33.  The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the legislation authorising secret surveillance in Bulgaria did not provide sufficient  <mask> and barred the authorities from giving out any information as to whether a person had been subjected to such surveillance. He further complained under Article 10 of the Convention that his first and second requests for information as to whether he had been subjected to secret surveillance had been rejected.


40.  The applicants argued that the interference had not been justified under Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, they stated that the prosecutor could have interviewed V.E. to verify his statements. They claimed that there had been no reasonable suspicion and therefore no basis for the search-and-seizure operation. In response to the Government’s assertion that the first applicant had already been warned by the police once, the applicants submitted that at that time they had presented all the necessary documents. In their view, the operation had been unlawful because the circumstances had not been pressing: the authorities had planned the operation carefully and could have sought judicial approval beforehand. The subsequent judicial review had been formalistic and had failed to provide any  <mask>, and the applicants had been unable to present their arguments. Also, it had not been necessary for the authorities to seize the computers; they could have seized only the computer products by recording them on paper or by some other means. Lastly, the applicants asserted that the computers had been retained without due consideration of the fact that they had contained personal information.


119.  The applicant contended that an investigating judge had authorised the use of special investigative measures, including the use of informants, without a thorough assessment of whether the use of such measures was justified and necessary in the circumstances of the case. Moreover, in the applicant’s view, there had not been sufficient  <mask> by informants of their position in the domestic system at the relevant time. The applicant further submitted that he had never engaged in any illegal activities. He had never requested a bribe and it had been J.K. who had entrapped him into the corrupt scheme. The applicant considered that it had been apparent from the recordings of his communication with J.K. that the latter had created the conditions for corruption and had then contacted him in order to incite him to participate in such activities. However, the domestic courts had not properly examined all the circumstances of his initial contacts with J.K. and the prosecution had failed to adequately refute his arguments of entrapment.


28.  The applicant noted that there had clearly been an interference with her right to respect for home and correspondence, and that that interference had had a basis in Finnish law. However, the quality of that law was problematic. There existed no legal safeguards whatsoever in this respect. Since very strict limits were called for as regards the conduct of searches without a warrant, the law in question did not fulfil the “in accordance with the law” requirements, as established by the Court. When searches were conducted in law offices, the safeguards against arbitrariness had to be particularly strong. It did not make any difference whether the applicant herself was suspected of an offence or not. Professional secrecy applied to all material in a lawyer's possession regardless of the capacity in which he or she had obtained it. The fact that the search had been conducted in an attorney's office only made the need for effective legal  <mask> and arbitrariness more apparent.


81.  The applicant said that while university authorities, including vice-chancellors’ offices and deaneries, were unquestionably at liberty to use the powers vested in them by law, the scope of those powers and the limits on them were also defined by law, as were the procedures by which they were to be exercised and the  <mask> of authority. In the instant case, the Vice-Chancellor had not possessed the authority or power, either under the laws in force or the Students Disciplinary Procedure Rules, to refuse students “wearing the headscarf” access to university premises or examination rooms. In addition, the legislature had at no stage sought to issue a general ban on wearing religious signs in schools and universities and there had never been support for such a ban in Parliament, despite the fierce debate to which the Islamic headscarf had given rise. Moreover, the fact that the administrative authorities had not introduced any general regulations providing for the imposition of disciplinary penalties on students wearing the headscarf in institutions of higher education meant that no such ban existed.


163.  The applicant contended that there had been interference with his private life as a result of his dismissal from the post of judge of the Supreme Court. That interference had not been lawful, as the grounds for liability for “breach of oath” had been drafted too vaguely; domestic law had not provided for any limitation periods that were applicable to the dismissal proceedings and had thus not provided adequate  <mask> and arbitrariness; moreover, it had not set out an appropriate scale of sanctions for disciplinary liability ensuring its application on a proportionate basis. For those reasons, it had not been compatible with the requirements of the “quality of law”. The applicant further asserted that the interference in question had not been necessary in the circumstances of the case.


56.  The applicant further took the view that the use of numerous further surveillance measures in addition to GPS surveillance had led to his total surveillance by the State authorities and had violated his rights under Article 8 in that the law did not contain sufficient  <mask>, in particular because no order by an independent tribunal had been necessary to authorise and supervise the surveillance measures in their entirety. A subsequent judicial review of the surveillance measures alone had not afforded sufficient protection to the persons concerned. It was carried out only if criminal proceedings were instituted at all following such a measure and if by that measure the prosecution had obtained evidence which it intended to use at the trial. Article 163f of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 32 above) had not been in force at the relevant time and, in any event, did itself not contain sufficient safeguards against abuse.


67.  The applicants submitted that the requirement of  <mask> was not met in their case. Whilst sections 44-47 of the 2000 Act were adequately accessible to the public, the authorisation and confirmation were not. Thus, a member of the public would know that a section 44 power to stop and search could be conferred on the police, but would not know at any given time or in any given place whether it had been so conferred. He could not know whether, if he went to any particular location, he would be liable to be stopped and searched and, if he were stopped and searched, he could not know whether the police officer was authorised to carry out the procedure. When, unknown to a member of the public, the power had been conferred on a constable, the constable's discretion to stop and search was broad and ill-defined, requiring no grounds of suspicion and constrained solely by the condition that it could be exercised only for the purpose of searching for articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism.


139.  The applicant submitted that, in keeping with the Court’s case-law as established in the judgments in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece ([GC], no. 30696/09, ECHR 2011) and Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 29217/12, ECHR 2014 (extracts)), the alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention had to be examined in concreto and in the light of all the facts of the case, taking into consideration the  <mask> of treatment in the country of destination and the particular vulnerability of the person concerned.


250.  The Government suggested the following remedies: complaints to the prison or prosecution authorities and complaints to the domestic courts, according to the procedures provided by the national law. The Court, taking into account its case-law as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies described above (see paragraphs 247 - 249 above), will examine the effectiveness and  <mask> of these remedies in relation to each of the applicants' complaints under Article 3 of the Convention.


46.  The Government further cited the provisions of Law no. 5378 (see paragraph 22 above) concerning the  <mask> of public buildings and spaces for persons with disabilities. They explained that the redevelopment work required for such accessibility had to be ordered within eight years of the entry into force of the Law, with the possibility of an additional maximum period of two years. They added that the Law laid down an administrative fine for failure to carry out the requisite redevelopment work within the legal time-limits.


27.  The applicant maintained that the Finnish law did not contain at the relevant time provisions governing restrictions on a bankrupt’s right to the secrecy of his correspondence. Neither the Bankruptcy Act nor the Postal Service Decree (which was not even in force at the relevant time) provided for any such restrictions. In the absence of relevant legislation, the interference with his rights was not “in accordance with the law”. In this connection the applicant recalled that in order to be a law, the rule had to be accessible and written in a form sufficiently precise to ensure foreseeability. As encroachment upon the right protected by Article 8 involved a serious invasion of privacy and violation of secrecy of correspondence, it should, therefore, be based on a law which was especially precise. It should clearly define the persons covered and the conditions in which the secrecy of correspondence could be interfered with. The internal instructions for the authorities, such as the repealed Postal Service Decree which was applied as an internal instruction within the postal service, did not meet the requirements of  <mask> and foreseeability.


29.  The Government argued that the measure satisfied the criteria of paragraph 2 of Article 8. In their submission, it had been in accordance with the law, namely, Emergency Ordinance no. 194/2002 published in the Official Gazette, and therefore fulfilled the condition of  <mask>. The Government considered that the criterion of foreseeability had also been satisfied in that section 83 of the above-mentioned ordinance provided that aliens could be banned from the country only in strictly defined circumstances, that is, if they had engaged, were engaged or had the intention of engaging in activities capable of endangering national security or public order.


98.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of foreseeability and  <mask> required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


45.  The Government further stated that  <mask> was one of the principles underpinning the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, as ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 3 December 2008, of which they quoted Article 9 § 1 (see paragraph 25 above). By the same token, referring to the provisions of Law no. 3194 on Urban Planning (see paragraph 23 above), they affirmed that the institutions and authorities, which had a duty and responsibility vis-à-vis the built environment, complied with the accessibility requirement. Therefore, according to the Government, all institutions and authorities were required to carry out the necessary redevelopment work, in line with the relevant standards of the Turkish Standards Institute, in order to render buildings, open spaces (roads, car parks, pedestrian areas, parks and pavements), transport and communications accessible.


289.  The Government pointed out, first of all, that the relevant applicants had not adduced any documents proving their title to the houses, or any detailed description of the property allegedly lost by them. The Government argued that it was incumbent on the relevant applicants to have their property rights confirmed under domestic law by the competent national authorities. They further argued that the alleged interference with the relevant applicants’ rights secured by Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been lawful, as the counter-terrorism operation in the Chechen Republic, in the context of which the strikes of 19 October 1999 had been executed, had been launched and carried out on the basis of Presidential Decrees nos. 2137, 2166 and 2155c of 30 November and 9 December 1994 and 23 September 1999 respectively, Governmental Decree no. 1360 of 9 December 1994, and the Suppression of Terrorism Act of 25 July 1998. In the Government’s submission, the aforementioned decrees, except for certain provisions, had been found compatible with the Russian Constitution by the Russian Constitutional Court. The Government insisted that all the aforementioned legal instruments had met the requirements of foreseeability and  <mask>.


110.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of foreseeability and  <mask> required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


118.  The Government claimed that in any event the damage to the applicant's property was lawful, as section 21 of the Law on Suppression of Terrorism “permits the deliberate inflicting of damage on legally-protected interests, including property rights”. In the Government's submission, the legal act had been duly published and therefore met the requirements of clarity,  <mask> and foreseeability. They also insisted that the interference in question had pursed a legitimate aim, as the counter-terrorist operation had been launched in order to suppress criminal and terrorist activity, ensure security of individuals, and protect their rights and freedoms.


95.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of foreseeability and  <mask> required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


173.  The applicant submitted that the violation of her rights had originated also in the unregulated practice of conscientious objection. The refusal of the Kraków University Hospital to provide certain services on grounds of conscientious objection constituted a failure to ensure the availability and  <mask> of reproductive health services. The public health care institutions, being public entities, had a duty to provide legal health services to the public. The State had a duty to ensure that the laws governing conscientious objection were complemented by implementing regulations or guidelines balancing the medical staff’s right to object against the patient’s rights to obtain access to lawful medical services.


52.  The Government first expressed the view that the impugned measure had been in accordance with the “law”, namely the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980, which satisfied the criteria of foreseeability and  <mask> that had emerged from the Court's case-law; on this point they cited the Tiemann v. Germany and France decision of 24 April 2000. They noted that the first applicant was familiar with the provisions of the Hague Convention since she herself had relied on Article 13 (b) in asserting her rights.


109.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of foreseeability and  <mask> required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


114.  The applicants submitted that this way of measuring the extent of dissemination did not take into account the fact that the Internet amplified material and rendered it ubiquitous and hence the possibility that, irrespective of the initial extent of its dissemination, the information concerning them could be found permanently, particularly through the use of search engines. In that connection the Court, while aware of the lasting  <mask> of any information once it is published on the Internet, notes that the applicants made no mention of any attempts to contact search‑engine operators with a view to making the information concerning them less easy to find (see Fuchsmann, cited above, § 53, and Phil v. Sweden (dec.), no. 74742/14, 7 February 2017). Moreover, the Court considers that it is not called upon to rule on the possibility that the domestic courts could have ordered measures that were less restrictive of the media outlets’ freedom of expression, given that these were not discussed before the courts in the domestic proceedings or, indeed, in the proceedings before the Court.


59.  The applicant company submitted that there had been a disproportionate interference with its freedom of expression. At the end of the proceedings, it had had to pay Ms L. a very high sum in damages (more than fifty times the average annual wage in Ireland) as well as her high legal costs, including those incurred on appeal. It was a very far-reaching interference with its right to freedom of expression that was not “prescribed by law” within the meaning of this Court’s case-law, since the domestic legal framework failed to meet the criteria of  <mask>, foreseeability and clarity. The domestic law in force at the time allowed the jury in a defamation case practically unlimited discretion in assessing damages. According to the applicant company, as seen in the present case, the trial judge was not permitted to offer any useful or meaningful guidance to the jury, such as relevant comparisons or even a range of figures. While the 2009 Act provided for guidance to be given to juries in relation to damages, it did not fundamentally alter the domestic system. There was even a risk that the amount given to Ms L. would be taken as setting a benchmark in future defamation cases.


56.  The Government contested that the telephone tapping constituted interference with the applicant’s rights. Even assuming that such interference occurred, they argued that it was done in accordance with the law, the  <mask> Act. Relying on Klass and Others v. Germany (6 September 1978, § 49, Series A no. 28), they stated that the Court had accepted that national security concerns could justify, in exceptional circumstances, measures of secret surveillance. Furthermore, the measure was authorised by the prosecutor and the applicant had the possibility to have the tapes thus obtained examined by an expert.


42.  The applicants further submitted that the judicial review of the annulment of the first applicant’s residence permit by the domestic courts had not been attended by adequate procedural safeguards. The courts had failed to request and examine its actual basis, that is scrutinise the evidence proving that he represented threat to  <mask>; moreover, the courts had directly stated that they could not subject the FSB’s submissions to judicial scrutiny (see paragraph 27 above), and had limited themselves to assessing whether the decision had been issued within the FSB’s administrative competence and in compliance with the relevant procedure.


122.  The applicants alleged that the proceedings available to Mr M. under Bulgarian law did not secure adequate protection against violations of Articles 3 and 8. That was so because, inter alia, the Supreme Administrative Court provided only a limited and formalistic review of the grounds underlying the deportation order, accepting without evidence the statements of the  <mask> Service. Furthermore, the court had failed to consider the proportionality of the impugned measure which interfered with all the applicants’ family life.


101.  The Government maintained that the issuance of the clearance had had a clear legal basis in the Lustration Act and had been necessary in the interests of  <mask>. The Lustration Act afforded comprehensive substantial and procedural guarantees, in the light of which the issuance of the applicant’s clearance was to be considered proportionate. Moreover, as from 1 January 1997, the Lustration Act had lost any legal force in Slovakia. It thus no longer prevented the applicant from living his life as he saw fit.


82.  The Government maintained that the interference pursued one or more legitimate aims: the prevention of crime, in so far as the first applicant’s own safety was concerned by the bomb threats, and the interests of  <mask> with regard to all the applicants. In each case the interference was moreover “necessary” for the achievement of the legitimate aim or aims pursued.


36.  The applicant submitted that under the Court’s case‑law sometimes the mere existence of laws authorising secret surveillance could render a person victim of an alleged breach of Article 8 of the Convention. It was not necessary to establish that he had in fact been subjected to such surveillance. The letter of the  <mask> Agency which said that it had no information that special means of surveillance had been used against the applicant was therefore irrelevant. In any event, that letter did not constitute full proof that the applicant had not been subjected to secret surveillance. When he had sought information on that issue in 2001 and 2003, the Special Surveillance Means Act 1997 had allowed a number of authorities to request the use of special means of surveillance against a person. The National Security Agency, which had been created long after that, in 2008, was the successor of only some of those authorities. A 2009 letter in which the Agency affirmed that it had no information that the applicant had been subjected to secret surveillance could not therefore show that other authorities had not sought to have the applicant subjected to such surveillance. Moreover, the law continued to be unclear as to the manner in which information about the use of special means of surveillance was to be recorded and stored. It was therefore difficult to accept that the Agency could provide full information on that point. Another reason why the information given by the Agency’s director was of dubious reliability was that by law any information relating to the use of special means of surveillance was classified, and its disclosure to an unauthorised person amounted to a criminal offence. It was therefore hard to believe that the National Security Agency would make public accurate information about the use of special means of surveillance against the applicant. The only authority, apart from a regional court, that would have been able to give comprehensive and reliable information on that point was the National Bureau for Control over Special Surveillance Means, whose creation had been mandated by the 2008 amendments to the 1997 Act.


19.  The Government submitted that the evidence proving that the applicant had posed a threat to  <mask> had been submitted to the domestic courts and duly examined by them. The evidence presented by the FSS to the Regional Court had constituted a State secret. Therefore, it had not been included in the case file but had been “reviewed” (принято на обозрение) by the court. As a result, the court had concluded that Russian national security interests outweighed the personal interests of the applicant. In addition, the applicant’s representative had failed to exercise his procedural rights and submit evidence during the examination of the appeal.


54.  The applicant did not submit a claim for pecuniary damage. As for non-pecuniary damage, she submitted that as a result of a violation of her right under Article 8 of the Convention, she had suffered from anguish and distress caused by the disruption to her family life with her husband and child and by the lack of information concerning the alleged threat she posed to Russia’s  <mask>. The applicant left the determination of the amount of compensation to the Court and requested that, given that she was an American living in Prague, any award be paid directly to her bank account outside the Russian Federation.


22.  The applicant disagreed and submitted that the domestic courts had not examined any evidence concerning the threat that he allegedly posed to  <mask>. In particular, he stated that the domestic courts had examined only the regulations concerning the FSS’s authority to take decisions and its compliance with the relevant procedure. The examination of his appeal had been conducted in camera; moreover, despite the undertaking given by his representative not to disclose information concerning the State secret concerned, the domestic courts had failed to examine concrete evidence against him.


59.  The Government did not dispute that the applicants’ removal from the territory of Moldova had constituted an interference with their private and family lives. However, that interference had been in accordance with the provisions of the Status of Aliens Act, had pursued the legitimate aim of protection of  <mask> and had been necessary in a democratic society because it had been justified by the pressing social need to ensure the nation’s safety. The Government also argued that the applicants’ families had not even attempted to visit them in Turkey during their detention and expressed the view that they would not be at any risk in Turkey. The Turkish authorities had informed the applicants’ families that the applicants had been taken into custody and the latter had been visited by family members who lived in Turkey on multiple occasions.


97.  The Government did not contest that the telephone tapping had constituted interference with the applicant’s rights. However, it had been carried out in accordance with the law, the  <mask> Act. Relying on Klass and Others (cited above, § 49), they stated that the Court had accepted that national security concerns could justify, in exceptional circumstances, measures of secret surveillance. Furthermore, the measure had been authorised by the prosecutor and the applicant had had the opportunity – of which she had availed herself – to obtain an expert examination of the evidence thus obtained.


180.  The applicant recalled that restrictions on court proceedings could only be compatible with Article 6 § 1 where they pursued a legitimate aim and there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be pursued. Further, limitations could not impair the very essence of fair trial rights and any restrictions had to be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities (citing Rowe and Davis v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28901/95, § 61, ECHR 2000‑II). Although the applicant appeared to accept that the restrictions on the procedure before the IPT pursued the legitimate aim of securing that information was not disclosed contrary to the public interest,  <mask> or the detection and prevention of serious crime, he argued that they were not proportionate and impaired the very essence of his right to a fair hearing. In particular, the applicant contended that Rule 6(2) to (5) (restrictions on disclosure and evidence), Rule 9 (secrecy of proceedings) and section 68 RIPA together with Rule 13 (the refusal to provide any reasons to unsuccessful complainants) were contrary to the principle of equality of arms.


35.  The Government thus maintained that in the present case the applicant’s deportation from the territory of Lithuania had corresponded to the legitimate aim of protecting the interests of  <mask>. On 11 June 2002 the State Security Department had started an investigation into the applicant, who was suspected of trying to set up an organisation of an anti-national character. The data collected during the investigation had proved that the applicant’s activities posed a threat to national security and public order. On that basis, the Migration Department had refused the applicant’s request for a temporary residence permit. Since all the data submitted by the State Security Department constituted State secrets, the courts had decided not to disclose it and had, exceptionally, relied on the data as evidence. However, the courts had duly examined the information marked “restricted use” and “secret”, and had found the conclusions of the State Security Department to be well reasoned. From the above, the Government deduced that the applicant’s deportation from the Republic of Lithuania had been fully compatible with the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention.


33.  The applicants said that they had had a genuine family life in Bulgaria, which had been disrupted by the first applicant’s expulsion. They conceded that this expulsion had been formally in line with the applicable provisions of the 1998 Aliens Act, but argued that domestic law had failed to provide sufficient safeguards against arbitrary action on ostensible  <mask> grounds. In particular, while the first applicant had been able to institute judicial review proceedings against the order for his expulsion, the courts had not properly scrutinised this decision and had refused to examine its proportionality. The only piece of evidence used to justify the conclusion that he was a national security risk had been a “proposal” containing information allegedly gathered through secret surveillance. However, the primary material from that surveillance had not been made available to the courts. The courts had thus surrendered their function of reviewing the exercise of the executive’s discretion and the lawfulness of its actions, thereby depriving the applicants of the minimum degree of protection against arbitrariness.


48.  The Government noted that the necessity of the measure had been assessed twice, with a possibility of rejection – first by the Attorney General and subsequently by the Vilnius Regional Court. The contested operational measure had been necessary and had been applied in the interests of  <mask>, public safety and the prevention of crime. The authorities had had operational information about the applicant’s possible involvement in criminal activities. The applicant had close connections with J.B. and persons from J.B.’s milieu. Most importantly, in the course of the operational investigation in respect of J.B., the authorities had learned about his threats to the State President. That information had later been confirmed when intercepting the applicant’s telephone conversation with J.B., in which the latter used psychological pressure and demanded that his requirements be reported to the head of State. Subsequently, J.B. had been convicted of having threatened the State President. The Government also observed that both J.B. and the applicant had had close relations with the State President and had played a significant role in the political activities of the President’s political party and his electoral campaign; at the time of surveillance the applicant had been a member of the Vilnius City Municipal Council. In this connection the Government also referred to the Court’s judgment in Craxi v. Italy (no. 2) (no. 25337/94, § 64, 17 July 2003), submitting that politicians inevitably and knowingly laid themselves open to close scrutiny by both journalists and the public at large. Therefore, even acknowledging that no investigation had been carried out by the SSD in order to reveal the circumstances in which the journalists had obtained the recording of the intercepted conversation, the question of fulfilment of the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention could not arise.


27.  The applicants stated that they did not question the FSS’s authority to issue exclusion orders. They stressed, however, that there had been no factual basis for such a decision to be taken in respect of the first applicant. They submitted that the Regional FSS had not furnished any evidence of a threat posed by the first applicant to  <mask> and that the domestic courts had not given them a chance to refute the allegations. The examination of their appeal against the exclusion order had been carried out in camera; despite the fact that they had given undertakings of confidentiality, the domestic courts had failed to disclose to them any evidence against the first applicant. In particular, in reply to the representative’s request that the FSS officer cite a single concrete fact indicating the first applicant’s threat to State security, the latter refused (with the judge’s approval) to provide such information. The FSS case file submitted to the Regional Court had been examined by the judge for only five minutes and neither the second applicant nor the representative had been allowed to see any of its contents. In addition, after the imposition of the exclusion order against the first applicant, the FSS had denied any involvement in the matter; this had prevented the applicants from lodging an appeal in a timely manner against the exclusion order with the domestic courts.


31.  The Government contested that the applicant’s exclusion from Russia had violated his right to respect for his family life. They submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right had complied with Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, the decision to exclude him had been taken within the competence of the Federal Security Service and had been dictated by the need to protect Russia’s  <mask>. The relevant procedure had also been complied with. They stated in general terms that “in refusing to grant the appeal, the courts had information which served as the basis for the decision [to exclude the applicant]”. They further stressed that the applicant’s exclusion for five years was not disproportionate as such a ban appeared reasonable in comparison with the one of ten years imposed on the applicant in Lupsa v. Romania (no. 10337/04, ECHR 2006‑VII). Furthermore, referring to the cases of Samsonnikov v. Estonia (no. 52178/10, 3 July 2012) and Senchishak v. Finland (no. 5049/12, 18 November 2014), the Government argued that the applicant was not a long-term migrant as he had not grown up in Russia. Therefore his move to Kazakhstan had not represented an extreme hardship for him.


20.  The Government contended that there was another characteristic which distinguished the present case from the previous judgments of Sidabras and Džiautas and Rainys and Gasparavičius, in which the Court had found a violation of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8. In the latter cases the statutory restrictions on holding certain jobs, functions or tasks were automatically applied to the applicants merely on the ground that at a certain time they had worked for the Committee of State Security of the Lithuanian SSR. However the Law applied to the applicant in the present case did not impose unconditional restrictions on a person’s employment. First, the person had to have intentionally collaborated in secret with the special services of the former USSR. Secondly, by the statutory deadline, the individual concerned had to have failed to confess to the State authorities about his or her secret collaboration. Thirdly, after the failure to confess, the fact of that person’s secret collaboration had to have been published in the “Official Gazette”. The Government maintained that 1,500 people had appeared before the Commission to admit their collaboration within the six-month period prescribed by the Law. The applicant had been free to take this step – if he had confessed, he would have avoided the unfavourable legal consequences. However, as the applicant had intentionally chosen not to confess about his past collaboration within the above-mentioned period, the State had had the right and duty to apply to him the employment-related restrictions. Moreover, under Article 8 of the Law, information concerning persons who had confessed about their collaboration in the past was to be classified as a State secret and the State assumed the obligation to protect them against possible blackmail and the declassification of information. Taking this into consideration, the Government argued that the State had not overstepped its margin of appreciation and that the Law constituted a proportionate measure to safeguard  <mask> and to protect the applicant’s rights under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention.


147.  The Government also insisted that any interference pursued a legitimate aim. The Government emphatically denied, in this regard, the applicant's allegation that interception was being used to intimidate him and undermine his business activities. The three relevant objectives set out in section 5(3) RIPA, namely safeguarding  <mask>, preventing or detecting serious crime and safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, were all legitimate aims for the purposes of Article 8(2).


351.  The Government submitted that at the time when the new State was being created, the independence legislation had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting  <mask>. Moreover, the right for the State to control the entry and residence of aliens within its territory presupposed that it could take dissuasive measures, such as deportation, against persons infringing immigration laws (see paragraph 325 above).


34.  The Government submitted that Article 8 was not applicable in the present case as that provision did not guarantee a right to retain employment or to choose a profession. They further stated that, in any event, the application of the KGB Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of protecting  <mask> and was necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, the KGB Act constituted no more than a justified security screening measure intended to prevent former employees of a foreign secret service from working not only in State institutions but also in other spheres of activity which were important to the State’s national security. The KGB Act itself did not impose collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. It provided for individualised restrictions on employment prospects by way of the list of positions in the former KGB which warranted application of the restrictions under section 2 of the KGB Act (see paragraph 27 above). The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in section 3 of the KGB Act showed that there existed a well-founded suspicion that the applicants lacked loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Given that not all former employees of the KGB were affected by the KGB Act, Article 14 of the Convention was not applicable. Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 8 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.


137.  The Government submitted that any interference which may have arisen in the present case satisfied the requirements of Article 8 § 2. The Government emphasised the duty of democratic governments to uphold the criminal law and protect citizens from terrorist threats and organised crime. In order to discharge this duty, the power to intercept the communications of specific targets was necessary. They pointed to the Commissioner's consistent conclusions that the interception powers under RIPA were an invaluable weapon for the protection of  <mask> and the fight against organised crime (see paragraphs 64 and 72 above). Further, in order for interception to yield useful intelligence, the fact of the interception, as well as the methods by which it could be effected, had to be kept secret. If possible targets were able to gain insight into sensitive interception techniques and capabilities, then they would be able to take steps to undermine the usefulness of any intelligence gathered against them. The Government explained that they had had experience of information about surveillance techniques being put in the public domain, which had led directly to the loss of important sources of intelligence. They insisted that their policy of “neither confirm nor deny” was important to ensure the overall effectiveness of surveillance operations.


90.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s fears were groundless in view of the prohibition in section 44a of the Aliens Act 1998 on the expulsion of aliens to a country where their health or life would be in jeopardy. The order to expel him had been intended to protect the  <mask> of Bulgaria. However, its enforcement was subject to the provisions of section 44a, which coincided with the principles underlying Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention. The practice in such cases was for the competent authorities, which worked in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and non‑governmental organisations, to verify the issue upon expulsion of their own motion. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs kept an updated list of safe third countries that could receive individuals in the applicant’s position. The authorities were thus complying with the absolute prohibition of Article 3 of the Convention, and, unlike the situation obtaining in Saadi v. Italy ([GC], no. 37201/06, ECHR 2008‑...), were not seeking to balance national security considerations against the risk of ill‑treatment faced by the applicant. The bar in section 44a applied to all aliens, including those subject to expulsion orders on national security grounds.


23.  The applicant contested the Government’s argument that his complaints were time-barred. He pointed out that, by the end of 2006 when the expulsion order against him had been issued, the Supreme Administrative Court had given numerous decisions accepting for examination applications for judicial review of similar expulsion orders based on  <mask> grounds. This meant that the judicial review that he had sought had been a normal remedy, which he had had to exhaust.


89.  The applicants alleged two separate violations of Article 8. The first concerned Mr M.’s detention, which in their view interfered in an arbitrary and disproportionate manner with their right to respect for their private and family life. The second concerned Mr M.’s deportation, which was arbitrary. The applicants averred that there was no evidence of any involvement of Mr M. in organising illegal border crossings and that in any event such activities could not be reasonably interpreted as a threat to  <mask>. The applicants also claimed that domestic law did not require that evidence of the alleged unlawful activities be presented to and examined by an independent authority.


15.  The Government claimed in addition that the Bulgarian authorities had “proven” that the first applicant’s expulsion had been justified and that it was “indisputable” that he had posed a threat to  <mask>. They considered that the Supreme Administrative Court had conducted a “thorough and comprehensive” review of the allegations against the first applicant, giving “convincing, albeit laconic”, reasons for its decision to uphold the expulsion order.


30.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with his rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of  <mask>, public safety, for the prevention of disorder and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


71.  The Government submitted that the requirement of lawfulness under the Convention was met in the present case by a combination of the legislative provisions; the information given to individuals following a search under section 44; the precise instructions in the Code on how search powers were to be exercised; and the availability of court proceedings to challenge the use of those powers by the police in individual cases. Sections 44-45 of the 2000 Act were clear as to their effect. They gave notice to citizens that they might be required to submit to a stop and search and provided safeguards against abuse, well in excess of provisions of national law that the Court or Commission in cases had held to be sufficiently foreseeable in the  <mask> context (as in, for example, Brind v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 18714/91, 9 May 1994; Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963/99, §§ 117-129, 20 June 2002; Esbester v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 18601/91, 2 April 1993).


74.  The Government submitted that the first applicant had been refused a residence permit and had been administratively removed from Russia because he presented a danger to  <mask>. They refused to produce copies of the materials from the Federal Security Service which had served as a basis for the refusal of a residence permit or copies of the minutes of the domestic hearings, stating that these were confidential documents. They submitted that the confidential materials had been examined by the domestic courts, which had found that certain factors warranting the refusal of a residence permit to the first applicant had indeed been uncovered by the security services. The sources of the security services’ information had not, however, been subject to judicial review.


16.  The applicants disagreed. They pointed out that they had lived as a family in Bulgaria and that there was no doubt that the first applicant’s expulsion represented an interference with their right to family life. They argued that the measures against the first applicant had been arbitrary, since the allegations against him had remained unproven and had been unsupported by any evidence. Moreover, according to the applicants it was doubtful whether some of the actions alleged on the first applicant could indeed be seen as impinging upon the  <mask> of Bulgaria. Lastly, the Supreme Administrative Court had applied a formalistic approach, failing to verify the executive’s allegations against the first applicant, and had failed to respond in a meaningful manner to his arguments related to his right to family life.


36.  The applicant further submitted that the Government had failed to comply with the Court’s request to produce documents serving to substantiate the authorities’ allegations that she posed a threat to  <mask>. Given that no explanations for such a failure had been given, the applicant, referring to Benzer and Others v. Turkey (no. 23502/06, § 160, 12 November 2013), invited the Court to draw inferences from the Government’s failure to furnish all necessary facilities to the Court in its task of establishing the facts.


20.  The applicants argued that they had had a genuine family life in Bulgaria, which had been disrupted by the first applicant's expulsion. They conceded that this expulsion had been formally in line with the applicable provisions of the 1998 Aliens Act, but argued that domestic law failed to provide sufficient safeguards against arbitrary action on ostensible  <mask> grounds. In particular, although the first applicant had been able to challenge before a court the order for his expulsion, the courts had failed to properly scrutinise that order and to exercise full judicial review. The first applicant had not been informed of the factual grounds that had led the authorities to the conclusion that he represented a threat to national security and in the judicial proceedings he had not been given a meaningful opportunity to disprove these allegations. Furthermore, the courts had failed to examine the proportionality of the first applicant's expulsion in view of the applicants' right to family life guaranteed under the Convention.


29.  The Government argued that the measure satisfied the criteria of paragraph 2 of Article 8. In their submission, it had been in accordance with the law, namely, Emergency Ordinance no. 194/2002 published in the Official Gazette, and therefore fulfilled the condition of accessibility. The Government considered that the criterion of foreseeability had also been satisfied in that section 83 of the above-mentioned ordinance provided that aliens could be banned from the country only in strictly defined circumstances, that is, if they had engaged, were engaged or had the intention of engaging in activities capable of endangering  <mask> or public order.


27.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant was no longer living in the area where he allegedly had had his “home”. In any event, the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with his rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of  <mask>, public safety, for the prevention of disorder and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


54.  The Government emphasised that it was not in dispute that from 1980 until 1991 the applicant had worked as a driver in the KGB. Furthermore, the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life was in accordance with law and it was necessary in a democratic society in the interests of  <mask>, public safety and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Government pointed out that for the transfer from a totalitarian regime to a democratic system, Estonia took various measures which, in aggregate, had to ensure the development and security of the democratic system. Criminal liability for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed under the totalitarian regime was established and an obligation to take an oath of conscience was introduced for those seeking the highest offices in the country. The Disclosure Act dealt with the persons who had not committed any crimes but had been employed by or collaborated with the intelligence or counterintelligence authorities of the States which had occupied Estonia. It was found that such persons had to come to terms with their past and not to try to forget, conceal or be silent about it. There was also a significant public interest in the publicity of information relating to the past; this had to guarantee transparency and clarity as well as overall internal peace in the society. Obtaining complete information about the members and agents of the security and intelligence authorities which had operated on the territory of Estonia was also important for the protection of independence and security of the Republic of Estonia. Estonia was lacking the relevant information; such information, including the lists of persons who had worked in the KGB, was in the hands of foreign States. There could be attempts to recruit former staff of the security authorities and make them perform security or intelligence tasks, or they could be subject to blackmailing. Such situation was dangerous and damaging for Estonia. The Government referred to recent cases where former employees or collaborators of the KGB had provided a foreign country with state secrets leading to their conviction of treason.


77.  The applicant submitted that there had been a difference in treatment between “traditional” Russian religions and those that were perceived as having foreign origins, in that only the latter were singled out in Russia’s  <mask> Concept as being a “negative influence” and posing a threat to national security. The extreme measure of excluding him from Russia, where he had engaged in the lawful and peaceful manifestation of his religious beliefs, had served no legitimate purpose and had also been disproportionate to whatever aim had been pursued.


28.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant complaints were only in respect of “field plots” and not in respect of her “home”. Moreover, she was no longer living in the area where she alleged she had had her “home”. In any event, the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with her rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of  <mask>, public safety, for the prevention of disorder and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


80.  The applicant further argued that the interference did not pursue a legitimate aim. The authorities did not seek to protect  <mask>, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, or to prevent disorder or crime. As to the protection of the health and morals of others, there was no indication that the applicant represented a threat to the rights of third parties. Finally, with regard to the applicant himself, the Government did not suggest that the incapacitation had had a therapeutic effect on the applicant. Nor was there any evidence that the authorities had sought to deprive the applicant of his capacity because he would otherwise have carried out actions which would result in a deterioration of his health. With regard to his own pecuniary interests, the protection of a person’s own rights is not a ground listed in Article 8 § 2, and it cannot therefore serve as a justification for interfering with a person’s rights as protected under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. In sum, the interference with his private life did not pursue any of the legitimate aims listed in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


133.  The applicant argued that the Court's decisions in Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 30 July 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑V; Huvig v. France, 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176‑B; Kruslin v. France, 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176‑A; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, ECHR 2000‑II; Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963/99, 20 June 2002; and Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, ECHR 2000‑V had expanded on the issue of “foreseeability” and indicated a departure from the narrower scope of earlier decisions which tolerated the restrictive extent to which  <mask> had imposed blanket secrecy on the publication of surveillance procedures. This broader approach had been confirmed by the Court's recent ruling in Liberty and Others, cited above. The applicant argued that the RIPA scheme remained “unnecessarily opaque” and that further details about the operation, beyond those currently included in the Code, should be made available in order to comply with the Convention requirements regarding clarity and precision.


215.  The Government argued that the authorities were entitled to rely on the advice of the consultees without requiring further environmental information or the detail of any of the studies. Such assessments were made in the context of the HSE’s detailed assessment and acceptance of the risks, continuing regulatory duties, MHPA’s duties and the obvious interest of the operators in the safe operation of the Milford Haven port. Both operators were under an obligation to provide safety reports pursuant to the COMAH Regulations, although these reports had not been made public for reasons of  <mask>. The HSE reviewed the reports in respect of its regulation of the shoreside risks. In deciding whether it had enough information to permit the LNG terminals to proceed, the relevant authorities were entitled to weigh all the evidence before them and were entitled to conclude that the grant of permissions and consents struck a fair balance and was proportionate, bearing in mind the overall assessment of the acceptability of the LNG terminals.


28.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with his rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of  <mask>, public safety, for the prevention of disorder and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


83.  The Government submitted that they were at a loss to understand the reason why the first applicant should claim at all that the Security Police’s registration and filing of information concerning threats against her were not in her best interests but, on the contrary, entailed a violation of her rights under the Convention. The information that had been released to the other four applicants was highly varied in nature. Most of it appeared to have been found in the public domain, such as the media. The Government were unaware of the origins of each and every piece of information, and therefore could not comment on that particular aspect. They noted, however, that from today’s perspective the information seemed either fairly old or quite harmless and that the interference was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, namely the protection of  <mask>.


141.  The Government stated that there had been no interference with the first applicant's right to teach religion. His deportation had not been a reaction against his religious classes - which had been lawful - but had been based on the assessment that his religious activities had constituted a thread to  <mask>. Furthermore, Mr Al-Nashif had voluntarily abandoned teaching after service of the deportation order and would not be able to restart as new instructions issued by the Chief Mufti Office after his deportation prohibited religious instruction by persons lacking appropriate religious education. The Government further stated that religious freedoms in Bulgaria were guaranteed and that the authorities strictly adhered to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of religious communities and regularly allowed visits by foreigners coming to teach religion.


22.  The applicants argued that the first applicant had been expelled from Bulgaria on the basis of general allegations made by the  <mask> Service, unsupported by any evidence. The failure to mention specific dates, places or facts in proposal no. B849 concerning the first applicant meant that he had been unable to present meaningful evidence to refute the allegations against him. Moreover, according to the applicants some of these allegations, such as the ones concerning extortion, drug trafficking or smuggling, could not justify a conclusion that he represented a threat to national security. In addition, the Supreme Administrative Court had failed to review the executive’s allegations, considering merely that it was bound by them. It failed to assess the proportionality of the measures against the first applicant and to comment on his arguments related to his family life.


35.  The Government submitted that the applicant did not have the status of a victim and that there had been no interference with his right to respect for his private life or his correspondence, because, as evident from the letter of the  <mask> Agency, he had not been subjected to secret surveillance. His supposition that he had been subjected to such surveillance, formed wrongly on the basis of random incidents, was erroneous. A perusal of his applications and requests showed that he had mistakenly interpreted certain facts. By law, the class of persons who could be subjected to surveillance was quite limited, as were the authorities which could request such surveillance. In that connection, it was not to be overlooked that in 2008‑09 the Special Surveillance Means Act 1997 and the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act 1988 had been amended, reinforcing the relevant safeguards. The law now provided for judicial authorisation of secret surveillance and for written notification of those concerned in cases of unlawful surveillance. Moreover, the 1988 Act provided for State liability in cases of unlawful surveillance.


145.  The Government emphasised that information concerning the arrangements put in place under section 15 RIPA had been published in the Code. However, in order to maintain the operational effectiveness of interception techniques, it was not possible to publish full details of the arrangements. In the view of the Government, the publication of any more detail than had already been published would be contrary to  <mask> and prejudicial to the prevention and detection of serious crime. They argued that the decision as to how much information on safeguards could safely be put in the public domain without undermining the interests of national security or prejudicing the prevention and detection of serious crime fell within their margin of appreciation. It was also significant that the full details of the arrangements in place were made available to the Commissioner, who was required to keep them under review. The Government emphasised that the Commissioner's approval was sought and given in respect of the safeguard documents either before or shortly after the entry into force of RIPA (see paragraph 63 above). They further emphasised that the Commissioner had expressed his satisfaction with the section 15 safeguards in every report prepared since 2000. They referred in particular to the Commissioner's 2002 and 2004 reports (see paragraphs 68 to 69 above).


66.  The Government put forward a number of aims pursued by the impugned restriction which appeared to follow closely the text of the Preamble to the HIV Prevention Act (see paragraphs 16 and 40 above). They did not explain how the alleged threats to  <mask> and to the existence of humankind were relevant to the applicant’s individual situation, what socio-economic or demographic consequences his presence in the Russian territory could entail or why the refusal of a residence permit would enhance the protection of the rights and interests of others. It transpires nevertheless from the Constitutional Court’s decision that the restriction on temporary residence of HIV-positive foreign nationals had the aim of ensuring the protection of public health (see paragraph 25 above). While that aim is without doubt legitimate, it does not in itself establish the legitimacy of the specific treatment afforded to the applicant on account of his health status. It has to be ascertained whether there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the aim pursued and the means employed.


20.  The Government argued that the application was time-barred, as it had not been submitted within six months of the date on which the order for the applicant’s expulsion was issued (6 November 2006) or of the date on which the applicant had left Bulgaria (29 October 2006). The Government were of the view that the six-month time-limit under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention had started running on one of these dates, because at that time the Aliens Act did not provide expressly for judicial review of expulsion orders based on  <mask> grounds. The Government relied in this regard on the Court’s findings in the case of Danawar v. Bulgaria ((dec.), no. 52843/07, 20 January 2015).


52.  The applicants submitted that, although the national courts had agreed to examine the first applicant’s application for judicial review, they had not in fact considered his arguments relating to the lawfulness of his expulsion. Both levels of court had held that the assertions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were sufficient to show that the first applicant represented a  <mask> risk. Moreover, the courts had refused to examine the proportionality of his expulsion. None of these defects could be remedied by the April 2007 amendment to the 1998 Aliens Act, firstly because that amendment had come into force after the first applicant’s case had been examined, and secondly because it did not contain any guarantees that the courts would not continue to take a formalistic approach. The crux of the problem was not the availability of proceedings by which to challenge expulsion orders, but the manner in which the courts scrutinised their legality in the course of such proceedings. The approach adopted in the first applicant’s case could not provide any guarantees against arbitrary action and effectively vindicate his Convention rights.


208.  The Government submitted that supervision of operational-search activities, including interceptions of telephone communications, was exercised by the President, Parliament and the government. In particular, the President determined the  <mask> strategy and appointed and dismissed the heads of all law-enforcement agencies. There was also a special department within the President’s Administration which supervised the activities of the law-enforcement agencies, including operational-search activities. That department consisted of officials from the Ministry of the Interior and the FSB who had the appropriate level of security clearance. Parliament participated in the supervision process by adopting and amending laws governing operational-search activities. It could also form committees and commissions and hold parliamentary hearings on all issues, including those relating to operational-search activities, and could hear the heads of law-enforcement agencies if necessary. The government adopted decrees and orders governing operational-search activities and allocated the budgetary funds to the law-enforcement agencies.


40.  The Government submitted that the applicant still lived in the Oryol Region and that, given his family ties and health condition, he had not been deported. The refusal of a residence permit did not interfere with his right to respect for his family life and, even assuming that it did, such interference had a legal basis in section 7(1)(13) of the Foreign Nationals Act. It was also justified by the Russian authorities’ concerns about the massive spread of the HIV epidemic and its socio-economic and demographic consequences in the Russian Federation, the threat it posed to personal, public and  <mask> and to the existence of humankind, and the need to ensure the protection of the rights and lawful interests of the population. The refusal of a residence permit was a necessary measure directed at preventing and combating HIV infection.


112.  The Government further argued that States had a wide margin of appreciation in matters of  <mask>, as well as in matters relating to general measures of economic and social strategy (they referred to James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 46, Series A no. 98, and National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 23 October 1997, § 80, Reports 1997‑VII). Because of their direct knowledge of the society and its needs, the national authorities were better placed than the international judge to appreciate what was “in the public interest”. The Court should respect the legislature’s policy choice unless it was “manifestly without reasonable foundation”.


71.  The applicants submitted that the refusal of a residence permit to the first applicant and his subsequent administrative removal to China had been unlawful and had not been “necessary in a democratic society”. Firstly, Instruction no. 0300 of 4 December 2003, which provided a legal basis for the Federal Security Service’s refusal of permission to grant a residence permit and on which the domestic courts relied in their judgments, had not been published. Secondly, a residence permit had been refused by reference to  <mask> considerations. To establish the risk to national security, the domestic courts had relied on classified materials from the Federal Security Service. However, they had declined to examine any evidence confirming the information contained in those materials, finding that the Federal Security Service’s sources of information were not subject to judicial scrutiny. Nor had the courts verified whether the alleged actions indeed presented a danger to national security, finding that the security services had unfettered discretion in such matters. Accordingly, in the applicants’ opinion, the judicial scrutiny had been excessively restricted in scope.


176.  The Government finally noted that the IPT's ruling was issued before the Court's judgment in Association for European Integration and Human Rights, cited above, § 106, in which the Court reached the conclusion that Article 6 § 1 did not apply to such proceedings. It was clear that secret powers of interception which were used solely in the interests of  <mask> or in order to prevent and detect serious crime formed part of the “hard core of public authority prerogatives”, such that it was inappropriate to classify any related rights and obligations as “civil” in nature (citing Ferrazzini, § 29; and Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, § 61, ECHR 2007‑IV).


25.  The Government submitted that the evidence proving the threat posed by the first applicant to  <mask> had been duly examined by the domestic courts. The classified evidence furnished by the FSS to the Regional Court had been reviewed without it being included in the case file. The information furnished by the executive had enabled the court to conclude that the first applicant’s exclusion had been substantiated and that the order had been issued within the scope of the FSS’s powers. The examination of the appeal had been held in camera in the presence of the second applicant and the applicants’ representative, who had failed to exercise their right to submit evidence. Having examined the information submitted by the Regional FSS and considered the applicants’ family situation, the court had found that the public interest prevailed over the private interests of the applicants.


230.  The Government argued in particular that the refusal to grant any civilian access to Gulistan was justified by the security situation pertaining in and around the village. While referring briefly to their obligations under international humanitarian law, the Government relied mainly on interests of defence and  <mask> and on their obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to protect life against dangers emanating from landmines or military activity.


76.  The Government concluded from the above that the applicant’s administrative removal from Russia had been lawful and proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting  <mask> because the public interest prevailed over the applicants’ private interests. In any event, the second, third and fourth applicants were free to leave Russia if they wanted to reunite with the first applicant.


32.  The applicant maintained his complaint. He stressed, in particular, that he was not questioning the lawfulness of his exclusion, but the lack of proof justifying that measure. The applicant pointed out that the Russian courts which had examined his appeals against the exclusion had not allowed for the relevant procedural guarantees as no evidence had been presented and examined by them in order to verify the Federal Security Service’s claim of his being a threat to  <mask>. Referring to the cases of Boultif v. Switzerland (no. 54273/00, ECHR 2001‑IX) and Al‑Nashif v. Bulgaria (no. 50963/99, 20 June 2002), the applicant submitted that his exclusion had been disproportionate and had failed to balance the interests of the State against his right to respect for his family life. He stressed that the exclusion had had the effect of disrupting his family life with his wife and children, who were minors.


32.  The Government submitted that Article 8 was not applicable in the present case as that provision did not guarantee a right to retain employment or to choose a profession. They further stated that, in any event, the application of the Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of protecting  <mask> and was necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, the Act constituted no more than a justified security screening measure intended to prevent former employees of a foreign secret service from working not only in State institutions but also in other spheres of activity which were important to the State's national security. The Act itself did not impose collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. It provided for individualised restrictions on employment prospects by way of the adoption of “the list” of positions in the former KGB which warranted application of the restrictions under Article 2 of the Act. The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in Article 3 of the Act showed that there existed a well-founded suspicion that the applicants lacked loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Given that not all former employees of the KGB were affected by the Act, Article 14 of the Convention was not therefore applicable. Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 8 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.


43.  The applicant stated that the domestic courts could not examine the applicability of Article 44a of the Aliens Act as their review was limited solely to the issue of the lawfulness of the order. He further claimed that the only procedure where the applicant’s grievances under Article 3 could be considered was the asylum procedure. However, possible proceedings under the Law on Asylum and Refugees were not capable of barring the expulsion of individuals who were considered a threat to  <mask>.


132.  The applicant relied on the Court's judgment in Liberty and Others, cited above, as to the lack of clarity of the relevant provisions of RIPA's predecessor, the Interception of Communications Act 1985, and argued that the changes introduced to the surveillance regime by RIPA were inadequate to address the flaws identified in that case. He concluded that any interference therefore automatically failed to meet the requirement that it must be in accordance with the law and relied in this regard on the conclusions of a report by a surveillance law expert instructed by him, Dr Goold, appended to his submissions. He further highlighted the conclusion of the Court in Liberty and Others, cited above, § 68, that the fact that extracts of the code of practice adopted under section 71 RIPA were in the public domain suggested that it was possible for a State to make public certain details about the operation of a scheme for external surveillance without compromising  <mask>.


21.  The applicant maintained her complaint. She submitted that the psychiatrists had acted in response to the letter they had received from the police. Neither the police nor the Government had shown that there had been any actual complaints about the applicant’s behaviour. The interference with her private life had neither been in accordance with law nor necessary in a democratic society. The head of the police department had acted in contravention of the Federal Police Act, which contained an exhaustive list of the circumstances allowing the collection of personal data by the police. The applicant’s situation had not fallen within the ambit of the relevant provisions. The applicant had not been a threat to  <mask> or public order or to the economic well-being of the country. Nor had the authorities been in possession of any information to the contrary. The aim of the police had been to put an end to the applicant’s activities. For years she had been a human rights activist. She had lodged many complaints about inactivity and corruption of the municipal authorities acting in the interests of the persons living in the area. As regards the wording of the letter of 15 January 2014, the applicant submitted that, according to the Ozhegov Dictionary of the Russian Language, the term “to examine (check) (проверить)” meant


34.  The applicant alleged that the revocation of her residence permit had adversely affected her right to respect for family life, as it had deprived her of any legal basis to remain in Russia, made her liable to deportation with a five-year re-entry ban and disrupted her family life with her husband and minor child in Russia. She further submitted that the judicial review of the impugned measure by the domestic courts had not been attended by adequate procedural safeguards, as it had been limited in scope, had not been adversarial and had taken place after the measure had been carried out. Moreover, the courts had not conducted a meaningful balancing exercise between the  <mask> interests and her right to respect for family life.


116.  The Government submitted that the secret surveillance of the applicant’s telephone conversations was justified for the purpose of investigating the information received at the NSS suggesting that the organisation led by the applicant was carrying out activities aimed at overthrowing the government through unconstitutional means. The interference was in accordance with the law since the grounds and the procedure for it were prescribed by the CCP. It pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in the interests of  <mask> and for the prevention of disorder and crime.


689.  The Government contended that the search of the homes and offices of certain applicants, and the confiscation of personal items and files, was in accordance with the law, namely Article 11 of the Law on the State of Emergency No. 2935, Article 3 of Decree No. 430 for the state of emergency region and Articles 90 to 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They were necessary under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention in the interests of  <mask>, public safety, for the prevention of disorder and crime, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others from terrorist attack. Furthermore, these matters did not raise any issue under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as any interference with the applicants' property was justified in the public interest, within the meaning of that provision. In this connection, the Government emphasised that the searches in the present case were part of an operation against the PKK, an illegal terrorist organisation responsible for thousands of atrocious murders and maimings, as well as serious economic and social losses.


202.  The applicant argued, relying on the Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria case (no. 50963/99, 20 June 2002), that the competing interests of the protection of sources and information critical to  <mask>, on the one hand, and the right to an effective remedy, on the other, could be reconciled through a specially adapted procedure. In the present case, however, no such procedure had been available, either before United Nations bodies or before the domestic authorities.


32.  The Government submitted that the interference in question had been prescribed by law and had pursued a number of legitimate aims, namely the protection of  <mask>, territorial integrity, public safety, public order and prevention of crime. They also claimed that the restriction had been necessary in a democratic society because it had been carried out as a result of a pressing social need and had been proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. They concluded that, in the exercise of their discretion, the prison authorities had decided not to allow the impugned letter to be sent outside.


40.  The Government submitted that if the Court concluded that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life and correspondence, which they disputed, then the alleged interference had been in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society for the protection of  <mask> and the prevention of disorder or crime. Additionally, the alleged “legislative interference” had been justified in the interests of public safety and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as set forth in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


49.  The applicants argued that they had been forced to leave Romania as a result of the measure taken against the first applicant, that being their only choice for re-establishing their family life. They further argued that the prosecutor could not justify the issuing of the order of 25 March 2003 and that the first applicant had not been engaged in any activities that would pose a threat to  <mask>.


24.  The Government maintained that the factual grounds for the first applicant’s deportation were based on information lawfully obtained by the competent administrative body, the  <mask> Service. This information was not refuted during judicial review at two levels of jurisdiction. The balance between the first applicant’s rights and the public interest had been respected. Furthermore, in case of expulsion the applicants could settle in the first applicant’s country of origin or another country of their choice.


53.  The Government submitted that the section 3(2) warrant regime was proportionate and “necessary in a democratic society”. Democratic States faced a growing threat from terrorism, and as communications networks became more wide-ranging and sophisticated, terrorist organisations had acquired ever greater scope to operate and co-operate on a trans-national level. It would be a gross dereliction of the Government’s duty to safeguard  <mask> and the lives and well-being of its population if it failed to take steps to gather intelligence that might allow preventative action to be taken or if it compromised the operational effectiveness of the surveillance methods available to it. Within the United Kingdom the Government had extensive powers and resources to investigate individuals and organisations that might threaten the interests of national security or perpetrate serious crimes, and it was therefore feasible for the domestic interception regime to require individual addresses to be identified before interception could take place. Outside the jurisdiction, however, the ability of the Government to discover the identity and location of individuals and organisations which might represent a threat to national security was drastically reduced and a broader approach was needed. Maintaining operational effectiveness required not simply that the fact of interception be kept as secret as appropriate; it was also necessary to maintain a degree of secrecy as regards the methods by which such interception might be effected, to prevent the loss of important sources of information.


174.  The applicant did not appear to deny that the impugned restrictions were imposed in pursuit of legitimate aims. The Court finds it established that those restrictions pursued one or more of the legitimate aims enumerated in Article 8 § 2: firstly, they sought to prevent crime, and, secondly, as the relevant Security Council resolutions had been adopted to combat international terrorism under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (“Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”), they were also capable of contributing to Switzerland’s  <mask> and public safety.


63.  The applicant accepted that  <mask> considerations might justify withholding information from the defence. Praying in aid Edwards and Lewis v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98, ECHR 2004‑X, and A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, ECHR 2009, he submitted that strict necessity for so doing should be shown; that the restrictions on access to the information should be the least intrusive possible; and that counterbalancing procedures should be in place.


28.  The Government submitted in the alternative that any interference with the applicant’s right under Article 8 had been carried out on the basis of section 48(A)(5) of Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. They provided the Court with extracts of this provision containing the amendments of 2008 (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). The Government also relied on section 39(1) of the Regulation on Private Tutoring Centres. They further contended that the applicant’s dismissal had pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining  <mask>, territorial integrity, public safety, public order and preventing crime, and that it had been necessary in a democratic society in the circumstances of the case.


49.  The applicant also maintained that Article 6 § 2 was violated as the State authorities presumed him to be guilty of posing a threat to  <mask> without having proved it. Relying on Article 6 § 3 (a), (b) and (d), he also alleged that the reasons why he purportedly posed a threat to national security were never disclosed to him and, therefore, he could not prepare his defence.


49.  The Government annexed to their Further Observations, dated 23 May 2003, a second statement by Mr Boys Smith, in response to Mr Campbell’s statement (see paragraph 48 above), which provided more detail, to the extent that was possible without undermining  <mask>, about the “arrangements” made by the Secretary of State under section 6 of the Act. The Government submitted that the Court should proceed on the basis that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, in the democratic society of the United Kingdom, the relevant ministers, officials and Commissioners properly discharged their statutory duties to ensure that safeguards were in place to comply with all the requirements of section 6. Moreover Mr Boys Smith’s statement showed that during the relevant period there was a range of safeguards in place to ensure that the process of selection of material for examination (the stage referred to by the applicants as “filtering”) could be carried out only strictly in accordance with the statutory framework and the terms of the warrant and the certificate (that is, could be carried out only when necessary in the interests of national security, for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime or for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom), and could not be abused or operated arbitrarily.


65.  The Government submitted that Article 10 was not applicable in the present case. In any event they stated that the application of the KGB Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of the protection of  <mask> and was necessary in a democratic society in view of the applicants’ lack of loyalty to the State. The applicants had not been punished for their views, be they views which they hold at present or views that they might have held in the past. The KGB Act had not imposed a collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in section 3 of the KGB Act showed that there had been a well-founded suspicion that the applicants had been lacking in loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Accordingly, there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.


51.  The applicants have been married since 1994 and have had two children. The Court is satisfied that the applicants' relationship amounted to family life. The second applicant and the children are Russian nationals who were born in Russia and have been living there all their lives. From 1994 to 1996 and from 2001 to August 2003 the first applicant lawfully resided in Russia with his wife and children on the basis of a renewable work visa. In 2003 he applied for a residence permit to which he had become entitled under the new law passed in 2002 (see paragraph 32 above). However, his application was refused by reference to  <mask> considerations and he was required to leave Russia. As he did not leave, his deportation was ordered. The deportation order is still valid and enforceable and the deportation is impending. The Court therefore concludes that the measures taken by the domestic authorities against the first applicant constituted interference with the applicants' right to respect for their family life (compare Bashir and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 65028/01, § 37, 14 June 2007, and Musa and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 61259/00, § 58, 11 January 2007).


48.  The applicants further argued that the Data Protection Ombudsman and the Parliamentary Committee for  <mask> were not a substitute for the judicial control in the authorisation phase since they constituted oversight, rather than remedial, mechanisms and these had only general consequences not affecting the concrete case. Upon queries addressed to these two organs, the applicants found that none of them had ever dealt with a case on surveillance of citizens. These potential control mechanisms were thus not effective.


33.  The applicants contested the Government's submissions. They complained in particular that they had lost their private-sector jobs, and that they had furthermore been deprived of the possibility to seek employment in various private-sector fields until 2009 as a result of their statutory status as “former KGB officers”. The applicants submitted that they had not been given any possibility under the Act either to present their personal cases in the evaluation and establishment of their loyalty to the State, or to avoid the application to them of the employment restrictions prescribed by Article 3 of the Act. In particular, the applicants stressed that they had left the KGB almost a decade before their dismissals. Furthermore, the applicants contended that their jobs in the private sector had not constituted any threat to the  <mask> of Lithuania. However, the domestic courts imposed the employment restrictions solely on the ground of their former employment in the KGB. Finally, the applicants submitted that, as a result of the negative publicity caused by the adoption of the “KGB Act” and its application to them, they had been subjected to daily embarrassment on account of their past.


82.  The Government submitted that Russian law treated all aliens on an equal basis, irrespective of whether or not they had a minor child in Russia. There was no evidence that the State authorities had prevented the applicant from being reunited with his son in a different State. Nor had he shown that he had taken any steps to remove his son from Russia. In any event, the Convention does not guarantee the right to establish family life in any specific country (here they referred to the case of Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321/99, § 97, ECHR 2003‑X). Unlike the first applicant in the Slivenko case, who had come to Latvia when she had been only ten months old and had spent her entire life there, the applicant had arrived in Russia as an adult and had lived there for only eight years. His integration into Russian society was open to doubt since he had been unable, by his own admission, to read a document handwritten in Russian. Moreover, owing to their profession, religious missionaries must be prepared to change their place of residence with greater ease. Finally, the Government submitted that, in any event, the interference with the applicant’s family life had been in accordance with law, pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of  <mask> and had also been necessary in a democratic society.


87.  The Government put forward the interests of  <mask> as the only justification for the course of action they had adopted. The Court has already found above that they failed to produce any material or evidence corroborating their claim that the applicant’s presence on Russian soil had indeed posed a threat to national security. It follows that the Government did not offer any justification which could outweigh the legitimate interest of the applicant and his son in staying together.


115.  The Government invoked the exception mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to justify the course of action adopted by the Russian authorities against the applicant. However, as the Court has found above, they did not submit any material or evidence capable of corroborating their claim that the interests of  <mask> or public order had been at stake. Accordingly, the exception set out in paragraph 2 cannot be held to apply in the instant case and the normal procedure described in paragraph 1 must have been followed. As regards compliance with that procedure, the Court notes that the Government did not furnish any explanation as to why the decision on the applicant’s exclusion had not been communicated to him for more than three months and why he had not been allowed to submit reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed with the participation of his counsel. He was therefore not afforded the procedural guarantees set out in Article 1 of Protocol No. 7.


86.  The Government submitted that the measures taken against the first applicant pursued a legitimate aim and were necessary. The Contracting States were entitled to expel an alien regardless of his or her level of integration. The first applicant’s removal from Bulgaria would not impose a disproportionate burden on the applicants, because they would be able to continue their family life outside the country. The circumstances in which the first applicant’s expulsion had been ordered showed that the authorities had not failed to strike a balance between the applicants’ rights and the public interest; they had carried out their duty to protect public order and  <mask>. The expulsion order had not yet been put into effect, and the applicants’ family life could not therefore be regarded as already affected by it. The first applicant’s detention pending removal had not been disproportionate either, because the other applicants had been able to visit him in custody.


181.  The applicant submitted that even where  <mask> was at stake, a domestic court could not infringe the fair hearing principle in a blanket and uncritical manner. He argued that less restrictive measures were available to achieve the aim pursued, including arrangements to protect witnesses' identities, disclosure of documents with redactions approved by the IPT, provision of a summary of particularly sensitive material under the supervision of the IPT and appointment of special advocates to whom disclosure of sensitive material could be made. He referred to a recent report on secret evidence published in June 2009 by the non-governmental organisation, JUSTICE, which called for the strengthening of disclosure procedures and increased transparency in court proceedings.


95. The Government further argued that neither the domestic courts nor other State institutions participating in the court proceedings for the applicant’s deportation could be blamed for delays. The Government admitted that, normally in cases regarding alleged violations of Article 8 of the Convention, the passage of time could have irremediable consequences for the applicant’s family. However, in the instant case, the passage of time had had no negative impact on the applicant’s private and family life. Quite the opposite, it was a well thought-out strategy, chosen by the applicant and his lawyers, expecting that the lapse of time would possibly render the applicant’s threat to  <mask> less significant. It was true that the administrative proceedings in the applicant’s case had started already in 2004. Nonetheless, the delays had been caused by the necessity to await the outcome of the criminal case against the applicant (see paragraph 42 above), and the applicant’s or his lawyers’ requests to suspend the administrative proceedings until his case had been heard before the European Court of Human Rights, or to make interpretative requests to the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 50 and 53 above).


101.  The applicants protested against the manner in which the Government's Agent had tried to “squeeze in” evidence by reading out at the oral hearing passages of documents she had not submitted to the Court. When those documents had later been submitted they had turned out to be declarations created for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court, full of vague generalisations and exaggerations lacking any credibility such as the statements about “hundreds of thousands of dollars..., once ... even twenty thousand” in the first applicant's home, coming in “USD 100 bills”. The  <mask> Service's Information Note, moreover, contained incorrect claims, such as those concerning the Tayba and Irshad foundations.


54.  The applicants submitted that the application for a residence permit had been refused by reference to  <mask> considerations. The first applicant's presence in Russia had become unlawful as a result of that refusal. The refusal of a residence permit and the deportation order had not pursued any legitimate aim. No criminal proceedings had ever been brought against him and there had been no evidence that he had presented a national security risk. Moreover, the deportation had been ordered by the Federal Migration Service in breach of domestic law because the deportation order had not been confirmed by a court in accordance with the procedure established in the Administrative Offences Code.


115.  The Government invoked the exception mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to justify the course of action adopted by the Russian authorities against the applicant. However, as the Court has found above, they did not submit any material or evidence capable of corroborating their claim that the interests of national security or public order had been at stake. Accordingly, the exception set out in paragraph 2 cannot be held to apply in the instant case and the normal procedure described in paragraph 1 must have been followed. As regards compliance with that procedure, the Court notes that the Government did not furnish any explanation as to why the decision on the applicant’s exclusion had not been communicated to him for more than three months and why he had not been allowed to submit reasons against his  <mask> and to have his case reviewed with the participation of his counsel. He was therefore not afforded the procedural guarantees set out in Article 1 of Protocol No. 7.


60.  The applicant’s case differed from previous cases examined by the Court in at least two aspects. Firstly, unlike the majority of applicants who had disputed their  <mask> before the Court, she had not committed any serious crime in the host country. Secondly, in contrast to the situation in a number of previous cases, it could not be argued that her residence in Norway had never had any basis or that her family ties with her children had been established after expulsion had become imminent.