74.  The Government accepted that the applicant associations could refer to their right of religious freedom under Article 9 § 1 of the Convention. They considered, however, that the statements under dispute did not interfere with this right, as they were neither aimed at restricting the applicant associations’ right to exercise their religion undisturbed nor did they directly bring about such an effect. Any possible indirect factual impact on the applicant associations’ right under Article 9 did not amount to an  <mask> with that right, given that the Government observed their obligation to neutrality in religious matters.


75.  The applicant submitted that his conviction had amounted to an  <mask> with his right to manifest his religious beliefs. This interference was not prescribed by law because the Armenian authorities, by convicting him, had acted in violation of the legally binding commitment which they had undertaken when joining the Council of Europe, namely to pardon all conscientious objectors sentenced to prison terms. This international obligation had become an integral part of Armenia’s domestic legal system and from then on all conscientious objectors who refused to perform military service could reasonably expect to be freed from that obligation and eventually be given the option of performing alternative civilian service. As a result, the domestic law was not sufficiently precise, since it was not harmonised with the legally binding international commitments of Armenia.


74.  The applicant organisation was the official body representing and managing the Muslim religious community in Bulgaria between February 1995 and October 1997. It complained about alleged arbitrary  <mask> by the State with the organisation and leadership of that community. An ecclesiastical or religious body may, as such, exercise on behalf of its adherents the rights guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention (see, Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], no. 27417/95, § 72, ECHR 2000-VII).


97.  The Government submitted that the applicants had not been convicted for their religious beliefs but for their membership of a terrorist organisation, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami. In particular, they had distributed leaflets and brochures promoting the superiority of Muslims over adherents of other religions, calling for a confrontation between Islamic fundamentalists and all others, for the violent overthrow of non-Muslim governments and for universal Islamisation of mankind. Hizb ut-Tahrir rejected the possibility of participating in the democratic political process and chose to conduct its activities in an illegal and clandestine manner. The  <mask> with the applicants’ freedoms of religion, expression and association had therefore been “necessary in a democratic society”. Moreover, given the terrorist and extremist nature of the organisation and its intention to create hostility between adherents of different religions, to foster disunity in society and to undermine the constitutional foundations of the Russian Federation, the applicants’ actions within that organisation had been aimed at destroying the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. Referring to Article 17 of the Convention, the Government argued that the applicants could not therefore claim the protection afforded by Articles 9, 10 and 11.


41.  The Government lastly argued that the alleged  <mask> had met the requirement of being necessary in a democratic society. They took the view that to find such documents inadmissible would prevent courts from ruling on situations that might present a risk for the health, morals or stability of other family members, especially where there were alcohol-related problems. They added that the fact of excluding documents obtained by duress or fraud fulfilled the State’s positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention. The Government further indicated that the Court of Appeal had maintained the applicant’s right of contact in respect of his children pending the results of the expert’s report, and inferred from this that any interference would thus, in any event, have been proportionate. Lastly, they observed that such interference, when compared with that in Z v. Finland (cited above) and M.S. v. Sweden, (27 August 1997, Reports 1997‑IV), appeared far less significant and was circumscribed by the requisite safeguards.


60.  The Government made contradictory submissions regarding the existence of an  <mask>, arguing, on the one hand, that “the interference was legitimate and prescribed by law”, but, on the other hand, that there was no interference. In any event, the Court considers that the applicants’ refusal to be drafted for military and alternative service was a manifestation of their religious beliefs and their conviction for draft evasion therefore amounted to an interference with their freedom to manifest their religion, as guaranteed by Article 9 § 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Bayatyan, cited above, § 112). Such interference will be contrary to Article 9 unless it is “prescribed by law”, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims set out in paragraph 2 and is “necessary in a democratic society” (see, among other authorities, İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], no. 62649/10, § 98, ECHR 2016).


33.  The Government submitted that there had been no  <mask> in the exercise by the applicant of his right to freedom of religion, because no direct connection could be made between the indication of religion on identity cards and freedom of religion and conscience. It could not be construed as a requirement to disclose one’s religious beliefs or as a restriction on the freedom to manifest one’s religion in worship, teaching, practice and observance.


202.  The applicant alleged that the pastor who attempted to visit him was denied access in June and September 2009. This was confirmed by the pastor in a letter to the Court (see paragraph 45 above). The two respondent Governments have not made any submissions on this point. The Court sees no reason to doubt the description of the facts provided by the applicant and the pastor and accepts that there was  <mask> with the applicant’s right to freedom of religion.


77.  The applicant further argued that the  <mask> was not necessary in a democratic society. Firstly, the fact that he – a conscientious objector who was committed to living peacefully with his neighbours and who had a blank criminal record – was imprisoned and treated like a dangerous criminal was totally unnecessary in a democratic society. In particular, he had been subjected to a harassing search process, had later been arrested and locked up in a cell without any bedding and with six others detained for various crimes, and had been subjected to insults and verbal abuse by the guards. Secondly, he had been subjected to wholly disproportionate punishment and treatment considering that he was simply exercising his fundamental right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Thirdly, his imprisonment had not been necessary also because the Armenian authorities had pardoned other individuals in a similar situation. Lastly, the military protection of the country would not be disorganised and weakened if persons like him were not punished. In particular, Armenia had 125,000 active conscripts in 2007 and 551,000 potential ones, while only 41 Jehovah’s Witnesses were imprisoned. Moreover, since 2002 only three individuals belonging to other religions had decided to become conscientious objectors. Such insignificant numbers could not have a negative impact on the military capacity of Armenia.


59.  The Government accepted that in the registration proceedings, which had not involved an interpretation of the applicant association’s doctrinal sources, the refusal of the domestic authorities to register the applicant association had amounted to an  <mask> with the applicants’ freedom of association and religion. However, that interference had been in accordance with the law and had pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Furthermore, it had been proportionate to the aim sought to be achieved and the reasons adduced by the authorities had been relevant and sufficient.


133.  The Government accepted that the applicant’s right to visit and contact his family members during his house arrest had been restricted, which had constituted an  <mask> with his right to family life. They submitted, however, that this interference had been in accordance with the relevant rules on house arrest, had pursued the legitimate aim of preventing the suspect from obstructing justice and, in view of the fact that the applicant had been granted leave on a number of occasions for various reasons, had been proportionate in the specific circumstances of the present case.


120.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> complained of was necessary in a democratic society. In the first place, to recognise the applicant Church the State would have had to give up its position of neutrality in religious matters, and in religious conflicts in particular, which would have been contrary to the Moldovan Constitution and Moldovan public policy. It was therefore in order to discharge its duty of neutrality that the Government had urged the applicant Church to settle its differences with the Metropolitan Church of Moldova first.


72.  The Government also claimed that the holding of the meeting on the college premises had been contrary to section 1 § 5 of the Education Act (cited in paragraph 48 above). The Court observes, however, that this ground was not relied upon in the domestic proceedings and that the Government relied on it for the first time in their pleadings before the Court. In any event, it appears that the Education Act expressly authorised educational establishments to rent out their premises (see paragraph 49 above). The provision on which the Government relied did not prohibit the physical use of college space by third parties, but rather the clericalisation of schools through the setting-up of religious structures involving students and/or staff. In the present case the applicants used the college premises for their meetings on Tuesday nights and on Sundays, that is, outside normal college hours, and there is no evidence that their activities interfered in any way with the educational process or involved college students or teachers. Thus, the Education Act could not serve as a legal basis for the  <mask>.


80.  The Government admitted that the majority of member States of the Council of Europe had adopted laws providing for various forms of alternative service for conscientious objectors. However, the provisions of Article 4 § 3 (b), which clearly left the choice of recognising conscientious objectors to each Contracting Party, could not be overlooked, and the fact that the majority of them had recognised this right could not be relied upon to hold a Contracting Party which had not done so to be in violation of its obligations under the Convention. In sum, Article 9 read in the light of Article 4 § 3 (b) did not guarantee a right to refuse military service on conscientious grounds and there had been no  <mask> with the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article 9.


18.  The Government further contend that the  <mask> was necessary in a democratic society. In many countries, the Muftis are appointed by the State. Moreover, Muftis exercise important judicial functions in Greece and judges cannot be elected by the people. The Government submit that because there were two Muftis in Xanthi at the time, the courts had to convict the spurious one in order not to create tension among the Muslims, between the Muslims and Christians and between Turkey and Greece. The courts considered that the offence in Article 175 is committed when somebody actually discharges the functions of a religious minister. The courts also considered that the acts that the applicant engaged in fell within the administrative functions of a Mufti in the broad sense of the term.


61.  The Government also submitted that, even if the 2011 Church Act complained of could be regarded as  <mask>, it was prescribed by a law adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of parliament. The applicants’ argument that the 2011 Church Act was invalid under public law had not been upheld by the Constitutional Court. Those provisions of the 2011 Church Act which had been found to be unconstitutional did not affect the applicants’ situation, while other provisions complained of by the applicants had not been declared unconstitutional.


78.  The Government accepted that under Russian law, the scope of the rights of “religious groups” was different from that of “religious organisations” that had obtained legal-entity status through State registration. However, in their submission, the difference in the scope of rights was in no way connected with the exercise of the rights to freedom of religion and association. The founding of a religious group was a voluntary act by a group of individuals. It did not require any special permission; notification to the municipal authority sufficed. Accordingly, in the Government’s view, the matter fell outside the State’s sphere of competence and the applicants were free to exercise their rights without State  <mask>. “Religious groups” could celebrate services, other religious rites and ceremonies, and also give religious instruction and training to their followers.


81.  The applicant and his son submitted that the applicant had not been informed in advance of the exclusion order or allowed to travel together with his son. He had lived in Russia for eight years and had not had a settled home elsewhere to which to take his son. As a result of State actions, he had faced the practical difficulty of having to arrange, from abroad, for the paperwork of an infant, including an exit visa, through a third party – a nanny – with no family relationship to him. The consideration of his complaint had been drawn out over seven and a half months because of repeated adjournments granted by the court to the FSB as a result of the latter’s consistent lack of preparation. In their submission, these elements pointed towards an  <mask> with the applicant’s and his son’s right to respect for their family life, for which the Government offered no reasonable justification.


68.  The Government submitted that the circumstances of the case gave no indication of any  <mask> with the third applicant's rights under Article 9 of the Convention on account of the fact that no ethics class had been organised for him in State schools. There were no indications that the third applicant had been in any way indoctrinated or subjected to any form of pressure as to his personal beliefs. Article 9 of the Convention did not deal with States' obligations regarding the content of school curricula.


150.  The Government did not contest that there had been an  <mask> with the applicant’s rights under Article 9 of the Convention. They maintained however that the measure was prescribed by law and served a legitimate aim, that is, the protection of public order and the rights of others. It was also proportionate, taking into account that the applicant was a teacher of religion by profession, who could have exercised his religion without the church attendances in question.


117.  The Government referred to the need to protect public order and, implicitly, the rights of others. The Court, however, does not find the Government’s reference to these aims to be convincing in the circumstances of the case, especially taking into account that at the time of the applicant’s conviction the Armenian authorities had already pledged to introduce alternative civilian service and, implicitly, to refrain from convicting new conscientious objectors (see paragraph 127 below). It nevertheless considers it unnecessary to determine conclusively whether the aims referred to by the Government were legitimate within the meaning of Article 9 § 2, since, even assuming that they were, the  <mask> was in any event incompatible with that provision for the reasons set out below.


48.  The Government further contend that the  <mask> was necessary in a democratic society. To start with, in many countries, the Muftis are appointed by the State. In Greece, Muftis exercise important judicial functions and judges cannot be elected by the people. This is all the more so that in the instant case the “election” of the applicant had been flawed because it had not been the result of a democratic procedure and the applicant had been used by the local Muslim MPs for party political purposes. Moreover, given that there were two Muftis in Xanthi at the time and that the applicant had questioned the legality of the acts of the lawful mufti, the courts had to convict the spurious one in order not to create tension among the Moslems, between the Moslems and Christians and between Turkey and Greece. In any event, the State had to protect the office of the mufti and, even if there had not existed a lawfully appointed mufti, the applicant would have had to be punished. In this respect, the Government submit that the Court of Cassation did not convict the applicant simply because he appeared as the Mufti. In fact, the courts considered that the offence in Article 175 is committed when somebody actually discharges the functions of a religious minister and that the acts perpetrated by the applicant fell within the administrative functions of a mufti in the broad sense of the term.


83.  The Government submitted that, even assuming that there had been an  <mask> with the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article 9, this interference was justified. Firstly, the interference was prescribed by law. In particular, the obligation of every Armenian citizen aged between 18 and 27, who had been found to be physically fit, to serve in the Armenian army, regardless of his religious convictions, was prescribed by Article 47 of the Constitution and sections 3 and 11 of the Military Liability Act. Furthermore, Article 75 of the Criminal Code prescribed a penalty for draft evasion. These legal provisions were both accessible and sufficiently precise. Moreover, the right to conscientious objection was not recognised under Armenian law at the material time.


16.  The Government firstly argue that the applicant was not convicted for the content of the messages that he disseminated but simply because he appeared as the Mufti of Xanthi. As a result, there was no  <mask> with his right to express his religious beliefs because Article 9 does not guarantee the applicant the right to usurp the functions of a minister of a “known religion”.


84.  The applicant submitted that the  <mask> complained of should be seen in the context of all the events that preceded and followed its creation, including the negative public campaign, the statements of public officials, and the alleged persecution of Mr Vraniškovski, which revealed an agenda by the respondent State aimed at preventing it from exercising its religious rights. The applicant association rejected as unsubstantiated the alleged formal shortcomings to which the national authorities had referred in their decisions. It argued that they were trivial and could easily have been rectified had the association been given the opportunity to do so. However, the entire process had been deliberately abused by the State authorities in order to prevent the applicant association from obtaining registration. The arguments given by the authorities in this respect had been excessively formalistic and had clearly demonstrated their biased attitude towards the applicant association. The Government’s arguments that the name “Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese” belonged to the MOC by association (see paragraph 90 below) demonstrated such an attitude, which was contrary to the principle of neutrality and impartiality with respect to different religions.


18.  The applicant complained that medical documents concerning him (operation report of 2 April 1994) had been produced and used before the court, without his consent and without a medical expert having been appointed for such purpose. He alleged that this had entailed a breach of professional confidentiality and serious and unjustified  <mask> with his right to respect for his private life. He relied on Article 8 of the Convention, of which the relevant parts read as follows:


65.  The Government considered that there was no  <mask> with the applicant's right to freedom of association because it had not been liquidated and retained the full capacity of a legal entity. On 10 August 2002 it had been entered on the Unified State Register of Legal Entities and continued its religious activities. In refusing the Moscow Justice Department's action for dissolution, the Nikulinskiy District Court founded its judgment of 30 April 2002 on the evidence showing that the applicant had on-going financial and economic activities, such as the applicant's balance sheets and permission to stage events in municipal districts of Moscow. The Government maintained that the applicant could not claim to be a “victim” of any violation solely because it was not willing to bring its founding documents in compliance with the existing law.


34.  The Government acknowledged that the refusal to register the applicant group constituted an  <mask> with the applicants’ right to freedom of religion. In their view, the interference was “prescribed by law” and all the refusals of registration had been based on the relevant legal provisions. The interference pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of protecting public order (they referred to Kimlya, cited above, § 97). The Government justified the interference as having been necessary in a democratic society for suppressing manifestations of religious discord (they referred to Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, 25 November 1996, § 58, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V, and Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, § 50, Series A no. 295‑A). They also claimed that similar waiting periods were provided for by the laws of some other Member States. According to their information, Austrian law set the waiting period at twenty years, Latvian law at twenty-five years, and Romania’s Law no. 489 of 28 December 2006 provided that religious denominations, other than the eighteen listed in the law, may be recognised if they can prove their existence in the country for at least twelve years.


43.  The applicant contested the Government's submissions. She alleged, first of all, that the  <mask> in question had not been prescribed by law. It had mainly taken the form of an opinion of the Conseil d'Etat, ministerial circulars and judicial interpretations of the case-law, none of which had the status of a law or regulation in French law in that they were not binding on the courts applying the law. The applicant pointed out that individual freedoms, and particularly religious freedom, were essential freedoms that could be restricted only by provisions that were at the very least legally binding; and that the French Government, well aware of that gap in the law, had considered it necessary to enact legislation on 15 March 2004.


163.  The applicants claimed that the  <mask> had not been prescribed by law or necessary in a democratic society. It had been established by the Presnenskiy District Court on 16 August 2002 that the Moscow Justice Department had not invoked the dissolution proceedings before the Golovinskiy District Court as a ground for refusing re-registration. Furthermore, the four criminal investigations between June 1996 and April 1998 had found no criminal activity on the part of the applicant community. In April 1999, after a detailed expert study, the Ministry of Justice had granted re-registration to the federal organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses, of which the applicant community had been a member. Likewise, 398 communities of Jehovah's Witnesses in other Russian regions had been granted registration or re-registration during the same period.


31.  The Government, for their part, submitted that there had been no  <mask> with the applicant’s right to manifest his religion freely since he had never been prevented from taking part in Jewish festivals and practising his religion freely. The authorities had simply sought to ensure that the applicant did not hamper the smooth operation of essential State services in exercising his right to request that the hearing be adjourned.


91.  The applicants further complained of the discriminatory nature of section 11 of the 1998 Religious Communities Act. This provision amended the Recognition Act in that it introduced further requirements for recognition as a religious society. In particular, it requires the existence of the religious association for at least twenty years in Austria and for at least ten years as a registered religious community; a minimum number of two adherents per thousand members of the Austrian population (at the moment, this means about 16,000 persons); the use of income and other assets for religious purposes, including charity activities; a positive attitude towards society and the State; and no illegal  <mask> as regards the association’s relationship with recognised or other religious societies.


70.  The applicants claimed that the right to freedom of religion encompassed the expectation that members would be allowed to associate freely without arbitrary State intervention. Therefore, the State was prohibited from regulating State-Church relationships arbitrarily; any  <mask> in that sphere had to be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society. The requirements relating to the registration of Churches had to be objective and reasonable, because in this matter the State was required to remain neutral and impartial. Consequently, if a religious community met the legal requirements it had to be entitled to be registered as a Church, and the registration procedure had to offer guarantees of fairness.


50.  The applicant disagrees with the Government’s arguments. He submits that his conviction amounted to an  <mask> with his right to be free to exercise his religion together with all those who turned to him for spiritual guidance. He further considers that his conviction was not prescribed by law. In this respect he affirms that the Treaty of Peace of Athens remains in force. The Greek Prime-Minister accepted that at the Diplomatic Conference leading to the 1923 Treaty of Peace of Lausanne. Moreover, the Court of Cassation has recently confirmed the continued validity of the Treaty of peace of Athens and legal scholars hold the same view. The Muslims had never accepted the abrogation of Law no. 2345/1920. The applicant lastly contends that his conviction was not necessary in a democratic society. He points out that the Christians and Jews in Greece have the right to elect their religious leaders. Depriving the Muslims of this possibility amounts to discriminatory treatment.


84.  The applicants submitted that the status of a registered religious community was inferior to that of a religious society and insufficient. They contended that the first applicant was subject to State control in respect of its religious doctrine, its rules on membership and the administration of its assets pursuant to sections 3-5 and 11 of the 1998 Religious Communities Act. They repeated in essence their above complaints. In particular, the applicants disputed the necessity of the ten-year waiting period, as the recognition of the Coptic Orthodox Church by a specific law in 2003 (see paragraph 45(e) above) proved the contrary. The Coptic Orthodox Church had only existed in Austria since 1976 and had been registered as a religious community in 1998. The applicants argued that most of the registered religious communities and even most of the recognised religious societies did not fulfil the criterion for the minimum number of adherents, which showed that this requirement was unnecessary for the observance of public duties, contrary to what the Government maintained. Since the first applicant, which was the fifth largest religious community in Austria and was thus even bigger than most recognised religious societies, also complied with the necessary number of adherents, it should have been recognised a long time ago. Further, the requirement of the use of income and other assets for religious purposes, including charity activities, was discriminatory as it interfered in an unjustified way with the first applicant’s internal administration and organisation, in breach of both Article 9 of the Convention and Article 15 of the Basic Law 1867. The prerequisite of a positive attitude towards society and the State was discriminatory as it was not required in respect of any other natural or legal personality in Austria. Further, it did not meet the “prescribed by law” requirement under Article 9 § 2 of the Convention. The same applied to the criterion of non- <mask> with other religious societies. Moreover, under Austrian law, recognised religious societies enjoyed privileged treatment in various fields which did not extend to religious communities.


82.  The Government submitted that Russian law treated all aliens on an equal basis, irrespective of whether or not they had a minor child in Russia. There was no evidence that the State authorities had prevented the applicant from being reunited with his son in a different State. Nor had he shown that he had taken any steps to remove his son from Russia. In any event, the Convention does not guarantee the right to establish family life in any specific country (here they referred to the case of Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321/99, § 97, ECHR 2003‑X). Unlike the first applicant in the Slivenko case, who had come to Latvia when she had been only ten months old and had spent her entire life there, the applicant had arrived in Russia as an adult and had lived there for only eight years. His integration into Russian society was open to doubt since he had been unable, by his own admission, to read a document handwritten in Russian. Moreover, owing to their profession, religious missionaries must be prepared to change their place of residence with greater ease. Finally, the Government submitted that, in any event, the  <mask> with the applicant’s family life had been in accordance with law, pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of national security and had also been necessary in a democratic society.


43.  The applicants submitted that the situation in the present case was to be examined under the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as the wage deductions involved a deprivation of their property for a service which they had never requested and which, as regards the greater part of the deductions, did not correspond to any service at all. Whichever rule of Article 1 was applicable, there had been an  <mask> with their property rights which lacked a legitimate aim and which, in any event, was not proportionate to any such aim.


76.  The applicants noted that “religious groups”, as defined in the Religions Act, could operate without State  <mask>. However, the status of a “religious group” entailed severe restrictions on community religious practice. A “religious group” had no legal personality; it could not acquire rights or obligations, and it could not protect its interests in court. Given the list of rights reserved to registered religious organisations in sections 15-24 of the Religions Act – including such fundamental aspects of “worship, teaching, practice and observance” as the right to establish places of worship, the right to hold religious services in other places accessible to the public, and the right to produce and/or acquire religious literature – a “religious group” was not a religious community with any substantial rights or “autonomous existence”, an issue which the Court had found to be “at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords” (see Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, no. 45701/99, § 118, ECHR 2001‑XII).


27.  The Government submitted further that, as the Contracting States were under no obligation to accept a refusal to perform military service for religious reasons, non-exemption of a person from military or alternative civilian service did not raise any concerns under Article 9 of the Convention. In any event, the applicant’s submissions did not indicate that the obligation to perform military or alternative civilian service entailed any concrete  <mask> with his rights under Article 9.


26.  The applicants complained of a violation of their rights guaranteed under Article 9 of the Convention as a result of the failure to issue them with a document necessary for the registration of their religious denomination. They submitted, inter alia, that the  <mask> with their rights had not been prescribed by law because it had been contrary to the domestic courts’ judgments ordering the issuance of the relevant document.


57.  The applicants maintained that the domestic authorities had refused to recognise the applicant association as a religious entity in both sets of proceedings despite the fact that it had existed and operated for many years before the 2007 Act had entered into force. They argued that the  <mask> with their rights under this head had not been in accordance with the law, had not pursued any legitimate aim and had not been necessary in a democratic society.


162.  The applicants submitted that the denial of re-registration amounted to an  <mask> with their rights to freedom of religion and association. As a matter of domestic law, it had the effect of depriving the applicant community of the right to seek the exemption of clergy from military service, the right to establish educational institutions, to invite foreign preachers, to manufacture, purchase, import and distribute religious literature, and many other rights. Moreover, the denial of re-registration curtailed the right to amend the applicant community's own articles of association, including their bank details and the list of authorised signatories. The entering of the applicant community on the Unified State Register of Legal Entities had been made in accordance with internal administrative reforms and did not constitute re-registration for the purposes of the Religions Act.


69.  The Government did not accept that the Certificate of Approval scheme of itself constituted a violation of the applicants' rights. Instead, they submitted that the House of Lords had identified three problems with the first version of the scheme: first, the manner in which the scheme was operated constituted a disproportionate  <mask> with the right to marry under Article 12 of the Convention; secondly, the existence of a fixed fee at a level which a needy applicant might not be able to afford could impair the essence of the right to marry; thirdly, the exemption for marriages conducted in the Church of England made the scheme discriminatory in breach of Article 14 read together with Article 12. In all other respects, the House of Lords held that the 2004 Act and the 2005 Regulations were unobjectionable and could be operated compatibly with Convention rights.


37.  The Government conceded that the denial of a broadcasting licence to Glas Nadezhda EOOD had amounted to an  <mask> with the applicants' freedom to impart information and ideas. In their view, however, this interference had been authorised under the third sentence of paragraph 1 of Article 10 of the Convention. The licensing of radio broadcasters had been specifically envisioned by the Radio and Television Act 1998. It had been entrusted to a special body, the NRTC, charged with protecting freedom of expression. Moreover, the law regulating licensing had been sufficiently clear in its terms. The NRTC's decision had been based on quite detailed and publicly announced criteria. The NRTC had clearly indicated, as could also be seen from the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 21 March 2002, which of those criteria had not been met by Glas Nadezhda EOOD. Some of the criteria were formal, while others had related to the utility and the feasibility of the proposed radio station. This could not be seen as unlawful, arbitrary or discriminatory, as indicated by the former Commission in its decision in the case of Verein Alternatives Lokalradio Bern et Verein Radio Dreyeckland Basel v. Switzerland (no. 10746/84, Commission decision of 16 October 1986, Decisions and Reports 49). The decision to refuse the licence had been based on the failure by Glas Nadezhda EOOD to meet a number of the announced criteria. This decision had been the result of a detailed examination and had been reviewed by two levels of court.


22.  The Government submitted that following the entry into force of the Religious Denominations Act on 17 August 2007 the applicants no longer had any need for the document which the courts had ordered to be issued. Moreover, after the law had changed and the enforcement warrant had been returned without enforcement, the applicants had not applied for registration of their denomination. This, in the Government’s opinion, proved the absence of a real intent by the applicants to register a denomination and thus the absence of an  <mask> with their rights. The Government submitted that the applicants had lost their victim status as a result of the legislative amendments and their subsequent failure to act.


42.  The applicants alleged that their beliefs prohibited them from permitting their children to take part in mixed swimming lessons. They added that, although the Koran laid down the precept that the female body was to be covered only from puberty, their faith instructed them to prepare their daughters for the precepts that would be applied to them from puberty onwards. The Court considers that the case concerns a situation in which the applicants’ right to manifest their religion is in issue. The applicants exercised parental authority and could decide, under Article 303 al. 1 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 23 above), on the religious education of their children. In consequence, they are entitled to rely on this aspect of Article 9 of the Convention. The Court considers, furthermore, that the applicants indeed suffered an interference with the exercise of their right to  <mask> as protected by that provision.


22.  The applicant complained that he had been obliged, without his consent and in breach of the right to  <mask> and conscience, to disclose his belief because it was mandatory to indicate his religion on his identity card. He submitted that the indication at issue could not be considered to be compatible with Article 24 § 3 of the Constitution, which provided that “no one shall be compelled ... to reveal his or her religious beliefs and convictions”. He pointed out that that public document had to be shown at the request of any public authority, private enterprise or in the context of any formality whatsoever.


23.  The Government stated that the applicant, who had merely asked the judicial authorities to replace the word “Islam” on his identity card with the indication of his belief as “Alevi”, had not duly exhausted domestic remedies in relation to his complaint concerning  <mask> and conscience. In the Government’s view, the applicant had never argued that the indication of his religion on his identity card was incompatible with his freedom of religion and conscience.


74.  The applicants in application no. 1413/08 submitted that the court‑appointed experts had no expertise in religious matters and, in particular, had no knowledge of Islam. They had therefore made a purely secular assessment of the texts, without taking into account their religious purpose and the particularities of religious texts. The recognised authorities on Islam, such as a co-president of the Council of Mufti of Russia, had told the courts that Said Nursi was a world-renowned Muslim scholar whose texts formed an integral part of the official teachings of Islam and did not contain any extremist statements. He had also said that the ban on Said Nursi’s books would hinder the religious life of Russian Muslims and unjustifiably restrict their  <mask>.


94.  The applicants alleged that the Moldovan authorities’ refusal to recognise the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia infringed their  <mask>, since only religions recognised by the government could be practised in Moldova. They asserted in particular that their freedom to manifest their religion in community with others was frustrated by the fact that they were prohibited from gathering together for religious purposes and by the complete absence of judicial protection of the applicant Church’s assets. They relied on Article 9 of the Convention, which provides:


72.  The Government’s warning and indoctrination campaign had had no legal basis. Neither of the constitutional norms quoted by the Government was sufficiently clear to allow the infringement of the applicant associations’ Convention rights. They considered that the principle of proportionality did not set sufficiently clear limits to the exercise of the Government’s discretionary power where interferences with the  <mask> derived directly from other constitutional rights. The importance of the right to freedom of religion required a strict adherence to legal principles and at least some procedural rules concerning the involvement of the religious communities in the process of defining the scope of the State powers and safeguards against abuse of authority. In the applicant associations’ view the authorities had failed in their duty to enact an adequate legal framework in this respect.


101.  The Government submitted that the confiscation by the prison authorities of the cassette player the applicant received from the national civil assistance centre for prisons could not be considered as an infringement of his  <mask> as he could have continued his religious instruction by correspondence and by attending the activities organised by the prison. Furthermore, they pointed out that the prison authorities had confiscated only the cassette player and not the applicant’s cassettes or religious books as the applicant alleged. They added that the applicant could have listened to his religious cassettes on the cassette player in the prison’s education and cultural department.


71.  The Government questioned the reliance on various media and other reports in substantiating the applicant's complaints and considered them immaterial to the case. Nevertheless, in respect of the media campaigns, the Government contended that they did not infringe on the applicant's right to  <mask>. To the contrary, they considered them a legitimate exercise of the media's right of freedom of expression, in so far as they were expressing the reservations of the public towards members of a religious organisation allegedly proselytising among the pupils of the School with the tacit support or approval of the institution's former principal. In any event, the Government considered that the media's singling out of the applicant had not, in itself, infringed her right to freedom of religion.


37.  The applicant in the present case brought a claim for damages in respect of the actions of the police which she claimed breached her right to  <mask> and freedom of assembly. Her claim was finally dismissed on the ground that the police had acted in implementation of the orders of the prosecution authorities, which, in their turn, could not be held liable under domestic law for the specific decisions at issue (see paragraph 14 above). The Government have not demonstrated to the Court that the applicant had at her disposal another remedy which would have provided her with effective relief in respect of her complaint under Article 9 of the Convention (see Krasimir Yordanov, cited above, §§ 50-55; see also Boychev and Others, cited above, § 56).


60.  The applicants complained that the Russian courts had violated their rights to  <mask> and freedom of expression, as provided for in Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention, by declaring that Islamic books by Said Nursi, which they had published and used for religious and educational purposes, were “extremist”. Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention read:


71.  The applicants submitted that by banning the books by Said Nursi, the Russian authorities had declared unlawful religious literature explaining the Islamic doctrine and had therefore interfered with the applicants’ rights to  <mask> and freedom of expression. In particular, “The Tenth Word: The Resurrection and the Hereafter” was a commentary on the Qur’an, recognised as such by the Council of Mufti of Russia. It dealt with the topics of resurrection, the judgment day and the afterlife. The applicant organisation in application no. 28621/11 had planned to use it for religious and educational purposes. By declaring it extremist, the domestic authorities had prohibited its use and distribution.


162.  The applicants submitted that the denial of re-registration amounted to an interference with their rights to  <mask> and association. As a matter of domestic law, it had the effect of depriving the applicant community of the right to seek the exemption of clergy from military service, the right to establish educational institutions, to invite foreign preachers, to manufacture, purchase, import and distribute religious literature, and many other rights. Moreover, the denial of re-registration curtailed the right to amend the applicant community's own articles of association, including their bank details and the list of authorised signatories. The entering of the applicant community on the Unified State Register of Legal Entities had been made in accordance with internal administrative reforms and did not constitute re-registration for the purposes of the Religions Act.


166.  The Government further submitted that there was no violation of the applicants' right to  <mask> or any restriction on that right. The penalty imposed on the applicant community “was not harsh and was not motivated by religious factors, but by a failure to observe the law and a violation of the administrative procedure”. Members of the applicant community continued to profess their faith, hold services of worship and ceremonies, and guide their followers. Thus, from 5 to 7 July 2002 the applicant community had held a regional congress of Jehovah's Witnesses which had been attended by up to 24,000 believers.


66.  The Government further submitted that there was no violation of the applicant's right to  <mask> or any restriction on that right. The penalty imposed on the applicant “was not harsh and was not motivated by religious factors, but by a failure to submit to the Religions Act and violation of the administrative procedure”. The refusal of re-registration of the applicant did not entail a ban on its activity. Members of the applicant continued to profess their faith, hold services of worship and ceremonies, and guide their followers.


97.  The Government accepted that the right to  <mask> included the freedom to manifest one’s religion through worship and observance, but considered that in the present case the refusal to recognise the applicant Church did not amount to a prohibition of its activities or those of its members. The members of the applicant Church retained their freedom of religion, both as regards their freedom of conscience and as regards the freedom to manifest their beliefs through worship and practice.


58.  The Government contested that there had been an interference with the applicants’ right to  <mask>. Since the entry into force of the 1919 Treaty of St Germain, all Austrian inhabitants had been allowed to practise publicly and privately their thought, religion and beliefs, irrespective of whether their religious society, community or church was recognised or had legal status. The right to autonomous administration of the entity’s internal organisation was likewise guaranteed. Referring to a judgment of the Constitutional Court (VfSlg. 10.915/1986), the Government contended that the refusal of recognition did not impede the applicants’ exercise of their right to freedom of religion within the meaning of Article 9 of the Convention. Against this background, they contested that the first applicant had no legal personality in Austria, was legally non-existent and could not acquire assets or enter into legal relations, because these allegations concerned the first applicant’s situation before it had obtained legal personality as a registered religious community on 11 July 1998. Even before the entry into force of the 1998 Religious Communities Act, the first applicant had had the possibility of setting up an association with a religious purpose under the Associations Act, as the Federation of Evangelical Municipalities in Austria (Bund Evangelikaler Gemeinden in Österreich) had on 21 March 1992, and the Church of Scientology in Austria (Scientology Kirche Österreich) on 20 May 1984. However, the applicants did not appear to have made any efforts to that end.


120.  The applicant association stated that its right to change religious orientation, as guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention, had been interfered with. There had been interference with its  <mask> as the State had refused to register the changes and amendments to its statute for no legitimate reason as all the conditions for making the changes and amendments were met. Furthermore, the applicant association had been prevented from using the church premises it had built for its religious ceremonies and even from using its chosen name.


33.  The Government submitted that there had been no interference in the exercise by the applicant of his right to  <mask>, because no direct connection could be made between the indication of religion on identity cards and freedom of religion and conscience. It could not be construed as a requirement to disclose one’s religious beliefs or as a restriction on the freedom to manifest one’s religion in worship, teaching, practice and observance.


91.  The Government claimed that the “fifteen-year rule” incorporated in the Religions Act complied with “universally accepted principles and rules of international law, provisions of the Russian Constitution and contemporary legal practice in democratic States”. They maintained that the grounds for refusing State registration had been “purely legal” and prescribed by the Religions Act, that the decision had not been motivated by religious considerations and that there had been no causal link between the decision and the enjoyment of the right of citizens to  <mask> and association. There had been no evidence of arbitrariness or discrimination on the ground of religion. The Government relied in that connection on the Court’s finding that “States have a right to satisfy themselves that an association’s aim and activities are in conformity with the rules laid down in legislation” (see Sidiropoulos and Others, cited above, § 40).


202.  The applicant alleged that the pastor who attempted to visit him was denied access in June and September 2009. This was confirmed by the pastor in a letter to the Court (see paragraph 45 above). The two respondent Governments have not made any submissions on this point. The Court sees no reason to doubt the description of the facts provided by the applicant and the pastor and accepts that there was interference with the applicant’s right to  <mask>.


24.  The Government submitted that, in contrast to the facts found in Boychev and Others, cited above, there was no evidence in the present case to support the view that the police action of 27 September 1995 interrupted a religious meeting. As could be seen from the summons requiring the applicant to appear at the police station, she was informed of the search well in advance. The summons was issued under the Public Education Act and decree no. 367/194 of the Supreme Prosecution Office (see paragraph 8 above) and was aimed at regulating educational activities. It followed, in the Government’s view, that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to  <mask>. In addition, the Government argued that the law in force at the material time allowing for interference with the rights under Article 9 should be assessed in context. Arguments had been put forward at the relevant time to suggest that followers of Word of Life, particularly minors, were at risk of isolation and lower standards of protection in medical, educational and civil terms. The prosecutorial authorities were part of the judiciary, not the executive and the police took action as sanctioned by the prosecutor’s office. The actions of the police were well founded and fully in compliance with the Supreme Court’s judgment of 1 April 1994, refusing registration of the three organisations affiliated with Word of Life (see paragraph 6 above). Moreover, the lack of registration as a religious denomination had never been an obstacle for its followers to profess their religion or practice their activity.


56.  The applicants complained that the refusal of the Austrian authorities to grant legal personality to the first applicant by conferring on it the status of a religious society under the Recognition Act violated their right to  <mask>. They further submitted that the legal personality conferred on the first applicant under the Religious Communities Act was limited and insufficient for the purposes of Article 9 of the Convention. The applicants also relied on Article 11 of the Convention. These provisions read as follows:


41.  The applicant associations contested those arguments. They considered that their right to  <mask> had to be regarded as a “civil right” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. They pointed out that the right to choose and profess one’s religion was an original individual right which was not bestowed by the State. They further maintained that the Convention did not limit the applicability of Article 6 § 1 to rights of a pecuniary nature. The field of “civil rights” traditionally encompassed a number of non-pecuniary rights including those relating to religious questions, such as the right to religious education.


34.  The Government acknowledged that the refusal to register the applicant group constituted an interference with the applicants’ right to  <mask>. In their view, the interference was “prescribed by law” and all the refusals of registration had been based on the relevant legal provisions. The interference pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of protecting public order (they referred to Kimlya, cited above, § 97). The Government justified the interference as having been necessary in a democratic society for suppressing manifestations of religious discord (they referred to Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, 25 November 1996, § 58, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V, and Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, § 50, Series A no. 295‑A). They also claimed that similar waiting periods were provided for by the laws of some other Member States. According to their information, Austrian law set the waiting period at twenty years, Latvian law at twenty-five years, and Romania’s Law no. 489 of 28 December 2006 provided that religious denominations, other than the eighteen listed in the law, may be recognised if they can prove their existence in the country for at least twelve years.


59.  The Government maintained that the status conferred on the first applicant as a registered religious community under the 1998 Religious Communities Act complied with the requirements of Article 9; it only provided a legal status and in no way restricted the exercise or enjoyment of the right to  <mask>. In conclusion, there had been no interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 9 of the Convention.


69.  The applicants submitted that the loss of their proper Church status as a result of the 2011 Church Act had constituted interference with their  <mask>. The proper functioning of religious communities necessitated the enjoyment of a specific and appropriate legal status, that is, Church status in the legal sense. In Hungary, religious communities had had a reasonable opportunity to be registered as Churches since 1990, and the applicants had indeed enjoyed that status. The fact that on 1 January 2012 the vast majority of Churches (including theirs) had lost their proper Church status and had been forced to convert into ordinary civil associations or else cease to exist legally had constituted in itself interference with their freedom of religion, especially since the loss of Church status had deprived them of privileges which had facilitated their religious activities. The fact that those privileges were guaranteed henceforth only to Churches recognised by Parliament had placed them in a situation which was substantially disadvantageous vis-à-vis those Churches.


57.  The applicants submitted that the refusal of the Austrian authorities to grant legal personality to the first applicant by conferring on it the status of a religious society recognised under the Recognition Act violated their right to  <mask>. In particular, before July 1998, the first applicant could not have been established as a legal entity and, thus, could not have entered into legal relations, concluded contracts or acquired assets. The first applicant had, thus far, no internal autonomy, could not hire the necessary religious ministers and was not entitled to perform its pastoral work for believers in hospitals or prisons. The second to fifth applicants, as leading executives of the first applicant, were also limited in exercising their right to freedom of religion. Neither the Basic Law 1867 nor the 1998 Religious Communities Act provided explicitly for the internal autonomy of a religious community. The Constitutional Court had found (in its judgment of 3 March 2001, B1713/98 – see paragraph 34 above) that registered religious communities, unlike recognised religious societies, did not enjoy the right to comprehensive organisation and administration of their internal affairs without State interference. Lastly, the applicants contested that they would have had the possibility of forming an association under the Associations Act. They referred to the Constitutional Court’s finding of 1929 (VfSlg. 1265/1929), confirming the administrative authorities’ practice not to allow religious societies to form an association, and thus refusing the request of the Jehovah’s Witnesses (Ernste Bibelforscher) to set up an association. Thereafter the Jehovah’s Witnesses had not tried again to form an association, but auxiliary associations (Hilfsvereine) with specialised religious aims had been created. The two examples of associations submitted by the Government were likewise merely auxiliary associations. It was not until the enactment of the 2002 Associations Act that religious societies had been allowed to set up an association.


74.  The applicant referred to the Court’s case-law in Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria ([GC], no. 30985/96, § 60, ECHR 2000‑XI), in which it was stated that the right to  <mask> did not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief. In the present case, the non-renewal decision following the publicity given to the applicant’s situation had clearly been disproportionate.


100.  The Government and the third party expressed doubts as to whether the case was about  <mask>. They alleged that the applicants’ concern was not the practice of religion but their ambition to control property and gain power to administer the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. The Government also stated that it was not the Court’s role to decide who the legitimate leader of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was and expressed the view that for that reason the case did not concern human rights.


42.  The applicant argued that he had never declared himself as Christian Orthodox. He was born in the former USSR, where christening children was not a common practice. He was raised as an atheist and embraced the Buddhist faith later in life. In detention, he relied on the vegetarian food his family sent him by post, but after the adoption of the Minister of Justice’s order no. 3042/2007 he could no longer receive parcels by post. His family had difficulty travelling to the prison regularly. When he was refused a vegetarian diet by the prison authorities he adopted a diet of bread and margarine and sometimes marmalade. He maintained that the Rahova prison authorities’ failure to provide him with a vegetarian diet amounted to a violation of his  <mask>.


113.  The Government of the Republic of Moldova submitted that the Chamber had not struck a sufficient balance between the freedom of association claimed by the applicant union and the  <mask> and right to autonomy of the Orthodox Church. They contended that Article 11 of the Convention could not be construed as imposing a positive obligation on the State to recognise a secular association within a religious community where such recognition would be at variance with the State’s duty of denominational neutrality.


70.  The applicants claimed that the right to  <mask> encompassed the expectation that members would be allowed to associate freely without arbitrary State intervention. Therefore, the State was prohibited from regulating State-Church relationships arbitrarily; any interference in that sphere had to be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society. The requirements relating to the registration of Churches had to be objective and reasonable, because in this matter the State was required to remain neutral and impartial. Consequently, if a religious community met the legal requirements it had to be entitled to be registered as a Church, and the registration procedure had to offer guarantees of fairness.


78.  The Government accepted that under Russian law, the scope of the rights of “religious groups” was different from that of “religious organisations” that had obtained legal-entity status through State registration. However, in their submission, the difference in the scope of rights was in no way connected with the exercise of the rights to  <mask> and association. The founding of a religious group was a voluntary act by a group of individuals. It did not require any special permission; notification to the municipal authority sufficed. Accordingly, in the Government’s view, the matter fell outside the State’s sphere of competence and the applicants were free to exercise their rights without State interference. “Religious groups” could celebrate services, other religious rites and ceremonies, and also give religious instruction and training to their followers.


25.  The applicant complained under Article 9 of the Convention that the measures taken against her, namely her questioning by the police, the search and seizure and the warning order, interfered with her right to worship collectively with like-minded adherents of the Evangelical faith in a home environment. In addition, the denial of legal registration to her church was done is a spirit which lacked any semblance of State neutrality. At all stages, the State authorities acted on the basis of discriminatory value judgments rather than evidence. The applicant considered that the measures were not prescribed by law, since they were arbitrary and based on legal provisions which allowed an unfettered discretion to the executive. Finally, the measures were not  <mask>. There was no evidence that that the religious beliefs of the members of the applicant’s church were responsible for family separation, isolation and suicide. The action of the state authorities failed to respect the need for true religious pluralism, which is inherent in the concept of a democratic society.


78.  The Government admitted that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. However, they considered that such interference had been  <mask> and had been justified by the need to ensure public safety and to prevent any obstruction by the applicant of the investigation of the criminal case against him.


57.  The applicants maintained that the domestic authorities had refused to recognise the applicant association as a religious entity in both sets of proceedings despite the fact that it had existed and operated for many years before the 2007 Act had entered into force. They argued that the interference with their rights under this head had not been in accordance with the law, had not pursued any legitimate aim and had not been  <mask>.


50.  The applicant disagrees with the Government’s arguments. He submits that his conviction amounted to an interference with his right to be free to exercise his religion together with all those who turned to him for spiritual guidance. He further considers that his conviction was not prescribed by law. In this respect he affirms that the Treaty of Peace of Athens remains in force. The Greek Prime-Minister accepted that at the Diplomatic Conference leading to the 1923 Treaty of Peace of Lausanne. Moreover, the Court of Cassation has recently confirmed the continued validity of the Treaty of peace of Athens and legal scholars hold the same view. The Muslims had never accepted the abrogation of Law no. 2345/1920. The applicant lastly contends that his conviction was not  <mask>. He points out that the Christians and Jews in Greece have the right to elect their religious leaders. Depriving the Muslims of this possibility amounts to discriminatory treatment.


41.  The Government lastly argued that the alleged interference had met the requirement of being  <mask>. They took the view that to find such documents inadmissible would prevent courts from ruling on situations that might present a risk for the health, morals or stability of other family members, especially where there were alcohol-related problems. They added that the fact of excluding documents obtained by duress or fraud fulfilled the State’s positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention. The Government further indicated that the Court of Appeal had maintained the applicant’s right of contact in respect of his children pending the results of the expert’s report, and inferred from this that any interference would thus, in any event, have been proportionate. Lastly, they observed that such interference, when compared with that in Z v. Finland (cited above) and M.S. v. Sweden, (27 August 1997, Reports 1997‑IV), appeared far less significant and was circumscribed by the requisite safeguards.


70.  The applicants claimed that the right to freedom of religion encompassed the expectation that members would be allowed to associate freely without arbitrary State intervention. Therefore, the State was prohibited from regulating State-Church relationships arbitrarily; any interference in that sphere had to be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim and be  <mask>. The requirements relating to the registration of Churches had to be objective and reasonable, because in this matter the State was required to remain neutral and impartial. Consequently, if a religious community met the legal requirements it had to be entitled to be registered as a Church, and the registration procedure had to offer guarantees of fairness.


20.  The applicant submits that his conviction amounted to an interference with his right to be free to exercise his religion together with all those who turned to him for spiritual guidance. He further considers that his conviction was not prescribed by law. In this respect he affirms that the Treaty of Peace of Athens remains in force. The Greek Prime-Minister accepted that at the Diplomatic Conference leading to the 1923 Treaty of Peace of Lausanne. Moreover, the Court of Cassation has recently confirmed the continued validity of the Treaty of peace of Athens and legal scholars hold the same view. The Muslims had never accepted the abrogation of Law no. 2345/1920. The applicant lastly contends that his conviction was not  <mask>. He points out that the Christians and Jews in Greece have the right to elect their religious leaders. Depriving the Muslims of this possibility amounts to discriminatory treatment.


68.  The Government submitted that in democratic societies, in which several religions coexisted within one and the same population, it was necessary to place restrictions on the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs were respected. Rules in this sphere could vary from one country to another in accordance with national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order. Accordingly, the choice of the extent and form such regulations took had to be left up to a point to the State concerned, as it depended on the specific domestic context. They referred in this context to Leyla Şahin v. Turkey ([GC], no. 44774/98, §§ 106-09, ECHR 2005‑XI). The Government interpreted the cases of Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France ([GC], no. 27417/95, § 84, ECHR 2000‑VII) and Wingrove v. the United Kingdom (25 November 1996, § 58, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V) to mean that where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions were at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society might differ widely, the role of the national decision-making body had to be given special importance. Given that Said Nursi’s books incited religious discord and proclaimed religious superiority and could therefore provoke serious religious clashes with unpredictable negative consequences, the ban on their publication and dissemination had pursued the aims of protecting territorial integrity and public safety in Russia, public order and the rights of others. Moreover, it had been  <mask>, taking into account the tense ethnic situation in the country and the possible negative impact of those books on non-religious citizens.


163.  The applicants claimed that the interference had not been prescribed by law or  <mask>. It had been established by the Presnenskiy District Court on 16 August 2002 that the Moscow Justice Department had not invoked the dissolution proceedings before the Golovinskiy District Court as a ground for refusing re-registration. Furthermore, the four criminal investigations between June 1996 and April 1998 had found no criminal activity on the part of the applicant community. In April 1999, after a detailed expert study, the Ministry of Justice had granted re-registration to the federal organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses, of which the applicant community had been a member. Likewise, 398 communities of Jehovah's Witnesses in other Russian regions had been granted registration or re-registration during the same period.


44.  The Government submitted that the refusal to renew the applicant’s contract had been  <mask>. The principle of the neutrality of public services required that employees could not wear any religious symbol, of any form, even if they did not engage in proselytism. In this connection they referred to the Court’s case-law with regard to civil servants and their duty of discretion and choice of attire (specifically, Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995, § 53, Series A no. 323, and Kurtulmuş v. Turkey (dec.), no. 65500/01, ECHR 2006‑II). They emphasised the particular importance of the principle of neutrality in the circumstances of this case, where it was difficult to assess the impact that a particularly visible external sign could have on the freedom of conscience of fragile and impressionable patients. The Government added that certain patients had specifically refused to meet the applicant, and that this situation had created a general climate of tension and difficulties within the unit, requiring the applicant’s colleagues and some social workers to handle sensitive situations. It was in the light of this general climate that the CASH had taken the contested decision, after reminding the applicant on several occasions of the duty of neutrality, and not on account of the latter’s professional skills, which had always been acknowledged. The Government considered that the contested decision had complied with the requirement to weigh up the interests at stake; it had been the consequence of the applicant’s refusal to comply with the rules applicable to every public employee, of which she had been perfectly aware, and not, as she alleged, on account of her religious beliefs. Lastly, although the applicant’s wearing of the religious symbol had been accepted by the hospital until 2000, this factor did not, in the Government’s view, render the contested interference unnecessary. They reiterated that “the fact that an existing rule is applied less rigorously because of a specific context does not mean that there is no justification for the rule or that it is no longer binding in law” (citing Kurtulmuş, cited above).


73.  The applicant associations further maintained that the interference with their Convention rights was not justified by any of the legitimate aims set out in Article 9 § 2 of the Convention. There could never be a justification for judging religious groups’ beliefs as contrasted to their actions. The Government had failed to submit any concrete facts which would allow the Court to verify the assumption that their movement was in any way dangerous or that urgent social needs necessitated the actions in question. Their movement could not be criticised for any activity which was illegal or contrary to public order and the existing legislation. Accordingly, their treatment by the political authorities had been persecutory and unjustified, and had not been  <mask>.


40.  The applicant submitted that the imposition of criminal sanctions on conscientious objectors, even in those few member States that have not yet implemented alternative civilian service, could not be considered  <mask>. The Armenian authorities had acknowledged that when they undertook a commitment to refrain from imprisonment of conscientious objectors even before a law providing for such service was passed. Furthermore, the punishment imposed on him was wholly disproportionate in a modern democratic State.


57.  The applicants further referred to the fact that the law had later been amended, arguing that the Government had conceded that it had been fundamentally flawed. One of the main defects identified when the amendments had been proposed was that the alternative labour service was under military control. Prior to those amendments there had been no genuine alternative service of a clearly civilian nature in Armenia. PACE and the Committee of Ministers had repeatedly called on the Armenian authorities to introduce a clearly civilian service. The applicants submitted that the fact that the law had eventually been amended in 2013 to remove all military control and supervision and to place the programme under a purely civilian administration also confirmed that it had not been  <mask> to prosecute and imprison them.


77.  The applicant further argued that the interference was not  <mask>. Firstly, the fact that he – a conscientious objector who was committed to living peacefully with his neighbours and who had a blank criminal record – was imprisoned and treated like a dangerous criminal was totally unnecessary in a democratic society. In particular, he had been subjected to a harassing search process, had later been arrested and locked up in a cell without any bedding and with six others detained for various crimes, and had been subjected to insults and verbal abuse by the guards. Secondly, he had been subjected to wholly disproportionate punishment and treatment considering that he was simply exercising his fundamental right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Thirdly, his imprisonment had not been necessary also because the Armenian authorities had pardoned other individuals in a similar situation. Lastly, the military protection of the country would not be disorganised and weakened if persons like him were not punished. In particular, Armenia had 125,000 active conscripts in 2007 and 551,000 potential ones, while only 41 Jehovah’s Witnesses were imprisoned. Moreover, since 2002 only three individuals belonging to other religions had decided to become conscientious objectors. Such insignificant numbers could not have a negative impact on the military capacity of Armenia.


82.  The Government submitted that Russian law treated all aliens on an equal basis, irrespective of whether or not they had a minor child in Russia. There was no evidence that the State authorities had prevented the applicant from being reunited with his son in a different State. Nor had he shown that he had taken any steps to remove his son from Russia. In any event, the Convention does not guarantee the right to establish family life in any specific country (here they referred to the case of Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321/99, § 97, ECHR 2003‑X). Unlike the first applicant in the Slivenko case, who had come to Latvia when she had been only ten months old and had spent her entire life there, the applicant had arrived in Russia as an adult and had lived there for only eight years. His integration into Russian society was open to doubt since he had been unable, by his own admission, to read a document handwritten in Russian. Moreover, owing to their profession, religious missionaries must be prepared to change their place of residence with greater ease. Finally, the Government submitted that, in any event, the interference with the applicant’s family life had been in accordance with law, pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of national security and had also been  <mask>.


24.  The Government acknowledged that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to family life. They stressed however that intervention by the domestic courts had been prescribed by law, namely section 92 (4) of the Csjt. (see paragraph 15 above). Moreover, it pursued a legitimate aim, that is, the protection of the child’s interests, and was  <mask>. They added that in this field the child’s interests were paramount, overriding the interests of the parents.


44.  The applicant alleged, lastly, that the restrictions in question had not pursued a legitimate aim that was  <mask>. Contrary to the Government's submissions, she had not failed to comply with her duty of assiduity but had been confronted with the teacher's refusal to allow her to take part in the class. Despite her proposal to wear a hat or balaclava instead of her headscarf, she had continually been refused permission to participate in sports classes. The teacher had refused to allow her to take part in the class on grounds of her safety. However, when the teacher had been asked, at the session of the pupil discipline committee, how wearing the headscarf or a hat during his classes would endanger the child's safety, he had refused to answer the question. The Government had not provided any further explanations on this point. The applicant also pointed out that wearing the headscarf had given rise to strike action by a number of teachers in the school on the pretext of defending the principle of secularism and that it was those very teachers who had started the unrest and disruption and not in any way the applicant, who had not engaged in any form of proselytism.


34.  The Government acknowledged that the refusal to register the applicant group constituted an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of religion. In their view, the interference was “prescribed by law” and all the refusals of registration had been based on the relevant legal provisions. The interference pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of protecting public order (they referred to Kimlya, cited above, § 97). The Government justified the interference as having been  <mask> for suppressing manifestations of religious discord (they referred to Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, 25 November 1996, § 58, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V, and Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, § 50, Series A no. 295‑A). They also claimed that similar waiting periods were provided for by the laws of some other Member States. According to their information, Austrian law set the waiting period at twenty years, Latvian law at twenty-five years, and Romania’s Law no. 489 of 28 December 2006 provided that religious denominations, other than the eighteen listed in the law, may be recognised if they can prove their existence in the country for at least twelve years.


120.  The Government submitted that the interference complained of was  <mask>. In the first place, to recognise the applicant Church the State would have had to give up its position of neutrality in religious matters, and in religious conflicts in particular, which would have been contrary to the Moldovan Constitution and Moldovan public policy. It was therefore in order to discharge its duty of neutrality that the Government had urged the applicant Church to settle its differences with the Metropolitan Church of Moldova first.


48.  The Government further contend that the interference was  <mask>. To start with, in many countries, the Muftis are appointed by the State. In Greece, Muftis exercise important judicial functions and judges cannot be elected by the people. This is all the more so that in the instant case the “election” of the applicant had been flawed because it had not been the result of a democratic procedure and the applicant had been used by the local Muslim MPs for party political purposes. Moreover, given that there were two Muftis in Xanthi at the time and that the applicant had questioned the legality of the acts of the lawful mufti, the courts had to convict the spurious one in order not to create tension among the Moslems, between the Moslems and Christians and between Turkey and Greece. In any event, the State had to protect the office of the mufti and, even if there had not existed a lawfully appointed mufti, the applicant would have had to be punished. In this respect, the Government submit that the Court of Cassation did not convict the applicant simply because he appeared as the Mufti. In fact, the courts considered that the offence in Article 175 is committed when somebody actually discharges the functions of a religious minister and that the acts perpetrated by the applicant fell within the administrative functions of a mufti in the broad sense of the term.


121.  The applicants submitted that the refusal to recognise the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia was not  <mask>. They asserted that all the arguments put forward by the Government were without foundation and unsubstantiated and that they did not correspond to a “pressing social need”. There was nothing in the file to show that the applicants had intended or carried on or sought to carry on activities capable of undermining Moldovan territorial integrity, national security or public order.


18.  The Government further contend that the interference was  <mask>. In many countries, the Muftis are appointed by the State. Moreover, Muftis exercise important judicial functions in Greece and judges cannot be elected by the people. The Government submit that because there were two Muftis in Xanthi at the time, the courts had to convict the spurious one in order not to create tension among the Muslims, between the Muslims and Christians and between Turkey and Greece. The courts considered that the offence in Article 175 is committed when somebody actually discharges the functions of a religious minister. The courts also considered that the acts that the applicant engaged in fell within the administrative functions of a Mufti in the broad sense of the term.


44.  The applicant submitted that the imposition of criminal sanctions on conscientious objectors, even in those few member States that have not yet implemented alternative civilian service, could not be considered  <mask>. The Armenian authorities had acknowledged that when they undertook a commitment to refrain from imprisonment of conscientious objectors even before a law providing for such service was passed. Furthermore, the punishment imposed on him was wholly disproportionate in a modern democratic State.


20.  The applicant submits that his conviction amounted to an interference with his right to be free to exercise his religion together with all those who turned to him for spiritual guidance. He further considers that his conviction was not  <mask>. In this respect he affirms that the Treaty of Peace of Athens remains in force. The Greek Prime-Minister accepted that at the Diplomatic Conference leading to the 1923 Treaty of Peace of Lausanne. Moreover, the Court of Cassation has recently confirmed the continued validity of the Treaty of peace of Athens and legal scholars hold the same view. The Muslims had never accepted the abrogation of Law no. 2345/1920. The applicant lastly contends that his conviction was not necessary in a democratic society. He points out that the Christians and Jews in Greece have the right to elect their religious leaders. Depriving the Muslims of this possibility amounts to discriminatory treatment.


50.  The applicant disagrees with the Government’s arguments. He submits that his conviction amounted to an interference with his right to be free to exercise his religion together with all those who turned to him for spiritual guidance. He further considers that his conviction was not  <mask>. In this respect he affirms that the Treaty of Peace of Athens remains in force. The Greek Prime-Minister accepted that at the Diplomatic Conference leading to the 1923 Treaty of Peace of Lausanne. Moreover, the Court of Cassation has recently confirmed the continued validity of the Treaty of peace of Athens and legal scholars hold the same view. The Muslims had never accepted the abrogation of Law no. 2345/1920. The applicant lastly contends that his conviction was not necessary in a democratic society. He points out that the Christians and Jews in Greece have the right to elect their religious leaders. Depriving the Muslims of this possibility amounts to discriminatory treatment.


24.  The Government acknowledged that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to family life. They stressed however that intervention by the domestic courts had been  <mask>, namely section 92 (4) of the Csjt. (see paragraph 15 above). Moreover, it pursued a legitimate aim, that is, the protection of the child’s interests, and was necessary in a democratic society. They added that in this field the child’s interests were paramount, overriding the interests of the parents.


38.  The applicants submitted that the manner in which the NRTC had applied its criteria for evaluating candidates for broadcasting licences had been arbitrary. Firstly, those candidates had had no direct contact with the NRTC, which had engendered delay and confusion. Secondly, the points system adopted by the NRTC had not been properly operated. It was natural to expect that each candidate would be allotted a certain number of points, that later a ranking would be made, and that the candidate obtaining the highest number of points would be granted a licence. However, the NRTC had eschewed such allotting of points, instead merely informing the candidates that they would or would not be granted a licence. The procedure followed had not been public and transparent. The NRTC had not disclosed the reasons for its decisions and the candidates had not been told why some of them had been approved and others not. Their evaluations had never been made public. These deficiencies had not been addressed or remedied in the ensuing judicial review proceedings, which had deprived judicial review of all practical meaning. For all these reasons, the applicants were of the view that the interference with their freedom of expression had not been  <mask>.


43.  The applicant contested the Government's submissions. She alleged, first of all, that the interference in question had not been  <mask>. It had mainly taken the form of an opinion of the Conseil d'Etat, ministerial circulars and judicial interpretations of the case-law, none of which had the status of a law or regulation in French law in that they were not binding on the courts applying the law. The applicant pointed out that individual freedoms, and particularly religious freedom, were essential freedoms that could be restricted only by provisions that were at the very least legally binding; and that the French Government, well aware of that gap in the law, had considered it necessary to enact legislation on 15 March 2004.


163.  The applicants claimed that the interference had not been  <mask> or necessary in a democratic society. It had been established by the Presnenskiy District Court on 16 August 2002 that the Moscow Justice Department had not invoked the dissolution proceedings before the Golovinskiy District Court as a ground for refusing re-registration. Furthermore, the four criminal investigations between June 1996 and April 1998 had found no criminal activity on the part of the applicant community. In April 1999, after a detailed expert study, the Ministry of Justice had granted re-registration to the federal organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses, of which the applicant community had been a member. Likewise, 398 communities of Jehovah's Witnesses in other Russian regions had been granted registration or re-registration during the same period.


75.  The applicant submitted that his conviction had amounted to an interference with his right to manifest his religious beliefs. This interference was not  <mask> because the Armenian authorities, by convicting him, had acted in violation of the legally binding commitment which they had undertaken when joining the Council of Europe, namely to pardon all conscientious objectors sentenced to prison terms. This international obligation had become an integral part of Armenia’s domestic legal system and from then on all conscientious objectors who refused to perform military service could reasonably expect to be freed from that obligation and eventually be given the option of performing alternative civilian service. As a result, the domestic law was not sufficiently precise, since it was not harmonised with the legally binding international commitments of Armenia.


97.  The Government claimed that the interference in the form of dissolution of the applicant community had been justified,  <mask> and had also pursued a legitimate aim. They referred to the Court's position to the effect that the State was “entitled to verify whether a movement or association carries on, ostensibly in pursuit of religious aims, activities which are harmful to the population” (Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, 26 September 1996, § 40, Reports 1996‑IV) and also “may legitimately consider it necessary to take measures aimed at repressing certain forms of conduct... judged incompatible with respect for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of others” (Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, § 47, Series A no. 295‑A).


70.  The applicants claimed that the right to freedom of religion encompassed the expectation that members would be allowed to associate freely without arbitrary State intervention. Therefore, the State was prohibited from regulating State-Church relationships arbitrarily; any interference in that sphere had to be  <mask>, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society. The requirements relating to the registration of Churches had to be objective and reasonable, because in this matter the State was required to remain neutral and impartial. Consequently, if a religious community met the legal requirements it had to be entitled to be registered as a Church, and the registration procedure had to offer guarantees of fairness.


58.  The Government submitted that in 2003 Armenia had enacted a law on alternative service as part of the commitments undertaken upon joining the Council of Europe. Unfortunately, it had transpired that there were a number of omissions in that law and inconsistencies with the European standards. However, in deciding on the applicants’ criminal cases, the domestic courts had been bound to apply the law as in force at the material time. Referring to the findings of the Criminal Court of Appeal, the Government argued that the alternative labour service available at the material time had been of a civilian nature and contained only a few formal elements of military supervision in theory, not being directly controlled by the military in practice. Thus, the interference was legitimate and  <mask>.


35.  The applicants pointed out that the sole reason for the St Petersburg City Court’s upholding the refusal to register the applicant group as a religious organisation had been the lack of a reliable document confirming its presence in St Petersburg for fifteen years. They contended that the refusal had not been “prescribed by law” because the law did not meet the standards of clarity and foreseeability required under the Convention. Referring to Article 132 of the Russian Constitution and sections 7(2) and 11(5) of the Religions Act, the applicants submitted that the law expressly authorised local authorities to issue letters confirming the length of a group’s existence and that the courts’ rejection of the confirmation letter on the basis of an alleged lack of authority was unreasonable. Furthermore, whereas the Religions Act required only formal presentation of a confirmation letter, the courts had rejected it as “unreliable” with reference to arbitrary criteria that were not  <mask> and had imposed an unforeseeable and unattainable threshold.


2.  The Government submitted that section 16 § 5 of the Religions Act, interpreted in conjunction with section 7 § 1 of the Public Gatherings Act, required the organisers of religious assemblies in non-residential premises to notify the local authorities, in writing and in advance. Moreover, the Government claimed that section 5 § 1 of the Education Act prohibited religious assemblies from being held in educational establishments. Both justifications are unfounded, and have already being rejected by this Court in Kuznetsov and Others[3]. More specifically, in that seminal case the Court found a violation of Article 9 of the Convention on account of the disruption of an indoor religious meeting. The Court found that the State’s interference was not even  <mask>, since the Government neither specified the nature of the allegedly missing documents in accordance with the Religions Act, nor produced any documents relating to the official powers of the commissioner and two senior police officers to interrupt and disperse the indoor religious meeting. In addition, the fact of holding the religious meeting on college premises outside normal college hours had not been contrary to the Education Act. In that same judgment, the Court referred to the case-law of the Russian Supreme Court, dating from at least 1999, to the effect that religious assemblies do not require any prior authorisation from, or notification to, the public authorities[4]. There is no valid reason to change this precedent[5]. On the contrary, as will be shown, the subsequent practice of the respondent State justifies insistence on this case-law[6].


78.  The Government submitted that the rights guaranteed by the Convention and the Armenian Constitution, including the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, were to be applied to everyone equally and without discrimination. The applicant, an Armenian citizen, was obliged under the Constitution to perform compulsory military service regardless of his religious convictions and the fulfilment of such obligation could not be considered an interference with his rights. The law did not include such grounds for exemption from military service as being a Jehovah’s Witness. Thus, exemption from compulsory military service on a ground not  <mask> would have been in breach of the principle of equality and non-discrimination.


83.  The Government submitted that, even assuming that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article 9, this interference was justified. Firstly, the interference was  <mask>. In particular, the obligation of every Armenian citizen aged between 18 and 27, who had been found to be physically fit, to serve in the Armenian army, regardless of his religious convictions, was prescribed by Article 47 of the Constitution and sections 3 and 11 of the Military Liability Act. Furthermore, Article 75 of the Criminal Code prescribed a penalty for draft evasion. These legal provisions were both accessible and sufficiently precise. Moreover, the right to conscientious objection was not recognised under Armenian law at the material time.


25.  The applicant complained under Article 9 of the Convention that the measures taken against her, namely her questioning by the police, the search and seizure and the warning order, interfered with her right to worship collectively with like-minded adherents of the Evangelical faith in a home environment. In addition, the denial of legal registration to her church was done is a spirit which lacked any semblance of State neutrality. At all stages, the State authorities acted on the basis of discriminatory value judgments rather than evidence. The applicant considered that the measures were not  <mask>, since they were arbitrary and based on legal provisions which allowed an unfettered discretion to the executive. Finally, the measures were not necessary in a democratic society. There was no evidence that that the religious beliefs of the members of the applicant’s church were responsible for family separation, isolation and suicide. The action of the state authorities failed to respect the need for true religious pluralism, which is inherent in the concept of a democratic society.


150.  The Government did not contest that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 9 of the Convention. They maintained however that the measure was  <mask> and served a legitimate aim, that is, the protection of public order and the rights of others. It was also proportionate, taking into account that the applicant was a teacher of religion by profession, who could have exercised his religion without the church attendances in question.


26.  The applicants complained of a violation of their rights guaranteed under Article 9 of the Convention as a result of the failure to issue them with a document necessary for the registration of their religious denomination. They submitted, inter alia, that the interference with their rights had not been  <mask> because it had been contrary to the domestic courts’ judgments ordering the issuance of the relevant document.