42.  The Government pointed out that the applicant had not been confined to a psychiatric hospital in order to secure treatment for a mental illness or to isolate her from society. Accordingly, her detention had not been ordered in accordance with Article 5 § 1 (e). Instead, the applicant had been placed in the hospital in order to have her mental capacity evaluated to determine whether she could be held criminally responsible for the criminal actions attributed to her. Taking that into account, the Government argued that the applicant’s confinement to the psychiatric hospital had been justified in order to secure the fulfilment of an obligation prescribed by law and/or because of non-compliance with the  <mask>, as provided for in Article 5 § 1 (b) of the Convention. They referred in this regard to the admissibility decision in the case of Berliński v. Poland ((dec.), nos. 27715/95 and 30209/96, 18 January 2001).


33.  The Government submitted that, following the breach of his bail conditions, the applicant was placed in detention in accordance with the second limb of Article 5 § 1 (b), namely in order to secure the fulfilment of an obligation that was prescribed by law and was entered into freely. However, the measure applied was also a result of the applicant’s failure to comply with the  <mask> and also fell under the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (b). Hence, it was punitive in nature. In such circumstances, there had been no other course of action than to apply the detention prescribed by law.


50.  The applicant’s deprivation of liberty clearly did not fall under sub‑paragraphs (a), (d), (e) or (f) of paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Convention. Nor could it be said to fall under sub—paragraph (b): there was no evidence of non‑compliance with a  <mask> and the applicant’s detention could not have been to secure the fulfilment of an obligation prescribed by law because, at the time his arrest, there was no unfulfilled obligation on the applicant (see Vasileva v. Denmark, no. 52792/99, § 36, 25 September 2003).


183.  The applicant complained that his son had been tortured before his death. He also asserted that the failure to enter Ferhat in any custody record had violated his right to  <mask> and that the violation was aggravated by the incommunicado detention. He further alleged that the authorities had failed to carry out an independent, thorough and effective investigation into his complaints. He relied on Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention.


86.  The Government were convinced that following the Prague 4 District Court’s judgment of 10 November 2011, the applicant had had a new opportunity at the domestic level to have the merits of his complaint that his involuntary placement in a social care home had violated his right to liberty and  <mask> reviewed. Had he not succeeded before the ordinary courts, he could have resorted to the Constitutional Court. Since he would have met the requirement of a previous lodging of a plea of nullity, the Constitutional Court could have been expected to examine the merits of his appeal. The Government referred in this connection to Constitutional Court opinion no. Pl. ÚS-st. 25/08 of 6 May 2008 (see paragraph 79 above) from which it can be deduced that the Constitutional Court would have reversed the ordinary court’s judgment if it concluded that it had violated the applicant’s right to liberty and personal security, despite the fact that at the time of the Constitutional Court’s decision, the applicant would no longer have been in the social care home.


131.  The applicant maintained that her husband was abducted by State agents without any guarantee as to  <mask> and disappeared. She contended that Talat Türkoğlu had not been brought promptly before a judicial authority after his arrest. She submitted in this connection that at the material time there were a significant number of killings and disappearances in Turkey.


96.  The Government contended that, following his acquittal, the applicant had lost his victim status in respect of his complaints under Article 5 of the Convention. Furthermore, in their view, it remained open to the applicant to bring a civil claim for compensation for the damage allegedly resulting from unlawful and unreasonably lengthy pre-trial detention as provided for in Articles 1070 and 1100 of the Russian Civil Code. As regards the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant's pre-trial detention, the Government conceded that from 25 November to 31 December 2002 his detention had not been authorised by a court order. They further submitted that the applicant had been remanded in custody pending investigation and trial owing to the gravity of the charges against him. In addition, it had been made known to the judicial authorities that, if released, the applicant could have absconded. Lastly, they argued that, as the applicant had been accused of having molested a boy of less than fourteen years of age with a learning disability, his pre-trial detention had also been necessary to ensure his own safety and  <mask>.


184.  The applicant maintained that his son had been detained without any guarantee as to  <mask>. In his opinion, the secrecy of his said detention and the failure to acknowledge detainees would have made him more vulnerable than acknowledged detainees and would have exposed him to acute anxiety of such a kind as to constitute torture. He alleged that there was direct evidence that Ferhat Tepe had been tortured while in detention, as the statement of Erkan Dağdelen, Murat Koparan and Taner Şarlak dated 16 August 1993 showed.


183.  The applicant reiterated his complaint and argued that it was arbitrary and irrational to continue detaining him rather than order his release pending trial, if necessary conditioned by  <mask>. He contended that there had been no risk that he would abscond or seek to interfere with the criminal proceedings and that, even if there had been such a risk, non-custodial preventive measures should have been considered.


33.  The Government pointed out that Article 5 § 3 expressly allowed for the release of a person detained on remand to be conditioned by guarantees of his appearance for trial. There was no absolute right to be released on bail and Article 5 § 3 did not specify how and under what conditions  <mask> should be applied or their application be terminated. Accordingly, these issues were subject to determination by domestic law. In the present case the applicant had been released on bail in 2002; however, he had been in breach of the conditions of the bail and had thus been taken into custody again in accordance with domestic law.


84.  The applicant reiterated his complaint and argued that it was arbitrary and irrational to continue detaining him rather than order his release pending trial, if necessary conditioned by  <mask>. He contended that there had been no risk that he would abscond or seek to interfere with the criminal proceedings and that, even if there had been such a risk, non-custodial preventive measures should have been considered.


58.  The applicant submitted that there was no proper  <mask> of the lawfulness of his detention, contrary to Article 5 § 4. The sheriff held the applicant to be treatable and therefore detainable in the face of the great weight of evidence to the contrary. The three judges of the Inner House of the Court of Session reviewing that evidence took the view that the evidence was not such that he was treatable and that he should be discharged. The House of Lords, which did not itself decide whether he was treatable, recognised that the Inner House would have been entitled to form the view it did on an appeal but that on judicial-review principles the sheriff’s decision could not be challenged as unlawfully perverse. He was therefore denied a proper decision by a court on the merits on the evidence.


149.  The Government submit that, according to Articles 228 § 3 and 2397 of the Civil Procedure Code, in force at the time, decisions of the state authorities, which affect the rights and obligations of individuals, are subjected to judicial  <mask> which is fully authorised to quash the impugned decision and terminate the administrative proceedings against the individual concerned.


94.  The Government, arguing that the applicants were not awaiting deportation or extradition, took the view that the facts of the case did not fall within sub-paragraph (f) of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which authorised a person’s “ <mask> ... to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country” or when “deportation or extradition” proceedings were pending against the person (see paragraph 81 above). The Government did not, however, indicate under which other sub-paragraph of Article 5 the deprivation of liberty could be justified in the applicants’ case.


77.  The applicant maintained that although the Act “On the procedure for the compensation of damage caused to a citizen by the unlawful actions of bodies of inquiry, pre-trial investigative authorities, prosecutors and courts” (the “Compensation Act”) of 1 December 1994, with amendments, and Article 1166 of the Civil Code of Ukraine provided a theoretical possibility of claiming compensation for un <mask>, the outcome of such a claim would have been conditional on a finding by the domestic courts that the arrest or detention was in breach of domestic law. Since the courts did not establish any unlawfulness in the applicant’s arrest and detention, any claim of this type would have been futile.


87.  The Government submitted that throughout the criminal proceedings, the applicants had displayed a contradictory attitude. According to the facts collected by the authorities, they were  <mask> and had regular problems with the police. They had told the authorities that their injuries had been caused during a street fight, and not at the police station. The medical reports drawn up by the Human Rights Foundation could not therefore be taken as credible evidence.


107.  The applicants’ confinement in a cage, as if they were dangerous criminals who had already been found guilty, had served as an instrument of unlawful influence upon the jury, in breach of the rules governing jury trials, which prohibited any actions capable of undermining the presumption of innocence and, in particular, any submissions which might cause jurors to be prejudiced against defendants, by referring for example to defendants’ previous convictions or to the fact that they were chronic alcoholics or  <mask>, unless that information was necessary for establishing the elements of the offences of which they were accused. In view of the foregoing, the applicants could not have a fair trial respecting the principle of the presumption of innocence. They had never pleaded guilty and it had been necessary to overcome the jury’s prejudice in order to prove their innocence. Being held in a cage before their judges who were to decide their fate, the applicants had felt helplessness, inferiority and anxiety during the entire trial. Such harsh treatment had had an impact on their power of concentration and mental alertness during the proceedings concerning as they did such an important issue as their liberty.


29.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention that on 1 October 2013 the court deciding on his pre-trial detention had not given any proper reasons, and that the domestic legislation did not require the domestic courts to give such reasons or to set time-limits. Relying on Article 5 § 3, he complained that his pre-trial detention had been extended by the court numerous times on identical grounds. He also complained that his application for release lodged with his local court on 27 December 2013 had not been examined until 21 January 2014, and that his similar request lodged on 15 August 2014 had not been examined until 4 September 2014, which did not comply with the requirements of  <mask> under Article 5 § 4.


15.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 about the outcome of the second set of proceedings. In so far as this complaint may be understood to concern the assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a  <mask>, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999‑I). In the present case, the Court is satisfied that the applicant's submissions do not disclose any appearance that the courts lacked impartiality, or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair or arbitrary. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.


12.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the decisions given by the courts. In so far as her complaint may be understood to concern the assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a  <mask>, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999‑I).


24.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Izmir State Security Court which tried and convicted him. He submitted that his statements in police custody which had been extracted under torture were admitted in evidence and that he had been denied the assistance of a lawyer at the initial stages of the proceedings. He argued that the court did not take into account his objections to the admissibility of the document and the findings of the unlawful search. He claimed that the unlawfully obtained evidence and other documents prepared by the police and the prosecution had been prejudicial to his defence rights. He claimed that the court did not hear Ms S.D. and despite the fact that her testimony was admitted to the case file at the appeal stage, the Court of Cassation did not take it into account. The applicant maintained that the court did not give any reasons as to why it had not taken into account the testimony of his witnesses. He complained that the testimony of two convicted persons had been included in the case file. Finally, he argued that his defence rights had been infringed as he was detained in a prison far from Izmir, thus making it difficult for his representative to see him. The applicant relied on Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant provides:


14.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the lack of a  <mask>, the length of the proceedings and the non-enforcement of the court decision given in his favour. Moreover, he complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention about the insufficient interest due on the additional compensation awarded following the expropriation of his property, and about authorities’ failure to pay this sum.


28.  The Government alleged that the applicant's right to a  <mask> of his civil case had not been breached. They admitted that there had been a delay in sending the notification from the Gusevskiy Town Court. However, the delay was caused by the applicant's transferral to the correctional colony. The State cannot be held responsible for the work of the postal service. They referred to the cases of Foley v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 39197/98, 11 September 2001, and Zagorodnikov v. Russia, no. 66941/01 7 June 2001.


15.  The Government further argued that the applicant had failed to lodge a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court. Had the applicant been of the opinion that the legal provisions on which the courts had based their decisions or their interpretation – namely Article 156 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in conjunction with section 52 § 2 of the Lustration Act – had breached his rights, in particular his right to a  <mask> enshrined in Article 45 of the Constitution, he should have lodged a constitutional complaint. In particular, the applicant should have requested the Constitutional Court to examine whether the rules imposed by those provisions had violated his right to a fair trial.


16.  The applicant complained in the first place that he had not received a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court, which tried and convicted him. He further alleged that he had been denied a  <mask> before the domestic courts since his conviction was based on his statement obtained under duress in the course of his detention in police custody. Finally, he claimed that he was deprived of his right to a lawyer during his detention in police custody. The applicant invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


33.  The applicant complained, under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, that she had been denied a  <mask> in that she had not been given an adequate opportunity to put questions to the witnesses against her, i.e. the child complainants, before the domestic courts. It was true that she had been afforded such an opportunity during the pre-trial investigation, but she did not realise that it would be the only opportunity. She also complained about the refusal of her request that K. be heard before the Court of Appeal, either at the oral hearing or elsewhere.


17.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal as the Supreme Military Administrative Court had been composed of military judges. He further argued under Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 that the prohibition of his access to the army’s social facilities, while other retired officers could benefit from this right, had amounted to discrimination. Lastly, he contended under Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 that there was no appeal against the decisions of the Supreme Military Administrative Court.


22.  The applicant complained that he had not had a  <mask> in his constitutional petition of 2001 and that the length of the proceedings in this petition and in his action of 1999 had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:


34.  The applicant complained, under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, that he had been denied a  <mask> in that he had not been afforded an opportunity to put questions to the witnesses against him, i.e. the children, and in that the police officer conducting the pre-trial investigation had put leading questions to two of the children, which affected their opinion of what had taken place.


27.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court which tried and convicted him. He further submitted that he had been deprived of his right to the assistance of a lawyer during his police custody. Finally, he claimed that the length of the criminal proceedings brought against him was excessive. The applicant relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


15.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the İzmir State Security Court which tried and convicted him. He alleged that his statement, taken under duress in police custody, was admitted in evidence and that the İzmir State Security Court relied heavily on the statements of the co-defendants without giving him an adequate opportunity to cross-examine them. Finally, he complained that he had been tried in absentia. The applicant relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


59.  The Government stressed that the instant case was distinguishable from the case of Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, ECHR 1999‑VII), as the protest was lodged by the President of the Regional Court and not by the prosecutor and concerned an interim procedural decision, not the final judgment in the case. The supervisory review procedure was expressly regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. It contained guarantees to ensure a  <mask> and was aimed at correcting judicial errors. The supervisory review did not contradict the principles of the rule of law and legal certainty. The procedure represented an effective legal mechanism created to correct erroneous judicial decisions. The Government considered that the applicant's case was examined by an independent and impartial tribunal in adversarial proceedings.


20.  The Government contended that several aspects distinguished this case from Brumărescu v. Romania ([GC], no. 28342/95, ECHR 1999‑VII) and Androne v. Romania (no. 54062/00, 22 December 2004), where the Court found that the quashing of a final decision had violated the applicant’s right to a  <mask>. They pointed out that no State official had intervened in the case, as the extraordinary appeal was directly lodged with the courts by the defendant.


49.  The applicant argued that the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, in their decisions of 23 October 2006 and 22 May 2007 (see paragraphs 22, 27 and 28), had been partial and unfair, in that they had ignored his procedural rights. Given that the essence of his case concerned allegedly unlawful dismissal from military service on a discriminatory basis, to fully present his case the applicant had asked both courts to order his battalion’s commanding officers to provide evidence, which he was not able to obtain on his own, concerning four soldiers who had served in the same military unit. If reaching a particular age was an absolute ground for dismissal from military service, those four servicemen should already have been dismissed on the same basis, that is, their age, moreover this should have happened much earlier than when the applicant was dismissed. However, the courts simply ignored the request, without even giving reasons for refusal. The applicant thus considered that there was a breach of his right to adduce evidence which was essential to a  <mask> of his claims of discrimination for his views and ideas.


50.  The applicant complained that the appeal proceedings in her case had breached her right to an adversarial trial enshrined in the  <mask> guarantees of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, by way of the courts’ failure to communicate to her the respondent company’s and prosecutor’s observations on her grounds of appeal and to duly summon her to the appeal hearing. The relevant part of the provision reads as follows:


37.  The applicant complained that he had not received a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the İzmir State Security Court. He further alleged under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention that the İzmir State Security Court had sentenced him on the basis of statements obtained in his absence, which he could not challenge during the proceedings against him and that, despite his requests, the court had not heard any witnesses in his favour.


12.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the İzmir State Security Court which tried and convicted them. They maintained that the domestic court relied on statements given by them under duress in police custody and failed to take into account their arguments presented during the criminal proceedings. They further complained that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter‑arguments. They relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


89.  The Government stressed that although the instant case concerned the quashing of a final judgment, it was nevertheless distinguishable from the case of Brumărescu v. Romania ([GC], no. 28342/95, ECHR 1999-VII), as the protest was lodged by the Deputy President of the Odessa Regional Court and not by the prosecutor. The supervisory review procedure (процедура розгляду справ в порядку нагляду) was expressly regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. It contained guarantees to ensure a  <mask>, it was used by Ukrainian citizens to defend their rights and was aimed at correcting judicial errors. The supervisory review did not contradict the principles of the rule of law and legal certainty. The procedure was transparent, foreseeable and was an effective legal mechanism enabling citizens to appeal against erroneous judicial decisions.


22.  The applicant submits under Article 6 of the Convention that he was denied a  <mask> as the domestic courts erred in their assessment of the facts. The applicant argues that the same court, namely the Supreme Administrative Court, examined both the requests for leave to appeal and for rectification of the judgment, in violation of his right under Article 13 of the Convention.


30.  The applicant complained that the criminal charges against him had not been determined within a reasonable time and that he had not had a  <mask> in the criminal proceedings against him. In particular, he alleged a violation of the principle of equality of arms since the domestic courts had refused to examine some witnesses and admit documentary evidence relevant to his case. He also complained of the refusal of the domestic courts to examine Z.S. at the trial. The applicant relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


44.  The applicant submitted that he had been refused legal aid for the purposes of the appellate proceedings and that these refusals had not contained any written grounds that would have justified them. The case had been very complex as it had arisen against the background of the fire which had destroyed his factory and subsequent serious difficulties which had affected the functioning of his company. Hence, the effective representation of the applicant’s interests had necessitated professional legal assistance. Likewise, the formal requirements of the appeal had been difficult to meet for a lay person. The applicant was an engineer by profession so it was exceedingly difficult for him to develop sound legal arguments in support of his position. As a result of the unreasoned refusals of legal aid he had been deprived of a  <mask> in his case and his chances of successfully challenging the first-instance judgment had been irremediably lost.


23.  The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies because he had not raised any such complaint in his constitutional complaint. They argued that in his application before the Court the applicant had complained that the Supreme Court had upheld the lower courts’ decisions, contrary to its own well-established case-law. His application to the Court was therefore a complaint of a lack of legal certainty caused by inconsistent Supreme Court case-law. However, he had not made those arguments before the Constitutional Court. It was the applicant’s responsibility to state clearly and to substantiate the manner in which his human rights had been violated. Moreover, he had failed to complain that his right to a  <mask>, guaranteed by Article 29 of the Constitution, had been violated.


52.  The applicant complained that the UAR’s decision of 27 June 1996, annulling his registration with the Constanţa Bar, and the subsequent administrative proceedings in which that decision had been upheld, had violated Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as regards the right to a  <mask>. He complained that the UAR’s decision had been adopted without any hearing and had not been notified to him and that, in the subsequent proceedings, the courts had failed to determine the full subject matter of the dispute, to deal with his main arguments, or to order disclosure of the UAR’s original Register of Decisions, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides:


46.  The applicant complained that the proceedings involving M.L.’s defamation claim and his counterclaim had been inordinately lengthy and that his right to a  <mask> had been breached, as the courts had failed to respond to his arguments and state adequate reasons for their findings in the judgments given in M.L.’s defamation claim. He referred to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:


30.  The applicant complained that neither the Istanbul State Security Court, nor the Istanbul Assize Court had met the requirements of independence and impartiality laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. He further argued that he had been denied an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention as he had not been tried by an independent and impartial tribunal and the Ninth Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation which had examined his appeal had been politicised. He maintained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that his statements had been extracted under duress in police custody, including by way of physical ill-treatment, and that the judgment of the Istanbul Assize Court had been erroneous, had lacked reasoning and had been based on insufficient evidence. Lastly, the applicant maintained that his imprisonment following an un <mask> had amounted to “torture” within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.


26.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court which had tried and convicted them. They further submitted that they had been denied the assistance of a lawyer while in police custody. They relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant reads:


18.  The applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention that he had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal as the Supreme Military Administrative Court had been composed of military judges and that it had acted as a first and only instance court, which had also infringed his right to an effective remedy. He further maintained under Article 6 § 1 that he had been denied a public hearing due to the lack of reference to the principal public prosecutor’s name in the court decisions. The applicant contended that his expulsion from the military academy had amounted to a punishment without a law, in violation of Article 7 of the Convention. Lastly, he maintained under Article 14 of the Convention that he had been expelled from the military academy by reason of his father’s affiliations with a certain trade union, which amounted to discrimination.


44.  The applicants therefore attributed the delay in the expropriation proceedings entirely to the CoL. His failure to act for over twenty years, according to the applicants, constituted a lack of access to court and a violation of their right to a  <mask> within a reasonable time. It was only after he was forced to do so by court order that proceedings had finally commenced. However, to date they had not ended. Moreover, no proceedings had been initiated in respect of two of the plots of land. In this regard, they further argued that they had no means of enforcing the judgment of 4 February 2000 ordering the CoL to initiate proceedings. They further contended that they could not be held to blame for instituting proceedings to force the CoL to take action only in the 1990s, since up to that date the prevailing case-law had found that the civil courts did not have any jurisdiction to review acts carried out by the Government jure imperii. Indeed, the first judgments recognising that the victims of expropriation could apply for such an order had only been delivered in the 1990s. This was irrespective of Article 1078 of the Civil Code, which the applicants acknowledged could allow for such an action, had it not been for the aforementioned impediment. Moreover, they contended that the proceedings before the LAB had been suspended again, in view of the current proceedings before the Court, and were to date still pending. Furthermore, they alleged that the CoL had intentionally initiated these proceedings in the names of the deceased, notwithstanding that notification of their heirs had been officially made to him, thus, rendering the proceedings null.


31.  The applicants submitted in reply, with reference to Article 131 (f) of the Constitution and the practice of the Constitutional Court, that in order to exhaust all domestic remedies, individuals had to lodge a complaint with the Constitutional Court if and when they alleged a breach of the right to a  <mask>. Moreover, the applicants’ complaint relating to the claimant’s lack of legal standing in the proceedings concerned was connected to the concept of a fair hearing as established by the case-law of the Constitutional Court. The latter had the jurisdiction and the obligation to consider the case and to decide it, if necessary by means of a judgment. Accordingly, the applicants claimed that they had lodged their application with the Court in time, as the Constitutional Court’s decision was dated 24 September 2002, even if it was a de plano inadmissibility decision.


33.  The applicant first complained that he had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the İstanbul State Security Court which tried and convicted him. Secondly, he submitted that he was convicted on the basis of false statements taken under duress and documents drafted by the police. Thirdly, he alleges that he should not have been tried by a State Security Court and that the rules of procedure before these courts are different from the standard rules of criminal procedure. The applicant relied on Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention.


22.  The Government submitted that, in civil proceedings generally, the onus to prove a certain fact lay with that party in whose interest it was that the court should accept it as true. The applicant had brought an action alleging that a business share held by it, worth HUF 103 million, had lost its value as a result of an unlawful omission on the part of the Tax Authority. The Court of Appeal could not be said to have violated the applicant’s right to a  <mask> since it had had good reasons for ordering the applicant to prove the amount of the purchase price which it could have obtained for the share had it been sold within or outside the enforcement procedure. It was doubtful whether under Hungarian market circumstances a business share purchased for HUF 32 million in 1993 could have been sold at a price three times higher when no meantime investment or equity raise had been put in place. It could be presumed that even if the share had not been attached in the tax procedure, no potential buyer would have been willing to pay over HUF 103 million at a time when the financial situation of the company in which the share had belonged had significantly worsened. Therefore it could not be argued that the loss of the value of the share in question had been a direct consequence of tax enforcement.


14.  The applicant alleged a number of violations of his rights enshrined in Articles 6 § 1, 17 and 18 of the Convention. He complained, in the first place, that he had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal as the Supreme Military Administrative Court had been composed of military judges and officers and that this court had acted as a first and only instance court. He further maintained that he had not had access to the classified documents submitted by the administration to the Supreme Military Administrative Court. Lastly, he alleged violations of Articles 17 and 18 of the Convention.


25.   The applicant complained that the presumption of innocence as guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the Convention had been violated and submits that the Independent Administrative Panel had applied a reversal of the burden of proof. The applicant further complained about the Austrian authorities’ failure to hear J. Z. in the proceedings before the Independent Administrative Panel as a witness. The applicant complained that no prosecuting authority participated in the proceedings before the Independent Administrative Panel and that therefore the member of the Independent Administrative Panel acted both as judge and prosecutor. He submits that, therefore, he did not have a  <mask> by a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. Finally, the applicant complained about the lack of an oral hearing before the Administrative Court.


76.  The applicant further claimed that he had not had access to a court affording him a  <mask> under Article 6. In addition to the effects of the allegedly excessive length of the proceedings, he relied on the following arguments in this context. The proceedings before the Tax Authority had not involved a determination that complied with the requirements of Article 6. Nor was, allegedly, the County Administrative Court a “tribunal established by law” as the administrative courts were not authorised to deal with criminal matters. Moreover, in order for the applicant to have an effective right of appeal, the execution of the Tax Authority's decisions should have been stayed. The applicant also asserted that he had not had a preliminary examination of the tax issues in the bankruptcy proceedings, as the courts that had heard the bankruptcy petition had not examined the underlying tax decisions or the Tax Authority's investigation. Furthermore, the immediate enforcement of the tax decisions and the bankruptcy order had caused the applicant irreparable damage, as his private and professional finances had been ruined as a result of the bar on carrying on business activities during bankruptcy. The applicant, therefore, said that any future reparation he might receive would not effectively remedy the damage he had sustained.


32.  The Government submitted that at the relevant time the two military judges and their two civilian counterparts sitting on the martial-law court enjoyed the guarantees of judicial independence and immunity laid down in the Constitution. The sole task of the army officer on the bench was to ensure the proper functioning of the hearing and he had no other judicial power. In the Government’s view, the procedure for the appointment and the assessment of the military judges sitting on the martial-law courts and the safeguards they enjoyed in the performance of their judicial duties at the time perfectly satisfied the criteria laid down by the Court’s case-law on the subject. They therefore requested that the Court hold that there had been no violation of the applicant’s right to a  <mask> by an “independent and impartial tribunal”.


23.  The Government firstly stated that the instant case was restricted to determining whether the applicant’s conviction on appeal by the Cáceres Audiencia Provincial for false accusation of a crime, the only crime he had been acquitted of by the criminal judge and convicted of on appeal, amounted to a violation of his right to a  <mask>. The case did not concern his conviction for serious disobedience to public authority imposed on him by the criminal judge, which the Audiencia Provincial had merely upheld.


15.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the İzmir State Security Court which tried and convicted them. They further submitted that they were convicted on the basis of their statements in police custody which were taken under duress and that the court refused their demands for a supplementary investigation. They maintained that they were denied the assistance of a lawyer during the initial stages of the criminal proceedings and that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter‑arguments.


31.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the State Security Court which tried and convicted him. He further submitted that he was convicted on the basis of his statements extracted under torture. Finally, the applicant maintained that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on him, thus depriving him of the opportunity to put forward his counter-arguments. The applicant relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


15.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 about the outcome of the proceedings. In so far as this complaint may be understood to concern the assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a  <mask>, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999‑I). In the present case, the Court is satisfied that the applicant’s submissions do not disclose any appearance that the courts lacked impartiality, or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair or arbitrary. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.


20.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention that his right to the presumption of innocence had been breached, as the domestic court assumed from the start that the applicant was guilty. He argued under Article 6 §§ 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention that he had been denied a  <mask> as the decision of the Court of Cassation, as well as the decision on the request for rectification of the judgment, had lacked reasoning. He maintained finally under Articles 6 § 1 and 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention that the first-instance court had failed to hear the crucial witness, A.S.


70.  The applicant also complained that the proceedings against him had fallen short of the guarantees of a  <mask> within a reasonable time and that his right to be presumed innocent had been violated by virtue of the Supreme Court's decisions of 31 July 2001 and 30 January 2002. He relied on Article 6 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:


33.  The Government accordingly inferred that the ministerial order of 22 January 1999 satisfied the requirements of the Court's case-law concerning loss of victim status, although they were aware that the Court had a fairly broad conception of the notion of “victim” (see Amuur v. France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, p. 846, § 36, and Association Ekin v. France, no. 39288/98, §§ 37-38, ECHR 2001-VIII) and that it had difficulty in accepting that a person could cease to be a victim during the course of the proceedings. They argued that although the order in issue had not on the face of it had a direct link with the alleged violation since it had not concerned the requirements of a  <mask>, which the applicant alleged had been infringed, it had nonetheless settled the dispute finally and unequivocally in the applicant's favour by authorising her to practise as a doctor.


156.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention alleging a violation of his right to a  <mask> by an impartial tribunal within a reasonable time. In particular, he complained that the bill of indictment had not been drawn up in accordance with the law in that it had not specified the particular circumstances of the offence with which he had been charged or the evidence against him. The applicant alleged that such defects of the bill of indictment had effectively placed on him the burden of having to prove his innocence in subsequent judicial proceedings. He also complained about the dismissal on 19 May 2003 of his application to have certain evidence declared inadmissible. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention about the dismissal on 18 June 2003 of the motion to admit his uncle to participate in the proceedings as his representative. He further complained under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention about the dismissal of his motion to call Mrs R. at the hearing and to adjourn the hearing in order to call Mr Kh.


64.  The Government maintained that at the hearing before the Bratislava Regional Court the defendant had submitted no additional evidence or arguments, and that prior to that hearing the applicant had been given the possibility of submitting all her arguments to the court and to make comments on the observations submitted by the defendant. In the Government’s view, the decision to dismiss the applicant’s action was not arbitrary and the applicant’s right to a  <mask> was respected.


63.  The applicant alleged a violation of his right to a  <mask> in connection with the two sets of proceedings in the Constitutional Court, concerning Decree no. 40 and the merits of the impeachment charges against him. He submitted that because of collusion between the court's President and the member of the Seimas who had initiated the proceedings against him, the Constitutional Court could not be considered an independent and impartial tribunal, and noted that that court had subsequently issued a public response to his accusations of bias on its part; in a supplement to his application, dated 30 November 2006, he added that the Constitutional Court's endorsement of the conclusions of the declaration of 25 March 2004 by the Seimas showed that it had been put under considerable pressure by Parliament as a result of such collusion. He further submitted that he had been unable to defend himself effectively and that, in the impeachment proceedings, his lawyers had not had access to certain classified documents which the special investigation commission had examined and the Constitutional Court had exceeded its powers by making findings as to the facts and the issue of “guilt”. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) of the Convention, which provides:


36.  The applicant complained of a violation of her right to a  <mask> within a reasonable time and also that she had been a victim of discrimination on grounds of sex. She further alleged that she had been unable to obtain redress for the violation of her fundamental right as acknowledged by the Constitutional Court. She relied on Articles 6 § 1 and 14 of the Convention, which read as follows:


24.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court which tried and convicted him on 15 April 1997. He invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:


42.  The applicant company complained that the judgments of 23 September 1997 and 24 December 1997 of the Appeal on Points of Law Chamber of the Economic Court and of the Supreme Court of Justice respectively (Proceedings A and B), which set aside two final judgments in its favour, had violated Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It also alleged that the filing of the application of 17 July 1996 by the Prosecutor General on the basis of Article 5 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Proceedings B) violated its right to a  <mask>.


33.  The applicants considered that they were still victims of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (lack of access to court and of a  <mask> within a reasonable time), since the compensation awarded by the Constitutional Court had been too low and because no proceedings had been initiated in respect of two of the plots of land. Moreover, in respect of the latter complaint, they had no means of enforcing the judgment of 4 February 2000 ordering the CoL to initiate proceedings. As to any previous arrangement in respect of Plot 3, this had never been debated before the domestic courts. As to Plot 2, they contended that it was not possible to challenge the amount awarded, as the new procedure only referred to recent expropriations. Furthermore, the awards made by the Constitutional Court had not been paid to date and there were no means of enforcing such claims. Lastly, the applicants remained, to date, uncompensated for the taking of all the plots of land.


36.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal since he had been tried by a military court. He maintained that he had been convicted on the basis of tape‑recorded telephone conversations which had been unlawfully obtained. He also alleged that the court had failed to hold a public hearing and to secure the attendance of a witness who was important for his defence. In this connection, he relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which provides as relevant:


37.  The applicants complained that the proceedings in their criminal case had fallen short of important guarantees of a  <mask>. They referred, in particular, to their confinement in metal cages during the court hearings and the intensive schedule of those hearings, and alleged that they had not had adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence and for confidential consultations with their counsel. They also complained that they had not been informed in sufficient detail about the nature and cause of the accusations against them as the charges had been identically phrased and the role and actions of each defendant had not been detailed. They further complained that their relatives and members of Parliament had not been permitted to represent them during the trial. The also alleged that the trial court had not taken measures to make witnesses reply to the questions put to them by the applicants’ counsel. Lastly, the applicants complained that the assessment of evidence by the domestic courts had been biased.


36.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the State Security Courts which tried and convicted him. He further complained that he had not been informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him and that he did not have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence. Finally, he claimed that the length of the criminal proceedings brought against him was excessive. The applicant relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a) and (b) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, read as follows:


102.  The Government reiterated that, whilst section 9-15(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure stated that appeals against interlocutory orders and decisions should normally be determined following a written procedure, section 9-15(2) provided: “An oral hearing shall be held if required out of regard to the need to ensure sound and fair legal proceedings” [emphasis added]. In the present case, after having considered whether an oral hearing was required by the  <mask> guarantee in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the High Court decided to determine the applicant’s appeal on the basis of the written case-file.


31.  The applicants complained under Article 3 of the Convention that they were ill-treated under police custody. They further complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention about the excessive length of their police custody and subsequent detention on remand. They also submitted that they were denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court which tried them. Lastly, they referred to the different procedural rules applied before state security courts and ordinary criminal courts and invoked a violation of Article 14 of the Convention.


16.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Izmir State Security Court which tried them. They submitted that they had been convicted on the basis of their statements in police custody which had been taken under duress and that they had been denied the assistance of a lawyer at the initial stages of the proceedings. They complained that the domestic court had refused their request for a further investigation. Finally, they maintained that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter-arguments. They relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) of the Convention, which in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


16.  The Government maintained in the first place that, in assessing whether or not the trial was fair, regard should be had to the entirety of the proceedings. As the applicant was represented by a lawyer during the proceedings before the State Security Court and the Court of Cassation, his right to a  <mask> had not been violated. The Government further stated that, as the applicant was illiterate, his statement taken by the gendarmes was read out to him. They underlined the fact that his confessions during his custody period were not the sole basis of the conviction.


48.  The Government asked the Grand Chamber to endorse the Chamber’s finding that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention. They stated, firstly, that the legislation had been changed in 2005. Furthermore, in their submission, the restriction imposed on the applicant’s access to a lawyer had not infringed his right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. Referring to the case-law of the Court (see, in particular, Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24 November 1993, Series A no. 275; John Murray v. the United Kingdom, 8 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑I; Averill v. the United Kingdom, no. 36408/97, ECHR 2000‑VI; Magee v. the United Kingdom, no. 28135/95, ECHR 2000‑VI; and Brennan v. the United Kingdom, no. 39846/98, ECHR 2001‑X), they maintained that in assessing whether or not the trial was fair, regard should be had to the entirety of the proceedings. Thus, as the applicant had been represented by a lawyer during the proceedings before the İzmir State Security Court and the Court of Cassation, his right to a  <mask> had not been violated. The Government further drew attention to several Turkish cases (see Saraç v. Turkey (dec.), no. 35841/97, 2 September 2004; Yurtsever v. Turkey (dec.), no. 42086/02, 31 August 2006; Uçma v. Turkey (dec.), no. 15071/03, 3 October 2006; Yavuz and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 38827/02, 21 November 2006; and Yıldız v. Turkey (dec.), nos. 3543/03 and 3557/03, 5 December 2006), in which the Court had declared similar complaints inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded on the ground that, since the police statements had not been the only evidence to support the convictions, the lack of legal assistance during police custody had not constituted a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.


19.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 about the outcome of the proceedings. In so far as this complaint may be understood to concern the assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a  <mask>, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999‑I). In the present case, the Court is satisfied that the applicant’s submissions do not disclose any appearance that the courts lacked impartiality, or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair or arbitrary. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.


113.  The applicants complained of an interference by the legislature in the judicial process on account of the enactment and application to their case of section 5 bis of Law no. 359/1992. They complained, among other things, that they had not had a  <mask> because, when the amount of their expropriation compensation was determined, the question submitted to the national courts had been settled by the legislature and not by the judiciary.


27.  The Government also contended that ever since the adoption of the above judgment a number of persons had filed civil actions (seven in total) against the Republic claiming damages for human rights violations. By way of example, the Government referred to a civil action pending before the District Court of Nicosia (civil action no. 3216/02) against the State in which the plaintiffs had complained of a violation of their right to a  <mask> due to the protracted length of proceedings under Articles 30 of the Cypriot Constitution and 6 § 1 of the Convention. In this connection, they pointed out that the applicants’ representative was the lawyer who had lodged the above-mentioned action before that district court.


47.  The applicant further complained that he did not have a  <mask> in that the impugned proceedings did not fulfil some of the guarantees specified in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, namely that the SJC had refused to examine witnesses in his defence; that he was denied the right to attend the hearing before the Appeal Panel; and that sufficient reasons were not given for his dismissal.


40.  The Government further argued that the Supreme Court, in its capacity as the court of appeal on points of law, had examined the alleged shortcomings which, according to the applicant, had constituted grounds for that remedy. The Supreme Court had given relevant and sufficient reasons for disagreeing with the applicant’s arguments. In the Government’s view, its conclusions had not been arbitrary and the applicant’s right to a  <mask> by a tribunal had been respected in the proceedings complained of taken as a whole.


13.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 about the outcome of the proceedings. In so far as this complaint may be understood to concern the assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a  <mask>, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999‑I). In the present case, the Court finds that the applicant's submissions do not disclose any indication that the courts lacked impartiality, or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair. Moreover, the Court is satisfied that the courts' findings concerning the release of the medical files in question, and in particular that of the image of computer tomography, do not indicate any appearance of arbitrariness, especially in view of the fact that the applicant had never sought its release from the hospital where it had actually been taken. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.


28.  The Government disputed the applicants' submission that they were not afforded a  <mask> by an impartial tribunal in the appeal proceedings before the High Court. They submitted that it was beyond doubt that no element of subjective bias had existed on the part of Judge G. or juror W. or any other members of the High Court.  Nor had the applicants any objective reason for fearing lack of impartiality.


21.  The Government contended that, in the judgment of 14 July 2005, the Supreme Court of Justice had failed to address all the claims concerning costs. In the Government’s view, this was a legal ground for upholding the request made by the bank under Article 250 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They argued that by varying the final judgment of 14 July 2005 the supplementary judgment of 30 March 2006 had not modified the Supreme Court’s previous findings on the merits. They observed that the action under Article 250 of the Code of Civil Procedure could be lodged only as long as the enforcement of the judgment to be varied was pending. Thus, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of the applicant company’s right to a  <mask>.


81.  The applicants, on the contrary, contended that they had not been given a  <mask>. They complained that the court had refused to accept the video recordings of their arrest as evidence and to call and examine the witnesses they had requested, and had disallowed a number of questions to the police officers during their cross-examination. Furthermore, the court had not respected the equality of arms in that it had rejected the testimonies of all the defence witnesses while giving weight to the testimonies of the two police officers. In addition, the applicants complained that the hearing had not been open to the public, that their right to defence had been violated and that they had not been given adequate time to prepare their defence. Lastly, they claimed that having spent the night in transfer between three different police stations and then in detention in appalling conditions at the Kitay-Gorod police station, they had been unfit to stand trial the following day and to defend themselves effectively.


36.  The Government submitted that the opportunity for any individual to benefit from qualified legal advice was characteristic of any State governed by the rule of law. However, the applicant had not been denied a  <mask>. The order requiring him to reimburse the costs of his defence had not prevented him from having a proper defence and the services of counsel, and had not had a negative impact on the fairness of the proceedings against him. He could reimburse that sum, which was not exorbitant, by working, even while still in prison. There was no indication that he had paid it.


28.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a  <mask> within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of the military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court. He further alleged that he had been denied a fair hearing before the domestic courts since his conviction was not based on concrete evidence. The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


41.  The applicant complained that she did not have a  <mask> in the proceedings before the Criminal Court of Appeal, as the court relied in its judgment on pre-trial witness statements which were not read out and examined in court. She further complained that she had no opportunity to examine those witnesses at any time during the proceedings. She alleged a breach of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(d) of the Convention, which reads as follows:


32.  The applicant first complained that he had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Ankara State Security Court which tried and convicted him. Secondly, he claimed that the court had been influenced by the Army since the proceedings against him had been prompted by the request of the Second Chief of the General Staff. Finally, he maintained that he had been convicted solely on the basis of the statements of the journalist who had a personal interest in incriminating him. The applicant relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


45.  The applicant submitted that the courts in the civil proceedings against her and her son had breached her right to a  <mask> by relying on the judgments in the criminal proceedings against V.O., in which her son had been a witness and she had not had any procedural status. She also submitted that V.M. should not have been allowed to lodge a civil claim against her and her son because he had already lodged such a claim against V.O. and that claim had been partly allowed, so he should not have been entitled to double compensation. The applicant lastly argued that it was unfair that she and her son had had to pay more in compensation for non‑pecuniary damage than V.O., the person who had been convicted of assaulting V.M.


41.  The applicant complained that the judicial decisions imposing the fine on him and ordering his administrative arrest and detention were arbitrary and in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. He further complained about an un <mask> in the second civil proceedings (paragraphs 22-26 above). Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in its relevant part provides as follows:


39.  The Government maintained that the right to a public hearing was not absolute and that an exclusion of the general public was admissible, inter alia, for the protection of the private lives of the parties or when required on grounds of private and family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. They pointed out that succession proceedings were not open to the general public in order to protect the private sphere of the parties. The legislator, thus, took into account that family relations and the pecuniary situation of the parties belonged to a person's private sphere which deserved protection from the disclosure of details. They concluded that the parties' right to protection of their private lives guaranteed by Article 8, and also by Article 6 § 1, justified an exclusion of the public for such proceedings were not of public interest. Moreover, the Government submitted that in the present case there had been a number of hearings at which the parties could duly put forward their arguments and that the applicant's submissions that there had been no  <mask> were unfounded. Finally they argued, referring to this Court's decision in the case of Varela Assalino v. Portugal (no. 643369/01, 25 April 2002), that the primarily “technical nature” of the issues to be determined in the present proceedings, namely the question of whether or not the farm qualified as hereditary, had justified the absence of a hearing altogether and that this, therefore, was true all the more for the lack of publicity at the hearings.


13.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 about the outcome of the proceedings. In so far as this complaint may be understood to concern the assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a  <mask>, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999‑I). In the present case, the Court is satisfied that the applicant's submissions do not disclose any appearance that the courts lacked impartiality, or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair or arbitrary. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.


31.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the Supreme Court had not afforded her a  <mask> before an impartial tribunal in that: (1) it had decided of its own accord to take evidence without any involvement of the parties; (2) without giving the parties an opportunity to comment on the measure; (3) and with the aim of overturning the expert conclusions reached at first instance thereby favouring the applicant's adversary, the NUH; (4) it had based its findings on the opinion of the employees of the respondent party; and (5) decided the issue of disqualification on the basis of the wrong standard, namely that it had not been demonstrated that extraneous considerations had influenced the Board's opinion.


70.  The applicant complained under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention that he had been discriminated against on the ground of gender in that he had been denied the right to take over a tenancy after the death of A.Z. He challenged in particular the domestic court’s position that his relationship with A.Z. had amounted merely to an “economic community” and not to a “long-lasting life community”. This amounted also to a violation of his right to a  <mask> guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.


88.  The applicants further claimed that they had not had access to a court affording them a  <mask> under Article 6. In addition to the effects of the allegedly excessive length of the proceedings, they relied on the following arguments in this context. The proceedings before the Tax Authority had not involved a determination that complied with the requirements of Article 6. Nor was, allegedly, the County Administrative Court a “tribunal established by law” as the administrative courts were not authorised to deal with criminal matters. Moreover, in order for the applicants to have an effective right of appeal, the execution of the Tax Authority's decisions should have been stayed. The first applicant also asserted that it had not had a court determination of the disputed tax assessments as, on account of the dissolution of the company, its appeals against the Tax Authority's decisions had been dismissed. As this had been done in accordance with applicable legal provisions and case-law, it was unlikely that there would be a different decision by the Supreme Administrative Court, where the case was pending. Furthermore, there had not been a preliminary examination of the tax issues in the bankruptcy proceedings, as the courts that had heard the bankruptcy petition had not examined the underlying tax decisions or the Tax Authority's investigation. The applicants further stated that the immediate enforcement of the tax decisions and the bankruptcy order concerning the first applicant had caused them irreparable damage. The applicants, therefore, said that any future court examination or reparation would not effectively remedy the damage they had sustained.


43.  The applicant disagreed and maintained his complaints. He submitted, in particular, that despite two judicial orders under Article 250t of the CCP, there had been no actual acceleration of the administrative proceedings in question. Resorting to that remedy for the third time would have had no better chances of genuine success. In response to his second action under Article 250t of the CCP, the Regional Court had imposed a fine on the Land Office, but in the absence of any accelerating effect this had had no benefit for him since the fine had not been payable to him but to the State. The constitutional judgment in his favour had not been concerned with the alleged violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time by the Land Office, as complained of in the present case, but with the violation of his right to a  <mask> by the Regional Court. On a careful reading, the precedent relied on by the Government (see paragraphs 34 et seq. and 40 above) actually disproved the effectiveness of the remedy under the State Liability Act. It was true that the domestic law had enabled him repeatedly to use various remedies, but the reality was that the domestic courts dealing with those remedies were not capable of actually resolving his problem. Lastly, in so far as the Government could be understood as attaching some responsibility for the length of the proceedings to his procedural behaviour, the applicant strongly denied any such responsibility.


49.  The applicants submitted that a lack of resources had affected the quality of their defence in that the main responsibility for their litigation had rested with the legal council of the Swedish Sami Association (Svenska samernas riksförbund), a lawyer with little experience of litigation. They further asserted that the reason for the allegedly enormous legal costs for both sides in the proceedings was the legislation, which was defective in that it did not define the winter grazing areas, which had necessitated the pursuit of thorough and time-consuming historical research. The applicants thus had not had any reason to blame the landowners for making the proceedings complex, as that responsibility had rested with the State. With this in mind, and having regard to the vital values at stake, the applicants submitted that their right to an effective access to court and a  <mask> had necessitated the grant of legal aid. The loans received from the Sami Fund will have to be repaid and were of no relevance in this respect. Rather, the payment of the legal costs in the case, together with increasing costs for reindeer herding through the payment of fees to lease land for grazing, puts strain on the economy of the Sami villages and may lead to bankruptcies.


34.  The Government maintained that in the present case the victim, Mr S., had sustained serious psychological damage as a result of the attempt on his life by the applicant and Mr Kh. Therefore, for medical reasons, his participation in the pre-trial investigation had been limited, and excluded the possibility of a confrontation. Nevertheless, the trial court had taken all possible measures to guarantee a  <mask>, and for this reason had summoned Mr S. to the hearings. Contrary to the doctor’s advice, Mr S. had attended a hearing, but had had to leave early on account of his health problems and need for treatment. For this reason the victim’s representative had lodged a petition in which he asked the court to examine the case in the victim’s absence. Besides, the lawyer had submitted to the Court Mr S.’s written statement, in which Mr S. confirmed the statements he had made during the pre-trial investigation. The applicant, the second accused and their representatives objected to that petition. The court had allowed the petition in an effort to guarantee the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of both the accused on the one side and the victim on the other (see, mutatis mutandis Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 148). The Government found that position to be well-founded, considering the fact that given that even attending the court hearing caused the victim considerable stress, having him interrogated would have had much more serious consequences for his health. In the Government’s opinion, the primary task for the national court in that situation was to protect the victim, Mr S., from situations in which memories of the armed attack could cause him undue stress, and that made it impossible to allow the victim to be interrogated in the courtroom. They also considered necessary to point out that the victim’s diagnosis, and the length of time for which he was in such a condition confirmed that his health problems were chronic. For this reason the court concluded that the victim’s presence at the subsequent court hearings, which took place during a short period of time, could have had the above-mentioned consequences.


22.  The applicant alleged that his right to a  <mask> had been violated in the proceedings before the domestic courts. He submitted that the Regional Court had based its decision in the second proceedings on a document which was not adduced at the hearing, which was not shown to the parties or discussed by them and which had also affected the outcome of the third proceedings. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:


63.  The applicants complained that they had not been allowed adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence and that they had not had a  <mask> because they had not had access to all the evidence in the case against them. They submitted in particular that they had been denied access to the documents of the case as well as to a list of documents, during both the investigation and the trial at both instances. They maintained that no one had reviewed the prosecution’s cherry-picking of the documents submitted to the court and that they had been denied the possibility of searching using the electronic system applied. In their view, the principle of equality of arms required that they should have had the same opportunities as the prosecution to access and select evidence from the collection of documents gathered by the police during the investigation. They relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(b) of the Convention, which is so far as relevant read as follows:


55.  The applicant was dissatisfied that when examining his complaint of dismissal from the military service on discriminatory grounds the administrative courts had based their decisions merely on an interpretation of Article 38 § 1 (7) of LMS and had ignored his repeated requests for access to the military files of four specific servicemen. On this point the Court observes that one of the elements of a  <mask> within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 is the right to adversarial proceedings; each party must in principle have the opportunity to make known any evidence needed for his claims to succeed (see Mantovanelli v. France, 18 March 1997, § 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑II). Moreover, the requirement of “equality of arms” implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case – including his evidence – under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent (see, for instance, Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, 27 October 1993, § 33, Series A no. 274; Helle v. Finland, 19 December 1997, §§ 53-54, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VIII). The Court has also held that the effect of Article 6 § 1 is, inter alia, to place the “tribunal” under a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant to its decision (see Kraska v. Switzerland, 19 April 1993, § 30, Series A no. 254‑B, and Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, 19 April 1994, § 59, Series A no. 288).


70.  The applicants complained of the fact that the Tax Authority's decisions concerning additional taxes and tax surcharges had been enforced prior to a court determination of the disputes. In particular, they maintained that the tax assessment proceedings had not been determined within a reasonable time and they had been unable to obtain a  <mask> in those proceedings. Moreover, they had been deprived of their right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. They relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which, in so far as is relevant to the complaint, provides:


59.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that his right to a  <mask> had not been respected in the proceedings brought under section 72 of the Local Elections Act, in that the statutory time-limits applicable to those proceedings were unreasonable and had adversely affected his ability to present his case. He further submitted that the courts had not examined the link between his statements and the official decisions he had relied on in support thereof. He also alleged that he had unfairly been denied access to the case file. Article 6 § 1 provides, in so far as relevant:


14.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court which tried him. The applicant further complained that the length of the criminal proceedings brought against him was in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.


27.  The Government argued that the applicant had been duly summoned to the IAP’s hearing by way of a writ addressed to his counsel in accordance with the applicable domestic law and his own free decision. While the relevant domestic legislation provides the possibility to name a person to whom all letters and summons are served, this is not an obligation. Even represented by a counsel, a party is free to exclude service authorisation from the scope of the power of attorney. The applicant had never maintained before the Austrian authorities that he wished to be summoned personally. Once a party had been duly summoned, the party’s absence did not prevent the conduct of a hearing. In the present case, counsel, although informed that the hearing would be conducted in the applicant’s absence if he failed to appear, failed to take any steps in order to secure the applicant’s right to be heard in person. In particular, counsel had not informed the applicant of the hearing and had not instituted proceedings for the issuing of a temporary exemption from the residence prohibition so that the applicant could attend a hearing in Austria. Counsel had only requested an adjournment sine die at the very day the hearing was held and had not indicated whether or when the applicant could attend a hearing or that he would prepare the applicant’s re-entry to Austria by filing a responding request under the Aliens Act. Neither did the applicant claim that he filed or was willing to file such request. In this context the Government noted that the applicant’s request to re-enter Austria from 4 until 6 October 1999 for purposes of medical control at the Pension Insurance Office was successful. There being no good reasons for the applicant’s absence at the hearing, he had to be considered as having waived his right to be heard in person. Counsel’s failure to inform him of the hearing was to be attributed to the applicant and was not a reasonable impediment justifying adjournment. In any event, the applicant was not deprived of a  <mask> of his case as his defence was conducted by his lawyer. Furthermore, he had only complained about a question of law, the matter was of minor significance as the proceedings concerned a minor offence and the IAP, due to the principle prohibiting a “reformatio in peius” could not increase the sentence. Finally, the applicant could file a complaint with the Administrative Court which reviewed the legal findings of the IAP. In any event, the issue of good faith did not necessarily require a personal hearing.


21.  The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. He further alleged under the same provision that he had not been afforded a public hearing and had not been notified of the public prosecutor’s written opinion, which had denied him the right to a  <mask>.


45.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that they had been denied a  <mask> on account of the excessive length of the compensation proceedings, as a result of which the amounts awarded to them failed to reflect the real damage incurred. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


28.  The applicant also alleged violations of his right to a  <mask> within a reasonable time and his right of access to a court, as well as a lack of effective remedies in this respect. He relied on Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention. Having regard to all the material in its possession, the Court finds that, in so far as these complaints fall within its competence, they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill‑founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


37.  The Government submitted that at the relevant time the two military judges and their two civilian counterparts sitting on the Martial Law Court enjoyed the guarantees of judicial independence and immunity laid down in the Constitution. The sole task of the army officer on the bench was to ensure the proper functioning of the hearing and he had no other judicial power. In the Government’s view, the procedure for the appointment and the assessment of the military judges sitting on the Martial Law Courts and the safeguards they enjoyed in the performance of their judicial duties at the time perfectly satisfied the criteria laid down by the Court’s case-law on the subject. They therefore requested the Court to hold that there has been no violation of the applicant’s right to a  <mask> by an “independent and impartial tribunal”.


67.  The Government argued that the refusal of legal aid for the applicant’s second appeal was not incompatible with his Article 6 rights. They accepted that denial of legal aid could, in certain circumstances, amount to a failure to ensure a  <mask> under Article 6 § 1. However, they pointed out that the Convention did not grant a general right to legal aid in civil cases: there was no obligation for States to make legal aid available for every civil dispute, and far less for multiple appeals. Having regard to the fact that resources were not unlimited, States could impose restrictions on legal aid. Such restrictions could validly be based on the prospects of success in the proceedings (citing Steel and Morris, cited above, § 62).


23.  The applicant association submitted that, since it had not had the opportunity to comment on the observations of either the Federal Department of Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication or the Swiss Radio and Television Company, it had been denied the right to a  <mask> within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:


40.  The applicant argued that she had not had a  <mask> of her case. She submitted that her relationship with her grandson J.B. had been very close, given the fact that his parents had avoided their parental responsibilities and that J.B. had lived with her. His death had caused her great mental suffering. Yet, when assessing the circumstances of her civil claim for damages, the Lithuanian courts had not ensured that the principles of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms were adhered to. Both at the stage of the criminal proceedings and during the civil litigation M.B. had been represented by a lawyer and thus had been able to effectively exercise his rights by responding to the applicant’s claim. In contrast, the applicant, being of old age, in poor health and a Russian speaker, having no understanding of legal matters, had been unable to use all the means theoretically available to her by law. She had pointed this out to the appellate and supreme courts, but with no success. For the applicant, such procedural inequality in a case entailing a great emotional toll had been in breach of the principle of adversarial proceedings.


37.  The Government pointed out that it was in the first place for the national judicial authorities to ensure that the requirements of a  <mask> were satisfied. They submitted that, in the circumstances of the present case, the refusal to take evidence did not amount to a disproportionate restriction on the applicant's ability to defend himself in the proceedings. Accordingly, there was no breach of Article 6 of the Convention.


100.  The applicant complained that she had not been afforded a  <mask> in respect of her application for reopening of her guardianship proceedings and had not been able to have her legal guardian changed. In support of her complaints, the applicant cited Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention. In addition, relying upon Article 13 of the Convention, the applicant argued that she had not been afforded an effective remedy to complain of the alleged violations.


44.  The applicant maintained that his right to a  <mask> and the rights of the defence had not been respected. He had been deprived of the opportunity to question the witness JH at any stage of the proceedings. JH’s evidence had been the sole evidence against him. It was all the more important to ensure that he had an opportunity to question JH since at the time of his questioning JH had been a minor and according to the psychologist’s report there had been inconsistencies in his testimony. Furthermore, it transpired from the minutes of the trial that other witnesses had had no knowledge of the alleged sale of drugs by the applicant.


34.  The applicant complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention that he was denied a  <mask> in that he was not afforded an opportunity to put questions to the principal witness against him, that is, the complainant child. A.'s account had been the only direct evidence against him. The other persons heard before the courts had not witnessed the alleged acts but were only able to give second-hand information about them or assess the reliability of A.'s account. Nevertheless, the courts had admitted as evidence the video recording of A.'s interview.


35.  The applicant contested the Government’s arguments. He submitted that no effective remedy existed in relation to his complaint. This was evident from the lack of case-law in respect of violations by the State of the right to trial within a  <mask>. The case of Yiallourou was a civil action where damages had been sought for the violation of constitutional rights between individuals and not between individuals and the State as in the instant case.


20.  The Government objected that, in respect of the proceedings examined by the Constitutional Court, the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a hearing within a  <mask>. They argued that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged such a violation and the amount of just satisfaction awarded and paid without undue delay was not manifestly inadequate in the circumstances of the case. They further argued that the second Constitutional Court’s finding had a preventive effect as no further delays had occurred in the subsequent period.


18.  The applicants complained that the proceedings before the domestic courts were long and thus in contravention of the  <mask> requirement under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. They further alleged that they had been denied a fair trial because the domestic courts had disregarded three expert reports and had taken into account solely the fourth expert report which had qualified the land in question as agricultural land and had awarded them an amount inferior than to real value of the land.


262.  The Government had no objection in principle to the Court specifying the criteria for non-pecuniary damage regarding this type of violation, and asked it to indicate that the amount of just satisfaction had to be calculated solely by reference to the delays beyond the  <mask> and for which the State was responsible. They also asked the Court to hold that the criteria for calculating compensation should not be limited to determining a particular sum per year, but that regard had to be had to other factors, including the stakes involved and the outcome of the case.


50.  The Government further claimed that the applicant had failed to assert claims for compensation of damage caused by his criminal prosecution in the domestic courts. Firstly, he could have obtained compensation for pecuniary damage suffered by certain measures of criminal prosecution, in particular searches and seizures, pursuant to sections 2 et seq. of the Act on Compensation for Measures of Criminal Prosecution (see paragraphs 37-40 above). Secondly, he could have brought official liability proceedings pursuant to Article 839 of the Civil Code, read in conjunction with Article 34 of the Basic Law, in the civil courts. In those proceedings, he could have obtained compensation for pecuniary damage, such as lawyers’ fees and loss of earnings, which he had proved to have been caused by the courts’ failure to adjudicate within a  <mask>, even if this failure had been caused by a lack of sufficient staff. Compensation for non-pecuniary damage could be obtained if the conditions of Articles 253 and 847 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 42 above) were met.


68.  The Government may be understood as claiming that the belated receipt of the request absolved the court from the duty to examine it. However, the Court notes that under Russian law the applicant had no other choice but to dispatch his request through the prison administration (see § 36). In such circumstances it was for the prison administration to ensure that it was delivered within a  <mask>. Given that the remand prison and the court were situated in the same city, the two weeks’ delivery time seems to be unusually long. It raises certain doubts as to when the request of 9 June 1999 was posted by the prison administration.


35.  The Government maintained that based on an overall assessment and in the light of the specific circumstances of the cases, the criminal charges against the applicants were determined within a  <mask> as prescribed by Article 6 of the Convention. They agreed that the cases were uncomplicated as concerned the facts, but found that they were to some extent complex due to problems in law as well as procure. In this respect the Government referred inter alia to the involvement of EU-law issues, notably the question whether the relevant provision of the 1989 Act should have been notified to the European Commission and the question whether the cases should have been referred to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. Moreover, the Government found that the applicants to a very considerable extent had been a contributory cause to the length of the proceedings. Finally, the Government maintained that it could not give rise to criticism that the city courts decided to adjourn the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the “test-cases” as these decisions were reasonably motivated. All in all the Government found it inappropriate that the applicants on the one hand requested adjournments of the proceedings; extensions of time-limits for submission of pleadings; were unable to appear before court hearings before certain dates; raised questions of principles, including a request for a preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice; requested an expert witness; and a special counsel assigned, and on the other hand claimed that the length of the proceedings were excessive.


61.  The Government explained that in the present case, for reasons of time constraints the Constitutional Court as a whole had decided on the applicant’s motions for bias under Article 11 § 2 of the Constitutional Court Act. That Act did not lay down any procedural requirements in this respect. In these circumstances, it complied with the Constitution and with the requirement to conduct proceedings within a  <mask> that the Court decided on the motion for bias in the absence of the challenged judge.


13.  The Government argued that in view of the Constitutional Court's judgment of 2005 the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a hearing within a  <mask>. In their opinion, the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as to the subsequent period, as he had not lodged a fresh constitutional complaint in accordance with the formal requirements.


38.  The Government considered that the applicant had not submitted sufficient arguments in respect of this complaint and asked the Court to reject it. They also referred to the power of the higher courts to verify the observance of the  <mask> requirement, as expressly provided for in Article 192 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 18 above). The applicant did not ask the courts to carry out such verification.