91.  The applicant disagreed with the Government's objection. Firstly, he argued that there was an administrative practice of non-compliance with the requirement to investigate effectively abuses committed by Russian servicemen and members of the police in Chechnya. He referred to complaints submitted to the Court by other persons claiming to be victims of such abuses, who also complained about lack of  <mask>. The applicant cited reports by human rights groups, international organisations and the media on violations of civilians' rights committed by federal forces and the subsequent lack of effective domestic investigation.


146.  The applicants relied on Article 3 of the Convention, submitting that, as a result of their relative’s disappearance and the State’s failure to investigate it properly, they had endured mental suffering in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. They also argued that they had serious grounds to believe that Mr Ali Khadayev had been subjected to torture and inhuman treatment when in detention and complained that no  <mask> had been conducted in this respect. Article 3 reads:


88.  The applicants complained that the police had used physical force against them, and that no  <mask> had been carried out into their complaints. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, and some of them also on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. The Court will examine their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


51.  The applicants submitted that the injuries found on Vasiliy Mikhalkov's body resulted from beatings by two police officers and his body being dragged, to which the first applicant was an eyewitness. Referring to their arguments in respect of the investigation under Article 2, the applicants argued that there had also been a breach of the obligation of the authorities to conduct an  <mask> into the allegations that Vasiliy Mikhalkov had been ill-treated.


188.  The applicant submitted that the authorities had failed to carry out an  <mask> in relation to her complaints concerning the disappearance and murder of her husband. She argued that a full investigation had been necessary and that, at the material time, there had been a practice of ineffective remedies in south-east Turkey in relation to complaints of this nature by Kurdish people (cf. the Kurt v. Turkey judgment of 25 May 1998, Reports 1998-III; the aforementioned Yaşa judgment; the Commission Report of 12 March 1998 in Çakıcı v. Turkey, no. 23657/94, § 286).


109.  The applicant submitted that his son had worked as a plumber and, as the eldest of ten children, had contributed significantly to his family’s upkeep. He claimed 12,300 euros (EUR) on behalf of the beneficiaries of the estate of Mehmet Şah Şeker, and on behalf of himself, for loss of earnings over five years and five months. He further claimed EUR 12,300 on account of the failure of the authorities to conduct an  <mask>. The applicant also requested that, in the case of a finding of a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, these figures be increased by 50%.


50.  The applicant contested the Government's submissions. He maintained that the investigation officers had failed to comply with the court decisions of 11 January and 12 November 2001 and had not held an  <mask> in his case. He further submitted that the reconstruction of events had been held in the absence of G. Moreover, the testimony of G. had been rejected on the ground that he was “an interested person” while the testimonies of the tax police officers had been included in the case file even though they were S.'s subordinates. Finally, the information about the applicant's head injury had been ignored and no investigation had been conducted into it.


67.  The applicant further complained that the authorities had failed to carry out an  <mask> into his complaint of ill-treatment in police custody, and that their refusal to open a criminal case had made it impossible for him to be granted the status of “victim”, which could have entitled him to compensation for the alleged ill-treatment. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


118.  The applicants complained that as a result of their son’s abduction and killing and the State’s failure to investigate it properly they had endured mental suffering. Furthermore, the first applicant complained that at the time of his son’s abduction he had been beaten and that no  <mask> was conducted into the incident. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:


47.  The applicant maintained his complaint and submitted that in the present case a substantive violation of Article 3 of the Convention was difficult to prove because there had been no  <mask>. He disagreed with the Government’s contention that his complaint was belated – he had submitted the complaint one week after his discharge from the hospital, on 8 September 2003, and one week later it had been forwarded to the police. He argued that he was not obliged to provide conclusive evidence in support of his allegations as the obligation to investigate and gather evidence was incumbent on the domestic authorities.


74.  The applicant maintained that Article 13 had been violated since the State authorities failed to conduct an  <mask> into his case. He referred to his arguments mentioned in paragraph 68 above. He further submitted that national legislation did not provide for the award of compensation in the circumstances of his case since he was found guilty of a crime (see paragraph 52 above). The applicant maintained that examination of a civil claim for compensation would in any event have been dependent on the outcome of the criminal proceedings, which are still pending.


135.  The applicant submitted that she had reasons to believe that Mr Sultan Isayev had been subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention following his arrest and that there had been no  <mask> into the matter. The applicant also complained that she had suffered severe mental distress and anguish amounting to ill-treatment falling within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


65.  The applicants contested the Government's objection. They pointed out that immediately after their relatives' detention and thereafter they had repeatedly applied to law-enforcement bodies, including various prosecutors. This avenue had proved futile, however, given that the criminal investigation had now been pending for several years but had failed to find and identify those responsible. The applicants also stated that there was no specific requirement in national law to have recourse to any other remedy once criminal proceedings were instituted and an investigation was under way. The applicants contended that, in any event, in the absence of an  <mask> any other remedy, including a civil claim, would also be rendered ineffective by the fact that court decisions would be based on the findings made within the context of the criminal investigation, which had so far failed to establish whether State agents had been involved in the murder of the Musayev brothers. In this latter respect the applicants referred to the judgments of Basmanny District Court of 23 December 2003 and 21 May 2004 which had dismissed their claims for compensation for non-pecuniary damage in connection with the unlawful detention on the ground that it had not been established that the applicants had lost their relatives as a result of State agents' unlawful actions.


21.  The applicants complained under Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention that they had been subjected to ill-treatment by police officers. They further alleged under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) and Article 13 of the Convention that the authorities had failed to carry out an  <mask> of their allegations of ill-treatment and to duly examine the evidence they had submitted in support of their allegations. The applicants claimed that the authorities had also failed to punish the police officers responsible, which cast doubt on their independence and impartiality. Lastly, the applicants maintained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the decisions of the Izmir public prosecutor and the Karşıyaka Assize Court lacked reasoning.


169.  The applicant relied on the evidence set out at paragraphs 106–124 above, which, he submitted, demonstrated that Jordanian prisons were beyond the rule of law.  <mask> was endemic, particularly for GID prisons and Islamist prisoners, who were frequently beaten. There was a systemic failure to carry out prompt and effective investigations of allegations of torture. This evidence was even more compelling than at the time of SIAC’s determination. Moreover, the culture of impunity that prevailed in the GID rendered it incapable of abiding by the assurances, even if its leadership wanted to. Jordan could not be relied upon to meet its international human rights obligations. It had refused to submit to any form of enforcement of those obligations; for instance, it had refused to ratify either Article 22 to UNCAT (the right of individual petition to the Committee against Torture) or the Optional Protocol to UNCAT (which established the Sub-Committee on the Prevention of Torture and gave it, inter alia, the right to visit places of detention).


93.  The Government argued that the applicant's conditions of detention could not be regarded as  <mask> or inhuman or degrading treatment. The conditions did not differ from, or at least were no worse than those of most detainees in Russia. Overcrowding was a problem in pre-trial detention facilities in general.  The authorities had had no intention of causing physical suffering to the applicant or of harming his health. The administration of the detention facility took all available measures to provide medical treatment for those persons suffering from any disease and to prevent the contagion of other inmates.


29.  The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that his removal to Tunisia would expose him to a real risk of  <mask> and other forms of ill‑treatment on account of his affiliation with Ennahda. He further submitted, without relying on any Article of the Convention, that he had not been interviewed by the competent authorities regarding his asylum request until November 2009, and has not been informed of the outcome of that interview. The applicant also contended that he was not able to challenge the decision to deport him as he had not been informed of any deportation order made in his respect.


78.  The applicant maintained that he had argued before the Russian courts that there was a real risk that he would be ill-treated and persecuted politically in Uzbekistan. He had submitted reports on Uzbekistan by the UN institutions and international NGOs, confirming that  <mask> was widespread in detention facilities and that this information had not been properly assessed by the Russian authorities. He pointed out that the courts had rejected his arguments without giving any reasons other than the reference to the assurances given by the Uzbek authorities. Finally, he referred to a number of cases examined by the Court in which it had been established that extradition to Uzbekistan of a person sought for political crimes would constitute a violation of Article 3.


40.  The applicant complained that he had been subjected to an unjustified use of force which amounted to  <mask>, and had been further subjected to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention since the police officer had insulted him and demanded that he plead guilty. He further invoked Article 13 of the Convention, stating that for more than seven years the State authorities had failed to protect his rights.


139.  The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that his brother had been subjected to  <mask> and inhuman and degrading treatment during his time in police custody from his arrest on 13 April 1996 until his admission to hospital on 16 April 1996. He further complained that he had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment during his confinement in hospital from 16 April to 3 May 1996, when, in great pain and in need of care and support, he was deprived of all contact with his family while police officers were posted permanently in his ward. As his death had been caused by serious and severe injuries, the treatment he had been subjected to amounted to torture. The applicant further claimed that his brother had been tortured for the purpose of compelling him to confess to certain crimes.


136.  The applicants alleged that there was a practice of non-respect of the requirement to investigate abuses committed by servicemen and members of the police effectively, both in peacetime and during conflict. The applicants based this assertion on four principal grounds: impunity for the crimes committed during the current period of hostilities (since 1999), impunity for the crimes committed in 1994-1996, impunity for police  <mask> and ill-treatment all over Russia, and impunity for the torture and ill-treatment that occur in army units in general.


31.  The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that she had been subjected to acts of police brutality which had caused her great physical and mental suffering amounting to  <mask>, inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment. She also complained under the same provision, taken together with Article 13 of the Convention, that the Greek investigating and prosecuting authorities had failed to carry out an effective and impartial official investigation into the incident which could have led to the identification and punishment of the police officers responsible. The applicant therefore claimed that she had been denied an effective domestic remedy for her sufferings.


52.  The applicants maintained that they would run a real risk of being caught by the Iranian authorities and subjected to  <mask>, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment based on the general situation in Iran regarding political dissidents, the high profile that the applicants had as such dissidents and these factors together with the fact that the applicants had left Iran illegally.


38.  The applicant submitted that only in respect of cases of violence between individuals is a complaint from the victim necessary to trigger a police investigation. Under Articles 276 and 298 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the triggering of an investigation into allegations of ill-treatment by police is not conditioned by the existence of a prior complaint from the alleged victim of ill-treatment. In support of his contention the applicant sent a copy of an order of the Prosecutor General addressed to his subordinates, according to which prosecutors are obliged to investigate ex officio any case concerning  <mask> or ill-treatment by the police.


165.  The applicants also referred to the institutional deficiencies of the proceedings conducted by the Investigative Committee, which was unable to investigate effectively the acts committed by the agents of the FSB, and depended in its work on the inadequate operational support provided by the police, who themselves could have been involved in the abductions. They referred to a letter of 11 March 2011 sent by the Deputy Prosecutor of Chechnya to the Head of the NGO, Committee Against  <mask>, in which the prosecutor had accused the officers of the Investigative Committee of outright “concealment” of the crimes related to the abductions (see paragraph 84 above).


81.  The applicant maintained his complaint. He claimed that all his confessions, testimonies and statements had been made under  <mask>. He had had no access to a lawyer between 23 and 26 February 2006 and lawyer Mr G. Ber. had been appointed for him by the investigators, in violation of the relevant procedure. The lawyer had signed backdated documents and had failed to provide the applicant with proper legal assistance.


143.  The applicant did not claim pecuniary damage. As to non-pecuniary damage, he submitted that the danger of being submitted to  <mask> in detention in Turkmenistan, his unlawful detention and the prolonged inability to have the lawfulness of his detention examined had caused him feelings of anguish, distress and anxiety for which the sole finding of a violation would not be sufficient compensation. He left the determination of the exact amount of compensation to the Court’s discretion.


42.  The applicant alleged that the suffering to which he had been subjected, taken as a whole, amounted to  <mask>. He submitted that he had been blindfolded, stripped naked, immersed in cold water and beaten with a truncheon on various parts of his body. He further maintained that he had been beaten on the soles of his feet and then forced to walk on a salt-strewn floor. He contended that he had been subjected to “Palestinian hanging” and that electric shocks had been administered to his genitals, his fingers and feet. The applicant relied on the medical reports of 27 December 1993 and 14 January 1994 (see paragraphs 14 and 17 above). As regards the difference in the contents of these two reports, the applicant submitted that, upon a complaint made by an arrestee, on 15 June 1995 the Istanbul Chamber of Physicians had forbidden the medical expert who had examined him on 27 December 1993 to practice medicine for a period of six months as the Chamber had found that the expert had drafted medical reports concealing signs of ill-treatment inflicted on the complainant while in police custody.


79.  The Government argued that the offences of which the applicant was accused in his home country were not punishable with the death penalty. The Court notes, however, that the thrust of the applicant’s complaint concerns not a fear of receiving the death penalty but the risk of him being subjected to ill-treatment or  <mask> if he were expelled to Uzbekistan.


78.  The applicant submitted that the Bulgarian authorities had agreed to extradite him to Iran on the basis of de facto reciprocity, rather than pursuant to an extradition agreement. In doing so, they had not subjected the request of the Iranian authorities – in particular the part concerning the punishment likely to be imposed on him under Article 656 of the Iranian Penal Code – to proper scrutiny, even though the duty to assess the risk of ill-treatment in the event of extradition stemmed from Bulgaria’s own law. Such scrutiny had been particularly necessary because it was well known that people accused and convicted of offences in Iran were often subjected to  <mask> and inhuman and degrading punishments, which were lawful in that country. No other European State was extraditing people to Iran. In the applicant’s view, the risk of his suffering ill-treatment was real. He referred in this connection to reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.


66.  The applicant submitted that his conviction had been exclusively based on self-incriminating statements extracted under  <mask> during the investigation, as well as on statements of P.M. and his brother extracted under ill-treatment during the investigation. In support of his claim, the applicant submitted the written statements by P.M. and his brother, in which they confirmed that their statements against the applicant had been extracted under ill-treatment during the police investigation.


122.  The Government argued that the offences of which the applicant was accused in his home country were not punishable by the death penalty. The Court notes, however, that the thrust of the applicant’s complaint concerns not a fear of receiving the death penalty but the risk that he would be subjected to ill-treatment or  <mask> if he were expelled to Uzbekistan. The Court’s task is now to establish whether there is a real risk of ill‑treatment in the event of the applicant’s extradition to Uzbekistan. Since he has not yet been extradited, owing to the application by the Court of an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the material date for the assessment of that risk is that of the Court’s consideration of the case (see, among others, Gaforov v. Russia, no. 25404/09, § 128, 21 October 2010).


300.  The applicants insisted on their account of the events as outlined in paragraphs 25-108 above. They maintained that, during and/or following the search and security operation conducted in Izyaslav Prison on 22 January 2007, they had suffered: extensive and cruel beatings; humiliation and degrading treatment, including but not limited to being ordered to strip naked and adopt humiliating poses; application of special means of restraint, including handcuffs, unnecessarily and in a particularly painful manner; being deprived of access to water or food for a long period of time during their transfer to the SIZOs; exposure to low temperatures without adequate clothing upon their arrival at the SIZOs; a lack of adequate medical examinations and assistance. They insisted that the ill-treatment complained of had amounted to  <mask>.


111.  The applicant insisted on his version of the events described to the Court in the application form and subsequent letters. He stressed that he had been tortured by the police officers, that he had never used force against them or resisted their orders, and that the change in his statements in February 2006 was merely his fearful response to an interview in the conditions of the correctional colony. The applicant argued that the evidence put forward by the Russian authorities in support of their explanation of his injuries had been contradictory and unconvincing. He pointed to the fact that certain police officers had not mentioned his having resisted arrest and that the authorities had not recorded any injuries when he was placed in the police station detention unit. The applicant also claimed that two of the police officers who had taken part in his beating had later been charged with the  <mask> of another detainee, and one of them had been convicted of the offence. However, he acknowledged that the evidence in support of his version was also weak, given that he had been in detention, had been unable to collect evidence himself and had been entirely dependant on the Russian investigating authorities. At that point, he listed numerous defects in the proceedings pertaining to his ill-treatment complaints. His complaints were similar to those which he expressed in respect of the inquiry into the events of 16 and 17 January 2002.


132.  The applicant’s representative submitted that the applicant had been forcibly handed over to Uzbek State agents by the FSB agents “Timur” and “Zakhar”. The applicant had been subjected to  <mask> while in detention in Uzbekistan. The Russian authorities had belatedly opened an investigation into the applicant’s abduction and had failed to take all the requisite measures to elucidate its circumstances, in breach of their procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention.


107.  The applicant maintained that he had been subjected to  <mask> while in detention. He referred to his detailed submissions about the ill-treatment, to the medical documents produced after his release and to the witness statements which corroborated his account. He alleged that the documents submitted by the Government could not be regarded as conclusive evidence of the contrary, because some had been issued in 2004 and the records kept in 2000 were not accurate. Even these documents acknowledged that he had had a bruise on his shoulder (his medical record made upon admission to Chernokozovo, see paragraph 66 above). He also referred to reports by NGOs, Council of Europe documents and other complaints brought to the Court that denounced the widespread ill-treatment of detainees in Chechnya, and particularly at the Chernokozovo detention centre.


161.  The Government submitted that the materials on diplomatic assurances, which the applicant and third parties had provided (see paragraphs 141–146 above), all spoke of what the practice of courts should be, rather than the established requirements of the Convention. This Court’s approach had been to find that assurances were not in themselves sufficient to prevent ill-treatment; however, the Court would also examine whether such assurances provided in their practical application a sufficient guarantee against ill-treatment (see Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) nos. 24027/07, 11949/08 and 36742/08, § 106, 6 July 2010). Furthermore, contrary to the applicant’s submission (see paragraph 168 below), there was no principle in the Court’s case-law that, where there was a real risk of ill-treatment owing to systemic  <mask> in the country of destination, assurances were incapable of eliminating that risk.


108.  The applicant claimed that his extradition to Turkmenistan would be incompatible with Article 3. He stated that the authorities had failed to take into account information which indicated that there existed a real risk of  <mask> and ethnically motivated persecution. He referred to numerous data showing that torture and ill-treatment were widespread among detainees in Turkmenistan, and that as a member of an ethnic minority he would be in a particularly vulnerable situation.


72.  The applicants maintained that they had become direct targets in China on account of their political and religious beliefs. For that reason, they would be exposed to a real risk of being executed or subjected to incommunicado detention,  <mask> or other inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention if returned to China. They further complained under Article 13 of the Convention that there was no effective domestic remedy at their disposal with regard to their complaints under Articles 2 and 3, whereby the risks involved in their deportation could be subjected to meaningful judicial scrutiny in a timely manner. The relevant provisions of the Convention read as follows:


71.  The applicant disputed the Government's submissions. He maintained that his state of health in detention had progressively deteriorated, which meant that he had not received proper medical treatment or nutrition. The applicant claimed that medical treatment had been denied to him with malicious intent. He further submitted that the effects of such treatment amounted to  <mask>. In October 1998 the applicant's heart problems had worsened. In March 1999 he had again suffered from an open duodenal ulcer, a tumour in his back and skin diseases. The same health problems had recurred when his detention had been renewed by the judge of the Kyiv City Court hearing his case from June to August 1999.


86.  The applicant submitted that the cells where he had been detained had been severely overcrowded. He pointed out that the space available to him during the whole detention period had been below the domestic standards (which specified no less than four square metres of personal space per inmate – see paragraph 70 above) and those recommended by the European Committee for the Prevention of  <mask> and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“the CPT” – seven square metres per prisoner). The applicant further referred to the Court’s findings in earlier cases concerning the conditions of detention in the same remand prison, no. IZ-77/2 (Skachkov v. Russia, no. 25432/05, § 24, 7 October 2010; Bychkov v. Russia, no. 39420/03, § 18, 5 March 2009; and Ilyadi v. Russia, no. 6642/05, § 20, 5 May 2011). In those cases the Court had found a violation of Article 3 on account of detention in overcrowded cells. Such overcrowding, in the Court’s view, constituted a structural problem in Russia.


60.  The applicant also submitted copies of newspaper articles according to which various officials had admitted that the conditions in the Plovdiv Investigation Service detention facility had been designed to  <mask> the detainees and bring pressure to bear on them. The applicant also referred to the 1995 report of the CPT on their visit to Bulgaria in which the conditions obtaining in similar detention facilities were described as inhuman and degrading.


44.  The Government contested that argument. They stated that the Kyrgyz Republic had applied for the applicant’s extradition in connection with his participation in a “general” crime, which had not been connected with the inter-ethnic clashes that had taken place in 2010 in Kyrgyzstan. In its request for the applicant’s extradition the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Kyrgyz Republic had provided the applicant with an adequate guarantee against the risk of ill-treatment. It had issued assurances that there were no political grounds for his prosecution, which was not connected with his nationality or religion, that he would not suffer  <mask> or other cruel or degrading treatment, and that his rights of defence would be protected.


104.  The applicant maintained that he had argued before the Russian courts that there was a real risk of his ill-treatment and political persecution in Uzbekistan. He had submitted reports on Uzbekistan by the UN institutions and international NGOs, confirming that  <mask> was widespread in detention facilities and that this information had not been properly assessed by the Russian authorities. He pointed out that the courts had rejected his arguments without giving any reasons other than the reference to the assurances given by the Uzbek authorities. Finally, he referred to a number of cases examined by the Court in which it had been established that extradition to Uzbekistan of a person sought for political crimes would constitute a violation of Article 3.


31. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been subjected to acts of police brutality inflicting on him great physical and mental suffering which amounted to  <mask> or inhuman and/or degrading treatment. Furthermore, he alleged that he was a victim of a procedural violation of the above Article since the prosecuting authorities had failed to proceed with an effective official investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of the police officers responsible. Article 3 reads as follows:


51.  The applicant submitted that the restriction on his right of access to a court did not serve a legitimate aim and was disproportionate. The House of Lords in ex parte Pinochet (No. 3) (see paragraph 34 above) had accepted that the prohibition of  <mask> had acquired the status of a jus cogens norm in international law and that torture had become an international crime. In these circumstances there could be no rational basis for allowing sovereign immunity in a civil action when immunity would not be a defence in criminal proceedings arising from the same facts.


501.  The applicant submitted that in the light of the Court’s case-law Poland had been under a positive obligation under Article 3 to protect him from  <mask> and other forms of ill treatment by the CIA on its territory and to prevent his transfer from Poland to other CIA secret detention facilities, which had exposed to him to further violations of that Article. However, the authorities, despite the fact that at the relevant time they knew, or should have known, that under the HVD Programme CIA prisoners were being subjected to interrogation methods and other practices manifestly incompatible with the Convention, had done nothing to stop or prevent the violations of his fundamental rights.


38.  The applicant complained that during his arrest and subsequent detention he was subjected to acts of police brutality which caused him great physical and mental suffering amounting to  <mask>, inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. He also complained that the investigative and prosecuting authorities failed to proceed with a prompt and effective official investigation into the incident capable of leading to the identification and punishment of the police officers responsible. The applicant therefore claimed that, contrary to Article 3, taken together with Article 13 of the Convention, he had had no effective domestic remedy for the harm suffered while in police custody.


168.  The applicant submitted that, as a matter of law, proper regard had to be given to the international community’s criticism of assurances. The international consensus was that assurances undermined the established international legal machinery for the prohibition on  <mask> and, if a country was unwilling to abide by its international law obligations, then it was unlikely to abide by bilateral assurances. International experience also showed that proof of compliance was notoriously difficult. The applicant also submitted that, following the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh (see paragraph 152 above), it was also appropriate to distinguish between an assurance that a State would not do something legal (such as carry out the death penalty) and an assurance that it will not do something illegal (such as commit torture). Moreover, this Court’s case law, particularly Shamayev and Ismoilov, cited above, demonstrated that, once a particular risk was shown to apply to an individual, assurances would not be sufficient, especially when torture was also shown to be systemic in the country of destination. He submitted, therefore, assurances would only suffice where (i) a previous systemic problem of torture had been brought under control; and (ii) although isolated, non-systemic acts continued, there was independent monitoring by a body with a track-record of effectiveness, and criminal sanctions against transgressors. These criteria had not been met in his case.


186.  The Government’s third ground of challenge to the House of Lords’ decision was directed principally at the approach taken towards the comparison between non-national and national suspected terrorists. The Court, however, considers that the House of Lords was correct in holding that the impugned powers were not to be seen as immigration measures, where a distinction between nationals and non-nationals would be legitimate, but instead as concerned with national security. Part 4 of the 2001 Act was designed to avert a real and imminent threat of terrorist attack which, on the evidence, was posed by both nationals and non-nationals. The choice by the Government and Parliament of an immigration measure to address what was essentially a security issue had the result of failing adequately to address the problem, while imposing a disproportionate and discriminatory burden of indefinite detention on one group of suspected terrorists. As the House of Lords found, there was no significant difference in the potential adverse impact of detention without charge on a national or on a non-national who in practice could not leave the country because of fear of  <mask> abroad.


64.  The applicant argued that the proceedings leading to his conviction and sentencing had been unfair and arbitrary. He submitted, in particular, that the Supreme Court of Justice had convicted him in his absence; that the Supreme Court had not examined the arguments of the defence and had ignored the findings of the first-instance court; that there had been no sufficient evidence to find him guilty of any of the accusations and that the findings of the Supreme Court had been arbitrary; that the statements incriminating him by other co-accused had been obtained illegally by the use of  <mask> and pressure by police. The applicant drew the Court's attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Land of Thuringia (see paragraph 37 above) concerning the applicant's co-accused G.D. in which it was found, inter alia, that the applicant's co-accused were subjected to ill-treatment by the police in order to extract confessions and statements incriminating each other and that courts in Moldova were not independent from the Government. He also pointed to the lack of reasons in the judgment of the Moldovan Supreme Court. He finally accused the Supreme Court of having falsified a piece of evidence and of wrongly applying the domestic law.


32.  The Government submitted that the applicants’ allegations were unfounded. They noted that the applicants had undergone three medical examinations and that the medical reports had stated that there were no signs of ill-treatment or sexual intercourse. Accordingly, it was understandable that the investigating authorities had terminated the proceedings against the gendarmes since there was no evidence capable of substantiating the applicants’ allegations. The Government further claimed that the applicants had failed to adduce any concrete evidence capable of proving that they had been subjected to  <mask> in the hands of the security forces.


116.  The applicant’s repeated complaints to the courts dealing with his criminal case that his confessions had been obtained through  <mask> did not lead to an examination of the matter, either in the context of an assessment of the admissibility of the applicant’s self-incriminating statements or through a separate inquiry. The courts rejected the complaints as unsubstantiated, having fully relied on the prosecutor’s decision of 26 January 2001.


48.  The Government argued that the applicant had failed to substantiate his allegation that he risked ill-treatment if extradited. Belarus is a party to a number of international agreements on human rights, and its own legislation, including its Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure, prohibits  <mask>. In approving the decision to extradite the applicant, the Russian courts took into account the assurances provided by the Belarusian authorities. Among other things, the authorities guaranteed that the applicant’s criminal prosecution had not been politically motivated; that he would not be subjected to torture; and that he would only be tried for those criminal offences in respect of which the Russian authorities had authorised his extradition. The Government also noted that in their experience of cooperating with the Belarusian authorities in extradition matters, they had never been faced with a failure on the authorities’ part to comply with their assurances.


98.  The applicant alleged that the known circumstances in which her mother and brother had died and the nature of their injuries entailed enough evidence to conclude that they had been subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. She submitted that acts of  <mask> had been widespread in Grozny at the beginning of 2000. She also contended that the authorities had failed to investigate the ill-treatment.


268.  The applicant has alleged that his retrial would amount to a flagrant denial of justice because of a number of factors, including the absence of a lawyer during interrogation, his notoriety and the composition of the State Security Court (see paragraph 248 above). However, as the Court has observed, the central issue in the case is the admission of  <mask> evidence. Accordingly, it will first examine this complaint.


30.  The Government pointed out that Kyrgyzstan had enhanced its cooperation with the UN and other international organisations, and had ratified all fundamental international conventions on human rights. In particular, Kyrgyzstan had been a party to the Convention against  <mask> and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 since 5 September 1997, and to its Optional Protocol of 18 December 2002 since 29 December 2008. In accordance with that Protocol, international experts regularly visited detention facilities in Kyrgyzstan to monitor the situation in respect of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.


53.  The applicant believed that in the event of extradition he would run a real risk of being ill-treated and tortured in order to extort his confession. In particular, the applicant stated that he had already been ill-treated by the police during the pre-trial investigation into his criminal case in 2001. Moreover, significant evidence collected by the international bodies confirmed that the practice of  <mask> and ill-treatment in order to extract a confession or to intimidate political opponents and activists was widespread in Belarus.


137.  The applicant submitted that he had been ill-treated and humiliated during his arrest in the street and at Kentron Police Station after he had been taken there on 1 March 2008. The violence he had faced was above the required threshold to be qualified as  <mask> under Article 3 of the Convention and was attributable to the police officers. Being in a very bad condition as a result of ill-treatment, he had not even been able to give testimony to the investigator who had come to question him. He had consistently raised the fact of his ill-treatment in all his submissions to the domestic authorities, including the courts and the prosecutor’s office. The Government did not deny that the police officers had been responsible for his injuries but, relying on the statements of the alleged perpetrators, simply doubted that those injuries had been inflicted during his arrest.


98.  The Government argued that, while deciding on the applicant’s extradition, the domestic authorities had carefully examined the possibility of his being subjected to  <mask> and various forms of ill-treatment. They referred to the extradition request and the letter of 26 January 2011 from the Prosecutor General’s Office of Tajikistan, which had contained various assurances to that effect. They further referred to the letter of 18 November 2010 rebutting the allegations of torture made by the applicant’s co‑accused. The Government emphasised Tajikistan’s various international obligations in respect of the prevention and punishment of torture and the fact that it had created the post of ombudsman as proof of its good faith in making genuine efforts to protect human rights. They pointed out that the court reviewing the extradition order had heard the applicant and his counsel, the prosecutor and numerous witnesses. It had admitted to the case file the opinion of Ms Ryabinina, the reports by various human‑rights organisations and the relevant case-law of the Court. The court had carefully examined the available material and had rightfully arrived at the conclusion that the applicant’s arguments had been ill-founded. Lastly, the Government forwarded a statement by the Tajik Prosecutor General’s Office, the relevant part of which reads as follows:


87.  The applicant complained that the use of morphine had not been an appropriate medical treatment but instead had resulted in his becoming addicted to drugs again, since he had been a drug addict since 1997 but had stopped shortly after his arrest and detention. The applicant was of the opinion that the medical treatment in question had amounted to  <mask>.


143.  The applicant maintained that neither of the investigations had met the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention. He contended, in particular, that the disappearance and ill-treatment of Cemal Uçar between 5 October and 2 November 1999 had never been investigated although his son had told the authorities that he had been subjected to  <mask> between 5 October and 2 November 1999. In this connection, the applicant contended that the prosecution authorities and the police had failed to take a detailed statement concerning his allegations of torture from Cemal Uçar. Nor did they make any efforts to obtain other evidence, such as forensic evidence and witness statements.


35.  The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that police officers had subjected him to  <mask> in order to force him to confess to a crime. He argued that he could still claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 3 because the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation, and the amount of compensation was disproportionate to the suffering he had endured. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:


31.  The applicant alleges that he was subjected to  <mask> while in police custody. He claims that during his interrogation, he was blindfolded and stripped naked. He was strung up by his arms in the form of torture known as “Palestinian hanging”. His head was hit against the wall and he was held parallel to the ground on his hands and feet. He was also electrocuted, threatened and insulted.


34.  The applicants complained that the treatment to which they were subjected by the prison authorities and gendarmes on 20 July 1995 in Buca Prison amounted to  <mask> and inhuman treatment, in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. In their observations dated 11 May 2006 the applicants further complained, without any elaboration, that the incident at Buca prison and subsequent developments also violated their rights under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention.


98.  The Government submitted that, generally, the alleged lack of medical treatment could not be considered as amounting to  <mask> or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. Moreover, the Government argued that the applicant had been provided with all necessary medical treatment. Specifically, they noted that all of the applicant's requests for medical examination had been satisfied and that he had been regularly examined by the government doctors and provided with necessary in-patient and out-patient treatment. After the applicant's in-patient treatment in the specialised hospital for prisoners suffering from tuberculosis, his health condition stabilised and no deterioration in his state of health was observed thereafter.


69.  The applicants insisted that there were serious reasons to believe that Abdulkasim Zaurbekov had been ill-treated after being detained. They referred to applications submitted to the Court by other individuals claiming to be victims of similar violations, and to documents by human rights NGOs and the Council of Europe reporting numerous instances where people detained in Chechnya had been found dead, or had returned from custody showing signs of  <mask> or ill-treatment. The applicants further claimed that no investigation had been carried out into the matter.


45.  The applicant claimed that he had done everything possible in the circumstances to substantiate the assertion that he would face a real and serious risk of  <mask> if he returned to Iran. He was of the view that, essentially, he had explained to the Migration Board what had happened in Iran in a consistent way. The inconsistencies in his story concerned only minor events and were due to the fact that the two interviews with the Migration Board had been different in nature. While the first one had been a short summary interview, the second had consisted of detailed questioning. It was therefore logical that certain details of his story, like the house search of 2011, had only been mentioned during the second interview. Furthermore, it had to be taken into account that a period of almost two years had elapsed between the two interviews. Nobody could be expected to tell exactly the same story after such a long time.


59.  The applicant maintained that her husband had been subjected to  <mask> after his abduction. In this respect she claimed that it was common knowledge that persons held in detention were subjected to torture. In addition she affirmed that, during his previous periods in detention, her husband had been tortured. She further claimed that she had been misled by the authorities when they first said that her husband was in custody and later denied this fact.


33.  The applicants maintained their complaint. They submitted that the expulsion proceedings had been instituted by Russian authorities in order to circumvent the effect of the refusal to extradite them. They asserted that  <mask> and ill-treatment of prisoners were a common practice of Uzbek law-enforcement and security forces. In this connection they relied on the data published by international human rights NGOs and the US Department of State about the situation in Uzbekistan. They further referred to the Court’s earlier findings in a number of extradition cases against Russia that the ill‑treatment of prisoners who, like themselves, were charged with membership of an extremist religious organisation, was a pervasive and enduring problem in Uzbekistan. As regards the Government’s referral to Uzbekistan’s ratification of the UN Convention against Torture, they referred to the Court’s earlier finding that the existence of domestic laws and accession to international treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights in principle were not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where reliable sources have reported practices resorted to or tolerated by the authorities which are manifestly contrary to the principles of the Convention (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, § 147, ECHR 2008).


81.  The applicant’s representative argued that his allegations of a risk of ill-treatment had not been examined by the Russian authorities. She relied on several reports by United Nations agencies and international and regional organisations and argued that the applicant had run and continued to run a risk of  <mask> in Uzbekistan on account of his religious beliefs. She gave examples of cases when Muslim detainees had been ill-treated, and in certain cases killed, because of their religious beliefs, or unjustifiably subjected to disciplinary penalties such as placement in punishment cells without food or water, in particular because of their attempts to pray. She also referred to recent reports on the allegedly appalling conditions of detention and the lack of monitoring of detention facilities in Uzbekistan. The applicant’s representative also relied on the third-party interveners’ submissions before the Court in the cases of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, ECHR 2005‑I) and Ismoilov and Others v. Russia (no. 2947/06, 24 April 2008). According to the applicant’s representative, the applicant’s expulsion had been in fact “an extradition in disguise”, as a result of which the applicant had been convicted of the offences in respect of which the Russian authorities had refused extradition. The applicant had been expelled in flagrant violation of Russian law before his appeals against the expulsion order and the dismissal of his refugee application could be examined. Besides, no diplomatic assurances had been obtained from the Uzbek authorities in the present case and, even if they had been obtained, they could not have been effective in the context of an administrative expulsion formally unrelated to any pending criminal proceedings against an applicant. With reference to the Court’s judgment in the case of Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia (no. 36378/02, ECHR 2005‑III), it was argued that the respondent Government’s failure to comply with an indication under Rule 39 should not necessarily prevent the Court from examining on the merits a complaint under Article 3. Otherwise, it would be less burdensome for a respondent State to remove an applicant from its territory in cases in which Rule 39 was applied and to be held in violation of Article 34 of the Convention than to comply with Rule 39 and to be found to have breached Article 3 and/or Article 6.


46.  The applicants submitted that they were wanted by the Kazakh authorities for their political activities in that country and alleged that if extradited to Kazakhstan they would be tortured by the authorities with the aim of extracting their confessions and subjected to the unacceptable conditions of detention. According to them, the Kazakh legal system did not guarantee either effective protection against  <mask> and ill-treatment or adequate investigation of allegations of ill-treatment. In this respect they referred to reports of various international organisations and governmental bodies concerning the human rights situation in Kazakhstan. The applicants, citing the Court’s judgment in Soldatenko v. Ukraine (no. 2440/07, § 73, 23 October 2008), argued that the assurances against ill-treatment provided by the Office of the General Prosecutor of Kazakhstan were not legally binding on that State.


162.  The Government relied on the reasoning of the House of Lords in Wellington and the Canadian Supreme Court in Burns and Ferras (see paragraphs 66–72, 74 and 75 above). On the basis of those cases, the Government submitted that, in the extradition context, a distinction had to be drawn between  <mask> and other forms of ill-treatment. A real risk of torture in the receiving State should be an absolute bar on extradition. However, for all other forms of ill-treatment, it was legitimate to consider the policy objectives pursued by extradition in determining whether the ill‑treatment reached the minimum level of severity required by Article 3. This was the appropriate means of resolving the tension that existed between the Court’s judgments in Soering, on the one hand, and Chahal and Saadi, on the other. Article 3 could not be interpreted as meaning that any form of ill-treatment in a non-Contracting State would be sufficient to prevent extradition. Such an absolutist approach to Article 3 would mean, for instance, that practices such as head shaving or shackling could act as a bar to extradition because the Court had found these forms of ill-treatment to be in breach of Article 3 (see Yankov v. Bulgaria, no. 39084/97, §§ 114-121, ECHR 2003‑XII (extracts); and Henaf v. France, no. 65436/01, §§ 45-89, ECHR 2003‑XI).


64.  The applicant maintained his complaint. He pointed out that the Government’s version that he had been ill-treated in Kazakhstan, before his extradition, had been refused by the official statements from the administration of the remand prison certifying that on 23 February 2006 he had not had any evidence of ill-treatment at the time of his arrival in Moscow (see paragraphs 10 and 27 above). Furthermore, his allegations of ill-treatment had been confirmed by the medical examinations of 1 March and 1 June 2006 (see paragraphs 29, 26 and 39 above), his consistent complaints to the authorities (see paragraphs 31, 32, 37, 39, 40, 42 and 47 above) and the domestic court’s findings of 3 October 2007 (see paragraph 41 above). He stressed that the Government neither provided a satisfactory explanation as to the origins of his injuries nor carried out an effective investigation into his complaints. The applicant further stated, in particular, that the inquiries conducted had been neither timely nor thorough; the authorities had not questioned him nor taken any steps to identify his torturers. Finally, he submitted that the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected by the police amounted to  <mask>. In support of his allegations, the applicant referred to the documents submitted and the findings of the CPT of 13 March 2007 in respect of the human rights violations committed by the staff of the ORB-2 at the material time (see paragraph 61 above).


114.  The Government further relied on the diplomatic assurances provided by the Uzbek Prosecutor General’s Office. They submitted that there was no reason to doubt that the assurances would be complied with: Uzbekistan was a party to all UN human rights treaties prohibiting  <mask>, and submitted regular reports to the UN bodies responsible for their supervision. To the Government’s knowledge, none of the persons extradited from Russia to Uzbekistan had been ill-treated.


82.  The Government submitted that the applicant had identified the body of his son from the photographs of the three persons killed during the armed clash at the petrol station. The applicant knew, therefore, that his son had been killed in the armed clash between the terrorists and security forces rather than as a result of  <mask>. In the opinion of the Government, the applicant's allegation to that effect demonstrated bad faith.


92.  The Government argued, first, that the present application had been entirely based on knowingly untrue facts and therefore should be declared inadmissible for “abuse of the right of individual petition”, pursuant to Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. For the Government, the content of the present application was contrary to the purpose of the right of individual application, as the information provided therein was untrue or insidious. An appropriate and carefully selected form of social care for the applicant had been portrayed as detention. Appropriate medical care and striving to save her life had been presented as her  <mask>. The facts concerning the reopening of the guardianship proceedings were also untrue, as well as those related to the applicant’s complaints of the alleged refusal of the Kėdainiai Home’s management to allow the applicant to have personal visits and of the censorship of her communications.


114.  The applicants insisted that there were serious reasons to believe that Apti Isigov and Zelimkhan Umkhanov had been ill-treated after being detained. They referred to applications submitted to the Court by other individuals claiming to have been victims of similar violations, and to documents by human-rights NGOs and the Council of Europe reporting numerous instances where people detained in Chechnya had been found dead, or had returned from custody, with signs of  <mask> or ill-treatment.


21.  The applicant maintained his complaint and noted that his allegations had been confirmed by the inquiry conducted by the authorities on 7 July 2006. He further contended that the lack of finance could not have justified the appalling conditions in the temporary detention facility. As regards the measures implemented by the authorities to upgrade the temporary detention facility, they had been taken only after he had lodged his complaints with the Court. Lastly, he considered that his detention had amounted to  <mask> and resulted in the deterioration of his health.


108.  The applicants alleged that there was a practice of non-respect of the requirement to investigate abuses committed by army servicemen and members of the police effectively, both in peacetime and during conflict. The applicants based this assertion on four principal grounds: impunity for the crimes committed during the current period of hostilities (since 1999), impunity for the crimes committed in 1994-1996, impunity for police  <mask> and ill-treatment all over Russia, and impunity for the torture and ill-treatment that occur in army units in general.


82.  The Government did not argue that the situation in Uzbekistan had improved during the period under consideration in the present case. Having examined recent materials originating from reliable and objective sources (see Salah Sheekh, cited above, § 136), the Court is also unable to find elements which would be indicative of such an improvement. Quite the contrary, it follows from the latest reports by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the US Department of State, as well as the information of other organisations to which they refer in their documents, that the use of  <mask> and ill-treatment against detainees in Uzbekistan is “systematic”, “unpunished” and “encouraged” by law-enforcement and security officers. According to those sources, despite the Uzbek authorities’ assertions that such practices had significantly decreased, reports of torture and ill-treatment of detainees and prisoners continued unabated (see paragraphs 46-48 above). Against this background the Court cannot but conclude that the ill-treatment of detainees remains a pervasive and enduring problem in Uzbekistan.


138.  The applicants submitted that since the first applicant’s initial confession had been extracted through  <mask> and had been made in the absence of a lawyer – evidence that had subsequently been declared inadmissible by the trial court for being irregular – it was even more difficult to understand why the domestic courts had chosen to rely on those statements when they had been repeated during the reconstruction of the events at the scene of the crime. The applicants also reiterated that the procedure in which the victim had identified the first applicant had been conducted with serious procedural deficiencies. The applicants further complained that the domestic courts had failed to give any meaningful answer to the first applicant’s arguments that he had had an alibi. The second applicant also maintained that although he had formally been assigned a public defence lawyer, that lawyer had never actually taken part in any of the early investigative measures at Tbilisi police headquarters.


223.  The applicant complained that he had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment and  <mask> while in detention, referring to the methods of ill-treatment inflicted on him by the police officers of the Oktyabrskiy VOVD. He also complained that no effective investigation had been conducted into his relevant allegations. The applicant referred to Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


110.  The applicants complained under Article 3 of the Convention that they had been subjected to ill-treatment and  <mask>. They referred, in particular, to the methods of ill-treatment to which they had been subjected in Ingushetia and in Khankala, to the conditions of detention in Khankala and to the threats of execution. The applicants also complained under Article 3 that the authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into their allegations of ill-treatment. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:


54.  The applicant submitted that the fact of his ill-treatment was sufficiently corroborated by the available evidence, in particular the medical evidence of injuries recorded after the applicant had left police custody. The domestic authorities had failed to provide any plausible explanation for his injuries. The applicant further argued that the ill-treatment he had suffered amounted to  <mask>, in particular in view of his young age at the time, the prolonged and intentional nature of ill-treatment, and the fact that he had been subjected to humiliating acts and to “Palestinian hanging”.


68.  The applicants considered that their ill-treatment by the authorities during their arrest and detention had constituted inhuman and degrading treatment which in certain instances amounted to  <mask>. The Government had failed to specify in what respect exactly the applicants’ behaviour had not been law-abiding. The applicants contended that none of them had offered any resistance towards the police at any time while being apprehended or during their detention. In such circumstances the force used had been excessive and unnecessary.


252.  The applicant also submitted that any possible distinction between  <mask> and ill-treatment (either in international law or in the Convention) was immaterial for two reasons. First, his allegation was that Al-Hamasher and Abu Hamsher’s ill-treatment was so severe as to amount to torture. Second, there was a breach of Article 6 whenever ill-treatment was inflicted in order to secure a confession and it was clear that Al-Hamasher and Abu Hamsher had been ill-treated for that reason.


114.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing as a result of the domestic courts' admission of statements obtained from him under  <mask> and in the absence of a lawyer during his detention in police custody. The applicant maintained also that he had not been informed promptly of the nature and cause of the accusations against him and that he had not been able to secure the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf in the proceedings brought against him.


66.  The applicant maintained that he faced a real risk of  <mask> and ill‑treatment if extradited to Uzbekistan, arguing that this kind of practice was widely used by the Uzbek law-enforcement authorities. In this regard, he relied on different reports of the UN institutions and international NGOs. The applicant contested the reliability of the Uzbek authorities' assurances. The applicant also submitted that he and all the members of his family had been previously persecuted and subjected to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment by the Uzbek authorities. In support of this claim, he submitted his family members' detailed accounts of their alleged ill‑treatment in Uzbekistan.


148.  The Government also noted that the applicant had never contended that he had been arrested or convicted or that any search warrant had been issued against him in his country of origin. Nor had he ever stated having been subjected to  <mask> or threats. On these grounds, and for the reason that the applicant had used several identities, his statements as a whole had not been considered reliable.


125.  The Government may further be understood to argue in general terms that the situation in Uzbekistan had been improving during the period under consideration in the present case. However, having examined recent material originating from reliable and objective sources (see Salah Sheekh, cited above, § 136), the Court is unable to find elements which would be indicative of such an improvement. Quite to the contrary, it follows from the latest reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, as well from information from other organisations to which the above non‑governmental organisations refer in their documents, that the use of  <mask> and ill‑treatment against detainees in Uzbekistan is systematic and unpunished by law-enforcement and security officers. According to those sources, despite the Uzbek authorities’ assertions that such practices had significantly decreased, reports of torture and ill-treatment of detainees and prisoners continued unabated (see paragraphs 91-93 above). Against this background the Court cannot but conclude that the ill-treatment of detainees remains a pervasive and enduring problem in Uzbekistan.


155.  The applicant alleged that the injuries and anguish she had suffered as a result of the violence inflicted upon her by her husband had amounted to  <mask> within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. Despite the ongoing violence and her repeated requests for help, however, the authorities had failed to protect her from her husband. It was as though the violence had been inflicted under State supervision. The insensitivity and tolerance shown by the authorities in the face of domestic violence had made her feel debased, hopeless and vulnerable.


39.  The applicant, who submitted that he would run a risk of  <mask> or inhuman or degrading treatment if he were removed to Eritrea, complained of the absence in domestic law of a remedy with suspensive effect in respect of decisions refusing aliens leave to enter the country and ordering their removal, whether or not they were asylum-seekers and whatever the risks, alleged or real. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3, which provide:


164.  The applicants rejected the submission that Article 3 allowed for a balancing exercise of any kind. The Court had specifically rejected that submission in Saadi, cited above. Even if, in extradition cases, a relativist approach could be taken in respect of ill-treatment which fell short of  <mask>, this was irrelevant to their case because, in their submission, years of solitary confinement at ADX amounted to torture or, at the very least, was at the upper end of the scale of ill-treatment (see further below). Furthermore, none of the policy reasons for taking a relativist approach to ill-treatment arising from life sentences could apply to ill-treatment arising from prison conditions. Detention at ADX was not mandated by United States law and the United States could give an undertaking not to detain the applicants there. Thus, the alternative to detention at ADX was not that they would be fugitives from United States justice, but rather that they would be detained in American prisons which were Article 3 compliant.


57.  The applicant complained that on 8, 22 and 28 June 2004 he had been subjected to violence by officers from the ORB police unit. He had then been transferred to correctional colony IK‑14 and during his detention there from July to November 2004 had been subjected to further violence by the police and prisoners acting on their instructions with the connivance of the prison administration. He argued that the violence had been used to make him confess to crimes, and had amounted to  <mask>. Furthermore, no effective investigation had been carried out into his complaints. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


91.  The applicant argued that her allegations of a violation of Article 3 in respect of Mr Sharani Askharov were supported by the fact that other men detained on 18 May 2001 who had subsequently been released had sustained serious injuries as a result of  <mask>. She claimed that the Government had failed to produce any evidence that could refute her allegations. The applicant also maintained her complaint that she herself had been subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention because of the anguish and distress she had suffered as a result of her husband’s disappearance.


30.  The applicant maintained his allegations. In particular, he alleged that the police officers present in the room were all known from criminal investigations involving  <mask> and arbitrary killings and that, therefore, the attack against him had been premeditated. He further criticised the promotion of Mr A.Ç. and submitted that, due to the physical and mental injuries he had sustained, he had been unable to pursue his profession effectively. Finally, he complained about the impunity enjoyed by the police in Turkey. In his additional observations, the applicant challenged the veracity of the witness testimonies given by the journalists whom he accused of being partial, due to links with the police.


175.  The applicant did not submit any claims for pecuniary damage. As regards non-pecuniary damage, he submitted that he had endured stress, frustration and anguish as a result of the high risk of being subjected to  <mask> if extradited to Uzbekistan and of the eleven months of his unlawful detention pending extradition in inadequate conditions. He left the determination of the amount of compensation to the Court.


86.  The applicant also invoked a number of other reasons why he faced a risk of ill-treatment or  <mask> in Syria. First of all, he raised the general situation for the Kurdish ethnic minority in Syria. In particular, he claimed that he was at risk of persecution by reason of his Kurdish origin, as Kurds in Syria were members of a generally oppressed minority whose human rights were systematically violated. Secondly, as a failed asylum seeker, he ran the risk of being imprisoned upon return to Syria. Thirdly, he relied on his connections with the Yekiti party or other political activities. He had participated in demonstrations organized by the Yekiti party and Syrian Kurds in Cyprus, including that of 17 May 2010. He believed that his activities were well known to the Syrian Embassy in Cyprus and the Syrian authorities in general. Fourthly, in his observations dated 12 August 2011 the applicant invoked the deterioration in the human rights’ situation in Syria.


88.  The applicant argued that none of the Russian authorities had properly examined his claim that he would be exposed to a risk of being subjected to ill-treatment if extradited to Uzbekistan. Those authorities had only relied on the material obtained from the Russian governmental agencies. No attempt had been made to study reliable independent sources. The Court had previously confirmed that the ill-treatment of detainees was a pervasive and enduring problem in Uzbekistan, especially in respect of detainees charged with politically-motivated criminal offences, as in his case. This submission had been and remained corroborated by other independent sources. If extradited, the applicant would be placed in detention pending trial and thus was running a risk of  <mask> in view of the charges against him. The Uzbek assurances should be disregarded, in view of the overall climate of impunity for human rights abuses in Uzbekistan and absence of any control mechanism attached to the assurances given by the Uzbek authorities.


123.  The applicant maintained his allegations. He contended that the admission by the domestic courts of unlawful evidence in the case file had breached his right to a fair hearing. Despite his repeated requests for the removal of his statements obtained under  <mask> from the case file, no response had been given by the first-instance courts and the Court of Cassation. Thus his conviction had been based on his statements obtained under torture and in the absence of legal assistance during his detention in police custody.


150.  The applicant also claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage. He indicated that he had been subjected to  <mask> with electrodes in the police station, which had caused him severe physical and mental suffering. Moreover, his fall from the window had resulted in a very serious and painful trauma. His legs were paralysed, he could move around only in a wheelchair and would never have children. For the rest of his life the applicant would be dependent on other people. He could not work and experience professional development and advancement in his career. The building where he lived had no elevator and he had to undertake strenuous efforts every time he wanted to go out. Most of the public buildings in Russia lacked special access facilities for wheelchair users. As a result, his movements and social contacts were very limited. All these factors caused him constant and severe mental anguish.


65.  The Government maintained that the police had had no choice but to use force since the first, second, third and fourth applicants had resisted arrest and/or tried to escape. In any event, any injuries suffered by them had not reached the threshold of  <mask>, inhuman and/or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3. Also, the said applicants’ statements as to when exactly the alleged abuse had occurred, upon arrest or subsequently, had been inconsistent and the third applicant had even stated that he had not been abused during arrest. There were likewise inconsistencies in their statements concerning the duration of the alleged abuse. Only the first applicant admitted before the police to having committed the crimes in question, whilst the second and third applicants did not do so. It is therefore difficult to maintain that the police had used force in order to elicit their confessions. The medical report of 22 September 2008 also concluded that the injuries sustained by the first, second and third applicants were inflicted between 3 and 7 days prior to 13 November 2007. Finally, the Government recalled that the fourth applicant had failed to attend the medical examination on 13 November 2007.


41.  The Government further noted the lack of basis of the impugned statements, which amounted to value judgments. They did not dispute the veracity of the factual information about the acts of  <mask>, but took the view that the subjective conclusions as to the judges’ implication in the commission of those acts were inadmissible; the Criminal Court had pointed out that M.B. had not been authorised to participate in S.A.’s interviews in Syria.


89.  The Government also submitted that the legislative framework governing pre-trial detention issues had evolved in the light of the recommendations of the Committee for the Prevention of  <mask>. For example, untried prisoners had been granted the right to make telephone calls to their relatives; the practice of accommodating foreign prisoners on separate premises had been discontinued; letters addressed to the federal and regional Ombudsmen and to the Court were exempt from censorship; the minimum exercise time for detainees in the punishment cell had been increased from 30 minutes to one hour. Improvements in the provision of medical care and assistance had been achieved.


45. The applicant also referred to the report by the European Committee for the Prevention of  <mask> and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) on its visit to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from 15 to 19 July 2002 (CPT/Inf(2003), which indicated that physical ill-treatment of persons in police custody was a serious problem and expressed doubt that judges or prosecutors conducted effective investigations where such ill-treatment came to their attention. This indicated a deep-rooted and widespread practice of abuse in police custody and impunity with regard to officers who perpetrated such acts. It was for the Government to show what they had done in response to the scale and seriousness of the problem at issue. In the present case, they had clearly done nothing. Finally, the applicant disputed that any remedies existed to provide redress for the authorities' blatant inaction.


149.  The applicant complained that the response of the authorities to the complaints and petitions about the detention,  <mask> and killing of Kadri Ateş was utterly inadequate. According to the applicant, the necessary remedies either did not exist or they were, in practice, useless. The applicant submitted that there had been a very clear violation of Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:


128.  The applicant argued that if he were deported to northern Somalia there was a real risk that he would be subjected to  <mask> or to cruel and inhuman treatment because he belonged to the Reer Hamar minority group. Not having any clan or family ties in the “relatively safe” areas, there was every possibility that he would be forced to live in a camp for IDPs; conditions in these camps had been described as inhumane. In the applicant's opinion, national policy based on the country reports prepared by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs paid only lip service to the position paper issued by UNHCR (see paragraph 100 above). An analysis of the November 2004 country report carried out by the Dutch Refugee Council (see paragraphs 81-83 above) had undermined that report's validity and highlighted its inadequacies. Nevertheless, from an anthropological point of view it gave a useful insight into the position of the Reer Hamar in Somalia, a position with which the applicant's personal circumstances were completely in line.


79.  The applicants submitted that Mr Stefanov’s fall from the window of room 36 had been either a suicide attempt provoked by severe  <mask>, or an attempt by the police to cover up his prior ill‑treatment. There was no evidence that the fall had been an attempt to escape, since the window was situated at 9.6 meters above ground level. No one could be expected to jump from such a height and subsequently be able to run away. There were no structures which could cushion the blow resulting from the fall; in particular, it was obvious that Mr Stefanov’s body had not touched the iron sheet roof before hitting the ground. The assertion that Mr Stefanov had made an attempt to flee was even more improbable in view of the facts that he had been handcuffed and that all of his injuries were inflicted on his upper body, which indicated that he had fallen head down. There was likewise no indication that the fall had been the result of a suicide attempt. Mr Stefanov had no history of mental illness and had been facing only a trivial burglary charge. Moreover, such an explanation had not been proffered during the investigation.


39.  The applicant contested the Government’s submissions. He maintained that he had been beaten up by the police officer, R., and that such treatment had amounted to  <mask>. The applicant maintained that he had had only some scratches and a bruise when he had been taken to the police station, but had been suffering from more serious injuries when he had been released 22 hours later. The applicant stated that his first medical examination had included a check for evidence of injected drugs, so he had had to remove his upper clothes. Moreover, he had been wearing a T-shirt with short sleeves. Therefore, if the applicant had had significant physical bodily injuries at that time the doctor should have noted them. The applicant also stated that the State authorities had already been aware of the assaults on him on 9 July 2005, when the ambulance doctor had informed the police of his hospitalisation, but that no action had been taken, and his allegations had not been investigated. In any event, when the criminal proceedings had finally been instituted, the investigation had not been adequate and effective.


107.  The applicant maintained that he had argued before the Russian courts that he faced a real risk of ill-treatment and political persecution in Uzbekistan. He had submitted reports on Uzbekistan by the UN institutions and international NGOs confirming that  <mask> was widespread in detention facilities and that this information had not received proper assessment by the Russian authorities. He pointed out that the courts had rejected his arguments without giving any reasons except a reference to the assurances given by the Uzbek authorities. Finally, he referred to a number of cases examined by the Court in which it had been established that extradition to Uzbekistan of a person sought for political crimes would constitute a violation of Article 3.


147.  The applicant claimed a sum of GBP 40,000 for the non-pecuniary damage arising from the violations of the Convention suffered by his son and from the alleged practice of such violations, to be held by him on behalf of his son's widow and four children, as well as a sum of GBP 2,500 for himself on account of the lack of an effective remedy. He referred to the Court's previous decisions regarding unlawful detention,  <mask> and the lack of an effective investigation.”


21.  The applicant claimed that, should he be returned to Baghdad or other parts of Iraq, he would face a real risk of being subjected to  <mask> or other inhuman or degrading treatment. He pointed out that the Christian minority was still in a vulnerable position in southern and central Iraq and that the authorities there could not guarantee the safety for Christians.


172.  The applicants also referred to the problem of the statute of limitations and the absence of a coherent official policy in that respect. They referred to the developments following two of the Court’s judgments: Khadisov and Tsechoyev v. Russia (no. 21519/02, 5 February 2009) and Akhmadov and Others v. Russia (no. 21586/02, 14 November 2008). In the first case, the Court had qualified the ill-treatment of the applicants as  <mask> and found a breach of both the substantive and the procedural aspects of Article 3. In May 2010 the domestic criminal investigation into abuse of authority had been closed because the prescribed period had expired. In the second case, the criminal investigation into the death of the applicants’ relatives, opened following charges of abduction and murder, had been terminated in October 2011 for the same reasons. The applicants stressed that since the crime of kidnapping under Article 126 of the Criminal Code could be qualified as either serious or particularly serious, depending on the circumstances, a more coherent approach was necessary to prevent the application of the period of limitations to the bulk of unresolved cases in the near future. The applicants referred, by way of example, to Article 44 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which stipulated that for crimes which were not investigated for political reasons, the statute of limitations started to run once such reasons had ceased to exist.


93.  The Government submitted that the allegation of politically motivated persecution of the applicant had been assessed by the Russian courts when examining his appeals against the  <mask> order, and rejected as unfounded. The Russian courts had relied on the statement from the Prosecutor General's Office of Uzbekistan to the effect that the applicant would face no risk of ill-treatment if he were to be extradited to Uzbekistan and on the fact that the Russian authorities such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the FSB did not have any information confirming his allegation. Referring to the assurances from the Uzbek authorities the Government argued that the applicant would not be subjected to ill‑treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.


153.  The Government argued that, given the existence of the Uzbek court’s detention order, the applicant’s detention during the impugned period was governed by Article 466 of the CCrP and was in accordance with the requirements of the Minsk Convention. The Court observes, however, that the Russian prosecutor’s detention order of 15 July 2010 contained no reference to Article 466 of the CCrP, presumably because that provision, as follows from its wording, started to apply only from the moment of receipt of the  <mask> request. In the applicant’s case that request was received on 16 August 2010 (see paragraph 20 above). Hence, the Court must assess what was the legal basis for the applicant’s detention from 14 July to 16 August 2010.


146.  The Government insisted that the applicant’s detention pending  <mask> included only the period of time from 11 January 2010 to 11 January 2011. They argued that this period of detention was lawful as it was based on detention orders issued by competent courts. While deciding on the extension, the courts had taken into account the progress of the extradition proceedings against the applicant. In compliance with Article 463 § 4 of the CCrP, the domestic courts at two levels of jurisdiction had swiftly examined the applicant’s appeals against the extradition decision within a month.


47.  The Government pleaded that the applicant had failed to exhaust available effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. In particular, they submitted that the examination of the applicant’s refugee status application by the migration authorities and domestic courts, including at the appeal stage, had had “an automatic suspensive effect” in respect of the  <mask> order. If the applicant had applied for and been granted temporary asylum, his extradition would have been suspended. Examination of an application for temporary asylum would also have had “an automatic suspensive effect” vis‑à-vis the extradition order.


72.  The applicant complained under Article 6 that he did not understand the charges against him during his deportation. The Court notes that there were no judicial proceedings concerning the applicant’s removal from the territory of Ukraine and that any such proceedings would fall outside the scope of Article 6 of the Convention (see Maaouia v. France [GC], no. 39652/98, § 40, ECHR 2000‑X). Despite its findings that the applicant’s expulsion has appearances of  <mask> in disguise (see paragraph 58 above), the Court considers that this does not preclude it from examining the question of whether the removal of the applicant from the territory of Ukraine, which was formally presented as expulsion, complied with the Convention requirements. Being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, the Court decides to examine the problem raised by the applicant under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7, which reads as follows:


78.  The applicant submitted that the Bulgarian authorities had agreed to extradite him to Iran on the basis of de facto reciprocity, rather than pursuant to an  <mask> agreement. In doing so, they had not subjected the request of the Iranian authorities – in particular the part concerning the punishment likely to be imposed on him under Article 656 of the Iranian Penal Code – to proper scrutiny, even though the duty to assess the risk of ill-treatment in the event of extradition stemmed from Bulgaria’s own law. Such scrutiny had been particularly necessary because it was well known that people accused and convicted of offences in Iran were often subjected to torture and inhuman and degrading punishments, which were lawful in that country. No other European State was extraditing people to Iran. In the applicant’s view, the risk of his suffering ill-treatment was real. He referred in this connection to reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.


177.  The Government argued that it had been open to the applicant to complain about his detention ordered on 15 July and 24 August 2010 under Article 125 of the CCrP to the Frunzenskiy District Court, that is, the court which had jurisdiction to examine complaints by persons held in custody in the Frunzenskiy District of St Petersburg, and that that court had the power to order the applicant’s release. In particular, under Article 125 § 5 a judge could declare a decision by a law-enforcement authority unlawful or unjustified and instruct the authority to rectify the indicated shortcomings. In the same procedure, should the court find that a person was unlawfully detained with a view to  <mask>, it was open to it, pursuant to Article 1 § 3 of the CCrP and Article 46 of the Constitution, to apply provisions established by an international treaty and to order such detainee’s release from custody.


175.  The applicant did not submit any claims for pecuniary damage. As regards non-pecuniary damage, he submitted that he had endured stress, frustration and anguish as a result of the high risk of being subjected to torture if extradited to Uzbekistan and of the eleven months of his unlawful detention pending  <mask> in inadequate conditions. He left the determination of the amount of compensation to the Court.


108.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies in respect of his complaints under Article 5 of the Convention as he had not complained about either the alleged unlawfulness or the length of his detention pending  <mask> to a prosecutor's office or a court. They also submitted that the applicant had not appealed against the decisions of 30 November and 28 December 2007.


107.  The Government maintained that, as their  <mask> decision was not based on guarantees made by Rwanda but, instead, on an assessment that the extradition of the applicant – regardless of guarantees – would be consistent with Article 6, the issue of monitoring commitments was not relevant. However, in the letter of 12 August 2009 (see § 24 above), the Rwandan Minister of Justice had confirmed that Swedish authorities were welcome to monitor and evaluate the conditions of the applicant’s detention or imprisonment in Rwanda as well as his trial. While not considering that Sweden had an obligation to do so under international law, the Government stated that, due to the circumstances of the case, Sweden was prepared, if necessary, to take measures to monitor the legal proceedings and the applicant’s situation as a detainee.


78.  The applicant contested the Government’s argument that the decision on administrative removal did not necessarily mean that he would be expelled to Uzbekistan. He stated that no other possibility had ever been discussed in the course of the administrative proceedings and, furthermore, that there was no reason to believe that any other country would be willing to accept him.The applicant submitted that he had brought his fears of ill‑treatment in Uzbekistan to the attention of the domestic authorities during the refugee-status and  <mask> proceedings. He had relied on reports by UN agencies and respected international NGOs, which clearly demonstrated that individuals who, like him, were suspected of membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir were at an increased risk of ill-treatment. In particular, to demonstrate that there had not been any positive change in the human‑rights situation in Uzbekistan, he had referred to the concluding observations of the UN Committee against Torture of 10 December 2013, the Human Rights Watch report released in January 2014 and the Amnesty International report of July 2013 (cited in paragraphs 66, 69 and 73 above, respectively). He had also made reference to the Court’s case-law (cited in paragraph 14 above), as well as the cases of Umirov v. Russia (no. 17455/11, 18 September 2012); Abdulkhakov (cited above); Ermakov v. Russia (no. 43165/10, 7 November 2013); and Kasymakhunov (cited above). However, the domestic authorities had not taken into account the evidence he had submitted and had dismissed his fears as unsubstantiated without making a thorough assessment of the general situation in Uzbekistan or his personal situation.


106.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention that his ongoing detention pending  <mask> had been “unlawful”: first, until 21 December 2007 he had been detained in the absence of an official request for extradition; secondly, the term of his detention had not been extended by the domestic courts. He also invoked Article 5 § 2, complaining that he had not been promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest. Lastly, he relied on Article 5 § 4 arguing, first, that his detention had not been subject to any judicial control and, secondly, that he had been deprived of the right to have the lawfulness of his detention reviewed by a court owing to lack of access to a lawyer during the first two weeks of his detention.


45.  The applicant noted that under the Court’s case-law, for a remedy in respect of Article 3 complaints in  <mask> cases to be an effective, the courts had to be able to effectively review the legality of the exercise of executive discretion on substantive and procedural grounds and quash decisions as appropriate. He maintained that he had no possibility of raising his complaint before the domestic courts, because Ukrainian legislation lacked a procedure for examining such complaints and providing him with sufficient means for defending his rights. He further referred to the Resolution of the Plenary Supreme Court of 8 October 2004, which provided specifically that “...[h]aving regard to the fact that the current legislation does not allow the courts independently to give permission for extradition of persons ... the courts are not empowered to decide on this issue.”. The lack of such a procedure, in the applicant’s opinion, created a real risk of extradition being carried out prior to the final decision of the domestic courts. He further maintained that the lack of information about the state of the proceedings for his extradition and the means of challenging it, as well as his lack of access to the material in the case file and to legal assistance, seriously hindered effective access to the courts.


92.  The Government argued that the applicant had had ample opportunities to challenge the lawfulness of his detention but had failed to use them. The applicant's lawyer had challenged the lawfulness of detention before the Prosecutor General on 11 October 2002 and before the Moscow City Court on 18 October 2002. The PGO had replied to the applicant's lawyer on 11 November 2002. The Moscow City Court had refused to consider the complaint because it should have been submitted to a competent district court. The applicant himself had not made any complaints. He had been informed of the decision to extradite him on 24 October 2002 and had not requested to contact a lawyer. The Russian legislation did not provide for notification of the lawyer of the person whose  <mask> was under way.


98.  The Government further argued that the domestic authorities, including the FMS and the courts, had carefully examined the applicant’s allegations that he would risk ill-treatment if extradited to Uzbekistan. In particular, the FMS examined the applicant’s complaint that he risked ill‑treatment if extradited to Uzbekistan on 16 June 2010, that is before the Prosecutor General’s office had decided on the applicant’s  <mask>. The conclusions by the FMS had been subsequently upheld by the domestic courts. Furthermore, the ill-treatment grievance had also been duly examined within the proceedings concerning the validity of the extradition order. The courts had correctly dismissed the applicant’s allegations as unfounded. They had also taken into account the reports on Uzbekistan by the UN Institutions of 2002 and 2006. In the proceedings concerning the applicant’s challenge of the extradition order the domestic courts had reached a reasoned conclusion that the Prosecutor General’s Office did not possess any information on human rights violations in Uzbekistan in 2010.


96.  The Government contended that the application should be declared inadmissible as incompatible ratione personae. They submitted that the applicant had not been extradited by the Russian authorities to Uzbekistan, the measure at issue had not been applied to him, his  <mask> had been suspended and therefore he could not claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 3.


87.  The Government argued that the applicant did not have victim status, as enforcement of the  <mask> order had been and remained suspended due to the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The Uzbek authorities had provided assurances that the applicant would not be prosecuted for offences other than those indicated in the extradition request; that he would not be surrendered to another State without Russia’s consent; and that he would not be subjected to ill-treatment. The offences for which the applicant was being prosecuted did not entail the possibility of a sentence of capital punishment. The Russian courts had delved into the issue of the possible risk of the applicant’s ill-treatment and had dismissed it.


94.  The Government, arguing that the applicants were not awaiting deportation or  <mask>, took the view that the facts of the case did not fall within sub-paragraph (f) of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which authorised a person’s “lawful arrest or detention ... to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country” or when “deportation or extradition” proceedings were pending against the person (see paragraph 81 above). The Government did not, however, indicate under which other sub-paragraph of Article 5 the deprivation of liberty could be justified in the applicants’ case.


89.  The Government insisted that the applicant's detention pending  <mask> had been lawful as it had been based on the decision of the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court of 1 November 2007. They submitted that after that his detention had been authorised by the same court on 30 January 2008 and that it fully complied with the provisions of Article 466 § 1 of the CCP. They further stated that the duration of the detention had lengthened owing to the applicant's request for refugee status and the application of the interim measures by the Court.