38.  The applicant complained that during his arrest and subsequent detention he was subjected to acts of police brutality which caused him great physical and mental suffering amounting to torture, inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. He also complained that the investigative and prosecuting authorities failed to proceed with a prompt and effective official investigation into the incident capable of leading to the identification and punishment of the police officers responsible. The applicant therefore claimed that, contrary to Article 3, taken together with Article 13 of the Convention, he had had no  <mask> for the harm suffered while in police custody.


22.  The Government acknowledged that although Babjak concerned a police decision stating that the applicant had committed a criminal offence, though a criminal prosecution could not be pursued against him due to his young age, in that case the police had issued a later decision clarifying that his conduct had not met the constituent elements of a criminal offence. Notwithstanding, the Government maintained that in the present case an action under Articles 11 et seq. of the Civil Code was also an available and  <mask>. An ordinary court dealing with such an action would examine whether the statement by the police infringed the applicant's right to be presumed innocent and her right to respect for her private life, given that no criminal prosecution had been initiated and that the courts had not pronounced either way on her guilt or innocence. In the event that the ordinary court considered that the applicant's rights had been breached, it was open to it to order the police to issue an apology and/or award the applicant financial compensation for any non-pecuniary damage caused to her as a result. In particular, the applicant could have relied on the request for reimbursement of the costs of her husband's medical treatment as the basis for her action.


253.  The Government conceded that prior to Mr H.K.’s statement the applicant had not had an  <mask> as required under Article 13 of the Convention in respect of his complaints under Articles 3 and 5. They further admitted that in the absence of any conclusions of the criminal investigation, the civil avenue of redress, as such, could not be regarded as effective in relation to the applicant’s complaint under Article 8 of the Convention.


44.  The Government submitted that the Court could not examine the case before the Constitutional Court had made an assessment as to whether section 504 of the Sentence Enforcement Code complied with the Convention. The Constitutional Court was the  <mask> created for this particular purpose, was capable of providing redress and was available to the applicant both in law and in practice. Even so, the applicant’s constitutional complaints had been rejected for lack of sufficient legal reasoning. The applicant had been aware of the mandatory requirements of a constitutional complaint and could not bypass the obligation to exhaust the available domestic remedies by deliberately and consistently submitting incomplete and insufficiently reasoned constitutional complaints. Moreover, the applicant had not been precluded from remedying the deficiencies identified by the Constitutional Court and lodging another constitutional complaint.


102.  The Government contested the applicant’s arguments, mainly relying on the substance of their observations made in respect of the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and maintained that the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his home had been lawful and necessary in a democratic society and had pursued the aim of “the improvement of the appearance of the city” which, in the Government’s view, was in the interests of the economic well-being of the country. They argued that the domestic civil proceedings had been fair and that they had constituted an  <mask>.


86.  The Government further submitted that the competent Azerbaijani authorities had examined the applicant’s complaints that he had been subjected to torture and ill-treatment during his temporary extradition to Russia. In particular, the Khazar District Court, while ordering the extension of the period of the applicant’s detention pending extradition, had examined his submissions concerning his alleged ill-treatment during his temporary extradition to Russia and had found them unsubstantiated, because he had never previously lodged any related complaints with either the Azerbaijani or Russian authorities. Therefore, the Government considered that the applicant had had an  <mask> for his complaint under Article 3 at his disposal.


83.  The applicant argued that he did not have effective remedies for his complaint about the appalling conditions of detention. He referred to the case of Benediktov v. Russia (no. 106/02, 10 May 2007), where the Court had found a violation of Article 13 on account of the absence in Russia of an effective remedy in respect of inhuman and degrading conditions of detention. He also cited the cases of Kalashnikov v. Russia ((dec.), no. 47095/99, 18 September 2001), Moiseyev v. Russia ((dec.), no. 62936/00, 9 December 2004) and Mamedova v. Russia (no. 7064/05, § 57, 1 June 2006), where the Court had noted that the problems arising from the conditions of the applicants' detention had apparently been of a structural nature, for which no  <mask> had been shown to exist. In the applicant's opinion, the Government had not put forward any argument capable of calling the above findings into question. The rare examples cited by the Government of redress being obtained by a detainee through an application to the domestic authorities were exceptions to the general rule.


22.  The applicant complained under Articles 5 and 13 of the Convention that he had been arrested in the absence of any reasonable suspicion that he would flee and that he did not have an  <mask> for his complaint about the unlawful arrest. The Court considers that the applicant’s grievances fall to be examined under Article 5 §§ 1 and 5, which read as follows:


37.  The applicant submitted that, as the Court had held in Louled Massoud, there was no  <mask> for the purposes of Article 5 § 4 which he could undertake in order to challenge the lawfulness of his detention. Indeed, although the applicant had attempted a remedy, it had taken more than a year for the IAB to determine his claim.


53.  The applicant also made a number of other complaints, relying on Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention, and Article 1 of Protocol No.1, concerning the proceedings before the domestic authorities. She complained, in particular, about the lack of fairness and outcome of the proceedings before the competent bodies, particularly the Constitutional Court; and lack of an  <mask> in that respect; length of proceedings before the administrative authorities and the Administrative Court concerning the recognition of her father’s status of a disabled war veteran; and alleged violation of her right to respect for her private and family life and the protection of property.


76.  The applicant submitted that after two rulings of the Constitutional Court, namely the judgment of 11 May 2007 (case no. K 2/07) and the judgment of 20 October 2010 (case no. P 37/09), and the amendment to the Institute Act which had entered into force on 27 May 2010, the proceedings concerning access to her file had been finally terminated. Before the entry into force of the said amendment to the Institute Act, the applicant had had no  <mask> whereby she could obtain access to all relevant documents concerning her. She had no influence over the decisions of the parliament as to whether and when such amendments should have been introduced.


49.  The Government maintained that the applicant's allegations of being beaten by the tax police officer had not been supported by any appropriate evidence and that, although the applicant had indeed sustained physical injuries it was impossible to conclude “beyond reasonable doubt” that they had been inflicted by S. They referred to the conclusions of the forensic medical examinations that the applicant had had only minor physical injuries which could have been inflicted three to five days before the events in question. None of the examinations established that the injuries had been inflicted on 28 April 1998. The Government also submitted that, as for the testimonies of G., who had allegedly seen the applicant being beaten by S., it had been established that G. could not have seen the events in the room properly since its windows had been covered with opaque plastic curtains. Furthermore, the Government maintained that the investigation in the applicant's case had been performed by an independent authority which had carried out a full investigation and had taken all necessary action. Therefore, the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention had not been violated and the applicant had had at his disposal an  <mask> in accordance with Article 13 of the Convention.


113.  The applicants submitted that they had been victims of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention and had lacked an  <mask> as required under Article 13. They pointed out that after the Supreme Court had upheld the normative framework as being compatible with the Convention (see paragraph 69 above), their subsequent applications for a judicial review had been bound to fail (see paragraphs 72 and 73 above).


39.  The Government submitted that the complaint was inadmissible on the ground that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies. In this respect, they referred to all of the Swedish Supreme Court’s judgments mentioned above (§§ 29-34) in which the court had awarded individual compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage concerning the violation of different Articles of the Convention. In the Government’s opinion, these showed that Swedish law now provided a remedy in the form of compensation for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in respect of any violation of the Convention, including violations under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Although the Government acknowledged that the legal position on this matter under domestic law had been less clear prior to the Supreme Court’s judgments in 2005 and 2007, they submitted that following these judgments the legal position must have been considered sufficiently clear. Therefore, since the applicant lodged his application with the Court on 13 November 2008, he should have been aware of the Supreme Court judgments and that there was an  <mask> available to him. They pointed out that the existence of mere doubts as to the prospects of success of a particular remedy, which was not obviously futile, was not a valid reason for failing to exhaust domestic remedies. Therefore, the Government held that compensation proceedings against the Swedish State constituted a domestic remedy which the applicant should have been obliged to exhaust prior to examination of the case by the Court.


43.  The applicant complained that he had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment while he had been detained. In particular, he alleged that the conditions of his detention in the Simferopol SIZO had been debasing with regard to the size of the cell in which he had been detained, the number of persons in the cell, the bedding and conditions of hygiene, sanitation and ventilation, nutrition, outdoor daily walks, and access to natural light and air. He further alleged that he had not received the necessary medical treatment and assistance for his diseases, and that he had been forced to work for more than 12 hours a day, for which he had not been paid. The applicant finally alleged that he did not have at his disposal an  <mask> for his Convention complaint about his conditions of detention, as required by Article 13 of the Convention. He invoked in substance Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, which provide as follows:


42.  The Government considered that these complaints were inadmissible because of the applicants’ non-compliance with the six-month rule. In particular, at the material time the law in force did not provide for a possibility to claim compensation from the State for any damage inflicted by a State official who was not acting in his/her official capacity. It had been established in the present case that at the time of the incidents D. had been off duty. Therefore, the applicants’ claim for damages lodged against the State bodies had been devoid of any prospect of success from the very beginning. Consequently, the six-month time-limit should be calculated from the date of the incidents, namely, 22 November 1999. Given that the applicants had lodged their complaints on 29 September 2005, the Government considered that the applications were inadmissible in the part relating to the applicants’ complaints about the absence of an  <mask> for their complaints under Article 2 of the Convention.


68.  The applicant replied that at the relevant time the CCP did not contain a procedure whereby a person could challenge his or her house arrest before a court. The national courts could not be expected to “produce” and apply a non‑existent procedure to conform to the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. It was true that the Convention was part of the domestic law of Bulgaria, but that did not make an application based directly on Article 5 § 4 an  <mask>.


88.  The applicant also complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he did not have any  <mask> in respect of his allegedly infringed rights, as the Senate of the Supreme Court had ruled that the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers was a political decision. He considered that an application for supervisory review by a public prosecutor was not an effective remedy since a decision by the latter in the instant case would not be subject to appeal.


26.  The applicant organisation complained that there had been an unlawful interference with its right to freedom of peaceful assembly, as provided in Article 11 of the Convention, on account of the prohibition issued by the municipality of the public rally planned for 19 April 2000. It also complained of the lack of an  <mask> for its complaint under Article 11 of the Convention on account of the domestic courts having declared null and void the prohibition issued by the municipality almost a year after the date of the planned event and also in view of the alleged inability to seek redress for the actions of the municipality.


60.  The applicant company submitted that it was, but the Court is not convinced by that argument. The rules applicable to such applications at the relevant time were analogous to those examined in Karuna v. Ukraine ((dec.), no. 43788/05, 3 April 2007). In that case the Court concluded that at the relevant time, applications for a rehearing by the Supreme Court were akin to requests for a reopening of the proceedings and Article 6 did not apply to the proceedings concerning them. In Bulanov and Kupchik v. Ukraine (nos. 7714/06 and 23654/08, § 32, 9 December 2010) the Court found that such applications were not an  <mask> to be used in administrative cases.


54.  The applicant disagreed with the Government's contention and claimed that his application related to a  <mask>. He noted that his initial communication to the Court of 12 December 1999 was followed by a completed application form, which detailed his complaints and contained additional facts and information. Separately, he claimed that Article 35 § 1 of the Convention does not preclude an applicant from submitting an application prior to the date on which a final decision by a domestic court is taken, or the date on which he is released, but rather stipulates the last day by which such an application must be made, following which the Court is barred from examining it as it would, in such case, be submitted out of time.


57.  The applicant replied that no change in his situation had occurred on 2 October 1996, when he had been released from detention and put under house arrest, as he had continued to be deprived of his liberty. This deprivation of liberty had been a  <mask>, which had come to an end only on 1 January 2000, when the amendments to the CCP had come into force. He had lodged his application well before that.


70.  The applicant argued that the conditions of detention in both facilities had been equally bad and should therefore be treated as a  <mask>. The Government had adduced no evidence in relation to the temporary detention centre and should not be absolved from responsibility merely on account of the expiry of the period for keeping relevant records and logbooks.


66.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been detained in the temporary detention centre in March 2001, whereas the complaint before the Court had been raised in 2003. Thus, he had failed to comply with the six-month rule. The temporary detention centre and the remand centre were supervised by different authorities and there was thus no reason to consider the applicant’s detention in both facilities as a  <mask>.


21.  The Government submitted that the deprivation of property was an instantaneous act and did not produce a  <mask>. They pointed out that it was the former Yugoslav legislation that allowed for the applicants’ property to be expropriated without at the same having determined or awarded them compensation. The subsequent 1994 Croatian legislation amended those rules, but could not have changed the applicants’ situation. In any event, all of these facts having occurred prior to Croatia’s ratification of the Convention, i.e. 5 November 1997, the Court is not competent ratione temporis to entertain the present application.


52.  The Government argued in the first place that in so far as the complaint related to the initial search and seizure conducted by the police prior to the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Estonia on 16 April 1996, it was outside the Court's jurisdiction ratione temporis. The police measures were instant acts and could not be viewed as constituting a  <mask>.


61.  The applicant first argued that his complaints concerning medical care after the arrest in April 2008 and during his subsequent detention in remand centre no. 77/6 and the prison hospital of remand centre no. 77/1 were closely linked to each other, concerned an uninterrupted period of detention, and had the same factual and legal basis. Thus, in his view, the facts of the case disclosed a  <mask> requiring the whole period of detention to be taken into consideration, despite the six-month rule under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.


69.  The applicant’s complaints concern problems relating to insufficient medical care which he allegedly had to endure during the uninterrupted period of his detention. It follows that the facts of the case can be regarded as a  <mask> (see, for instance, Vladimir Sokolov v. Russia, no. 31242/05, § 56, 29 March 2011, and, by contrast, Vladimir Vasilyev v. Russia (dec.), no. 28370/05, 1 July 2010). Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection to this effect.


193.  The applicants were forced to leave Lachin when the district came under military attack in May 1992. However, the Court’s task is not to scrutinise this event as such, but to determine whether the applicants have been denied access to their property since 26 April 2002, the date on which Armenia ratified the Convention, and whether they have thereby suffered a continuing violation of their rights. Earlier events may still be indicative of such a  <mask>.


55.  The applicant company argued that its submissions in respect of the quashing of the decision which had recognised its claims were merely an elaboration and development of the original complaints contained in its application form (see paragraph 50 above). The quashing itself had merely been another episode in what it believed was a  <mask>  the ineffectiveness of bankruptcy proceedings as a process. In any event, a further appeal lay against the HCC’s decision to the Supreme Court (see paragraph 47 above). That remedy was effective in theory even though it had proven without result in practice as the HCC had refused it leave to apply for a Supreme Court review and it had only become aware of that decision on 15 July 2014 (see paragraph 40 above). As there was still no decision by the Supreme Court on the substance of its application for review, the situation of unfairness still persisted.


61.  The applicant's complaints which fall under paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 5 of the Convention, meanwhile, relate to certain alleged deficiencies of the relevant provisions of the CCP, in force at the relevant time, as construed by the competent authorities and as applied to the applicant, which gave rise to a  <mask> against which no effective remedies were available at the time.


14.  The Government asked the Court, firstly, to dismiss the application as inadmissible for failure to comply with the six-month time-limit under Article 35 of the Convention. For the purposes of that provision, time had started to run on 17 March 1998. However, the applicants had not lodged their application with Court until 4 May 1999, that is almost fourteen months after the  <mask>.


42.  The Government further argued that the applicant had failed to submit his case to the Court within the six-month time-limit provided for by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Where an applicant was entitled to be served with a written copy of the  <mask> as a matter of course, the object and purpose of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention were best served by counting the six-month period as running from the date of service of the written judgment (the Government cited Worm v. Austria, 29 August 1997, § 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-V). In the present case the applicable law did not provide the applicant with the right to be served with a written copy of the judgment of the second-instance court, as a matter of course. Hence, the six-month period should be counted from 16 January 2007, the date when that court had given judgment. The applicant submitted his application to the Court on 31 July 2007. He had therefore failed to comply with the obligation to apply to the Court within six months, as stipulated by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.


27.  The applicant contested the Government’s arguments, maintaining that he had appealed against the domestic decisions in accordance with the law. In particular, he submitted that the remedies proposed by the Government were of a theoretical nature and not practical and effective. The constitutional complaint was an extraordinary remedy and he should not have been obliged to exhaust it. Moreover, he maintained that if any additional remedy had been open to him, he should have been informed of this when the authorities gave the  <mask>. Finally, as regards the possibility of his lodging a civil action, the applicant argued that he would have been required to prove that he had sustained damage by the unlawful action of an official, while the decisions given in his case had a legal basis in the domestic law.


73.  The applicant lodged his application with the Court on 4 February 2008, more than six years after he had lodged his criminal complaint with the prosecuting authorities. Yet, the investigation was still pending at that time; some investigative steps had been taken and the applicant could legitimately have believed that there were tangible indications of progress in the investigation. For the reasons indicated above, which remained valid at least until the time when the applicant lodged his application before the Court, he cannot be criticised for having waited too long. Besides, the Court observes that the  <mask> in the applicant’s case was rendered on 29 March 2010 (see ibid. §§ 281‑282).


47.  The Government argued that the second applicant failed to lodge his complaint within the six-month time-limit prescribed in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In the present case, given that the  <mask> was the refusal by the Supreme Court on 14 November 2011 to grant the applicants permission to appeal (see paragraph 24 above), that time-limit expired at midnight on 14 May 2012.


33.  The Government argued that the  <mask> in the present case had been the Constitutional Court’s decision of 12 March 2009, by which the Constitutional Court had dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the judgment of the Osijek County Court. They pointed out that this decision had been served on the applicant on 26 March 2009 and that the present application had been lodged with the Court on 23 October 2009. As regards the decision of the Constitutional Court of 26 May 2009 by which the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the judgment of the Supreme Court had been declared inadmissible, they argued that the request for extraordinary review of the County Court’s judgment could not have been considered decisive in respect of the criminal charges against the applicant. He had had no grounds on which to lodge a constitutional complaint against the judgment of the Supreme Court, as he had already lodged a constitutional complaint against the judgment of the Osijek County Court.


43.  The applicants contended that the six months’ time-limit for the lodging of applications, in respect of the four applicants, should be calculated from the date of the  <mask> that was given in respect of M.N. filed on 27 October 2011 and served on the latter applicant’s lawyer on 10 November 2011, irrespective of the fact that the decisions in respect of the other three applicants had been antecedent to that. They argued that had M.N.’s claim been successful, the measure would have been annulled and the effects of such an annulment would extend to the other applicants, who would have then lost their victim status in respect of the alleged violations.


121.  The Government asserted that the Russian legal system provided for an effective remedy in respect of the applicants’ grievances under Article 8 of the Convention. They referred to Chapter 25 of the CCP containing the mechanism for challenging State and municipal authorities’ decisions before the courts. The Government stated that a  <mask> in the context of such proceedings would be “an appellate (cassation appellate) judgment of the second-instance court, where citizens ha[d] a right to apply if they disagreed with the findings of the first-instance court”.


195.  The Government argued that the third to nineteenth applicants had failed to comply with the six-month requirement established in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They stated that the criminal proceedings in case no. 34/00/0008-03 had been discontinued on 17 November 2003 owing to the absence of constituent elements of a crime in federal officers’ actions. In their submission, the relevant decision had established the absence of any grounds to hold the relevant officials criminally responsible for the alleged violations of the applicants’ rights which, in its turn, indicated that there had been no grounds for the applicants to receive compensation in civil proceedings. Accordingly, in the Government’s view, the decision of 17 November 2003 should be regarded as the  <mask> for the applicants’ complaints under Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and therefore the applicants should have lodged their applications within six months after the date on which that decision had been taken, that is before 18 May 2004. The Government further pointed out that, as could be ascertained from the Court’s stamp on the application forms submitted by the third to nineteenth applicants, it had received those applications on 1, 14, 15 and 23 June 2004 and 7 February 2005 respectively, that is outside the six-month period that ended on 18 May 2004.


79.  The Government submitted that the applicant had raised his complaint under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 for the first time in a supplement to his application dated 30 September 2005, more than six months after the  <mask> (the Constitutional Court's ruling of 25 May 2004). They accordingly contended that this part of the application was out of time and, as such, inadmissible.


77.  The Government firstly submitted that it appeared that the applicants had not complied with the six-month time-limit under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They stated that while the  <mask> had been given by the Vienna Regional Court on 16 March 2012 (see paragraph 30 above), the application to the Court was dated 2 November 2012. It was therefore doubtful that the time-limit had been complied with.


83.  The Government were of the opinion that the application was also inadmissible for the applicants’ failure to observe the six-month time-limit laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. On the issue of whether the applicants’ education was channelled into special education on the basis of assessments made with culturally biased or unbiased tests and methods, the Regional Court’s judgment of 27 May 2009 had been the  <mask>. This judgment became final in regard to the Expert Panel on 2 July 2009. The applicants, however, had not submitted their application until 11 February 2011, that is, more than six months later.


52.  The Government submitted that the applicants’ various complaints with respect to both of the alleged instances of the dispersal of the protest at the University were inadmissible owing to their having been lodged out of time. They claimed in this connection that an inquiry initiated on the basis of the applicants’ complaint of 24 July 2006 had been discontinued on 29 July 2006. This had been the  <mask> for the purposes of the calculation of the six-month time-limit, given that the subsequent administrative proceedings had been limited to the examination of the applicants’ “guilt” only. There had been no basis for the applicants, in the Government’s view, to expect their allegations of violence against police to be addressed within the scope of the administrative proceedings conducted exclusively against them. Therefore, the applicants’ complaints with respect to the events of 19-20 June and 3-4 July 2006 should be declared inadmissible, in accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.


23. The Government pleaded failure to comply with the six-month time-limit, referring to the date on which the  <mask> had been taken (29 May 2002), and the date on which the application had been lodged (8 January 2003). Furthermore, they contended that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, as he had failed to raise, even in substance, his complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) in the national courts.


62.  The applicant appears to be complaining about the length of the various sets of proceedings which were concluded between 1996 and March 1998 (see paragraph 13 above). Insofar as the Court is competent ratione temporis, the Convention having entered into force in respect of Albania on 2 October 1996, that complaint must in any event be considered to have been lodged out of time, that is to say, more than six months after the date of the relevant  <mask>. Accordingly, this part of the complaint must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.


38.  The Government objected that the applicant had not complied with the six-month time-limit under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, they argued that he should have lodged his application, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, within a period of six months which ran, according to them, either from the date of the act complained of or from the date on which he had allegedly become aware of the ineffectiveness of domestic remedies. The Government stated that, if the applicant considered that the decision of the public prosecutor’s office, adopted on 3 April 2008, constituted the  <mask>, he should have lodged his application by 3 October 2008. Consequently, they argued that the application of 17 October 2008 was out of time and had to be rejected.


92.  The applicant company complained that the domestic courts had quashed the  <mask> recognising its claims in the bankruptcy proceedings and had failed to recognise its claims. It also complained that the bankruptcy proceedings had been ineffective as a tool for protecting the creditors’ rights. It relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which reads, in so far as relevant:


21.  The Government alleged that the applicants have failed to comply with the six-month rule of Article 35 of the Convention. They argued that in the present case the  <mask> was taken on 29 November 2001 by the Court of Cassation; however the application was introduced on 26 September 2002 that is more than six months after that date.


26.  The Government submitted that the application was inadmissible for failure to comply with the six-months’ rule. They observed that the  <mask> was the Katowice Regional Court’s judgment given on 7 September 2001 and that the applicant had until 7 March 2002 to lodge his application. However, the applicant’s first letter was received by the Registry on 19 March 2002 and thus more than six months after the final domestic decision was rendered. The Government further submitted that they had not been provided with any proof that the applicant’s first letter had in fact been sent before the expiry of the six-month time-limit. The date printed on the applicant’s letter (7 March 2002) should not be taken as the date on which the application had been lodged, since the applicant could have chosen this date arbitrarily. In addition, they argued that the applicant’s first letter had been sent beyond the prescribed time-limit, having regard to the date of its arrival at the Registry.


91.  The Government submitted that the complaint was inadmissible as under Article 35 § 2 (b) the Court could not deal with an application which was substantially the same as a matter that had already been examined by the Court or which had already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement and contained no  <mask>. The applicant had in fact complained to the CPT about the conditions of his detention.


37.  The applicant’s claim in that regard, as it can be derived from her submissions, concerns the manner in which the Supreme Court dealt with one of her principal arguments based on the Court’s 2007 judgment. In particular she maintained that the reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in its decision of 14 March 2008 manifestly contradicted the Court’s pertinent findings in its 2007 judgment (see paragraph 29 above). This new grievance thus concerns the manner in which the March 2008 decision had been reached in the proceedings concerning the applicant’s exceptional appeal, not either their outcome as such or the effectiveness of the national courts’ implementation of the Court’s judgment (compare and contrast Steck-Risch and Others, Öcalan, and Schelling, all cited above, in which no distinct unfairness was alleged in relation to the conduct of the relevant new proceedings brought by the applicants in those cases at the domestic level). Although the applicant’s initiatives to have the domestic decisions in the present case reconsidered were undoubtedly connected with the execution of the Court’s judgment of 3 May 2007, her complaints regarding the unfairness of the subsequent judicial proceedings both concern a situation distinct from that examined in that judgment and contain  <mask> relating to issues undecided by that judgment.


24.  The Government further maintained that the first applicant was not a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, because the amount of compensation he had claimed before the domestic courts (MDL 0.1) had been so low as to suggest that the true purpose of his libel action had not been to obtain redress for being defamed, but rather to make a political example of the President and the governing party. In the alternative, the Government submitted that the first applicant’s application was inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention because he had suffered  <mask>.


178.  The applicant contested the applicability of Article 5 § 4 and maintained that the Chamber’s approach had been the correct one and that the proceedings fell within the scope of Article 6 and should be considered in terms of compliance with that provision. He contended that his placement in the temporary detention centre had not been aimed at  <mask> but to punish him for the crime he had allegedly committed. In his view, the authorities had used the placement as a measure of criminal prosecution since they were prevented from instituting criminal proceedings against him on account of his age.


76.  The Government justify his detention on the grounds of “educational supervision” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (d) and the Court has therefore considered whether his detention complied with the conditions imposed by that subsection. The Court notes that the applicant turned 17 during the impugned period of detention and could no longer have been required to attend school. However, the relevant part of Article 5 § 1 (d) referring to “educational supervision” concerns the detention of “minors”, accepted by Ireland (section 2(1) of the Child Care Act 1991) to be persons under the age of 18. Since the applicant was therefore a minor throughout the relevant period, the only question for the Court is whether the detention was lawful and “for the purpose” of  <mask> (Bouamar, cited above, p. 21, § 50) within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (d).


156.  The applicant agreed with the reasoning in the Chamber judgment in relation to Article 5 § 1. He had been placed in the temporary detention centre for thirty days for the “correction of conduct”, which did not involve  <mask> within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (d). In his view, the temporary detention centre was in no sense an institution intended for educational supervision and, according to section 22 of the Minors Act, its tasks did not include carrying out educational work with the minor. In fact, according to domestic legislation, temporary detention centres were not included in the system of educational institutions. The applicant stressed, further, that special closed institutions existed that did have the specific task of bringing up and educating children and young persons of deviant behaviour.


135.  The Government submitted that the applicants’ deprivation of liberty was a consequence of their unauthorised entry and pending the examination of their asylum application, thus in line with the first limb of the provision. Once they resulted to be  <mask>, they had been released. They noted that practically all immigrants reaching Malta did not carry documents and thus ascertaining their identities upon entry was a lengthy process which dependent on the cooperation of the migrants themselves. Moreover, the large number of undocumented migrants constituted a huge and entirely justified security concern for Malta.


113.  The Government submitted that the applicant must demonstrate that there was a relevant difference in treatment, that it had no legitimate aim and that the treatment was not proportionate to that aim. While he was undoubtedly treated differently to other  <mask>, adults and citizens, that is not the relevant distinction. The real question is whether he was treated differently to other minors in the same position and he clearly was not – any other minor with the same problems would have been treated similarly. Even if the Court finds that he was treated differently to other minors, the Government argue that any such treatment had a legitimate aim and was proportionate. The applicant maintained his allegations of discrimination.


27.  The Government considered that the applicant's pre-trial detention had satisfied the requirements of Article 5 § 3. They submitted that between 12 August 1999 and 27 December 1999 the applicant had been serving a prison sentence ordered in another set of criminal proceedings against him. The Government maintained that his detention was justified by “relevant” and “sufficient” grounds. These grounds were, in particular, the gravity of the charges against the applicant, who had been accused of being the leader of an organised criminal gang. Moreover, there was a high risk of the applicant attempting to influence the victims, particularly since two other co-accused had been convicted of having threatened the victims. The Government also submitted that the applicant had absconded in the past and that there was a serious risk that he would go into hiding again. They further underlined the complexity of the case which had involved 12 co‑accused and concerned multiple offences of rape and false imprisonment of 5 victims, some of whom were  <mask>.


81.  The applicants submitted that the centres at Safi Barracks were both staffed exclusively by Detention Service personnel, most of whom came from a security background and were neither trained nor competent to provide psychological or social support to detainees. While the applicants acknowledged that the personnel did their best, there was no provision of psycho-social support to detainees, especially to the applicants who were  <mask>. Thus many of their concerns related to the treatment they experienced at the hands of fellow detainees which could not be addressed. The applicants highlighted that they were not provided with support to deal with the harsh realities of life in detention.


222.  The Government contested the applicants’ claims. They alleged, in particular, that the applicants’ mental suffering had not reached the minimum level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention, as certain applicants had been  <mask> at the time of the abductions of their parents. The Government also noted that the domestic legislation provided the applicants with effective remedies for their complaints.


160.  The Government maintained that the applicant’s detention in the temporary detention centre had been in accordance with Article 5 § 1 (d) of the Convention since his placement had been ordered precisely for the purposes of “educational supervision”. They noted that the national courts had authorised the applicant’s placement in the temporary detention centre to prevent him from committing further offences – by correcting his behaviour through individual preventive work – in accordance with section 22(2)(4) of the  <mask> Act. They observed that other preventive measures taken earlier had not resulted in the improvement of the applicant’s behaviour and that his family had been unable to ensure his proper supervision. In relation to this, the Government stressed the applicant’s troubled background with alcoholic parents, placements in orphanages, anti‑social and aggressive behaviour and commission of offences which had led to his being placed under the preventive supervision of the Juveniles Inspectorate between 2002 and 2005. They noted that the case file concerning the preventive supervision of the applicant had been destroyed in 2011.


111.  The applicant further argued that he was discriminated against as regards all of the above matters on the grounds of his social origin, birth or “other status”. He was discriminated against as compared to other  <mask> (he was not placed in specialised residential institution aimed at the proper care of minors), as compared to adults (as no adult could have been detained in a penal institution in such circumstances) and as compared to other citizens (as he was detained in a penal institution without having been charged or convicted of a criminal offence).


32.  The applicants,  <mask> of sixteen and seventeen years of age respectively when they entered Malta, were subjected to routine detention by the immigration authorities. Not even the vague governmental policy on “vulnerable” irregular migrants helped them. Entering Malta as irregular migrants, all odds were against them. They were placed under detention in the Safi Barracks Detention Centre. Their situation was not different from that of thousands of other migrants in Malta, the aggravating factor in their case being their age. This is the first case in which the Court finds that the conditions of detention at the above-mentioned detention centre breach Article 3. As in Suso Musa, the Court also found that the placement in detention itself breached Article 5, but the important novelty in the present case is that the Court explicitly has applied the necessity test to the interpretation of the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (f), which it did not do in Suso Musa. This is the added value of the present case.


23.  The applicant alleged that he should have been provided with a lawyer during the detention proceedings and given the opportunity to challenge and question witnesses. We note that the applicant was temporarily detained in a juvenile detention centre under section 22(2)(4) of the  <mask> Act for the purpose of preventing him from committing further delinquent acts. As we have already pointed out (see paragraph 9 above), this provision requires that the domestic court assess whether the minor has committed a “delinquent act” and whether certain personal or public interests, namely the life or health of the minor or the interest in preventing further delinquent acts, justifies imposing a temporary detention order on him or her. The review of lawfulness under this provision, and the vulnerable status of the minor – in the present case a young boy only twelve years old at the relevant time, with certain health problems – thus clearly necessitate under Article 5 § 4 that the minor have access to legal assistance during the proceedings and have the possibility of challenging the veracity of witness statements that form the basis of the allegation against him.


59.  The Government noted that from July 1997 until the beginning of 1998 there had been a considerable increase in burglaries and thefts in the city of Pärnu committed by different groups of persons. Altogether the police had initiated 11 criminal cases and on 7 occasions the investigator had joined different criminal cases. This was because the burglaries and thefts had been committed by the same persons or the joinder of the cases had been considered necessary for the better conduct of the preliminary investigation and for speeding up the investigation. The charges against the applicant had been investigated within a criminal case which had included 39 counts of burglary and theft from different kiosks and numerous other episodes of burglaries and thefts. During the preliminary investigation 18  <mask> and 7 adults, including the applicant, had been charged with criminal offences.


66.  The applicant has claimed that by the end of March 1998 the factual circumstances concerning the offences committed by him had largely been established by the investigation. The Court has not been provided with any information to the contrary and finds no reason to hold otherwise. It should also be noted that as regards two of the counts of burglary the applicant was caught in the act by witnesses who then took him to the police. Moreover, during the investigation the applicant admitted having committed the offences, except for the additional count of inducing  <mask>. That being so, the authorities could hardly be regarded as having exercised special diligence in the conduct of the proceedings.


133.  The applicants claimed that the Age-Assessment Procedure has often been criticised, as it is plagued by delays and by a lack of adequate procedural guarantees, including lack of information about the procedure followed and the possibility of appeal. No reasons are ever given for decisions and there is no real possibility to challenge the decision taken by the AAT. In addition, migrants undergoing Age-Assessment Procedures are detained throughout the procedures, usually in centres with adults without any special consideration for the fact that they are  <mask>. They referred to the 2012 report of Human Rights Watch entitled ‘Boat-ride to Detention: Adult and Child Migrants in Malta’[2].


102.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s dwelling was “inspected” rather than “searched”. This action was governed by Article 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960, which allowed the police to enter and inspect a dwelling on the basis of its resident’s consent. The inspection in the present case was lawful, as prior written consent had been received from the applicant, and pursued the legitimate aim of investigating a crime. Regard being had to the suspicions that the applicant had engaged in sexual activity with  <mask> in the venue at issue, this inspection was justified in the interests of public safety and did not constitute a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s rights.


88.  The Government submitted that the Safi Detention centre (a military base) had two warehouses (House 1 and House 2) as well as (according to the photographs submitted) a two-storey building called B Block. They explained that Warehouse 2 had been closed at the beginning of 2013 for refurbishment. Both warehouses have a capacity of 200 persons and host only men and male  <mask> undergoing age-assessment procedures. They consist of a single open space with half-length low partitions between rows of bunk beds. At the entrance of the warehouse, there is a common area with tables, benches and a television, which exits onto an outdoor recreational facility. There is also access to secluded sanitary facilities with hot and cold water which respect the privacy of the individual using the shower facilities. All compounds have recreation yards which are accessible to inmates from sunrise to sunset.


133.   The Government considered that the detention was carried out in good faith, as the centre at issue had been set up especially for that purpose, and the detention had fulfilled all the conditions indicated by the Court in Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC] (no. 13229/03, ECHR 2008). They also considered that detention was based in law and was not discriminatory, nor was it applied across the board. Indeed they noted that vulnerable persons, including unaccompanied  <mask>, women with children, pregnant women, elderly persons and disabled persons were not subject to detention, more than would be necessary until medical clearances were obtained. The Government claimed that since many persons alleged to pertain to such categories, procedures were in place to screen such requests accurately and expeditiously. As an example they submitted that in the first half of the year of 2012, out of 1, 065 persons who arrived in Malta irregularly, seventy‑five claimed to be minors. AWAS processed and determined all the cases and forty-six persons were issued with a care order. They further noted that age assessment of persons who were quite young was fast tracked as in such cases there was little difficulty in assessing the age. On the other hand with teenagers or alleged teenagers, close to the age of adulthood, the procedure involved more steps and thus inevitably took longer.


156.  The applicant agreed with the reasoning in the Chamber judgment in relation to Article 5 § 1. He had been placed in the temporary detention centre for thirty days for the “correction of conduct”, which did not involve educational supervision within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (d). In his view, the temporary detention centre was in no sense an institution intended for educational supervision and, according to section 22 of the  <mask> Act, its tasks did not include carrying out educational work with the minor. In fact, according to domestic legislation, temporary detention centres were not included in the system of educational institutions. The applicant stressed, further, that special closed institutions existed that did have the specific task of bringing up and educating children and young persons of deviant behaviour.


55.  The Government submitted that on his recall to prison the applicant had access to a court satisfying the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. The Parole Board which authorised his continuing detention was independent of the executive and the parties and had the power to direct the Secretary of State to order the applicant’s release. While  <mask> and persons of unsound mind were entitled to an oral hearing, with representation, this was not always the case. An oral hearing was not essential to the fairness of the proceedings in the applicant’s case as he did not dispute the facts that led to his recall, as he had been provided with all the materials before the Board and had made written representations to the Board and on the basis of the facts admitted, the Board was bound to conclude that public protection required that he be confined. The review took place approximately six weeks after recall and was therefore prompt. The decision in October 1998 to direct release was based on the progress that he had made since his first recall to prison. The applicant’s second recent recall on drug related matters to prison indicated that he continued to raise matters of grave concern having regard to the circumstances in which the original murder offence came to be committed.


49.  The Government argued that the applicant’s daughter had lost her victim status in respect of the complaints under Article 5 §§ 1 (d) and 5 of the Convention, raised on her behalf by the applicant, in view of the failure to pursue civil proceedings for compensation in respect of damage caused by her unlawful placement in the closed educational facility for  <mask>.


138.  The Government submitted that in 2013 567 individuals had claimed to be unaccompanied  <mask> and most of them had required referral to the FAV test. Thus, any delay in the examination of the applicants’ request was as a result of this huge influx. Moreover, one had to bear in mind the small size of the island and its limited resources, which sometimes resulted in a waiting list to carry out certain tests. They further noted that out of the 567 individuals, only 274 were ruled to be minors.


247.  The Government contested the applicants’ claims. They stated in particular that the applicants’ mental suffering had not reached the minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention, particularly on account of the fact that certain applicants were  <mask> and there was no evidence of the applicants’ relatives’ arrests by State agents. Lastly, the Government averred that the domestic legislation, including Articles 124 and 125 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, provided the applicants with effective remedies for their complaints.


28.  The Government submitted that there had been valid reasons for holding the applicant in detention on remand. They maintained in the first place that the applicant had previous convictions for similar offences and provided the relevant court decisions. Secondly, they stated that, as the applicant had been charged with armed robbery, he faced up to fifteen years’ imprisonment. At this point, they referred to Article 19 of the Law on the Establishment, Jurisdiction and Judicial Procedures of Juvenile Courts which stipulated that  <mask> could not be held in detention if the charges they faced did not carry a sentence of a minimum of three years’ imprisonment.


43.  The Government pointed out that the charges against the applicant had concerned several serious sexual crimes which had been committed in co-operation with other persons. Some of the crimes had been committed with extreme cruelty and involved  <mask>. The applicant faced a heavy sentence and there existed, in the Government's opinion, a genuine public-interest requirement which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighed the rule of respect for individual liberty and justified the applicant's continued detention. They noted that the applicant was eventually sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment and temporary deprivation of his civic rights.


152.  The Government stated that, during the relevant period, the CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola had been fully operational and had had the necessary human and material resources to provide aid and initial accommodation to migrants. In addition to the director and two deputy directors, the centre employed ninety-nine “social operators” and cleaning staff, three social workers, three psychologists, eight interpreters and cultural mediators, eight administrative staff and three division managers responsible for supervising activities in the facility. Three doctors and three nurses provided medical assistance in a temporary unit. According to the results of an inspection carried out on 2 April 2011 by the Palermo health services, the conditions of hygiene were satisfactory, and so was the quality and quantity of the food provided. A further inspection immediately after the fire of 20 September 2011 reported that drinking water was provided in bottles and that the canteen was serving meals. Before being transferred to the Lampedusa CSPA, the applicants had undergone a medical examination which showed that they were in good health. Furthermore,  <mask> and particularly vulnerable individuals had been separated from the other migrants and taken to the centre of Loran (see § 31 of the PACE report of 30 September 2011, cited in paragraph 49 above).


162.  The Government also claimed that the regime in closed educational institutions, as foreseen by section 15(4) of the  <mask> Act, was similar to the regime in temporary detention centres, as specified in section 22(2)(4) of the Minors Act. Although the emphasis was placed differently in the wording of the two provisions, the essence, methods and aims of the work conducted with the minors were the same in both places. The difference was merely in the duration of the stay. The main objects of the closed educational institutions, as specified in section 15 of the Minors Act, were fully applicable to temporary detention centres.


57.  The applicant claimed that to detain a post-tariff mandatory life prisoner by reference to concerns about the prisoner which bore no necessary relationship to the nature of the criminal conduct which resulted in the imposition of the sentence in the first place produced a form of detention which had no sufficient connection with the object of the legislature and the sentence of the court, such that it amounted to an arbitrary detention in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. He pointed out that no Secretary of State had ever sought to justify post-tariff detention of a mandatory life prisoner who was no longer a risk to the public on the basis of a general need to maintain public confidence in the system of criminal justice. The Government could not convincingly rely on the domestic courts' decisions where those judges had expressed unease about the imposition of a substantial term of imprisonment by the exercise of executive discretion. Nor could they rely on the recent case-law of this Court in V. v. the United Kingdom ([GC] no. 24888/94, ECHR 1999-IX), which concerned  <mask> detained during Her Majesty's pleasure and did not address developments in domestic law concerning adult mandatory life prisoners. The domestic courts identified no practical distinction between these two categories and have clearly found that the fixing of tariffs in both was akin to an exercise of sentencing or imposing punishment which attracted the same procedural safeguards as applied to a judge when passing sentence.


56.  The applicant also maintained that the charges brought against him and the circumstances of the offence had not been complicated. He had admitted the charges from the very beginning and had assisted the investigation in a reasonable way. He submitted that it had appeared from the criminal case-file that by the end of March 1998 all or most of the factual circumstances supporting the charges had been established by the police investigators. He considered that, after having established the facts, the legal issues – for example the question whether he had induced  <mask> to burglary or whether they had acted of their own will – could have been determined during the trial, without any excessive delay of the investigation.


48.  The applicant disagreed with the Government’s argument that K. had lost her victim status. He argued that neither he nor K., as of her coming of age, could have claimed compensation for the latter’s unlawful placement in a closed educational institution in the absence of clear provisions to that effect in the domestic law. He referred, in particular, to the absence of either a criminal or an administrative case in respect of K., the lack of clarity as to the procedure followed by the District Court when taking the decision of 18 February 2008 on K.’s placement, and the uncertainty of K.’s procedural status. Article 1070 § 1 of the Civil Code provided for compensation for unlawful criminal conviction or prosecution, the unlawful application of a preventive measure and an unlawful administrative penalty, whereas K. had been neither the accused in any criminal proceedings, nor a party to any administrative proceedings. The  <mask> Act did not contain any provisions on compensation for damage caused by illegal placement of minors in closed educational institutions, either. Nor did the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Dagestan of 7 August 2008 contain any mention of K.’s right to compensation. Lastly, the applicant noted the absence of any established domestic practice as regards compensation for damage caused to a minor as a result of his or her unlawful placement in a closed educational institution.


44.  The Government also argued that the applicant's detention had been aimed at securing the proper conduct of the investigation as there had been a risk that he would obstruct the proceedings and influence witnesses, in particular since he had been charged (and later sentenced) with threatening the victims. The Government emphasised that the case concerned rape and the victims – women, some of whom were  <mask> – were especially vulnerable to violence and required adequate protection. They concluded that only the detention of the main perpetrators could secure the proper conduct of the proceedings since in cases of that kind victims often refrained from reporting the offence.


26.  The Government considered that the applicant's pre-trial detention satisfied the requirements of Article 5 § 3. It was justified by “relevant” and “sufficient” grounds. These grounds were, in particular, the gravity of the charges against the applicant who had been accused of membership of an organised criminal gang. Moreover, there was a high risk of the applicant attempting to influence the victims, particularly since two other co-accused had been convicted of having threatened the victims. The Government also submitted that the applicant had absconded in the past and that there was a serious risk that he would go into hiding again. They further underlined the complexity of the case which had involved 12 co-accused and concerned multiple offences of rape and false imprisonment of 5 victims, some of whom were  <mask>.


86.  The applicants found the living conditions in detention very difficult, particularly because of the fact that they had to live with so many people. They highlighted how unsafe they both felt in the often tense and violent atmosphere of detention, where other violent individuals were hosted (despite criminal records); both applicants describe incidents of bullying and intimidation which left them feeling very threatened and unsafe in detention, where it was impossible for them to obtain protection or effective redress for the harm suffered. Apart from being a minor, the first applicant also belonged to a minority group in that he was a member of the Midgan, a minority tribe, which caused him to fear other detainees, who often also stole his food. The applicants failed to understand how they, as  <mask>, could be detained with other aggressive individuals, without any form of protection, supervision or support. Furthermore they admitted that they did not always report certain individuals for fear of reprisals. They noted that incidents of assault in detention were common, particularly among detainees, although few if any were reported, possibly due to doubts about the efficacy of the system in place to provide redress. A report entitled Becoming Vulnerable in Detention, National Report on Malta, July 2010 under the DEVAS project, reported that 28% of respondents interviewed for the study reported being physically assaulted while in detention. Of these 68% were assaulted by other detainees; 18% of them reported that they had filed complaints in cases of physical assault, but none reported that the complaints had resulted in any change.


27.  The Government considered that the applicant's pre‑trial detention satisfied the requirements of Article 5 § 3. It was justified by “relevant” and “sufficient” grounds. These grounds were, in particular, the gravity of the charges against the applicant who had been accused of membership of an organised criminal gang. Moreover, there was a high risk of the applicant attempting to influence the victims, particularly since two other co‑accused had been convicted of having threatened the victims. The Government also submitted that the applicant had absconded in the past and that there was a serious risk that he would go into hiding again. They further underlined the complexity of the case which had involved 12 co‑accused and concerned multiple offences of rape and false imprisonment of 5 victims, some of whom were  <mask>.


72.  The Government took the view that the applicant’s preventive detention in the present case had complied with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. It was justified under sub-paragraph (a) of Article 5 § 1 as “detention of a person after conviction by a competent court”. There had been a sufficient causal connection between the order for the applicant’s preventive detention by the sentencing Cologne Regional Court in 1972 and his  <mask> after 26 January 2000. The repeated suspensions of the execution of the preventive detention order by the Krefeld Regional Court on 17 December 1980 and on 2 March 1994 (see paragraphs 11 and 14 above) had not affected that causal connection as those suspensions had had to be revoked following the applicant’s fresh offences (see paragraphs 12 and 15 above).


84.  The Government argued that the applicant had not been the victim of a  <mask> that could be imputed to the State. The applicant had been detained in a private clinic, and there had not been a court order or other decision by a State entity authorising her confinement. Nor had any State entities been involved in the applicant’s detention as supervisory authorities. Such supervision had only been provided for by law in respect of institutions competent to admit patients confined to a psychiatric hospital by a court order. Dr Heines’s clinic had not been such an institution. The clinic had had no obligation and indeed, on account of a doctor’s duty of confidentiality, no right to inform the State authorities about the applicant’s treatment there.


67.  The applicant submitted that she had been subjected to a criminal sanction and that her  <mask> could therefore, on the face of it, be treated in the same way as the situation covered by Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention. Since, in her submission, her deprivation of liberty had not been effected in accordance with the applicable criminal procedure, it had to be regarded as breaching that provision of the Convention. Nor was her placement in the school compatible with Article 5 § 1 (d) of the Convention, seeing that she had not had access to a system offering adequate education and support at the Podem school and had not been properly protected against the exploitation to which she had previously fallen victim and which had formed the basis for her placement in the school.


112.  The applicants further took the view that the information provided for in Article 5 § 2 had to emanate from the authority carrying out the arrest or placement in detention – or, in any event, from official sources. During their  <mask> they had had no contact with the authorities, not even orally, concerning the reasons for their detention. The fact that members of non-governmental organisations had been able to communicate with the migrants on this subject could not, in their view, satisfy the requirements of that provision.


24.  The Government have not invoked any of the permissible grounds for the applicant’s  <mask> between 18 and 25 September 2014. They did, however, cite the Court’s case-law relating to sub‑paragraph (e) of Article 5 § 1, namely the detention of persons of unsound mind. Since it is obvious that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty was not covered by sub‑paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) or (f) of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the Court will ascertain whether the applicant’s detention in the present case was justified under sub-paragraph (e) of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


42.  The Government submitted that remanding the applicant in custody had been justified on several grounds. Firstly, she had been charged with having committed several crimes for which the punishment could entail  <mask>. Secondly, in view of her personality and life-style there had been a serious risk that if she remained at liberty she would commit further crimes and obstruct the investigation. According to the references from the boarding school, the applicant was prone to truancy, drinking alcohol and smoking and had a negative influence on her schoolmates. Moreover, the applicant had already been placed on the wanted list before her arrest, which evidenced her proneness to abscond. These reasons, on the basis of which the District Court had remanded her in pre-trial custody, were relevant and sufficient for the ordering of the measure.


48.  The applicant maintained that his placement in the social care home was in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. As regards the objective aspect of  <mask>, the applicant submitted that his situation in the Ruda Różaniecka Home had been similar to the conditions examined by the Court in the case of D.D. v. Lithuania (no. 13469/06, 14 February 2012). In particular, the applicant could not leave the home freely. Only his guardian could apply to the home’s management for a leave of absence for the applicant. The length of the leave of absence was limited and could only be extended exceptionally. In the event of an unauthorised absence the police would be informed. Therefore, the applicant had been entirely under the control of the staff of the social home.


52.  The applicant argued that his detention after 25 January 2005 had been unlawful, for reasons which the Constitutional Court had indicated in its judgment I. ÚS 6/02 of 4 December 2002 and a number of judgments delivered subsequently, including those of 10 May and 30 November 2006, in the applicant’s case. The position set out in the Constitutional Court’s judgments put an end to the practice of ordinary courts, which had been applied in the applicant’s case and which was contrary to Article 5 § 1, namely of not providing appropriate guarantees for judicial control of  <mask> of accused persons following their indictment.


43.  The applicant claimed that his preventive detention at issue had violated Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. His detention was unlawful and could no longer be justified under sub-paragraph (a) of Article 5 § 1 because there was no longer a causal connection between his conviction and his  <mask> after his renewed detention in May 2008.


32.  The Government asserted that the applicant's arrest had been based on the presence of a reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence. Furthermore, the Izmir Assize Court had dismissed the applicant's claims of compensation for the allegedly unlawful  <mask> given that the circumstances of the applicant's case had not been prescribed by Article 1 of Law no.466. Accordingly, the applicant's arrest and detention and the domestic courts' refusal to grant him compensation complied with Article 5 §§ 1 and 5 of the Convention.


61.  The applicants acknowledged that, under Italian law, the CSPAs were not detention centres but reception facilities. They argued, however, that this fact did not preclude the finding that, in practice, they had been deprived of their liberty in the Lampedusa CSPA and on the ships Vincent and Audace, in spite of the domestic law classification of the confinement. They observed that, to ascertain whether a person had been deprived of his or her liberty, the starting-point had to be his or her concrete situation and not the legal characterisation of the facility in question. Otherwise States would be able to implement forms of  <mask> without any safeguards simply by classifying the premises in question as a “reception facility” rather than a “detention facility”.


79.  The applicant submitted that on 9 March 2010 he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty from 8.40 a.m. to 9.34 p.m. Under the domestic criminal procedure rules, the warrant to appear could not justify a person’s  <mask>. In addition, the authorities had not complied with the aforementioned criminal procedure rules because they had not provided any reasons why they had issued this order against him. There had been no danger that the applicant might contact the victims of his alleged offence, because he had been unaware of the accusations brought against him and had not known who his accusers were. Also, the authorities had disregarded the law by holding the applicant for periods longer than had been necessary to question him.


68.  The Government submitted that Mr Raza’s placement in a detention facility pending his deportation had complied with all substantive and procedural rules. The length of his  <mask> was due to the need to secure a document allowing him to travel abroad. The Bulgarian immigration authorities had made numerous requests in this regard to the embassy of Pakistan, to no avail.


77.  The Government argued that the applicant’s pre-trial detention had been in full compliance with the requirements of the relevant domestic law and had been based on relevant and sufficient reasons. In particular, the time-limits for his pre-trial detention had not been set out in the decisions extending the detention following the submission of the indictment because that had not been required under the relevant domestic law. However, on each occasion the domestic authorities had paid due attention to the necessity of his continued detention and had examined the particular circumstances of the case warranting his continued  <mask>.


29.  The applicant brought the claim for compensation under Article 552 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, his claim was finally dismissed by the Supreme Court on 15 November 2007. The domestic courts found that the proceedings against the applicant had ultimately been discontinued, a circumstance which, under Polish law, rendered his pre‑trial detention “undoubtedly unjustified” within the meaning of Article 552 of the Code - a prerequisite for obtaining compensation under this provision. The Court has held in similar circumstances that the compensation due to an applicant as a result of his acquittal was indissociable from any compensation he might have been entitled to under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention as a consequence of his  <mask> being contrary to paragraphs 1 to 4 (see N.C. v. Italy [GC], cited above, § 57; and Staykov v. Bulgaria, no. 49438/99, § 108, 12 October 2006).


41.  The applicant argued that section 2 of the SMRDA gave a right to compensation only to persons placed in pre-trial detention, provided that their detention had been quashed for lack of legal grounds. However, her  <mask> did not amount to pre-trial detention, and moreover there was no procedure for challenging its lawfulness. Therefore, her action was barred.


123.  The Government submitted that the “first part” of the applicant’s detention fell within the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (f). They further submitted that the applicant’s  <mask> was required for the purpose of repatriation. It had continued until there were no longer any prospects of her return, and at that point she was released on 12 September 2013 given that, while it transpired that she was not Somali, the Government were unable to establish the exact country of origin of the applicant.


36.  The applicants complained under Article 5 §§ 1, 2 and 4 of the Convention that their detention by the police prior to their removal on 12 September and 11 October 2008 had been unlawful, and that they had not been informed of the reasons for their  <mask> in the course of their deportations and had no means of challenging its lawfulness.


48.  The Government acknowledged a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, they submitted that the applicant’s  <mask> from 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. on 15 February 2005 had been effected in breach of Articles 91 and 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which regulated the grounds and procedure for the arrest of a suspect in criminal proceedings, and Article 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning the enhanced guarantees for a juvenile suspect in case of arrest in criminal proceedings.


102.  The applicant was apprehended on suspicion of procurement and attempted supply of drugs following a search in his flat and seizure of a quantity of drugs. The Court is satisfied that that suspicion was a reasonable one. For at least an initial period, its existence justified the applicant’s detention. However, the Court reiterates that the persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, but with the lapse of time this no longer suffices. Thus, the Court must establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the  <mask> (see McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, § 44, ECHR 2006‑...). Where such grounds were “relevant” and “sufficient”, the Court must also be satisfied that the national authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings.


97.  The applicant submitted that she had been able to exhaust adequate and effective remedies only after 10 October 2005, when she had been released from hospital and had escaped from her family. In this connection, she contended that she had lodged several criminal complaints against her family members, the psychiatrist Dr. I., and police officer G.C. for unlawful  <mask>, bodily harm and association cooperation with a view to committing offences. In addition, she had joined the criminal proceedings as a civil party. Consequently, she had provided the authorities with the opportunity to examine her case and her claims. The authorities could have assessed if her hospitalisation, diagnosis and treatment had been carried out in accordance with the rules set out by Law no. 487/2002. In addition, the said Law provided that a doctor’s criminal liability could be engaged if he had breached the principles protected by it.


44.  The Government contested the applicant’s argument that house arrest had constituted a  <mask> within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention. They suggested that the measure should be examined as a restriction of freedom of movement under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. In any event, they considered that the coercive measure had been justified in view of the prior breach of the applicant’s residence order. They submitted that although the investigator’s order to apply a written undertaking not to leave the city of Moscow, dated 17 December 2012, could be “interpreted in different ways”, it did not absolve the applicant from obtaining prior authorisation from the investigator for travelling to Moscow Region. They maintained that the requirement of prior authorisation set out in Article 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had remained valid irrespective of the investigator’s decision of 17 December 2012. They submitted that the cancellation of that decision by the investigator himself on 13 January 2014 corroborated their argument. They also pointed out that the applicant had not gone to the investigator’s office to study the criminal case file on 19 December 2013.


95.  The applicant argued that his case was a parallel case to that of M. v. Germany (cited above). The defendant State was therefore obliged under Articles 1 and 46 of the Convention to put an end to the Convention violation also in his case. It was possible for the German courts to interpret the relevant provisions of German law in conformity with the Convention (the applicant referred, in particular, to a decision of the Federal Court of Justice (fourth senate) of 12 May 2010 (file no. 4 StR 577/09)). The new Therapy Detention Act (see paragraph 40 above) was unconstitutional, circumvented the Court’s findings in the M. case and led to a prolongation of the  <mask> in breach of the Convention of the persons concerned.


59.  The Government maintained that the applicant’s  <mask> was not in breach of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. Her pre‑trial detention had been based on Article 152 of the CCP, which had stipulated that it was mandatory in cases like hers. Moreover, the time‑limits set in domestic law for pre‑trial detention had not been exceeded. As regards the applicant’s house arrest, under domestic law there was no absolute time‑limit for its duration. Nevertheless, the length of the applicant’s house arrest had corresponded to her state of health and to the pace of the criminal proceedings against her.


97.  The applicant was refused leave to enter Russia and his detention at Sheremetyevo Airport was thus covered under Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention for the purpose of preventing his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country. The Court reiterates that it falls to it to examine whether the applicant’s detention was “lawful” for the purposes of Article 5 § 1, with particular reference to the safeguards provided by the national system. Where the “lawfulness” of detention is in issue, including the question whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law, but it requires in addition that any  <mask> should be in keeping with the purpose of Article 5, which is to protect the individual from arbitrariness (see Amuur, cited above, § 50).


62.  The applicants complained that the poor material conditions of their stay in the transit zone of Sheremetyevo Airport had been incompatible with the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention. They further complained that their confinement to the transit zone of Sheremetyevo Airport amounted to an unlawful  <mask> in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. These Convention provisions read, in so far as relevant, as follows:


62.  The Government submitted that, although subsequently impugned by the courts, Mr Dzhabarov’s and Mr Petkov’s detention had been in line with the formal requirements of the law and based on a reasonable suspicion, which did not presuppose the existence of categorical evidence of them committing an offence. As for Ms Nikolova, she had not been detained but simply taken to a police station for a short time to be questioned. The Government went on to emphasise that both the Code of Criminal Procedure 2005 and the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006 laid down a number of safeguards intended to prevent unlawful and arbitrary  <mask>.


57.  The applicant noted that the institution of the criminal proceedings in itself had not been sufficient to justify his  <mask>. He maintained that his arrest had been conducted with numerous procedural violations and had not been justified. The case file had contained no specific evidence that the applicant had had any intention of escape and he could not have possibly continued any alleged criminal activities, as by the time of his arrest he had not been a member of the Government anymore.


60.  The Government further submitted that the applicant had had the opportunity to apply to the administrative courts under Article 125 of the Constitution to object to the decision to hold him at the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre, and indeed had done so. They therefore considered that the applicant had had a remedy whereby he could challenge the lawfulness of his  <mask>.


66.  The Government observed that, following the judgments of 30 January and 3 February 2003, the applicants had been immediately released and had left the centre for illegal aliens in Bruges. However, as they had not been allowed to enter the territory owing to the decisions refusing them entry, which were still in force, they had been taken to the transit zone. That measure had implemented the above-mentioned decisions in accordance with domestic law and with the domestic courts' interpretation of it. The investigating courts had no jurisdiction to set aside or stay the execution of decisions refusing entry or ordering removal. Under section 72, subsection 2, of the Act of 15 December 1980, their role was limited to ascertaining whether administrative decisions depriving individuals of their liberty were in accordance with the law. In any event, the applicants' transfer to the transit zone could not be regarded as  <mask>. The order of 14 February 2003 had departed from domestic and international case-law in considering that the transit zone was a “closed place”. The only restriction placed on the applicants' freedom was that they had been prohibited from entering Belgian territory. Furthermore, the applicants had been duly informed of their situation in English, a language which they knew, and their luggage, money and personal effects had been returned to them. They had been free to move and, in particular, to leave Belgian territory. The authorities had also given them the opportunity to do so by taking a flight on which seats had been booked in their names, but the applicants had refused these opportunities on three occasions and one occasion respectively. In those circumstances, the applicants must be considered to have been at the origin of the complaint which they had put forward and the State was therefore not responsible for the situation created (citing Mogoş v. Romania, no. 20420/02, 13 October 2005).


75.  The Government contended that the enforcement of the order to appear before the criminal-investigation authority issued in the applicant’s name could not be considered a  <mask> within the meaning of Article 5 § 1. They claimed that the applicant had willingly accompanied the police officers from the Bihor Police Inspectorate. They maintained that although the questioning of the applicant had lasted one and a half hours (between 0.30 a.m. and 1.52 a.m.), enforcement of the measure had taken longer because of the applicant’s problematic medical condition. The Government further submitted that the order to appear before the criminal-investigation authority had been issued in compliance with the national law and had been justified by the investigators’ doubt that the applicant would present himself for questioning at the police headquarters.


24.  The applicant complained that he had been deprived of the right to obtain compensation for his pre‑trial detention between 20 September 1994 and 11 January 1995. He submitted that he had used the only available domestic remedy; however, his claim for compensation failed. The applicant argued that the domestic courts’ practice of crediting a period of  <mask> towards a fine was unfair and had not compensated for the damage sustained by him.


53.  The applicants submitted, in particular, that their detention had not been justified under sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1, as that provision did not authorise a purely preventive  <mask>. They had not been detained in connection with criminal proceedings, as required by that provision as interpreted in the Court’s case-law (they referred, inter alia, to Ječius v. Lithuania, no. 34578/97, § 50, ECHR 2000‑IX). This was proved by the fact that their detention had not been based on section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which concerned remand in custody (see paragraph 42 above). On the contrary, the courts had based their detention on sections 55 and 56 of the Mecklenburg-West Pomerania Public Security and Order Act (“the PSOA”), which governed detention for preventive purposes without any link to criminal proceedings.


66.  The Government took the view that the applicant's  <mask> complied with Article 5 § 1. They pointed out that during the period in which the applicant had been released on probation and had been instructed by the Bayreuth Regional Court to reside in an old people's home (from 16 December 2003 until 3 March 2004), he had not been deprived of his liberty. During that period, he had only been subjected to a restriction of his freedom of movement to which he had agreed in the hearing before the Regional Court.


46.  The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies with regard to the issue of his  <mask> or the legality of his continued detention. In respect of the deprivation of liberty, the Government noted that the applicant had not appealed against the Tallinn Administrative Court’s decision of 31 October 2003 whereby his placement in the deportation centre had been authorised. In so far as the applicant’s subsequent stay in the deportation centre was concerned, the Government emphasised that the domestic courts, when authorising the extension of his detention in the deportation centre, had dealt with the issue only in the context of extending the stay. If the applicant had believed that the length of his detention had been unlawful, he should have filed a separate claim for damages.


50.  The applicant’s  <mask> clearly did not fall under sub‑paragraphs (a), (d), (e) or (f) of paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Convention. Nor could it be said to fall under sub—paragraph (b): there was no evidence of non‑compliance with a lawful order of a court and the applicant’s detention could not have been to secure the fulfilment of an obligation prescribed by law because, at the time his arrest, there was no unfulfilled obligation on the applicant (see Vasileva v. Denmark, no. 52792/99, § 36, 25 September 2003).


101.  The applicant maintained his claims. Firstly, he alleged that his placement in hospital had amounted to a deprivation of his liberty. Thus, he was placed in a locked facility. After he attempted to flee the hospital in January 2006, he was tied to his bed and given an increased dose of sedative medication. He was not allowed to communicate with the outside world until his discharge. Finally, the applicant subjectively perceived his confinement in the hospital as a  <mask>. Contrary to what the Government suggested, he had never regarded his detention as consensual and had unequivocally objected to it throughout the entire duration of his stay in the hospital.


191.  The Government suggested that the applicant’s  <mask> during the period under consideration was caused by slow progress of the copy of the court order of 7 July 2003 from the Kominternovskyy Court to the Hospital and the need to warn the competent authorities about the release of a mentally ill person. The Court takes this to be an argument that, in the circumstances, the applicant’s detention was still authorised by the decision of 5 July 2002. The Court reiterates that administrative formalities connected with release cannot justify a delay of more than several hours (see Nikolov v. Bulgaria, no. 38884/97, § 82, 30 January 2003; see also Giulia Manzoni v. Italy, judgment of 1 July 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑IV, § 25; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 172, ECHR 2000‑IV, and Quinn v. France, judgment of 22 March 1995, Series A no. 311, § 42).


23.  The Government stated that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as it had been open to her to request the District Court to revoke its order, pursuant to Article 344 of the 2006 CCP. They argued that the District Court had already done so when the applicant’s lawyer appealed against the fine imposed on her (see paragraph 9 above). On the merits, the Government argued that Article 5 was not applicable because the measure taken against the applicant did not amount to a  <mask> but rather to a temporary restriction of her freedom of movement. They stated that the applicant’s detention on the day before the hearing had been necessary, because the train used by the escort departed early the next morning. They also stated that the order of 18 September 2006 had a legal basis in Article 269 (2) of the 2006 CCP.


48.  The applicants complained that their arrest, conviction for breach of public order and contempt of court, and consequent punishment by  <mask>, as imposed by the President of the Tbilisi Court of Appeal in her decision of 29 June 2006, was unlawful and unfair, in breach of Articles 5 § 1 and 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.


90.  The Government submitted that this complaint was premature. In particular, since the domestic investigation into the applicant’s complaint of unlawful  <mask> was incomplete, it was not possible to determine whether the applicant had been deprived of his liberty before 8.40 p.m. on 19 July 2005. The Government were therefore precluded from commenting on whether the applicant had been promptly brought before a judge.


121.  The applicant submitted that Article 5 § 1 of the Convention also enshrined requirements as to the quality of the law, which meant that a domestic law authorising  <mask> had to be sufficiently clear and foreseeable in its application. She further submitted that Article 5 applied to the right of a convicted person to early release where the legal provisions establishing the right did not make it conditional or discretionary but applicable to anyone who met the legal conditions of entitlement (see Grava, cited above, §§ 31-46), irrespective of whether the measure related to the sentence proper or to its execution for the purposes of Article 7. She argued that the extension of the sentence and/or of its effective duration had not been reasonably foreseeable and, in the alternative, that the substance of the penalty imposed and/or the manner of its execution and/or its effective duration had not been reasonably foreseeable either.


98.  The applicant claimed that his detention pending extradition had been in breach of both domestic and international legal provisions. The decision of the district prosecutor’s office of 9 June 2009 authorising his remand in custody had been unlawful as, contrary to the requirements of Article 466 § 2 of the CCrP, the Russian authorities had not received either a copy of the Almaty City Court’s arrest warrant or an extradition request by the time they had taken the decision in question. Furthermore, the applicant insisted that he should have been released no more than two months after his initial remand in custody since, pursuant to Article 466 § 2 of the CCrP, a term of detention authorised by a prosecutor could not be longer than two months. In the absence of any judicial decision covering his detention between 3 May 2009 and 30 April 2010, his detention had therefore been in breach of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. During his lengthy detention he had not been protected against arbitrary  <mask>.


95.  The Government argued that, in any event, the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention had been met. The  <mask> had been justified under Article 5 § 1 (b) of the Convention, since its purpose had been to allow the applicant to become acquainted with the criminal file against her. Relying on the case of Soare and Others v. Romania (no. 24329/02, 22 February 2011), they pointed out that the order had not had a punitive intent, but had been issued in order to ensure that an obligation prescribed by law was fulfilled. Moreover, the order to appear had a legal basis in domestic law, namely Articles 183 and 250 of the CCP, and it had been delivered by the prosecutor in the interests of the proper administration of justice. Bearing in mind the applicant’s behaviour in the past, when she had refused to comply with such orders, the prosecutor had reasons to suspect that she might try to obstruct and delay the proceedings. The Government provided copies of summonses to appear which had been sent to the applicant in December 2002 and January 2003, as well as police reports stating that the applicant had not responded to those summonses.


40.  The Government submitted: “... the acceptance of  <mask> to which no other citizens are subject is the result of a voluntary decision on the part of those who embrace a career in the armed forces and consequently accept the discipline it imposes ... It is quite clear that such situations are not covered by Article 5 of the Convention as they result from the choice made by the applicant, who is free to avoid such legal consequences whenever he wishes simply by abandoning his military career, unlike a person who commits and is convicted of a criminal offence ...” The Government said in conclusion that the situation examined in the instant case did not come within the ambit of the cited Convention provision, even if the Spanish reservation was found not to be applicable to such cases.


19.  The Government’s claim that the applicant had been released at 3.15 p.m. and had gone to the Nadterechnyi police station of his own will appears as implausible to this Court as it did to the domestic court (see paragraph 10 above). The applicant denied that he had asked to be taken there to file a complaint, and the Government were unable to produce a copy of any such complaint to substantiate their contention. The facts that the applicant was brought there by police car in the company of a police officer, that he had his identity checked, and that he had thanked the station chief for “a prompt release” (see paragraph 6 above) suggest that the applicant’s transfer to the Nadterechnyi police station and his stay there amounted to a  <mask>. He was therefore deprived of his liberty until 5.10 p.m. on 10 October 2006, for a total duration of four hours and ten minutes.


74.  The applicant further submitted that his  <mask> was not in compliance with Articles 183 and 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He emphasised that he had never been summoned to appear before the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Cluj Court of Appeal before 27 November 2006 and that no reasons had been provided by the Romanian authorities for taking such a measure against him.