the interests of the community. The authorities had failed to do so. In these circumstances, the applicant should not be obliged to have recourse to the available instruments of civil law.


29.  The applicant noted that there had clearly been an interference with her right to  <mask> and that that interference had had a basis in Finnish law. However, the quality of that law was problematic. There existed no legal safeguards whatsoever in this respect. Since very strict limits were called for as regards the conduct of searches without a warrant, the law in question did not fulfil the “in accordance with law” requirements, as established by the Court. According to Finnish law, a search might be conducted if there was reason to suspect that an offence had been committed. The threshold for “reason to suspect” was very low and was always considered to be fulfilled when the investigative authority so decided. There existed no possibility to challenge a decision to open an investigation and to obtain a decision from a court finding that there had been no reason to suspect a person of an alleged crime following a search of his home. Moreover, the applicant's telephone number had been and still was listed in the public telephone directory. However, the authorities did not try to contact her and she had thereby been deprived of her right to be present at the time of the search. Accordingly, it had not been performed in accordance with the national law.


108.  The applicant further insisted that the occupation of his estate had been in breach of national law, including the Constitution of Russia and other legal acts. The applicant stressed that none of the domestic legal instruments referred to by the Government allowed occupation of private property and housing during a counter-terrorist operation. In particular, the only limitation provided for by the Law on Suppression of Terrorism with regard to the right to  <mask> and property was that enshrined in section 13 (1.4), which enabled State agents to access housing and other premises or land belonging to individuals or organisations “while suppressing a terrorist act or pursuing persons suspected of committing such an act, when a delay may entail a real risk for human life or health”. The applicant pointed out that the said legal provision did not provide any grounds for the State's occupation of private property for any period of time.


61.  The Government, for their part, submitted that if the search carried out at the applicant’s home had constituted an interference, it had been in accordance with the law, namely Articles 100-110 of the RCCP (see paragraph 46 above). The measure had been necessary, as it had related directly to the needs of the investigation, and proportionate to the legitimate aim of the  <mask>. It had also involved appropriate procedural safeguards, being issued by a judge and therefore subjected to judicial scrutiny. The search had been based on a reasonable suspicion and its scope had been reasonably limited. Furthermore, it had been carried out in the presence of independent observers (the Government cited Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, no. 65755/01, § 38, 22 May 2008).


31.  The Government agreed that the search and seizure at the applicant's home constituted an interference within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. Because of the urgency of the matter, the search had been conducted on the basis of an order given orally by an officer with power of arrest only a few hours after the arrival in Finland of persons suspected of illegally entering the country. It had been necessary to conduct the search immediately to verify whether there had been other such persons in the applicant's home, and to ensure that no evidence of an offence had been destroyed. Therefore, in the Government's view, there had been a justified reason, as required by Chapter 5, section 5, subsection 2, of the Coercive Measures Act, to conduct the search at 10 p.m. The search had been performed for the purposes of the  <mask> and it had therefore pursued a legitimate aim. It had not been possible to inform the applicant about the possibility to be present during the search as neither her telephone number nor that of her counsel had been known to the officers. The applicant had, however, been immediately informed about the search by a hand-written note left in her apartment, mentioning, inter alia, the contact details of the officers who had carried out the search. The written search warrant and the records of the seizure had been communicated to the applicant as soon as she had been located for the purposes of questioning, namely a day and a half after the search. The search and seizure had thus been carried out in accordance with the law.


53.  The Government submitted that even assuming that there has been an interference with the applicant’s right to private life in the present case, such interference was prescribed by the law and it was necessary in a democratic society, as it was aimed at the protection of public order, namely the  <mask>, at protecting health and the rights and liberties of others.


48.  The Government noted that the necessity of the measure had been assessed twice, with a possibility of rejection – first by the Attorney General and subsequently by the Vilnius Regional Court. The contested operational measure had been necessary and had been applied in the interests of national security, public safety and the  <mask>. The authorities had had operational information about the applicant’s possible involvement in criminal activities. The applicant had close connections with J.B. and persons from J.B.’s milieu. Most importantly, in the course of the operational investigation in respect of J.B., the authorities had learned about his threats to the State President. That information had later been confirmed when intercepting the applicant’s telephone conversation with J.B., in which the latter used psychological pressure and demanded that his requirements be reported to the head of State. Subsequently, J.B. had been convicted of having threatened the State President. The Government also observed that both J.B. and the applicant had had close relations with the State President and had played a significant role in the political activities of the President’s political party and his electoral campaign; at the time of surveillance the applicant had been a member of the Vilnius City Municipal Council. In this connection the Government also referred to the Court’s judgment in Craxi v. Italy (no. 2) (no. 25337/94, § 64, 17 July 2003), submitting that politicians inevitably and knowingly laid themselves open to close scrutiny by both journalists and the public at large. Therefore, even acknowledging that no investigation had been carried out by the SSD in order to reveal the circumstances in which the journalists had obtained the recording of the intercepted conversation, the question of fulfilment of the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention could not arise.


64.  The Government submitted that any interference was “in accordance with the law” in that it fell within section 163 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (“the 1994 Act”) and section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972 (“the 1972 Act”), both of which provisions complied with the Convention's “quality of law” requirements. They added that any interference pursued a legitimate aim: as accepted during the judicial review proceedings, the Council's intention in installing and operating the CCTV system and in disclosing footage to the media was the detection and  <mask>, thereby securing public safety and private property.


32.  The Government conceded that there was an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life. As to the applicants’ allegation that the interference was contrary to the Association Agreement between the European Union and Turkey, the Government pointed out that the Administrative Court had dealt in detail with this submission but dismissed it on the ground that the applicant had failed to show that he fulfilled the conditions set out therein. Further, the Government asserted that the residence ban at issue served the  <mask> and was proportionate, having regard to the first applicant’s convictions for shoplifting, theft and various administrative offences, and the consideration that his family life as established at the relevant time could not weigh very heavily in the balance. In particular, he was not a second generation immigrant and was well acquainted with the language and society of his country of origin.


82.  The Government maintained that the interference pursued one or more legitimate aims: the  <mask>, in so far as the first applicant’s own safety was concerned by the bomb threats, and the interests of national security with regard to all the applicants. In each case the interference was moreover “necessary” for the achievement of the legitimate aim or aims pursued.


115.  The applicant also maintained that the search-and-seizure order had not pursued any legitimate aim because the documents seized had been readily available from other sources. According to the Government, the search had served the legitimate aim of identifying and collecting evidence in the criminal case. The Court is ready to proceed on the assumption that the order was issued with a view to finding and seizing documents that could be used for a handwriting assessment; this pursued an aim which was consistent with the Convention, namely the  <mask>.


86.  The Government also alleged that the applicant’s father had, on the applicant’s instructions, assisted him in removing incriminating evidence in relation to the crime for which he was serving a sentence at the time of his failure to return from home leave. Accordingly, they argued that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring public safety and the  <mask> and disorder.


32.  The Government submitted that the interference in question had been prescribed by law and had pursued a number of legitimate aims, namely the protection of national security, territorial integrity, public safety, public order and  <mask>. They also claimed that the restriction had been necessary in a democratic society because it had been carried out as a result of a pressing social need and had been proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. They concluded that, in the exercise of their discretion, the prison authorities had decided not to allow the impugned letter to be sent outside.


43.  The Government submitted that the first applicant’s expulsion would be justified under Article 8 § 2 as being in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society. They emphasised that the applicant had been the subject of several criminal convictions and that his expulsion would pursue the legitimate aim of the  <mask> and the protection of the rights of others.


36.  The Government acknowledged that the use of this device interfered with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life. They submitted that it was justifiable under the second paragraph of Article 8 as being necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the  <mask> and/or for the protection of the rights of others. They referred, inter alia, to the serious nature of the crime under investigation, the fact that B. was regarded as being surveillance-conscious, rendering conventional forms of surveillance insufficient, and that the conversations proved that an armed robbery was being planned. They recalled, however, that in Khan v. the United Kingdom (no. 35394/97, §§ 26-28, ECHR 2000-V), the Court found that the Home Office Guidelines governing such devices did not satisfy the requirement of “in accordance with the law” and recognised that the Court was liable to reach the same conclusion in the present case.


54.  The Government submitted that the prosecutorial requests for information had served the purpose of preventing criminal acts, and this was not challenged by the applicant. The Court accepts that the interference aimed to investigate a criminal act and thereby served the legitimate aims of the  <mask>, the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and also the economic well-being of the country (compare M.N. and Others v. San Marino, cited above, §75).


40.  The Government acknowledged that those who used the telephone had an expectation of privacy in respect of the numbers which they dialled and that obtaining detailed billing information concerning that telephone constituted an interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 8. The obtaining of the information was, however, necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the  <mask> and/or the protection of the rights of others, as the investigation concerned a very serious crime, the applicants had guns for use in the intended robbery and, as B. was surveillance-conscious, conventional surveillance would not suffice. The only use of the information was to corroborate the times recorded by police officers in respect of the covert listening device in the flat.


42.  The Government accepted, on the other hand, that the applicant enjoyed private life in the United Kingdom and that his deportation would represent an interference with that private life. However, that interference would be justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8, being in accordance with law and taken in pursuit of the legitimate aims of protecting public safety, the  <mask>, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Government also contended that the interference was proportionate given the nature and seriousness of the applicant’s offences, which were, for the most part, drugs offences, which the Government considered to be particularly grave given the issues of public protection that they raised. The Government pointed in particular to the fact that the applicant’s last offence had been of sufficient gravity to attract a sentence of three years’ imprisonment. The applicant had committed his offences when he was already an adult and his case could therefore be distinguished from that of the applicant in Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, 23 June 2008, whose offences by contrast could be characterised as “juvenile delinquency”. The Government considered the young age at which the applicant had entered the United Kingdom and the fact that he had stronger ties with that country than with Nigeria to be relevant factors, but maintained that his deportation would have a relatively minor impact on the applicant given that he did not have family life in the United Kingdom and could re-establish private life in Nigeria. In this regard, the Government pointed to the applicant’s good health, high intelligence and the fact that he had lived alone since the age of eighteen with little support. As such, and having regard to the importance of protecting the public from drugs-related crime, the Government were of the view that the applicant’s deportation to Nigeria would represent a proportionate interference with his private life in terms of Article 8.


125.  The Government admitted that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his home. However, they considered it to have been in compliance with the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention. The Government observed that the search of the applicant’s home had been based on the judicial ruling of 19 May 2004 and that it had been necessary for the  <mask>. While the aforementioned ruling had concerned a criminal investigation in respect of a different person, Mr B., it had become known to the investigator that the applicant might have been involved in the production and sale of illegal drugs. Accordingly, it had been legitimate to verify this information by way of a search. Lastly, the Government emphasised that the lawfulness of the search in question had been reaffirmed by the courts of three levels of jurisdiction in the course of the trial and appeal proceedings.


39.  The Government submitted that the interference complained of was justified under Article 8 of the Convention. In their view, it was in accordance with the law and based on a reasonable suspicion that the first applicant had committed an offence, namely that he had been illegally distributing software. The first applicant had not been diligent in conducting his business, as was evident from the fact that he had already been warned by the police once and could have predicted the consequences of his behaviour. The Government went on to argue that the interference had the legitimate aim of  <mask> and maintenance of fair competition. They claimed that the interference was also proportionate: the officers who had carried out the search and seizure had known where to search and what to search for, and the operation had been conducted in the presence of the applicants, a technician and two certifying witnesses. Also, the authorities had carefully listed the seized computers in the search-and-seizure record, retained the computers in accordance with the law and in connection with the ongoing criminal proceedings, and the content of the computers had not been made public. Furthermore, the approval of the record by the court had been an important safeguard and had served as a guarantee for the justification of the measure. Lastly, the Government pointed out that unlike the cases of Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria (no. 65755/01, 22 May 2008), Kopp v. Switzerland (25 March 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-II) and Heino v. Finland (no. 56720/09, 15 February 2011), the search-and-seizure operation had not touched upon any privileged material.


67.  The applicant also considered the obligation to report suspicions incompatible with the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to his clients, enshrined in the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the  <mask> and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Havana, Cuba, from 27 August to 7 September 1990, and Recommendation No. R. (2000) 21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member States on the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer, of 25 October 2000. It was alien to the very role and aim of the lawyer, and undermined the relationship of trust between lawyer and client.


146.  The Government insisted that the applicant’s detention pending  <mask> included only the period of time from 11 January 2010 to 11 January 2011. They argued that this period of detention was lawful as it was based on detention orders issued by competent courts. While deciding on the extension, the courts had taken into account the progress of the extradition proceedings against the applicant. In compliance with Article 463 § 4 of the CCrP, the domestic courts at two levels of jurisdiction had swiftly examined the applicant’s appeals against the extradition decision within a month.


53.  The applicant maintained her complaint. She considered that the interference with her right to have family visits while in detention had not been in accordance with law and that the applicable law had lacked clarity, certainty and foreseeability as regards the authorisation of family visits in respect of people detained pending  <mask>. She further argued that the interference had not pursued a legitimate aim. It had placed a disproportionate burden on her and had not been necessary.


115.  The applicant further argued that the diplomatic assurances of the requesting State were insufficient to discard the risk of ill-treatment. First, there was no control mechanism at the domestic level which would allow tracking the authorities’ compliance with the assurances and holding them liable in case of a breach. Second, the information sent by the Prosecutor General’s Office to their Uzbek counterpart following the  <mask> request, such as the applicant’s intention to apply for asylum in Russia and his criticism of the human rights situation in Uzbekistan, made him particularly vulnerable to a risk of political persecution. Lastly, as the Court had established in a number of cases concerning extradition to Uzbekistan, assurances from the Uzbek authorities could not offer a reliable guarantee against the risk of ill-treatment, given that the practice of torture there was described by reputable international sources as being systematic.


190.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been arrested in Russia following the  <mask> request by the Uzbek authorities, which had wanted him on criminal charges. The Government argued that extraditing the applicant, who had no Russian nationality, would not breach his right to respect for family life, as it was aimed at the fulfilment by Russia of its international obligations under the Minsk Convention in matters of extradition. Thus, execution of the extradition order would be justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


191.  The applicant argued that execution of the  <mask> order against him would entail “significant and irreparable” consequences to his relationship with his wife and children, especially his daughter who required health care in Russia. The extradition order and judicial review decisions had not properly taken into account various aspects relating to his family life. In particular, the appeal court provided no reasoning in response to his related arguments. His extradition would not pursue any of the aims set out in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention, the Government’s reference to their other international obligations being insufficient to outweigh their obligations under Article 8 of the Convention.


58.  The applicants submitted that they had lived in Moldova together with their families for long periods of time. After their  <mask> to Turkey their families had remained in Moldova without sources of income. Their families could not return to Turkey for fear of reprisals and therefore all contact with them had been interrupted. Thus, there had been an interference with their private and family lives. That interference had not been in accordance with the law because the law on the basis of which they were expelled from Moldova did not offer any guarantees against abuse and arbitrariness. Moreover, the interferences had not been necessary in a democratic society.


145.  The applicant also claimed that the domestic authorities had not displayed due diligence in conducting the  <mask> proceedings, in particular from 3 February to 24 June 2010, when the said proceedings remained dormant. The domestic courts had failed to take into account the progress of the extradition proceedings. The Government had failed to provide reasons for the applicant’s detention during this period.


112.  The Government argued that the Russian authorities (the MFA, the FSB, the FMS and the courts) had duly examined the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment in the event of his  <mask> to Uzbekistan and dismissed such allegations as unfounded. The Government referred to the FMS information notice and the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, denying the practice of torture and ill-treatment in respect of detainees in Uzbek prisons and the existence of any internal or international conflict, which would pose a real threat to the applicant’s life and freedom (see paragraph 68 above).


93.  The Government also submitted specific examples of the use of DNA material for successful investigation and prosecution in some eighteen specific cases. In ten of these cases the DNA profiles of suspects matched some earlier unrelated crime-scene stains retained on the database, thus allowing successful prosecution for those earlier crimes. In another case, two suspects arrested for rape were eliminated from the investigation as their DNA profiles did not match the crime-scene stain. In two other cases the retention of DNA profiles of the persons found guilty of certain minor offences (disorder and theft) led to establishing their involvement in other crimes committed later. In one case the retention of a suspect’s DNA profile following an alleged immigration offence helped his  <mask> to the United Kingdom a year later when he was identified by one of his victims as having committed rape and murder. Finally, in four cases DNA profiles retained from four persons suspected but not convicted of certain offences (possession of offensive weapons, violent disorder and assault) matched the crime-scene stains collected from victims of rape up to two years later.


147.  The Government also submitted that, pursuant to the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Russia, the provisions of Chapter 13 of the CCrP, in particular Articles 108 and 109, were fully applicable to persons detained with a view to  <mask> under Article 466 § 1 of the CCrP. The applicant’s placement into custody had been ordered in accordance with Article 108 of the CCrP. His detention had been repeatedly extended under Article 109 of the CCrP. The domestic courts had referred to these provisions in their decisions. Upon the expiry of the maximum authorised detention term under Article 109 of the CCrP, the applicant had been released. Hence, the applicable legislation had enabled him to estimate the length of his detention.


75.  The Government referred first of all to the Court’s settled case-law relating to the deportation or  <mask> of non-nationals, according to which the regularisation of an applicant’s stay – even if the case was still pending before the Court – was sufficient in principle to remedy a complaint under Article 8 (the Government cited Pančenko v. Latvia (dec.), no. 40772/98, 28 October 1999; Mikheyeva v. Latvia (dec.), no. 50029/99, 12 September 2002; Yang Chun Jin alias Yang Xiaolin v. Hungary (striking out), no. 58073/00, §§ 20-23, 8 March 2001; and, most recently, Fjodorova and Others v. Latvia (dec.), no. 69405/01, 6 April 2006). In the Government’s view, the Chamber had not only failed to follow that case‑law, but had also adopted a judgment which contradicted its own decision of 28 February 2002 in the present case (see paragraph 5 above). In its decision, the Chamber had rejected Mrs Vizule’s complaints on the ground that she had been given the opportunity in the meantime to regularise her stay in Latvia.


144.  The applicant argued that the term of detention pending  <mask> had started running on 29 October 2009 when the court had first ordered his detention. Since the statutory twelve-month period of detention under Article 109 of the CCrP had thus expired on 29 October 2010, there had been no legal basis for his subsequent detention from 29 October 2010 to 11 January 2011. In the applicant’s view, the legal provisions governing detention pending extradition did not provide him with an opportunity to estimate the maximum statutory period of detention. As a result, the domestic courts had construed and applied them in an arbitrary manner.


23.  The Government submitted that it had not been confirmed that the impugned letter was indeed intercepted, and if so, whether it was intercepted and opened by the authorities. They referred to the fact that the notice on the envelope which indicated that the letter had been opened and read was not signed. Should the Court accept that this was indeed the case, the Government decline to take a stand as to whether this amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to  <mask> within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention.


74.  The Government submitted that the restriction imposed on the applicant's right to respect for his correspondence by section 48 of the Bankruptcy Act was intended to “achieve a fair balance between the public interest” and the applicant's interest. It enabled the trustee in bankruptcy to obtain all the information that was relevant to establishing the bankrupt's financial situation in order to prevent him from concealing or diverting sums of money to the creditors' detriment. The legal basis for the limitation on the right to  <mask> was included in the specific exceptions set out in paragraph 2 of Article 8 by the reference to the “protection of the rights ... of others”. The Government stressed that the monitoring was temporary and not punitive. Moreover, the trustee in bankruptcy was under a statutory duty to send the bankrupt any correspondence that did not relate to his financial interests and to keep the content of his personal correspondence confidential.


44.  The Government did not contest that the applicant’s criminal conviction had interfered with his right to the enjoyment of his private and family life. They considered, however, that this interference had been justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8 as being necessary in a democratic society in the interest of the prevention of disorder and for the  <mask>.


59.  The applicant maintained that the  <mask> had not been “necessary in the democratic society” because the domestic courts had failed to respect the principle of proportionality between the restriction of freedom of expression and the objective set out in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. In particular, he had been sanctioned for criticism of a member of the government in respect of whom the limits of acceptable criticism should be wider than in respect of a private individual. He further argued that a free political debate is the core concept of a democratic society, that the discussions about political issues deserve a greater protection than non-political discussions and that, consequently, the State has very narrow margins for restricting such expression.


22.  The Government further submitted that, as the Contracting States were under no obligation to accept a refusal to perform military service for religious reasons, non-exemption of a person from military or alternative civilian service did not raise any concerns under Article 9 of the Convention. In any event, the applicant's submissions did not indicate that the obligation to perform military or alternative civilian service entailed any concrete  <mask> with his rights under Article 9.


63.  The applicants submitted that the refusal by the domestic courts to examine the merits of the application for judicial review of the NRTC's decision had deprived them of an effective remedy. They referred to the Court's judgment in the case of Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria (cited above), and argued that the Supreme Administrative Court's holding that the competent bodies enjoyed unreviewable discretion when examining applications for licences had been contrary to Article 13 of the Convention, which required a remedy allowing full examination of the necessity of the  <mask> with their Article 9 and Article 10 rights.


52.  The Government further claimed, as they did in the Kuznetsov and Others case, that the holding of the meeting on the premises of the Academy had been contrary to section 1 § 5 of the Education Act (cited in paragraph 23 above). Once again, this particular justification for the  <mask> was not invoked before the domestic courts and was first put forward in the Strasbourg proceedings. In any event, it had already been examined and rejected by the Court in the Kuznetsov and Others judgment, in which the Court concluded that the Education Act expressly authorised educational establishments to rent out their premises (see paragraph 24 above) and that the provision on which the Government relied did not prohibit the physical use of college space by third parties, but rather the clericalisation of schools through the setting-up of religious structures involving students or staff (see Kuznetsov and Others, cited above, § 72). In the present case the service was held “after sundown”, that is, outside normal academy hours, and there is no evidence that it interfered in any way with the educational process or involved college students or teachers. Thus, the Education Act could not serve as a legal basis for the interference.


141.  The Government stated that there had been no  <mask> with the first applicant's right to teach religion. His deportation had not been a reaction against his religious classes - which had been lawful - but had been based on the assessment that his religious activities had constituted a thread to national security. Furthermore, Mr Al-Nashif had voluntarily abandoned teaching after service of the deportation order and would not be able to restart as new instructions issued by the Chief Mufti Office after his deportation prohibited religious instruction by persons lacking appropriate religious education. The Government further stated that religious freedoms in Bulgaria were guaranteed and that the authorities strictly adhered to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of religious communities and regularly allowed visits by foreigners coming to teach religion.


60.  The Government further maintained that freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs under Article 9 did not confer on the applicant communities or their members any entitlement to secure additional funding from the State budget. Nor did it entail a right to receive the State subsidies that were due to Churches as such. Therefore, the loss of such subsidies could not be regarded as  <mask> with the applicants’ rights under Article 9 of the Convention.


78.  The Government admitted that there had been an  <mask> with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. However, they considered that such interference had been necessary in a democratic society and had been justified by the need to ensure public safety and to prevent any obstruction by the applicant of the investigation of the criminal case against him.


106.  The Government stated that the enactment of the 2002 Act and its implementation amounted to nothing more than recognition of the leadership of the Church, as determined by its own canons. Those canons enshrined the unity of the Church and prohibited alternative leaderships and divisions in organisational or property matters. In the Government’s view the recognition of the canonical leadership of the Church by the State was an act of respect for its autonomy and canons, not  <mask> with them. The third party was of the same opinion. The applicants disagreed (see paragraphs 86-99 above).


143.  The applicant submitted that the ban imposed by the public authorities on wearing the Islamic headscarf clearly constituted  <mask> with her right to education, which had resulted in her being refused access to oncology examinations on 12 March 1998, prevented from enrolling with the university’s administrative department on 20 March 1998, and refused access to a lecture on neurology on 16 April 1998 and a written examination on public health on 10 June 1998.


148.  The Government maintained, in line with their arguments under Article 3, that there had been no  <mask> on the part of the State authorities in the exercise by the applicants of their various rights guaranteed under Article 9 of the Convention. The alleged incidents of violence had been committed by private individuals and the Government had reacted adequately, inter alia, by instituting criminal proceedings. They noted in this connection that between 1999 and 2003, fifty-three cases of religious incidents had been brought to the attention of the prosecutor’s office and the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior. Only eight of those cases had been discontinued, while criminal proceedings had been brought in a further forty cases and a preliminary investigation was under way in another three. Nine prosecutions had been referred to the courts.


97.  The Government claimed that the  <mask> in the form of dissolution of the applicant community had been justified, prescribed by law and had also pursued a legitimate aim. They referred to the Court's position to the effect that the State was “entitled to verify whether a movement or association carries on, ostensibly in pursuit of religious aims, activities which are harmful to the population” (Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, 26 September 1996, § 40, Reports 1996‑IV) and also “may legitimately consider it necessary to take measures aimed at repressing certain forms of conduct... judged incompatible with respect for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of others” (Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, § 47, Series A no. 295‑A).


86.  The applicants stressed that the Government’s suggestion that they should register as a new religious denomination was no answer to their grievances. The present case did not concern a refusal to register a new religious group but a State  <mask> in an internal dispute within an existing religious denomination. The Government had misleadingly tried to represent the applicant organisation as usurpers of Church property, but omitted important facts such as the fact that the leaders and religious ministers of the applicant organisation had always been part of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and of its leadership, some of them for decades. Furthermore, many believers did recognise the applicant organisation as the legitimate leadership of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Instead of helping the two wings in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to coexist peacefully, the authorities had decided to remove one of them and give its full support to the other.


107.  The applicants accepted that the  <mask> in question was prescribed by the Religious Denominations Act. They asserted nevertheless that the procedure laid down by the Act had been misapplied, since the real reason for refusal to register had been political; the Government had neither submitted nor proved that the applicant Church had failed to comply with the laws of the Republic.


120.  The applicant association stated that its right to change religious orientation, as guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention, had been interfered with. There had been  <mask> with its freedom of religion as the State had refused to register the changes and amendments to its statute for no legitimate reason as all the conditions for making the changes and amendments were met. Furthermore, the applicant association had been prevented from using the church premises it had built for its religious ceremonies and even from using its chosen name.


65.  The applicants further submitted that even if it was accepted that the scheme pursued a legitimate aim, it was disproportionate as it failed to take account of the different personal circumstances which could affect different individuals. In particular, they submitted that the level of the fee was too high and that the legislation made no provision for persons who could not pay the fee to be exempted. For the applicants, and for many others, the amount of the fee alone nullified the right to marry. The applicants submitted that in addition to the fee for the Certificate of Approval, couples wishing to marry had to pay a further GBP 103 for marriage formalities. In addition, if they wished to apply to UKBA for a change of immigration status, they would then have to pay a further sum of between GBP 465 and GBP 1020 (depending on the status sought and the service provided). The cumulative level of these fees was disproportionate and beyond the means of most of the immigrant population. The high fees charged for obtaining Certificates of Approval were therefore an inherent  <mask> with the right to marry for the vast majority of those affected by the scheme, and not just “the poorest of the poor”.


24.  The applicant association submitted that the domestic courts had not provided cogent reasons for their decisions. There had been no “pressing social need” which the impugned  <mask> served. The crucial argument on which the domestic court’s refusal to register the applicant association had rested was that the applicant association would violate the rights and freedoms of others, namely adherents of the MOC. Behind that argument lay the doctrine that no Orthodox church other than the MOC should be allowed to operate in the respondent State. That doctrine ran contrary to the respondent Government’s duty of neutrality and impartiality and the principle of religious pluralism. Furthermore, it had not been alleged that the applicant association had engaged or intended to engage in any unlawful activities or had pursued any illegal aims. Accordingly, the interference with the applicant association’s rights under this head was not “necessary in a democratic society”.


25.  The Government conceded that the refusal of the domestic courts to register the applicant association amounted to an  <mask> with its rights under Article 11 of the Convention. However, the refusal had been lawful and had pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Furthermore, the reasons adduced by the courts had been relevant and sufficient. In this connection they submitted that the language used in the minutes of the constituent assembly (see paragraph 4 above) demonstrated that the applicant association was disrespectful of the MOC and offended the religious beliefs of its adherents.


58.  The Government submitted that in 2003 Armenia had enacted a law on alternative service as part of the commitments undertaken upon joining the Council of Europe. Unfortunately, it had transpired that there were a number of omissions in that law and inconsistencies with the European standards. However, in deciding on the applicants’ criminal cases, the domestic courts had been bound to apply the law as in force at the material time. Referring to the findings of the Criminal Court of Appeal, the Government argued that the alternative labour service available at the material time had been of a civilian nature and contained only a few formal elements of military supervision in theory, not being directly controlled by the military in practice. Thus, the  <mask> was legitimate and prescribed by law.


86.  The Government submitted that the impugned  <mask>, if any, could be regarded as pursuing the legitimate aims of protection of the rights and freedoms of others and the protection of public order, within the meaning of Article 9 § 2, namely, by eliminating entities claiming to pursue religious ends but in fact striving only for financial benefits. The applicants contested this view.


42.  The Government submitted further that, as the Contracting States were under no obligation to accept a refusal to perform military service for religious reasons, non-exemption of a person from military or alternative civilian service did not raise any concerns under Article 9 of the Convention. In any event, the applicant’s submissions did not indicate that the obligation to perform military or alternative civilian service entailed any concrete  <mask> with his rights under Article 9.


38.  The Government considered that this  <mask> could be regarded as satisfying at least two of the legitimate aims provided for in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. The family-affairs judge had certainly been required to take account of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, because the applicant’s alcoholism had been considered as part of the cause of the violence he had been inflicting on his wife at the time, and the judge had also had a duty to protect the health and morals of the children, in respect of whom a right of visiting and staying contact had been granted to their father.


57.  The applicants submitted that the refusal of the Austrian authorities to grant legal personality to the first applicant by conferring on it the status of a religious society recognised under the Recognition Act violated their right to freedom of religion. In particular, before July 1998, the first applicant could not have been established as a legal entity and, thus, could not have entered into legal relations, concluded contracts or acquired assets. The first applicant had, thus far, no internal autonomy, could not hire the necessary religious ministers and was not entitled to perform its pastoral work for believers in hospitals or prisons. The second to fifth applicants, as leading executives of the first applicant, were also limited in exercising their right to freedom of religion. Neither the Basic Law 1867 nor the 1998 Religious Communities Act provided explicitly for the internal autonomy of a religious community. The Constitutional Court had found (in its judgment of 3 March 2001, B1713/98 – see paragraph 34 above) that registered religious communities, unlike recognised religious societies, did not enjoy the right to comprehensive organisation and administration of their internal affairs without State  <mask>. Lastly, the applicants contested that they would have had the possibility of forming an association under the Associations Act. They referred to the Constitutional Court’s finding of 1929 (VfSlg. 1265/1929), confirming the administrative authorities’ practice not to allow religious societies to form an association, and thus refusing the request of the Jehovah’s Witnesses (Ernste Bibelforscher) to set up an association. Thereafter the Jehovah’s Witnesses had not tried again to form an association, but auxiliary associations (Hilfsvereine) with specialised religious aims had been created. The two examples of associations submitted by the Government were likewise merely auxiliary associations. It was not until the enactment of the 2002 Associations Act that religious societies had been allowed to set up an association.


44.  The Government submitted that the refusal to renew the applicant’s contract had been necessary in a democratic society. The principle of the neutrality of public services required that employees could not wear any religious symbol, of any form, even if they did not engage in proselytism. In this connection they referred to the Court’s case-law with regard to civil servants and their duty of discretion and choice of attire (specifically, Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995, § 53, Series A no. 323, and Kurtulmuş v. Turkey (dec.), no. 65500/01, ECHR 2006‑II). They emphasised the particular importance of the principle of neutrality in the circumstances of this case, where it was difficult to assess the impact that a particularly visible external sign could have on the freedom of conscience of fragile and impressionable patients. The Government added that certain patients had specifically refused to meet the applicant, and that this situation had created a general climate of tension and difficulties within the unit, requiring the applicant’s colleagues and some social workers to handle sensitive situations. It was in the light of this general climate that the CASH had taken the contested decision, after reminding the applicant on several occasions of the duty of neutrality, and not on account of the latter’s professional skills, which had always been acknowledged. The Government considered that the contested decision had complied with the requirement to weigh up the interests at stake; it had been the consequence of the applicant’s refusal to comply with the rules applicable to every public employee, of which she had been perfectly aware, and not, as she alleged, on account of her religious beliefs. Lastly, although the applicant’s wearing of the religious symbol had been accepted by the hospital until 2000, this factor did not, in the Government’s view, render the contested  <mask> unnecessary. They reiterated that “the fact that an existing rule is applied less rigorously because of a specific context does not mean that there is no justification for the rule or that it is no longer binding in law” (citing Kurtulmuş, cited above).


124.  The Government responded that the applicants had not specified the particular ideas or matters of conscience which they wished to express. Accordingly, this aspect of the case was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. They had been convicted under Articles 68 and 70 of the Criminal Code for their anti-state activities not because of any manifestation of their beliefs. If there had been an  <mask> under these Convention provisions, it was justified for the protection of national security, public order and the rights and freedoms of others, as well as for the prevention and punishment of crime. The applicants were not prosecuted for their political beliefs or communist party affiliations, but for their anti-state activities, in contravention of Article 17 of the Convention, against which the young democracy of Lithuania had been entitled to defend itself (cf. the aforementioned Ždanoka case, § 100).


90.  The Government firstly argued that there had been no  <mask> with the applicant’s private life. The domestic courts had duly examined her claims but had found no “substantial evidence” to hold that it had been possible to recognise her from the Srovės broadcast. In particular, for the Court of Appeal, there was a lack of features making it possible to confirm the applicant’s identity during the broadcast. The Government also argued that the information provided by doctor D.Š. to the journalists had consisted of fairly abstract references to the applicant’s studies for a master’s in the United States, without giving details about those studies. It was fairly widely known in Lithuania at the relevant time that quite a lot of Lithuanian citizens were studying in the United States. According to Government statistics, 493 Lithuanian citizens studied at a higher education institution in the United States in 2001, 628 in 2002 and 647 in 2003. In fact, it had been the applicant’s open letter of 14 August 2003 to the Srovės journalists that had exposed her, by divulging her name, surname, a detailed description of her treatment at psychiatric facilities and her participation in the Osho movement (see paragraphs 21-23 above). By explicitly identifying herself as the character “Violeta” depicted in the Srovės television broadcast, the applicant had herself publicly established a link between that character and herself.


37.  The Government agreed that the refusal of the domestic courts to register the applicant association had amounted to an  <mask> with its rights under Article 11 of the Convention. The refusal had been lawful and had pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, in particular adherents of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Furthermore, the reasons adduced by the courts had been relevant and sufficient. In this connection they averred that in the domestic case file there had been no proof attesting to the Macedonian nationality of the applicant association’s founders, a fact which the applicants had failed to remedy in the impugned proceedings.


34.  The applicant considered that her conviction for the above‑mentioned statements had amounted to an unlawful  <mask> with her right to freedom of expression. Referring to the Court’s case-law, she considered that the domestic courts had failed to address the substance of the impugned statements in the light of Article 10 of the Convention. If they had done so, they would not have qualified them as mere value judgments. Value judgments were only excessive if they were not linked to facts, whereas her incriminated statements had been based on facts. The applicant stressed that by stating that Muhammad had had sexual intercourse with a nine-year-old, she had quoted a historically proven fact and raised the question whether this could be regarded as paedophilia; thus, she had based her value judgment on facts, which was always permissible under Article 10 of the Convention. Furthermore, through the impugned statements she had expressed criticism concerning Islam and the unreflecting imitation of Muhammad, in the framework of an objective and lively discussion, which the domestic courts had failed to take into account. Against that background, this had been an objective criticism of religion, had contributed to a public debate and had not been aimed at defaming the Prophet of Islam. Consequently, contrary to the domestic courts’ reasoning, a sufficient factual basis had existed for her assessment that Muhammad’s behaviour had amounted to paedophilia. She added that she had held a seminar extending over a number of days with an overall duration of twelve hours, and therefore a few “individual statements” had to be tolerated in order to allow for a lively discussion, which was a necessary part of such a seminar.


125.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> was lawful. In particular, they noted that the Ukrainian legislation contained certain requirements as to the statutes of religious organisations. These requirements were of a general nature and formulated in such a way as to avoid State interference with religious freedom. The Government referred, in particular, to section 12 of the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations Act (hereinafter the “Act”), which had particular requirements concerning the statutes of religious organisations. It was because of the failure of these documents to comply with the applicant association's statute that the Kyiv City State Administration had refused to register the amendments (see paragraph 42 above).


73.  The applicant associations further maintained that the  <mask> with their Convention rights was not justified by any of the legitimate aims set out in Article 9 § 2 of the Convention. There could never be a justification for judging religious groups’ beliefs as contrasted to their actions. The Government had failed to submit any concrete facts which would allow the Court to verify the assumption that their movement was in any way dangerous or that urgent social needs necessitated the actions in question. Their movement could not be criticised for any activity which was illegal or contrary to public order and the existing legislation. Accordingly, their treatment by the political authorities had been persecutory and unjustified, and had not been necessary in a democratic society.


36.  The applicant, who did not file his observations within the time allowed, submitted in his application form that the denial of his request to have the indication “Islam” on his identity card replaced by the indication of his faith as “Alevi”, amounted to an  <mask> with his right to freedom to practise his religion. He also complained that he was obliged to disclose his belief because that indication was mandatory on identity cards.


63.  The Government asserted that the meeting had been attended by hearing-impaired and disabled children without proof of the consent of their parents or legal guardians. The Commissioner asked the police officers to assist her in verifying whether this was the case. In the Government's view, the suspected participation of children had been sufficient justification for the  <mask>, which was “prescribed by law” and necessary for the protection of the health and rights of others.


38.  The applicants submitted that the manner in which the NRTC had applied its criteria for evaluating candidates for broadcasting licences had been arbitrary. Firstly, those candidates had had no direct contact with the NRTC, which had engendered delay and confusion. Secondly, the points system adopted by the NRTC had not been properly operated. It was natural to expect that each candidate would be allotted a certain number of points, that later a ranking would be made, and that the candidate obtaining the highest number of points would be granted a licence. However, the NRTC had eschewed such allotting of points, instead merely informing the candidates that they would or would not be granted a licence. The procedure followed had not been public and transparent. The NRTC had not disclosed the reasons for its decisions and the candidates had not been told why some of them had been approved and others not. Their evaluations had never been made public. These deficiencies had not been addressed or remedied in the ensuing judicial review proceedings, which had deprived judicial review of all practical meaning. For all these reasons, the applicants were of the view that the  <mask> with their freedom of expression had not been prescribed by law.


152.  The applicant union submitted that the  <mask> had had no legal basis in domestic law since the provisions of the Church’s Statute, not ranking as an institutional Act, could not override the provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing trade-union freedom. The Government disputed that argument, submitting that as the Statute had been approved by a government ordinance, it formed part of domestic law.


134.  The applicant association submitted that the  <mask> did not pursue a legitimate aim, as required by Article 9 § 2 of the Convention. In particular, a distinction had to be drawn between the members of the Parish and laymen, who attended religious ceremonies, but never participated in the management of church affairs or meetings of the Parishioners' Assembly. The laymen had never asked to become members of the Parish. In particular, the composition of the applicant association had been virtually unchanged since 1989, with the governing body – the Parishioners' Assembly – consistently having between 22 and 30 members. The Assembly had always complied with Article 2.12 of the statute when admitting new members.


35.  The applicant took the view that the  <mask> with the exercise of his freedom to manifest his religion did not correspond to any of the aims listed in Article 9 § 2. The Government maintained, for their part, that the impugned measure pursued two legitimate aims: to protect the rights and freedoms of others; and to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. The Court notes that the second paragraph of Article 9 does not refer expressly to the second of those aims. As regards the first of the aims invoked – to ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms of others – the Government referred to the principle of secularism and the need to promote tolerance in a post-conflict society. The Court has already held that secularism is a belief protected by Article 9 of the Convention (see Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 30814/06, § 58, ECHR 2011) and that an aim to uphold secular and democratic values can be linked to the legitimate aim of the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” within the meaning of Article 9 § 2 (see Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, § 99, ECHR 2005‑XI, and Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey, no. 41135/98, § 43, 23 February 2010). There is no reason to decide otherwise in the present case.


20.  The applicant submits that his conviction amounted to an  <mask> with his right to be free to exercise his religion together with all those who turned to him for spiritual guidance. He further considers that his conviction was not prescribed by law. In this respect he affirms that the Treaty of Peace of Athens remains in force. The Greek Prime-Minister accepted that at the Diplomatic Conference leading to the 1923 Treaty of Peace of Lausanne. Moreover, the Court of Cassation has recently confirmed the continued validity of the Treaty of peace of Athens and legal scholars hold the same view. The Muslims had never accepted the abrogation of Law no. 2345/1920. The applicant lastly contends that his conviction was not necessary in a democratic society. He points out that the Christians and Jews in Greece have the right to elect their religious leaders. Depriving the Muslims of this possibility amounts to discriminatory treatment.


78.  The Government submitted that the rights guaranteed by the Convention and the Armenian Constitution, including the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, were to be applied to everyone equally and without discrimination. The applicant, an Armenian citizen, was obliged under the Constitution to perform compulsory military service regardless of his religious convictions and the fulfilment of such obligation could not be considered an  <mask> with his rights. The law did not include such grounds for exemption from military service as being a Jehovah’s Witness. Thus, exemption from compulsory military service on a ground not prescribed by law would have been in breach of the principle of equality and non-discrimination.


62.  The applicants concluded that, since the objectives of education, socialisation and integration were, in their view, not called into question by an exemption from mixed swimming lessons, especially where the parents had organised private swimming classes for their daughters, and there was nothing likely to disrupt the smooth functioning of the school in any way or in any form, the  <mask> in question had not been based on any valid legitimate aim.


42.  The applicants alleged that their beliefs prohibited them from permitting their children to take part in mixed swimming lessons. They added that, although the Koran laid down the precept that the female body was to be covered only from puberty, their faith instructed them to prepare their daughters for the precepts that would be applied to them from puberty onwards. The Court considers that the case concerns a situation in which the applicants’ right to manifest their religion is in issue. The applicants exercised parental authority and could decide, under Article 303 al. 1 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 23 above), on the religious education of their children. In consequence, they are entitled to rely on this aspect of Article 9 of the Convention. The Court considers, furthermore, that the applicants indeed suffered an  <mask> with the exercise of their right to freedom of religion as protected by that provision.


21.  The applicant submitted that he had been treated differently due to his religious convictions in respect of the enjoyment of his rights under Article 8 of the Convention from other persons seeking access rights to their children following divorce or separation. In particular, he submitted that the domestic authorities’ decision withdrawing his access rights in respect of his son on the basis of his religious beliefs had amounted to an unjustifiable  <mask> with his right to respect for family life.


58.  The Government contested that there had been an  <mask> with the applicants’ right to freedom of religion. Since the entry into force of the 1919 Treaty of St Germain, all Austrian inhabitants had been allowed to practise publicly and privately their thought, religion and beliefs, irrespective of whether their religious society, community or church was recognised or had legal status. The right to autonomous administration of the entity’s internal organisation was likewise guaranteed. Referring to a judgment of the Constitutional Court (VfSlg. 10.915/1986), the Government contended that the refusal of recognition did not impede the applicants’ exercise of their right to freedom of religion within the meaning of Article 9 of the Convention. Against this background, they contested that the first applicant had no legal personality in Austria, was legally non-existent and could not acquire assets or enter into legal relations, because these allegations concerned the first applicant’s situation before it had obtained legal personality as a registered religious community on 11 July 1998. Even before the entry into force of the 1998 Religious Communities Act, the first applicant had had the possibility of setting up an association with a religious purpose under the Associations Act, as the Federation of Evangelical Municipalities in Austria (Bund Evangelikaler Gemeinden in Österreich) had on 21 March 1992, and the Church of Scientology in Austria (Scientology Kirche Österreich) on 20 May 1984. However, the applicants did not appear to have made any efforts to that end.


48.  The Government contended that, if Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was at all applicable, what had occurred in the present case had to be considered as a control of the use of property falling within the scope of its second paragraph. They left it to the Court to decide whether an  <mask> giving rise to State responsibility had occurred. They submitted, however, that the alleged interference had been lawful. Furthermore, the wage monitoring system that followed from the Construction Agreement, and the costs to which the applicants were compelled to contribute, served not only the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, but also pursued the general interest of the community, namely to uphold the legitimacy of the Swedish approach in the area of industrial relations.


71.  The Government submitted, however, that by the time the applicants applied for a Certificate of Approval, the first scheme had been amended to distinguish between sham and genuine marriages and no longer constituted a disproportionate  <mask> with the right to marry. The level of the fee had been the subject of active consideration by the Government. The fee was suspended with effect from 9 April 2009 and on 10 July 2010 the Government introduced a scheme whereby needy applicants could reclaim the money paid.


49.  The Government further maintained that the alleged  <mask> under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been proportionate to the aim pursued. In support of that contention they submitted, inter alia, the following. In general, the assessment of proportionality had to be made in the light of the importance attributed in Sweden to the system of collective bargaining. The collective agreements had an important normative effect and protected workers’ interests in a general sense. In the construction business, employees who were not members of the Union also benefited from the latter’s negotiations with the Industries concerning, for instance, wage levels, although they did not contribute financially to this part of the Union’s activities, which was financed by means of membership fees. As wage monitoring ensured that the collective agreement was adhered to by the employers, it fulfilled an important function in the interests of construction workers generally. There was no difference in treatment between Union members and other workers; Byggettan would also inform non-unionised workers and contact their employers in case any discrepancies were found. In this respect, the Government referred the statement by Mr Bromander, according to which, in 1999, wages had been adjusted upwards for 250 non-unionised workers as a result of the monitoring work (paragraph 26 above). The Government asserted that, if non-unionised workers were exempt from contributing to the wage monitoring system, it would appear to be at the expense of the Union’s members, who would presumably have to contribute more to help cover the costs of the monitoring work.


24.  The Government submitted that, in contrast to the facts found in Boychev and Others, cited above, there was no evidence in the present case to support the view that the police action of 27 September 1995 interrupted a religious meeting. As could be seen from the summons requiring the applicant to appear at the police station, she was informed of the search well in advance. The summons was issued under the Public Education Act and decree no. 367/194 of the Supreme Prosecution Office (see paragraph 8 above) and was aimed at regulating educational activities. It followed, in the Government’s view, that there had been no  <mask> with the applicant’s right to freedom of religion. In addition, the Government argued that the law in force at the material time allowing for interference with the rights under Article 9 should be assessed in context. Arguments had been put forward at the relevant time to suggest that followers of Word of Life, particularly minors, were at risk of isolation and lower standards of protection in medical, educational and civil terms. The prosecutorial authorities were part of the judiciary, not the executive and the police took action as sanctioned by the prosecutor’s office. The actions of the police were well founded and fully in compliance with the Supreme Court’s judgment of 1 April 1994, refusing registration of the three organisations affiliated with Word of Life (see paragraph 6 above). Moreover, the lack of registration as a religious denomination had never been an obstacle for its followers to profess their religion or practice their activity.


53.  The Government further submitted that the lawful requirement to bring the founding documents of a religious organisation into compliance with the existing law did not amount to an  <mask> within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Articles 11 or 9 of the Convention. In any event, the Russian authorities could not be blamed for the applicant branch’s unwillingness to apply for re-registration.


71.  The Government stressed that the lack of a mark for “religion/ethics” on the third applicant's school reports did not constitute  <mask> with his rights under Article 9, as the reports did not disclose his philosophical or religious beliefs. The absence of a mark or the presence of a line on a school report could not be interpreted as anything more than official information as to whether or not a pupil had been following a religion/ethics class in a particular year. Hence, the third applicant's right to remain silent with regard to his philosophical or religious beliefs had been fully respected. Furthermore, the Government claimed that the applicant had not provided any evidence that the form of the school reports constituted interference with his Article 9 rights. He had not pointed to any inconvenience of a sufficient degree of seriousness to be considered as a breach of his rights under Article 9.


21.  The applicant argued that it could be seen from the facts of the case, which the Government had not disputed, that in his appeal he had requested a ruling disallowing the production in the proceedings of a medical document that in his view constituted  <mask> with his private life. His application for legal aid for the purposes of lodging an appeal on points of law having been dismissed, he considered that he could not be criticised for failure to exhaust all available domestic remedies.


41.  The Government considered that the impugned  <mask> was “in accordance with the law”, since at the relevant time the domestic law clearly set out the principle of strict neutrality required from all public officials, and the penalties to which they were liable in the event of failure to comply with this principle. The “law” in question, within the meaning of the Court’s case-law, included, firstly, the 1905 Act, which had enshrined the State’s neutrality vis-à-vis religions, and Article 1 of the Constitution, which affirmed the principle that all citizens are equal before the law (see paragraph 21 above). It also included the Law of 13 July 1983 laying down the rights and duties of civil servants, section 29 of which provided that any misconduct committed by a civil servant in the course of or in connection with the performance of his or her duties could lead to a disciplinary sanction. In addition, both the case-law of the administrative courts over more than fifty years (see paragraph 26 above) and that of the Constitutional Council (see paragraph 25 above) reiterated the obligation of neutrality incumbent on all public servants in carrying out their functions. The Conseil d’État, in its Opinion of 3 May 2000, also emphasised the pre-existing general nature of the principle of neutrality, before applying it in the case before it.


31.  The applicant considered that the Court of Appeal had failed in its duty to ensure that personal data as fundamental as that resulting from medical observations could not be diverted from its initial purpose and cause prejudice to the person complaining of a breach of his or her privacy, in so far as that court had, in justifying its decision, expressly referred to the medical documents in question. He regarded this as  <mask> with his right to respect for his private life.


92.  The Government stated that the applicants’ complaints were manifestly ill-founded as there was no evidence in support of his allegations that an  <mask> with his rights had taken place. In particular, there was no evidence that the applicant had ever asked for permission before the relevant authorities, namely the investigator or the court involved, to meet with a priest but had been refused.


2.  The Government submitted that section 16 § 5 of the Religions Act, interpreted in conjunction with section 7 § 1 of the Public Gatherings Act, required the organisers of religious assemblies in non-residential premises to notify the local authorities, in writing and in advance. Moreover, the Government claimed that section 5 § 1 of the Education Act prohibited religious assemblies from being held in educational establishments. Both justifications are unfounded, and have already being rejected by this Court in Kuznetsov and Others[3]. More specifically, in that seminal case the Court found a violation of Article 9 of the Convention on account of the disruption of an indoor religious meeting. The Court found that the State’s  <mask> was not even prescribed by law, since the Government neither specified the nature of the allegedly missing documents in accordance with the Religions Act, nor produced any documents relating to the official powers of the commissioner and two senior police officers to interrupt and disperse the indoor religious meeting. In addition, the fact of holding the religious meeting on college premises outside normal college hours had not been contrary to the Education Act. In that same judgment, the Court referred to the case-law of the Russian Supreme Court, dating from at least 1999, to the effect that religious assemblies do not require any prior authorisation from, or notification to, the public authorities[4]. There is no valid reason to change this precedent[5]. On the contrary, as will be shown, the subsequent practice of the respondent State justifies insistence on this case-law[6].


69.  The applicants submitted that the loss of their proper Church status as a result of the 2011 Church Act had constituted  <mask> with their freedom of religion. The proper functioning of religious communities necessitated the enjoyment of a specific and appropriate legal status, that is, Church status in the legal sense. In Hungary, religious communities had had a reasonable opportunity to be registered as Churches since 1990, and the applicants had indeed enjoyed that status. The fact that on 1 January 2012 the vast majority of Churches (including theirs) had lost their proper Church status and had been forced to convert into ordinary civil associations or else cease to exist legally had constituted in itself interference with their freedom of religion, especially since the loss of Church status had deprived them of privileges which had facilitated their religious activities. The fact that those privileges were guaranteed henceforth only to Churches recognised by Parliament had placed them in a situation which was substantially disadvantageous vis-à-vis those Churches.


77.  The applicant began by observing that this  <mask> could not be said to have the legitimate aim of “public safety” as it was not a measure intended to address specific safety concerns in places of high risk such as airports, but a blanket ban applying to almost all public places. As to the Government’s argument that it sought to ensure respect for the minimum requirements of life in society, because the reciprocal exposure of faces was fundamental in French society, the applicant objected that it failed to take into account the cultural practices of minorities which did not necessarily share this philosophy or the fact that there were forms of communication other than visual, and that in any event this bore no relation to the idea of imposing criminal sanctions to prevent people from veiling their faces in public. She submitted, moreover, that the Government’s assertion that for women to cover their faces was incompatible with the principle of gender equality was simplistic. She argued that, according to a well-established feminist position, the wearing of the veil often denoted women’s emancipation, self-assertion and participation in society, and that, as far as she was concerned, it was not a question of pleasing men but of satisfying herself and her conscience. Furthermore, it could not be maintained that because of wearing the veil the women concerned were denied the right to exist as individuals in public, when in the majority of cases it was worn voluntarily and without any proselytising motive. She added that other member States with a large Muslim population did not prohibit the wearing of the full-face veil in public places. She also found it ironic that an abstract idea of gender equality could run counter to the profoundly personal choice of women who decided to wear veils, and contended that imposing legal sanctions exacerbated the inequality that was supposed to be addressed. Lastly, she took the view that in claiming that the prohibition had the legitimate aim of “respect for human dignity” the Government were justifying the measure by the abstract assumption, based on stereotyping and chauvinistic logic, that women who wore veils were “effaced”.


24.  The Government acknowledged that there had been an  <mask> with the applicant’s right to family life. They stressed however that intervention by the domestic courts had been prescribed by law, namely section 92 (4) of the Csjt. (see paragraph 15 above). Moreover, it pursued a legitimate aim, that is, the protection of the child’s interests, and was necessary in a democratic society. They added that in this field the child’s interests were paramount, overriding the interests of the parents.