73.  The applicants further submitted that the Bochum prosecution authorities had not informed them of their various procedural rights in their capacity as next of kin of the deceased in accordance with Article 406h of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see Relevant domestic and international law and practice above) which, as a consequence, had not been effective in practice. Moreover, they had not been able to exercise their right to join the public prosecutor as plaintiffs in the proceedings against U. since the prosecution authorities had omitted to notify counsel for the second applicant mandated in Germany of the termination of the investigations and of their decision to charge U. by means of an application for a penal order. Insofar as German criminal procedure did not impose an express obligation on the prosecution authorities to keep potential joint plaintiffs to the prosecution informed on the state of progress of pending (preliminary) criminal proceedings, the applicants argued that domestic law failed to give full effect to the procedural guarantees inherent in Article 2 § 1. They contended in this connection that the German authorities had concealed their intention to prosecute and convict U. in Germany with a view to preventing his  <mask> to the United Kingdom where he would have expected a heavier sentence for having caused their father’s death through negligence.


80.  The Government argued that the applicant’s  <mask> was ordered by the Court of Appeal’s decision of 1 November 2010, which was final and had acquired the force of res judicata. In their view, Article 499 § 1 of the CCP provided for the applicant’s release if the Ministry of Justice did not order the applicant’s extradition within a month from the date of the Court of Appeal’s decision, despite the fact that the applicant’s appeal was pending before the Supreme Court. The Government further clarified that domestic law did not envisage the continuation of detention in the event of a remittal of a case by the Supreme Court. Consequently, in so far as the law did not stipulate the continuation of a defendant’s arrest, the legal interpretation was to be in favour of the defendant, which would result in his subsequent release. In the present case, had the authorities released the applicant, the Government would have been in breach of the Extradition Treaty provisions. If the authorities had not extradited the applicant by 1 December 2010, they would have had to release him in accordance with Article 499 § 1 of the CCP. Consequently, the Minister of Justice was faced with an objective impediment to compliance with the Court’s interim measure.


109.  The Government recalled that the High Court had accepted that, upon  <mask> to Florida, there was a realistic possibility of prosecution under the felony murder rule. It was not the Government’s position that the case against the applicant was one of premeditated killing. It had been accepted by the Government in the High Court proceedings that the case against the first applicant might be put on the basis that he killed Mr Hayes in the course of the robbery without the prosecution having to prove that the first applicant intended to kill Mr Hayes. It was not accepted by the Government that the fact that it was open to the prosecution to put the case on this basis demonstrated that the killing was accidental or that the first applicant did not intend to kill Mr Hayes.


437.  The applicants' representatives alleged that the extradited applicants learned of their  <mask> before being driven to the airport. As the extradition orders of 2 October 2002 had not been served on them, they had been deprived of the possibility of bringing their complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention before a court. In addition, the extradition orders were not served on the applicants' lawyers before the domestic courts. The latter learned by chance on 3 October 2002 that the extraditions were imminent.


126.  The Government disagreed with the applicant. They submitted that the detention and  <mask> of the applicant had been lawful and not arbitrary, as they were authorised to detain him according to the 1993 Minsk Convention and the relevant provisions of the domestic law, including section 11 § 5 of the Militia Act (see paragraphs 63 - 66 above). They repeated their arguments in the case of Soldatenko v. Ukraine (§§ 104 – 106, cited above). They further alleged that Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and (e) were not applicable to the present case as the applicant's detention had from the outset related to his extradition. The Government stated that the applicant remained in detention due to the Court's decision to suspend extradition and due to its examination of the case. Thus, they could not release the applicant and they could not extradite him.


94.  The applicants’ representatives stated that, despite requests to the authorities, they had been unable to contact their clients following the latter’s  <mask>. The applicants had consequently been deprived of the possibility of having further inquiries made in order to obtain evidence in support of their allegations under Article 3. The applicants’ extradition had thus proved a real obstacle to the effective presentation of their application to the Court.


329.  The applicants' representatives also contended that the assurances provided by the Russian authorities to their Georgian counterparts had no value and that the undertakings given to the Court by the Russian Government were no more than signed pieces of paper. They pointed out that the CPT itself had stated in one of its statements that Russia was failing to respect the undertakings that it had signed (see paragraph 267 (e) above). In their opinion, the Georgian authorities had not ensured that the assurances provided had any real value. On the contrary, they had actively cooperated with their Russian counterparts to facilitate the extraditions. Thus, they had sent photographs of the applicants which were subsequently used to support the  <mask> request, and had kept the Russian authorities informed of changes in the applicants' identities. Assisted in this way, the Russian authorities had “updated” their extradition request, altering the applicants' names to reflect the changes in identification. The Georgian authorities had not taken the measure of either the political nature of the accusations made against the applicants by the Russian authorities or the latter's clear bias in the disputed extradition proceedings. They had not required any prima facie evidence of those accusations. The letters referred to by the Georgian Government (see paragraph 324 above) did not contain a guarantee that the applicants would not be sentenced to death, but simply an assurance that a moratorium was in force in Russia.


87.  The applicant contested this view. In particular, he submitted that he had complained about his unlawful detention and  <mask> to the domestic courts. The applicant further stressed that the GPO of Ukraine decision of 27 September 2004 to extradite him had constituted a final decision for the purpose of exhaustion of domestic remedies. It was not amenable to appeal as to its lawfulness, as the domestic courts were allowed to review only the existence of the formal grounds for extradition and not the compliance of a decision to extradite with the obligations set out in Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. In that respect, he referred in particular to Resolution no. 8 of the Plenary Supreme Court of 8 October 2004 on issues related to the application of legislation governing the procedure and length of detention (arrest) of persons awaiting extradition, which summarised the domestic courts' practice on extradition issues.


79.  The Government submitted that it was not the authorities’ intention to disregard the obligations arising from the Court’s Rule 39 interim measure. Having regard to the highly complex nature of the applicant’s case, the societal risk he posed and the obligations stemming from other international commitments, the authorities attempted to find the best solution. The Government requested the Court, in view of the exceptional circumstances of the case, to be flexible in the assessment of the facts which prompted the applicant’s  <mask>.


427.  The Government do not dispute that the applicants' lawyers were denied access to the  <mask> files. Having regard to the argument relied on in this connection by Mr Mskhiladze (see paragraph 177 above), the Court has no doubt that the employees of the Procurator-General's Office themselves needed to carry out a detailed examination of the documents submitted by the Russian authorities. However, this ground does not in itself justify refusing the applicants all access to documents which had direct repercussions on their rights and on which the exercise of the remedy set out in Article 5 § 4 of the Convention was contingent. The Court does not accept the Government's argument that, since the right not to be extradited is not guaranteed by the Convention, it was not the task of the Procurator-General's Office to grant the applicants access to the case files concerning their extradition (see paragraph 395 above). It points out that, while Article 5 § 2 does not require that the case file in its entirety be made available to the person concerned, the latter must nonetheless receive sufficient information so as to be able to apply to a court for the review of lawfulness provided for in Article 5 § 4 (see Fox, Campbell and Hartley, cited above, § 40; and Čonka, cited above, § 50).


150.  The Government disagreed, stating that such an effective procedure existed in the Ukrainian domestic law. They referred to Articles 106, 165-2 and 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which specified the procedure for examining appeals against preventive measures. They further maintained that on 8 October 2004 the Plenary Supreme Court had adopted a practice recommendation concerning review of complaints concerning  <mask> matters.


388.  The applicants' representatives claimed that their clients had never officially been detained with a view to their  <mask> and that their placement in custody on 6 and 7 August 2002 was a disguised form of detention for the purpose of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. Their transfer on those dates from the civilian hospital to prison (the prison infirmary in the case of Mr Margoshvili) was the result of a visit to Georgia on 6 August 2002 by the Russian Procurator-General, who had brought with him the request for the applicants' extradition (see paragraphs 58-60 and 62 above). Quite apart from the requirement of promptness set out in Article 5 § 2 of the Convention, the applicants were not informed either during their transfer to prison or subsequently that they had been arrested with a view to being handed over to the Russian authorities. The applicants had thus been deprived of the possibility of challenging the lawfulness of that detention. Submitting the same complaints, Mr Khadjiev relied on Article 5 § 2 and Article 6 § 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 235 above). He also complained that he had been questioned without an interpreter at the civilian hospital and that he had not been informed of the accusations against him when he was brought before a judge on 6 August 2002 (see paragraph 58 above).


75.  The applicants responded that even if there had been no official request for their  <mask>, the administrative actions against them had been taken on the strength of information and requests received from the Chinese authorities. Moreover, the Government’s allegation that the orders for their removal from Turkey did not necessarily entail their return to China was not entirely accurate; they had been pressured constantly to purchase tickets back to China by the State authorities. In any event, whether or not they were sent there directly, they would most likely end up in China once deported.


66.  The applicant maintained that, on the basis of the documents submitted by the United States authorities, there existed the risk that a capital sentence would be imposed on him. He argued that this consideration was entirely overlooked by the District Court and the Court of Appeal which authorised his  <mask>. This was further reinforced by the Supreme Court’s decision of 26 November 2010. He also questioned the quality of the assurances given by the United States authorities by way of diplomatic notes: the only responsible authority for giving such assurances should have been the Attorney General. The applicant invited the Court to disregard the New York Court of Appeals’ judgments since the crimes with which he was charged were federal crimes and that case-law did not therefore apply. The applicant’s lawyer asked the Court to disregard the hearing record of 19 July 2011 as having been extracted under violence and ill-treatment (see paragraph 41 above).


60.  The applicants complained under Article 2 of the Convention, read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under its Article 1 to “secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, that Germany did not provide for an adequate or effective official investigation into their father’s death. They further complained that the German authorities had refused to allow U.’s  <mask> to face trial in the United Kingdom. They relied in this respect on the procedural obligations inherent in Article 2 § 1 which provides in its first sentence:


127.  The applicant maintained that the requirements of Article 5 § 1 did not dispense the State from fulfilling its international obligations regarding  <mask>, since such a ground for detention was clearly provided for in Article 5 § 1(f), which only required the detention to be in accordance with a procedure prescribed by the domestic legislation. The applicant submitted that the Minsk Convention did not provide for such a procedure. He further stated that his detention, from the moment of his apprehension on 23 August 2004 until the present date, lacked a legal basis, had been groundless and in breach of the procedure prescribed by law. He stated that his detention until 16 September 2004 should fall within the ambit of Article 5 § 1(c) of the Convention and after that date – it should be examined under Article 5 § 1(f).


155.  The applicant initially complained under Article 5 § 5 that he did not have an enforceable right to compensation as regards the violation of his rights under Article 5 §§ 1(c), (e) and (f), 2, 3 and 4 of the Convention. In particular, he mentioned that domestic law made no provision for compensation for unlawful detention pending  <mask>. Article 5 § 5 provides:


105.  The Government relied on the reasoning of the House of Lords in Wellington and the Canadian Supreme Court in Burns and Ferris (see paragraphs 34–42 and 44 and 45 above). On the basis of those cases, the Government submitted that, in the  <mask> context, a distinction had to be drawn between torture and other forms of ill-treatment. A real risk of torture in the receiving State should be an absolute bar on extradition. However, for all other forms of ill-treatment, it was legitimate to consider the policy objectives pursued by extradition in determining whether the ill-treatment reached the minimum level of severity required by Article 3. This was the appropriate means of resolving the tension that existed between the Court’s judgments in Soering, on the one hand, and Chahal and Saadi, on the other. Article 3 could not be interpreted as meaning that any form of ill-treatment in a non-Contracting State would be sufficient to prevent extradition.


118.  The Government, the applicant and the third party further referred to their arguments with respect to the Government's objection as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. In particular, the third party stated that there were no effective remedies to complain about  <mask> contrary to Articles 2, 3 or 6 of the Convention. They maintained that the law at issue was not sufficiently accessible and precise, failing to avoid risks of arbitrariness. They referred in contrast to the experiences of Poland and the United Kingdom in this area, where the courts, as opposed to the prosecutor's office rule, on requests for extradition. They stated that the courts in the United Kingdom, acting under the Extradition Act 2003, assessed the following issues in assessing the requests for extradition: (a) the rule against double jeopardy; (b) extraneous considerations (whether a person was in fact extradited for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing him on account of his race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions, or whether if extradited he might be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions); (c) passage of time; (d) the person's age; (e) hostage-taking considerations; (f) specialty; (g) the person's earlier extradition to the United Kingdom from different territories; (h) human rights considerations arising from the 1998 Human Rights Act.


154.  The applicant also challenged the remedy in terms of its  <mask>. First of all, the letters sent out by the authorities notifying the issuance of the deportation and detention orders made no mention of the remedies available to challenge their lawfulness. Secondly, although it was possible in view of recent amendments to the relevant domestic legislation to apply for legal aid in deportation and detention cases, this was, as in asylum cases, rarely granted (see paragraphs 72, 76 and 124 above).


61.  The applicant submitted that the RUC investigation into her husband's death was, inter alia, hopelessly inadequate as it failed entirely to explore the possibility of collusion and as the investigating officers were hierarchically linked to those against whom allegations were made. The inquest was also strictly limited in its scope, involving no key witnesses or any persons suspected of involvement in the death and could not provide an effective part of the process of identifying or prosecuting the perpetrators of any unlawful act. As regards the first two Stevens inquiries, neither was concerned with investigating the murder of Patrick Finucane and neither fulfilled the requirements of independence, promptness, public scrutiny or  <mask> to the next-of-kin. The inquiry teams never, for example, made contact with the applicant's family, her husband's firm of solicitors or any of his clients who had reported death threats.


68.  The applicant argued that he had raised the arguments relating to Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention before the national authorities, namely in the temporary asylum procedure (see paragraphs 15 and 22 above). He argued that there was no statutory provision specifically requiring that a pending application for temporary asylum should have automatic suspensive effect vis-à-vis a removal order. The applicant disagreed with the Government, arguing that section 10 of the Refugees Act only concerned a ban on removing a foreigner pending an application for refugee status. The bailiff service in charge of enforcing the removal order had not issued a decision suspending such enforcement, for instance on account of the pending application for temporary asylum. Moreover, the applicant had had difficulties in communicating with his lawyer, which had adversely affected the  <mask> of the temporary asylum procedure.


289.  The Government pointed out, first of all, that the relevant applicants had not adduced any documents proving their title to the houses, or any detailed description of the property allegedly lost by them. The Government argued that it was incumbent on the relevant applicants to have their property rights confirmed under domestic law by the competent national authorities. They further argued that the alleged interference with the relevant applicants’ rights secured by Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been lawful, as the counter-terrorism operation in the Chechen Republic, in the context of which the strikes of 19 October 1999 had been executed, had been launched and carried out on the basis of Presidential Decrees nos. 2137, 2166 and 2155c of 30 November and 9 December 1994 and 23 September 1999 respectively, Governmental Decree no. 1360 of 9 December 1994, and the Suppression of Terrorism Act of 25 July 1998. In the Government’s submission, the aforementioned decrees, except for certain provisions, had been found compatible with the Russian Constitution by the Russian Constitutional Court. The Government insisted that all the aforementioned legal instruments had met the requirements of foreseeability and  <mask>.


402.  The applicants submitted that the deliberate destruction of their homes, property and possessions and the resulting arbitrary  <mask> from their homes and village represented a serious violation of their right to respect for private and family life and of their right to respect for their home, as well as a serious interference with their way of life. They further claimed that the destruction of their homes and family life was part of a practice and that, therefore, they had suffered an aggravated violation of their rights under Article 8 of the Convention.


84.  The applicants complained that their  <mask> to Syria, if carried out, would be in breach of their right to life and the prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, as provided in Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. They also stressed that they had no effective domestic remedies in respect of these violations, in breach of Article 13. The provisions read as follows, in so far as relevant:


59.  The Government argued that the applicant's claim appeared to be connected with the parts of the application relating to Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, which had already been declared inadmissible by the Court. As the applicant's  <mask> had not yet taken place, the Government further found it difficult to understand how damage resulting from a potential violation of Article 2 or 3 could already have been sustained by the applicant.


129.  The applicant did not claim that the general circumstances obtaining in Iran would on their own preclude his return to that country. Moreover, the Court notes that a general situation of violence will not normally in itself entail a violation of Article 3 in the event of an  <mask> to the country in question (see H.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997, §41, Reports 1997‑III). However, the Court has never excluded the possibility that the general situation of violence in a country of destination may be of a sufficient level of intensity as to entail that any removal to it would necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the Court would adopt such an approach only in the most extreme cases of general violence, where there is a real risk of ill-treatment simply because the individual concerned will be exposed to such violence in that country (see Sufi and Elmi, cited above, § 218 and NA. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 115).


90.  The applicants argued that the question of their  <mask> to Syria had been considered and decided primarily within the framework of the administrative proceedings, in which they had submitted extensive documents and arguments pointing to the danger of a violation of Articles 2 and 3 in the event of their return. The judicial decisions of 15 and 16 April and 27 May 2014 had failed to take these arguments into account and had made no effort to dispel them. In the April hearings in the District Court, they had raised their fears of returning to Syria. During the hearing of 27 May 2014, they had submitted extensive and detailed information about the conflict there and the danger they would face if returned. These documents included UNHCR and FMS documents, other relevant information and their own detailed statements. The applicants stressed that L.M. was a stateless Palestinian and was therefore in particular need of international protection, while A.A. and M.A. were from Aleppo, where fierce fighting had been raging since 2013. A.M specified in addition that several of his family members had been killed by the opposition forces. Following the decision taken at that hearing, the decisions to expel them had entered into force.


143.  The Government disputed the allegations. They were of the opinion that since the  <mask> order remained valid, but was only temporarily stopped through the application of interim measures by the Court, the authorities still had lawful grounds to detain the applicants pending expulsion. They pointed out that the applicants’ illegal residence in Russia was weighted towards maintaining detention as a measure to ensure compliance with the domestic court order. They also pointed out that the relevant provisions of the Code of Administrative Offences did not allow for another measure of restraint, and that there were therefore no grounds for the applicants’ release while the expulsion order remained in force (see paragraph 62 above). The Government were of the opinion that while no time-limit for the applicants’ detention had been stipulated, the maximum term of enforcement of an administrative penalty was two years. The applicants were able to seek a supervisory review of the expulsion and ensuing detention orders if there was a significant change in their circumstances.


129.  The applicants listed the following elements as the basis for their complaint under this head: verbal abuse and physical violence by the detention centre staff, limited privacy, limited access to an interpreter and legal aid, lack of opportunity to take walks and have outdoor exercise, and a lack of medical treatment. They referred to their complaints and the affidavits made by themselves and to their representatives. They believed that the cumulative effect of these factors amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. They also referred to the Courts’ previous findings of a violation of Article 3 on account of the conditions of confinement in detention centres for foreign nationals pending  <mask> and argued that conditions there, as a rule, were substandard to the requirements of the Convention.


51.  The Government submitted that Article 2 of the Convention did not apply in the circumstances of the present case. They maintained that the applicants were no longer victims of a violation of the aforementioned provision following the redress provided by the authorities, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. They further noted that in the case of D. v. the United Kingdom (application no. 30240/96, 2 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑III), which concerned the attempted  <mask> of an AIDS sufferer to St. Kitts where he would have been deprived of the medical treatment he was receiving in the United Kingdom, the Court had examined the complaints of the applicant under Article 3 of the Convention rather than Article 2.


196.  The Government submitted that the present case had to be distinguished from the cases cited by the applicants. Firstly, the applicants had never been removed since they had themselves decided to return to Serbia. Secondly, the decision taken by the authorities following their asylum application, even if it only concerned the determination of the responsible State and accordingly ruled out any examination of the application on the merits, aimed to ensure their transfer to France, a country in which they had not presented an arguable claim that they would be victims of treatment contrary to Article 3 and not be provided with the conditions necessary to have their fears examined. Where foreign nationals did not show that their return would have potentially irreversible consequences, it was not imperative, in order for a remedy to be effective, that it should have automatic suspensive effect but only that they should have an effective possibility of challenging the  <mask> order and of having the relevant issues examined with sufficient procedural safeguards and thoroughness by an appropriate domestic forum offering adequate guarantees of independence and impartiality (see De Souza Ribeiro v. France [GC], no. 22689/07, § 83, ECHR 2012), which was not disputed by the applicants in the present case.


376.  The applicant further complained under Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the destruction of his and the Orhans' home, property and possessions represented a serious violation of their right to respect for their private and family lives and their homes and of their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. He also argued that his  <mask> from his home, village and community represented a separate and serious violation of his rights under these provisions. The Government disputed that there was any such military operation in Deveboyu as alleged or at all.


86.  The Government further argued that during the administrative  <mask> proceedings, notably during the court hearings, the applicants had only provided general and summary information about the reasons allegedly preventing their return. The documents to support the claims had only been submitted for the hearing of 27 May 2014 in the Kaluga Regional Court, and had either been outdated, such as “Update I” of December 2012 relating to the UNHCR document “International Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic”, or so general in nature that they had failed to corroborate the individual circumstances of each applicant. By way of example, the Government submitted copies of two court decisions where Syrian nationals had been able to obtain reversal of the expulsion orders (see paragraphs 71 and 73 above).


144.  The applicants stressed that the court decisions did not stipulate the maximum length of this detention. Other than the requirement that the  <mask> order be executed within the two-year time-limit, the Code of Administrative Offences did not contain any provisions governing the length of detention pending expulsion, and therefore lacked legal certainty. Moreover, there was a conflict between the position of the Federal Bailiff Service, which was of the opinion that the expulsion could not be carried out and sought to amend the relevant court decisions, and the court decisions confirming the validity of the measure ordered (see paragraphs 15-17 above). Lastly, the applicants claimed that such a long stay in detention significantly exceeded the maximum custodial sentence permissible under the Code of Administrative Offences, and that their detention pending expulsion was of a punitive rather than preventive nature.


68.  The applicants alleged a breached of Article 3 of the Convention on account of their forced  <mask> from their village. They had mentally suffered as a result of the actions of the members of security forces, who had burned their family houses. Under Article 8 of the Convention, they complained about the destruction of their property. Furthermore, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, they maintained that the destruction of their houses and their forced eviction from the village had violated their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. The provisions of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention are set out above at paragraph 59, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides, insofar as relevant, as follows:


81.  The Government submitted that the circumstances of Y.C.’s death had also been the subject of ensuing administrative proceedings, namely to examine the question of whether Y.C.’s death had been caused by a lack of adequate medical treatment while in detention pending  <mask>. The IAP had based its decision on findings which had relied on the results of two oral hearings during which the police officers concerned, a further medical expert and the detainee sharing a cell with Y.C. had been questioned extensively about the course of Y.C.’s hunger strike and his medical treatment. Moreover, the Human Rights Advisory Board had carried out an independent review of the police investigation and published the results in a report (see paragraph 27 above).


240.  The applicant, relying on the Čonka judgment (cited above), submitted that he had been the subject of a collective  <mask> operation. In his view, the intention of the authorities had been to deal with a group of individuals, namely Syrian Kurds, collectively. This had been evident from all the circumstances of the case. The relevant meetings that had been held by the authorities concerned the handling of the situation of Syrian Kurdish failed asylum-seekers. The Minister of the Interior had given instructions to proceed with the deportation of Syrian Kurdish failed asylum-seekers with the exception of those who were Ajanib or Mahtoumeen. The police had been instructed to use discreet methods of arrest and execute the deportation orders starting with the leaders of the protest. As a result, the police had carried out an operation on 11 June 2010 against the whole group of protesters, including women and children. According to the Government only those whose asylum applications had still been pending were released. The rest had been kept in detention pending deportation. However, in reality, the asylum procedure had not been completed for the applicant as well as a number of other protesters whom the Government had intended to deport. If it had not been for the application of Rule 39 by the Court they would all have been deported. In fact, some of the protesters had been released by the authorities following the application of Rule 39 and had had their deportation orders annulled. The applicant also noted that the authorities had issued deportation orders against stateless Syrian Kurds and that some of the asylum-seekers concerned had had their asylum applications dismissed purely on procedural grounds without having benefited from an examination of the merits of their claim.


59.  The Government further submitted that the domestic courts had found that the exclusion order against the applicant had been issued by a competent authority in accordance with the procedure  <mask> and had been based on sufficient reasons. Given that the applicant was sought by the Chinese authorities on suspicion of murder, had been fined several times in Russia for driving offences and had lived in Russia unlawfully with an unlawfully issued passport, there had been sufficient reasons to find that he represented a real threat to public order and security.


127.  The applicant maintained that the requirements of Article 5 § 1 did not dispense the State from fulfilling its international obligations regarding extradition, since such a ground for detention was clearly provided for in Article 5 § 1(f), which only required the detention to be in accordance with a procedure prescribed by the domestic legislation. The applicant submitted that the Minsk Convention did not provide for such a procedure. He further stated that his detention, from the moment of his apprehension on 23 August 2004 until the present date, lacked a legal basis, had been groundless and in breach of the procedure  <mask>. He stated that his detention until 16 September 2004 should fall within the ambit of Article 5 § 1(c) of the Convention and after that date – it should be examined under Article 5 § 1(f).


138.  The applicant submitted, in particular, that the authorities who arrested his son had not acted in accordance with a procedure  <mask>. He further argued that the authorities' failure to create, maintain and produce adequate documentation in relation to his son's arrest amounted to a violation of the lawfulness requirement inherent in Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


90.  The Government further denied that the domestic law in any way failed to comply with the requirements of Article 2. They argued that the procedural aspect of this provision was satisfied by the preliminary investigation and the criminal proceedings. The authorities had taken the steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident. Witness testimonies were taken, autopsies, deciphering of the police radio communications and examining of forensic evidences were secured. These assured the fundamental purpose of the procedural obligation, in that they provided for effective accountability for the use of lethal force by State agents. They submitted that the available procedures provided the necessary effectiveness, independence, and transparency by way of  <mask>.


289.  The Government pointed out, first of all, that the relevant applicants had not adduced any documents proving their title to the houses, or any detailed description of the property allegedly lost by them. The Government argued that it was incumbent on the relevant applicants to have their property rights confirmed under domestic law by the competent national authorities. They further argued that the alleged interference with the relevant applicants’ rights secured by Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been lawful, as the counter-terrorism operation in the Chechen Republic, in the context of which the strikes of 19 October 1999 had been executed, had been launched and carried out on the basis of Presidential Decrees nos. 2137, 2166 and 2155c of 30 November and 9 December 1994 and 23 September 1999 respectively, Governmental Decree no. 1360 of 9 December 1994, and the Suppression of Terrorism Act of 25 July 1998. In the Government’s submission, the aforementioned decrees, except for certain provisions, had been found compatible with the Russian Constitution by the Russian Constitutional Court. The Government insisted that all the aforementioned legal instruments had met the requirements of  <mask> and accessibility.


118.  The applicant maintained that her son had been ill-treated during his apprehension as he had been ordered to get half undressed, to kneel on the rails and to stay in this position for over two hours while his hands had been tied behind his back with iron wire. She further contended that the State had failed to conduct an  <mask> into these events. The applicant also contended that the anguish and suffering she had endured amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.


72.  The applicants submitted that Article 2 of the Convention had been violated in respect of their mother and close relative, Nura Luluyeva. They submitted that the circumstances of her detention and the discovery of her body in a mass grave indicated that she had been killed by federal forces. They further submitted that there had been a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 2 since no  <mask> had been carried out into the circumstances of her detention and murder. They relied on Article 2 of the Convention, which provides:


92.  The Government maintained that the domestic authorities had conducted all necessary investigative actions and carried out an  <mask> into the applicant’s complaints. They further stated that the repeated quashing of the decisions refusing to initiate criminal proceedings, as well as the instructions given by the court and superior prosecutors to the investigating officer, indicated that the domestic authorities had intended to carry out an effective investigation into the applicant’s complaints.


102.  The applicant complained under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention that he had been beaten up on 28 October 2007 and 14 February 2008 while in State custody and that there had been no  <mask> into these incidents. The Court will examine the applicant’s complaints from the standpoint of the State’s negative and positive obligations flowing from Article 3, which reads as follows:


35.  The applicant, who showed signs of injury after spending time in police custody, stated on his arrival at the SIZO that he had been beaten up by police officers of the Kanavinskiy RUVD on 15 September 2007 (see paragraph 13 above). The authorities were thus made promptly and sufficiently aware of his allegation of ill‑treatment. This was supported by the detention facilities’ records of his injuries (see paragraphs 12 and 13 above). It was therefore credible and gave rise to the State’s obligation to carry out an  <mask>.


48.  The Government submitted that the incident at Buca prison was serious. They pointed out that the prisoners had piled up metal cupboards behind the dormitory door and had broken windows, burned beds and used metal handles from the cupboards to attack the gendarmes and prison officers. The Government maintained that Mehmet Kurnaz had actively taken part in the riot which took place ten days after he had been transferred to the prison. They stated that he had received all the necessary medical treatment immediately after he was injured. The Government further submitted that an  <mask> had been conducted into the circumstances surrounding the incident in Buca prison.


17.  The Government contended that the authorities had complied with the requirement of  <mask> in the present case. They further stated that the applicant had complained to the prosecutor’s office after a substantial delay – about three years after she had been diagnosed with hypothyroidism in 1996 (see paragraph 6 above). Thus, it had been impossible to establish whether she had been treated with radioactive iodine and whether this could have resulted in the destruction of her thyroid.


68.  The applicants complained that it was very likely that Abdulkasim Zaurbekov had been subjected to torture and inhuman treatment and that no  <mask> had been conducted in this connection. They also submitted that they had suffered severe mental distress and anguish in connection with their relative’s disappearance and on account of the State’s failure to conduct a thorough investigation into the matter. The applicants referred to Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


125.  The applicant claimed that the authorities had failed in their obligation to carry out an  <mask> into the circumstances of her husband's disappearance. She argued that the investigation had fallen short of the requirements of domestic law and the Convention standards. In particular, it had been pending for over six years but had not achieved any tangible results so far, having been repeatedly suspended and reopened. Furthermore, the investigating authorities had failed to inform the applicant of the decisions to adjourn and reopen the investigation, or of its progress. Throughout the investigation the applicant had requested to be granted crime victim status, but had received no replies to those requests. In support of her argument regarding the inefficiency of the investigation, the applicant also referred to the Government's refusal to submit a copy of the file of the criminal case concerning her husband's disappearance. In her observations submitted after the Court's decision as to the admissibility of the application the applicant contended that she still had not been granted the victim status.


74.  The applicants further complained that there was no  <mask> into the death of Kamil Menteşe, Yusuf Bozkuş, Reşit Demirhan and Abdulvahap Maço, or into their forced eviction and destruction of their family homes and possessions. In this respect, they alleged that they were denied access to a court, in violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in relevant part, provides as follows:


93.  The Government contended that the circumstances of the present case were different from those in the case of Kaverzin, in which the Court had held that that the procedures of appeal to hierarchically superior prosecutors and to the courts had not been proved to be capable of providing adequate redress in respect of complaints of ill-treatment by the police and in <mask> (see Kaverzin v. Ukraine, no. 23893/03, § 97, 15 May 2012). More specifically, the Government observed that in the Kaverzin case the Court had criticised the prosecutors’ reluctance to take all reasonable steps, in a prompt and expeditious manner, to establish the facts and circumstances pertinent to complaints of ill-treatment and to secure relevant evidence (§ 175). In the Government’s opinion, the present case was different because the prosecution authorities had initiated a criminal investigation into the second applicant’s complaint without delay, thus putting in place an appropriate framework for all the necessary investigative measures.


148.  The Government contended that the complaints should be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, as the applicants had failed to substantiate their allegations before the Court. They also submitted that no evidence had been obtained in the domestic investigations to suggest that the applicants’ relatives had been held under State control, or were dead. They pointed out that the mere fact that the investigative measures taken had not produced any specific results, or had yielded only limited results, did not mean that there had been any omissions on the part of the investigative authorities. They claimed that all necessary steps were being taken to comply with the obligation to conduct an  <mask>.


33.  The applicant complained that on 15 June 2001 he had been subjected to treatment incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention and that the authorities had not carried out an  <mask> into those events. The Court will examine this complaint from the standpoint of the State’s negative and positive obligations flowing from Article 3, which reads as follows:


44.  The applicant complained that the Pravieniškės Prison authorities had failed to protect his physical well-being when he was serving his sentence. As a result, he had been seriously injured but had received no compensation for the damage sustained. The applicant also argued that the State had failed to conduct an  <mask> into the circumstances of the attack on him and his injury in the prison.


191.  The applicants claimed EUR 100,000 each in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the suffering they had endured as a result of the loss of their relatives, the failure to carry out an  <mask> into the killings and the indifference shown by the authorities towards their grief. In addition, the third applicant claimed a similar sum of EUR 100,000 for each of her five daughters who had suffered as a result of their father's killing.


33.  The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police officer, R., and that there had been no adequate or  <mask> of his complaints. The applicant further complained under Article 13 of the Convention of the absence of effective remedies for his complaints. The relevant Articles read as follows:


27.  The applicant submitted that he had exhausted the domestic remedies available to him and that he had lodged the complaint with the Court within the time-limit set by Article 35 § 1. He made reference to the Court’s case-law in this regard, with particular emphasis on the Court’s approach to applying the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism. The applicant submitted that he had officially asked the judicial police officer in charge of investigating his brother’s death to carry out an investigation with a view to clarifying the circumstances of his brother’s death. This had constituted a formal request to bring charges under Article 59 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In addition, the mere fact that his brother had died, had given rise ipso facto to an obligation on the part of the authorities under Article 2 of the Convention to carry out an  <mask>.


128.  The Government contended that the domestic investigations had obtained no evidence that the detainees had been held under State control or that the missing persons were dead. They further noted that the mere fact that the investigative measures had not produced any specific results, or had produced only limited ones, did not mean that there had been any omissions on the part of the investigative authorities. They claimed that all necessary measures were being taken to comply with the obligation to conduct an  <mask>.


120.  The applicants maintained their submissions. They stressed, in particular, that they feared for their lives. In their observations of 7 April 2008 on the admissibility and merits of the case they also complained for the first time that Idris Gakiyev had been ill-treated by Russian servicemen prior to his death and that there had been no  <mask> into the ill-treatment.


45.  The applicants complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the first applicant’s life had been put at risk and that he had been ill-treated by police officers, who had beaten him with truncheons, had punched and kicked in the face, head, stomach and back. They further complained under this Article that there had been no  <mask> into his allegations. Relying on Article 13, they complained that there had been no effective remedy in respect of their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention. Lastly, they complained under Article 6 that they had been denied the right of access to court due to the failure of the public prosecutor to reject the criminal complaint by means of a formal decision. The Court considers that this last complaint falls to be examined under Article 13 of the Convention, as it concerns a particular aspect of the right to an effective remedy under this provision. It further considers that the applicants’ complaint concerning the risk to the first applicant’s life should be examined under Article 2 of the Convention. Articles 2 (the applicability of which the Court will examine, see below), 3 and 13 of the Convention read as follows:


313.  The Government contended, on the one hand, that Article 2 of the Convention was not applicable to the applicants’ complaints concerning the disappearance of their relatives and that their complaints under this head must be examined under Article 5 of the Convention. To this end they referred to the case of Kurt v. Turkey (25 May 1998, §§ 101‑09, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑III). On the other hand, they submitted that the complaints should be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, as the applicants had failed to substantiate their allegations before the Court. Further, the Government submitted that the domestic investigations had obtained no evidence that the applicants’ relatives had been held under State control, or that they were dead. They further noted that the mere fact that the investigative measures employed had not produced any specific results, or had yielded only limited results, did not mean that there had been any omissions on the part of the investigative authorities. They claimed that all necessary steps were being taken to comply with the obligation to conduct an  <mask>.


37.  The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that she had been ill-treated while in police custody. She alleged that she had been beaten with a truncheon, hosed down with cold water and banged against walls, which had brought about intense mental suffering leading to a suicide attempt, considering in particular her age at the material time. The applicant also maintained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention that the respondent State had failed to conduct an  <mask> into her allegations of ill-treatment as her request to initiate criminal proceedings against the accused police officers had not been dealt with by an independent and impartial tribunal.


90.  The Government submitted that the respondent State had undertaken a prompt, thorough and  <mask> into the applicants’ allegations of ill-treatment. They did not contest that the prison guards had used excessive force, but considered it justified. Following the Ombudsman’s recommendation to that effect, disciplinary proceedings had been instituted against three prison guards who had ultimately been fined for the use of excessive force. The applicants’ families, the Ombudsman and the NGOs with an interest in this case were duly informed about the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings.


212.  The applicant’s representatives alleged that his disappearance and possible unlawful removal from Russia, the failure of the Russian authorities to put in place the necessary protective measures, and the lack of an  <mask> into the matter had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39. These claims, substantively focusing on a violation of the right to individual application, fall to be examined under Article 34 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


114.  The applicants complained that as a result of their relative's killing and the State's failure to investigate it properly they had endured profound mental suffering. Furthermore, referring to the forensic expert examination report, the applicants alleged that Umar Zabiyev had sustained an injury to his lower jaw prior to his death and that no investigation had been carried out in respect of his ill-treatment. Lastly, the first applicant complained that on 10 June 2003 she had been seriously wounded by State agents and that no  <mask> had been conducted into the incident. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:


112.  The applicant argued that his son's disappearance and presumed death and the failure of the authorities to conduct an  <mask> and to provide an effective remedy were due to the fact that he and his son were of Kurdish origin. According to the applicant, there was a discriminatory practice by the police and other State security forces in the south-east region of Turkey which singled out members of the Kurdish population for enforced or involuntary disappearances and for assassination in police custody.


93.  The applicant submitted that the authorities had failed to carry out an  <mask> into her complaints concerning her husband's disappearance. She argued that the location, nature and circumstances of her husband's disappearance were sufficient by themselves to warrant a full investigation. She also alleged that, at the material time, there was an official tolerance of the lack of effective remedies in south-east Turkey, a fact that demonstrated a systematic practice in relation to complaints of this nature.


77.  The applicant argued that the compensation awarded by the Warsaw Regional Court’s judgment of 3 March 2010 did not constitute a sufficient redress. He maintained that only a prompt and  <mask> would have satisfied the requirements of Articles 3 and 13. In addition, the outcome of the criminal and civil proceedings in his case did not have a sufficient deterrent effect on the individuals concerned.


34. The applicant maintained his allegations that he had been ill-treated by policemen during his visit to the Prilep police station to discuss issues related to the petrol station. He further submitted that the Government’s arguments were contradictory. The public prosecutor had not taken any effective measure to discover who the perpetrators were, although, as was evident from the Sector’s records, the Ministry had been aware of their identity. No statement had been taken from the eyewitnesses put forward. No  <mask> had been carried out with respect to Mr P.R., whose identity was known to the trial court.


85.  The applicant alleged under Article 5 of the Convention that his son had been arbitrarily deprived of his liberty since his detention had not been recorded and that there had been no prompt or  <mask> into his allegations. He maintained under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention that his son had been denied access to a lawyer and contact with members of his family while in police custody. In his post-admissibility observations, the applicant further submitted under Article 8 of the Convention that the authorities had withheld information from him which might have shed light on the circumstances of and reasons for his son’s abduction.


81.  The applicant claimed EUR 20,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused to him. He submitted that he had been suffering as a result of his ill-treatment and continued to have health problems despite his young age, and that there had not been an  <mask>, also that he had been threatened and obstructed in the course of the criminal proceedings against the perpetrators. The sum awarded to him domestically (MDL 15,000, the equivalent of EUR 997 at the time), was completely disproportionate to his suffering and the delay and small increments in which he receives even that sum only added to his humiliation.


88.  The applicants complained that no  <mask> had been conducted by the national authorities into the killing of their relatives. In that connection they referred to the document drawn up by the Ovacık prosecutor on 18 June 2005, in which it was stated that that prosecutor had not gone to the area where their relatives had been killed because of security concerns. The applicants pointed out that that document clearly disproved the Government’s submissions according to which “immediately after the armed clash had ended the prosecutor had gone to the incident area, conducted an on-site inspection, prepared an incident report and opened an investigation” (see paragraph 17 above and paragraph 103 below). The applicants questioned the validity of the prosecutor’s concerns for his security in connection with a visit to an area where the operation had ended and which was under the control of the soldiers.


65.  The Government acknowledged a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the absence of an  <mask> into the applicant’s allegations of rape. They observed that the courts of the Dagestan Republic had repeatedly criticised the ineffectiveness of the inquiry carried out by the investigative authorities and held that the latter’s acts and omissions were in breach of domestic law.


42.  The Government submitted that the facts of the case as a whole did not support the allegations that the injuries observed on the applicant’s body, which in their opinion had not attained the level of severity proscribed by Article 3, were caused by a treatment for which the Government bore responsibility. They submitted that bearing in mind the applicant’s reckless conduct from the moment of his arrest, it was likely that the injuries noted in the medical reports had been self-inflicted. Moreover, if any force had been used against the applicant by the police, such use of force had been proportionate and had been made strictly necessary by the applicant’s own aggressive conduct. The Government further contended that an  <mask> had been immediately carried out in respect of the applicant’s allegations and that the authorities had taken the necessary steps to identify and prosecute the alleged perpetrators. However, the mere fact that the outcome of the proceedings had not been favourable for the applicant did not mean that the remedy in question had been inadequate.


97.  The applicants next alleged that their relatives had been ill-treated after having been detained, which constituted a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. They referred to the medical certificate of death issued on 8 October 2001 in respect of Umar Musayev, confirming that there had been multiple stab wounds and bruises on the latter's head and chest. They further submitted that the authorities had failed to conduct an  <mask> in this respect, in violation of their procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention.


88.  The Government argued that there had been an  <mask> in response to the first applicant’s complaint about his alleged ill-treatment on 30 June 2004. They distinguished the present case from Labita v. Italy on the facts, stating that the actions of the Cēsis District Police Department had never been the subject of explicit media attention. Moreover, the applicants’ allegations had given rise to certain doubts as to their credibility. In this regard the Government referred to Avşar v. Turkey (no. 25657/94, ECHR 2001‑VII (extracts)), noting that the obligation under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention was one of means, not result (ibid., § 394): an effective investigation could well end with a finding that no violation had taken place.


140.  The applicant argued that she had provided sufficient evidence to prove that her husband, Mehmet Şen, had been abducted, tortured and killed by security forces. She requested the Court to find that the death of her husband and the authorities’ failure to carry out an  <mask> were in violation of Articles 2, 3, 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention.


391.  The Government contended that the domestic investigations had found no evidence to suggest that the applicants’ relatives had been held under State control or that they were dead. They further noted that the mere fact that the investigative measures had not produced any specific results, or had given only limited ones, did not mean that there were any omissions on the part of the investigative authorities. They claimed that all necessary steps were being taken to comply with theobligation to conduct an  <mask>.


19.  The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been subjected to ill-treatment during his arrest and subsequently during his custody at the Security Directorate Building. He also alleged that the domestic authorities had failed to carry out an  <mask> capable of leading to the punishment of those responsible for the treatment. In respect of his complaints, the applicant relied on Articles 3, 6 and 13 of the Convention.


127.  The Government considered that the domestic authorities had conducted an  <mask>, as of the time of occurrence of the events, with a view to ascertaining the cause of the applicant’s injuries and identifying those responsible. They recalled the different inquiries made, emphasising the intensive involvement of both the judiciary and the public prosecutors. They submitted that the length of the investigation had not been excessive given, in particular, the number and complexity of many of the expert assessments conducted.


169.  The applicants Sonia Biga, Augustin Biga, Carol Ciorcan, Sorin Ciorcan, Costel Ciorcan, Edith Csiki (Biga) and Ildiko Kalanyos (Biga) claimed jointly a total amount of 2,000,000,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage including costs and expenses for the pain and suffering caused by the use of excessive force against their mother and the lack of a subsequent  <mask>.


159.  The Government submitted that the circumstances in which the applicant had sustained an injury had been examined within the framework of the criminal case against him. His allegations of ill-treatment had received a prompt and due response. The investigation into his criminal case had been carried out by authorities, the Ararat Regional Prosecutor’s Office and the Yerevan City Prosecutor’s Office, which had no hierarchical or institutional connection with the Artashat Police Department and were therefore independent and impartial bodies. The authorities had taken all possible measures to identify those responsible, including numerous interrogations, confrontations and medical examinations. Moreover, an additional medical examination had been ordered specifically upon the applicant’s own motion. Furthermore, all the motions and requests filed by the applicant had been treated with necessary promptness. The investigation had been open, which was supported by the fact that the applicant had had access to all the necessary materials in his case. In sum, the authorities had complied with their positive obligation under Article 3 to carry out an  <mask>.


29.  The Government submitted that the police officers had had to use reasonable force against the applicant in order to effect a lawful arrest and to take him to the police station, because he had insulted them and resisted arrest. Furthermore the applicant’s allegations were ill-founded, given that the findings contained in the medical report dated 29 October 1997 were inconsistent with his allegations. In the Government’s opinion, had the applicant been beaten up by six police officers, as he alleged, he would have sustained serious injuries. Finally, they claimed that an  <mask> did not necessarily mean a favourable outcome for the applicant. Nonetheless, the authorities had carried out an effective investigation into the applicant’s allegations and had concluded that they were unsubstantiated.


117.  The applicants claimed that the authorities had failed in their obligation to carry out an  <mask> into the circumstances of Saydi Malsagov’s disappearance. They argued that the investigation had fallen short of the requirements of domestic law and the Convention standards. In particular, it had been pending for six years without any tangible results, having been repeatedly suspended and resumed. The main investigative steps had been taken after the communication of the present application to the Government, which, according to the applicants, once again proved the overall ineffectiveness of the investigation. The first applicant had not been granted victim status until two months after the opening of the investigation; she had not been promptly informed of all developments in the case.


63.  The Government alleged that the available domestic remedies in respect of the above complaint had not been exhausted when their observations had been lodged (23 December 2013). First of all, at that time the criminal proceedings against the co-owners of the applicant’s flat, instituted in 2007, had been still pending at the material time; thus it had been premature to prejudge their outcome. Secondly, had the applicant been unsatisfied with the manner in which the law-enforcement authorities had conducted these proceedings or generally responded to her complaints, it had been open for her to lodge a complaint against them seeking damages for delayed and in <mask>. Finally, it had always been open to the applicant to institute private criminal prosecution proceedings to seek punishment of the alleged offenders for the episodes of violent behaviour, in particular, under Articles 125 and 126 of the Criminal Code. She had not done so until July 2006, and even then she had failed to pursue her claim.


58.  The applicant interpreted the Government’s stance as an admission that, four years after the events in question, they were not in possession of any factual information on his detention, even though between 18 June and 23 November 2000 he had lodged no fewer than nine complaints to various authorities, including the Moscow City Prosecutor, the Minister of the Interior, the Prosecutor General and the Head of the Moscow Department of the Interior. However, these complaints had not prompted any  <mask> or the punishment of those responsible. No criminal proceedings had been instituted or inquiry carried out. Moreover, in the subsequent civil proceedings for compensation, the domestic courts had refused his requests for information concerning his detention and permission to interview witnesses. The applicant considered that an investigation that had been started only after the communication of his application by the Court, by which time a significant period had elapsed, could not be effective or produce any tangible results.


71.  The Government denied the factual basis of the applicant’s allegation that his son had been killed while in prison. They further submitted that the investigation carried out by the security directorate and the public prosecutor’s office in Diyarbakır into his death had revealed that Cemal Uçar had committed suicide. They maintained that the authorities had not been and could not have been aware of the psychological problems of Cemal Uçar, especially because he had committed suicide only fifteen days after he was placed in Diyarbakır E‑type prison. The Government finally submitted that the domestic authorities fulfilled their obligation to conduct an  <mask> into the death of Cemal Uçar.


30.  The applicant argued that she had retained the status of a victim in respect of the above complaints because, apart from the violations being acknowledged, she had not been provided with adequate redress. Notably, no  <mask> into her allegations of ill-treatment had been conducted, and the compensation award had been too small to provide redress for her suffering. The applicant further contended that she could not be blamed for having failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of her allegations regarding the damages awarded being insufficient: despite her non-compliance with the procedural formalities, the Higher Administrative Court should have provided her with additional time to allow her to rectify all the procedural shortcomings in her appeal on points of law.


322.  The applicants did not agree with the Government and maintained that the prison authorities had interfered with their correspondence to the Court and tried to put pressure on them to discourage them from pursuing their applications. The applicants alleged that their correspondence and complaints did not reach the domestic authorities they were sent to, as they were intercepted by the prison administration, forwarded to the prosecutor's office and eventually destroyed. No  <mask> into these allegations had ever been conducted by the General Prosecutor's Office and the local prosecutor's office.


40.  The applicants argued that they had complied with the six-month rule and there had been no excessive and unexplained delays in the submission of their application to the Court. In particular, they submitted that after the initiation of the criminal investigation they had had no reason to doubt its effectiveness. They pointed out that the armed conflict in the region had led them to believe that delays in the investigation were inevitable. Moreover, owing to their lack of legal knowledge and funds to hire a lawyer, and in the absence of information concerning the Convention standards for an  <mask>, they had been unable to assess the effectiveness of the pending criminal proceedings. Referring to Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, the applicants further argued that the six-month rule did not apply to “continuing situations” such as cases of enforced disappearances.


78.  The applicant relied on Article 3 of the Convention, submitting that Mr Abu Aliyev had been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention and that no  <mask> had been conducted in this respect. She also complained that as a result of her husband's disappearance and the State's failure to investigate it properly she had endured mental suffering in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 reads:


106.  The applicant also submitted that the authorities had not carried out an  <mask> of those events. The first failure in that respect had been that the applicant’s injuries had not been properly documented. It was true that the applicant had been examined on 2 June 1999 by Dr D.D., but she had not been a qualified forensic specialist, had carried out the examination solely for the purpose of checking whether the applicant needed medical treatment, and had noted only the injuries brought to her attention by the applicant. Even though Dr D.D. had noted that the applicant’s injuries were indicative of ill‑treatment, the applicant had been examined by a forensic specialist as late as fifty‑three days after his arrest. A full examination, conducted in the presence of attesting witnesses and an investigator, and accompanied by photographs, had not taken place until the fifty‑sixth day after his arrest. That delay had been deliberate: there was evidence that the investigator had tried to put off the applicant’s medical examination, which had made it necessary for his superiors to specifically take measures to make that happen.


43.  The Government first noted that the applicant had not been arrested and taken into custody, but merely kept under police surveillance in accordance with Article 5(b)(4) of the Regulations on Apprehension, Custody and Taking of Statements in force at the material time on account of her refusal to disclose her identity. Secondly, they maintained that the applicant had failed to submit any concrete evidence to suggest that she had been ill-treated or even handcuffed at any point during her detention at the Bahçelievler police headquarters. The Government stressed in this regard that, upon her release from police custody, the applicant's family had not even attempted to obtain a medical report in support of her allegations of ill-treatment. The Government further argued that the applicant had been extremely calm and quiet during the period she had spent under police surveillance and only started acting in a disorderly manner upon seeing her family at the police station. The applicant's family had already acknowledged that she had psychological problems and that this was not her first attempt to run away from home. In these circumstances, the State authorities could not be held accountable for the applicant's self-destructive actions, especially her suicide attempt after she was handed over to her family. The Government lastly contended that an  <mask> had been immediately carried out in respect of the applicant's allegations.


102.  The applicants claimed that the authorities had failed in their obligation to carry out an  <mask> into the circumstances of their relatives' disappearance. They argued that the investigation had fallen short of the requirements of domestic law and the Convention standards. In particular, it had been pending for several years but had not brought any tangible results thus far, having been repeatedly suspended and reopened. Furthermore, the investigating authorities had failed to inform the applicants of the decisions concerning the adjournment and reopening of the investigation or its progress. The applicants' numerous requests to the authorities throughout the investigation had remained unanswered or only produced standard replies. The applicants had not been granted access to the case file. In support of their argument regarding the ineffectiveness of the investigation, the applicants also referred to the Government's refusal to submit a copy of the file in the criminal case concerning their relatives' disappearance. The applicants also argued that the investigation could not have met the requirements of Article 2 of the Convention since civilian prosecuting authorities were not competent to conduct investigations involving the military and military prosecuting authorities could not be considered to be independent from the military.


63.  The applicant complained of two distinct violations of Article 3 of the Convention by prison staff while he was in Jelgava prison. First of all, he claimed to have been subjected to various unlawful disciplinary penalties; he particularly emphasised the illegal and unjust character of the last of these, imposed on 18 July 2000. Secondly, he complained of a brutal assault by prison guards which, according to him, took place on an unspecified date at the end of 2000 while he was again placed in a disciplinary cell. He claimed to have suffered serious injuries as a result and alleged that no adequate medical treatment had been provided to him. Finally, he alleged that there had been no  <mask> into his allegations of ill-treatment.


84.  The Government contended that the complaint should be rejected as unsubstantiated, as the investigation into the disappearance had not obtained any evidence that State agents had killed Mr Aslan Dudayev, that Mr Ali Dudayev had been abducted by them or that he was dead. They further noted that all the necessary steps were being taken to comply with the obligation to conduct an  <mask> into the killing and the abduction.


26.  The Government contested the applicant's allegations. In particular, they submitted that the physical findings noted in the medical reports did not attain a sufficient level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. In addition, the Government maintained that an  <mask> had been conducted into the circumstances of the case. In this connection, they referred to the steps undertaken by the public prosecutor.


68.  The Government also submitted that the domestic authorities had carried out an  <mask>. The public prosecutor’s office heard the parties and all the relevant witnesses, including the witnesses brought by the applicant in support of his allegations. The prosecutor’s office also ordered a forensic medical report and gathered all the relevant medical evidence from all the hospitals which examined the applicant. In addition, it submitted all the available medical evidence to the Superior Review Panel for examination. Moreover, the public prosecutor assessed the evidence in the file, decided that the witness evidence submitted by the applicant was biased because it was contradicted by the remaining evidence available to the file, and dismissed the applicant’s complaint. Furthermore, at the second stage of the proceedings the public prosecutor’s office clarified all the aspects raised by the Court of Cassation in its judgment of 11 May 2005.


89.  The applicant claimed 86,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. He noted that he did not have any evidence of pecuniary damage in the form of medication he had bought to treat his illnesses obtained in detention. As to non-pecuniary damage, he submitted that he had suffered as a result of the ill-treatment, and also as a result of the in <mask>, the inhuman conditions of detention and the failure to provide him with appropriate medical assistance, as well as his unlawful detention and the excessive length of the proceedings against him. He also claimed to have been subjected to additional suffering by the fact that he had feared for his life after complaining about officer R.B.


31.  The applicants alleged that they had been subjected to various forms of torture, including rape, by gendarmes at the Çınar Gendarmerie Station with a view to extracting confessions concerning their alleged involvement in the PKK. The gendarmes had forced them to sign confession statements which they had not been allowed to read. Furthermore, although they had undergone three medical examinations, all reports stated that they had not had any sexual intercourse and that there was no sign of ill‑treatment. These reports had been written in a suitable manner to preclude any criminal responsibility on the part of the gendarmes and, very strangely, none of them had indicated the name of the medical doctor who had examined them. Lastly, the national authorities had turned a blind eye to their allegations of torture by failing to carry out an  <mask> and had allowed the gendarmes to escape justice.


40.  The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to lodge their application with the Court with due expedition as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The applicants had lacked diligence in voicing their grievances before the relevant domestic authorities in a timely fashion. They ought to have realised that no  <mask> would ensue from their criminal complaint of 10 November 2009, as the prosecutor had readily forwarded it to the court examining the case against the applicants instead of initiating a separate enquiry, and no response had been provided to the complaints lodged throughout the subsequent months. The Government also argued that the criminal proceedings against the applicants had not constituted an effective remedy for their grievances concerning the alleged ill-treatment, as their scope had been limited to the charges brought against the applicants.


42.  The Government submitted that the domestic authorities conducted an  <mask> of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. In particular, the Government noted that following the applicant’s complaint on 9 November 2005 the domestic authorities instituted criminal proceedings. The investigator heard the applicant, two witnesses and A.V. and took all appropriate actions to identify those who had beaten the applicant. Moreover, the investigator ordered a forensic examination for 28 January 2006, at which the applicant failed to appear.


80.  The applicants contested the Government’s statement as incorrect. They pointed out that in fact they had lodged a court complaint about the authorities’ failure to carry out an  <mask> into the events of 27 October 2001, which had yielded no results. The applicants contended in this connection that they were not required to pursue that remedy, since it was ineffective and, in particular, incapable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible, as required by the Court’s settled case-law in relation to complaints under Article 2 of the Convention.


56.  The applicant stressed that public prosecutors, who are exclusively responsible for examining charges of police misconduct, lack sufficient independence and impartiality, given their dual and contradictory functions: they are both parties to and supervisors of criminal proceedings. This resulted in the absence of a thorough and  <mask> into his allegations, which manifested itself in the disregard of the testimonies of his witnesses and his medical evidence and in terminating the case for want of conclusive evidence.


146.  The applicant claimed 60,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage suffered on account of the violations of the Convention in his case. He submitted that he had suffered severe emotional anguish and distress, anxiety and trauma. He had also suffered immense frustration, helplessness and injustice in the face of the indifference that the Russian authorities had demonstrated in his case by refusing to conduct an  <mask> into his complaint.


52.  The applicant submitted to the Court sufficiently detailed information about the investigating authorities’ response to his complaints of police ill-treatment, the authenticity of which the Court has no reason to doubt. Contrary to the Government’s view (see paragraph 45 above), that information, together with the national courts’ decisions taken in the case, can serve a basis for the Court’s assessment of whether the authorities have carried out an  <mask> into the applicant’s serious allegations of police ill-treatment.


38.  The applicant complained that the State had failed to effectively address her complaint of sexual abuse, contrary to Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. However, as the applicant’s complaints were limited to the effectiveness of the criminal proceedings concerning the continuous sexual assault committed against her, the Court considers that it is not necessary in the particular circumstances of the present case, where the offences against the applicant were committed from 1992 until 1994 and therefore at least to a large extent before the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Slovenia on 28 June 1994, to decide whether its temporal jurisdiction also extends to issues under Article 8 (see P.M. v. Bulgaria, no. 49669/07, § 58, 24 January 2012). Having already held that Article 3 provides sufficient legal basis for the State’s duty to conduct an  <mask> and/or trial of such criminal offences, the Court considers that the applicant’s complaints fall to be examined solely under this provision, which reads as follows:


83.  The applicant complained to the prosecutor about the beatings inflicted by the police, the forceful removal of his underwear, clipping of his nails and attempted taking of a blood sample. His detailed account of the events, together with the visible bodily injuries, amounted to an “arguable claim” of ill-treatment. Accordingly, the authorities had an obligation to carry out an  <mask> into the circumstances of the alleged ill-treatment.


203.  The applicant finally claimed that the police in northern Cyprus were effectively under political and military control. Accordingly, the requirement that the persons responsible for carrying out the investigation had to be independent from those implicated in the events was not satisfied. For all these reasons, the applicant invited the Court to hold that the authorities of the “TRNC”, for which the respondent Government were responsible, had failed to conduct a prompt, thorough and  <mask> into the murder of her husband.


40.  The applicant alleged that towards the end of 1993, gendarmes had raided his village and that his home and possessions had been destroyed. He requested the Court to find that the destruction of his property and the failure to carry out an  <mask> by the authorities engaged the responsibility of the respondent State under Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14 and 18 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and that each of these Articles had been violated.


55.  The Government submitted that the penalties imposed on the three officers had been proportionate and fully in line with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. The authorities had first carried out a prompt and  <mask>. They had gathered and duly assessed all relevant evidence, and had on its basis carefully considered what penalties to impose on the officers. In fixing the penalties, the Kazanlak District Court had taken into account the requirements of both domestic law and Article 3 of the Convention. On appeal, the Stara Zagora Regional Court had, of its own motion, examined the proportionality of the penalties, including with regard to the point that the officers’ act had infringed the applicant’s human rights, and had not found them manifestly unjust. That, coupled with the disciplinary penalties imposed on two of the officers and the award of damages obtained by the applicant, showed that this was not a situation in which police officers had been able to encroach with impunity on the rights of those under their control.


39.  The applicant argued that the investigation had been pending for a long time without producing any tangible results. That remedy had proved to be ineffective and her complaints, as well as any other potential remedies, had proved futile. She further argued that she had complied with the six-month rule and there had been no excessive or unexplained delays in the submission of her application to the Court. In particular, she submitted that after the initiation of the criminal investigation she had had no reason to doubt its effectiveness. She pointed out that the armed conflict in the region had led her to believe that delays in the investigation were inevitable. Moreover, owing to her poor command of Russian, her lack of legal knowledge and funds to hire a lawyer, and in the absence of information concerning the Convention standards for an  <mask>, she had been unable to assess the effectiveness of the pending criminal proceedings. As soon as she had been able to obtain legal advice from the pro bono lawyer, she had realised that the investigation was ineffective and had applied to the Court.


467.  The Government contended that the domestic investigations had obtained no evidence that the applicants’ relatives had been held under State control or that they were dead. They further noted that the mere fact that the investigative measures had not produced any specific results, or had given only limited ones, did not mean that there were any omissions on the part of the investigative authorities. They claimed that all necessary steps were being taken to comply with the obligation to conduct an  <mask>.


74.  The applicant alleged that the authorities had failed to conduct an  <mask> into the circumstances of the deaths of her mother and brother, in violation of their procedural obligation under Article 2. She argued that the investigation had fallen short of the standards established by the Convention and national legislation. She argued that the investigation had not been prompt because of the delay in opening it and in taking important steps. A number of investigative measures had never been taken, such as securing the relevant evidence and questioning servicemen who could have been involved. The investigation had been going on for more than six years without producing any tangible results. Despite her requests, she had not been granted victim status in the proceedings. The authorities had systematically failed to inform the applicant or her family of the progress of the investigation and they had been given no information about important procedural steps. The applicant also asked the Court to conclude that the Government had failed in their obligations under Article 38 § 1 (a) of the Convention in that they had not submitted a copy of the entire criminal investigation file to the Court.


84.  The Government further disputed that the witness statements obtained by the Commission showed beyond reasonable doubt that the Turkish authorities had failed to carry out an adequate and  <mask>. The statements taken from members of the applicant's family and persons close to the family were riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions if considered together or, even worse, on their own. These inconsistencies concerned such matters as the number of assailants, their physical characteristics, the date on which the applicant and her sister had gone to the gendarmes or the prosecutor, the existence, or absence rather, of any denunciation on their part of the killings when they appeared before the competent authorities. Neither the applicant nor her sister, who were the only eye witnesses, were able to read or write or speak Turkish and had both led withdrawn lives. At the hearing the applicant revealed that she had little notion of time, space and distance.


67.  The applicants contended that the authorities had failed in their obligation to carry out an  <mask> into the circumstances of their relative's disappearance. They argued that the investigation had fallen short of the requirements of domestic law and Convention standards. In particular, it had been pending for several years but had not brought any tangible results so far, having been repeatedly suspended and reopened. The applicants contended that the main investigative actions had been taken only after the communication of the present application to the respondent Government on 7 June 2005. Furthermore, the investigating authorities had failed to inform the applicants about the decisions concerning the adjournment and reopening of the investigation or its progress and had not granted the first applicant the status of victim of a crime until 15 January 2003, that is, two months after the criminal proceedings had been instituted. The applicants also insisted that the authorities had failed to take all possible measures to establish the identity of the alleged perpetrators, and, in particular, had not checked the possible involvement of federal military personnel in their relative's abduction. In support of their argument regarding the inefficiency of the investigation, they also referred to the Government's refusal to submit a copy of the file in the criminal case concerning Vakhid Musikhanov's disappearance.


87.  The applicant substantiated his complaint with medical documents dated 19 March 2006 which attested to fractures to his eighth and ninth ribs on the left side and abrasions and haematomas on his face, head, chest, back and hips (see paragraphs 30-32 above). The applicant’s claim was therefore shown to be “arguable” and the domestic authorities were under an obligation to conduct an  <mask> satisfying the above requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.


28.  The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been subjected to ill-treatment during his arrest and subsequently during his custody at the Security Directorate Building. He also alleged that the domestic authorities had failed to carry out an  <mask> capable of leading to the punishment of the police officers responsible for the treatment. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:


28.  The applicant maintained his complaint. He argued that while he had had no injuries when he had been taken to the police station at 11 p.m. on 9 April 2007 (as confirmed by concordant evidence, including written submissions by eyewitnesses I., A. and Pan., and not contested by the Government), he had been discovered to have an injury on his head when he had been released from the police station on the afternoon of 10 April 2017 (which was also not contested by the Government). The applicant promptly brought an arguable claim of ill-treatment before the domestic authorities. However, no  <mask> had followed. In particular, although the pre-investigation inquiry had concluded that there had been no objective data confirming the fact that the injuries had been inflicted under the circumstances indicated by the applicant, no explanation had been provided by the domestic authorities as to how the applicant had sustained his injuries.


39.  The Government contested that argument. They submitted, in view of the judicial award in the applicant’s favour, that he had lost his victim status, even though such an award did not signify that his rights set out in Article 3 of the Convention had been infringed. The amount of the award had been commensurate with the severity of his injury. In the alternative, the Government asserted that the applicant could have sustained the injuries prior to his arrest, a fact which had been confirmed in the course of the  <mask> conducted by the authorities in response to the applicant’s complaint about the alleged ill-treatment in custody. The investigating authorities had taken all the steps necessary to verify the applicant’s allegations. They had questioned the witnesses and studied the medical documents. Both the investigating authorities and the courts had repeatedly looked into the matter. Accordingly, the national authorities had complied with their obligation to conduct a thorough and effective investigation.


139.  The Government considered that when the Bulgarian Consular Section signalled a coercive holding of a minor-aged female, the Italian authorities gave full assistance and carried out an  <mask>, but after having established the above-mentioned facts, could not conclude that the case concerned trafficking in human beings. They noted that the Italian authorities “freed” the first applicant who was found to be in a good health and mental condition. She was questioned by staff specialised in interaction with minors and had access to an interpreter. Moreover, the authorities provided support to her and her relatives, including accommodation and payment of costs. The Italian authorities took all the relevant witness testimony and other measures to establish the facts and the applicants had ample opportunity to participate as witnesses in the investigation, throughout which they were provided with an interpreter. Thus, the relatives had also been directly involved in the investigation. Therefore, the criteria for an effective investigation according to the Court’s case-law (Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, no. 25965/04, § 233, 7 January 2010) had been fulfilled.


91.  The applicant also complained that the authorities’ failure to carry out an  <mask> capable of providing redress for the ill‑treatment suffered by the applicant constituted a violation of Article 13 of the Convention. Furthermore, he complained that he could not effectively challenge, before a court, the decision not to prosecute taken by the military prosecutor in favour of the police officer who had allegedly injured him.


89.  The Government maintained that they could not conduct an  <mask>, as no arguable claim had ever been raised by the applicant concerning his ill-treatment in Sremska Mitrovica Prison. In their view, the reason why there had been no investigation into the circumstances of the applicant’s case was because he had failed to lodge his complaints with the relevant domestic authorities. Besides, the Government claimed that the circumstantial evidence established in the civil proceedings would not have been sufficient to trigger or prompt a criminal investigation on the part of the State.


89.  The Government stated that the prosecutor’s office had conducted an  <mask> into the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment. In particular, the investigation was started immediately after the applicant’s lawyer’s complaints and a number of important witnesses were questioned, and a forensic medical examination was conducted. Later, more witnesses (the applicant’s cellmates) were questioned and additional information was checked. The applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment were carefully checked and finally rejected on 27 June 2013 as unsubstantiated. The investigation was full and prompt and all the court’s and prosecutor’s instructions were followed.  Therefore, there was no breach of the applicant’s right to an effective investigation under the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention.


64.  The applicant maintained his complaint. He pointed out that the Government’s version that he had been ill-treated in Kazakhstan, before his extradition, had been refused by the official statements from the administration of the remand prison certifying that on 23 February 2006 he had not had any evidence of ill-treatment at the time of his arrival in Moscow (see paragraphs 10 and 27 above). Furthermore, his allegations of ill-treatment had been confirmed by the medical examinations of 1 March and 1 June 2006 (see paragraphs 29, 26 and 39 above), his consistent complaints to the authorities (see paragraphs 31, 32, 37, 39, 40, 42 and 47 above) and the domestic court’s findings of 3 October 2007 (see paragraph 41 above). He stressed that the Government neither provided a satisfactory explanation as to the origins of his injuries nor carried out an  <mask> into his complaints. The applicant further stated, in particular, that the inquiries conducted had been neither timely nor thorough; the authorities had not questioned him nor taken any steps to identify his torturers. Finally, he submitted that the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected by the police amounted to torture. In support of his allegations, the applicant referred to the documents submitted and the findings of the CPT of 13 March 2007 in respect of the human rights violations committed by the staff of the ORB-2 at the material time (see paragraph 61 above).


120.  The applicant sought an award for non-pecuniary damage for the suffering she had endured as a result of the loss of her elderly mother and her brother, the failure to carry out an  <mask> into the killings and the indifference shown by the authorities towards her grief. She also stressed that she had suffered immense frustration and helplessness as a result of her inability to obtain any information about the investigation into her family members' deaths. She left the amount to be determined by the Court.