17.  The applicant complained that the continued non-enforcement of the judgments of 11 January and 14 December 1999 and that of 6 June 2000 violated his right of access to a court enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention and his right to  <mask> guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


64.  The applicants have thus had to bear an individual and excessive burden which has upset the fair balance that should be maintained between the demands of the general interest on the one hand and protection of the right to the  <mask> on the other. There has therefore been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


20.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of the judgment of 5 July 2002, as amended on 20 January 2003, violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles, in so far as relevant, provide as follows:


14.  The applicants complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of their respective awards provided for in the judgments of 7 August 2000 and of 22 January 2001 violated their “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and their right to the  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles in so far as relevant provide as follows:


37.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the judgment of 2 October 2003, as upheld on 26 February 2004, by means of the legality review procedure had violated his right to a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the  <mask> under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read:


9.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of the judgment of 24 December 2001 violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles in so far as relevant provide as follows:


55.  The Government criticised the Chamber judgment, considering it methodologically inappropriate and legally incorrect to confuse compensation for an expropriation and the court fees to be paid. Referring to the dissenting opinion attached to the judgment (see paragraph 5 above), the Government considered that the Chamber's conclusions confused two legally different things: “the credit and the debt, [which were] two completely separate things”. The Government gave the example of a situation where a creditor lodged a claim to recover a certain sum, and the debtor filed a counter claim for a sum higher than that claimed by the creditor; if the court allowed the counterclaim, the creditor would receive nothing and, in addition, would have to pay the costs, without there being, the Government argued, any interference with the  <mask>.


36.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the final judgment of 17 December 2001, as upheld on appeal on 19 February 2002, made in his favour violated his “right to a court” and his right to  <mask>. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions are cited above.


97.  The Government questioned whether there could have been an interference with the right to  <mask> in a situation where the State had in no way restricted the owners’ acquired rights, but, on the contrary, the owners themselves had entirely voluntarily entered into the existing tenancy relationships as the original owner-landlord with full knowledge of the regulations on tenancy agreements as valid at that time. In the Government’s opinion, the new owners had thus, in a way, waived their right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions in so far as their ownership rights had been restricted at the time when they had voluntarily acquired them. Nor could the owners have any specific legitimate expectation that in the future the restriction of their ownership rights would be abolished as regards rent control.


16.  The applicant complained that he had been unable to enforce the judgment in his favour owing to the domestic court’s refusal to provide him with a copy of the said judgment. He further alleged that the non‑enforcement of this judgment had violated his right to  <mask>. In this connection, he invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


12.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the final judgment of 16 October 2002 made in his favour had violated his “right to a court” and his right to  <mask>. He also complained that he had been deprived of his right to effectively participate in the supervisory-review hearing. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


18.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2001 violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles in so far as relevant provide as follows:


9.  The applicants complained that the quashing of the final judgments made in their favour violated their “right to a court” and their right to  <mask>. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


25.  The applicants’ entitlement to receive a flat arose in 1986 and such flat was provided to them in 2006 (see paragraphs 6 and 12 above), namely twenty years later, fourteen of which, after 7 September 1992 when the Convention entered into force for Bulgaria, within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction. In the earlier similar cases the Court found that comparable delays, seen together with the authorities’ passive attitude, the long periods of uncertainty endured by the applicants and the lack of effective domestic remedies for rectifying the situation, meant that the applicants had been made to bear a special and excessive burden which had upset the fair balance between the demands of the public interest and protection of the right to  <mask> (see Kirilova and Others, §§ 108‑23, Lazarov, §§ 30-32, and Antonovi, § 30, all cited above). The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case.


22.  The Government, in their memorandum of 20 February 2006, admitted that the judgment of 28 November 2003, as upheld on appeal on 14 January 2004, and the judgment of 6 December 2004 were not fully enforced within a reasonable time, which violated the applicant's right to  <mask>. At the same time, in a letter of 10 July 2007, they argued that the applicant's rights were not violated as the decisions in his favour had eventually been fully enforced.


152.  The applicant considered that the authorities had acted unlawfully. To begin with, all the administrative decisions implementing the measures for controlling the use of her property, notably those allocating flats to A.Z. and W.P. and subjecting the house to State management, had in 1996-1997 been declared as having been issued contrary to Polish law. Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 an interference by the State with the  <mask> – be it an expropriation or control of the use of property – could not be regarded as lawful if the relevant decision had been made contrary to the existing legal provisions.


15.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non‑enforcement of the judgment of 20 January 2000 as upheld on 6 April 2000 in his favour violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the  <mask> as provided in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. These Articles, in so far as relevant, read as follows:


27.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the act of quashing of the final judgment of 15 July 2002, as amended on 12 September 2002, had violated her “right to a court” and her right to  <mask>. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


25.  The applicant complained that delayed enforcement of the judgments of 19 March 2001, 28 May 2002, 16 June and 10 October 2003 violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. These Articles in so far as relevant provide as follows:


13.  The applicants complained that they had been unable to enforce the judgments in their favour owing to the domestic court’s refusal to provide them with copies of the said judgments. They further alleged that the non-enforcement of those judgments had violated their right to  <mask>. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which read as follows:


13.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of the judgment of 5 January 2000 violated her “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and her right to the  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles in so far as relevant provide as follows:


15.  The applicants complained that the quashing of the final judgments made in their favour violated their “right to a court” and their right to  <mask>. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


14.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the quashing of the final judgment of 14 January 2002, as confirmed on 1 April 2002, had violated his right to a fair trial and his right to  <mask>. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


72.  The Government were of the opinion that the applicants had obtained full redress for any delays in securing possession of the property restored to them. Therefore, there had been no interference with their  <mask> for which the Government could have been held responsible. Although the applicants’ property had remained for a time in the possession of the public company, their rights had been safeguarded by the civil law and they had already obtained redress at the domestic level.


48.  The applicant complained that the failure on the part of domestic authorities to enforce the final judgment taken by the Astrakhan Regional Court on 14 December 1999 violated his right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to a  <mask> under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. These Articles, in so far as relevant, provide as follows:


27.  The applicants complained that their right to  <mask> had been violated because of the domestic authorities’ continuing failure to decide on the expropriation of their plot of land and their consequent inability to make use of their property during that period. They relied on Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which read as follows:


36.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the renewal of the time-limit for an ordinary appeal after a considerable lapse of time and the consecutive quashing of the judgment of 5 October 2001 had violated the principle of legal certainty and unlawfully prolonged the judicial proceedings. He further complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention of an interference with his right to the  <mask>. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


91.  The Government considered that the interference complained of was lawful, pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate in the circumstances of the case. They submitted that the right to  <mask> was not absolute and that certain restrictions were permissible. The restrictions in the present case were based on the general interest, namely protection of the natural environment. The Government further submitted that the property in question had been classified as “farmland” when the applicant bought it and that it had never been designated for construction purposes, even before the creation of the Wigry National Park and the adoption of the local development plan of 1994. Consequently, the Government invited the Court to find the present application manifestly ill‑founded.


41.  The applicant replied that the Government's reference to the Baneković case in support of their argument that the present complaint was incompatible ratione materiae was rather superficial. In that case the Court had not held, as the Government suggested, that employment disputes between the authorities and public servants were excluded “from the scope of the (entire) Convention” but only from the scope of Article 6 § 1 thereof. For that reason, in the Baneković case the Court had declared inadmissible, as incompatible ratione materiae, the applicant's complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The present complaint however concerned the right to  <mask> guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


12.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of their respective awards provided for in the judgments of 10 October 2000 violated their “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and their right to the  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles in so far as relevant provide as follows:


11.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of the judgments of 7 June 2001 and of 27 September 2002 violated her “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and her right to the  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles in so far as relevant provide as follows:


20.  The applicant contended that the Department’s refusal to execute the contract in full, and the domestic courts’ refusal to enforce the impugned clause, have denied him his right to the  <mask>, and have deprived him of those possessions, contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He alleged that the disputed term of the contract was lawful and had created a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The delay in the execution of the contract, unchallenged by the respondent Government, had caused him substantial financial loss.


27.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of the judgment of 10 December 2001, as amended on 31 July 2003, violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles, in so far as relevant, provide as follows:


23.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of the judgments taken on 4 December 1998, 11 March 1999, 27 April 2000 and 29 November 2002 respectively in his favour violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles in so far as relevant provide as follows:


9.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2001 violated her “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and her right to the  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles in so far as relevant provide as follows:


45.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the judgment of 9 October 2001 in his favour, as upheld on 26 December 2001, by way of supervisory review violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the  <mask> under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He further complained that he had not been informed of the date of the supervisory instance hearing and that the domestic courts had allowed the Bank’s request for restoration of the time‑limit for lodging the supervisory review complaint in breach of the domestic law requirements. Relevant Convention provisions read as follows:


42.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of the judgment of 18 October 1999 and the decision of 22 October 2001 violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol  No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles in so far as relevant provide as follows:


20.  The applicants pointed out, firstly, that the Ministry's application for supervisory review had been lodged on 9 June 2004, that is more than a year after the judgments in their favour had become legally binding on 23 April 2003, whereas Article 376 of the Code of Civil Procedure established a one-year time-limit for lodging an application for supervisory review. Secondly, the interim decisions of 30 September and 14 October 2004 contradicted each other. Furthermore, the Presidium did not indicate any compelling reasons for quashing the final judgments in their favour. The applicants considered that the quashing of final judgments had irremediably impaired the principle of legal certainty and violated their right to  <mask>.


39.  The applicant argued that on the basis of the Koprivnica Municipal Court's decision on recognition of the final judgment of the Titograd Court of First Instance of 15 October 1991, he had acquired an undisputed and outstanding claim for damages against the companies C.O. and P., that is to say a pecuniary right. By refusing to enforce that judgment, the Croatian courts had prevented him from realising his acquired pecuniary right, thereby violating his right to  <mask> protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


14.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the final judgment of 11 March 2001 had violated his “right to a court” and his right to  <mask>. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


17.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the judgment of 9 February 2007 by way of supervisory review proceedings had violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the  <mask> under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


69.  The Government submitted that there had not been any interference with the applicants’  <mask> for which the Government could be held responsible under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They further submitted that “although it took some time until the compensation was paid to the applicants, their rights were safeguarded by the civil law and they have already obtained redress at the domestic level for any negative consequences”. The Government did not dispute that the payment of the compensation had been delayed. However, in their view it had not led to increased financial loss for the applicants.


39.  The Government submitted that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention was not applicable to the present case because the case concerned a civil-law dispute between private parties. In this connection the Court first reiterates that while such disputes do not themselves engage the responsibility of the State under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see Zagrebačka banka d.d. v. Croatia, no. 39544/05, § 250, 12 December 2013, and case-law cited therein), this does not mean that the Article in question is inapplicable to that type of dispute. If court decisions in such disputes are arbitrary or otherwise manifestly unreasonable they would constitute a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (ibid.). If they are not, then those decisions do not amount to an interference with the right to  <mask> (ibid., § 252, and see also the case-law cited therein). In either case, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 remains applicable. Consequently, the Government’s objection as to the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has to be dismissed.


11.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the final judgment of 25 December 2002, as upheld on appeal on 17 February 2003, made in her favour had violated her “right to a court” and her right to  <mask>. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


39.  The Government maintained that the procedures available under domestic law afforded a sufficient remedy to ensure protection of the right to  <mask>. In particular, the relevant legislation provided for the payment of full compensation to be determined by the courts. Since the applicants had failed to lodge their applications within the statutory time-limits, it was their own fault that they did not receive any compensation. The Government identified three periods of inactivity attributable to the applicants: from 1941 to 1951, from 1951 to 1959 and from 1961 to 1971. In their submission, the applicants must have been sufficiently aware of the risk they ran by neglecting the proceedings for long periods. The requirement of proportionality had therefore been satisfied.


16.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the final judgment of 22 February 2002 made in his favour violated his “right to a court” and his right to  <mask>. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


44.  The Government first submitted that the house had been demolished at a time when it clearly belonged to the applicant. They admitted that the demolition of the house meant that the applicant had been deprived of her  <mask> within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. However, they contended that this deprivation had been justified under the terms of that Article for the following reasons.


50.  The Government further submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask>, in the form of control of use, had been lawful since the plot of land in question was federal property. The applicant’s garage situated on it was found, for the reasons outlined above, to be an unauthorised construction, and the legal consequences outlined in the domestic law for unauthorised constructions had been applied by the domestic courts. The documents provided by the applicant in support of his application (see paragraphs 7, 8 and 10 above) were incapable of disproving that garage no. 169 had been constructed without authorisation. The fact that the local administration had certified the garage as ready for use did not confirm the existence of permission by the competent federal authorities to use the plot of land in question for the construction of garages. Such permission had been required given that the owner of the plot was the Russian Federation and not the City of Moscow.


40.  The applicant alleged that towards the end of 1993, gendarmes had raided his village and that his home and  <mask> had been destroyed. He requested the Court to find that the destruction of his property and the failure to carry out an effective investigation by the authorities engaged the responsibility of the respondent State under Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14 and 18 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and that each of these Articles had been violated.


27.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of the judgment of 10 December 2001, as amended on 31 July 2003, violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles, in so far as relevant, provide as follows:


46.  The applicants could continue to utilise their  <mask> and, although it became more difficult to sell their property on account of the use of part of their land as the school yard, the possibility of selling or renting it remained. Indeed, it appears from the letter of the local mayor that the applicants’ house is currently rented out (see paragraph 21 above).


38.  The Government admitted that there had been an interference with the applicant's right to peaceful enjoyment of her  <mask> when the police authorities impounded her vehicle. However, they went to argue that this measure amounted to the control of use of property and that the interference was justified under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In the alternative, should a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention be found, the Government invited the Court to find that it was unnecessary to examine the applicant's complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (Zanghì v. Italy, judgment of 19 February 1991, Series A no. 194-C, p. 47, § 23).


24.  The Government argued that the applicant had not had a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. He had obtained “MRT” roubles through a purchase contract which could not be considered valid since its object was items banned from circulation in Moldova. This had been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Justice. Moreover, the applicant could not have had a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining a property right over such banknotes, as they were banned from circulation, being considered “unlawful items”. The case was similar to Agneessens v. Belgium (no. 12164/86, Commission decision of 12 October 1988, Decisions and Reports 58, p.81), where the Commission had found that “there can be no deprivation of  <mask> if a conditional claim lapses as a result of non-fulfilment of the condition”. Moreover, the case was somewhat similar to Handyside v. the United Kingdom (7 December 1976, § 63, Series A no. 24), in which the British authorities had seized the book printed for the applicant in order to protect the morals of others. In the present case, the Moldovan authorities had been protecting the sovereignty of the country, which was undermined by actions taken by “MRT” such as issuing banknotes other than the only currency recognised in Moldova, the Moldovan leu. To accept the applicant’s request to export the banknotes outside Moldova would be tantamount to officially recognising the possibility that “MRT”-issued banknotes could be put into circulation. This was unlawful and unacceptable.


34.  The applicant complains that, by quashing the final judgment of 30 May 1994 which recognised his right to be compensated for the expense of building a new house, there has been an unlawful interference with his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask>. He refers to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which in so far as relevant provides:


34.  The applicant complained that non-enforcement of the judgments of 19 June 2000, 14 March 2001 and 28 May 2002 violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol  No. 1. These Articles in so far as relevant provide as follows:


79.  The applicants submitted that they had had a legitimate expectation that they would receive the full amount of their pensions, based on the contributions they had been required to make throughout their employment. After the entry into force of paragraph 6(1) of the transitional and concluding provisions of the Social Security Code 1999, they had expected that the cap on the maximum amount of pension would be lifted on 31 December 2003 and that from that date on they would receive the full amount of their pensions. The ensuing postponement of the lifting of the cap had accordingly amounted to an interference with their  <mask>.


56.  The applicants contended that the complete prohibition on fishing species other than salmon and sea trout from 1 May to 5 July 1997 was arbitrary and unjustified. In the coastal waters other species than salmon could well be fished without jeopardising the salmon stock. This prohibition, for which the applicants received no compensation, prevented them from exercising their profession and enjoying their  <mask>. Nor was a complete prohibition required by the Frontier Rivers Agreement. The restrictions imposed on the Swedish side and particularly in the Kalix river, while not as lengthy and far-reaching as those imposed on the applicants' waters, had successfully ensured the fish stocks without placing an excessive burden on the holders of the fishing. The restrictions on the fishing of salmon and trout were likewise excessive with a view to safeguarding the stocks. The restrictions applied at the period when it was possible to benefit from their possessions and nearly all their value had been lost.


17.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the judgment of 9 February 2007 by way of supervisory review proceedings had violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of  <mask> under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


51.  The Government further noted that some applicants had shared properties and that it had not been proved that their co-owners had agreed to the partition of the  <mask>. Nor, when claiming damages based on the assumption that the properties had been rented after 1974, had the applicants shown that the rights of the said co-owners under domestic law had been respected.


64.  The applicants have thus had to bear an individual and excessive burden which has upset the fair balance that should be maintained between the demands of the general interest on the one hand and protection of the right to the peaceful enjoyment of  <mask> on the other. There has therefore been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


39.  The applicant argued that on the basis of the Koprivnica Municipal Court's decision on recognition of the final judgment of the Titograd Court of First Instance of 15 October 1991, he had acquired an undisputed and outstanding claim for damages against the companies C.O. and P., that is to say a pecuniary right. By refusing to enforce that judgment, the Croatian courts had prevented him from realising his acquired pecuniary right, thereby violating his right to peaceful enjoyment of  <mask> protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


71.  The Government first argued that since Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was limited to enshrining the right to the peaceful enjoyment of already existing  <mask>, the applicants could not rely on any exceptional grounds affording them a right to fish salmon and sea trout independently of the State's limited right in rem. Accordingly, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was inapplicable.


26.  The applicants sought reparation for the pecuniary damage they had sustained, which they calculated as follows: 60,000,000 Italian lire (ITL) [30,987.41 euros (EUR)], the sum being the loss of rent for the period from December 1993 (first attempt of the bailiff) to March 2000 (when the applicants recovered  <mask> of their flat). However, they left the matter to be assessed by the Court in an equitable manner given the impossibility to exactly determine the loss of rent.


57.  The applicant complained that there had been an interference with his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask> within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, in that the overall amount of expropriation compensation awarded by the domestic courts did not correspond, in his opinion, to the real value of the expropriated property. He submitted, inter alia, that Turkish legislation did not enable him to obtain adequate compensation, in the absence of legal criteria for determining the value of buildings making up the country's cultural and historical heritage, such as the one which he formerly owned.


54.  The Government conceded that the obligation to tolerate hunting, which ran counter to the applicant’s convictions, had interfered with his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Nevertheless, they pointed out that in Germany – in contrast to the situation in France and Luxembourg, where hunting rights were transferred completely to the hunting associations – the landowner remained the holder of the hunting rights and was thus not deprived of any  <mask>. He merely had to cede the right to practise hunting. Privately owned land, which was limited in quantity, had a particular social relevance which entitled the legislature to limit its use in the general interest.


30.  The applicant submitted that his complaint was directed at the application of the law itself, viewed in the light of reasonableness and proportionality, and that the amount of rent was thus of secondary importance. According to the applicant, for the RRB to have jurisdiction and competence, the owner must have accepted as a precondition that the act depriving him of his  <mask> respected his fundamental rights. This was not so in the present case. A decision by the RRB regarding the rent would be futile if the act of deprivation was found to be null and void. Moreover, it was established by law that the amount of rent the RRB could grant could not exceed MTL 180 (approximately EUR 420). The applicant further submitted that the second remedy proposed by the Government, was not applicable to the present proceedings, according to section 12(3) of the Housing Decontrol Ordinance (see paragraph 24 above). However, even if it were, it appeared from domestic case-law that such proceedings did not generally have prospects of success. The applicant argued that it was for the Government, who were better placed to acquire the relevant information, to prove that any other property owned by a tenant was fit for use as accommodation. The burden of proof should not be on the owner, who generally did not have the relevant knowledge to make such allegations.


20.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of the judgment of 5 July 2002, as amended on 20 January 2003, violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles, in so far as relevant, provide as follows:


37.  The applicant complained that the renewal of the time-limit for appeal and the subsequent quashing of the final judgment of 8 June 2001 had violated the principle of legal certainty and the peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask>. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which, in so far as relevant, read as follows:


25.  The applicants’ entitlement to receive a flat arose in 1986 and such flat was provided to them in 2006 (see paragraphs 6 and 12 above), namely twenty years later, fourteen of which, after 7 September 1992 when the Convention entered into force for Bulgaria, within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction. In the earlier similar cases the Court found that comparable delays, seen together with the authorities’ passive attitude, the long periods of uncertainty endured by the applicants and the lack of effective domestic remedies for rectifying the situation, meant that the applicants had been made to bear a special and excessive burden which had upset the fair balance between the demands of the public interest and protection of the right to peaceful enjoyment of  <mask> (see Kirilova and Others, §§ 108‑23, Lazarov, §§ 30-32, and Antonovi, § 30, all cited above). The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case.


126.  The Government submitted that the revoking of the licence did not constitute deprivation of  <mask>, but was a control of the use of property. They further argued that that interference was lawful and sought to safeguard an important public interest: the stability of the banking system. The interference was also proportionate to the attainment of that aim. Both conditions for withdrawing the licence were satisfied.


45.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the judgment of 9 October 2001 in his favour, as upheld on 26 December 2001, by way of supervisory review violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of  <mask> under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He further complained that he had not been informed of the date of the supervisory instance hearing and that the domestic courts had allowed the Bank’s request for restoration of the time‑limit for lodging the supervisory review complaint in breach of the domestic law requirements. Relevant Convention provisions read as follows:


48.  The Government further argued that the applicant should have lodged a claim before a civil court, claiming damages against either the State Treasury or the municipality for the interference with his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask>. Had a civil court found against him, he could also have lodged a constitutional complaint, challenging the provisions of the Local Planning Act 1994 which were applied to his case.


34.  The applicant noted that the State had positive obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Kotov v. Russia [GC], no. 54522/00, §§ 109-113, 3 April 2012). He further asserted that the failure to adopt the necessary legal mechanisms with a view to implementing section 43 of the Mining Act had constituted an interference with his right to peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask> because his right to be exempt from electricity and gas payments had been breached.


39.  The Government further noted that some applicants had shared properties and that it was not proved that their co-owners had agreed to the partition of the  <mask>. Nor, when claiming damages based on the assumption that the properties had been rented after 1974, had the applicants shown that the rights of the said co-owners under domestic law had been respected.


42.  The Government argued that under the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention ownership was not ius infinitum. A State had the right to enact such laws as it deemed necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. The forfeiture of the arms held without a licence had amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask>. It had served the public interest as it had been ordered in order to safeguard public safety and to control the possession of arms by individuals. All States were entitled to control access to weapons as a fundamental power vested in them on the strength of their sovereignty. They were also under a positive obligation to ensure safety by way of licensing the possession of weapons. The States enjoyed a margin of appreciation in this regard. Under the Court’s case-law the scope of this margin varied depending on the issue concerned in a case. The State’s margin of appreciation in issues concerning arms control was particularly wide. A requirement to obtain a licence to possess weapons fell within the State’s margin of appreciation and could not be regarded as imposing an excessive individual burden on the applicant. The licensing system would be illusory if it was not attended by criminal sanctions or by the possibility to order forfeiture of illegally possessed arms.


47.  The Government further submitted that even assuming that the applicants had an existing possession or a legitimate expectation and that the Supreme Court of Cassation’s judgment of 12 December 2007 had amounted to interference with their  <mask>, that interference had been in the public interest and proportionate because the applicants had been entitled to compensation under the 1997 Act. The fact that, although knowing that restitution was impossible, they had failed to avail themselves of that opportunity within the statutory time-limit could not be attributed to the authorities.


36.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the final judgment of 17 December 2001, as upheld on appeal on 19 February 2002, made in his favour violated his “right to a court” and his right to peaceful enjoyment of  <mask>. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions are cited above.


28.  The applicant complained that the quashing under supervisory review procedure of the judgment of 29 August 2000 and the consequent quashing of the judgment of 5 December 2002 violated his right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask> guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


92.  The applicant concluded, referring to the case of Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden (23 September 1982, Series A no. 52), that in her case, having regard to its circumstances seen as a whole, a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised by measures depriving her of her  <mask> had not been respected.


62.  The Government admitted that there had been an interference with the applicant's right to peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask> when the domestic authorities had allowed V.P. to use his property. They argued that this measure amounted to control of use of property and that it was not disputed that the interference had been based on law and had been in the general interest. As to proportionality, the State had been amending the relevant legislation as the circumstances and the need for the control of possessions had been changing. Namely, the legislation granting rather extensive powers to temporary occupants at the beginning had been amended over time to benefit the owners. Therefore, the interference had met the conditions of the extraordinary post-war situation and had not placed an excessive individual burden on the applicant.


42.  The applicant highlighted that the enjoyment of his  <mask> had been severely restricted. Firstly, he could not resume possession of his property (except in extreme circumstances which were difficult to attain). Secondly, he could not charge a fair rent, as the law only provided for it to be doubled every fifteen years, which did not reflect increases in the property market (which, as an example, had increased by more than 40% over the seven-year period between 2004 and 2011).


24.  The applicant complained that the municipal council’s failure, for nine and a half years, to fully comply with the final judgment in her favour had been in breach of her right to a court under Article 6 § 1 and of her right to peaceful enjoyment of her  <mask> under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which read respectively as follows:


46.  The applicants considered that they had a possession provided for by domestic law that fell within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Their right to a pension had been based on the salaries they had earned; however, because of Law no. 296/06 that right had been denied to people like the applicants who had worked in Switzerland. While it was true that the Italo–Swiss Convention had provided for the possibility for the State to enact specific norms regulating the matter, norms which totally reshaped the law to the detriment of the applicants had only come into being thirty-eight years after the adoption of that Convention. By that time, in the absence of a lex specialis, the rights in question had matured and become part of the applicants’ patrimony in accordance with the applicable general laws. Thus, the new law had interfered with the applicants’ peaceful enjoyment of their  <mask>, in an arbitrary and radically unjustified manner, drastically reducing their pensions. They further considered the interference to be discriminatory and aimed solely at those people who had worked abroad, particularly in Switzerland.


47.  The Government further noted that some applicants had shared properties and that it was not proved that their co-owners had agreed to the partition of the  <mask>. Nor, when claiming damages based on the assumption that the properties had been rented after 1974, had the applicants shown that the rights of the said co-owners under domestic law had been respected.


84.  The applicant maintained that the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996, upheld by the courts, amounted to a control of the use of his  <mask>, within the meaning of the aforementioned Article. He considered the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996 illegal, submitting that its legal basis had been removed by Law no. 51/1995; that the UAR was no longer competent, according to the provisions of the aforementioned law at that time, to annul his registration with the Constanţa Bar in 1991; that the Rules adopted by the UAR, on which the domestic courts had based their decisions, could not be relied on in addition to the law; and that the annulment of his registration had become time‑barred by 1996.


80.  The applicant argued that there had been a breach of his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask>. He had remained the owner of the land, but in view of the planning measures taken in his case and the applicable legal framework his property rights had been stripped of any real significance. On the one hand, the applicant could not obtain a building permit in order to make use of his property, in particular by constructing a new house or substantially renovating his old house. On the other, he had been adversely affected by the expropriation to be carried out at an undetermined future date.


44.  The Government recognised that the impugned measures constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask> or, in the alternative, amounted to a deprivation of his property and thus fell to be considered under the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It was their view, however, that this provision had not been violated.


49.  The Government raised a preliminary objection that the matter of the decision on the costs of the proceedings in which the applicant sought compensation did not fall within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, since it did not affect the applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask>. In the Government’s opinion, the applicant did not have a specific property right to the adjudicated compensation as the first-instance court’s ruling was not final.


37.  The Government pointed out at the outset that the Court was not empowered to examine questions linked to the deprivation of property itself, such questions clearly being beyond its jurisdiction ratione temporis. In the Government’s submission, it was the lack of any payment of compensation for expropriation which constituted an interference with the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their  <mask>. The applicants agreed with that submission and complained that, in depriving them of any compensation, judgments nos. 3156/1995 of the Salonika Court of Appeal and 1302/1997 of the Court of Cassation had imposed an excessive burden on them.


26.  The Government argued that any interference with the applicants' property rights had been justified. The properties claimed by the applicants had been expropriated in accordance with the laws of the “TRNC”. Owing to the relocation of the populations, it had been necessary to facilitate the rehabilitation of Turkish-Cypriot refugees and to renovate and put to better use abandoned Greek-Cypriot property. The Greek-Cypriot side had taken similar measures in respect of abandoned Turkish-Cypriot properties in the southern part of the island. There was a public interest in not undermining the inter-communal talks concerning freedom of movement and right of property. The status of the UN buffer zone had also rendered it necessary to regulate the right of access to  <mask> until a settlement of the political problem could be achieved. In the light of all the above, it would have been unrealistic to grant individual applicants a right of access to property in isolation from the political situation.


13.  The Government argued that this complaint was inadmissible. The supervisory review had been initiated by a party to the litigation, and the applicants had been aware of these proceedings. Annulment of binding judgments was legitimate in a democratic society and known, for example, to such countries as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Besides, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe had been satisﬁed that Russia’s supervisory-review procedure had been improved (ResDH(2006)1, 8 February 2006; CM/Inf/DH(2005)20, 23 March 2005). Supervisory review had been applied only in exceptional cases. In the present case, it had been applied to correct the district court’s misinterpretation of material law. There had been no interference with the applicants’  <mask>, because the State had not contested as such their right to a service at.


30.  The Government stated that the applicants had acquired an apartment in violation of the law. The relevant provisions of civil law had been clear and predictable – they provided that transactions in breach of the law were null and void. The Government further rejected the applicants' allegation that they had been the victims of a selective attack. Following the democratic changes in 1989, the reformed State institutions had carried out revisions of recent transactions and sought to recover property acquired unlawfully. The aim pursued had been clearly legitimate. Finally, the Government submitted that nullity was the only appropriate sanction for transactions that violated the law and that therefore the interference with the applicants'  <mask> could not be regarded as disproportionate.


255.  The applicant further submitted that the Government did not appear to have disputed his title to three vehicles which had been stolen from him and a house which had been ruined. As regards his other  <mask>, the applicant referred to a report listing his items of lost property and indicating its value which had been certified by the administration of the Oktyabrskiy District of Grozny (see paragraph 91 above) and stated that he had been unable to adduce any other documentary evidence in that respect, as all relevant documents had been burnt in the house. The applicant insisted that the Court should accept his relevant submissions, given that the Government had not provided the Court with any evidence that conflicted with his version of events. The applicant further contended that the fact that his property had been looted by State agents had been confirmed by a number of eyewitnesses – his neighbours – whose names he had communicated to the investigating authorities, and that this interference with his property rights had not been justified under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


63.  The applicant disagreed. She argued that in the context of a continuing violation of her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her  <mask> the events that had taken place before the date of ratification should be taken into account as a relevant background for the assessment of the facts of the case. In her case the 1977 decision announcing the future expropriation had been the root cause of all the subsequent developments. Moreover, in her case most of the facts which should be regarded as giving rise to further breaches of her right guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention had occurred after 10 October 1994.


14.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the final judgment of 11 March 2001 had violated his “right to a court” and his right to peaceful enjoyment of  <mask>. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


30.  The applicant submitted that the interference with her property rights had been unlawful as the local administration had had no legal basis on which to rent out her land in view of her title to it. In her opinion, the fact that by July 2004 the boundaries of the disputed land had not been marked out did not entitle the local administration to let out her  <mask>. The applicant added that she had requested that the boundaries of the plot be marked out as early as October 2004 but that the local administration had delayed this procedure in disregard of her numerous requests. Thus, in her opinion, the boundaries could have been established earlier if the land in question had not been occupied by company B., which had already planted seeds on the land and was expecting to realise a profit by harvesting the crop.


39.  The applicant company argued that the sale of goods in its duty free shop and bar had been its only activity. It submitted that the Law on Foreign Investments was clear in stating that foreign investments were guaranteed complete security and protection. Such was the wording of section 39 of the Law. In the applicant's view this law had been enacted in order to encourage foreign investors to invest their money in the Moldovan economy, in conditions of security while not being afraid of any change of legislation or of changes of the political course of Moldova. In such circumstances, any ambiguous part of the text concerning the guarantees afforded to it by this law should have been interpreted in its favour. If a State interpreted contradictions within its legislation for its own benefit, that constituted a breach of the principle of lawfulness, and accordingly a breach of the right to respect for one's  <mask>.


46.  The applicants submitted that the interference with their  <mask> had no basis in law. Having failed to pay their debts, the State deprived them of the actual possession of their property, in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They maintained that the public interest justifications mentioned by the Government could not be relied on at their expense, and that it was for the State to find a solution for the payment of their salaries.


55.  The Government criticised the Chamber judgment, considering it methodologically inappropriate and legally incorrect to confuse compensation for an expropriation and the court fees to be paid. Referring to the dissenting opinion attached to the judgment (see paragraph 5 above), the Government considered that the Chamber's conclusions confused two legally different things: “the credit and the debt, [which were] two completely separate things”. The Government gave the example of a situation where a creditor lodged a claim to recover a certain sum, and the debtor filed a counter claim for a sum higher than that claimed by the creditor; if the court allowed the counterclaim, the creditor would receive nothing and, in addition, would have to pay the costs, without there being, the Government argued, any interference with the peaceful enjoyment of  <mask>.


19.  The applicant complained that since the Turkish invasion of the northern part of Cyprus in July 1974, Turkey had prevented her from exercising her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her home and  <mask>. She submitted, in particular, that on 9 December 1990 she had been prevented from returning to her home and property. The applicant observed that she had produced documentary evidence that she was the owner of the properties at issue. Relying on the principles laid down by the Court in the case of Loizidou v. Turkey ((merits), 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI), she alleged that the interference with her property rights had lacked any legal justification.


64.  The applicants further submitted that the deprivation of the second applicant’s  <mask> was also not carried out under “conditions provided for by law”, namely Article 225 of the Civil Code. According to that provision, only the owner of a property could claim the termination of the right of use enjoyed by another person in respect of that property. In the present case, however, it was the Government that initiated the proceedings seeking to terminate the second applicant’s right of use and therefore there was no legal basis to grant this claim.


13.  The applicants complained that they had been unable to enforce the judgments in their favour owing to the domestic court’s refusal to provide them with copies of the said judgments. They further alleged that the non-enforcement of those judgments had violated their right to peaceful enjoyment of  <mask>. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which read as follows:


107.  The applicants reiterated that, prior to the entry into force of section 5 bis of Law no. 359/1992, their land had already been expropriated and they had brought legal proceedings seeking compensation to which they could legitimately expect to be entitled under Law no. 2359/1865. As the law in question was applicable to expropriations that were under way and to the related proceedings, including the ones concerning them, it had had the effect of depriving them of a substantial part of the compensation to which they were entitled. The enactment of that law therefore amounted to an interference with the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their  <mask> that was incompatible with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


18.  The applicants argued that the quashing of the binding and enforceable judgments of 11 December 2001 delivered by the Ryazan Garnison Military Court in their favour violated the principle of legal certainty and, therefore, their right to a court and the right to peaceful enjoyment of their  <mask>. They emphasised that the defendant military unit did not use the available means of appeal against the judgments before they became binding and enforceable and that the subsequent supervisory review upon application of the President of the Moscow Circuit Military Court could not be justified by the higher court’s mere disagreement with the decision on the merits.


27.  The applicant further complained that the length of the proceedings complained of and the subsequent non-enforcement of the part of the in-court settlement of 11 March 2004 concerning the return of her vehicle had infringed her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her  <mask> because she has been unable to use her vehicle for a prolonged period of time. She relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which reads as follows:


46.  The applicant complained of an infringement of his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask>, a plot of land which he had purchased in good faith but of which he had been deprived by the domestic court decisions to recognise the State’s title to it, without compensating him for any loss sustained. He alleged a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:


26.  The applicant's daughter sought enforcement of the judgment of 19 January 1998, namely to be allowed to take possession of the 2.13 hectares of land and to receive ownership titles. She also claimed 2,130,000 Euros (EUR) for the loss of profit or any benefit from her  <mask>, representing the value of the rent she could obtain by renting the land for a period of ten years (10 Euros per square metre per year). In respect of nonpecuniary damage, she claimed EUR 4,000.


89.  The Government acknowledged that the adjudicated claims of the applicant company had constituted “possessions” and that their quashing had amounted to an interference with those  <mask> within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. However, they emphasised that the quashing of the judgments in question had been in full compliance with the law, legitimate, and had not placed an excessive individual burden on the applicant company.


102.  The applicants complained that the revocation by law of their licences without any compensation had breached their right to peaceful enjoyment of their  <mask>, guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The second applicant also complained that that provision had been breached on account of the suspension of her licence in May 2009. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 reads:


55.  The applicants noted that they were not obliged to submit repeated complaints about the delay in question since there was an ex officio obligation on the part of the Commercial Court to enforce its own final decision. Further, the said court did not take adequate steps to bring the impugned proceedings to a successful and speedy conclusion. Lastly, the applicants referred to Article 20 of the Property Act (see paragraph 27 above) and stressed that they have been deprived of their  <mask> as of February 1991, which is when the Commercial Court's decision of 27 December 1990 had become final.


14.  The applicant complained that the drastic decrease in his monthly disability allowance, which had prevailed between 1 July 2012 and 31 December 2013, amounted to an unjustified deprivation of  <mask> in view of the fact that his underlying medical condition had not changed. He relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Articles 6, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention.


27.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the act of quashing of the final judgment of 15 July 2002, as amended on 12 September 2002, had violated her “right to a court” and her right to peaceful enjoyment of  <mask>. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


19.  The applicants complained that they had been deprived of their right to peaceful enjoyment of their  <mask> as a result of the national authorities’ refusal to recognise them as the legal heirs in respect of the immovable property which had been owned by the late Polikseni Pistika. They alleged a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:


96.  The applicants complained that the judgments by which the Prosecutor General’s actions for annulment of the contracts of lease and sale of land were upheld had had the effect of infringing their right to peaceful enjoyment of their  <mask> as secured by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The Government disputed the applicants’ contention and argued that the applicants did not have a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In particular, they were simple tenants and not owners of the 5.63 hectares of land, while the rest of the land was obtained by them unlawfully.


49.  The Government concluded that there had been no interference with the applicants'  <mask> as they remained the lawful owners of the land and could still use it. The mere fact that the land served public purposes in that it had been used for the construction of roads accessible to the general public and that the applicants had had to finance the construction of these roads themselves was insufficient for finding that their possessions had been interfered with.


15.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non‑enforcement of the judgment of 20 January 2000 as upheld on 6 April 2000 in his favour violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of  <mask> as provided in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. These Articles, in so far as relevant, read as follows:


41.  The applicant claimed that it had been deprived of its  <mask>. It stated that it had remained owner of its assets during the bankruptcy proceedings; the bankruptcy estate had only administered these assets. In any event, the applicant maintained that the assets relevant in the present case had undoubtedly belonged to the applicant before the declaration of bankruptcy and that they had thereafter been appropriated to pay costs caused by that erroneous declaration. Allegedly, already in those circumstances, the applicant’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated.


11.  The applicant complained that the lengthy non-enforcement of the court judgment in his favour rendered by the Kronshtadt Garrison Military Court on 7 March 2002 constituted a breach of his right to a court and his right to peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask>. Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the Convention, relied on by the applicant, insofar as relevant, read as follows:


72.  The Government were of the opinion that the applicants had obtained full redress for any delays in securing possession of the property restored to them. Therefore, there had been no interference with their peaceful enjoyment of  <mask> for which the Government could have been held responsible. Although the applicants’ property had remained for a time in the possession of the public company, their rights had been safeguarded by the civil law and they had already obtained redress at the domestic level.


39.  The Government submitted that the activities of the Chechen Savings Bank had been suspended in August 1996 in view of the difficult political, economic and social situation in Chechnya, and that it had been impossible to resume the activity of the bank, as it had sustained significant pecuniary damage and had lost a considerable number of its primary documents and official seals, which could have enabled the falsification of claims concerning the reimbursement of deposits made with it. In such circumstances, in December 1996 the Management Board of the Savings Bank of Russia had taken a decision to wind up the Chechen Savings Bank. The Government thus argued, referring to these facts, that the Savings Bank of Russia had had no real opportunity to restore the applicant's savings deposited in the Chechen Savings Bank and transfer them to the Moscow branch of the Savings Bank of Russia and that it had had no intention of depriving the applicant of his  <mask>.


101.  The Government recognised that the sale of the applicant’s property and the eviction constituted an interference with his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask>. However, they submitted that the sale served the purpose of securing the payment of taxes and therefore, in accordance with the Court’s case-law (J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 44302/02, §§ 65-66, ECHR 2007‑III, and Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, 23 February 1995, § 59, Series A no. 306‑B), should be considered as a control of use of the applicant’s property not as a deprivation of it. Following this case-law, the State should be allowed a wide margin of appreciation when passing laws for the purpose of securing the payment of taxes and the Court would respect the legislature’s assessment in such matters unless it was devoid of reasonable foundation (Gasus, § 60).


25.  The Government argued that, since the disputed clause was unlawfully entered into, the Department was not obliged under domestic law to execute it, and the refusal to do so could not amount to an interference with the applicant’s  <mask>. However, given the terms of the agreement, which Mr R. entered into with the applicant on behalf of the Department, the Court is of the view that the Department’s actions may be regarded as having frustrated the applicant’s legitimate expectations under the contract and depriving him, in part, of the consideration which he gave in entering into the agreement. Regardless of whether this is an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of the applicant’s possessions, within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1, or a deprivation of possessions within the meaning of the second sentence of that provision, the same principles apply in the present case, and require the measure to be justified in accordance with requirements of that Article, as interpreted by the established case-law of the Court (amongst many authorities,Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, judgment of 23 February 1995, Series A no. 306-B, § 55).


63.  The Government submitted that the interference had lasted until the decision allowing V.P. to use the applicant's property had been set aside. From then on, the State had no longer interfered with the applicant's right to peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask> but had rather attempted to provide for the repossession of his property. The Government admitted that the repossession proceedings had lasted for a long period of time. However, in this respect they referred to their arguments concerning the applicant's length complaint.


93.  The applicant submitted that his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask> had been violated when his property was sold at public auction, and he was subsequently evicted, for an enforceable debt amounting to no more than SEK 6,721 on the day of the sale. In his view, this measure constituted an irrevocable and definite deprivation of his property and was completely disproportionate to the aims pursued, in particular as the decision to sell the property had not gained legal force when the property was sold and when he was evicted.


63.  The Government in their submissions disputed the assertion that the awards made by the domestic courts to the applicants constituted  <mask> within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as they concerned payments for judicial benefits provided by the State. They further alleged that the claims in respect of the arrears granted did not even amount to legitimate expectations, as they had been directed against the wrong institution – the Ministry of Finance instead of the State Judicial Administration. The Government further referred to the difficult financial situation of the State (see Raimondo v. Italy, judgment of 22 February 1994, Series A no. 281‑A, §§ 27 and 30) and the technical complications encountered in the course of the enforcement proceedings. Moreover, they contended that the State had taken active steps to solve the problem, as it had made a budgetary allocation of UAH 1,067,200[7] for the payment of the various arrears. They further asserted that these judgments had been enforced in full and without undue delay, and that accordingly there had been no infringement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


145.  The applicants recalled that in the restitution process the State was not supposed to create disproportionate new wrongs while trying to attenuate old injuries. The legislation should make it possible to take into account the particular circumstances of each case, avoiding putting a disproportionate burden on persons who had acquired  <mask> in good faith (see Pincová and Pinc v. the Czech Republic, no. 36548/97, § 58, 5 February 2003, and Velikovi and Others, cited above, § 178). In the present case, the disproportion lay in the repeal of the tenant’s right to purchase under the “third model”. From the year 2000 onwards the two alternatives available to the applicants (namely, continuing to lease the existing dwelling or moving out of it and obtaining a financial incentive) were neither a suitable compensation for the loss of the specially protected tenancy nor a comparable alternative to the right to purchase. In this connection, the applicants submitted the following arguments.


37.  The Government submitted that the judgments of the domestic courts given in the applicants’ case were based on well-established and extensive case-law. The courts had conducted an extensive examination of the evidence in the case and had explained in detail their decisions to uphold the assessment of the Social Insurance Authority. It was not the task of the Court to take the place of the domestic courts, as it was in the first place for them to interpret domestic law (Tejedor García v. Spain, 16 December 1997, § 31, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII). Accordingly, the interference with the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their  <mask> complained of in the present case was prescribed by law.


65.  The Government admitted that the compulsory lease of the land under sections 3 et seq. of Law no. 64/1997 constituted an interference with the applicant's rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It reflected the legislator's position, according to which it was in the general interest that the rights of persons using the land for gardening purposes should prevail over the rights of the owners of the plots of the land in garden colonies. The work the gardeners had done had considerably increased the value of the land, which at the time the colonies were established had generally been unusable and of low quality. The Government argued that a fair balance had been struck between the general interest and the rights of the original land owners. Given the margin of appreciation which the Contracting States had in similar cases, the interference in issue with the applicant's right to peacefully enjoy her  <mask> was not contrary to the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


76.  The applicant company pointed out that the State had not previously suggested, either in 2008 or during the domestic proceedings, that it could or should have changed its business model. It was no answer to a claim of loss of livelihood or interference with  <mask> to say that the operator should have altered an important aspect of its business. It was even an implicit admission that its rights had been impacted.


21.  The Government submitted that the authorities had made three attempts to enforce the judgment of 18 March 2002. The delay in enforcement had been due to objective reasons, namely the difficulty in identifying an equivalent land, as well as the fluctuant conduct of the applicant, who requested only in 2006 compensation with land in the neighbouring plot. They also argued that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of her  <mask>, since the authorities had offered her different lands in compensation. Were the Court to hold that there had been interference based on delay in enforcement of the judgment of 18 March 2002, the Government submitted that the alleged interference had been justified and proportionate.


32.  The Government in their submissions confirmed that the amount awarded to the applicant by the domestic court constituted a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They acknowledged that the non-enforcement of the judgment in favour of the applicant could be considered to be an interference with the applicant's right to the peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask>. However, the Government claimed that such interference was justified in the general interest, namely the need to control the export of contaminated materials from the Chernobyl area. The large number of creditors of the liquidated company required the liquidation commission and the State to develop comprehensive measures to satisfy all claims.


27.  The applicants complained that their right to peaceful enjoyment of  <mask> had been violated because of the domestic authorities’ continuing failure to decide on the expropriation of their plot of land and their consequent inability to make use of their property during that period. They relied on Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which read as follows:


37.  The Government admitted that there had been an interference with the applicant's right to peaceful enjoyment of her  <mask> when the local authorities had placed another person in the applicant's flat. However, they repudiated the applicant's contention that, by issuing a decision allowing M.V. to use her flat shortly after she had instituted civil proceedings to evict him, those authorities had acted in bad faith. In the Government's view, it was highly unlikely that the local authorities had been aware of the pending civil proceedings instituted only three days before they had given the impugned decision.


36.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the renewal of the time-limit for an ordinary appeal after a considerable lapse of time and the consecutive quashing of the judgment of 5 October 2001 had violated the principle of legal certainty and unlawfully prolonged the judicial proceedings. He further complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention of an interference with his right to the peaceful enjoyment of  <mask>. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


44.  The applicant company submitted that it had been deprived of its building unlawfully, alleging that such deprivation had been based on the resolution of the Plenary Court of 15 February 2001 which had contravened the principle of rule of law. It further submitted that there had been no public interest which could have justified the deprivation of its  <mask>.


11.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of the judgments of 7 June 2001 and of 27 September 2002 violated her “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and her right to the peaceful enjoyment of  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles in so far as relevant provide as follows:


100.  The Government also argued that any interference with the applicant company’s rights could only be regarded as a “control of use” of  <mask>, that had been applied in the general interest. In the present case, the general interest was clear, namely the protection of the environment in accordance with the requirements of EU law. As the Court had repeatedly recognised in its case-law, this was a weighty consideration, which was of growing importance for contemporary society. In support of their argument the Government referred to a series of cases decided by this Court, notably: Depalle v. France [GC], no. 34044/02, ECHR 2010; Malfatto and Mieille v. France, nos. 40886/06 and 51946/07, 6 October 2016; Matczyński v. Poland, no. 32794/07, 15 December 2015; Alatulkkila and Others v. Finland, no. 33538/96, 28 July 2005; and Posti and Rahko v. Finland, no. 27824/95, ECHR 2002‑VII. The pursuit of this aim was not confined to the applicant company’s particular circumstances, but extended to all aquaculture operators based in designated locations around the coastline.


36.  The applicant alleged that his forced eviction from Nurettin village and destruction of his house and  <mask> by the State security forces as well as his inability to return to his village had given rise to breaches of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which reads in so far as relevant as follows:


141.  The applicants argued instead that the interference with their  <mask> had not been lawful on other grounds. They noted that at the time of the Constitutional Court’s decision repealing the “third model” (November 1999 – see paragraph 37 above), Slovenia had already ratified the Revised European Social Charter, making it fully part of its domestic legal order. In its decision of 8 September 2009 (see paragraphs 97-100 above), the European Social Committee had found that the “combination of insufficient measures for the acquisition of or access to a substitute flat, the evolution of the rules on occupancy and the increase in rents” were contrary to Article 31 § 1 of the Charter and that the discrimination between former holders of occupancy rights in the right to purchase was incompatible with Article E. It followed that the Constitutional Court’s decision had violated a binding ratified international instrument.


18.  The applicant submitted that he had had a proprietary interest in the plots of land at issue at least from 1974 onwards, which was before the date on which Turkey had accepted the jurisdiction of the Commission and the Court. As a consequence, there had been an interference with his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his  <mask> after that date. He relied on the principles laid down in the case of Loizidou v. Turkey ((merits) 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI), where the Court had denied legal validity to Article 159 of the “TRNC” Constitution and to all subsequent legislation enacted by the “TRNC” authorities.


37.  The Government submitted that the applicants' complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They referred to the Convention institutions' case-law according to which the Convention did not guarantee the right to have property returned, since Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 protected only a person's existing  <mask> and did not guarantee the right to acquire possessions.


11.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the final judgment of 25 December 2002, as upheld on appeal on 17 February 2003, made in her favour had violated her “right to a court” and her right to peaceful enjoyment of  <mask>. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


29.  The Government argued that, since the enforcement of the disputed assignment was dependent on an administrative decision not issued, the courts' dismissals of the applicant's action could not amount to an interference with its  <mask>. However, having regard to the considerations outlined in paragraph 28 above and paragraph 33 below, the Court is of the view that the courts' decisions may be regarded as having frustrated the applicant's legitimate expectation to benefit from an assignment acquired for consideration (Fedorenko v. Ukraine, no. 25921/02, § 25, 1 June 2006). Regardless of whether this is an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of the applicant's possessions, within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1, or a deprivation of possessions within the meaning of the second sentence of that provision, the same principles apply in the present case, and require the measure to be justified in accordance with requirements of that Article, as interpreted by the established case-law of the Court (amongst many authorities, Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, 23 February 1995, Series A no. 306-B, § 55).


29.  The Government acknowledged that the seizure and confiscation of the lorry constituted an interference with the applicant company’s  <mask>. During the period of seizure the applicant company had not been able to use it and, therefore, its property had been controlled. When the court’s confiscation decision became final, the applicant company had lost its title to the lorry. However, it had regained this right by purchasing the lorry at auction.


14.  The applicants complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of their respective awards provided for in the judgments of 7 August 2000 and of 22 January 2001 violated their “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and their right to the peaceful enjoyment of  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles in so far as relevant provide as follows:


67.  The Government submitted that the applicants’ allegation that the moratorium was in place for an indefinite period was not true. Each extension of the moratorium had contained a clear endpoint, and each new extension had been adopted before the previous end date and at no point could the applicants entertain any expectation that they would be able to sell before the end date. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 could not be interpreted as protecting the applicants against the changes in the legal regime of their  <mask>. The Government cited Van Marle and Others v. the Netherlands (26 June 1986, § 43, Series A no. 101) in support of their argument. The extensions had been passed following a wide discussion of the matter and the applicants could not claim to be unaware of the possibility of those extensions.


71.  The applicant further contended that the judgment of 20 November 1998 declaring his complaints against the bailiffs well-founded (see paragraph 55 above) was a mere declaration of the State bailiffs’ inactivity. It was not enforceable. He also submitted that it was unnecessary to complain to the domestic courts about the bailiffs as it was in any event an obligation and a particular task of the State bailiffs to enforce final judgments without undue delay. This obligation was  <mask> and they should therefore have used all available and possible legal means to comply with their duty of enforcing judgments.


49.  The applicant submitted that it had been deprived of its possessions unlawfully. The domestic courts had relied on the resolutions of 10 April 1992 and 4 February 1994 (see paragraphs 17 and 18), even though under Article 321 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 36 above) a person could be deprived of property only under conditions  <mask>, namely by the laws of Ukraine. It also stated that in the Supreme Court decision of 4 February 2015 it had been established that the issue regarding holders of title to property of Union-wide civic organisations of the former Soviet Union had not been regulated by domestic law. In the applicant’s opinion, the Supreme Court had thereby recognised the absence of legitimate grounds for depriving it of its property. The applicant also stated that the fact that it had been deprived of its property more than twenty years after the adoption of the above-mentioned legal acts constituted a breach of the principle of legal certainty. In any event, those acts concerned property of Union-wide civic organisations of the former Soviet Union before their successors had been determined, and not that of the Federation, which in October 1990 had stopped functioning under the charter of trade unions of the Soviet Union and had declared itself the successor of trade unions of the Ukrainian SSR. Moreover, the above-mentioned legal acts gave the State temporary rights regarding the property of Union-wide civic organisations of the former Soviet Union until their successors had been determined, and did not provide for transferring title to relevant property to the State. Even assuming that the interference with its rights was based on formal grounds in the domestic law, that law did not correspond to the “quality of law” requirements, as in cases nos. 137/7, 48/202-20/191 and 51/227 the domestic courts had concluded that the transfer of property from the Federation to UPO had been lawful. However, that had not precluded the HCCU from reaching the opposite conclusion in the applicant’s case. Furthermore, the applicant considered that there had been no public interest in depriving it of its property: since the Federation was a legal successor of the trade unions of the Ukrainian SSR, the transfer of management of the disputed property to the State, let alone its ownership, under the resolutions of 10 April 1992 and 4 February 1994, had not pursued any legitimate aim. The applicant stated that even assuming that the above-mentioned legal acts had been applicable, their application twenty years later had constituted a disproportionate burden on it. Lastly, it had not received any compensation.


66.  The Government of Cyprus observed that the interference by the Turkish police with the peaceful assembly which was taking place in the buffer zone had not been  <mask>, was unnecessary and grossly disproportionate in relation to any conduct by the applicant or any claimed public-order issue which could have arisen. The laws of the Republic of Cyprus, applicable to the area where the demonstration took place, did not permit such an interference. The respondent Government could not alter the legal system in the occupied territory and had not invoked any Turkish law that could have provided a legal basis for its agents' behaviour.


107.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article 11 of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant's rights was not  <mask> and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


15.  The Government contended that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as he had not challenged the Bailiffs' actions. They also maintained that the applicant, while re-submitting the enforcement writ, had failed to comply with the procedural formalities  <mask>. They asserted in this regard that he was no longer interested in the enforcement of the judgment in question.


116.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article 11 of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant's rights was not  <mask> and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


74.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant's initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied her liberty in circumstances which did not follow a procedure  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities' failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


48.  The Government submitted that there had been no interference with the applicant’s possessions since the proceedings instituted by the applicant concerned exclusively the issue of cancelling the children’s registration at her flat. In this respect, the Government reiterated that, under Armenian law, the registration of a person at a flat by a passport section of the police did not serve as a legal basis for establishing any property rights in respect of that flat. In particular, registration at the police was nothing but a system of data on permanent, temporary or factual place of residence kept to promote an effective realisation of citizens’ rights and freedoms such as, for example, to vote in an election or to be served a court summons. As to the right of use of accommodation, such right originated only from the moment of its state registration in a manner  <mask>. Besides, the applicant’s allegation that she was unable to rent out her flat was groundless since there was no evidence in the case indicating that she was ever deprived de jure or de facto of the possibility to do so.


113.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article 11 of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant's rights was not  <mask> and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


55.  The Government admitted that in the instant case there had been interference with the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. It clearly followed from the domestic courts’ case-law that a decision whereby a property was added to the list of historic monuments constituted such interference. However, the interference had been  <mask>, namely section 14 of the Protection of the Cultural Heritage Act and had pursued a legitimate aim (the protection of historic monuments). The grounds for the listing decision were explained therein and had therefore been known to the applicants.


64.  The Government stated that, since bankruptcy proceedings were  <mask> and pursued a legitimate aim, namely ensuring that creditors recovered at least part of their debts, the resulting deprivation of property did not infringe Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. As to the length of the proceedings, the Government said that it was primarily attributable to the unsuccessful attempts that had been made to sell the applicant's house at auction. Following attempts on unspecified dates in 1985, 1991 and 1995, the sale had finally been fixed for 19 April 1996, then adjourned to 21 April 1996. The applicant was also responsible for the length of the proceedings, as he had resorted to every means possible to block the liquidation process. He had made an application for a composition with the creditors, which had been declared inadmissible on 1 April 1996, requested the bankruptcy judge on 5 April 1996 to refer an issue to the Constitutional Court thereby causing the proceedings to be stayed, made an application on 17 April 1996 for a stay of execution of the order for sale (which was dismissed the following day) and followed that up with a like application on an unspecified date to the Court of Cassation.


37.  The Government submitted that the judgments of the domestic courts given in the applicants’ case were based on well-established and extensive case-law. The courts had conducted an extensive examination of the evidence in the case and had explained in detail their decisions to uphold the assessment of the Social Insurance Authority. It was not the task of the Court to take the place of the domestic courts, as it was in the first place for them to interpret domestic law (Tejedor García v. Spain, 16 December 1997, § 31, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII). Accordingly, the interference with the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions complained of in the present case was  <mask>.


20.  The Government submitted that in the cases at hand the applications for supervisory review were lodged by a party to the proceedings and within the time-limit  <mask> and the proceedings had fully complied with the requirements set out in the Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation. The quashing had been justified because the judgments had been based on a misapplication of law and hence had contained a fundamental defect. Review of binding judgments had been legitimate in a democratic society and known to such countries as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Besides, the Council of Europe had been satisfied with reforms of the supervisory-review procedure in Russia. As regards the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Presidium had found that the applicants’ claims had been unfounded and therefore they had not had a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The fact that they had not appealed against the judgment of 25 December 2003 showed that they considered the initial multiplier incorrect.


84.  The Government of Cyprus observed that during the applicant's initial arrest, subsequent detention and prison sentence following the court conviction, the applicant was denied his liberty in circumstances which did not follow a procedure  <mask> and which were not lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention. Moreover, the authorities' failure to inform the applicant of all the reasons for her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5 § 2.


47.  The applicant strongly denied having committed any offence or entered into conspiracy with any State officials, in particular with A.B., or having conducted any illegal dealings with V., or having evaded tax. She had bought the flat for her own use and lived there with her son, having complied with all the requirements  <mask> for her to become its lawful owner. The mere fact that the flat was being re-sold within a short period of time did not strike her as unusual, because many people buy real estate for investment and resell it as soon as it becomes commercially sound to do so. V. had been questioned in the criminal proceedings and this had not led the investigating authorities to suspect him of involvement in fraud. The applicant had no reason to doubt that he had bought and re-sold the flat in good faith. She has never been suspected of any illegal dealings and the Government’s allegations of unlawful conduct on her part were unfounded.


42.  The Government submitted that the applicant failed to exhaust the domestic remedies. In particular, they claimed that, despite the fact that the applicant alleged a violation of her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions because the children of her late niece enjoyed a right of use of accommodation in respect of her flat, the proceedings instituted by her before the domestic courts concerned exclusively the issue of cancelling their registration. However, a right of use of accommodation originated from the moment of state registration of that right, in accordance with the procedure  <mask>, and not from the moment of obtaining registration at a flat. In addition, the only body competent to terminate that right was a court. This was in fact mentioned by the Court of Cassation in its decision of 23 July 2004, in which it informed the applicant about a possibility to restore her property right by instituting separate court proceedings. Hence, the applicant did not avail herself of the only effective remedy under the domestic law to terminate the children’s alleged right of use of accommodation in respect of her flat. Moreover, it was still open for the applicant to apply to a court and to restore her rights through the court proceedings as suggested by the Court of Cassation.


115.  The applicant company submitted that the refusal to allocate it any broadcasting frequencies amounted to interference with the exercise of its rights under Article 10 § 1 of the Convention (Meltex Ltd and Movsesyan, cited above, and Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov, cited above). The interference had not been  <mask>, as required by the Convention, on account of the unforeseeability of the transitional legislation passed by the national parliament. The applicant company further pointed out that the Italian courts had applied the legislation in question and had found that compensation should be calculated with effect from 1 December 2004, contrary to what the ECJ had held in its judgment.


117.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article 11 of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant's rights was not  <mask> and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.