35.  The applicant submitted that there was no justification for the interference with its right to determine its membership. There was no interference with Mr Lee's freedom of expression as expulsion did not interfere with his right to express his political views. In any event any sanction was minimal and did not take priority over its right, and its members' rights, to exercise their own  <mask> and expression. Mr Lee never claimed that he suffered any detriment from exclusion. It referred to Article 17 to the effect that Article 10 would not protect some-one engaged in destroying other rights and freedoms. Since it was committed to opposing race discrimination, it would interfere with its rights, and its members, to be forced to admit into membership a person who was a member of such a right wing organisation. It did not accept that section 174 imposed a limited restriction, pointing out that it simply did not wish to associate with those whom they regarded as fascists or members of extreme right wing parties, whether active or not. It claimed that it had the right to dissociate itself from those whose political membership they abhorred. While Mr Lee's status as an activist might furnish greater reason to expel him, this did not touch on the fundamental issue. It would be acceptable if section 174 were framed so as to limit exclusion to membership of a party the objectives of which were contrary to the objectives of the trade union.


27.  The Government argued that there had been no interference with the applicants’  <mask>, noting that the Ministry had not formally refused to register the association. Instead, it had merely returned the association’s foundation documents to the founders so that the latter could rectify the deficiencies and ensure that they complied with the requirements of the domestic law. The Government contended that, although “a refusal to register a public association might be regarded as a violation of the right to freedom of association, a delayed response to [an application for state registration] is not a violation of that right”. Even if the Ministry had committed procedural errors, they had not amounted to a violation of the applicants’ rights under Article 11.


49.  The applicants alleged that the dissolution of Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and the temporary prohibition barring its leaders – including Mr Necmettin Erbakan, Mr Şevket Kazan and Mr Ahmet Tekdal – from holding similar office in any other political party had infringed their right to  <mask>, guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:


51.  The Government denied that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to  <mask>. The police officer had only requested her to show him the leaflets which she had been distributing in a hospital, during working hours, and without having obtained the hospital administration’s permission. Each work place had its own rules; even more so hospitals. The applicant, as a nurse, should have obtained permission or at least informed the chief doctor. She could have distributed the leaflets outside the hospital, in her own time and without any prior permission.


27.  The applicant complained of a violation of his rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. He submitted that, in choosing to become a member of the BNP and to stand for election, he was engaging both his right to freedom of expression pursuant to Article 10 of the Convention and his right to  <mask> pursuant to Article 11 and that his dismissal had disproportionately interfered with his exercise of those rights.


116.  The applicants submitted that it was particularly important for the Court to examine the complaint under Article 14 as well. Only a ruling under that provision would spur a real solution to the problem. Otherwise, the authorities would feel encouraged to continue their practice of searching for various pretexts to restrict the exercise of the applicants’ right to freedom of peaceful assembly. In that relation, one had to bear in mind the general situation in the country in relation to the so‑called “Macedonian question”. The interference with the applicants’ rights was a result of the lack of recognition of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and of the resulting infringement of that minority’s rights. The non‑execution of a number of the Court’s judgments in previous cases concerning Ilinden showed that even now individuals asserting a Macedonian ethnic consciousness were being denied the right to  <mask>. The Macedonian minority was the only one not recognised by Bulgaria and, as a result, suffered diverse instances of discrimination. It was precisely the refusal to recognise the existence of a Macedonian minority that lay at the source of the systematic banning and hindering of Ilinden’s rallies.


45.  The applicants also submitted that the refusal to register Ilinden had been discriminatory. In examining that issue, one had to bear in mind the general situation in the country in relation to the so‑called “Macedonian question”. The interference with the applicants’ rights was a result of the lack of recognition of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and of the resulting infringement of that minority’s rights. The non‑execution of a number of the Court’s judgments in previous cases concerning Ilinden showed that even now individuals asserting a Macedonian ethnic consciousness were being denied the rights to  <mask>. The Macedonian minority was the only one not recognised by Bulgaria, and had as a result suffered diverse instances of discrimination. That had been noted by various Council of Europe bodies, such as the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, and the Commissioner for Human Rights. The national courts systematically refused to register any organisation which endeavoured to defend the rights of the Macedonian minority, because they feared that such registration would amount to a recognition of that minority.


62.  The applicants submitted that the Court was clearly competent to examine the implementation of its judgments. Under Article 32 of the Convention, the Court’s jurisdiction extended to all matters concerning its interpretation and application, including the execution of judgments. In recent times, the Court had on a number of occasions analysed the application of Article 46 § 1 and the contents of the States’ obligations under that provision, going as far as specifying the individual and/or general measures necessary for the execution of its judgments. In the present case, there existed good reasons why the Court should examine whether Article 46 § 1 had been breached. It had in several judgments found various breaches of the Article 11 rights of persons asserting a Macedonian ethnic consciousness, and was currently faced with five similar applications. That was indicative of a systemic violation which could justify the indication of specific measures to the respondent State. The persistent nature of the breaches had been noted by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, whose Secretariat had sought to remedy the situation by giving indications to the Bulgarian authorities in connection with UMO Ilinden – PIRIN’s efforts to obtain re‑registration. However, those indications had remained unheeded, and the Bulgarian courts had again refused to register the party. That was indicative of complete disregard for the Committee of Ministers’ decisions and of a deliberate policy of denying the applicants’ rights to  <mask> and refusing to comply with the Court’s judgment in United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – PIRIN and Others (cited above), and amounted to a breach of Article 46 § 1. In those circumstances, it would be appropriate for the Court to indicate the individual measures that would remove the consequences of the repeated violations mentioned above. In the instant case, there was no real choice as to the measures required to remedy the breach. In October 2007 the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to register UMO Ilinden – PIRIN solely because it did not accept the validity of the list of 5,778 party members. Since that issue had been examined in the course of the proceedings before the Committee of Ministers, and since there existed no further obstacles to the party’s registration, it was necessary to reopen those proceedings and register the party on the basis of the documents already submitted, including that list.


34.  The Government contended that there had been no interference with the applicant's right to  <mask> and that accordingly there had been no violation of Article 11 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, the Government maintained that the applicant had not belonged to a trade union. At the material time, there had only been one trade union at Komunenergiya and the applicant had withdrawn from that union in February 1999. The Government further submitted that the applicant had been dismissed for her repeated breach of her duties of employment and not because of the alleged labour dispute between the management and employees of Komunenergiya. According to the Government, the picket on 3 March 1999 had not been related to the applicant's work at Komunenergiya. Rather, it concerned a dispute which she had had with Rivneteplokomunenergo. Despite the fact that it had been held in front of the Komunenergiya office, the picket had been actually directed against the management of Rivneteplokomunenergo.


46.  The applicant disputed the arguments of the respondent Government. He submitted that his complaints had not focused in practice or in theory upon freedom of movement as such. It was the inability to engage in peaceful discourse and intercourse, to pursue the basic democratic rights of receiving and imparting “information and ideas with those on the island of Cyprus who shared his aims of a peaceful and friendly resolution of the problems of that island without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers” that lay at the heart of his application. In the circumstances of the current situation in Cyprus, he felt that it was only by meetings between Turkish and Greek Cypriots that ideas for a peaceful political settlement could be truly imparted, received and exchanged. However, he stated that such meetings could not be held in northern Cyprus and meetings of equivalent range and quality could not be organised anywhere other than in southern Cyprus. Thus, the lack of a proper system to regulate crossing from north to south and the arbitrary and erratic way in which he alleged he had been prevented from attending various relevant meetings in the south had substantially and adversely affected his Convention rights to  <mask> as well as expression.


34.  The Government disputed that there had been any restriction on the applicant’s right of association, as provided for in Article 11 of the Convention, with respect to either his right to  <mask> or his right not to belong to an association. The applicant was not a member of the FII and had not been coerced in any way into becoming a member. The applicant was only one of 10,000 – in a country with a population of 300,000 – who were subject to the industry charge. The amount of the industry charge was very low, constituting 0.08% of business turnover. It was not a membership fee but a tax imposed for a specific purpose laid down in statute, in the Industry Charge Act (“the 1993 Act”), namely to promote industry and industrial development in Iceland. Like other taxes, the charge was collected by the State. In accordance with the Act, the funds were disbursed to the FII, which was obliged to use them for the stated purpose. It should be stressed that, even though the FII was a non-governmental organisation, it had been given a clear and legally prescribed role in one aspect, which was to use the industry charge for the benefit of industry as a whole. This included the applicant as a self-employed individual.


34.  The applicants argued that by refusing to register Ilinden the authorities had infringed their rights under Article 11 of the Convention. The refusal of the courts had been based on deliberately erroneous findings in respect of the relevant facts and a misconstruction of the applicable law. It was clear that freedom of association could not be subjected to restrictions other than those which were provided for by law for the protection of national security and public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the  <mask> or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


43.  The applicant considered that a request to serve the prison sentence before it had become final and enforceable had not been an  <mask> to be exhausted because there was a general problem of prison overcrowding in Croatia. Moreover, it would have been contrary to his position of denying his guilt for the offences at issue if he had asked to serve his sentence before it had become final and enforceable. In any event, given the case-law of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 39 above), it had been unnecessary to secure his right to use a remedy under the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act to address his complaints about the conditions of detention.


13.  The Government, relying on the same arguments as in the case of Bizjak v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 25516/12, §§ 17-22, 8 July 2014, pleaded non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies. They argued that the applicant had an  <mask> at his disposal, a claim for compensation under Article 179 of the Civil Code, which he had failed to use. Furthermore, they claimed that the applicant, being released on 5 October 2009, could have lodged the claim by 5 October 2012, namely by the expiry of a three-year time-limit prescribed by Article 352 of the Civil Code.


10.  The applicants complained of the non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic decisions given in their favour and of the lack of any  <mask> in domestic law. They relied, expressly or in substance, on Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention. In applications nos. 54430/08, 69362/10, and 67231/11 they also relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. These Articles, in so far as relevant, read as follows:


115.  The Government have not elaborated on their assertion in relation to Chapter 16 of the CCrP and section 17(1)(7) of the Custody Act (see paragraphs 56 and 57 above). In any event, the Court observes that Chapter 16 of the CCrP concerns the possibility for “parties to the criminal proceedings” to challenge decisions taken in the course of a preliminary investigation, such as a decision not to initiate criminal proceedings or a decision to discontinue them. There is no indication that the applicant was a party to criminal proceedings within the meaning given to that phrase by the Russian courts (see Nasrulloyev, cited above, § 89). Thus, the Court is not satisfied that the provisions of this Chapter afforded an  <mask> for challenging detention pending extradition. As regards the Custody Act, the Court notes that it derives from the Code of Criminal Procedure and concerns persons suspected or accused of criminal offences in Russia. There is no indication that this Act applied at the material time to persons who were detained pending extradition. Thus, the Court is uncertain that the remedies suggested by the Government related to the breaches alleged. In such circumstances, the Government was required, but failed, to show that the existence of the above remedies was sufficiently certain both in theory and in practice, failing which they lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see, among other authorities, A. and E. Riis v. Norway, no. 9042/04, § 41, 31 May 2007, and Vernillo v. France, judgment of 20 February 1991, Series A no. 198, § 27). Thus, the Government’s argument under this head should be also dismissed.


107.  The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust an  <mask> that had been open for him to complain about the alleged violations of his rights under Article 3 of the Convention, at least in so far as he complained of a lack of bedding and food and insufficient light and ventilation. They considered that a complaint to the prosecutor’s office would have allowed the competent authority to resolve his situation.


88.  The Government raised the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicant. The Court considers that the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies is closely linked to the merits of the applicant's complaint that he did not have at his disposal an  <mask> for complaining about the inhuman and degrading conditions of his detention. Thus, the Court finds it necessary to join the Government's objection to the merits of the applicant's complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.


42.  The Government argued that the applicant company had had an  <mask> at its disposal in respect of the alleged violation of Article 6 § 1. It was not one single remedy, but a combination of several actions by which the applicant company could have expedited the proceedings. In particular, the applicant company had had the opportunity to indicate to the courts another expert organisation which would have been more efficient in carrying out the court-ordered expert assessment, but it had failed to do so. Furthermore, it had failed to obtain a writ of execution for the courts’ decisions ordering the technical examination and submit it to the DEJA for compulsory enforcement. Lastly, the applicant company had failed to contest the decisions of the trial courts staying the proceedings before the Civil Court of Appeal. The Government argued that, since the applicant company had failed to take any of these actions, the application should be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.


120.  The applicant complained that two of his judicial appeals against detention (those submitted in March and April 1997) were never examined and that his third appeal (submitted on 12 August 1997) was not examined speedily. Stating that as a result he did not have an  <mask> against the violations of Article 5 in his case, he relied on Articles 5 and 13 of the Convention.


47.  The applicant was of the opinion that the domestic courts had denied him an  <mask>. They had not even established the facts. Thus, far from deciding the substance of his case, they had ruled that the legislature would have to step in before claims such as his could be decided on the merits. The Government, for their part, argued that there had been no violation of this provision, since the applicant had not been prevented from presenting his complaints before the domestic courts.


61.  The Government considered that even if the Court were to find that none of the above remedies individually constituted sufficient and  <mask>, the aggregate of remedies nevertheless ensured effective legal protection to the individuals in respect of the length of proceedings. The Government contended that there had been sufficient remedies available to the applicant company, which, however, did not make any attempts to make use of them.


102.  The Government also argued, albeit in the context of Article 13 of the Convention, that an  <mask> did not necessarily mean one in which the State was a defendant. They underlined that the Court did not find a breach of Article 13 in Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom (25 March 1993, § 27, Series A no. 247‑C) as the applicant was able to sue the private school or its authorities for assault. They also relied on the sufficiency of the negligence action in Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy (cited above). They considered Z and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 29392/95, ECHR 2001‑V) to be distinguishable: that respondent Government had conceded that a negligence action was the only effective remedy but that that action did not lie against local authorities.


120.  The applicant argued that, in view of the case‑law of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division, a further appeal to that body would not have stood any chance of success; hence, this did not constitute a domestic remedy which he was required to exhaust. With regard to the decision on his objection lodged on the basis of section 72(3) of the Aliens Act 2000 – which was in any event not capable of providing him with an  <mask> against expulsion –, the applicant pointed out that he had appealed against that decision.


19.  The Government invited the Court to reject the applicant’s complaint for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. It maintained that the applicant could have filed another constitutional complaint, after the Constitutional Court had dismissed his first one. Stressing that the Constitutional Court changed its practice in this respect, so as to comply with the Court’s case-law, the Government claimed that a complaint under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act would have been an  <mask> for the applicant’s length complaint.


143.  The Government contended that the applicant had had effective remedies at his disposal as required by Article 13 of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented him from using them. They referred to Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allowed participants in criminal proceedings to complain to a court about measures taken during an investigation. This was an  <mask> to ensure the observation of his rights. In addition, the applicant had failed to claim damages in civil proceedings.


63.  The Government submitted that the applicant had challenged the refusal to approve the location of his public event before the domestic courts, which had carefully examined his complaint. He had participated in the hearings and had appealed to a higher court. The appellate court had re‑examined the case in its entirety without being bound by the arguments raised in the appeal submissions. The applicant had also lodged cassation appeals. He had therefore had an  <mask> at his disposal.


49.  The Government contested that argument. They submitted that judicial review provided an  <mask>. They argued that damages might have been available as a remedy in the judicial review proceedings, if the applicant had sought them. They distinguished the above-cited case of Doran v Ireland on the ground that it concerned civil proceedings. They also submitted that the Doran judgment was wrongly decided and failed to take into account the flexibility of the common law system, where the absence of precedent would not necessarily preclude the applicant from obtaining damages for delay.


98.  The applicants complained that owing to the systemic nature of the inadequate prison conditions they did not have any  <mask> at their disposal as regards their complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In any event, there is no evidence that the remedies which were available in theory could work effectively in practice when it came to prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners. They invoked Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


52.  The Government simply reiterated their assertion that the first applicant had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies. They claimed that he could have initiated an action against the State under section 2 (2) of the SMRDA, which they considered to be an  <mask>. The Government referred in this respect to the alleged persistent practice of the domestic courts and the finding of the Court in the inadmissibility decision in the case of Ekimdjiev v. Bulgaria (no. 47092/99, 3 March 2005).


38.  The applicant complained that owing to the systemic nature of the inadequate prison conditions he did not have any  <mask> at his disposal as regards his complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In any event, there is no evidence that the remedies which were available in theory could work effectively in practice when it came to prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners. He cited Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


167.  The applicants argued that they had no  <mask> by which to obtain protection against acts of harassment and violence. The Court notes that the Government suggested a number of remedies allegedly at their disposal in that connection. However, the Court has established that none of the remedies referred to by the Government could have addressed the applicants’ situation in connection with their complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.


58.  The applicant asserted that he had been detained in appalling conditions in remand prison no. IZ-44/1 in Kostroma. All the cells had been overcrowded. The applicant challenged the veracity of the data submitted by the Government as regards the population and the size of the cells in which he had been detained. In that connection he referred to the findings made by the Kostroma Sverdlovskiy District Court, which on 10 September 2009 had held that the cells in which the applicant had been detained had been overcrowded. He further relied on statements made by Kh. and V., who had been detained together with him at the remand prison and who had provided a description of the conditions of detention in the remand prison similar to that of the applicant. As regards his application to the domestic courts in connection with the poor conditions of detention in the remand prison, the applicant considered that it could not have been considered an  <mask> for his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention in view of the structural nature of the problem of overcrowding of remand detention facilities in Russia.


95.  The Government maintained that since 1999 the applicants had had at their disposal an  <mask> against the alleged infringement of their right to a speedy trial. In July 1999 the CCP had been amended to provide for a “complaint against delays” whose very purpose was to protect the right of litigants to a determination of their civil disputes within a reasonable time.


118.  The Government referred to their submissions on exhaustion of domestic remedies (§§ 47 to 48 above). They maintained that it was open to the applicant to challenge the legality of the order to place him in solitary confinement under Article 146 of the Constitution. Had he done so, he would have been able to raise all of his Convention complaints before the Supreme Court. Accordingly, Article 146 offered the applicant an  <mask> in respect of his Convention complaints. The applicant could also have complained to the Prisons Board, which could have heard and investigated his complaints and communicated its findings to the Minister of Justice and the director of the prison.


30.  The applicant complained that owing to the systemic nature of the inadequate prison conditions he did not have any  <mask> at his disposal as regards his complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In any event, there is no evidence that the remedies which were available in theory could work effectively in practice when it came to prison conditions and the treatment of detainees. He cited Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


21.  The Government invited the Court to reject the application on the ground that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They maintained that the applicants could have filed another constitutional complaint, after the Constitutional Court had dismissed their first one. Bearing in mind that the Constitutional Court changed its practice in this respect, so as to comply with the Court’s case-law, the Government claimed that a complaint under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act would have been an  <mask> for the applicants’ length complaint.


12.  The applicants complain that their removal, direct or indirect, to Serbia and the refusal to regularise their stay in Belgium amounted to a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, in that it put their oldest daughter’s life at risk and placed all of the applicants at risk of inhuman and degrading treatment (see paragraph 173). Furthermore, they complain that they did not have access to an  <mask>, in violation of Article 13 of the Convention (see paragraph 174).


38.  The applicant, referring to the Court’s case law, further submitted that she was not obliged to pursue civil remedies and that lodging complaints against the investigators under Article 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code would not have remedied the investigation’s shortcomings. She submitted that the only  <mask> in her case – the criminal investigation – had proved to be ineffective.


20.  The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. He also complained under Article 13 of the Convention about the lack of an  <mask> against the excessive length of the proceedings. The relevant parts of Articles 6 § 1 and 13 read as follows:


54.  The applicants argued that the admissibility of their complaints under Article 6 § 1 and Article 8 of the Convention had already been examined and there was no reason to reconsider this matter. According to them, the situation in the case of Babjak and Others (cited above) was substantially different from their case. The applicants also emphasised that the Government had been unable to show a single final judicial decision confirming their argument that the action for protection of personal integrity was an  <mask> in a situation comparable to theirs.


56.  The applicant challenged the effectiveness of the remedies relied upon by the Government. He argued that the remedy introduced by the Property Act 2004 could not provide an  <mask> within the meaning of the Convention as his property rights had been considered in the final judgments of 17 December 1998 and 7 December 2000 and an administrative body could not, therefore, re-examine the same issue. He further maintained that, had the domestic courts awarded compensation in one of the forms provided for by law, the bailiffs would not have been able to enforce the decision. It was up to the Government to adopt effective measures, either by classifying the State properties available for compensation in kind or by providing sufficient budgetary funds for pecuniary compensation, in order to make such a means of redress feasible. In conclusion, the applicant maintained that the Government had thus far failed to take effective steps to find solutions relating to the issue of compensation for former owners.


35.  The Government raised an objection, arguing that the applicants had not exhausted the domestic remedies available to them. The Court considers that the question whether the requirement that an applicant must exhaust domestic remedies has been satisfied in the instant case is closely linked to the complaint concerning the existence of an  <mask> within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. It therefore considers that this objection raised by the Government under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention should be joined to the merits of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. It further notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.


74.  The Government maintained that the applicant had failed to exhaust effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaints of a lack of adequate medical assistance while in detention. Referring to Article 55 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Government indicated that all decisions, actions or omissions of State bodies could be challenged in court. Although the applicant had instituted proceedings against the SIZO administration, he had failed to appeal against the court's decision of 11 February 2005. The Government further argued that a claim for compensation was an  <mask> which the applicant should have exhausted. In support, the Government submitted a copy of the court's decision of 4 February 2009 in the case of K. and B. against SIZO no. 13. The plaintiffs' daughter and mother had died in the above SIZO because of a lack of medical assistance. The court awarded the plaintiffs 25,000[1] Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) each in compensation for non-pecuniary damage.


26.  The applicant pointed out that under the Operational-Search Activities Act only the actions of the officers carrying out the operational-search activities, but not the judicial authorisation for those measures, were amenable to judicial review. The avenue suggested by the Government, that is, a public-law complaint in civil proceedings, would not be an  <mask> because such proceedings would not have any bearing on the validity of the judicial decision of 22 March 2006, which authorised an unlawful search at the applicant’s home. For as long as the decision of 22 March 2006 remained in force, it would be futile to seek a declaration of unlawfulness of the search. In so far as section 5 of the Operational-Search Activities Act provides that an appeal against the actions of the police lay to the same District Court as that which issued the authorisation, it essentially required another judge of the same level of jurisdiction to give legal assessment to a valid decision of his or her fellow judge. Such an assessment would be unavoidable since the police would base a justification of the search on the judicial authorisation which allowed them to proceed as they did. In these circumstances, the procedure under section 5 of the Operational-Search Activities Act would be a mere formality and would not meet the criteria of an effective remedy. The applicant pointed out that the Russian courts at two levels of jurisdiction replied to him that the decision of 22 March 2006 was not amenable to judicial review. His application to the Constitutional Court was likewise fruitless. Lastly, the applicant emphasised that the existing legislation allowed the courts to authorise operational-search activities in respect of any person and on any grounds, without incurring a risk that the authorisation would later be quashed or set aside by a higher court.


147.  The applicant claimed a sum of GBP 40,000 for the non-pecuniary damage arising from the violations of the Convention suffered by his son and from the alleged practice of such violations, to be held by him on behalf of his son's widow and four children, as well as a sum of GBP 2,500 for himself on account of the lack of an  <mask>. He referred to the Court's previous decisions regarding unlawful detention, torture and the lack of an effective investigation.”


99.  The applicants complained that the investigatory procedure in this case was not effective and capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the death of their relatives and that, for this reason, they did not have an  <mask> within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. They also alleged a violation of Article 6 of the Convention on the same factual basis. The Court will consider these complaints under Article 13, which provides:


31.  The applicant complained that owing to the systemic nature of the inadequate prison conditions he did not have any  <mask> at his disposal as regards his complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In any event, there is no evidence that the remedies which were available in theory could work effectively in practice when it came to prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners. He cited Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


88.  The Government submitted that the applicants had had appropriate remedies at their disposal and had made use of them. An appeal to the Federal Minister of the Interior regarding an incorrect entry in the criminal record could lead to an amendment of the criminal record and was therefore an  <mask> in principle. Moreover, the applicants, who had failed to lodge applications with the Court concerning the criminal proceedings in respect of which modification of the criminal record had been sought – some of them had not even appealed against the first-instance conviction – had also had the opportunity of requesting a renewal of the criminal proceedings under Article 363a of the Code of Criminal Proceedings. In the event that such a request had been successful, it would have had repercussions on the entries in their criminal records. As regards the latter remedy, it should be noted that this provision was, according to the wording of Article 363a, possible only in respect of violations of the Convention found by a judgment of the Court. The Supreme Court, however, considered it its duty, under Article 46 of the Convention, to guarantee compliance with the constitutional and international obligations flowing from the Convention in the field of criminal jurisdiction by extending the scope of application of Article 343a of the CCP to cases where no judgment against Austria had been issued. In so doing, the Supreme Court found that it would be in accordance with the spirit of Article 35 of the Convention if its review of domestic decisions were limited in time, and therefore adopted the six-month time-limit stipulated in Article 35 of the Convention. Since the applicants had not applied to the Supreme Court for a renewal of the criminal proceedings within that time-limit, their requests were inadmissible. It was therefore exclusively due to circumstances attributable to the applicants that that remedy had been unsuccessful.


138.  The applicant referred to her submissions concerning the procedural aspects of Article 2 of the Convention, claiming that in addition to the payment of compensation where appropriate Article 13 required a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible and including effective access for the complainant to the investigatory procedure. She disputed that judicial review was an  <mask> in respect of the DPP's decision not to prosecute, as the cases showed that he has a wide discretion and the courts would only overturn aberrant, inexplicable or irrational decisions.


285.  The applicants conceded that they had been able to object to the public prosecutor's request to discontinue the proceedings and that following that objection a hearing had been held in private before the investigating judge. However, the hearing had been conducted in camera, with only the parties and their counsel allowed to attend. Furthermore, the investigating judge had had to take a decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by the prosecuting authorities, who had effectively accepted without question the version of events given by the law-enforcement agencies' representatives, without the injured party having the opportunity of questioning the accused, witnesses or experts. The investigating judge had established the facts on the basis of an anonymous account posted on a website with possible links to French anarchists; a public hearing should have been held to test the accuracy of that account. Finally, the applicants had had no  <mask> by which to challenge the investigating judge's decision to discontinue the proceedings, as an appeal on points of law was admissible only on grounds of nullity, which did not apply in the instant case (Article 409 § 6 of the CCP – see paragraph 151 above).


73.  The applicants claimed that at the relevant time, there had not been an  <mask> to obtain redress for the excessive length of the criminal proceedings against them. The first applicant further argued that the decision of the Federal Court of Justice of 17 January 2008 (see paragraphs 50-54 above) did not apply to the present case. This decision presupposed that the domestic courts had expressly recognised a breach of the reasonable time requirement, but neither the Federal Court of Justice in its decision of 7 February 2006 nor the Federal Constitutional Court in its decision of 21 June 2006 had done so. Moreover, it only applied ex nunc and was not applicable to proceedings which had previously been terminated by final decision.


87.  The applicant disagreed, noting that he had repeatedly addressed his complaints concerning the lack of adequate medical treatment to various authorities, including inter alia the prison authorities, the prison's medical staff and the chairman of the Court of Appeal. All these attempts were fruitless and did not result in better medical care. As to the civil action in the domestic courts, the applicant argued that, although he had tried to make use of this avenue of redress, a post factum civil action for damages could not be considered as an  <mask> because it could not restore his health and lead to the improvement of his deteriorated health condition.


55.  The Government also proposed the possibility of a complaint to the Prisons Board. However, the applicant alleges that he did seek to complain to the Prisons Board and was granted a brief audience before them but heard nothing further. The Court observes that the prison diary submitted by the respondent Government records meetings between the applicant and the Prisons Board on 1 and 5 November 2003. It further observes that the Government have not disputed that the applicant sought to make a complaint to the Prisons Board. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the applicant did attempt to lodge his complaints with the Prisons Board but for reasons which are unexplained, the Prisons Board did not take any further action to investigate the complaints and report its findings to the applicant. In any event, in circumstances such as those arising in the present application, there is an obligation to conduct an ex officio investigation as soon as Article 3 is raised in substance (see Selmouni, cited above, §§ 79 to 80). To the extent that a complaint to the Prisons Board could be considered an  <mask>, the Court considers that the applicant has done what was required of him in order to exhaust that remedy.


26.  The applicants complained about the State authorities’ failure to enforce the judgments taken in their favour in due time. In this regard they invoked Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Mr Shylkin also complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had no  <mask> in that respect. These provisions provide, in so far as relevant, as follows:


23.  The applicants stated that the authorities’ refusal to return the body of Isa Kushtov had been unlawful and disproportionate. They submitted that the law contained vague notions such as “terrorist action”, “terrorist activity” and “terrorist act” and was unclear as regards the cremation policy, the specific official with authority to take the decision, the possibility of bringing appeal proceedings, the policy concerning the disclosure of the date of the burials, and the need to observe rituals during the burials. They also argued that the measure was disproportionate in that no other European country had similar legislation; that while the Israeli authorities had had a similar administrative policy, this had since been condemned by the Israeli courts; that international humanitarian law prohibited such treatment and that other, less restrictive, measures were available to the authorities to address terrorism-related concerns. They further claimed that the relevant law was discriminatory. The applicants also complained that the domestic legal system afforded them no  <mask> to complain about the refusal to return the body of Isa Kushtov.


45.  The applicant complained that her right to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial court was breached in that the national courts acted in order to acquit the accused officers despite the evidence in the case file and without conducting any further investigation. She further complained that she did not have an  <mask> in respect of her complaints of torture and ill-treatment. The applicant relied on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.


107.  The applicants alleged that prolonging the second applicant’s detention and then proceeding to deport her following an order by the chambre du conseil for her immediate release was contrary to the Convention and rendered the remedy ineffective. In their submission, even assuming that detention could be prolonged in order to enable Crown Counsel to appeal against the order within twenty-four hours, detention could only be used for that purpose and not as a means to deport the alien within that period. Furthermore, once the alien had been deported, the powers of review of the chambre du conseil and the indictments division became redundant, even though deportation did not amount to release. They concluded from the above that they had not had an  <mask> in respect of the second applicant’s detention.


59.  The Government submitted that the conditions of the applicant’s detention had been compatible with the standards set forth in Article 3 of the Convention. The Government relied upon excerpts from the remand prison population register and certificates prepared by the administration of the remand prison in August 2010. The Government also considered that the applicant had an  <mask> in respect of his grievances under Article 3 of the Convention. He had lodged a civil action seeking damages resulting from his detention in the remand prison. His claims were duly considered and granted in part by domestic courts at two levels of jurisdiction which fact showed the accessibility and efficiency of the remedy.


130.  The applicants complained of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as a result of non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic court decisions given in their favour. The first and fifth applicants also complained of the lack of  <mask> in domestic law in breach of Article 13 of the Convention. In so far as relevant, these provisions read as follows:


217.  The applicants submitted that a claim for damages under section 1 of the 1988 Act was not an  <mask>, citing the reasons they had put forward in their submissions relating to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. They went on to say that the possibility of bringing proceedings under Articles 256 and 257 of the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006 was not an effective remedy either, for several reasons. First, some aspects of the conditions of their detention flowed directly from the prison regime under which they were placed, and were therefore not actionable under those Articles. In this regard they referred to the Court judgment in Sabev (cited above, § 85). Secondly, neither the 2009 Act nor its implementing regulations laid down clear rules on the treatment of life prisoners. Thirdly, it was unclear which authority would be the proper defendant, and there did not exist an appropriate mechanism for enforcing a mandatory injunction against a public authority. The administrative courts considered that authorities that were second-tier beneficiaries of budget funds – and the likely defendant to a claim under Articles 256 and 257 was likely to be just such an authority – could not be fined for failure to comply with an injunction. Moreover, any such injunction would be of limited duration and would not be able to provide the applicants with lasting redress. Lastly, the only two examples cited by the Government were judgments given by first-instance administrative courts. Accordingly, there was no established case-law in that domain.


54.  The applicant submitted that after the acquittal of the police officers and the dismissal of his civil claim by the Supreme Court of Cassation, he had not had at his disposal any further remedies. In his view, a civil suit could not provide an  <mask> in respect of an alleged ill-treatment by State agents; only a criminal investigation was sufficient to redress such grievances. In any event, a civil suit was not possible, because a civil court would be bound by the Supreme Court of Cassation's holding as to the lack of criminality in the officers' act. Moreover, a fresh civil action by the applicant, whether against the officers themselves or their employer, would be rejected on res judicata grounds, as the applicant's civil claim in the criminal proceedings had already been dismissed.


85.  The Government raised the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicant. The Court considers that the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies is closely linked to the merits of the applicant’s complaint that he did not have at his disposal an  <mask> for complaining about the inhuman and degrading conditions of his detention. Thus, the Court finds it necessary to join the Government’s objection to the merits of the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.


70.  The Government submitted that the applicants had not exhausted the domestic remedies because they had not applied to Russian courts with claims for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage in connection with the allegedly inhuman conditions of their detention. The procedure for making claims was established in Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as clarified by the Supreme Court’s Ruling no. 2 of 10 February 2009. Articles 151 and 1069 allowed individuals to claim compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by unlawful actions of State authorities. The Government further pointed out that the prosecutors had competence to review compliance with laws in penitentiary institutions. They carried out monthly inspections of remand prisons, during which they checked in particular the conditions of detention and medical assistance. In the Government’s view, such inspections were an  <mask> capable of preventing breaches of law and putting an end to them. This remedy was accessible to everyone who was held in custody. However, a majority of the applicants did not apply to a prosecutor.


42.  The Government submitted that the applicant had had an  <mask> against the length of proceedings in the present case. In particular, after examining the applicant's complaints the Moscow City Court quashed a number of rulings by the Ostankinskiy District Court which had left the applicant's claim without consideration. They further contended that the Ostankinskiy District Court had taken appropriate measures to examine the applicant's claim, which had resulted in favourable judgments.


216.  The Government submitted that, in view of the well-established case-law of the Bulgarian courts in conditions-of-detention cases brought by prisoners, a claim under section 1 of the 1988 was an  <mask> with respect to the material conditions of the applicants’ detention. In any event, no issue arose under Article 13 of the Convention as the applicants’ claims were not “arguable” for the purposes of that provision. The Government went on to say that the possibility to challenge omissions of the authorities under Articles 256 and 257 of the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006 was an effective remedy in respect of poor material conditions of detention. The Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act of 2009 and its implementing regulations clearly set out the minimum conditions that the prison authorities had to provide to inmates, and any failure to do so was therefore actionable under those Articles. The Government referred to two cases (see paragraphs 151‑152 above), one of which involved Mr Harakchiev, in which first-instance administrative courts had allowed such claims.


62.  The applicant replied that the “complaint about delays” under Article 217a of the 1952 Code of Civil Procedure was not an  <mask> because it could not lead to compensation for excessive length of proceedings, but merely trigger disciplinary sanctions against a judge who had caused unjustified delay. The remedy’s shortcomings had been exposed in a number of judgments of the Court. Its successor, the “request for fixing of time‑limit in the event of delay” under Articles 255‑57 of the 2007 Code of Civil Procedure, was irrelevant because it had been introduced after the end of the proceedings at issue in the present case and because it reproduced the shortcomings of the “complaint about delays”. As evident from examples provided by the Government, the national courts routinely failed to deal with such complaints or requests within the statutory time‑limits. The failure of a lower court to comply with a time‑limit fixed by the higher court pursuant to such a request could not have any consequences. Moreover, in contrast to previous cases against Portugal and Austria, the statistics supplied by the Government did not show in how many cases the complaints or requests had been allowed, whether any instructions given as a result of them had been complied with, and whether that had in fact led to the acceleration of the proceedings in connection with which they had been made.


76.  The applicant complained under Articles 6 of the Convention and 1 of Protocol No. 1 that, due to the excessive length of the proceedings, he had been time-barred from bringing a new application and, consequently, from raising his relevant property claims before the domestic courts. He further complained under Article 13 of the Convention about the lack of an  <mask> in respect of the above complaints.


96.  The applicants refuted the Government's argument. They pointed out that the Constitution had been amended, with effect from 1 January 2002, as a result of which the Constitutional Court was entitled to grant compensation for damage of a non-pecuniary nature to successful plaintiffs. In their view, had an action under Article 11 et seq. of the Civil Code been an  <mask> as argued by the Government, such an amendment would not have been necessary and the Constitutional Court would have rejected their complaint filed under Article 130(3) of the Constitution for failure to exhaust the remedy invoked by the Government.


45.  The applicants replied that the Government had failed to substantiate their objection because they had failed to show that an action under the SMRDA was an  <mask> for their complaint of the excessive length of the criminal proceedings against them and, therefore, that it was required of them to have made use of it. They submitted that the violations complained of could neither be established nor compensated under the SMRDA.


63.   The Government contested these claims. They submitted that the costs for the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court could not be claimed, as the Court, in its judgment of Sürmeli v. Germany, had found that a constitutional complaint was not an  <mask> against proceedings that lasted too long. As regards the costs incurred before the Court, the Government maintained that the applicant had failed to indicate the number of actual hours spent by his lawyer on the case, which made it impossible to judge whether the amount claimed was reasonable.


16.  The applicants complained under Article 6 of the Convention that their right of access to court was violated by the refusal to hold a hearing at which they could challenge the order made by the High Court of Justiciary on 15 February 2005. They further complained under Article 10 of the Convention that this was an unjustified interference with their right to impart information as guaranteed by that Article. Finally, under Article 13 of the Convention, they complained that there was no  <mask> to challenge the making of an order under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1983.


62.  The Government raised an objection arguing that the applicants had not exhausted the domestic remedies available to them. The Court considers that the question whether the requirement that an applicant must exhaust domestic remedies has been satisfied in the instant case is closely linked to the complaint concerning the existence of an  <mask> within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. It therefore considers that this objection raised by the Government under Article 3 of the Convention should be joined to the merits of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. It further notes that this part of the applications is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.


120.  The Government submitted that, since the applicant claimed that there had been no  <mask>, his complaint about the disproportionate use of force should have been introduced within six months from the act alleged to constitute a violation of the Convention. They submitted that the impugned incident took place on 8 July 2002 whereas the application was introduced to the Court on 29 December 2003, more than six months later.


63.  The applicants submitted that the refusal by the domestic courts to examine the merits of the application for judicial review of the NRTC's decision had deprived them of an  <mask>. They referred to the Court's judgment in the case of Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria (cited above), and argued that the Supreme Administrative Court's holding that the competent bodies enjoyed unreviewable discretion when examining applications for licences had been contrary to Article 13 of the Convention, which required a remedy allowing full examination of the necessity of the interference with their Article 9 and Article 10 rights.


47.  The Government argued that the applicant had had an  <mask> at his disposal concerning the alleged inadequate conditions of his detention, which he had used. He had complained to the Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice, the Pula County Court and the Pula Prison governor, and they had replied to his complaints indicating that he could not be transferred to another prison or prison ward due to the problem of overcrowding. In the Government’s view, that had been sufficient, as the use of a remedy did not require its favourable outcome.


49.  The applicant contested the Government’s arguments. He submitted that no  <mask> existed in relation to his complaint. He noted that he had complained about the unreasonable delay in the proceedings on several occasions before the court and other competent authorities but to no avail. In view of this, it was evident that the Government were incapable under the existing mechanism of preventing or terminating the violation complained of. As regards the case of Yiallouros, the applicant noted that not only was the judgment in that case issued fourteen months after the lodging of the present application but also that its facts were completely unrelated. In this connection, the applicant pointed to the absence of judicial practice granting damages for violations due to excessive length of proceedings. In any event, the applicant claimed that he should not be obliged to seek redress through a judicial system that had already kept him in proceedings for such a long time.


38.  The applicants lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court. Although they did so at the time when the proceedings had not yet been concluded by a final decision, the Constitutional Court refused to examine it. As established in paragraph 25 above, the manner in which the applicants' complaint was dealt with by the Constitutional Court failed to meet the purpose of protection of their right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to a hearing within a reasonable time as interpreted and applied by the Court. The Court, therefore, considers that the applicants' right to an  <mask> has not been respected (see mutatis mutandis, A. R., spol. s r. o. v. Slovakia, no. 13960/06, §§ 59-60, 9 February 2010).


64.  The applicant disagreed with the Government. It asserted that the compensation remedy in question was not accessible and effective due to its limited scope and field of application. In any event, it had not been obliged to pursue this remedy since an applicant was only required to exhaust one potentially  <mask>, which the applicant had done by making full use of the remedies provided by Swedish administrative law before the administrative courts. In this connection, the applicant also mentioned that it had made a complaint to the Parliamentary Ombudsman and petitioned the Supreme Administrative Court for a re-opening of the case concerning its request for exemption of documents.


106.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article 13 of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented the applicants from using them. They referred to Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allowed participants in criminal proceedings to complain to a court about measures taken during an investigation. This was an  <mask> to ensure the observation of their rights. The applicants should have made more use of that possibility which required the initiative of the participants in criminal proceedings, and thus the absence of court action could not constitute a violation of Article 13.


108.  The Government contended that the applicants had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article 13 of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. In particular, the applicants received reasoned replies to all their complaints lodged in the context of criminal proceedings. Besides, the applicants had an opportunity to appeal against the actions or omissions of the investigating authorities in court. They referred to Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allowed participants in criminal proceedings to complain to a court about measures taken during an investigation. This was an  <mask> to ensure the observation of their rights. The applicants never made use of this possibility, which required the initiative of the participants in criminal proceedings, and thus the absence of court action could not constitute a violation of Article 13.


33.  The applicant association further argued that the fact that it had been allowed to demonstrate after the third decision of the Lesznowola Mayor had been overruled by the Mazowiecki Governor only showed that all three decisions of the mayor had lacked any justification. The third demonstration had taken place some five months later and should not be considered as remedying the banning of the two demonstrations in May 2008 and depriving the applicant association of its right to an  <mask> in that respect.


97.  The Government considered that the applicants' complaints were not arguable, and hence outside the scope of Article 13, save for the complaints under Article 8 concerning the interference with family life. They submitted that the first applicant was able to avail herself of the local authority's complaints procedure. A thorough investigation had been conducted by an independent person, resulting in the first applicant receiving an apology. While she did not receive compensation, she did not ask that such a recommendation should be made. She had also had the opportunity to oppose any interim care orders, or to appeal. The Government, however, accepted that it was arguably obliged to ensure that an enforceable right to compensation was made available for such damage as could have been proved to have been suffered as a result of any violation of Article 8 and that this complaint should be declared admissible. As the applicants acknowledged, there was now an  <mask> provided under the Human Rights Act 1998.


57.  The applicant organisation submitted that the Government had limited themselves to a theoretical analysis of the relevant domestic law, while disregarding the particular circumstances of the case and the fact that the arbitrary application of that law had deprived it of an  <mask>. For the applicant organisation to have been able to contest the merits of the Mayor’s ban before the Administrative Court and for such an appeal to have been effective, it would have been necessary at the very least for the Mayor’s decision to be served on it 24 hours prior to the planned event. An appeal against a decision received after the time of the planned event would have been not only ineffective, but also completely meaningless.


30.  The applicant complained that owing to the systemic nature of the inadequate prison conditions he did not have any  <mask> at his disposal as regards his complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In any event, there is no evidence that the remedies which were available in theory could work effectively in practice when it came to prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners. He cited Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


140.  The Government pointed out that the secret taping had taken place at a time when the applicant had already been in custody and under direct personal observation during his interrogation. The taping had been just an auxiliary means of gathering evidence, and had for this reason been excluded by the Sofia City Court from the evidence against the applicant. The Government went on to acknowledge that until 2007 there had not been an  <mask> in respect of secret surveillance, but added that such a remedy had been put in place in 2008‑09, when Parliament had enacted amendments to the Special Surveillance Means Act 1997, Parliament’s standing rules and section 2(1) of the 1988 Act.


74.  The Government contended that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as he had not lodged an appeal against the decision of the Federal Asylum Office of 5 January 2011 in which his asylum application had been rejected under the Dublin Regulation and his transfer to Hungary ordered. However, the Court notes that, as argued by the applicant (see paragraph 61 above), the criticism raised with regard to the detention practices affecting asylum-seekers in Hungary, the conditions of their detention and the problems in relation to transferees’ access to asylum proceedings and the risk of refoulement only became widely known after the decision on the applicant’s application had been rendered. The first report of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee as regards immigration detention dated from April 2011, the UNHCR Regional Office’s letter from 17 October 2011 and the UNHCR report on Hungary as a country of asylum from April 2012. The Austrian Asylum Court’s practice of staying transfers to Hungary and seeking an update on the country of origin information concerning Hungary maintained by the Federal Asylum Office spanned the period from the end of October until December 2011. The Court is therefore able to subscribe to the applicant’s argument that at the relevant time, when he would have been able to lodge an appeal against the first-instance asylum decision and the transfer order, he was not aware of the problems that asylum-seekers faced in Hungary which were later raised by the reports mentioned above. The Court reiterates that the only remedies which are required to be exhausted under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention are those that relate to the breach alleged and are available and effective (see Diallo v. the Czech Republic, no. 20493/07, § 54, 23 June 2011). In view of the specific complaints raised by the applicant in the course of the proceedings before the Court, namely the use of immigration detention in Hungary, the conditions of detention there, the treatment of detained asylum-seekers and the lack of access to appeal proceedings, an appeal against the decision of 5 January 2011 rejecting his first asylum application would clearly not have been an  <mask>. The Court therefore rejects the Government’s contention that the applicant failed to exhaust domestic remedies in this regard.


84.  The applicant alleged that she had not had an  <mask> in respect of her complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention by which to challenge the order to leave the country. As her application to the Aliens Appeals Board to set aside that order, which was still pending, did not suspend her expulsion, she had lodged a request with that court under the extremely urgent procedure for a stay of execution of the order to leave the country, with a view to obtaining a ruling on the merits of her complaints before she was expelled. However, that procedure had proved fruitless because she had not been in detention and could therefore not establish the urgency of the situation. She stressed that the Aliens Appeals Board applied the same case-law when examining requests for interim measures as a matter of extreme urgency in the context of requests for a stay of execution under the ordinary procedure.


78.  The Government considered that as there had been no violation of Article 6, there existed no arguable claim under Article 13. Should the Court take another view, they submitted that the complaint was unfounded as the applicants had appealed against the County Administrative Board’s decision at two court levels. As to the length of the proceedings, the applicants had had an  <mask>, as proved by the fact that one of the applicants lodged a successful complaint with the Chancellor of Justice, who drew the Board’s attention to tardiness in the proceedings. The Government also relied on the principle that, although no single remedy might itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13, the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law might do so (see, for example, X v. the United Kingdom, 5 November 1981, § 60, Series A no. 46; Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, 24 June 1982, § 56, Series A no. 50; and Leander v. Sweden, 26 March 1987, §§ 77 and 81-82, Series A no. 116). In addition, the “authority” referred to in Article 13 did not necessarily have to be a judicial authority.


55.  The Government claimed that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies and to apply to the Court within six months of the date of the final decision. In particular, the applicant had failed to lodge an appeal against the investigator’s decision of 21 June 2005, whereas such a possibility was prescribed by Articles 263 and 290 of the CCP and was capable of providing redress in respect of his complaint under Article 3. However, even assuming that these appeal procedures were not an  <mask>, the applicant should have then applied to the Court within six months of the date of the investigator’s decision, which he had failed to do. As regards the civil claims lodged by the applicant on 11 September 2007 and 26 February 2009, taking into account the fact that the applicant had failed to contest the investigator’s decision of 21 June 2005, whereby the police officers’ actions had been considered to be justified, the fact of the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment had never been established. He had not been recognised as a victim and lost the right to compensation under Armenian law. Consequently, the applicant’s civil claims had had no prospects of success and had therefore not been an effective remedy.


94.  The applicant disputed the Government's objection. She stated that an administrative practice consisting in the authorities' continuing failure to conduct adequate investigations into offences committed by representatives of the federal forces in Chechnya rendered any potentially effective remedies inadequate and illusory in her case. In this connection she relied on applications submitted to the Court by other individuals claiming to be victims of similar violations, and on documents by human rights NGOs and the Council of Europe. The applicant contended that, in any event, she had repeatedly applied to law-enforcement bodies, including various prosecutors, and had actively participated in the investigation. This avenue, however, had proved futile, given that the criminal investigation had by now been pending for over six years but had failed to identify those involved in the illegal detention and disappearance of Mr Sultan Isayev despite compelling evidence confirming the involvement of federal servicemen. The applicant also argued that the Government had failed to demonstrate that a court complaint against the actions or omissions of the investigating authorities would have been an  <mask> in her situation. She stated that under domestic law a court, in examining such a complaint, could order the investigating authorities to resume the investigation or to take certain investigative measures. In this connection she pointed out that the investigation into her husband's abduction had been resumed on several occasions following her complaints to higher prosecutors; however, so far it had produced no results. The applicant therefore argued that court complaints against the investigators would not have changed the situation, and therefore she had been under no obligation to make use of that remedy. She also referred to the Court's established case-law to the effect that, in any event, the authorities had to carry out the investigation of their own motion once the matter had come to their attention, without leaving it to the initiative of the next of kin to take responsibility for the conduct of any investigative procedures. The applicant also denied the Government's allegation that she had failed to appear at the Chechen Republic Prosecutor's Office and that this had prevented the investigators from granting her the victim status. She contended that on numerous occasions she had written to, and visited in person, various prosecutors' offices in Chechnya but had never been granted victim status.


14.  The Government further argued that the applicant did not exhaust available domestic remedies in that he failed to lodge a constitutional complaint, which is an  <mask> for the length of pending proceedings. That remedy became available in the Croatian legal system on 22 March 2002, and the applicant’s inheritance proceedings were pending until 22 May 2002, i.e. until the service of the second-instance decision on his lawyer.


62.  The Government contested these claims. With respect to the costs of the proceedings in the domestic courts, they argued that there was no causal link between the length of those proceedings and the costs claimed, which, in any event, were excessive, given that they were five to seven times as high as the costs to be accorded by law. As regards the costs claimed for the constitutional complaint, they pointed out that this was not an  <mask> and, in the present case, moreover, had been clearly inadmissible.


31.  The applicant complained that his detention from 22 May 2000 to 6 September 2002 in appalling conditions had been in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Relying on Article 13 of the Convention, he further complained that he had not had at his disposal an  <mask> to obtain an improvement in the conditions of his detention. The Articles relied on read as follows:


121.  The applicant contested the Government’s submission, stating that the only supposedly  <mask>, the criminal investigation, had proved to be ineffective. As for the possibility to complain to the courts about the investigators’ acts or omissions, the applicant stated that the effectiveness of the investigation should not have depended on her efforts to point out the investigation’s deficiencies; the authorities should have taken all measures possible of their own motion.


130.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. They referred to Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allowed participants in criminal proceedings to complain to a court about measures taken during an investigation. This was an  <mask> to ensure the observation of their rights. They had also failed to claim damages in civil proceedings.


14.  The Government submitted that there was an  <mask> to address the applicant’s grievances under Article 3, which he had not availed himself of, namely a civil action in compensation against the authorities. For that reason, his complaint under Article 3 should be rejected for non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies, whereas the complaint under Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 3 was manifestly ill-founded.


19.  The Government invited the Court to reject the applicant’s complaint for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. It maintained that the applicant could have filed another constitutional complaint, after the Constitutional Court had dismissed his first one. Bearing in mind that the Constitutional Court has changed its practice in this respect, so as to comply with the Court’s case-law, the Government claimed that a complaint under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act would have been an  <mask> for the applicant’s length complaint.


93.  The applicants dispute that a remedy could still be regarded as effective where it would not be economic to bring the claim. Article 13 should be interpreted so as to make its guarantee practical and effective and genuine practical obstacles to bringing a claim undermined the effectiveness of the procedure. The Human Rights Act 1998 was of no assistance either, since it only covered events which took place after the Act came into force on 2 October 2000. While the Wright case (see paragraph 43 above) indicated that the courts could apply the Act even though the death had occurred before that date, where the circumstances were still the subject of active and ongoing controversy, this was not so in the present case. Damages would only have been available for the failure to provide an effective investigation after that date and not in relation to the death itself. Finally, the Health and Safety Executive investigation, which was still ongoing, was a mere administrative procedure which could not be an  <mask> for the purpose of Article 13.


46.  The Government argued that it had been open to the applicants to make use of the remedies provided by Article 572 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 6 of the Penitentiary Code, which applied by analogy. The Government acknowledged that the applicants in the instant case had lodged a complaint with the public prosecutor in accordance with Article 572 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They maintained that, despite it not having been satisfied immediately, it had proved an  <mask> given that applicants nos. 2 and 3 had been transferred from Menemeni police station shortly after lodging their complaint.


65.  The applicant referred to the Court’s findings in the case of Sürmeli v. Germany ([GC], no. 75529/01, ECHR 2006‑VII) to the effect that there was no  <mask> in the German legal system to complain about the length of civil proceedings. Germany had to date failed to execute that judgment by introducing an effective preventive or compensatory remedy. In particular, he had not been able to obtain redress before the Court of Appeal or the Federal Constitutional Court.


45.  The Government maintained that the applicant had at her disposal an  <mask> pursuant to section 7 of the HRA, under the 1976 Act and/or under the 1934 Act. The applicant argued that those remedies were not available to her. The Court considers that the question of the availability of effective domestic remedies prior to the above-described Supreme Court judgment in the Rabone case of February 2012 is closely linked with, and should be joined to, the merits of the related complaints under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention.


11.  The Government contested that argument. They submitted that the final domestic decision in the case had been made by the Regional Court on 26 August 2005 and that the application had been introduced only on 24 February 2007, i.e. outside the six-month time-limit prescribed in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant’s petition for review, rejected by the Supreme Court in the admissibility phase, could not be regarded as an  <mask> and did not, in their view, influence the running of the time-limit.


76.  The applicant argued, secondly, that a supervisory complaint could not be classified as an  <mask>. Such a complaint was only an administrative remedy which did not confer on him a subjective right that the proceedings be conducted within a reasonable time. It further did not have any prospects of success. The applicant pointed out that the Constitutional Court had not considered it necessary for him to lodge a supervisory complaint prior to lodging a constitutional complaint on claims of a breach of the reasonable-time requirement.


109.  The applicant disagreed with the Government’s allegation that he had not exhausted domestic remedies and claimed that he had attempted several avenues of redress. He maintained that he had not had an  <mask> for his complaint concerning the inadequate conditions of detention. He pointed out that on 4 April 2011 the Tverskoy District Court had refused to examine his complaint concerning the conditions of detention on the grounds that it was a matter that could be addressed only in the course of the administrative proceedings; he had previously attempted to pursue that avenue, but his complaint had been dismissed without examination. As regards the divergence between the Government’s account of his conditions of detention and his own, he pointed out that the Government’s claim had not been supported by evidence, whereas he had provided a report by a public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities, which had corroborated his allegations.


29.  The applicant further complained that the proceedings were unfair in that the domestic courts misapplied the domestic law, that she had not been heard during the first-instance proceedings and that the judge of the Municipal Court had been biased. She also complained that she had no  <mask> at her disposal to challenge the impartiality of the judge and, finally, that by failing to allow her to buy the flat, the domestic authorities violated her property rights.


27.  The applicant organisation submitted that, according to the domestic practice, applications filed against a public authority seeking to acknowledge a violation of the right to freedom of assembly had been regularly declared inadmissible by the Administrative Court as not falling into any of the categories listed in Articles 66-69 of the Code of Administrative Procedure. Had the applicant organisation been notified of the decision of 8 May 2008 in due time, it would have had a possibility to challenge that decision before the Administrative Court under the provisions of the Act and that court would have been obliged to take a decision within 24 hours, thereby providing an  <mask>. But since the decision was received after the planned event, a post-hoc application could not have provided an effective remedy.


152.  The applicants submitted that the consequences of transferring them to the Iraqi authorities in breach of the Court’s Rule 39 indication could not have been more serious, both as to their right to individual petition and their right to an  <mask>. Both this Court’s judgment in Paladi v. Moldova ([GC], no. 39806/05, § 92, 10 March 2009) and the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in LaGrand (judgment of 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports 2001, p. 466), on which the Government relied, made it clear that the obligation was to take all reasonable steps to comply with an indication of interim measures. Nonetheless, the Government had conceded that at no stage did they make any approach to the Iraqi authorities to investigate the possibility of detaining the applicants at the British detention facility at Basra for the matter of the few weeks or months that it would take for the legal issues to be resolved. Moreover, the Government had failed to inform either the Court or the applicants’ representatives on the morning of 31 December 2008 that they did not intend to comply with the Rule 39 indication. The Court was informed only when the transfer had taken place.


23.  The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. They had failed to intimate their intention to challenge the interim order made on 15 February 2005. It was also apparent that they were content that a hearing would not be fixed before 18 February 2005, whereas it would have been open to them to seek an earlier hearing. Furthermore, when the order became final on 17 February, there was an  <mask> in the form of a petition to the nobile officium. The applicants were well aware of that remedy, having used it effectively in the past: see BBC Petitioners at paragraph 15 above. In any event, they were afforded the opportunity to make representations on 24 March 2005 once the appeal had been determined.


73.  The applicant in the present case complained about the material conditions in two different detention facilities, namely Tunca Accommodation Centre, from which he was released on 11 November 2009 at the latest, and Fatih police station, where he was kept between 1 and 9 October 2010. Bearing in mind his allegations concerning the absence of an  <mask> in relation to the present complaint, and without prejudice to the Court’s findings on this issue under Article 13 below, the applicant was accordingly expected to lodge his application with the Court within six months from the respective dates of his release from the relevant facilities.


17.  The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been subjected to torture whilst in police custody. Relying on Articles 6 and 13, he further alleged that he had been denied a fair trial and an  <mask> in respect of his ill-treatment complaint. He maintained, in particular, that the national authorities had failed to carry out an effective official investigation capable of establishing the facts and identifying and punishing those responsible for torturing him.


26.  The Government pointed out that the proceedings in the applicants’ case were still pending and that consequently they could have lodged a constitutional complaint in line with the new case-law. Since the latter permitted the Constitutional Court not only to award compensation but also to set a time-limit for the competent court to decide the case, the Government contended that such a complaint was an  <mask> and that the Court should make an exception to the general rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, according to which an applicant is required to exhaust only the remedies available at the moment of the introduction of an application with the Court.


33.  The applicant association further argued that the fact that it had been allowed to demonstrate after the third decision of the Lesznowola Mayor had been overruled by the Mazowiecki Governor only showed that all three decisions of the mayor had lacked any justification. The third demonstration had taken place some five months later and should not be considered as remedying the banning of the two demonstrations in May 2008 and depriving the applicant association of its  <mask> in that respect.


152.  The applicants submitted that the consequences of transferring them to the Iraqi authorities in breach of the Court’s Rule 39 indication could not have been more serious, both as to their right to individual petition and their  <mask>. Both this Court’s judgment in Paladi v. Moldova ([GC], no. 39806/05, § 92, 10 March 2009) and the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in LaGrand (judgment of 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports 2001, p. 466), on which the Government relied, made it clear that the obligation was to take all reasonable steps to comply with an indication of interim measures. Nonetheless, the Government had conceded that at no stage did they make any approach to the Iraqi authorities to investigate the possibility of detaining the applicants at the British detention facility at Basra for the matter of the few weeks or months that it would take for the legal issues to be resolved. Moreover, the Government had failed to inform either the Court or the applicants’ representatives on the morning of 31 December 2008 that they did not intend to comply with the Rule 39 indication. The Court was informed only when the transfer had taken place.


42.  The Government rather attempted to diminish the importance of the County Court's delay by emphasising various mitigating factors, such as the award of compensation and the express acknowledgment of the violation, which in their view rendered the remedy effective nevertheless. Admittedly, while these factors may be of some importance in deciding whether an applicant had an effective remedy, the Court considers that they cannot be considered decisive in the present case. In particular, as already found above (see paragraph 20), the compensation awarded to the applicants was too low and thus insufficient. While it is true that this factor alone normally does not render the remedy ineffective (see paragraph 39 above), the Court notes that in the present case it was reinforced by the failure of the competent court to execute the Constitutional Court's decision in timely fashion; it being understood that the cessation of an ongoing violation is for the Court an important element of the  <mask> (see, implicitly, Cocchiarella, cited above, § 74).


38.  The applicants lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court. Although they did so at the time when the proceedings had not yet been concluded by a final decision, the Constitutional Court refused to examine it. As established in paragraph 25 above, the manner in which the applicants' complaint was dealt with by the Constitutional Court failed to meet the purpose of protection of their right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to a hearing within a reasonable time as interpreted and applied by the Court. The Court, therefore, considers that the applicants'  <mask> has not been respected (see mutatis mutandis, A. R., spol. s r. o. v. Slovakia, no. 13960/06, §§ 59-60, 9 February 2010).


50.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s  <mask> at domestic level was respected and guaranteed in full under Moldovan law. The applicant was able to complain about the alleged ill-treatment to the prosecutor. After the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings, the applicant complained to a Municipal Prosecutor and had a right of appeal against his decision. She exercised this right but her appeal was dismissed on 14 February 2005. The Government argued that these remedies were effective because both new and existing evidence was considered during the hearing and witnesses and police officers were permitted to give evidence.


54.  The Government maintained that there had been no violation of the applicant's  <mask>. They firstly submitted that under the case-law of the Supreme Court the courts had always had jurisdiction to decide on the civil action for repossession brought by an owner against a temporary occupant. Contrary to the applicant's view, the 2002 Amendments had not (re)established but merely confirmed the existence of that jurisdiction and the right of owners to sue for repossession of their property. In spite of that, the Government conceded that to lodge an appeal against the Karlovac Municipal Court's decision of 10 March 2000 – by which that court declined jurisdiction in the case – would have been futile. The appeal would have ultimately resulted only in a negative decision on the merits instead of a negative procedural decision because at the material time the decision allowing M.V. to use the applicant's flat had not yet been set aside in the administrative proceedings. However, once the Housing Commission had done so on 16 October 2000 (see paragraph 18 above), the situation became completely different and from then on to bring a (second) civil action would have resulted in a decision favourable to the applicant. Accordingly, the Government argued that at the time she introduced her application with the Court the applicant had at her disposal an effective domestic remedy for the alleged violation of her right to property.


60.  The Government submitted that the applicant should have first raised his complaints before the competent domestic authorities, including the administration of the detention facility, the prosecutors and the relevant court. They argued that he had had a right to complain of lack of medical care in detention to various authorities, but no complaints from him had been recorded by, inter alia, the prosecutors’ offices. As regards the complaints introduced by his mother, they had been examined in accordance with the applicable domestic law. The Government stressed that prior to 4 December 2013 the applicant had not applied to the courts, either with a view to instituting criminal proceedings or to obtain compensation. The Government concluded that there had been no violation of the applicant’s  <mask>.


139.  The applicants submitted that the administrative authorities’ decision to issue a permit authorising a gold mine to use the cyanidation process and these authorities’ refusal to comply with the decisions of the administrative courts constituted violations, respectively, of their right to life and their  <mask>. They relied on Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention.


40.  The applicant submitted first of all that, according to the Court’s case-law, it was not necessary to establish that there had been an actual violation of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Convention in order to complain of a violation of Article 13: the  <mask> was recognised to any person who claimed that one of those rights or freedoms had been violated provided the claim was “arguable” for the purposes of the Convention.


202.  The applicant argued, relying on the Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria case (no. 50963/99, 20 June 2002), that the competing interests of the protection of sources and information critical to national security, on the one hand, and the  <mask>, on the other, could be reconciled through a specially adapted procedure. In the present case, however, no such procedure had been available, either before United Nations bodies or before the domestic authorities.


33.  The applicant complained that his  <mask> was violated by the prosecutor’s refusal to institute criminal proceedings against the Bailiffs dealing with his case. He referred to Article 13 of the Convention. The Court recalls that the right to have criminal proceedings instituted against a third person and to have the person concerned convicted is not as such guaranteed by the Convention (see, Kubiszyn v. Poland (dec.), no. 37437/97, 21 September 1999). It therefore finds that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


12.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the Commission could not be considered an independent and impartial tribunal and that, since no appeal lay against its decision, they had been refused access to a court. On the same grounds they argued that they had been denied the  <mask> under Article 13 of the Convention.


31.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court. Even though she did so at a time when the proceedings had not yet been concluded by a final decision, the Constitutional Court refused to examine it. As established in § 18 above, the manner in which the applicant's complaint was dealt with by the Constitutional Court failed to meet the purpose of protection of her right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to a hearing within a reasonable time in a similar manner as interpreted and applied by the Court. The Court, therefore, considers that the applicant's  <mask> has not been respected (see mutatis mutandis, A. R., spol. s r. o. v. Slovakia, no. 13960/06, §§ 59-60, 9 February 2010).


30.  The applicant complains of discrimination under Article 14. He alleges that his rights under Article 6 § 1 have been subject to discrimination on the grounds of religion, political opinion or association with a national minority. He further complains that in breach of Article 13, he has not had any effective remedy before a  <mask> in respect of his alleged violations of his rights and freedoms.


177.  The applicants’ grievance under Article 9 of the Convention being arguable, the Court finds that Article 13 is applicable in the present case.  It reiterates, however, that this provision does not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State’s laws as such to be challenged before a  <mask> on the ground of being contrary to the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Maurice v. France [GC], no. 11810/03, §§ 105-108, ECHR 2005‑IX, and Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community, cited above, §§ 107-109).


84.  The Government reiterated that, in accordance with the Court's case-law concerning Article 13, where an individual had an arguable claim to have been the victim of a violation of the right set forth in the Convention, he or she should have a remedy before a  <mask> in order to have the claim decided and, if appropriate, to obtain redress (they cited Gustafsson v. Sweden, judgment of 25 April 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, p. 660, § 70). The Government averred that the applicant had had effective domestic remedies at his disposal, but had failed to use them.


47.  The applicant further maintained that neither the courts nor any other  <mask> could properly examine the risk of his being tortured in Turkmenistan. He reached this conclusion on the basis of the Government’s position, expressed in their observations, that they could not cast doubt on the assurances given by the Turkmen authorities and that they had no possibility of, or any legal basis for, seeing these assurances respected.


73.  The applicants rejected the respondent Governments’ allegations that the Court did not have jurisdiction ratione materiae to examine the present application. They pointed out that their application raised novel issues not discussed previously before the Court. They complained of the first two applicants’ conditions of detention after 8 July 2004, and of their deprivation of liberty after that date. There was nothing in the Court’s judgment of 8 July 2004 that referred to these claims. They also complained under Articles 13 and 46 of the Convention that they had no effective remedy before a  <mask> for these violations.


188.  The applicants submitted that Italy’s interceptions of persons on the high seas were not in accordance with the law and were not subject to a review of their lawfulness by a  <mask>. For that reason, the applicants had been deprived of any opportunity of lodging an appeal against their return to Libya and alleging a violation of Article 3 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.