51.  The applicant contested this view. In particular, he claimed that he had complained about the unlawful acts committed during the investigation to the Leninsky District Court and the Chernivtsi Regional Court under Articles 234 of the CCRP and 248-3 of the CCP. The relevant decisions were given by these courts on 25 April, 31 May and 2 June 2000. The applicant further stressed that the resolution adopted by the deputy prosecutor of the Chernivtsi Region on 19 September 2000 constituted a final decision for the purpose of  <mask>. The applicant maintained that there were no effective remedies that he was required to exhaust in order to challenge this resolution. In particular, the applicant stated that he had complained on various occasions to the General Prosecution Service (Генеральна Прокуратура України) and the Chernivtsi Regional Prosecution Service about the unreasonable length and unlawfulness of the proceedings in his case. The final answer to these complaints was given on 7 December 2001 by the prosecution informing the applicant that the case was still being investigated.


64.  The Government can be understood as raising an objection of non- <mask>. The Court points out that, in principle, any plea of inadmissibility must be raised by the respondent Contracting Party in its observations on the admissibility of the application (Rule 55 of the Rules of Court). However, in the present case the decision on the admissibility of the application was adopted on 15 September 2005; at that time the fact on which the Government's objection was based had not yet occurred. Therefore, the circumstances did not allow the Government to comply with the deadline set forth in Rule 55. The Court will thus examine the Government's objection.


89.  The applicant maintained that he had exhausted domestic remedies. He pointed out that he had lodged two complaints with the Federal Constitutional Court, which the latter had refused to admit. Alternatively, he argued that, in the exceptional circumstances of the present case, his application should not be dismissed for non- <mask>. The German courts appeared to be unwilling to expedite the proceedings still pending, and further damage was to be prevented.


118.  The Government, the applicant and the third party further referred to their arguments with respect to the Government's objection as to the  <mask>. In particular, the third party stated that there were no effective remedies to complain about extradition contrary to Articles 2, 3 or 6 of the Convention. They maintained that the law at issue was not sufficiently accessible and precise, failing to avoid risks of arbitrariness. They referred in contrast to the experiences of Poland and the United Kingdom in this area, where the courts, as opposed to the prosecutor's office rule, on requests for extradition. They stated that the courts in the United Kingdom, acting under the Extradition Act 2003, assessed the following issues in assessing the requests for extradition: (a) the rule against double jeopardy; (b) extraneous considerations (whether a person was in fact extradited for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing him on account of his race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions, or whether if extradited he might be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions); (c) passage of time; (d) the person's age; (e) hostage-taking considerations; (f) specialty; (g) the person's earlier extradition to the United Kingdom from different territories; (h) human rights considerations arising from the 1998 Human Rights Act.


53.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to observe the requirements of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention as regards  <mask> in that he had failed to challenge the length of the proceedings by means of a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution, lodged in accordance with the applicable procedural rules and established practice. They contended in particular that the applicant had failed to raise his objection before the Constitutional Court as to the length of the proceedings before the District Court while the latter proceedings were still pending. They considered that the applicant could have done so even after the District Court had decided on the matter but before it had transmitted the case‑file to the Regional Court for a determination of the defendant’s appeals. The Government further maintained that, had the applicant formulated his constitutional complaint properly, the Constitutional Court would have examined the total length of the proceedings, that is to say their phases before both the District Court and the Regional Court.


26.  The Government pointed out that the proceedings in the applicant's case were still pending and that consequently he could lodge a constitutional complaint in line with the new case-law. Since the latter permitted the Constitutional Court not only to award compensation but also to set a time-limit for the competent court to decide the case, the Government contended that it was an effective remedy and that the Court should make an exception to the general rule of  <mask>.


93.  The Government further argued that the applicant’s detention was authorised under section 254 of the Code of Administrative Violations. It suffices to note in this respect that the measure of administrative detention pursuant to this provision could only be imposed on a person, who had committed an administrative offence (see paragraph 37 above). The Court notes that there is no indication, in the documents submitted by the parties to the Court, that the applicant had committed the administrative offence under section 171 or indeed any other administrative offence. The Government have not sufficiently explained the application of section 254 in practice to the applicant’s situation and have not, accordingly, justified his detention on the basis of the latter provision. Taking into account this conclusion, the Court also rejects the Government’s preliminary objection of non- <mask> as the legal grounds for the applicant’s detention and any appeals thereof remain unclear.


267.  The Government referred in essence to their submissions concerning the  <mask>. They maintained in particular that Azerbaijani law protected both ownership and possession of property and provided adequate procedures which were accessible to citizens and foreigners allowing them to take action before the courts in respect of any loss or damage suffered on the territory of Azerbaijan.


50.  The Government continued by raising an argument of non- <mask>. In their view, the following avenues could have provided the applicant with an effective protection of his rights: a complaint to the facility governor, a prosecutor, a court, the Ombudsman, the President of the Russian Federation, the Government, or the Russian Parliament. They drew the Court’s attention to three judgments of Russian courts allowing negligence claims by former inmates. In particular, in 2007, 2009 and 2010 courts in the Yaroslavl, Kaliningrad and Smolensk Regions had awarded damages to three inmates on account of the authorities’ failure to provide them with adequate medical assistance. Relying on a number of the Court’s judgments in cases concerning the alleged failure by detention authorities to render effective medical services to applicants, the Government further submitted that on a number of occasions the Court had already examined and dismissed complaints related to the quality of medical care in detention. They concluded by arguing that the applicant’s complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention were manifestly ill-founded.


100.  The Government also contended that the applicants had not complied with the six-month time-limit laid down by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The Court reiterates that the six-month rule is closely linked to the rule of  <mask>, as the six-month period runs from the date of the decision considered as final for the purposes of exhaustion of domestic remedies (see, among other authorities, Edwards v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 46477/99, 7 June 2001). Nevertheless, where no adequate remedy is available in domestic law, the six-month period in principle starts to run from the date on which the act complained of took place (see Gongadze v. Ukraine, no. 34056/02, § 155, ECHR 2005‑XI).


21.  The Government asked the Court to dismiss this complaint for failure to comply with the requirement of  <mask> under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They argued that the applicants could have sought reparation for the harm allegedly suffered by instituting an action in the administrative courts. They further maintained that this part of the application was not lodged within the six-month time-limit.


33.  The Government confirmed the determination of the Bulgarian authorities to shed light on and prosecute all acts of racist violence, but submitted that the existence of such motivation had not been established in the present case. They reiterated the arguments put forward in the context of the objection as to non- <mask> to the effect that the applicant could have brought criminal proceedings for minor injuries or civil proceedings against those responsible.


80.  The Government averred that the applicants had failed to comply with the  <mask> rule in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In this connection they reasoned that the applicants had filed their application without having recourse to the local remedies which were effective, sufficient and accessible to them and capable of providing redress for their complaints within the judicial system of the “TRNC”.


245.  The Government contended that the present complaint should be declared inadmissible for non‑ <mask>. They argued that a suspect who was under arrest was expected to raise allegations of ill-treatment by the police at the time of his appearance before a judge for a remand hearing. In deciding whether or not, and on what conditions, to issue the remand order, the judge would also take into account, as a material factor, the suspect’s complaint that he had been ill‑treated by the police and would, as necessary, give instructions for allegations of ill-treatment to be investigated and the suspect to be medically examined.


82.  The Government submitted that the application should be declared inadmissible for non- <mask>. They noted that the applicant had failed to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Supreme Court in the proceedings relating to the issuance of the writ of execution. Moreover, he had given no reasons for his appeal to the Court of Appeal in those proceedings. The Government observed that when the District Court had examined the appeal, the Tax Authority had not yet granted the respite from payment of the tax debt although that had been granted at the time of the Court of Appeal’s examination of the appeal. However, since the applicant did not inform the appellate court about it, the court was unaware of this fact. In the Government’s opinion, the Court of Appeal might have granted leave to appeal and revoked the decision to issue the writ of execution if it had known about the respite. Had this occurred, the decision to sell the property and the ensuing eviction could also have been revoked in accordance with Chapter 18, section 14, of the Enforcement Code.


78.  The Government contended that the complaint should be declared inadmissible for non- <mask>. They submitted that the applicants had failed to appeal against the decision of 18 February 2003 to terminate the criminal proceedings. They argued that it had been open to the applicants to lodge complaints with the courts about any acts or omissions of the investigating authorities, but that the applicants had not availed themselves of that remedy.


31.  The Government pointed out that the proceedings in the applicant's case were still pending and that consequently he could lodge a constitutional complaint in line with the new case-law. Since the latter permitted the Constitutional Court not only to award compensation but also to set a time-limit for the competent court to decide the case, the Government contended that it was an effective remedy and that the Court should make an exception to the general rule of  <mask>.


38.  The Government further argued that the applicant had also not appealed to a court against the decision of 27 April 2000 by which the criminal proceedings against the police officers were once again discontinued. In this connection the Court reiterates that the rule of  <mask> must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism. The Court has further recognised that the rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically; for the purposes of reviewing whether it has been observed, it is essential to have regard to the circumstances of the individual case. This means, in particular, that the Court must take realistic account not only of the existence of formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting State concerned but also of the general context in which they operate, as well as the personal circumstances of the applicant (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, p. 1211, § 69, and Aksoy, cited above, p. 2276, §§ 53-54).


86.  The Government contended that the domestic investigation had obtained no evidence to the effect that Visita Shokkarov was dead or that any State servicemen had been involved in his abduction or alleged killing. They contended that the complaint should be declared inadmissible for non‑ <mask> as the investigation into the abduction of Visita Shokkarov had not yet been completed. They further stated that it had been open to the applicants to lodge court complaints against acts or omissions of the investigating authorities.


50.  The applicant did not use the formal procedure to challenge the decision of 3 July 2001 before a court as was required by the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 41 above). Instead, he lodged an action against the Ministry of Justice, alleging that the assistant prosecutor had erred in his findings. He sought compensation for damage caused by the alleged ill-treatment and the refusal to punish the perpetrators. In this connection, the Court observes that the rule of  <mask> must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism. The Court has already held on a number of occasions that the rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically; for the purposes of reviewing whether it has been observed, it is essential to have regard to the circumstances of the individual case (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, p. 1211, § 69, and Aksoy, cited above, p. 2276, §§ 53-54).


122.  The Government firstly raised the objection of non- <mask>. They argued that the alleged violation consisting of failure to obtain informed consent from a patient was a matter of civil liability under national law and that the applicant had not made use of the civil-law remedies to complain of O.’s involuntary treatment. According to the Government, the remedy of claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage would have been available to the applicant under national law. The Government submitted that although the applicant had submitted her complaints within criminal proceedings, this could not be considered an effective remedy as no elements of a criminal offence had been found with regard to the acts complained of.


36.  The Government have raised an objection of non- <mask> by the applicant. The Court considers that the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies is closely linked to the merits of the applicant’s complaint that he did not have at his disposal an effective remedy for the complaint that he was being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by being detained in inadequate conditions. The Court thus finds it necessary to join the Government’s objection to the merits of the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.


11.  The Government raised objections, contested by the applicant, regarding  <mask> similar to those already dismissed in a number of the Court's judgments regarding non-enforcement against the State-owned companies (see e.g. among many others, Trykhlib v. Ukraine, no. 58312/00, §§ 38-43, 20 September 2005 and Mykhaylenky and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 35091/02 and following, §§ 38-39, ECHR 2004‑XII). The Court considers that these objections must be rejected for the same reasons.


23.  The Government raised objections as to the applicant’s lack of victim status and non- <mask>. They submitted that all the requisite domestic action had been taken by Partidul Verde but not by the applicant. They considered that the latter had not put forward in his own name before the domestic courts the complaint raised before the Court. Under those circumstances the Government argued that Partidul Verde should have applied to the Court rather than the individual candidate.


52.   The applicants also complained that the proceedings before Centru District Court and Court of Appeal were excessively long and thus in further violation of Article 6 § 1. The Court observes that these proceedings lasted little over a month before two courts: this is not unduly lengthy and the complaint must be declared  <mask> pursuant to Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.


46.  The applicant further complained that the domestic proceedings were discriminatory in violation of Article 14 of the Convention. Having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matter complained of is within its competence, the Court finds that it does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application is  <mask> and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


181.  The Government further noted that subsequent to the reforms carried out in 2002 and 2004, namely revision of certain provisions of the Civil Code and the adoption of a new Criminal Code, and the entry into force of Law no. 4320, Turkish law provided for sufficient guarantees, meeting international standards, for the protection of women against domestic violence. The Government concluded that this complaint should be declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies or as being  <mask> since these allegations had never been brought to the attention of the domestic authorities and, in any event, were devoid of substance.


75.  The Government considered that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in that he had not complained of the length of these proceedings to the Constitutional Court under Article 127 of the Constitution (see Andrášik and Others, cited above). They pointed out that the proceedings had ended in March 2002 when the remedy under Article 127 of the Constitution had already been available to the applicant. The Government also considered that, moreover, and in any event, this part of the application was  <mask> given the factual complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and the fact that the case was closely related to the issue of custody and maintenance which had been dealt with in parallel in another set of proceedings.


175.  The applicants disagreed with the Government concerning the degree of damage to their homes, relying on photographs that they provided (see paragraph 15 above) and their own statements. They considered a comparison with the Lisnyy and Others case misguided since, unlike in that case, the very fact that their homes had been damaged was not in dispute; it was only the extent of that damage that was in dispute. Moreover, they belonged to a particularly vulnerable group by virtue of their Roma ethnicity and being in a situation tantamount to that of internally displaced persons. Referring in particular to the statements of the thirteenth and sixteenth applicants (see paragraph 14 above), they stated that only “some” of them had sold their houses for “a small amount of money”. They considered that it was for the Government to search the registers and archives for proof of the applicants’ ownership. They furthermore considered the Government’s conclusion (that their complaint was  <mask> for lack of proof) to have been based on racist stereotypes about the Roma as being rootless.


110.  The applicants also alleged a violation of Article 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the administrative proceedings conducted against them. In view of all the materials in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application is  <mask> and must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


163.  The applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 1 on that account is therefore  <mask> and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. In view of the fact that the applicant had the opportunity to appoint a lawyer, no separate issues in that regard arise under Article 5 § 4.


160.  The Government submitted that these complaints were inadmissible in view of the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, as the applicants had never aired them before any domestic judicial or other competent authority, including the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Health. As an alternative, assuming there were no effective remedies to exhaust, these complaints had been lodged out of six months of the events complained of. In any event they were  <mask>. The applicants provided no evidence whatsoever in support of their factual account of events. According to the information available to the Government, the authorities did everything in their power to ensure respectful and proper handling and identification of the remains of the accident victims and there was nothing in their conduct to cause the applicants suffering beyond that, which was unavoidable in their situation.


19.  The applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had not had an effective remedy available to defend his right to freedom of expression. The Court notes that the applicant was found guilty of defamation as a result of court proceedings instituted against him by V.P. He had been able to appeal against the judgments of the Briceni District Court and the Bălţi Court of Appeal and he had his case examined twice by the Supreme Court of Justice. The applicant did not explain why, in his opinion, such a remedy cannot be considered effective within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. The fact that the applicant is not satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings does not automatically trigger a violation of Article 13 of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court cannot accept the applicant's contention that he had not had an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 10 of the Convention. The complaint is therefore  <mask> within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.


90.  The Government noted that the applicant’s enforcement petition had been rejected due to serious formal shortcomings which had made it unenforceable. In their view the decision to reject the enforcement petition was merely of a procedural nature and did not involve the determination of the applicant’s “civil rights or obligations” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government thus considered that the complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. They admitted that, if this were not the case, the complaint could not be considered  <mask>.


118.  The Government contested the applicants’ arguments. They first submitted that the administrative confiscation proceedings represented a “civil” dispute within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. During the examination of that dispute, the domestic courts had given ample opportunity to the first, second and fourth applicants to submit their written and oral arguments. However, only one of them, the second applicant, had availed himself of that opportunity, whilst the remaining applicants had ignored the domestic court’s two summonses. As to the second applicant, his arguments had been duly heard by the domestic courts; as a result of the courts’ thorough examination, some of his property had eventually been removed from the confiscation list. In general, the judicial examination, in which the burden of proof was placed on the respondent applicants by law, had been fair, and the court decisions had been sufficiently reasoned. As to the first applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, the Government submitted that the provision in question could not apply to the administrative confiscation proceedings, as the latter had not involved the determination of any criminal charge against the applicant.  All in all, the Government concluded that the applicants’ complaints under Articles 6 §§ 1 and 2 were  <mask>.


170.  The Government argued that the applicants had failed to comply with the requirements of admissibility, in particular, the observance of the six-month time-limit and exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Government stated that the military prosecutor's office had notified the office of the Government of Chechnya of the decision of 13 March 2002. In view of a difficult security situation prevailing in the region and the lack of information as to the residential addresses of the victims in the criminal case, such action constituted due notification. The applicants eventually appealed that decision and on 6 March 2006 the Grozny Military Garrison Court found in their favour. The applicants were also informed of the second decision to terminate the investigation made on 14 June 2007, which they had failed to appeal. The Government further submitted that the applicants could have sought compensation for their non-pecuniary and pecuniary damage through a court in civil proceedings. Finally, they asked the Court to declare the application  <mask>.


55.  The Government argued that the application was  <mask>. In his application the applicant had complained merely that the imposition and extension of the TBS order were in themselves unlawful. That, however, was a matter within the reserved domain of the domestic courts. The TBS order had been imposed by the Regional Court, confirmed by the Court of Appeal and left intact by the Supreme Court; for the applicant to argue that it was unlawful was to approach the Court as a “court of fourth instance”.


70.  The applicant also lodged complaints under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention regarding her involuntary psychiatric examination. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that these complaints are  <mask> and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.


162.  The Government contested the applicants’ contentions, maintaining that the complaints were  <mask> because the impugned remedy – a complaint under the 2004 Act – was effective for the purposes of Article 13 and capable of providing the applicants with the required redress. In any event, in their view there had been no violation of Article 13 in the present case.


115.  The Government pointed out that the “physical damage caused to the applicant’s health” had been reimbursed by performing surgery on him. He was also awarded compensation of 30,000 Russian roubles (RUB) by the Ivanovo Regional Court. As to the non-pecuniary damage, the Government submitted that the applicant’s claim was  <mask>. In any event, a finding of a violation would constitute sufficient redress.


45.  The Government argued that the complaint under Article 5 § 1 was inadmissible on several grounds. Firstly, the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as he had not claimed compensation for his detention under the State Liability Act 2003. Secondly, the application was  <mask>, as the guarantees of Article 5 § 1 had been complied with. Thirdly, and in any event, given the redress which the applicant obtained in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, he could no longer be considered a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention.


50.  The Government put forward two lines of argument, insisting that the applicant had had a choice of effective remedies before him but had not exhausted them and, at the same time, arguing that both the treatment provided to the applicant during the entire period of his detention and the conditions of his detention in colony no. 8 had corresponded to the highest standards. As to the first argument, the Government stressed that the applicant had not complained to a court that he was not receiving adequate medical assistance and that the conditions of his detention were unsatisfactory. The procedure for making claims before a court was established in Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as clarified by the Supreme Court’s Ruling no. 2 of 10 February 2009. Having relied on two cases examined by the Russian courts and the Court’s findings in the case of Popov and Vorobyev v. Russia (no. 1606/02, 23 April 2009), they submitted that it had also been open to the applicant to lodge a tort action claiming compensation for damage caused by the allegedly inadequate medical assistance and poor conditions of his detention. Relying on Resolution no. CM/ResDH(2010)35 adopted at the 1078th Meeting of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the Government further noted that statistics and a number of cases presented to the Committee had demonstrated the developing practice of the Russian courts in awarding compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by unsatisfactory conditions of detention. In the Government’s opinion, the applicant’s failure to apply to a Russian court with a complaint had to be interpreted by the Court as his unwillingness to comply with the admissibility requirements set out by Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. The Government stressed that his complaints under Article 3 should therefore be dismissed for failure to exhaust domestic remedies and the complaints under Article 13 were obviously  <mask>.


25.  The Government contested the applicant's argument. They claimed that the presumption of innocence had not been breached in the applicant's criminal case. The information disseminated by the investigator on the TV show could not be considered libellous because the applicant had been convicted by a final judgment for the acts described by the investigator. By the time that the show had been broadcast, a bill of indictment had been drawn up in respect of the applicant, charging him with the crimes referred to by the investigator, which could not be done until sufficient evidence of the applicant's guilt had been collected. The investigator had had a right to disseminate information about the course of the investigation as he had seen fit. The final judgment of 4 February 2004 established that the investigator had only disseminated that part of the information about the investigation that he had been entitled to disseminate. In sum, they concluded that the applicant's complaint under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention was  <mask>.


101.  The applicants also maintained that it had not been an obligation to exhaust remedies by making claims which would have been  <mask>. Referring to the Supreme Court minority’s opinion the applicants argued that a claim for a retrial would have been ill-founded as there had not been any legal provision to allow remand of this aspect of the District Court’s judgment back to the first instance for a new process. They further argued that a retrial at this point would also been meaningless as the deadlines to impose fines on them at first instance under Sections 223 and 224 of the Act had expired.


29.  The Government raised no objection as to the admissibility of this complaint. The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint in respect of the proceedings instituted against the Komsomolska Pravda newspaper is not  <mask> within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.


49.  The Government further submitted that the complaint regarding secondary strike action should be rejected as  <mask>. They considered that there had been no violation of, or even interference with, the applicant union’s right of freedom of association since Article 11 did not confer any right to take secondary action. Instead, it was plain from the very wording of that provision that it contemplated collective action by workers to protect their own interests. Sympathy strikes, which were no more than a show of solidarity with another group of workers, lacked the requisite nexus between collective action and the direct interests of the persons taking part in it. It did not appear from the facts adduced that the situation of the RMT members employed by Hydrex had any real bearing on the situation of their union colleagues employed by Jarvis. Had any similar threat to the latter’s interests materialised, it would have been open to them to take strike action, just as the Hydrex members had done.


73.  The Government further considered that the complaint was  <mask>, given the limited character of the prohibition and its limited impact on the applicant company’s activities. It was only the fishing of mussel seed that had been affected, and only for a brief period of time while the State negotiated with the Commission. Other aspects of the applicant company’s business – growing transplanted mussels and harvesting them at maturity – had not been interrupted. There had been no impact on the applicant company’s boat licence and boat registration, meaning that it would have been able to gather mussel seed at other locations. It had also had the option of purchasing the raw material it required from other operators. The real cause of the applicant’s loss in 2008 was not the closure of the harbour, but the action of predators, a natural risk that was always present.


13.  The Government contended that the complaint is inadmissible on three grounds. They claimed, first, that the applicant is not a “victim” of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention because, in consequence of his reliance on the provision before the Court of Appeal, he obtained a substantial reduction in his sentence. Secondly, they contended that even if he is a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34, he has failed to exhaust domestic remedies because it was open to him to bring a civil action under Section 7 (1) (a) of the Human Rights Act in respect of the delay of the hearing of his appeal, but he did not do so. The applicant does not comment on these pleas. Finally, as noted above, they contended that the complaint is  <mask>.


14. The applicant complained about a violation of Article 4 § 1 of the Convention, referring to the fact that he was forced to work without receiving remuneration. The Court notes that the applicant performed his work voluntarily and his entitlement to payment has never been denied. The dispute thus involves civil rights and obligations, but does not disclose any element of slavery or forced or compulsory labour within the meaning of this provision (see Sokur v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 29439/02, 26 November 2002). In these circumstances, the Court considers that this part of the application must be rejected as being  <mask> pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


50.  The Government argued that this complaint was  <mask>. Under Article 255 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, detention on remand remained in force during the trial. As soon as the prosecution had passed the case to the court, the applicant was “assigned” to the court (перечислен за судом). In such circumstances the District Court had, under Article 227 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, fourteen days for deciding on the applicant’s detention. Hence, the effect of the Basmanniy District Court’s decision of 26 December 2003 lasted until 6 April 2004.


50.  The Government continued by raising an argument of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. In their view, the following avenues could have provided the applicant with an effective protection of his rights: a complaint to the facility governor, a prosecutor, a court, the Ombudsman, the President of the Russian Federation, the Government, or the Russian Parliament. They drew the Court’s attention to three judgments of Russian courts allowing negligence claims by former inmates. In particular, in 2007, 2009 and 2010 courts in the Yaroslavl, Kaliningrad and Smolensk Regions had awarded damages to three inmates on account of the authorities’ failure to provide them with adequate medical assistance. Relying on a number of the Court’s judgments in cases concerning the alleged failure by detention authorities to render effective medical services to applicants, the Government further submitted that on a number of occasions the Court had already examined and dismissed complaints related to the quality of medical care in detention. They concluded by arguing that the applicant’s complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention were  <mask>.


98.  The applicants raised serious issues regarding the lack of independence, impartiality, and inadequacy of the investigation into the suspect death of V.P. The Court is not convinced by the Government’s assertion that these alleged shortcomings would amount to the degree of “arbitrariness” within the meaning of the Constitutional Court’s case-law. Indeed, the arguments similar to those raised by the applicants in the instant case were submitted to the Constitutional Court only on one occasion (see paragraph 62 above). In that case, the Constitutional Court, despite the applicant’s exhaustive complaint as to the independence of the Supervision Department, omitted to discuss that issue in its reasoning and rejected the complaint as  <mask>. The Government, for their part, did not put forward any submissions that would contest this conclusion. Thus, the Court is not persuaded that the Constitutional Court was likely to reach a different opinion on those issues in any proceedings which might have been initiated by the applicants. Moreover, even if the Government’s assertions were correct, the Court cannot see how the intervention of the Constitutional Court could have had any impact on the outcome of the investigations. Indeed, the alleged lack of independence and impartiality of the investigation is of a structural nature. Thus, even if the Constitutional Court had adopted a different approach in the instant case and had found that the decisions to discontinue the investigation were arbitrary, as the Government suggest, it would not have been capable to remedy the applicants’ situation.


42.  The Government held that the complaint was  <mask> and therefore inadmissible. In particular, the impugned decisions did not disclose bias as they were in accordance with the constant case-law of the Federal Social Court and the Federal Constitutional Court. By his unsubstantiated allegation concerning the judges' partiality, the applicant merely aimed at correcting the outcome of the impugned proceedings. If he had actually doubted the judges' impartiality, he would have lodged a motion for bias or requested the reopening of the proceedings on that account. In any event, he had accordingly failed to exhaust the domestic remedies in this respect.


48.  The applicant also complained of other violations of the Convention. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that they are  <mask> and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


65.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not appealed against his allegedly unlawful arrest and detention to a court. Therefore, he had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. If, however, the Court were to dismiss that objection, his complaint would still be inadmissible, being  <mask>. The Government constructed their arguments along two general lines. Firstly, they submitted that the police officers had rightfully arrested the applicant because he had refused to disclose his identity. The officers had acted in response to phone message no. 12316, which contained information on wanted criminals who looked similar to the applicant and his brother. Relying on section 11 of the Police Act, the Government stressed that police officers were entitled to check persons’ identity documents if there were sufficient grounds to suspect them of having committed a criminal or administrative offence. In their second line of argument, the Government stated that the applicant had been arrested because, by using offensive language in public, he had committed a minor disorderly act, that is to say, an administrative offence. Hence, by virtue of section 242 of the Administrative Code, he could be detained until his case was to be examined by a judge or a high-ranking police officer. The Government concluded that the applicant’s rights as guaranteed by Article 5 of the Convention had therefore not been violated.


16.  The applicant further complained about a violation of Article 4 § 1 of the Convention, referring to the fact that he was forced to work without receiving remuneration. The Court notes that the applicant performed his work voluntarily and his entitlement to payment has never been denied. The dispute thus involves civil rights and obligations, but does not disclose any element of slavery or forced or compulsory labour within the meaning of this provision (see Sokur v. Ukraine (dec.), cited above). In these circumstances, the Court considers that this part of the application must be rejected as being  <mask> pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


26.  The applicants disagreed with the Government and argued that under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code in force at the material time, the offence allegedly committed by the four police officers was within the category of offences which did not require an express complaint from the victim in order to trigger a criminal investigation by the Prosecutor’s Office. In any event, the second, third, fourth and fifth applicants had intended to intervene as victims after the formal initiation of criminal proceedings. However, they had not been able to do so because the Prosecutor’s Office had refused to initiate criminal proceedings and dismissed the complaints as  <mask> after a superficial preliminary investigation.


59.  The Government submitted that the proceedings in the applicant’s case had been conducted fairly and that the applicant had enjoyed all procedural guarantees under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant had been represented and his case heard at two instances before Medical Courts which had been independent and impartial. As regards the personal impartiality of the members of the Medical Courts, the Government argued that they had been impartial and that there was no proof to the contrary. Although the applicant had attempted to challenge the members of the Medical Court, this challenge had not included any specific complaint or evidence pointing to a lack of impartiality; it had thus been dismissed as  <mask>. The Government, referring to the Albert and Le Compte case (cited above), submitted that it had been necessary for the members of the Medical Courts to have expertise in medicine. They had been independent in exercising their functions and had followed the law and the Code of Ethics. Moreover, one judge sitting in the Supreme Medical Court had been appointed by the Supreme Court. The Government concluded that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.


193.  The applicant relied on Article 4 of the Convention, claiming that she had been subjected to forced labour during her imprisonment after the conviction. The Court observes that the applicant's situation is clearly justified under Article 4 § 3 (a) of the Convention, and therefore this complaint is  <mask> and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


62.  The Government invited the Court to find this part of the application  <mask>. They contended that the applicant had at her disposal options to submit a request to the President of the Zagreb Municipal Court or the Ministry of Justice to speed up the proceedings and a request pursuant to section 59(4) of the Constitutional Court Act. In the Government’s view these options constituted effective remedies in respect of the length of the proceedings in the applicant’s cases.


64.  The applicants referred to certain injuries and cigarette burns on the body of Ms Aleksandrovich which, in their view, constituted irrefutable evidence that she had been ill-treated in police custody with a view to extracting a confession. However, the medical experts who examined Ms Aleksandrovich’s body after her death made no mention of cigarette burns or of any injuries that could not have been caused by her lethal fall (see the medical reports of 10 June 2002 and 12 March 2004). The applicants did not corroborate their claims with written statements by any witnesses who may have seen those burns or injuries. Likewise, their claim that the medicine she had been given could have had a detrimental impact on her well-being appears to be conjecture without a solid basis in fact. In these circumstances, the Court is unable to detect any evidence of the alleged ill-treatment and considers that this complaint is  <mask> and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


45.  The applicant also complained under Articles 3 and 6 of the Convention that he had been ill-treated by policemen and that the domestic courts had erroneously assessed the evidence in his criminal case. The Court considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, those complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. Accordingly, the Court rejects them as  <mask>, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


44.  The Government recalled that the decision on the claim of the applicant’s son had become final on 30 January 2002 and argued that the applicant could have sought redress by means of a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution enacted with effect from 1 January 2002. They relied on the relevant practice of the Constitutional Court. In their view, the application was in any event  <mask>.


56.  The applicant also relied on Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention with respect to the enforcement proceedings. The Article 8 complaint was based on the applicant’s allegation that the judgment debt could have been used by him to ensure better treatment for his son, who had been suffering from leukaemia and had subsequently died, in March 2003. The Court notes that the applicant did not raise these complaints before the domestic courts. In any event, his allegations are unsubstantiated and do not lay a basis for an arguable claim of a breach of this provision. It follows that this part of the application is  <mask> too and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


112.  The Government further submitted that the applicants’ procedural complaint, insofar as it related to the independence of the investigation, had been  <mask>. Notably, the investigation had been carried out under the supervision of the General Prosecutor’s Office by a team of the investigators belonging to various entities. It resulted in the indictment of ten military servicemen, including five officers of General rank. Even following acquittals of some of the defendants by the court, the prosecution chose to appeal and to maintain the charges until the end of the proceedings. It was therefore not possible to discern either an objective or a subjective appearance of lack of independence or impartiality on the part of the investigative authorities.


153.  The applicant also complained of a violation of Article 14 taken with Articles 5 and 6. Having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within the Court’s jurisdiction, it finds that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that these complaints must be rejected as being  <mask>, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


213.  The Government reiterated that, in accordance with the Court’s case‑law, the obligation deriving from the procedural limb of Article 2 was one of means and not of result. In this regard, if some doubts had persisted concerning the events surrounding the applicant’s husband’s death, this was simply because there were always situations in which medical science was unable to predict, diagnose or explain. However, this was not in any way attributable to a lack of effort on the part of the domestic authorities. The Government therefore considered that the procedural obligations deriving from Article 2 of the Convention had been fulfilled in the present case. Accordingly, they called for the application to be rejected as inadmissible under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention, on the ground that it was  <mask>.


177.  The Government argued firstly that the appointment of a guardian did not involve a determination of the applicant’s civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against her. It followed that Article 6 was not applicable under that head. Were the Court to take a different view on the matter, the applicant’s complaint that she had not had an opportunity to be heard in person on the need for the appointment of a guardian was, nevertheless,  <mask>, for the reasons set out below.


112.  The applicant owed a significant amount in taxes, as established by final judicial decisions which had entered into force prior to the impugned events. The applicant’s complaint that those decisions were arbitrary was rejected by the former Commission as being  <mask> (see partial decision of 12 April 1996 in application no. 28411/95). While it appears that there was certain ambiguity as to whether the Passport Law or the relevant legislation on the residence of foreigners applied in respect of the travel ban imposed on the applicant (who had double citizenship until 2004), the Bulgarian courts examined in detail her arguments and dismissed them in reasoned decisions (see paragraphs 20-24 above). On the basis of the material before it, the Court is satisfied that the prohibition against the applicant leaving Bulgaria had legal basis in Bulgarian law.


45.  The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that because of his unlawful conviction, he had been obliged to pay an administrative fine and compensation to the victim. The Court cannot speculate on the outcome of the proceedings had the applicant’s case been examined in full compliance with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention. For these reasons, this part of the application should be dismissed as  <mask> within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.


63.  The Government maintained that the guarantees of Article 5 § 4 do not extend to proceedings before the Constitutional Court. Those proceedings were governed by different legal provisions from the proceedings before criminal courts. They were separate from and independent of proceedings before criminal courts and were of a specific nature, as they concerned alleged breaches of the applicant’s fundamental rights and freedoms. A complaint to the Constitutional Court could not be regarded as an ordinary remedy against criminal courts’ decisions related to the applicant’s detention. In any event, the Government considered this complaint to be  <mask>.


37.  The Government admitted that the complaint about the length of the execution proceedings was not  <mask>. They considered, however, that the applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings by insisting that the execution be carried out despite the fact that the debtor had had no property and by refusing to pay an advance on the costs of the execution.


42.  The Government’s main submission was that the application was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention in that Article 2 did not apply to the unborn child. They further submitted that the applicant had had a legal remedy capable of redressing her complaint, namely an action for damages against the hospital in the administrative courts. Accordingly, she had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In the alternative, they considered that the application should be rejected as being  <mask>.


75.  The Government argued that the applicant’s complaint relating to the conditions of his detention on the premises of the Cluj police station and in Gherla and Rahova Prisons should be dismissed as  <mask>. In this connection they pointed out that the applicant had benefitted from personal space in accordance with the CPT’s requirements of 4 sq m per person. Moreover, he had benefitted from special status as a vulnerable person. They acknowledged that just for one day, on 12/13 January 2012, the applicant had shared his cell with seven other detainees, but insisted that that situation had remained an isolated problem.


116.  The Government further submitted that the applicants’ procedural complaint, insofar as it related to the independence of the investigation, had been  <mask>. Notably, the investigation had been carried out under the supervision of the General Prosecutor’s Office by a team of the investigators belonging to various entities. It resulted in the indictment of ten military servicemen, including five officers of General rank. Even following acquittals of some of the defendants by the court, the prosecution chose to appeal and to maintain the charges until the end of the proceedings. It was therefore not possible to discern either an objective or a subjective appearance of lack of independence or impartiality on the part of the investigative authorities.


15.  The applicant complained about a violation of Article 4 § 1 of the Convention, referring to the fact that he had been forced to work without receiving remuneration. The Court notes that the applicant performed his work voluntarily and his entitlement to payment has never been denied. The dispute thus involves civil rights and obligations, but does not disclose any element of slavery or forced or compulsory labour within the meaning of this provision (see Sokur v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 29439/02, 26 November 2002). In these circumstances, the Court considers that this part of the application must be rejected as being  <mask> pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


43.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of the length of the second set of proceedings. The Court notes however that this case has been pending for three years and one month, the pre-trial investigation having taken up nearly two years of the total period (paragraphs 25-28 above). In view of the complexity of the case and the absence of any significant delay which may be attributed to the authorities, the Court considers that the “reasonable time” requirement has not been exceeded to date. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being  <mask> under Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


48.  The Government argued that the applicant’s claim was inadmissible because he had not exhausted the domestic remedies; specifically, he had not complained about the alleged ill-treatment to prosecutors. Alternatively, the Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint was  <mask>, in that he had failed to submit coherent and detailed proof of his ill-treatment to any domestic authorities or to the Court.


13.  The applicant next complained about a violation of Article 4 § 1 of the Convention, referring to the fact that he was forced to work without receiving remuneration. The Court notes that the applicant performed his work voluntarily and his entitlement to payment has never been denied. The dispute thus involves civil rights and obligations, but does not disclose any element of slavery or forced or compulsory labour within the meaning of this provision (see Sokur v. Ukraine (dec.), cited above). In these circumstances, the Court considers that this part of the application must be rejected as being  <mask> pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


51.  The applicant submitted various other complaints under Articles 3, 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (c), and 13 of the Convention. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application is  <mask> and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


31.  The applicant also complained under Article 10 of the Convention about the outcome of the proceedings. The Court observes in this connection that the impugned statement was not made by the applicant but by his political opponent. It follows that – the applicant’s own freedom of speech not having been at stake – the facts of the case do not give rise to any issue under Article 10 from the applicant’s perspective. This complaint is therefore  <mask> within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.


58.  The Government argued that the remainder of the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (that is, his complaint in respect of the period from 14 January 2008 to 14 September 2009) was  <mask>. However, the Court is satisfied that the complaint raises complex issues of fact and law, such that it cannot be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.


124.  The applicants argued that a constitutional appeal was an ineffective remedy and submitted one case in which a decision concerning an interim custody and contact order was challenged. The constitutional appeal was in this case rejected as  <mask> (decision number Up-498/08, 15 April 2008). In another case referred to by the applicants the constitutional court dismissed on procedural grounds a constitutional appeal concerning alleged inactivity of the court in proceedings concerning enforcement of an interim contact order. The Constitutional Court found that no constitutional appeal lay against a conduct or omissions, such as a court's inactivity, but only against legal acts issued by public authorities (decision number Up-1044/05, 21 December 2005).


49.  The Government further argued that the complaints were  <mask>: in their view, the periods of time from receipt of the necessary documents by the competent authorities to the effective payment of judicial awards had ranged between thirteen days and nine months and were thus reasonable in the light of the Court’s case-law. The Government blamed the applicant for having repeatedly withdrawn the writ of execution concerning the judgment of 17 April 2003 and consecutively sent it to different authorities. The judgment of 4 December 2003 was enforced only six months after its rectification on 9 March 2006. Finally, the judgment of 24 March 2006 was enforced in two steps: on 2 November 2006 in its major part and on 17 August 2007 for the remainder, namely only nine months after the partial execution.


59.  The Government objected that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as he had not formally requested, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitutional Court Act, that the Constitutional Court determine whether or not there had been a violation of Article 8 as a result of the length of the proceedings in issue. The applicant could have requested that the District Court issue an injunction pending the determination of his claim. There was no need to examine separately the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention which, in any event, was  <mask>.


55.  The Government submitted that the application should be dismissed as  <mask> for the applicant’s failure to exhaust domestic remedies and comply with the six-month time-limit. In particular, they pointed out that on 23 September 2008 the Karabulak District Court rejected the applicant’s complaint concerning the failure of the Karabulak investigating department to initiate an investigation into his nephew’s killing, and that the applicant, who had been duly informed of that decision, failed to either appeal against it or bring his complaint to the Court within six months of that date. The applicant’s assertion that he was not informed of the decision of 23 September 2008 was based solely on his lawyer’s statement to that effect. In any event, after having been informed of the decision to terminate proceedings in criminal case. 27520028 of 2 November 2007 or at the latest of the decision of 23 September 2008, the applicant should not have waited until 30 May 2009 to lodge his application with the Court.


45.  The Government maintained that Bosnia and Herzegovina could not be held responsible for the conduct of the High Representative (they relied on Berić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), nos. 36357/04 et al., ECHR 2007‑XII). They therefore invited the Court to declare this complaint inadmissible as being incompatible ratione personae. Even if the Court had jurisdiction ratione personae to deal with this complaint, the Government submitted that it was  <mask>. The Convention did not require that judges be appointed for their lifetime, as illustrated by Sramek v. Austria, 22 October 1984, Series A no. 84, in which the Court regarded appointment for a renewable period of three years as sufficient. Moreover, the international members of the State Court had been appointed as judges in their countries of origin by independent bodies and had been seconded to the State Court as a means of international assistance to war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina.


31.  The Government contested the applicant's argument. In their view, the applicant's complaints were  <mask>. First, the Government stressed that in April 2005 the applicant had received the flat in accordance with the judgment of 28 November 2001. Therefore, the judgment in his favour had been fully enforced. As to the delay in enforcing it, the Government pointed out that this had been explained by the need to provide housing for various groups of socially disadvantaged people, including other victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe. The Government argued that on two occasions the authorities had offered the applicant housing which he had not accepted.


62.  The Government raised an objection arguing that the applicants had not exhausted the domestic remedies available to them. The Court considers that the question whether the requirement that an applicant must exhaust domestic remedies has been satisfied in the instant case is closely linked to the complaint concerning the existence of an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. It therefore considers that this objection raised by the Government under Article 3 of the Convention should be joined to the merits of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. It further notes that this part of the applications is not  <mask> within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.


34.  The applicant further relied on Article 14 of the Convention (the prohibition on discrimination) without any further reasoning. The Court finds no indication whatsoever in the case-file which might disclose any appearance of a violation of this provision. The Court, therefore, rejects this part of the application, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, as being  <mask>.


27.  The Government contested the applicant's arguments. They indicate that he failed to follow the procedures provided for the enforcement of court decisions against the State. In particular, the applicant failed to send to the competent authority – the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation - certain documents, required by Decree no. 666 of 9 September 2002 (see the “Relevant domestic law” above). Therefore, the delay in execution of a judgment was the applicant's fault. The Government further alleged that “taking into account that Mr. A. E. Shvedov [the applicant] has not received the money due to him, in connection with his death, ... the heirs of the departed, in particular, Mr. A. A. Shvedov [the second applicant] can address for execution of the judicial decision by way of submitting the relevant documents to the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation”.  The Government concluded that the complaint about the non-enforcement of the court decision was  <mask>.


87.  The Government argued that the applicant’s complaint was  <mask>, being linked to the manifestly ill-founded complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. In any event, it had been open to the applicant to lodge a tort action with the Yakutsk Town Court and he had explored that avenue. The fact that the applicant’s action had been unsuccessful did not strip that avenue of its effectiveness.


26.  The Government next observed that that there were two sets of proceedings in the applicant's case: contentious and administrative proceedings. As to the contentious proceedings, they ended on 29 November 1999, more than six months before the application was lodged with the Court. As to the second set of proceedings, the Government considered that their length did not exceed a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, because it amounted to one year and four months. They considered therefore that these complaints should be rejected as being  <mask>.


30.  The applicant also referred to Article 17 of the Convention (the prohibition of an abuse of rights) without any reasoning. The Court finds no indication whatsoever in the case file which might disclose any appearance of a violation of this provision. The Court, therefore, rejects this part of the application, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, as being  <mask>.


98.  The Government submitted that the Court should reconsider its admissibility decision arguing that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, that she was no longer a victim of a violation of the Convention, that her application was out of time and, finally, that her complaints were  <mask>. The applicant rejected these submissions relying, inter alia, on the Chamber’s unanimous admissibility decision.


210.  The Government contested these arguments by disputing the admissibility of these complaints on three grounds. They argued that the applicant bank could not claim to be a victim of a breach of positive obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, that it had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, and that in any event the bank’s complaints were  <mask>.


174.  The Government also submitted that the applicants had failed to substantiate their arguments. In this context they referred to the Court’s decision in Lisnyy and Others v. Ukraine and Russia ((dec.), nos.  5355/15, 44913/15 and 50853/15, 5 July 2016). The Government argued that the applicants’ explanation that they had supposedly lost their title documents owing to the attack on their homes was not convincing since (i) the applicants had been warned ahead of time of the attack, (ii) some houses had been sold (so it follows that the owners did have the relevant title documents), (iii) copies of title documents could be obtained from State registries and archives, and (iv) in their civil claims lodged in the criminal case some applicants claimed very specific amounts (suggesting that they must have had some documents on which to base those claims). Accordingly, the Government considered that the applicants’ complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was  <mask>.


101.  The Government argued that the reasons given in the above two judgments were similar to the reasons put forward in the decisions refusing the applicant’s request to institute the so-called “auto-lustration” proceedings. They recalled that it was the national authorities that were charged with interpreting the internal law of a Contracting Party. The application to institute the “auto-lustration” proceedings was examined by two courts with full jurisdiction to assess the relevant facts and law. The applicant did not produce any evidence indicating that the relevant courts’ decisions had been arbitrary. In consequence, the Government maintained that the applicant’s complaint was  <mask> and that the applicant had failed to substantiate her complaint of a breach of Article 8 § 1.


10.  The applicant complained that the introduction of the 2001 Law, barring debt retrieval from State-owned enterprises, violated Article 17 of the Convention. The Court finds no evidence whatsoever in the case-file which might disclose any appearance of a breach of this provision. The Court, therefore, rejects this part of the application, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, as being  <mask>.


74.  The Government submited that the relocation of the courts from the non-controlled territory had not been discriminatory and was not aimed at restricting the rights of those who lived on those territories. On the contrary, the aim of the relocation had been to ensure the compliance of rights guaranteed by law for those who lived in the zone of the ongoing hostilities. Given the above, the Government stated that the above complaints should be rejected as  <mask>.


61.  The Government therefore concluded that the work the applicant had been required to perform was appropriate to his age and that the requirement to work was proportionate. Echoing the reasoning of the Federal Court (see paragraph 14 above), they submitted that a voluntary occupation would not achieve the desired objectives. Accordingly, the work the applicant had been required to perform came within the scope of Article 4 § 3 (a) of the Convention and did not constitute forced or compulsory labour within the meaning of Article 4 § 2 of the Convention. In the Government’s submission, therefore, the complaint alleging a violation of Article 4 was  <mask>.


65.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies in respect of his complaint under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention because he had not sought judicial review of the decision to determine his whereabouts and the decision to bring him before the investigator (see paragraphs 18 and 35 above). The Court does not need to address this argument. Given the short duration of the deprivations of liberty on 25 January and 25 December 2006, the applicant did not have time to “take proceedings” by which his release could be ordered. Thus, no issue arises in the circumstances under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. Accordingly, this complaint of the application is  <mask> and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


103.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 3 (c) and (d) that the criminal proceedings initiated against him on 18 July 2005 for forgery of documents had been unfair. The Court observes that a person may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he was acquitted or which were discontinued (see Osmanov and Husseinov v. Bulgaria (dec.), nos. 54178/00 and 59901/00, 4 September 2003). The Court notes that the proceedings against the applicant were discontinued on 17 May 2006 because the relevant limitation period had expired. The Court considers that in these circumstances the applicant can no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a fair trial. It follows that this complaint must be rejected as  <mask>, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


84.  The Government submitted that since the third, fourth and fifth applicants (X’s sister Y and the grandparents) had not been part of the domestic proceedings, and the application to the Court did not specify or substantiate that those applicants’ own rights had been violated, or that X and the grandparents had shared a “family life”, their complaints should be declared inadmissible under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention as  <mask> or for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.


26.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings in respect of her were not fair because she was not invited to participate at the hearings at which the courts decided her detention order. Since the proceedings in question did not concern the determination of a criminal charge against the applicant, the Court considers that the complaint is  <mask> pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, and declares it inadmissible.


198.  The applicant also submitted that the overall length of the criminal proceedings against her had exceeded the reasonable time requirement of Article 6 of the Convention. The Court reiterates that the period to be taken into consideration in determining the length of criminal proceedings begins with the day on which a person is “charged” within the autonomous and substantive meaning of that term and ends with the day on which a charge is finally determined or the proceedings are discontinued (see, among many other authorities, Kalashnikov, cited above, § 124). In the present case, the applicant was detained and questioned as an accused on 28 February 2000 and her conviction was upheld on appeal and became final on 23 May 2001. Thus the overall length of the proceedings at issue was less than fifteen months, during which period the applicant's case was examined at two levels of jurisdiction. The Court does not find such a length of the proceedings excessive within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It follows that this complaint is  <mask> and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


194.  The applicant made a number of further complaints under Articles 1, 3, 6, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the provisions invoked. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as  <mask>, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


57.  The Government put forward a two-fold argument submitting that the applicant’s complaint is both  <mask> and inadmissible due to his failure to exhaust domestic remedies. In particular, they insisted that the applicant, while having lodged numerous complaints with the detention facility administration and various executive authorities, had not taken “full advantage of the domestic remed[ies]”. In the Government’s opinion, a tort action against the detention facility could have provided the applicant with the desired relief in the form of “the restoration of his allegedly violated rights or compensation for non-pecuniary damage”. The Government supported their submission with a reference to two judgments issued by Russian courts in favour of former inmates who had obtained compensation for damage resulting from the inadequate conditions of their detention or ineffective medical care. Citing Resolution no. CM/ResDH(2010)35 adopted on 4 March 2010 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, they further stressed that there was a developing judicial practice in Russia “of awarding compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by poor detention conditions”.


64.  The Government put forward two lines of argument, insisting that the applicant, who had had a choice of effective remedies before him, had not exhausted them and, at the same time, arguing that the treatment provided to the applicant during the entire period of his detention corresponded to the highest standards. As to the first argument, the Government stressed that the applicant had not complained to a court that he was not receiving adequate medical assistance. The procedure for making claims before a court was established in Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as clarified by the Supreme Court’s Ruling no. 2 of 10 February 2009. Having relied on two cases examined by the Russian courts and the Court’s findings in the case of Popov and Vorobyev v. Russia (no. 1606/02, 23 April 2009), they submitted that it had also been open to the applicant to lodge a tort action claiming compensation for damage caused by allegedly inadequate medical assistance. Relying on Resolution no. CM/ResDH(2010)35 adopted at the 1078th Meeting of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the Government further noted that statistics and a number of cases presented to the Committee had demonstrated the developing practice of the Russian courts in awarding compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by unsatisfactory conditions of detention. In the Government’s opinion, the applicant’s failure to apply to a Russian court with a complaint had to be interpreted by the Court as his unwillingness to comply with the admissibility requirements set out by Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. The Government stressed that his complaint under Article 3 should therefore be dismissed for failure to exhaust domestic remedies and the complaint under Article 13 was obviously  <mask>.


28.  The applicant alleged that he was deprived of an income which would allow a decent standard of living. He relied in this connection on Article 2 § 1 of the Convention. The Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, neither Article 2 nor any other provision of the Convention can be interpreted as conferring on an individual a right to enjoy a particular standard of living (see, Wasilewski v. Poland (dec.), 32734/96, 20 April 1999). Moreover, the applicant has not shown that he suffers such destitution that his life is at risk. The Court, therefore, rejects this part of the application, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, as being  <mask>.


47.  The applicant also complained about being placed under house arrest. The Court considers that Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (the right to freedom of movement) is relevant in respect of this part of the application. However, the Court finds that the applicant has failed to show either the domestic unlawfulness of the measure, or that it was disproportionate in relation to the general interest, within the meaning of the above provision. Accordingly, this part of the application must also be rejected as being  <mask>, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


98.  The applicant argued that a constitutional appeal was an ineffective remedy and submitted one case in which a decision concerning interim access and custody had been challenged. The constitutional appeal had been rejected as  <mask> (decision no. Up-498/08, 15 April 2008). In another case referred to by the applicant the Constitutional Court had dismissed on procedural grounds a constitutional appeal concerning alleged inactivity of the court in proceedings concerning enforcement of an interim access order. The Constitutional Court found that a constitutional appeal did not lie against a conduct or omissions, such as a court’s inactivity, but only against legal acts issued by public authorities (decision no. Up-1044/05, 21 December 2005).


79.  The Government maintained that the guarantees of Article 5 § 4 do not extend to proceedings before the Constitutional Court. Those proceedings were governed by different legal provisions from the proceedings before criminal courts. They were separate from and independent of proceedings before criminal courts and were of a specific nature, as they concerned alleged breaches of the applicant’s fundamental rights and freedoms. A complaint to the Constitutional Court could not be regarded as an ordinary remedy against criminal courts’ decisions related to the applicant’s detention. In any event, the Government considered this complaint to be  <mask>.


50.  The Government argued that the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was  <mask>. Article 6 § 1 was not applicable to the proceedings at issue and thus the operation of the Foundation's bodies could not be examined under this provision. The Foundation's organs which dealt with the applicant's case had been established in accordance with section 19 of the GFA and the Agreement of 16 February 2001 between the German and the Polish Foundation. Section 19 of the GFA stipulated that the partner organisations were to create appeals organs which were independent and subject to no outside instruction. The Partnership Agreement contained further detailed regulations in this respect. In so far as the appeal procedure was concerned, the Polish Foundation operated within the legal framework provided for by the GFA and the Partnership Agreement.


119.  The Government submitted that this complaint was  <mask> and that the whole of the period of the applicant’s detention had been covered by orders issued by the competent court, the Vienna Regional Court, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. These decisions had been repeatedly and carefully examined by courts of higher instance, the Vienna Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, which had all concluded that the decisions given by the Regional Court had been issued in accordance with the law.


118.  The Government contended that the applicants’ complaint of a lack of a reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence of abuse of official authority was  <mask> in so far as the items of evidence that had been collected at the early stage of the investigation had been more than enough for the domestic courts to confirm the need to keep the applicant in pre-trial detention. They also stated that the court decisions in question had been properly reasoned.


16.  The applicants complained that the introduction of the 2001 Law, barring debt retrieval from the State-owned enterprises violated Article 17 of the Convention. The Court finds no evidence whatsoever in the case file which might disclose any appearance of a breach of this provision. The Court, therefore, rejects this complaint, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, as being  <mask>.


71.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not challenged the investigator’s decision of 31 December 2011 refusing to initiate a criminal investigation into the matter (see paragraphs 60 and 63 above). They therefore asserted that she had failed to exhaust effective domestic remedies before making her application to the Court, contrary to Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In the alternative, the Government contended that these complaints were  <mask>.


108.  The applicant accepted that he no longer faced a risk of deportation to Syria and the question of violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention taken alone was not as such in issue anymore. He submitted that his recognition as a refugee was in substance an acknowledgment by the Government that his deportation to Syria would have been in violation of these provisions. He stressed, however, that if it had not been for the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court by the Court he would have been deported by the authorities. In reply to the Government’s plea of non-exhaustion he maintained that he did not have an  <mask> at his disposal as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In this respect, the applicant pointed out, inter alia, that a recourse against a decision by the Reviewing Authority or against deportation and detention orders did not have automatic suspensive effect. Neither did an application for a provisional measure to suspend deportation made in the context of such proceedings. Lastly, the applicant argued that the scope of the recourse proceedings before the Supreme Court was too limited, as it did not entail an examination of the merits of the administrative decisions concerning asylum and deportation.


35.  The Government further submitted that, following the delivery of the Court's judgment in the case of Kudła v. Poland (application no. 30210/96, judgment of 26 October 2000), the applicant could have requested, with reference to Article 144 of the Constitution, that the domestic courts should apply the State Liability Act of 1969 in accordance with the requirement of an  <mask> under Article 13 of the Convention, as interpreted by the Court. In the Government's view, in such case the domestic courts would be obliged to compensate the applicant for non-pecuniary damage resulting from the protracted length of the proceedings.


195.  The Government further referred to the Court’s previous pilot judgments concerning the excessive length of proceedings and the lack of remedy in that respect, in particular to the cases of Finger v. Bulgaria (cited below), Rumpf v. Germany (no. 46344/06, 2 September 2010) and Vassilios Athanasiou and Others v. Greece (cited below). In their view, the circumstances which had given rise to the Court’s finding of a systemic problem in those judgments could not be compared to the instant case. In Finger the only existing domestic remedy had not met the Court’s standards as regards the possibility of accelerating the procedure and obtaining sufficient redress. In the remaining cases the domestic system had offered no  <mask>. In contrast, in Poland a remedy had been introduced and had been positively assessed by the Court. It operated effectively and enabled a party to expedite proceedings and receive sufficient compensation.


58.  The applicant further submitted that the arrest of Mr Apti Dalakov had not been planned appropriately to minimise the risk to his life in violation of the State’s positive duty to protect it. For instance, the FSB officers had failed to identify themselves, they were not in uniform, and their vehicle did not have official registration numbers. In addition, the FSB officers had aggressively refused to obey the orders of the police who had arrived at the crime scene and to identify themselves. The investigation of criminal case no. 27520028 had demonstrated that the authorities’ version of the events had been in contradiction to the statements collected by the investigators and the documents contained in the criminal case file. The investigation into Mr Apti Dalakov’s death was inadequate, as no criminal case was opened in connection with his killing, and criminal case no. 27520028 was terminated in spite of the investigator’s failure to take the necessary steps and comply with the supervisors’ orders (see paragraphs 27 and 30 above). The conclusions of that investigation were based solely on the statements given by the FSB officers implicated in the incident. The applicant further alleged that there was no  <mask> in his case under Article 125 of the Russian Criminal Procedure Code, as domestic judges had no right to prescribe which actions should be taken by the investigation.


116.  The applicant complained that she had not been able to initiate compensation proceedings against the State authorities in respect of the ill-treatment and death of her son in the army because of a jurisdictional conflict between the national civil and administrative courts. She therefore complained that she had been denied an  <mask> in respect of her complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. Although the applicant relied on Article 6 of the Convention, the Court considers, having regard to the substance of this complaint that it would be more appropriate to examine it from the standpoint of Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


23.  The Government invited the Court to reject the applicant’s complaint for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, claiming that in 2002 Section 63 of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court introduced an  <mask> in respect of the length of proceedings. On 2 February 2005 the Constitutional Court adopted a decision whereby it applied the reasonable time requirements in respect of the pending enforcement proceedings.


27.  The Government further submitted that “despite [the fact that] the Supreme Court, as a cassation instance, was the highest judicial authority in Azerbaijan, there was [a] higher judicial instance directly accessible to the applicant, [namely] the Constitutional Court”. The Government argued that, under domestic law, final decisions of the Supreme Court could be reviewed by the Constitutional Court. An individual application to the Constitutional Court constituted an ordinary remedy which the applicant had failed to exhaust. In this regard, the Government argued that, in Ramazanova and Others v. Azerbaijan (no. 44363/02, § 43, 1 February 2007), the European Court had recognised the Constitutional Court as an  <mask> for alleged violations of the rights and freedoms under the Convention.


90.  The Government submitted that should the Court conclude that for some of his complaints, the applicant did not have at his disposal an  <mask>, they would plead that his application had been filed outside the six-month time-limit. They observed that the period for filing the application had started to run on the date of the violation complained of, namely on 23 August 2011 when he had left the social care home and had been transferred to the Convalescent Home – Long-term Care Hospital. In any case it was on 27 September 2011 at the latest, when the applicant had been moved back to his flat in Prague. However, he did not introduce his application with the Court until 29 September 2012.


79.  The applicant stated that a complaint to the Court of Serbia and Montenegro, vaguely defined as it was, could not be considered an  <mask> in terms of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, and that, having complained to the President of the Municipal Court on 31 March 2003, she had not complained to the President of the District Court or the Ministry of Justice as this would only have resulted in additional delay and, in any event, could not have provided her with any effective redress. Finally, the applicant stated that Article 199 of the Obligations Act was irrelevant, as it concerned civil defamation primarily, and that a successful lawsuit based on Article 200 of the same Act could, at best and after years of litigation, have provided her with compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered, but could not have expedited the proceedings of which she complained.


169.  The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been ill-treated in police custody upon his arrest; under Article 6 that he had not been informed of the charges against him and had not been presumed innocent in that he was held in custody merely on the ground of the seriousness of the charges against him; that the tribunal which convicted him on 17 May 2004 had been unlawful; that two members of the Supreme Court had on several occasions participated in the review of his pre-trial detention and conviction at second instance and, therefore, could not have been impartial in their decisions. He further complained that the Supreme Court had not read out the full text of the appeal decision of 10 March 2005. Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 13 about the lack of an  <mask> with regard to the alleged violations.


110.  The Government observed that the right to an  <mask> was a procedural right which had to be linked to a possible violation of a substantive right under the Convention or the Protocols thereto. In paragraph 15 of its admissibility decision of 7 July 2015 the Court had found that “in the absence of an arguable complaint of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, the complaint under Article 13 is unsustainable”. The Government therefore argued that, since there had likewise, in their view, been no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 in the present case, no violation of Article 13 of the Convention could be found.


90.  The applicant also complained that there had been no grounds for his arrest on 13 October 2010. Furthermore, his arrest had been conducted in violation of the domestic law and he had been taken to the police station under a false pretext. He also complained that the domestic courts had not taken into account the time of his actual arrest and therefore he had spent an additional twenty-six hours in detention. The applicant maintained that the domestic legislation did not provide for compensation for unlawful detention in cases like his. He complained that he had had no  <mask> by which to challenge the lawfulness of his arrest and detention after the three-day period of administrative arrest had expired. He referred to Article 5 §§ 1 (a) and (c) and 5 and Article 13 of the Convention.


76.  The applicant submitted that the Ukrainian authorities’ recurrent failure to enforce domestic decisions delivered against the authorities or companies owned or controlled by the State and to introduce an  <mask> constituted a systemic problem. He referred to several cases raising similar issues which had already been determined with final effect by the Court, including Svintitskiy and Goncharov v. Ukraine (no. 59312/00, 4 October 2005); Mikhaylova and Others v. Ukraine (no. 16475/02, 15 June 2006); Aleksandr Shevchenko v. Ukraine (no. 8371/02, 26 April 2007); Kolesnik v. Ukraine (no. 20824/02, 10 April 2008); Maydanik v. Ukraine (no. 20826/02, 10 April 2008); and Tishchenko v. Ukraine (no. 33892/04, 25 September 2008).


31.  The applicant replied that an appeal to the Constitutional Court was not an  <mask> for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention as it lacked automatic suspensive effect. He referred to Čonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, ECHR 2002‑I; Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, no. 25389/05, ECHR 2007‑II; and Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, no. 30471/08, ECHR 2009‑....


137.  The applicants maintained that the State had not demonstrated that an  <mask> was available to any of them and they were not required to initiate ineffective actions simply to clarify facts. They underlined that it was not the law, but the State’s interpretation of the law, which was overly restrictive. In addition, only remedies which could intervene prior to any necessary abortion could be considered effective.


96.  The Government pointed out at the outset that the applicant had lodged his appeal against the judgment of the Zamokvoretskiy District Court outside a ten-day time-limit set out in the domestic law. However, the domestic courts granted an extension of the period for introduction of the grounds of appeal. They examined the appeal against the refusal to grant the applicant refugee status. Furthermore, the applicant made use of the procedure for challenging the extradition order by the Prosecutor General. In each set of the proceedings, his arguments were examined by the courts at two levels of jurisdiction. Therefore, the applicant had an  <mask> in respect of his complaint under Article 3 and was able to make use of it.


197.  The applicant further submitted that neither could she exercise her right to an  <mask> through other persons. As concerns her guardian, who was her legal representative in accordance with the law, this remedy had been purely discretionary. More importantly, it was difficult to conceive how this remedy could have worked with regard to complaints challenging decisions taken by the guardian him, her or itself on the applicant’s behalf, such as the decision to hospitalise the applicant in the institution, or the decision by the Kėdainiai Home to restrict visitors’ access to the applicant.


31.  The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that she had been subjected to acts of police brutality which had caused her great physical and mental suffering amounting to torture, inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment. She also complained under the same provision, taken together with Article 13 of the Convention, that the Greek investigating and prosecuting authorities had failed to carry out an effective and impartial official investigation into the incident which could have led to the identification and punishment of the police officers responsible. The applicant therefore claimed that she had been denied an  <mask> for her sufferings.


60.  The Government further noted that although the issue of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted is normally to be determined in view of the date when the applications were lodged, exceptions could be justified in the specific circumstances of a given case (see, for example, Baumann v. France, no. 33592/96, § 47, ECHR 2001-V (extracts); Brusco v. Italy, (dec.), no. 69789/01, ECHR 2001-IX; and Nogolica v. Croatia (dec.), no. 77784/01, 5 September 2002; see also Marinković, cited above, where, according to the Government, the Court held that, in the context of socially owned companies, a constitutional appeal should be considered as an  <mask> as of 22 June 2012).


56.  The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the respondent State had failed to enforce a final and enforceable decision of 16 May 1994 rendered in his favour and that he had been unable to obtain payment of the difference between the pension actually paid to him and the pension for the period between September 1990 and December 1993 as awarded to him by that decision. The applicant also complained under Article 13 that he had had no  <mask> by which he could have had the 1994 decision enforced.