185.  The Government initially submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of his complaint concerning the risk of ill‑treatment in the case of his  <mask>. He had not requested refugee status immediately on his arrival in Russia, had stated during the hearing of 8 July 2010 that he had come to the respondent State to earn money, and had also omitted to raise the issue of the risk of ill-treatment before the appeal court on 22 September 2010. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the remedy and the existence of a “well-established practice” in that regard, they referred to the case of Zokhidov (see Zokhidov, cited above, communicated to the Government at the time of the events), where the applicant had brought his ill-treatment argument to the attention of the domestic authorities and the extradition order had been set aside.


221.  The applicant submitted that his abduction and transfer to Tajikistan, despite the interim measure under Rule 39 indicated by the Court, had hindered the effective exercise of his right of individual application. The risk of his  <mask> from Tajikistan was imminent, as confirmed by the detention order issued by the Tajik court from which it followed that he had been detained with a view to extradition to Uzbekistan (see paragraph 61 above). The applicant argued that such a risk persisted even after his release. He had not been informed of the reasons for his release and he had subsequently been warned that he was again wanted by the Tajik authorities.


76.  The Government contested this claim. They argued that the provisions of the Russian law governing the detention of persons pending  <mask> were clear enough and foreseeable. In accordance with the decision of the Constitutional Court of 4 April 2006 No. 101-O, the provisions of Article 466 and Chapter 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were applicable to such detention. The Government noted that the first applicant had been brought before a judge within forty-eight hours of her arrest. Under Article 109 of the Criminal Procedural Code, her detention could not exceed twelve months, while she had spent eleven months and twenty-five days in detention. In so far as the first applicant complained about the absence of review of her detention, the Government noted that she had made use of the relevant provisions of the Russian criminal procedural legislation and appealed to higher courts against the decisions by which her detention had been ordered. She could also make use of Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which allowed the parties to the proceedings to seek judicial review of decisions of the investigation.


97.  The applicant complained that he was detained in violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 3. He maintained that prior to 30 January 2007, when the General Prosecutor’s Office had received the official request for his  <mask>, his detention had fallen within the ambit of Article 5 § 1 (c). Only after that date, in his view, could the detention be qualified as being “with a view to extradition”.


109.  The applicant submitted that Russian courts did not apply Articles 108 and 109 of the Code to  <mask> proceedings and normally refused to review the lawfulness of detention pending extradition, with reference to Article 466 of the Code. The applicant argued that the delay of eight months had been unreasonable in view of the fact that the request had been rejected on formal grounds and showed that the proceedings had not been conducted with due diligence. His detention pending extradition had served other purposes than that of being “with a view to extradition” (for example, examination of his applications for asylum and refugee status). Lastly, in his observations he raised a new argument, alleging that his continued detention after the decision of 22 September 2006 until 29 September 2006 had also violated Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


149.  The Government further submitted that the domestic authorities had been obliged to hold the applicant in custody because the Strasbourg Court had applied Rule 39 and indicated to them to suspend his  <mask>. Referring to the Chahal case (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V), they stressed that paragraph 1 (f) of Article 5 of the Convention provided for a level of protection different from paragraph 1 (a)-(e), requiring only that extradition proceedings be pending. Hence, it was immaterial for that provision whether there existed sufficient grounds for holding the person in custody. Accordingly, the applicant's detention from 5 August 2008 onwards had been “lawful” within the meaning of the above provision.


107.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to provide any reliable evidence to show that in the event of his  <mask> to Uzbekistan he would run the risk of being subjected to ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Uzbekistan had sought the applicant’s extradition in order to pursue criminal proceedings against him arising out of ordinary criminal charges. The applicant had not alleged that he belonged to any banned religious movement or any other vulnerable group which, according to reliable international sources, systematically endured the practice of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan. Moreover, in his explanations given to a Russian prosecutor on 29 June and 20 July 2010 and 2 June 2011 (see paragraphs 23 and 33 above) the applicant had stated that he had left Uzbekistan for Russia on business and had denied any persecution on political grounds there. He had never sought political asylum in Russia, or applied for Russian citizenship. The Government went on to note that the guarantees provided by the Prosecutor General of Uzbekistan were sufficient to protect the applicant from the risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the event of his extradition.


139.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been arrested on the basis of the decision of the Bukhara Criminal Court of 15 June 2011 ordering his placement in detention, and the decision of the prosecutor of the Meshchanskiy District of Moscow of 19 March 2012. The  <mask> request had been received within thirty-eight days, that is, in compliance with the forty days’ time-limit provided for in Article 62 § 1 of the Minsk Convention. They pointed out that Russia had accepted the Protocol of 28 March 1997 to the Minsk Convention without any reservations. On 25 April 2012, after receipt of the extradition request, the prosecutor of the Meshchanskiy District of Moscow had extended the applicant’s detention for a total period of two months. By a decision of 15 May 2012 that court had extended his detention to a total period of six months, that is, until 17 September 2012, when the applicant was released. The decisions on the applicant’s detention had been taken in full compliance with the applicable laws. The applicant’s counsel’s appeals against the detention orders had been examined and dismissed by the courts.


118.  The Government, the applicant and the third party further referred to their arguments with respect to the Government's objection as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. In particular, the third party stated that there were no effective remedies to complain about  <mask> contrary to Articles 2, 3 or 6 of the Convention. They maintained that the law at issue was not sufficiently accessible and precise, failing to avoid risks of arbitrariness. They referred in contrast to the experiences of Poland and the United Kingdom in this area, where the courts, as opposed to the prosecutor's office rule, on requests for extradition. They stated that the courts in the United Kingdom, acting under the Extradition Act 2003, assessed the following issues in assessing the requests for extradition: (a) the rule against double jeopardy; (b) extraneous considerations (whether a person was in fact extradited for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing him on account of his race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions, or whether if extradited he might be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions); (c) passage of time; (d) the person's age; (e) hostage-taking considerations; (f) specialty; (g) the person's earlier extradition to the United Kingdom from different territories; (h) human rights considerations arising from the 1998 Human Rights Act.


66.  The applicant pointed out that, in view of the Court’s practice in the matter, if he had requested the interim measure before 6 August, his request would have been disallowed because the date of his  <mask> had not yet been set. He was not convinced by the Government’s argument that they had not had enough time, alleging that two or three hours’ notice would have sufficed to take the necessary steps to prevent his extradition.


60.  The applicant submitted that he was being sought on the capital charge of murder by the Chinese authorities. The Russian authorities had initially envisaged extraditing him to China but the  <mask> proceedings had eventually been abandoned. An attempt to remove him to China through administrative removal proceedings had proved unsuccessful because the domestic courts had refused to order his administrative removal. The Russian authorities had then initiated exclusion proceedings, which were purely administrative in nature and did not require approval by a court. Although an exclusion order could be challenged in court, the judicial review proceedings did not have suspensive effect. The domestic authorities relied explicitly on the charges brought against him in China as grounds for finding that he presented a security risk justifying an exclusion order.


130.  The Government submitted that the Minsk Convention required that the applicant’s arrest and detention be regulated by the Russian CCrP, which included Chapters 13 and 54. Referring to a 1998 constitutional ruling, the Government argued that Article 466 § 1 of the CCrP required any deprivation of liberty exceeding forty-eight hours after arrest to be authorised by a court decision. Article 61 § 1 of the Minsk Convention allowed detention before receipt of a formal  <mask> request, which had been the case in respect of the applicant when a prosecutor had ordered his detention. After receipt of such a request, the applicant’s situation had come within the scope of Article 466 § 2 of the CCrP. His detention had thus been sought before and authorised by a court.


88.  The applicant’s vague reference to his poor state of health cannot in itself be regarded as a ground warranting his stay in Russia, as nothing in the applicant’s submissions suggests that treatment facilities in Kazakhstan are in any way inferior to those available in Russia and that the applicant would not receive appropriate medical treatment for cancer in the requesting country. The Court thus does not discern any compelling humanitarian grounds against the applicant’s  <mask> in the present case (see N. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565/05, § 42, ECHR 2008).


95.  The applicant complained under Article 2 § 1 of the Convention that there was a real risk that he would be liable to capital punishment in the event of his  <mask> to Kazakhstan. He alleged that the assurances given by the Government of Kazakhstan were insufficient as the moratorium imposed on capital punishment could be lifted at any time and the charges against him could be reclassified. This provision reads as follows:


86.  The Government maintained that they could not assess the probability of a violation of the applicant’s right to a fair hearing, as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, after his  <mask>. The Government observed that no proceedings in the applicant’s case were pending before the Turkmen courts, and they had no grounds to believe that his case would be considered by an unfair court in Turkmenistan.


43.  The Government pointed out that in the course of their cooperation on  <mask> matters there had been no instances of violations of the assurances provided by Kyrgyzstan. They referred to information from the Kyrgyz Republic regarding the outcomes of criminal prosecution of extradited persons. The Government cited examples of three individuals of Uzbek ethnic origin who had variously received a suspended sentence, been released on parole, and whose criminal case had been dismissed.


96.  The applicant was detained in Russia pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the Prosecutor General of Turkmenistan. As the Court has found above, the applicant's detention was not authorised by a Russian court, in violation of the relevant domestic provisions. The Moscow City Court refused to consider the complaints concerning the unlawfulness of detention for lack of jurisdiction, but did not indicate which district court would be competent to review them. It nevertheless addressed the issue of detention in the context of the  <mask> proceedings, but only after the applicant's extradition had taken place. Thus, the lawfulness of the applicant's detention during the period in question was not examined by any court, despite his appeals to that effect.


117.  The applicant agreed with the Government in so far as the periods from 24 to 30 July 2013 and from 31 July to 5 August 2013 were concerned. He maintained, in respect of the entire period of his detention pending administrative removal as from 31 July 2013, that administrative‑removal proceedings had been initiated only when the authorities had faced the need to release him. He argued that the authorities had abused their powers by ordering his detention within the framework of administrative proceedings solely with a view to ensuring his return to Uzbekistan, notwithstanding the refusal of the  <mask> request. The applicant considered that his detention pending administrative removal had in any event been unlawful, as the Code of Administrative Offences set no time-limit for such detention, and no such time-limit was given by the domestic courts. He argued that the Russian law on detention pending expulsion was not sufficiently clear and foreseeable. Referring to Azimov (cited above, §§ 172-73), the applicant argued that detention pending expulsion must not exceed the maximum term for detention as an administrative penalty, as otherwise it constituted a punitive rather than a preventive measure.


115.  The Government have not elaborated on their assertion in relation to Chapter 16 of the CCrP and section 17(1)(7) of the Custody Act (see paragraphs 56 and 57 above). In any event, the Court observes that Chapter 16 of the CCrP concerns the possibility for “parties to the criminal proceedings” to challenge decisions taken in the course of a preliminary investigation, such as a decision not to initiate criminal proceedings or a decision to discontinue them. There is no indication that the applicant was a party to criminal proceedings within the meaning given to that phrase by the Russian courts (see Nasrulloyev, cited above, § 89). Thus, the Court is not satisfied that the provisions of this Chapter afforded an effective remedy for challenging detention pending  <mask>. As regards the Custody Act, the Court notes that it derives from the Code of Criminal Procedure and concerns persons suspected or accused of criminal offences in Russia. There is no indication that this Act applied at the material time to persons who were detained pending extradition. Thus, the Court is uncertain that the remedies suggested by the Government related to the breaches alleged. In such circumstances, the Government was required, but failed, to show that the existence of the above remedies was sufficiently certain both in theory and in practice, failing which they lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see, among other authorities, A. and E. Riis v. Norway, no. 9042/04, § 41, 31 May 2007, and Vernillo v. France, judgment of 20 February 1991, Series A no. 198, § 27). Thus, the Government’s argument under this head should be also dismissed.


115.  The applicant further argued that the diplomatic assurances of the requesting State were insufficient to discard the risk of ill-treatment. First, there was no control mechanism at the domestic level which would allow tracking the authorities’ compliance with the assurances and holding them liable in case of a breach. Second, the information sent by the Prosecutor General’s Office to their Uzbek counterpart following the  <mask> request, such as the applicant’s intention to apply for asylum in Russia and his criticism of the human rights situation in Uzbekistan, made him particularly vulnerable to a risk of political persecution. Lastly, as the Court had established in a number of cases concerning extradition to Uzbekistan, assurances from the Uzbek authorities could not offer a reliable guarantee against the risk of ill-treatment, given that the practice of torture there was described by reputable international sources as being systematic.


64.  The applicant maintained his complaint. He pointed out that the Government’s version that he had been ill-treated in Kazakhstan, before his  <mask>, had been refused by the official statements from the administration of the remand prison certifying that on 23 February 2006 he had not had any evidence of ill-treatment at the time of his arrival in Moscow (see paragraphs 10 and 27 above). Furthermore, his allegations of ill-treatment had been confirmed by the medical examinations of 1 March and 1 June 2006 (see paragraphs 29, 26 and 39 above), his consistent complaints to the authorities (see paragraphs 31, 32, 37, 39, 40, 42 and 47 above) and the domestic court’s findings of 3 October 2007 (see paragraph 41 above). He stressed that the Government neither provided a satisfactory explanation as to the origins of his injuries nor carried out an effective investigation into his complaints. The applicant further stated, in particular, that the inquiries conducted had been neither timely nor thorough; the authorities had not questioned him nor taken any steps to identify his torturers. Finally, he submitted that the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected by the police amounted to torture. In support of his allegations, the applicant referred to the documents submitted and the findings of the CPT of 13 March 2007 in respect of the human rights violations committed by the staff of the ORB-2 at the material time (see paragraph 61 above).


128.  The applicant complained that as a result of his secret transfer to Tajikistan, where he was under an imminent risk of  <mask> to Uzbekistan, he had been exposed to a threat of torture and religious persecution. He also complained that his arguments concerning the risk of being subjected to ill-treatment if extradited to Uzbekistan had not received genuine and thorough consideration by the Russian authorities. He relied on Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, which read as follows:


101.  The applicant also questioned the value and credibility of the assurances put forward by the Tajik authorities. In particular, he drew attention to the fact that they had only provided for the possibility of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs examining the conditions of his detention but had not pointed to any specific mechanism that would allow monitoring of the treatment received by the applicant, nor had they established any form of responsibility on the part of the authorities of the requesting country for a potential breach of their obligations. Furthermore, he referred to the Court’s position in the case of Saadi v. Italy ([GC] no. 37201/06, ECHR 2008) and the cases concerning  <mask> to Tajikistan: Khodzhayev, cited above; Khaydarov v. Russia (no. 21055/09, 20 May 2010); and Gaforov, cited above, to the effect that diplomatic assurances were not sufficient to conclude that a State would refrain from subjecting the individual extradited to torture when various independent sources pointed to the existence of such practice in that State.


90.  The applicant has further claimed that he would risk persecution in Rwanda because of the fact that he is a Hutu. The Court notes that none of the decisions by the ICTR and national jurisdictions refusing transfer or  <mask> to Rwanda has been based, even in part, on such considerations. Nor has any evidence been submitted or found which gives reason to conclude that there is a general situation of persecution or ill-treatment of the Hutu population in Rwanda. Moreover, the applicant has not pointed to any particular personal circumstances which would indicate that he risks being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 due to his ethnicity.


55.  The applicant averred that his submissions concerning the risk of ill‑treatment had not been properly, if at all, considered by the domestic authorities either in the expulsion or the asylum proceedings. In the former proceedings the courts had had no obligation to consider the issue of the risk of ill-treatment and, given the expedited nature of the court’s examination of the expulsion matter, the applicant had been deprived of a meaningful opportunity to state his case. Likewise, in the asylum proceedings, although the courts had not been formally prevented from assessing the matter of the risk of ill-treatment, they had chosen to disregard the applicant’s submissions in that respect and the information from independent sources provided by him. Moreover, in view of the expulsion of the applicant in the Muminov case despite pending asylum proceedings and also the insufficiently clear wording of the relevant provisions, it could not be argued with certainty that a pending application for asylum had a suspensive effect in the event of an expulsion being ordered. Lastly, the applicant alleged that his expulsion would be, in reality, a disguised  <mask> and that the migration authorities and the courts had been influenced by the FSB, who wished to expel him from the country because of his presumed membership of HT.


81.  The applicant’s representative argued that his allegations of a risk of ill-treatment had not been examined by the Russian authorities. She relied on several reports by United Nations agencies and international and regional organisations and argued that the applicant had run and continued to run a risk of torture in Uzbekistan on account of his religious beliefs. She gave examples of cases when Muslim detainees had been ill-treated, and in certain cases killed, because of their religious beliefs, or unjustifiably subjected to disciplinary penalties such as placement in punishment cells without food or water, in particular because of their attempts to pray. She also referred to recent reports on the allegedly appalling conditions of detention and the lack of monitoring of detention facilities in Uzbekistan. The applicant’s representative also relied on the third-party interveners’ submissions before the Court in the cases of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, ECHR 2005‑I) and Ismoilov and Others v. Russia (no. 2947/06, 24 April 2008). According to the applicant’s representative, the applicant’s expulsion had been in fact “an  <mask> in disguise”, as a result of which the applicant had been convicted of the offences in respect of which the Russian authorities had refused extradition. The applicant had been expelled in flagrant violation of Russian law before his appeals against the expulsion order and the dismissal of his refugee application could be examined. Besides, no diplomatic assurances had been obtained from the Uzbek authorities in the present case and, even if they had been obtained, they could not have been effective in the context of an administrative expulsion formally unrelated to any pending criminal proceedings against an applicant. With reference to the Court’s judgment in the case of Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia (no. 36378/02, ECHR 2005‑III), it was argued that the respondent Government’s failure to comply with an indication under Rule 39 should not necessarily prevent the Court from examining on the merits a complaint under Article 3. Otherwise, it would be less burdensome for a respondent State to remove an applicant from its territory in cases in which Rule 39 was applied and to be held in violation of Article 34 of the Convention than to comply with Rule 39 and to be found to have breached Article 3 and/or Article 6.


59.  The Government submitted that the applicant's detention had been lawful and compatible with Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. On the day of her arrest the Russian authorities had had in their possession a confirmation from the Belarus authorities that a request for  <mask> would be sent shortly, an arrest warrant approved by the Minsk prosecutor and a decision on her inclusion on the list of fugitives from justice. The domestic courts had reviewed and confirmed the lawfulness of the custodial measure.


94.  The applicant complained that his  <mask> to the United States of America exposed him to treatment incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention. He contended that offences A and B, on the basis of which his extradition had been granted, carried a maximum life prison sentence which was irreducible de facto, and that if he were convicted he would have no prospect of ever being released.


133.  The Government maintained that the applicants had been detained pending  <mask> to Uzbekistan pursuant to a court order issued in accordance with Article 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Their detention had therefore been lawful. The Government further noted that on 4 April 2006 the Constitutional Court had issued a decision in which it declared that the general provisions of Chapter 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were to apply to all forms and stages of criminal proceedings, including proceedings for extradition (see paragraph 85 above). The Supreme Court had noted in that respect that not only initial placement in custody, but also extensions of detention were to be ordered by a court on application by a prosecutor. However, no application for extension of detention had been made by the prosecutor in the applicants' case.


98.  The applicant maintained that his detention between 4 and 30 January 2007 fell within the ambit of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention. He considered that once the request for his  <mask> had been received by the Ukrainian authorities on 30 January 2007, his detention fell within the ambit of Article 5 § 1 (f). For the Government, the detention fell within Article 5 § 1 (f) throughout.


74.  The applicant asserted that the Government had not provided any detailed explanations regarding the alleged violation of this provision. He insisted that he had been deprived of “speedy” judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention on account of the delays in examining his appeals against the extension orders of 25 December 2012 and 25 March 2013 of forty-seven and fifty-six days, respectively. Furthermore, he alleged that Article 125 of the CCrP did not provide a reviewing court with the competence to order the release of a detainee, as required by Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. Lastly, the applicant claimed that Articles 108-10 of the CCrP did not allow him to apply for release on his own initiative and pointed out that he had been detained for two-and-a-half months after the final decision upholding the  <mask> order in his respect had been issued on 19 June 2013, which he asserted had amounted to a breach of his right to judicial review of his detention at “reasonable intervals”.


77.  The Government submitted that none of the material in the  <mask> case could have led the Bulgarian authorities to suspect that the applicant would be in danger of ill-treatment if surrendered to Iran. In particular, in their extradition request the Iranian authorities had given assurances in that regard, and when describing the text of Article 656 § 4 of the Iranian Penal Code, had not mentioned that it also envisaged flogging. The Interpol red notice had not said anything of the sort either. The Bulgarian authorities could not be expected to know Iranian criminal law, especially since the information about it provided by the Iranian authorities had seemed complete and accurate. The applicant and his counsel had not raised the point either. His vague statement at the hearing on 21 December 2016 could not be taken into account, as at that stage the courts had only been deciding whether to keep the applicant in custody pending extradition, not whether to extradite him.


50.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s allegations concerning the risk of ill-treatment in Kyrgyzstan had been subject to examination in the course of the refugee status and temporary asylum proceedings. Moreover, the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office, the Moscow City Court and the Supreme Court of Russia had thoroughly examined the allegations in the course of the  <mask> proceedings. For instance, in the course of the hearing before the Moscow City Court on 16 April 2013 the applicant and Ms Ryabinina, an expert on refugee law, had made submissions regarding possible ill-treatment in Kyrgyzstan. However, the claims had been dismissed, as the applicant had only referred to the general human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan and had thus failed to demonstrate any individualised risk of ill-treatment. The courts’ decisions upholding the extradition order had been fully and properly reasoned.


86.  The Government contended that the application should be declared inadmissible as incompatible ratione personae. They submitted that the applicant had not been extradited by the Russian authorities to Uzbekistan, the impugned measure had not been applied to him, his  <mask> had been suspended and therefore he could not claim to be the victim of a violation of Article 3.


107.  The applicant further argued that in examining his case the Russian authorities had disregarded his specific submissions concerning his religious and political persecution and relevant reports by independent NGOs, and had relied solely on “official sources of information”. The courts' conclusion that the applicant had voluntarily left Tajikistan was at variance with his consistent submissions that he had fled because of his persecution on religious grounds and the ill-treatment sustained in custody. Referring to other cases against Russia concerning expulsion and  <mask> and pending before the Court, the applicant insisted that the Russian courts consistently adopted the same formalistic approach in dealing with such complaints, which showed that the remedies suggested by the Government were ineffective in practice.


79.  The applicant claimed that the interval between the instances of “automatic periodic review” of the lawfulness of his detention pending  <mask> had been excessively long, as he had not been able to ask the domestic courts to reconsider the issue of custodial detention after 30 January 2014. Moreover, he disagreed with the Government’s assertion that it had been open to him to initiate proceedings for release under Article 110 of the CCrP, as in his view it had been incumbent on the State agencies to initiate such proceedings of their own motion. He further claimed that the application procedure under Articles 119-122 of the CCrP could not be regarded as an effective remedy in his case as it was applicable only to parties to criminal proceedings instituted in Russia. Moreover, any prosecutor’s decision taken on the basis of that procedure could only be challenged in court under Article 125 of the CCrP, which does not empower a court to order a detainee’s release, even if it finds the impugned detention order unlawful or unjustified (see Zokhidov v. Russia, no. 67286/10, § 188, 5 February 2013).


88.  The Government further contended that the present case was also different from Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 66069/09 and 2 others, ECHR 2013 (extracts) and Trabelsi (cited above) in that neither of those cases involved enforceable Sentencing Guidelines establishing ranges of in concreto punishment to be examined and assessed by the Court. In that regard, they further argued that the applicant in the instant case, unlike Trabelsi, faced only a potential conviction for criminal offences related to drug trafficking and not for terrorist offences. The Government also noted that notwithstanding the theoretical maximum penalty of life imprisonment, the US Criminal Code assigned an advisory sentencing range of 188 to 235 months of incarceration to the counts that were the basis of the  <mask> request, which was far less than the possible life sentence provided for under the statutes under which the applicant had been charged.


180.  The Government confirmed that by the date of the applicant’s arrest with a view to  <mask> he was living in Moscow with his wife and three of their six minor children, while the other three children remained in Uzbekistan. They argued that the decision to extradite the applicant to his home country did not constitute an interference within the meaning of Article 8 § 1. The decision was in accordance with law, namely Article 466 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation and Article 61 § 1 of the 1993 Minsk Convention. It served a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. First, it was justified by a pressing social need to ensure that the proceedings against the applicant in Uzbekistan were conducted with reasonable grounds to suspect him of having committed particularly serious crimes in Uzbekistan. It was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, because neither the applicant’s wife nor their children held Russian nationality. They were Uzbek nationals. The applicant’s wife and three children could follow him to Uzbekistan if the applicant was extradited.


196.  The applicant argued that, contrary to the Government’s submission, the FMS officials who had carried out his deportation had been aware of the Court’s application of Rule 39 because he and his lawyer had not only told them about it but he had also shown them the Court’s letter to that effect when they had burst into his flat on 21 December 2011 and had taken him away. In any event, the FMS was a structural division of the Ministry of the Interior and thus part of the Government of the Russian Federation. From the information made available to the Government after notice of the applicant’s case had been given to it, it was clear that the FMS had already been involved in the assessment of the issue of whether he was to be returned to Uzbekistan at the time when the  <mask> proceedings were pending. Accordingly, it was for those State bodies, including the Russian GPO and the Office of the Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights, to ensure that the information on the Court’s application of the interim measure was brought to the attention of all authorities involved.


213.  The Government noted that the applicant had provided a breakdown of the work performed by his representatives, but had submitted no agreement concerning legal assistance, or other documents setting out their hourly rates. Furthermore, as the applicants’ representatives specialise in cases involving  <mask> and expulsion to the CIS States, the Government expressed doubts as to whether the present case required research and preparation to the extent claimed by the applicant.


53.  The applicant maintained her complaint. She considered that the interference with her right to have family visits while in detention had not been in accordance with law and that the applicable law had lacked clarity, certainty and foreseeability as regards the authorisation of family visits in respect of people detained pending  <mask>. She further argued that the interference had not pursued a legitimate aim. It had placed a disproportionate burden on her and had not been necessary.


27.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s allegations that he risked ill-treatment in the event of his  <mask> to Uzbekistan had been considered by the national authorities and dismissed on sufficient grounds. Referring to the decisions of the prosecution and immigration authorities and the domestic courts in the course of the extradition and expulsion proceedings, the Government asserted that his claims had been duly reviewed and found to be devoid of substance. In their opinion, the assurances presented to the Russian authorities by the Uzbekistani authorities were sufficient and compatible with the countries’ international obligations and domestic legal developments. As regards the expulsion proceedings, the expulsion order did not specify that the applicant was to be taken to Uzbekistan, but merely stated that he was to be removed from the territory of the Russian Federation. The Government concluded that a risk of the applicant’s treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention had not been convincingly established.


81.  The Government further claimed that while certain prejudices towards ethnic Uzbeks persisted in the requesting country, there was no “flagrant denial of justice” for the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan. The diplomatic assurances given by the Kyrgyz authorities in the applicants’ respective cases excluded the possibility of their ill-treatment upon  <mask>. The Court had not yet allowed demonstrating the effectiveness of Russian authorities’ diplomatic supervision mechanism for the protection of the rights of those extradited to Kyrgyzstan because it had indicated interim measures precluding such extraditions.


78.  The Government argued that the applicant did in fact have the opportunity after 30 January 2014 to initiate a review of the lawfulness of his detention and to apply for release, as is required by Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. They submitted, in particular, that the domestic legal system provided for an application for the release of individuals detained pending  <mask> under Articles 119-122 of the CCrP. The Government claimed, furthermore, that the applicant could also have asked a prosecutor to reconsider the imposition of custodial detention under Article 110 of the CCrP after the interim measures had been applied by the Court. They illustrated the application of this legal provision by reference to the case of Kadirzhanov and Mamashev (cited above, §§ 34, 35, 111, 113 and 131), where Mr Kadirzhanov – who had been held in custody pending extradition and in respect of whom the Court had applied interim measures pursuant to Rule 39 of the Rules of Court – was released on the basis of a prosecutor’s decision at the request of his lawyer. The Government further stated that, although the interim measure had been applied by the Court on 28 January 2014, the Supreme Court was not competent to take a decision on the applicant’s release from custody during the court hearing of 30 January 2014 because the scope of that hearing had been limited to reviewing the decision of the Primorye Regional Court of 1 November 2013 and the latest extension order had been delivered by a different court.


97.  The applicant provided a different interpretation of the statistics cited by the Government. He pointed out that the average sentence length of 8.4 years excluded life sentences and took no account of the period of detention served by sentenced persons who were either released at the time of trial or placed on probation. Nor did these studies cover persons who had been arrested during the reference period but had not yet been tried. Furthermore, the US Department of Justice produced different figures: of the 403 persons already tried between 11 September 2001 and 18 March 2010, thirty-one had not yet been convicted, twelve had been given life sentences and five had been sentenced to sixty or more years’ imprisonment. The applicant cited the case of Richard Reid, whose name had been mentioned on several occasions in the criminal file which had led to the applicant’s conviction in Belgium, as well as during the  <mask> proceedings. Richard Reid had been sentenced in 2003 to life imprisonment on the same charge B as the applicant, for planning to destroy an aircraft during flight by means of explosives hidden in his shoes.


92.  The applicant maintained that in the event of his  <mask> he would face a strong risk of being denied a fair trial. He noted that the Government had failed to give any explanations about the domestic judicial system in Turkmenistan, probably because they considered this problem beyond their responsibilities. The applicant drew attention to the Government’s acceptance that they could not consider the probability of a flagrant denial of a fair trial in Turkmenistan.


29.  The applicant further submitted that there existed the administrative practice of substituting expulsion for  <mask> which was based on an unpublished order of the Moscow Region prosecutor, no. 86/81 of 3 July 2009, which provided that in every case of release of a detained individual because his extradition was impossible, it was mandatory to decide on his administrative expulsion from Russia. The applicant therefore maintained that his expulsion had been ordered to secure his rendition to the Uzbekistani authorities, that is to prevent him from being released and to secure either expulsion or extradition, as the case might be, and that his allegations of the risk of ill-treatment had not been thoroughly examined in the administrative expulsion proceedings.


107.  The applicant maintained that the requirements of Article 5 § 1 did not dispense the State from fulfilling its international obligations regarding  <mask>, since such a ground for detention was clearly provided for in Article 5 § 1 (f), which only required the detention to be in accordance with a procedure prescribed by the domestic legislation. The applicant submitted that the Minsk Convention did not provide for such a procedure. He further observed that the unlawfulness of his detention between 4 and 10 January 2007 had also been admitted by the State authorities themselves.


34.  The Government pleaded that the applicant had failed to exhaust available effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. In particular, they submitted that the applicant had failed to appeal against the refusal to grant him temporary asylum of 26 November 2013. If the applicant had been granted temporary asylum, his  <mask> would have been suspended or even rescinded. The Government also submitted that the applicant had failed to lodge a cassation appeal under Chapter 48.1 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”) against the Supreme Court’s appeal judgment of 25 February 2014 upholding the extradition order.


150.  The Government disagreed, stating that such an effective procedure existed in the Ukrainian domestic law. They referred to Articles 106, 165-2 and 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which specified the procedure for examining appeals against preventive measures. They further maintained that on 8 October 2004 the Plenary Supreme Court had adopted a practice recommendation concerning review of complaints concerning  <mask> matters.


113.  The applicant’s  <mask> was also permissible under the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees which excludes the application of that Convention to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons to believe that he or she (i) has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee, or (ii) has been found guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Article 33 § 2 of that Convention does not extend the prohibition of expulsion to refugees whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country they are in, or who, having been convicted of a particularly serious crime by a final judgment, constitute a danger to the community of that country.


156.  The Government contested that argument. They stated that the first applicant’s detention with a view to  <mask> had been fully in accordance with domestic law. The first applicant had been present at all first-instance hearings on his detention, and when he had requested to participate in the appeal hearings, this had been ensured by means of a video-conference. The length of his detention had not exceeded that permitted by domestic law, and he had been released when the maximum duration was reached. Accordingly, the first applicant’s detention had been fully in compliance with both domestic law and Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention.


147.  The Government also submitted that, pursuant to the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Russia, the provisions of Chapter 13 of the CCrP, in particular Articles 108 and 109, were fully applicable to persons detained with a view to  <mask> under Article 466 § 1 of the CCrP. The applicant’s placement into custody had been ordered in accordance with Article 108 of the CCrP. His detention had been repeatedly extended under Article 109 of the CCrP. The domestic courts had referred to these provisions in their decisions. Upon the expiry of the maximum authorised detention term under Article 109 of the CCrP, the applicant had been released. Hence, the applicable legislation had enabled him to estimate the length of his detention.


122.  The Government argued that the offences of which the applicant was accused in his home country were not punishable by the death penalty. The Court notes, however, that the thrust of the applicant’s complaint concerns not a fear of receiving the death penalty but the risk that he would be subjected to ill-treatment or torture if he were expelled to Uzbekistan. The Court’s task is now to establish whether there is a real risk of ill‑treatment in the event of the applicant’s  <mask> to Uzbekistan. Since he has not yet been extradited, owing to the application by the Court of an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the material date for the assessment of that risk is that of the Court’s consideration of the case (see, among others, Gaforov v. Russia, no. 25404/09, § 128, 21 October 2010).


125.  The Government further pointed out that the first applicant had availed himself of the opportunity to appeal before a court, under Article 463 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the Prosecutor’s Office’s decision to extradite him. Under that provision a court must examine an appeal within one month and either declare the  <mask> decision unlawful and quash it or dismiss the appeal. In the latter case a cassation appeal could be lodged against the decision. The fact that the first applicant’s appeal had eventually been dismissed did not mean that the remedy had been ineffective, as the requirement of effectiveness did not mean that the outcome of the proceedings should be favourable to the applicant (relying upon Kaijalainen v. Finland (dec.), no. 24671/94, 12 April 1996). The Government also noted that the effectiveness of the remedy was further corroborated by the fact that in the cases of Soliyev v. Russia, no. 62400/10, § 27, 5 June 2012; Khodzhamberdiyev v. Russia, no. 64809/10, § 19, 5 June 2012; and Abidov v. Russia, no. 52805/10, §§ 26‑27, 12 June 2012, the Russian court had annuled extradition orders issued by the Prosecutor’s Office. Therefore, the first applicant had had an effective remedy in respect of his complaint under Article 3 as required by Article 13 of the Convention.


94.  The applicant maintained that he had argued before the Russian courts that he faced a real risk of ill-treatment and political persecution in Uzbekistan. He had submitted reports on Uzbekistan by the UN institutions and international NGOs confirming that torture was widespread in detention facilities and that this information had not received proper assessment from the Russian authorities. He further maintained that the authorities had failed to take into account the information from the Russian Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees confirming that the risk of his being ill‑treated in Uzbekistan was justified and substantiated. He pointed out that the courts had rejected his arguments without giving any reasons except a reference to the assurances given by the Uzbek authorities. Finally, he referred to a number of cases examined by the Court in which it had been established that  <mask> to Uzbekistan of a person sought for political crimes would constitute a violation of Article 3.


66.  The Government argued that the applicant did not have victim status, as enforcement of the  <mask> order had been and remained suspended due to the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, in the Government’s view, the applicant had not made any detailed submissions about the risk of ill-treatment and, thus, had not exhausted domestic remedies. Finally, the Government submitted that Belarus had ratified and applied a large number of international treaties aimed at the protection of human rights. The Belarusian authorities had provided assurances that the applicant would not be prosecuted for offences other than those indicated in the extradition request and would not be subjected to torture or ill-treatment or political persecution. The offences for which the applicant was being prosecuted did not entail the possibility of a sentence of capital punishment. The Russian courts had delved into the issue of the possible risk of the applicant’s ill-treatment and had found it to be unsubstantiated. Thus, the applicant had no case to argue.


44.  The Government claimed that the applicant had failed to provide substantial evidence that he would risk ill-treatment if extradited to Kyrgyzstan. They submitted that the domestic authorities and courts had thoroughly examined his allegations concerning the risk of ill-treatment in Kyrgyzstan in the course of the refugee status and  <mask> proceedings. The applicant had been able to attend those proceedings and to present his position, and had used his right of appeal against the judgments.


83.  The applicant argued that there had been insufficient reasons for his detention since he had had no intention to abscond, and that the courts should have considered less stringent preventive measures such as house arrest. He also argued that the provisions of the CCrP on detention in  <mask> cases were unclear and unforeseeable because they allowed arrest and detention without a detention order issued by a Russian court. Such provisions did not specify the circumstances in which detention could be replaced by house arrest, which remained an illusory option.


99.  The applicant argued that the detention order of 25 November 2009 had not set a limit on the duration of his detention and that there had been no extension orders. At the same time, the applicant also argued that subsequent detention orders had authorised his detention for long periods of time. The circumstances relating to his detention could have changed with the passage of time, while the detention orders had remained based on the gravity of the charges against him and the existence of pending  <mask> proceedings. In any event, the applicable procedures and legislation had been insufficiently clear and precise.


131.  The applicants further noted that the Russian courts had denied the applicability of Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to detention pending  <mask> and had ruled that Russian law did not establish any time-limits for such detention or any procedure for its extension. The applicants argued that the absence of such a procedure had rendered their detention arbitrary and unlawful.


145.  The applicant also claimed that the domestic authorities had not displayed due diligence in conducting the  <mask> proceedings, in particular from 3 February to 24 June 2010, when the said proceedings remained dormant. The domestic courts had failed to take into account the progress of the extradition proceedings. The Government had failed to provide reasons for the applicant’s detention during this period.


227.  The Government contested this argument. They stated that the second applicant’s detention with a view to  <mask> had been fully in accordance with the procedure and time-limits provided in domestic law. The second applicant and her lawyer had been present at all court hearings concerning her detention. Accordingly, the second applicant’s detention had been in compliance with both domestic law and Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention.


388.  The applicants' representatives claimed that their clients had never officially been detained with a view to their  <mask> and that their placement in custody on 6 and 7 August 2002 was a disguised form of detention for the purpose of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. Their transfer on those dates from the civilian hospital to prison (the prison infirmary in the case of Mr Margoshvili) was the result of a visit to Georgia on 6 August 2002 by the Russian Procurator-General, who had brought with him the request for the applicants' extradition (see paragraphs 58-60 and 62 above). Quite apart from the requirement of promptness set out in Article 5 § 2 of the Convention, the applicants were not informed either during their transfer to prison or subsequently that they had been arrested with a view to being handed over to the Russian authorities. The applicants had thus been deprived of the possibility of challenging the lawfulness of that detention. Submitting the same complaints, Mr Khadjiev relied on Article 5 § 2 and Article 6 § 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 235 above). He also complained that he had been questioned without an interpreter at the civilian hospital and that he had not been informed of the accusations against him when he was brought before a judge on 6 August 2002 (see paragraph 58 above).


141.  The applicant submitted that his  <mask> in contravention of the interim measure indicated by the Court had been decided without any regard to legal considerations and had stemmed from a deliberate political decision based on fallacious reasons. The Government provided no evidence to substantiate the applicant’s so-called dangerousness; moreover, the applicant had not been the subject of any investigation consequent upon any attempted escape or acts of proselytising; on the contrary, all the opinions of the governors of the prisons in which the applicant had been held mentioned his irreproachable behaviour. The only reason for the Belgian Government’s action had been a political determination to hand the applicant over to the US authorities as quickly as possible and to avoid a Court judgment finding a violation of Article 3 in the event of extradition. This determination had in fact long been in evidence, as could be seen by the repeated requests for the lifting of the interim measure while the appeal pending before the Conseil d’Etat was not of suspensive effect vis-à-vis the decision to extradite. In so doing the Government had irreversibly infringed the applicant’s right of individual petition, as he now found it legally impossible, because of his extradition, and materially impossible, because of his solitary confinement in a prison virtually cut off from the outside world, to usefully pursue his application to the Court.


127.  The applicant maintained that the requirements of Article 5 § 1 did not dispense the State from fulfilling its international obligations regarding  <mask>, since such a ground for detention was clearly provided for in Article 5 § 1(f), which only required the detention to be in accordance with a procedure prescribed by the domestic legislation. The applicant submitted that the Minsk Convention did not provide for such a procedure. He further stated that his detention, from the moment of his apprehension on 23 August 2004 until the present date, lacked a legal basis, had been groundless and in breach of the procedure prescribed by law. He stated that his detention until 16 September 2004 should fall within the ambit of Article 5 § 1(c) of the Convention and after that date – it should be examined under Article 5 § 1(f).


106.  The applicant complained under Article 3 and Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention that his detention from 2 February to 29 September 2006 had been unlawful and that the  <mask> proceedings had not been conducted with due diligence. The Court will examine those complaints under Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:


109.  The applicant pointed out that the Minister of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan, in an interview given in the course of  <mask> proceedings, had described him as the leader of a terrorist group and one of the perpetrators of the terrorist attack of 3 September 2010 who had been arrested during the criminal investigation of the attack. However, the only statements of charges accompanying the extradition request were dated 26 and 30 March 2009 and did not mention involvement in this attack. No additional charges were brought against him afterwards. The applicant argued that the Minister’s statement had violated his presumption of innocence and called into question the credibility of the assurances that he would enjoy a fair trial in Tajikistan. He insisted that the accusations against him had been “fabricated”, which intensified the risk that he would be subjected to torture in Tajikistan in order to extract self-incriminating testimonies. Finally, the applicant referred to the conclusion reached by the UNHCR, namely that he faced a real risk of torture in Tajikistan.


41.  The applicant replied that diplomatic assurances by the Uzbek authorities did not refute his arguments about high risk of ill-treatment (he referred to the Court’s established case-law: Abdulkhakov v. Russia, no. 14743/11, §§ 149-150, 2 October 2012, and Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, §§ 147-148, ECHR 2008). The Government’s claim that they had no information about anyone being ill-treated in Uzbekistan appeared to be false in the light of the recent reports by Amnesty International about the destiny of Mr Khamidkariyev who had been abducted in Russia and forcibly returned to Uzbekistan where he faced an unfair trial based on his confessions obtained by torture (see paragraph 33 above and the facts of application no. 42332/14). The mere fact of ratification of international human rights treaties by Uzbekistan does not in itself provide sufficient safeguards against ill-treatment because of the absence of any control mechanisms in relation to the country’s compliance with its commitments (here the applicant referred to the Court’s findings in: Ermakov v. Russia, no. 43165/10, § 204, 7 November 2013, and Khodzhayev v. Russia, no. 52466/08, § 98, 12 May 2010). The applicant deemed illogical the Government’s argument that his  <mask> had been refused in respect of some of the charges. What is important is that it was authorised for the offence of participation in an extremist organisation which put him in a vulnerable group systematically subject to torture. In view of the recent publications by international human rights organisations, the applicant submitted that there were no improvements in the sphere of human rights in Uzbekistan and that torture of persons suspected of prohibited religious activities had remained a widespread practice. However, the applicant’s allegations of an increased risk of torture were not examined at any stage of the domestic proceedings.


161.  The applicant submitted that the  <mask> proceedings had lasted for more than eight years and the authorities had therefore had plenty of time to examine the extradition request and to fulfil all necessary formalities while he had been serving his prison term. By resuming the extradition proceedings only after the end of his prison term, the authorities had failed to exercise due diligence and had made him languish in detention for many additional months after he had finished serving his sentence.


72.  The applicant submitted in reply that he had consistently raised the grievance concerning the risk of ill-treatment at all stages of the  <mask>, the expulsion and the refugee-status proceedings. He maintained that the administrative-removal proceedings had been used by the authorities in order to circumvent the guarantees available to the applicant in extradition proceedings. For instance, the CAO did not contain any provisions obliging the authorities concerned to consider the risk of ill-treatment allegations in a removal case. The refugee-status proceedings had not had any suspensive effect in relation to the administrative expulsion. He further argued that a supervisory-review appeal against the final administrative removal order would not have suspensive effect either, and therefore could not be regarded as an effective remedy.


130.  The applicants submitted that Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure set the initial time-limit for detention at two months. As no extension of the applicants' detention had been ordered after the expiry of the two-month time-limit, the applicants' subsequent detention had been unlawful. The applicants referred in that respect to the Government's submissions in which it had been confirmed that the detention pending  <mask> was to be extended following the procedure established by Russian law for the extension of detention during the investigation and that that procedure had not been respected in the applicants' case (see paragraph 133 below).


157.  The applicant argued that the Russian law on detention pending expulsion was not sufficiently clear and foreseeable. In particular, the applicant complained that his arrest for the purposes of expulsion had been ordered to circumvent the requirements of the domestic law, which established a maximum time-limit for detention pending  <mask>. On the contrary, detention pending expulsion was not limited in time under Russian law. He noted that administrative removal proceedings had been initiated only when the authorities faced the need to release the applicant. In addition, since the application of Rule 39 by the Court, the applicant’s detention pending expulsion had no legitimate purpose and was therefore arbitrary, since he could no longer be expelled.


106.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s allegation of politically motivated persecution had been assessed by the Russian courts when examining his appeals against the  <mask> order, and rejected as unfounded. The Russian courts had relied on the statement from the Prosecutor General’s Office of Uzbekistan to the effect that the applicant would face no risk of ill-treatment if he were to be extradited to Uzbekistan and on the fact that the Russian authorities did not have any information confirming his allegation. Referring to the assurances from the Uzbek authorities, the Government argued that the applicant would not be subjected to ill-treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.


40.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s allegations that he risked ill-treatment in the event of his  <mask> to Uzbekistan had been duly considered by the national authorities. The Russian Prosecutor General had received the assurances from his Uzbekistani counterpart that the applicant would not be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment and that he would be given an opportunity to defend himself. The Russian authorities had no information about any extradited persons having been ill-treated or tortured in Uzbekistan. The Government pointed out that Uzbekistan was a party to international instruments prohibiting torture and ill-treatment and that the extradition was refused in respect of the offences of organising a criminal association, illegal crossing of the State border, terrorism and infringement of the constitutional order of the Republic of Uzbekistan.


96.  The Government contested that argument. They stated that in the event of the applicant's  <mask> to Kazakhstan he would not be liable to capital punishment as the indictment in his case related to a criminal act under Article 96(1) of the Criminal Code and involved the offence of murder, not punishable by capital punishment. Furthermore, they stated that there had been a moratorium on capital punishment in Kazakhstan, that capital punishment was applied only in exceptional circumstances and that this sentence could not be enforced, even if one assumed that such a sentence would be passed in relation to the applicant.


170.  The applicant submitted in his observations dated 11 July 2011 that the available procedure for review of detention was not effective, for the following reasons. First, in the proceedings concerning the extension of the applicant’s detention, the domestic courts at all levels of jurisdiction factually reproduced the same reasoning, that there had been no new circumstances warranting an application of a measure of restraint milder than detention. Furthermore, the proceedings for review were ineffective, since on 25 March 2010 the Perovskiy District Court ordered the applicant’s detention in the absence of the guarantees from the Uzbek authorities that the applicant would not be subjected to ill-treatment in case of his  <mask>. Finally, the applicant or his representative had been unable to challenge the judgment of 25 March 2010, since during these proceedings the applicant had been represented by a State-appointed lawyer and not a lawyer of his own choosing.


29.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> proceedings against the applicant had been discontinued because the Uzbek authorities had not produced a detention order or an extradition request in respect of the applicant. The domestic courts had then ordered his administrative removal to Uzbekistan because his residence in Russia had been unlawful. The Government drew the Court’s attention to the fact that the applicant had not applied for refugee status immediately after his arrival in Russia. His application for refugee status had been lodged only after the administrative removal order had been issued against him. Moreover, the applicant had not referred to the risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan either upon arrest or before the Serpukhov Town Court. It had not been until the appeal proceedings before the Moscow Regional Court that the applicant had for the first time mentioned the risk of ill-treatment. His allegations had been examined and rejected by the Regional Court as unsubstantiated.


55.  The applicant maintained that in Turkmenistan there was a practice of torturing people during investigation to extract confessions. Furthermore, in Turkmenistan he would face a risk of appalling conditions of detention. The applicant made particular reference to the conditions in the SIZO of the Ministry of the Interior in Ashgabat, in which he was most likely to be held in the event of his  <mask>. He referred to a number of international materials, which described the human rights situation in Turkmenistan as particularly worrying.


105.  The Government relied on the reasoning of the House of Lords in Wellington and the Canadian Supreme Court in Burns and Ferris (see paragraphs 34–42 and 44 and 45 above). On the basis of those cases, the Government submitted that, in the  <mask> context, a distinction had to be drawn between torture and other forms of ill-treatment. A real risk of torture in the receiving State should be an absolute bar on extradition. However, for all other forms of ill-treatment, it was legitimate to consider the policy objectives pursued by extradition in determining whether the ill-treatment reached the minimum level of severity required by Article 3. This was the appropriate means of resolving the tension that existed between the Court’s judgments in Soering, on the one hand, and Chahal and Saadi, on the other. Article 3 could not be interpreted as meaning that any form of ill-treatment in a non-Contracting State would be sufficient to prevent extradition.


136.  The Government stressed that the applicant’s detention had been subject to review by the courts and that on 14 March 2005 the Kuybyshevskiy district court of St. Petersburg had ordered his release, referring directly to the European Convention. The court noted the absence of legal grounds in the domestic legislation which could allow the extension or alteration of measures of restraint in relation to persons detained with a view to  <mask>. The Government therefore argued that there had been no breach of the applicant’s right to judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention.


104.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s detention pending  <mask> had been lawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (f). The applicant was detained with a view to enforcement of the court order for his administrative removal from the country under Article 18.8 § 1 of the CAO. Referring to the reasons given by the courts for the applicant’s expulsion and detention, the Government argued that the expulsion proceedings had nothing to do with the extradition proceedings. The law on detention pending expulsion was sufficiently clear and foreseeable. The applicant’s detention was necessary to ensure the administrative removal, because he could have absconded from the authorities if released.


226.  The Government observed that the Chamber had referred to “refoulement” (refusal of entry) and to “expulsion” (deportation), without pointing out the distinction between the two notions, which in reality corresponded to different procedures in domestic legislation, more specifically under Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 (see paragraph 33 above). In particular, “refusal of entry at the border” was a decision by the border guards to turn away aliens arriving at border crossings without papers and without meeting the requirements for admission to Italy. The “deferred refusal-of-entry” procedure, ordered by the Chief of Police (questore), applied where an alien had entered the country illegally and had been allowed to stay temporarily to receive protection. Lastly, “deportation” corresponded to a written and reasoned decision whereby the competent administrative or judicial authorities ordered the removal from the country of an alien who did not have, or no longer had, leave to remain in the country. The Italian legal system made no provision for collective  <mask> and Article 19 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 prohibited the return of an alien to a State where he or she might be subjected to persecution. The Government explained that in the present case the applicants had been issued with “refusal-of-entry and removal” orders and had not been subjected to a measure of “expulsion” (i.e., deportation). Therefore, in the Government’s view, it could not have been a “collective expulsion”.


120.  The applicant argued that, in view of the case‑law of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division, a further appeal to that body would not have stood any chance of success; hence, this did not constitute a domestic remedy which he was required to exhaust. With regard to the decision on his objection lodged on the basis of section 72(3) of the Aliens Act 2000 – which was in any event not capable of providing him with an effective remedy against  <mask> –, the applicant pointed out that he had appealed against that decision.


129.  The applicants listed the following elements as the basis for their complaint under this head: verbal abuse and physical violence by the detention centre staff, limited privacy, limited access to an interpreter and legal aid, lack of opportunity to take walks and have outdoor exercise, and a lack of medical treatment. They referred to their complaints and the affidavits made by themselves and to their representatives. They believed that the cumulative effect of these factors amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. They also referred to the Courts’ previous findings of a violation of Article 3 on account of the conditions of confinement in detention centres for foreign nationals pending  <mask> and argued that conditions there, as a rule, were substandard to the requirements of the Convention.


113.  The applicant’s extradition was also permissible under the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees which excludes the application of that Convention to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons to believe that he or she (i) has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee, or (ii) has been found guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Article 33 § 2 of that Convention does not extend the prohibition of  <mask> to refugees whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country they are in, or who, having been convicted of a particularly serious crime by a final judgment, constitute a danger to the community of that country.


81.  The applicant’s representative argued that his allegations of a risk of ill-treatment had not been examined by the Russian authorities. She relied on several reports by United Nations agencies and international and regional organisations and argued that the applicant had run and continued to run a risk of torture in Uzbekistan on account of his religious beliefs. She gave examples of cases when Muslim detainees had been ill-treated, and in certain cases killed, because of their religious beliefs, or unjustifiably subjected to disciplinary penalties such as placement in punishment cells without food or water, in particular because of their attempts to pray. She also referred to recent reports on the allegedly appalling conditions of detention and the lack of monitoring of detention facilities in Uzbekistan. The applicant’s representative also relied on the third-party interveners’ submissions before the Court in the cases of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, ECHR 2005‑I) and Ismoilov and Others v. Russia (no. 2947/06, 24 April 2008). According to the applicant’s representative, the applicant’s  <mask> had been in fact “an extradition in disguise”, as a result of which the applicant had been convicted of the offences in respect of which the Russian authorities had refused extradition. The applicant had been expelled in flagrant violation of Russian law before his appeals against the expulsion order and the dismissal of his refugee application could be examined. Besides, no diplomatic assurances had been obtained from the Uzbek authorities in the present case and, even if they had been obtained, they could not have been effective in the context of an administrative expulsion formally unrelated to any pending criminal proceedings against an applicant. With reference to the Court’s judgment in the case of Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia (no. 36378/02, ECHR 2005‑III), it was argued that the respondent Government’s failure to comply with an indication under Rule 39 should not necessarily prevent the Court from examining on the merits a complaint under Article 3. Otherwise, it would be less burdensome for a respondent State to remove an applicant from its territory in cases in which Rule 39 was applied and to be held in violation of Article 34 of the Convention than to comply with Rule 39 and to be found to have breached Article 3 and/or Article 6.


49.  The applicant had subsequently been forced to get into a car which had no official designation and looked like a private vehicle. Fearing she was being abducted, the applicant had resisted and shouted for help. The officers had covered her mouth with their hands and started beating her on her arms and legs. Obliged to get into the vehicle, yet still unaware of the reasons for her abduction, she had been brought to a building which might have been a “police” station. Her bag had been forcibly taken from her and searched and when she complained she had again been physically abused. She had received repeated blows to her back, head and shoulders by an agent of the Turkish secret service. She had been taken for interrogation to another room, where she had been abused and mocked. After being taken back to the bus, she had asked to return to the unoccupied part of Cyprus. The response to that request had been further physical beating. The next day a female Turkish Cypriot doctor, fearing for her own safety, had refused to certify the existence of bruises on the applicant’s body. During the following nights, stones had been thrown at the applicant’s house with the purpose of intimidating her. She had been threatened with  <mask> from the occupied area or death if she were to make any complaints.


133.  The Government argued that, according to the information of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the FSB, there were no circumstances which would preclude the applicant’s extradition to Uzbekistan. Whilst noting that the Government failed to elaborate on that point, the Court reiterates that in cases concerning aliens facing  <mask> or extradition it is entitled to compare material referred to by the Government with information from other reliable and objective sources (see Salah Sheekh, cited above, § 136, and Gaforov v. Russia, no. 25404/09, § 129, 21 October 2010).


126.  The applicant submitted that there was no indication that the authorities had been actively pursuing his  <mask> or that it was at all possible. The only thing that the authorities had done had been to contact the Lebanese embassy in Sofia with a view to obtaining travel documents for the applicant to allow him to enter Lebanon. They had not tried to contact the embassies of any safe third countries. In the applicant’s view, detention pending deportation should be allowed to reach the maximum eighteen‑month period allowed by law only in exceptional cases.


164.  The applicant observed that he had a family life in Italy which would be disrupted by enforcement of his  <mask>: he had been living with Mrs V. since 1998 and their child had been born the following year. At that time he had already requested a residence permit, which was not issued until 2001. When that permit expired he had tried unsuccessfully to regularise his situation in order to find work. The applicant’s child attended school in Italy, which would not be possible in Tunisia, where the applicant himself was at risk of imprisonment or even death. Mrs V. had been out of work for about a year as she suffered from a serious form of ischaemia, which frequently made it necessary for her to be taken into hospital and also prevented her from travelling to Tunisia. The applicant was therefore the family’s sole means of financial support.


133.  The applicant submitted that even if removal had in fact been possible in the circumstances of the case, the duration of her detention had been excessive. It had become possible for the immigration authorities to deport the applicant from 11 February 2011. She considered that the fact that she had been serving a sentence of imprisonment for part of the time after that date (from 17 February to 16 June 2011) should not, in itself, have been an obstacle to the initiation of removal proceedings. Indeed, Article 14 (2) of the Act allowed the Minister to order the  <mask> from Malta of a person serving a prison sentence, prior to the completion of such sentence.


32.  The Government contested that argument. In their opinion, the applicants’ allegations about the existence of a risk of their being subjected to ill-treatment were hypothetical. They were not relevant to the issue of the legality of their stay in Russia and could not be considered in the course of  <mask> proceedings. Besides, the applicants had not even referred to the existence of such a risk when challenging their expulsion. The applicants’ allegations were thoroughly reviewed by the Russian migration authorities, which found them unfounded. The Government also noted that Uzbekistan had ratified the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and was obliged to act in compliance with it. Accordingly, no issue would arise under Article 3 of the Convention if the applicants were to be deported to Uzbekistan.


23.  The Government submitted that the lawfulness of the period of detention from the date on which it had been ordered and until the date of  <mask> ought to be presumed. Any alleged breaches of the requirements of good faith or due diligence were amenable to a judicial review in the proceedings under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure governing complaints about unlawful actions of State officials.


166.  The applicant claimed an amount of EUR 15,000 or such amount as the Court deemed equitable in respect of non‑pecuniary damage He submitted that the Government's failure to recognise that his  <mask> would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Convention had led to tremendous anxiety and suffering on the part of the applicant and his family, which could not be compensated by a finding of a violation alone.


163.  The applicant, however, argued that the real purpose of that last detention order had been to keep him detained after the maximum period of detention pending extradition had expired, and that the authorities had used  <mask> proceedings as a pretext to circumvent the requirements of the law. The first question before the Court is therefore whether or not the authorities acted in good faith when detaining the applicant within the expulsion proceedings.


93.  The applicant maintained that the Czech legal system had not offered him any effective opportunity to contest his  <mask> at the decisive points when he became aware of new relevant facts, in particular the Belarus extradition request and the decision by the Plzeň Regional Court that his extradition was not allowed because of the risk of violations of Articles 3 and 6 of the Convention.


25.  The Government submitted that the lawfulness of the period of detention from the date on which it had been ordered and until the date of  <mask> ought to be presumed. Any alleged breaches of the requirements of good faith or due diligence were amenable to a judicial review in the proceedings under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure governing complaints about unlawful actions of State officials.


73.  The Government maintained that the applicants could have obtained a review of their claims in the asylum proceedings and that while lodging the request for a judicial review they could have asked that the legal force of the decisions be suspended. They held that the first applicant had withdrawn his action and that a judgment had been delivered prior to the  <mask> of the second applicant. They also maintained that the applicants should have requested judicial review of the administrative expulsion decisions, notwithstanding that it had been ruled out by law at that time, and ultimately should have lodged constitutional appeals, which would have been successful as evidenced by the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 9 December 2008.


260.  The applicants alleged that it had not been possible for them to submit to the Italian authorities a complaint about the degrading conditions to which they had been subjected during their deprivation of liberty. They added that the refusal-of-entry orders had provided for the possibility of an appeal, within a period of sixty days, to the Agrigento Justice of the Peace. However, such a remedy would not have stayed the execution of the removal. The applicants argued that it was clear from the Court’s case-law (they referred in particular to Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, § 206) that the suspensive nature of a remedy was, in such matters, a condition of its effectiveness. That was merely a logical consequence of the hermeneutic principle that, to be effective, Convention provisions must be interpreted in a manner which guaranteed rights that were practical and effective and not theoretical and illusory. In the applicants’ view, the assessment of the lawfulness of the  <mask> must therefore take place before the measure is enforced.


38.  The applicant contended that his  <mask> to Afghanistan would expose him to a real risk of ill-treatment due to the high and visible profile of his father in Afghanistan as a result of his involvement with the PDPA Government until its overthrow in 1992. Whilst not disputing the findings of GS (set out at paragraph 26 above), he argued that the assessment of the risk to him required consideration of the level of violence in Afghanistan as well as his personal circumstances, having regard to the Court’s case-law that even though a number of individual factors may not, when considered separately, constitute a real risk, they may do when taken cumulatively and when considered in a situation of general violence and heightened security (NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904/07, § 130, 17 July 2008). He argued that his personal circumstances were such that he had established that there existed special distinguishing features that could or should have enabled the Secretary of State to foresee that he would be exposed to a very personal risk upon return to Afghanistan (Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, § 112, Series A no. 215).


223.  The Government alleged that no collective  <mask> had taken place. They observed that the applicants had been returned according to the fast-track procedure provided for in the agreement with Tunisia (see paragraphs 36-40 above), which could be regarded as a “readmission” agreement within the meaning of the Return Directive (see paragraph 41 above). They argued that this agreement had contributed to the repression of migrant smuggling, as called for by the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. Moreover, Tunisia was a safe country which respected human rights, this being shown by the fact that the applicants had not reported experiencing persecution or violations of their fundamental rights after their return.


58.  The Government provided several documents with regard to administrative proceedings concerning the applicant. These include an administrative offence report from the Leninskiy district dated 13 October 2006, indicating the applicant’s arrest on the same day at 10 o’clock and a decision of the Vidnoye Town Court of the Moscow Region, also dated 13 October 2006, fining the applicant (RUB 1,000) for not observing the applicable registration procedure, and ordering the applicant’s  <mask>. The Court decision also indicates that the applicant shall be held at the Reception Centre of Serpukhov until his expulsion. Furthermore, the judgment shows a stamp of Domodova airport, dated 17 October 2006.


69.   The Government further held that if the Court were to find that there had been an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life, it was evident that the  <mask> orders against the first, second and fourth applicants were in accordance with law within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. They further argued that the regulation in the Aliens Act served the legitimate aim of protecting the economic well-being of Sweden and preventing disorder.


39.  The applicant rejected the Government’s argument that the decision on his administrative removal did not necessarily mean that he would be expelled to Uzbekistan. No other possibility had ever been discussed in the course of the administrative proceedings and, furthermore, there was no reason to believe that any other country would be willing to accept him. His placement in the detention facility foreclosed the possibility of his voluntary and independent departure from Russia and prevented him from choosing the country of destination. He disagreed with the Government’s submission that his  <mask> had been made necessary because of his failure to abide by the Russian migration laws and the absence of family ties in Russia. Article 3 prohibited ill-treatment in absolute terms and there could be no justification for imposing a sanction that would expose him to a real risk of torture.


176.  The applicant submitted that he was being prevented from exercising the rights listed in paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c) of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7, whereas his  <mask> could not be regarded as “necessary in the interests of public order” or “grounded on reasons of national security”. In that connection, he observed that the considerations of the Minister of the Interior were contradicted by the Milan Assize Court, which had acquitted him of international terrorism. In any event, the Government had not adduced any evidence of the existence of dangers to national security or public order, so that the decision to take him to a temporary holding centre with a view to his expulsion had been “unlawful”.


44.  The applicant submitted that, should the  <mask> order against her be enforced, she would face a real risk of either being killed by her uncles because she had refused to agree to a forced marriage before fleeing Somalia or being forced to marry someone against her will again upon return. She also stated that the general situation in Somalia was very severe for women, in particularly for those who lacked a male network. As a consequence, she would risk having to live alone in a refugee camp, which would expose her to serious danger. In this respect, she referred to available country information which, she claimed, the Swedish authorities had ignored.


150.  The Government submitted that, although it was acknowledged in the Court’s case-law that the responsibility of a Contracting Party could be engaged under Article 3 on account of the  <mask> of an alien and his exposure to a risk of a breach of his economic and social rights, it nevertheless had to be taken into consideration that, where the person concerned suffered from an illness, neither the returning State nor the receiving State could be held directly responsible for the shortcomings of the health-care system and the repercussions on the health of the individual concerned. The case-law demonstrated that in order for the threshold of severity required by Article 3 to be attained in such cases the extreme nature of the applicant’s living conditions or his or her extreme vulnerability had to be established. The circumstances contrary to human dignity had to be exceptional to such a degree that the person concerned, owing to his or her critical condition prior to removal, would inevitably be placed in a situation of intense suffering solely on account of the removal procedure and the complete absence of care and treatment in the receiving country. Human rights were not synonymous with compelling humanitarian considerations and a general obligation to provide social welfare assistance could not be inferred from Article 3 even in the name of human dignity.


84.  The applicant alleged that she had not had an effective remedy in respect of her complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention by which to challenge the order to leave the country. As her application to the Aliens Appeals Board to set aside that order, which was still pending, did not suspend her  <mask>, she had lodged a request with that court under the extremely urgent procedure for a stay of execution of the order to leave the country, with a view to obtaining a ruling on the merits of her complaints before she was expelled. However, that procedure had proved fruitless because she had not been in detention and could therefore not establish the urgency of the situation. She stressed that the Aliens Appeals Board applied the same case-law when examining requests for interim measures as a matter of extreme urgency in the context of requests for a stay of execution under the ordinary procedure.


122.  The Government’s case was that the issue of risk would be examined upon the enforcement of the  <mask> order against the applicant and that the authorities would not remove him from Bulgaria without ensuring that this would not fall foul of the prohibition set out in section 44a of the Aliens Act 1998 (see paragraph 38 above). However, the Court has already found that there are no guarantees that before proceeding with the expulsion the authorities would subject the applicant’s claims under Article 3 of the Convention to rigorous scrutiny (see paragraphs 105 and 106 above). More importantly, the Government did not point to any procedure whereby the applicant would be able to challenge their assessment of those claims. From the provisions of the Aliens Act 1998 and the regulations for its application it does not appear that it is possible to bring a separate legal challenge against the enforcement of the expulsion order, let alone that there exists an avenue of redress that meets the two requirements set out in paragraph 120 above. The Court would emphasise in that connection that the existence of remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, and that it falls to the respondent State to establish that (see, among other authorities, McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333/06, § 107, ECHR 2010‑...).


220.  The applicants submitted that the key issue in the present case was whether an individual interview was necessary prior to their  <mask>. They observed in this connection that only two aspects distinguished their case from Hirsi Jamaa and Others (cited above), namely the fact that they had actually been identified and that they had received identical “deferred refusal-of-entry” orders. Even though the similarity between the orders did not, in itself, lead to the conclusion that there had been a collective expulsion, it was an indication to that effect. In addition, in Sharifi and Others (cited above) the Court had found a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 in respect of one of the applicants who had been expelled (Mr Reza Karimi) even though he had been identified, because there was no evidence that, at the time of the identity check, an interpreter or independent legal adviser had been present, those being indications of an individual interview. Where there was evidence of such an interview, however, the Court had excluded any violation of that provision in the cases of M.A. v. Cyprus (no. 41872/10, ECHR 2013); Sultani v. France (no. 45223/05, ECHR 2007-IV); and Andric v. Sweden ((dec.) no. 45917/99, 23 February 1999). In the applicants’ view, to exclude the need for an individual interview would render meaningless the procedural safeguard of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, because an expulsion could be justified purely on the basis that the alien’s nationality – that is, the fact of belonging to a group – had been established.


58.  The Government, to dispel doubts as to this risk of ill-treatment (see Saadi, cited above, §§ 129-32, and F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, § 120), have argued that the Swedish authorities have made a careful examination of the applicant’s case and found that, in view of the improved human rights situation in Morocco, he would not face a real risk of ill-treatment in his home country. They have also underlined that the Security Service reviews the situation regularly and would stop the  <mask> should any factor emerge to show that the applicant would be at risk.


26.  The applicant acknowledged the two main decisions rendered by the Court regarding Dublin transfers to Greece, namely K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), no. 32733/08, 2 December 2008) and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (cited above), and observed that it would be difficult for the Court to fix a point in time in which Greece had stopped adhering to the minimum standards foreseen for asylum proceedings and reception conditions. In the first-mentioned decision, the Court had still believed that Greece would abide by its obligations, whereas later, it had found that Greece could no longer cope with the number of asylum cases to be conducted or the reception of asylum-seekers in Greece. The applicant, relying on the principles established in the judgment in Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom (30 October 1991, § 107, Series A no. 215) concerning risk assessment under Article 3, observed that the Court would not be precluded from having regard to information which came to light subsequent to the  <mask>. That might be of value in confirming or refuting the appreciation that has been made by the Contracting party or the well-foundedness or otherwise of an applicant’s fears (ibid.). He emphasised that, under these circumstances, the Government’s contention that he had been transferred before the Court’s decision in K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom (cited above) was unimportant.


107.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been administratively expelled to Algeria on the basis of the Foreigners Police decision of 20 July 2006 as there had been no legal ground for his stay in Slovakia. The  <mask> took place after the final effect of the Supreme Court’s judgment of 30 March 2010 concerning his asylum request. The applicant had not shown any relevant ground to justify granting him asylum and his continued stay in Slovakia would have represented a security risk.


141.  The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the alleged breaches of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention. He submitted that his impending  <mask> to Lebanon, entailing a risk for his life, and the lack of procedural safeguards in that regard, had caused him stress, fear and a sense of helplessness. He claimed a further EUR 20,000 in respect of the alleged breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, emphasising the excessive duration of his detention in poor conditions. He claimed EUR 10,000 in respect of an alleged breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, submitting that he suffered frustration on account of the lack of speedy and effective judicial review of his detention. Lastly, he claimed EUR 10,000 in respect of the alleged breaches of Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention, submitting that the formal manner in which the courts had reviewed the order for his expulsion and the impossibility for him to lead a normal life in Bulgaria, even if released from detention, had given rise to feelings of injustice and humiliation.