135.  The Government submitted that the applicants’  <mask> was a consequence of their unauthorised entry and pending the examination of their asylum application, thus in line with the first limb of the provision. Once they resulted to be minors, they had been released. They noted that practically all immigrants reaching Malta did not carry documents and thus ascertaining their identities upon entry was a lengthy process which dependent on the cooperation of the migrants themselves. Moreover, the large number of undocumented migrants constituted a huge and entirely justified security concern for Malta.


145.  The Government maintained that the domestic courts had not breached the domestic law when ordering or extending the applicant’s pre-trial detention. As regards the initial detention order (that of 25 October 2003), and the subsequent extensions, it is true that they did not specify the time-period for the detention. However, under Article 109, section 1 of the CCrP pre-trial detention is imposed for a period of up to two months. The law also specified the maximum duration of any extension thereof. The fact that the courts had not indicated the periods of detention did not mean that the applicant had been subjected to an unlimited  <mask>.


90.  The applicant submitted that his  <mask> between 13 July and 12 October 2006 and between 26 April and 28 June 2007 had not been acknowledged as unlawful in the domestic proceedings and, therefore, he had had no grounds to claim compensation under Articles 1070 and 1100 of the Civil Code. There had therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention in respect of the above-mentioned periods.


92.  The applicant attempted to make use of the avenue open to him under Russian law. However, his appeal was never examined.  The Court would like to reiterate that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention requires that certain procedural rights of a detained person must be respected. These need not be the same as the guarantees of “a fair hearing” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and they should take account of the possibility, in the context of the  <mask> of persons of unsound mind, that those persons may be personally incapable of using their procedural rights. Accordingly, the prescribed minimum must ensure that that the mentally ill person has access to the courts and the opportunity to be heard either in person, if possible, or through a legal representative, where his condition demands this (see Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, cited above, § 60). The Court is prepared to tolerate certain limitations on the exercise of this right where justified by the circumstances (see, for instance, X. v. Belgium, no. 6692/74, Commission decision of 13 March 1975, Decisions and Reports (DR) 2, p. 108, concerning the introduction of a time limit on applications for release). In the present case, the Government did not cite any justification, apart from the applicant’s mental illness, for the court’s silence towards his appeal against the detention order. However, it would be inconceivable, in the opinion of the Court, that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention should afford procedural guarantees to a party whose detention matter is pending before a court without also protecting what makes it in fact possible to benefit from such guarantees – that is, the possibility to access the court by making an application to review the lawfulness of the detention. The effective and expeditious characteristics of judicial review of the lawfulness of detention are of no value at all if there are no judicial proceedings. The Court will not accept the state of mind of a detained person, on its own, as an implied and blanket limitation on his right to institute judicial review proceedings for the purpose of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, particularly so when, as in the present case, no assessment of his ability to be personally involved in the proceedings leading to his detention was performed by the court and no formal court decision explaining the reasons behind the refusal to examine the appeal was issued. The importance of what is at stake – personal liberty – compels this conclusion.


194.  The Government submitted that from 5 April 2011 until 22 December 2011 the applicant had been deprived of his liberty on the basis of deportation and detention orders that had been issued on 4 April 2011, pursuant to section 6(1)(k) and (l) of the Aliens and Immigration Law, on the grounds that the applicant had been a prohibited immigrant staying in the Republic unlawfully. In particular, the decision ordering the applicant’s detention had been based on section 14 of the Aliens and Immigration Law, which permitted the Chief Immigration Officer to order (i) the deportation of any alien who was a prohibited immigrant and (ii) his or her detention in the meantime. Therefore, the applicant’s  <mask> throughout this period fell within the ambit of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention as he had been detained for the purposes of being deported, in accordance with domestic law.


43.  The applicant complained that, in two respects, the procedure through which he challenged his provisional detention before the Indictment Division of the Thessaloniki Criminal Court did not comply with the requirements of Article 5 § 4 and Article 6 of the Convention. The Court considers that these complaints fall to be examined under Article 5 § 4, which is the lex specialis for matters of  <mask> (see Reinprecht v. Austria, no. 67175/01, § 55, ECHR 2005-XII). Article 5 § 4 reads as follows:


128.  The applicant submitted that his detention had been ordered and extended without justified and sufficient legal and constitutional grounds and that his detention had been excessively lengthy, in violation of the principle of speediness in a case where the defendant had been deprived of his liberty. In his view the domestic authorities had failed to demonstrate special diligence during the criminal proceedings and the higher courts had also failed to address any of his complaints in that regard, interpreting the grounds for  <mask> very broadly and generally.


27.  The applicant submitted that Article 5 of the Convention required domestic courts to review the lawfulness of a person’s  <mask> at regular intervals. Under domestic law that obligation was embodied in Articles 121 and 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which required the Court of Appeal to carry out reviews no later than every three months, once the duration of remand detention had exceeded six months. He argued that the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal had arbitrarily omitted to carry out such a review between 28 July 2014 and 15 April 2015. It had taken its decision more than five months after he had requested, on 7 November 2014, that the detention order against him be set aside.


146.  The applicant was apprehended on suspicion of participating in multiple acts of organised armed robbery. The Court is satisfied that this suspicion was reasonable. For an initial period at least, its existence justified the applicant's detention. However, the Court reiterates that the persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, but with the lapse of time this no longer suffices. Thus, the Court must establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the  <mask> (see McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, § 44, ECHR 2006‑...). Where such grounds were “relevant” and “sufficient”, the Court must also be satisfied that the national authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings.


94.  The Government, arguing that the applicants were not awaiting deportation or extradition, took the view that the facts of the case did not fall within sub-paragraph (f) of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which authorised a person’s “lawful arrest or detention ... to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country” or when “deportation or extradition” proceedings were pending against the person (see paragraph 81 above). The Government did not, however, indicate under which other sub-paragraph of Article 5 the  <mask> could be justified in the applicants’ case.


126.  The Government noted that the refusal-of-entry orders had indicated that it was open to the applicants to lodge an appeal with the Justice of the Peace in Agrigento (see paragraph 19 above). Some other Tunisian migrants had in fact used that remedy, and in 2011 the Justice of the Peace had annulled two refusal-of-entry orders (see paragraphs 30-31 above) as a result. The Government concluded that the applicants had certainly had the possibility of applying to a court to challenge the lawfulness of their alleged  <mask>.


71.  The Government submitted that the reasoning by which the Chamber had established that the applicant had been under the control of State agents was inconsistent since that issue was the same as the issue of the existence of a  <mask>. They argued that in its judgment of 15 June 2010 the Chamber had made a serious error by reversing the burden of proof and thus establishing a presumption of deprivation of liberty against the State, a presumption which in the Government’s view constituted an extremely dangerous precedent. The Government pointed out that it had not been established in the instant case that the applicant had been deprived of his liberty; that was precisely what had to be determined.


33.  The applicant was confined to a psychiatric hospital for a seven-day period lasting from 23 to 30 December 2010 pursuant a court order requiring him to undergo an in-patient psychiatric assessment. The Court has previously accepted that a  <mask> for the purpose of conducting a court-ordered psychiatric assessment falls to be examined under subparagraph (b) of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see Trutko v. Russia, no. 40979/04, §§ 33-35, 6 December 2016, and D.R. v. Lithuania, no. 691/15, § 69, 26 June 2018).


20.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s hospitalisation had been carried out in accordance with the court order of 2 July 2014 and had been necessary in order to determine whether he was fit to answer for his deeds. They further submitted that the applicant’s hospitalisation had not amounted to a  <mask> because he had consented to it by signing the hospital’s pre-printed consent forms. It was only on 24 September 2014 that the applicant expressed his wish to leave the hospital and was released the next day.


57.  The Government argued that the applicant had been free to leave after his questioning as a witness on 23 June 2010 and that no coercion or pressure had been exercised on him to make him stay at the Security Service building. In that connection, the Government attached weight to the fact that the applicant had been accompanied by his lawyer, who must have been aware of the issues associated with the  <mask>. In the absence of any complaints from the lawyer regarding his client’s staying in the offices of the Security Service, there was no indication that the applicant had been kept there against his will.


68.  The Government submitted that the conditions of the applicant’s detention had been adequate. He had been detained in twenty-two different cells in the SIZO between 26 February 2003 and 18 August 2010, including cell nos. 10, 40 and 167. Every cell was equipped with a ventilation system, water supply and heating, a toilet, sink, table, bench, and a box for crockery. The applicant’s complaints about his conditions of detention had been investigated and found to be unsubstantiated. Each detainee had a place to sleep, there was a weekly disinfection and clean-up of rodent-infested areas, the temperature in the cells was satisfactory, and bedding was in a reasonable condition. Therefore, the applicant’s conditions had not caused him suffering exceeding that inevitably caused by a  <mask>.


23.  The Government further argued that the applicant had been released as soon as the decision on his conditional release had been served on the prison governor. Having regard to the foregoing, they maintained that his detention between 12 April 2000 and 14 April 2000 had been lawful under the Convention and in conformity with the applicable domestic law, in particular the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice of 27 August 1998 on Administrative Acts concerning Execution of Pre-Trial Detention and Sentences and Coercive Measures resulting in  <mask>.


41.  The applicant submitted that he had not been “reliably shown to be a person of unsound mind” for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention. In his view, a psychiatric patient could be hospitalised only if he suffered from a serious condition which had a reasonable prospect of deterioration and would seriously endanger his health if not treated. Medical professionals must reliably show that these criteria were met, and their opinions and the domestic courts’ decisions must be subject to strict scrutiny. Unwillingness to undergo hospitalisation should not be considered as justifying  <mask> unless it was convincingly established that the patient was incapable of deciding on his medical treatment. The applicant claimed that in the instant case the above criteria had not been met.


75.  The applicant contended that his pre-trial detention had been excessively lengthy and had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons. He stressed that when extending his detention throughout the period at issue the domestic courts had failed to cite any compelling reasons justifying his  <mask>. In fact, from the very beginning of his deprivation of liberty they had merely reiterated the same stereotyped wording without making the necessary assessment of the particular circumstances of the case. Moreover, following the submission of the indictment in the competent court, the domestic courts had failed to set time-limits for the continued detention in their decisions extending his detention.


70.  The applicant argued that preventive detention did not fall under any of the sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 § 1. In particular, he had not been lawfully detained “after conviction by a competent court” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (a). There had been an insufficient causal connection between a conviction and his detention because his  <mask> had been exclusively preventive and thus not linked to a conviction. He further submitted that the preventive detention order made against him in 1972 following his conviction for armed robbery had not been intended to prevent him from committing further acts of fraud.


48.  The applicants submitted that their compulsory placement in Drin did not meet the conditions for  <mask> of persons of unsound mind set out in Winterwerp v. the Netherlands (cited above, § 39). The social work authorities based their decisions to place them in Drin on the simple fact that their families were not prepared to take care of them and they needed social assistance. They had not examined whether the necessary assistance could be provided through alternative measures that were less restrictive of their personal liberty. Furthemore, the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention in the cases of Ms Hadžimejlić and Mr Crepulja. Subsequently, the competent civil court held that the current state of their mental health was not of a kind or degree warranting continued placement. However, despite these rulings, they were still in the social care home against their will.


101.  The Government considered that this provision was not applicable in the present case, given that the applicant’s  <mask> had been effected for the sole purpose of Article 5. They further noted that the applicant did not invoke Article 18 in his application to the Court and the only allegation of possible political pressure had been made by the applicant in his request for priority. They noted that the applicant made only general remark about hypothetical pressure on him and therefore this issue cannot be considered by the Court. They further reiterated that the status of a politician could not grant him or her immunity from criminal prosecution. The Government observed that the applicant had been deprived of his liberty in connection with the criminal proceedings instituted against him. The criminal offences with which he had been charged were defined in the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code. The prosecuting authorities had conducted an investigation in connection with the suspicion that the applicant had committed serious crimes and, as a result, more than forty-seven volumes comprising the criminal case file, together with the indictment, had been forwarded by the prosecuting authorities to the court. On 23 May 2011 the court had held a preliminary hearing in the criminal case against the applicant. Furthermore, the applicant’s behaviour during the period when he was at large had given sufficient grounds to believe that he had been attempting to influence the investigation and to obstruct the establishment of the truth in the case. Therefore, the Government considered that the purposes behind the deprivation of the applicant’s liberty had been exclusively those envisaged by Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention.


157.  The Government claimed that the applicant could initiate proceedings before the Constitutional Court to challenge the compliance of specific legal provisions contained in the Law on Social Services and Social Assistance, the Civil Law and the Law on Custodial Court with provisions of superior force. The Court, being mindful of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 27 December 2010, notes however that the present applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention relates to his inability to obtain release from the Īle Centre and not to the issue of his legal capacity. In this connection, the Court reiterates that the Constitutional Court in Latvia is empowered to repeal legal provisions which it finds unconstitutional, but not to adopt new legal procedures or to close an alleged legislative gap (see Liepājnieks v. Latvia (dec.), no. 37586/06, §§ 73 and 75, 2 November 2010). This conclusion is further supported by the Constitutional Court ruling of 27 December 2010, whereby some legal provisions of the Latvian Civil Law relating to the legal capacity of individuals were declared null and void with effect from 1 January 2012. Parliament therefore had to come up with a legislative solution to comply with the Constitutional Court’s ruling and to establish a system of partial legal capacity for individuals in Latvia. This was done two years after the Constitutional Court’s ruling and the new regulation is applicable from 1 January 2013. In such circumstances the Court fails to see how the present applicant’s recourse to the Constitutional Court would enable him “to take proceedings at reasonable intervals” to determine the lawfulness of his continued  <mask>. The Government did not suggest that there were any other venues available to the applicant to obtain a review of the lawfulness of his detention in the institution.


94.  The Government further argued that the applicant’s preventive detention was the least intrusive way of protecting the public. The experts consulted by the domestic courts had confirmed that the applicant’s dangerousness had not diminished as a result of his age because, in order to commit his offences, he had used force against considerably weaker women or children. Moreover, the applicant’s transfer to a supervised residence run as a closed facility would not have constituted a less intrusive measure as it would equally have entailed  <mask>.


72.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been accused of serious offences and that his  <mask> had been necessary and not excessive in duration. Most of the investigative actions had been carried out before he had lodged his application with the Court. A careful reading of his requests for release indicated that he had failed to invoke any change in the relevant circumstances; it was therefore logical that these requests had been rejected. Each time the competent authorities had dismissed such requests, they had had regard to the risk that the applicant may abscond, obstruct the investigation or re‑offend. As a chairman of the board the applicant would have had the opportunity, if released, to destroy documents. Moreover, before being arrested for a second time, the applicant had failed to pay his bail and had took flight for three months. In sum, the Government were of the view that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty had been fully warranted, regard being had to his disregard to his duty to cooperate with the authorities. Furthermore, the applicant’s house arrest had been de facto fictitious, as the authorities responsible for monitoring compliance with it had been in Burgas, whereas he had been in Sofia for medical treatment. Since the end of 1996 the applicant had had the opportunity to leave and change his place of abode without any control.


79.  The Government further argued that the fact that the domestic authorities, when extending the applicant’s pre-trial detention, had reiterated the same or similar reasoning did not suggest any breach of his rights since his detention had been extended by the domestic courts sitting in various formations and with due respect to the applicant’s rights and the particular circumstances warranting his continued  <mask>. The domestic courts had examined the possibility of applying less restrictive preventive measures but had found them insufficient in view of the circumstances of the case. The Government also pointed out that the criminal proceedings at issue concerned a particularly complex case and that the domestic authorities had duly complied with the requirement of special diligence in the conduct of the proceedings.


321.  The applicant submitted that, starting from 19 April 2004 and during the period when he was questioned as a witness, it was not explained to him that he was in fact under arrest, and no reasons for his arrest were given. He was not formally charged with a crime during those days, nor was his arrest official, but was carried out on internal instructions of the Military Prosecutor’s Office. He was unaware of the duration of his arrest, by whom it was ordered and whether and how he could appeal against it. He was not brought promptly before a judge, this was done only on 27 April 2004, which was about eight days after he had been taken into custody, and he had no opportunity to clarify in the meantime whether his  <mask> was lawful.


77.  The applicants also observed that the treatment to which they had been subjected could not be justified on the basis of Article 10 § 2 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 (see paragraph 33 above), which in their view provided for so-called “deferred” refusal of entry when an alien had entered Italy, “for purposes of public assistance”. The above-cited Article 10 made no mention of  <mask> or of any procedure for a possible confinement measure.


104.  The Government also considered that the damages invoked by the applicant were not linked with the violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which concerned only the period exceeding the reasonable time of the pre-trial detention and not the overall duration of the  <mask>. Moreover, even if he were released pending trial the applicant would not have been able to return in the United States, being thus in any case obliged to provide for his daily life expenses outside prison and to receive visits from his family.


87.  The applicant repeatedly raised the argument that his detention had ceased to be lawful upon the expiry of an initial six-month period, both in his statement of appeal to the Regional Court and at the new detention hearing before the District Court (see paragraphs 19 and 21 above). This argument was undeniably an essential condition for determining the lawfulness of his  <mask> in the period after 30 December 2013. However, both courts treated the argument as irrelevant and disregarded it in their decisions. The Regional Court first examined the merits of the applicant’s grievance and ordered his release only on 11 March 2014, that is seventy days after his detention had ceased to be lawful. It follows that the scope of the judicial review was manifestly inadequate and that the proceedings were not “speedy” within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.


59.  The applicant’s  <mask> was justified only if it was lawful, in particular on condition that it was not arbitrary and that it complied with one of the permissible grounds for deprivation of liberty listed in sub‑paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 § 1, in this case presumably sub‑paragraphs (b) or (c). The Court considers that the period of house arrest between 30 December 2014 and 5 January 2015 constituted a continuation of the house arrest applied as a provisional measure because of the court’s definition of it as an extension of the “pre-trial detention”. It cannot accept the Government’s claim that this period fell under sub‑paragraph (a) of Article 5 § 1 because the applicant was sentenced to a suspended prison term, which would normally entail release, and not to house arrest.


69.  The applicant complained that in the proceedings brought for release under section 64 of the 1984 Act it was for the patient to satisfy the sheriff that he was no longer suffering from a mental disorder requiring his detention in hospital for medical treatment, arguing that under Article 5 of the Convention it was for the State to justify the  <mask>.


30.  The Government contended that the applicants had been escorted to the police stations within two hours of their arrest, which had not been “manifestly unreasonable”. The legal grounds for their escorting had been Article 27.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences, which had empowered the police to take individuals to a police station for the purpose of drawing up an administrative-offence record. Once the applicants had been issued the administrative-offence records, they had been administratively arrested (Article 27.3 of the Code). The term of such an arrest had to be calculated from the time a person had been brought to a police station and should not have exceeded forty-eight hours, in accordance with Article 27.5 of the Code. Both applicants had spent fourteen hours at the police stations, which had not exceeded the statutory limit. Overall, the Government considered that the applicants’  <mask> had complied with domestic law and with the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


63.  The applicant argued that, as a result of the belated service on him of the Bratislava-vidiek District Court’s decision of 19 August 1993 he had been unable to challenge effectively the lawfulness of his  <mask> and to seek his release. In any event, the overall length of the proceedings concerning the lawfulness of his detention was excessive and incompatible with the reasonable time requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.


31.  The applicants complained that the suppression of the demonstrations and the arrests made by the police were in violation of their rights to freedom of expression and assembly as provided in Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. In respect of the events of 3 February 2009, the first applicant complained under Article 11 of the Convention that the State had not discharged its positive obligation to protect his right to freedom of assembly. The applicants also complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that their  <mask> had been unlawful. Article 5 § 1 reads as follows:


36.  The Government alleged that the applicants had disobeyed the police officers’ orders to stop the unauthorised march, and that it had been necessary to arrest them to put an end to their unlawful conduct and to take them to the police station so that an administrative offence report could be drawn up. Overall, they considered that the applicant’s  <mask> had complied with domestic law and that all the requisite formalities, such as the issuing of a lawful detention order, had been fulfilled. They argued that the first applicant’s pre-trial detention had not exceeded three hours, and that the second applicant’s detention had been within the statutory time‑limit of forty‑eight hours.


42.  The Government argued, in particular, that the applicant’s  <mask> was justified as detention after conviction within the meaning of sub-paragraph (a) of Article 5 § 1. There was still a causal link between the applicant’s conviction by the Münster Regional Court and his continuing detention, as the applicant was still detained for the protection of the public. All medical experts, albeit using different terminology, had agreed that the applicant continued to suffer from the same mental illness, namely a pathological personality disorder with schizoid and dissocial elements and a sexual preference disorder including sadism. As he had been unable to address, in sex therapy, his condition and the most serious sexual offences he had committed, there was a high risk that he would commit further similar serious sexual offences if released.


101.  The applicant contended that, although under domestic law placement of people with mental disorders in a social care institution was regarded as “voluntary”, his transfer to the Pastra social care home constituted a  <mask>. He maintained that, as in Storck v. Germany (no. 61603/00, ECHR 2005-V), the objective and subjective elements of detention were present in his case.


91.  The Government submitted that the applicant could have sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of unlawful  <mask> under Act no. 82/1998, which provided for the possibility of compensation for damage caused by exercise of public authority. Secondly, they contended that the applicant could have brought an action for protection of personality under Articles 11 and 13 of the Civil Code.


21.  The Government submitted that the Convention permitted  <mask> only in those cases which were enumerated in Article 5 and only in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law. Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention provided for the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court. This category of permissible detention concerned any prisoner serving a sentence where “the lawful detention” was based on “conviction by a competent court”. This normally referred to a prison sentence, although that was not specifically indicated in the text. The Government further observed that the execution of a prison sentence was, as a rule, dependent on a further decision which was not a matter for the courts but for the prosecution or prison authorities. The actual order to serve the sentence might not therefore emanate from a “competent court” but the detention would still be lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a). This would be so even where a prisoner's conditional release was revoked for a breach of the conditions, entailing re-imprisonment for the remaining term.


125.  The Government offered no explanation for the absence of any procedural steps on the part of the Idrija Local Court between 15 July and 8 August 2005. Still, they argued that the twenty-eight day delay in obtaining a second opinion and making an appropriate order – neither of which had eventually taken place – had been in accordance with the rules of domestic procedure. However, even assuming that the rules of domestic law were complied with, the Court considers that the legislation allowing for such an extensive amount of time to pass before a decision was made on confinement raises serious concerns under Article 5 § 1, as it implies a lack of procedural safeguards. The Court has already recognised that an inadequate legal framework allowing a hospital’s healthcare professionals to assume full control of the liberty and treatment of a vulnerable individual solely on the basis of their own clinical assessments deprives an individual of sufficient protection against arbitrary  <mask> (see H.L. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, §§ 121 and 124; and Storck, cited above, §§ 104-106).


41.  The applicant conceded that, despite some practical difficulties, he could have brought a claim under section 2(2) of the SRDA. However, for him, such a claim would not have provided redress in respect of the complaints which he had raised before the Court. These complaints were all founded on his unlawful and unjustified detention between 10 and 14 July 2000, whereas a claim under section 2(2) of the SRDA would have been based exclusively on his eventual acquittal. In such proceedings the national courts would not have addressed the issues brought before the Court because they would have considered them irrelevant. Moreover, such a claim would have only been capable of providing compensation, not securing his release. Only remedies which could result in release could be considered effective with regard to  <mask>. Similarly, a claim under section 2(2) could not have provided genuine redress for the breach of his freedom of expression.


30.  The applicants complain about their detention after they applied for asylum. In Malta, any prohibited immigrant subject to a removal order has to be detained until he or she is removed from Malta[91]. The detention of undocumented migrants is the rule and not the exception[92]. The application of the law is blind and is not carried out on a case-by-case basis.  <mask> is not a measure of last resort, but a measure of first and sole resort.


97.  The applicant was transferred to the open ward on 8 August 2005 and remained there for four days. She was discharged and left the hospital on 12 August 2005 at her request. The Court notes that she did not provide any detailed statement to the effect that the Idrija Psychiatric Hospital prevented her from leaving the open ward. Although some of the applicant’s general arguments to the effect that her stay in the open wards had constituted a  <mask> – for example that the transfer to the open ward constituted a privilege for good behaviour, or that she could only leave the hospital grounds with her psychiatrists’ permission – may be regarded as applying to both psychiatric hospitals in question, her specific complaints in this regard, as well as the arguments and evidence in their support all related to the Ljubljana Psychiatric Hospital.


259.  The applicant should accordingly have been able to avail himself of effective and practical remedies capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible and to an award of compensation, for the purposes of Article 13. For the reasons set out above (see paragraphs 186-94 and 242 above), no effective criminal investigation can be considered to have been carried out in accordance with Article 13 with regard to the applicant’s complaints under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. The superficial approach which the public prosecutor took cannot be said to be compatible with the duty to carry out an investigation into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment and unlawful  <mask>. The Government have also confirmed the lack of an effective remedy at the relevant time (see paragraph 253 above).


28.  The Government contended that the complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention had been introduced out of time. In their opinion, the six‑month time-limit started running on 23 June 2006 (see paragraph 13 above), as that was the date of the final domestic decision concerning the lawfulness of the applicant’s  <mask>. As regards the subsequent compensation proceedings brought by the applicant, the Government maintained that they concerned his civil rights under Article 6 of the Convention only and were of no relevance for his complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


162.  The applicant submitted that he had been held at the police station between around 6.30 a.m. and 10.30 p.m. on 1 March 2008 unlawfully and without any status. His so-called “bringing-in” (բերման ենթարկելը), including the record drawn up in that respect, had been unlawful. Moreover, during that period he was questioned as a witness in the absence of a lawyer. The legal provisions regulating and defining the procedures of “bringing-in” and “arrest”, relied on by the Government, failed to meet the requirements of certainty and foreseeability. In particular, in accordance with Article 128 of the CCP, as interpreted by the Court of Cassation in its decision of 18 December 2009 (see paragraph 123 above), the procedural status of a suspect was effective only from the moment when the record of his arrest was drawn up. Thus, the procedure of “bringing-in”, which was an initial stage of  <mask> of a suspect largely practised in Armenia, lacked legal certainty. Article 153 of the CCP, which defined the concept of “bringing-in”, was not applicable in his case, while the only other Article of the CCP which mentioned that procedure was Article 180 § 2. As a result, after having been “brought-in” at 6.30 a.m. on 1 March 2008, he was kept in a state of uncertainty as a non-suspect in a police cell until, at 10.30 p.m., the record of his arrest was drawn up. The lack of legal certainty had also been acknowledged by the Court of Cassation in its above-mentioned decision, whereby it attempted to add some certainty to the status of those who, like the applicant, were brought in but no record of arrest was drawn up to enable them to obtain the status of a suspect. The applicant lastly submitted that he had been taken into custody at around 6.30 a.m. on 1 March 2008 but taken before a judge only at 7 p.m. on 4 March 2008. Thus, he had been kept at the police station for an extra twelve and a half hours, in excess of the maximum 72‑hour period for arrest allowed by Article 129 of the CCP. In sum, his arrest had violated the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


77.  The applicant contended that there were no arguments in favour of his  <mask> and that neither the detention in custody nor the house arrest had been based on relevant and sufficient reasons. He submitted that the absence of reasons for his deprivation of liberty was confirmed by his subsequent acquittal and by the fact that the Prosecutor’s Office had not challenged the court judgment by which he had been acquitted.


40.  The applicants were not formally suspected of, or charged with, any offence and no criminal or administrative proceedings were instituted against them. The representative of the police station explicitly acknowledged in the domestic proceedings that “no elements of an administrative offence [had been] established in the actions of the plaintiffs” (see paragraph 15 above). The Court also observes that no records of an administrative violation, detention or arrest had been compiled (ibid.). It follows from the above that the applicants’ arrest could not have been effected “for the purpose of bringing [them] before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (c) (compare with Makhmudov v. Russia, no. 35082/04, §§ 82-85, 26 July 2007). Hence, the  <mask> to which the applicants were subjected did not have any legitimate purpose under Article 5 § 1 and was arbitrary.


35.  The applicant replied that the SRDA did not provide an effective remedy for the complaints which he had raised before the Court. In his view, a distinction had to be made between the right to seek release from detention and the right to claim compensation for unlawful  <mask>. A claim under the SRDA would not have led to his release, nor would it have led to the speeding up of the examination of his application for release.


46.  The applicant submitted that, since the case‑file of the proceedings against him had been destroyed, it was impossible to verify whether his conviction and the resulting  <mask> had been ordered by a competent court and had not been arbitrary. The destruction of the case‑file had been unlawful, because section 91(4) of Regulation no. 28 provided that it should have been kept until the expiry of the limitation period for the enforcement of his sentence. The judgment, which was the only remaining document, was not enough to prove the regularity of his conviction. On 21 August 2002 he had filed a request for the restoration of the case‑file with the president of the Pernik District Court, but had received no reply.


132.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s  <mask> was required for the purpose of repatriation (until she was granted subsidiary humanitarian protection), at the same time they also submitted that it fell within the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (f). They noted that practically all immigrants reaching Malta did not carry documents and thus ascertaining their identities upon entry was a lengthy process which was dependent on the cooperation of the migrants themselves.


75.  The applicants explained that under Italian law (Article 14 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998, see paragraph 33 above), the only legal form of  <mask> of an unlawful migrant awaiting return was placement in a CIE, subject to judicial supervision (validation of administrative detention decisions by a Justice of the Peace), as required by Article 5 of the Convention.


92.  The applicant attempted to make use of the avenue open to him under Russian law. However, his appeal was never examined.  The Court would like to reiterate that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention requires that certain procedural rights of a detained person must be respected. These need not be the same as the guarantees of “a fair hearing” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and they should take account of the possibility, in the context of the deprivation of liberty of  <mask>, that those persons may be personally incapable of using their procedural rights. Accordingly, the prescribed minimum must ensure that that the mentally ill person has access to the courts and the opportunity to be heard either in person, if possible, or through a legal representative, where his condition demands this (see Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, cited above, § 60). The Court is prepared to tolerate certain limitations on the exercise of this right where justified by the circumstances (see, for instance, X. v. Belgium, no. 6692/74, Commission decision of 13 March 1975, Decisions and Reports (DR) 2, p. 108, concerning the introduction of a time limit on applications for release). In the present case, the Government did not cite any justification, apart from the applicant’s mental illness, for the court’s silence towards his appeal against the detention order. However, it would be inconceivable, in the opinion of the Court, that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention should afford procedural guarantees to a party whose detention matter is pending before a court without also protecting what makes it in fact possible to benefit from such guarantees – that is, the possibility to access the court by making an application to review the lawfulness of the detention. The effective and expeditious characteristics of judicial review of the lawfulness of detention are of no value at all if there are no judicial proceedings. The Court will not accept the state of mind of a detained person, on its own, as an implied and blanket limitation on his right to institute judicial review proceedings for the purpose of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, particularly so when, as in the present case, no assessment of his ability to be personally involved in the proceedings leading to his detention was performed by the court and no formal court decision explaining the reasons behind the refusal to examine the appeal was issued. The importance of what is at stake – personal liberty – compels this conclusion.


88.  The applicant contends that Article 5 § 4 could only be complied with by creating a right of access to the Tribunal at the same time that detention was extended under section 29(4). It was no answer that there might not be a violation of Article 5 § 4 if the domestic authorities exercised their functions speedily. She further contends that the availability of judicial review and/or habeas corpus could not meet the difficulty raised by patients who lacked capacity to institute legal proceedings themselves. Neither procedure could, in practice, satisfy Article 5 § 4 because they were unsuitable for the resolution of complex factual issues and the relevant courts lacked specialist medical expertise and were not, therefore, well‑adapted to determining the lawfulness of the detention of  <mask>. There was also no guarantee that a nearest relative, if there was one, would be eligible for public funding and the cost of privately instructing a solicitor could be a very real barrier to accessing the legal advice necessary to make such an application.


28.  The applicant took the view that his preventive detention at issue had violated Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, his detention had not been justified under Article 5 § 1 (e). The personality disorder he allegedly suffered from, which 80 to 90 per cent of the prison population could be diagnosed with, was, in any event, not pathological and not serious enough for his being classified as of “unsound mind”, that is, mentally ill as required by that provision. Furthermore, Schwalmstadt/Weiterstadt prisons, in which he had been detained, had not been suitable institutions for  <mask>. He had not been offered sufficient therapies tailored to the needs of a mental health patient and had never been placed in a psychiatric hospital.


55.  The Government submitted that on his recall to prison the applicant had access to a court satisfying the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. The Parole Board which authorised his continuing detention was independent of the executive and the parties and had the power to direct the Secretary of State to order the applicant’s release. While minors and  <mask> were entitled to an oral hearing, with representation, this was not always the case. An oral hearing was not essential to the fairness of the proceedings in the applicant’s case as he did not dispute the facts that led to his recall, as he had been provided with all the materials before the Board and had made written representations to the Board and on the basis of the facts admitted, the Board was bound to conclude that public protection required that he be confined. The review took place approximately six weeks after recall and was therefore prompt. The decision in October 1998 to direct release was based on the progress that he had made since his first recall to prison. The applicant’s second recent recall on drug related matters to prison indicated that he continued to raise matters of grave concern having regard to the circumstances in which the original murder offence came to be committed.


44.  The Government argued that the competent national authorities had not relied on the exception set out in Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention allowing detention of  <mask> to justify the applicant’s apprehension, confinement in the police station and subsequent transfer to PH‑13 for psychiatric examination. No decision was made by the domestic courts as to whether the applicant suffered from a psychiatric disorder necessitating her involuntary hospitalisation.


106.  The applicant submitted that his detention had been unlawful as the court had had no power to order for him to be held for the period until the judgment in his case had become final. He further submitted that in any event it had been arbitrary as the temporary detention facility which had accommodated him during that period had been unsuitable for the detention of  <mask>.


58.  The applicant further took the view that his preventive detention had not been justified under sub-paragraph (e) of Article 5 § 1 as detention of a person “of unsound mind” either. He submitted that following the Court’s judgment in the case of M. v. Germany (cited above), difficult detainees were now “reclassified” as being  <mask> in order to allow their detention to be prolonged beyond the former ten-year maximum duration. His continuing preventive detention was no longer proportionate. He submitted that there was no very high risk that he would commit the most serious violent or sexual offences if released. The fact alone that he had not completed a therapy was insufficient to prove this. The domestic courts had only considered that there was a medium to high risk that he would commit further sexual offences if released. Moreover, he was ready to undergo a therapy and to take medication once released from prison and to comply with further orders such as to stay away from schools etc. Furthermore, he was of advanced age and in a poor state of health. His preventive detention therefore had to be terminated also under the requirements set by the Federal Constitutional Court in its leading judgment of 4 May 2011.


49.  The Government accepted that the applicants’ placement in Drin amounted to a “deprivation of liberty” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, as had been established by the Constitutional Court. They submitted, however, that the placement had been lawful. The applicants are  <mask> and were in a situation of social need. Their respective family circumstance did not allow for a proper care outside the social care home. The Government thus argued that the applicants’ placement in a social care home had been intended to protect their interest in receiving social care.


48.  The applicants submitted that their compulsory placement in Drin did not meet the conditions for deprivation of liberty of  <mask> set out in Winterwerp v. the Netherlands (cited above, § 39). The social work authorities based their decisions to place them in Drin on the simple fact that their families were not prepared to take care of them and they needed social assistance. They had not examined whether the necessary assistance could be provided through alternative measures that were less restrictive of their personal liberty. Furthemore, the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention in the cases of Ms Hadžimejlić and Mr Crepulja. Subsequently, the competent civil court held that the current state of their mental health was not of a kind or degree warranting continued placement. However, despite these rulings, they were still in the social care home against their will.


24.  The Government have not invoked any of the permissible grounds for the applicant’s deprivation of liberty between 18 and 25 September 2014. They did, however, cite the Court’s case-law relating to sub‑paragraph (e) of Article 5 § 1, namely the detention of  <mask>. Since it is obvious that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty was not covered by sub‑paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) or (f) of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the Court will ascertain whether the applicant’s detention in the present case was justified under sub-paragraph (e) of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


17.  The Government maintained that the applicant had made his request for release on 24 February 1997, that is on the same day when the first instance court convicted him of an offence and sentenced him to a prison term. The Supreme Court later dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the judgment. In the Government’s view, as from 24 February 1997, the applicant’s detention was to be regarded as falling under Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention, that is “the lawful detention ... after conviction by a competent court”, despite the fact that at that time he continued being detained on remand in terms of domestic law. They considered that the guarantees of Article 5 § 4 did not, in general, extend to persons who were lawfully deprived of liberty after conviction by a  <mask>. The Government concluded that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention was not applicable to the applicant’s case following the delivery of the Košice Regional Court’s judgment of 24 February 1997.


46.  The applicant submitted that, since the case‑file of the proceedings against him had been destroyed, it was impossible to verify whether his conviction and the resulting deprivation of liberty had been ordered by a  <mask> and had not been arbitrary. The destruction of the case‑file had been unlawful, because section 91(4) of Regulation no. 28 provided that it should have been kept until the expiry of the limitation period for the enforcement of his sentence. The judgment, which was the only remaining document, was not enough to prove the regularity of his conviction. On 21 August 2002 he had filed a request for the restoration of the case‑file with the president of the Pernik District Court, but had received no reply.


113.  The applicant emphasised that the court order issued regarding her confinement in the Ljubljana Psychiatric Hospital had been quashed on appeal for lack of grounds justifying the necessity of the confinement. However, no new decision had been rendered establishing whether the conditions for involuntary confinement had been met in the three months that followed. In this regard, the applicant criticised the Ljubljana Higher Court’s decision to remit the case to the lower court instead of deciding on the applicant’s appeal itself. As to this second period of confinement, the applicant also submitted that the hospital had failed to notify the  <mask> of her confinement within the prescribed 48-hour time-limit (see section 71 of the Non-Contentious Civil Procedure Act in paragraph 59 above). Lastly, the applicant complained that her father was allowed to participate in the proceedings in breach of the domestic procedure, as the hearings in her case should have been conducted in private.


58.  The Government submitted that the applicant had explicitly requested the house arrest to be carried out at Nagyteve camping site, and this following a warning that the site was not suitable for winter residence. Furthermore, the conditions at the camping site were continuously monitored by the local police department which indicated to the  <mask> that the conditions were inadequate. Following this warning the applicant’s placement had immediately been changed. He had been taken to hospital by the police and subsequently accommodated in a social care home.


69.  The Government stressed that in 2003 the applicant had not been available to the police authorities, which was why the  <mask> had lawfully ordered that he be remanded in custody. His detention was thereafter regularly extended because of the risk of flight, which could not be excluded given the high maximum sentence for the crime of which he had been accused as well as his behaviour prior to his deprivation of liberty on 6 February 2004.


22.  The Government submitted that in the present case the applicant had been serving a prison sentence in Tarnów Mościce Prison following three separate convictions. The overall term of his imprisonment was due to come to an end on 6 January 2002. Thus, the Government maintained that his detention had been lawful in that it was based on a conviction by a  <mask>.


23.  The applicant submitted that he had challenged his detention on several occasions and requested to be placed in an open reception centre; he had also lodged a request for termination of his detention with the District Court on 18 November 2010. In any event, since the  <mask> had performed ex officio monthly judicial reviews of his detention on five occasions, and had had the obligation to examine all aspects of the lawfulness of the detention, it would have been superfluous for him to request judicial review on his own motion, or to expressly refer to all relevant legal arguments in the requests he had submitted.


35.  The Government contended that in the periods between 21 July and 4 October 2011, 2 February and 23 October 2012, and 18 December 2012 and 18 June 2013 the applicant had not been detained pending trial but on the basis of a conviction by a  <mask>. The first of those periods had ended on 4 October 2011, when the execution of the applicant’s prison sentence had been stayed, and the second on 23 October 2012 when the Supreme Court had quashed the first-instance judgment convicting the applicant. As the applicant had lodged his application with the Court on 13 May 2013, it followed that it had been introduced one year and six months after the expiry of the first period and seven months after the expiry of the second period. The Government further considered that the applicant had been detained pending trial only in the periods between 5 October 2011 and 2 February 2012, and 23 October and 18 December 2012. In view of the fact that the former period had ended on 2 February 2012 following the adoption of the first-instance judgment of the Osijek County Court, and that the applicant had lodged his application with the Court on 13 May 2013, the Government considered that his application in respect of that period had been lodged out of time. Accordingly, in the Government’s view, only the period between 23 October and 18 December 2012 could be examined by the Court.


71.  The applicant also complained that his first appeal against detention had not been examined speedily. The appeal had been handed by his lawyer on 3 September 1997 to the duty prosecutor who, in accordance with usual practice, had handed it to the clerical staff. They had registered it on 8 September 1997. It was not until 16 September 1997, however, that the Prosecutor’s Office had transmitted the appeal to the  <mask>, which had listed it for hearing on 19 September 1997.


123.  The Government submitted that the applicant had had, at his disposal, an effective procedure to challenge his detention. In particular, by virtue of Article 165 of the CCP it had been open to him during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings to lodge an appeal against the court decision ordering and extending his detention, but he had not done so. They further submitted that the applicant had fully benefitted from the procedure required by the Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, as all of his requests for release had been promptly and duly examined by a  <mask>. They also stated that the domestic court had reviewed the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention on several occasions (on 18 March, 5 May 2004 and on 13 August 2005) and had reasonably upheld the preventive measure, having considered the arguments of all participants in the proceedings.


74.  The applicant's house arrest fell under Article 5 § 1(c) of the Convention, being deprivation of liberty for the purpose of bringing him before the  <mask> on suspicion of having committed an offence. During the same period, in view of his mental illness, it was essential to conduct an assessment of his mental health (see paragraphs 8, 15 and 25-33 above). In the Court's view, remand in custody or house arrest under Article 5 § 1(c) of the Convention may be perfectly compatible with lawful confinement to a psychiatric hospital effected for the purpose of establishing whether or not the accused person's mental health has a bearing on his criminal liability for the offences with which he has been charged: deprivation of liberty may be justified on more than one ground listed in Article 5 § 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, X v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 5 November 1981, Series A no. 46, pp. 17-18, §§ 36-39).


62.  The applicant’s detention had been justified under sub-paragraph (a) of Article 5 § 1 as detention “after conviction” by a  <mask>. In particular, the fact that Article 66b § 2 of the Criminal Code, on which the applicant’s preventive detention had been based, had only been inserted in the Criminal Code in 2004 did not break the causal connection between his conviction and the deprivation of liberty. It was true that the Coburg Regional Court convicted the applicant in February 2000, that is, prior to the entry into force of the said provision. However, the fresh proceedings in which the applicant’s preventive detention had been ordered retrospectively in 2008/2009 had to be qualified as akin to a reopening of the proceedings in relation to the assessment of the dangerousness of the perpetrator. New facts had been necessary which had only then disclosed the applicant’s dangerousness. Therefore, the judgment of the Coburg Regional Court of October 2008 ordering the applicant’s preventive detention retrospectively had to be qualified as a “conviction”, for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 (a).


21.  The Government submitted that the Convention permitted deprivation of liberty only in those cases which were enumerated in Article 5 and only in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law. Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention provided for the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a  <mask>. This category of permissible detention concerned any prisoner serving a sentence where “the lawful detention” was based on “conviction by a competent court”. This normally referred to a prison sentence, although that was not specifically indicated in the text. The Government further observed that the execution of a prison sentence was, as a rule, dependent on a further decision which was not a matter for the courts but for the prosecution or prison authorities. The actual order to serve the sentence might not therefore emanate from a “competent court” but the detention would still be lawful under Article 5 § 1 (a). This would be so even where a prisoner's conditional release was revoked for a breach of the conditions, entailing re-imprisonment for the remaining term.


54.  The applicant submitted that his detention until 10 October 1994 had been a lawful detention after conviction by a  <mask> and thus in accordance with Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention. However, from 10 October 1994 when his TBS order – being of a non-punitive character and imposed on the basis of a finding that he was suffering from a mental disorder requiring treatment because it posed a threat to society – had taken effect, his detention had no longer fallen within the scope of Article 5 § 1 (a) but under Article 5 § 1 (e).


119.  The Government submitted that this complaint was manifestly ill-founded and that the whole of the period of the applicant’s detention had been covered by orders issued by the  <mask>, the Vienna Regional Court, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. These decisions had been repeatedly and carefully examined by courts of higher instance, the Vienna Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, which had all concluded that the decisions given by the Regional Court had been issued in accordance with the law.


60.  The Government submitted, firstly,  that the law, as applicable at the material time, provided that proceedings concerning appeals against  judicial decisions to prolong detention were to be held in camera. The purpose of such proceedings was to examine the lawfulness of detention, and therefore not all the guarantees of a fair hearing that were applicable to the proceedings on the merits of a criminal charge had to be observed. However, the  <mask> had had to examine both compliance with the procedural requirements set out in domestic law and the reasonableness of the suspicion grounding the arrest and the legitimacy of the purpose of the arrest and the ensuing detention.


56.  The Government contended that the applicants’ continued placement in the social care home had been intended to protect their best interest in receiving social care. In this connection, the Court notes that the Constitutional Court already examined these arguments and found that the domestic authorities had failed to comply with the requirements of the relevant domestic law concerning compulsory admission to an institution: any such placement must be ordered by the  <mask> (see paragraph 29 above). The Court sees no reason to disagree with the findings of the Constitutional Court.


57.  The applicant submitted that his detention until 5 February 1998 had been a lawful detention after conviction by a  <mask> and thus in accordance with Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention. However, from 5 February 1998, when his TBS order – being of a non-punitive character and imposed on the basis of a finding that he was suffering from a mental disorder requiring treatment because it posed a threat to society – had taken effect, his detention had no longer fallen within the scope of Article 5 § 1 (a) but under Article 5 § 1 (e).


401.  The applicants submitted that their detention was not lawful, since the judgment pursuant to which they had been detained, and in three cases still were detained, had not been given by a  <mask>. They alleged that while in Tiraspol Prison they had not been able to correspond freely or receive visits from their families. They also complained of their conditions of detention.


32.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been deprived of his liberty between 7 June 2005 and 23 March 2006 in accordance with Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention. His detention on remand had been ordered by a court decision, issued in accordance with domestic law for the purpose of bringing him before a  <mask>. At the time of his arrest, the investigating authorities had gathered considerable evidentiary material. The witnesses’ testimonies had clearly stated that the applicant had been violent towards his parents. In the Government’s view the authorities had been under an obligation to ensure effective protection for victims of domestic violence. It had also been established that the applicant had been in possession of marijuana.


47.  The applicant’s situation was examined on 30 March 2008 by a  <mask>, which found no grounds to deprive the applicant of his liberty during the criminal investigation against him. In the Court’s opinion, it is obvious that the situation had not changed within the two days during which the applicant remained in custody. Accordingly, it finds that the investigating authorities’ second application to a different court seeking the applicant’s remand in custody was nothing but an attempt at forum shopping which degraded the administration of justice. Such actions are expressly proscribed by domestic law and, accordingly, warrant the conclusion that the applicant’s remand in custody on 1 April 2008 was not “lawful” or “in accordance with a procecure prescribed by law”. The fact that the judge of the Dedovichi District Court was aware of the situation and did nothing to rectify it is also a matter of serious concern to the Court.


244.  The Government claimed that the applicant should have challenged the refusal of 1 June 2012 by the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office to take measures in respect of her allegations about her permanent surveillance in hospital and about the publication of her medical report before a higher-ranking prosecutor or a  <mask>. She could also have challenged the same acts directly before the administrative courts.


75.  The applicant contended that his pre-trial detention had been excessively lengthy and had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons. He stressed that when extending his detention throughout the period at issue the domestic courts had failed to cite any compelling reasons justifying his deprivation of liberty. In fact, from the very beginning of his deprivation of liberty they had merely reiterated the same stereotyped wording without making the necessary assessment of the particular circumstances of the case. Moreover, following the submission of the indictment in the  <mask>, the domestic courts had failed to set time-limits for the continued detention in their decisions extending his detention.


82.  The Government concluded from the above that the review decisions had been taken speedily. The necessity of conducting an oral hearing or obtaining an expert opinion affected the duration of the proceedings. Under section 167(1) of the Execution of Sentences Act a detainee must be heard in person by the  <mask> at least once every two years. That legal requirement was fulfilled in the instant case, as the applicant was heard in person on 15 March 2010 during the 2009/10 review proceedings, and subsequently on 23 January 2012 in the course of the 2011/12 review proceedings. Equally, an expert opinion had been requested by the domestic courts every second year, namely during the same review proceedings in which oral hearings were held (2009/10 and 2011/12).


102.  The applicant further challenged the Government’s reference to assurances that the trial against the applicant would be fair. He submitted, in particular, that at the very beginning of the proceedings against him the Uzbek authorities had been already regarding him as a criminal, in violation of the presumption of innocence. In fact, they had informed their Russian colleagues that the applicant was a criminal in their letter of 4 February 2010, in the absence of a conviction by a  <mask>. Therefore, contrary to the Government’s submissions, the fair trial guarantees were already not being observed by Uzbekistan at the earliest stage of the proceedings. Furthermore, the Prosecutor’s Office of Uzbekistan requested the applicant’s extradition in February 2010, whilst their assurances that the applicant would not be subjected to any form of prohibited treatment only reached the Russian authorities on 19 April 2011. Therefore, at the initial stage of the extradition proceedings there was a risk of the applicant being returned to Uzbekistan in the absence of any assurances from the Uzbek authorities.


48.  The Government did not submit any comments with regard to the applicant’s complaint about the circumstances surrounding his arrest.  As to the allegedly unlawful period of detention, the Government stated that this period had complied with the provisions of the CCP. On 7 July 2004, after the investigation had been concluded, the prosecutor had sent the bill of indictment and case file to the  <mask>, in accordance with Article 416 of the CCP. Afterwards, the court had committed the applicant for trial in conformity with Article 419 of the CCP.


37.  The Government argued that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty had been decided by a  <mask> in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. As the applicant had been dangerous, the court had issued a temporary injunction before hearing the applicant and appointing a lawyer to represent her. Thereafter, a lawyer had promptly been appointed for her and she had been heard at the earliest opportunity that her condition had allowed. According to a forensic psychiatric examination report which had been ordered in the course of the criminal proceedings and which had been drawn up on 17 November 2006 – that is, between the court ruling on the applicant’s admission (8 November 2006) and her hearing by the court (23 November 2006) – the applicant had been mentally incompetent and unable to participate in the pre-trial investigation, give evidence in court or serve a punishment. Accordingly, the Government argued that the applicant’s mental disorder had not allowed hearing her earlier.


57.  The Government took the view that the applicant’s preventive detention had complied with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention also after expiry of the two-year time-limit on 23 December 2009. The detention had been justified under sub-paragraph (a) of Article 5 § 1 as being detention after conviction by a  <mask>. There remained a sufficient causal connection between the applicant’s conviction on 26 November 1997 by the Berlin Regional Court and his preventive detention at issue. The Regional Court had ordered the applicant’s preventive detention following his conviction of rape and sexual assault without any maximum duration. Therefore, the fact that the time-limit for review of the applicant’s preventive detention had been exceeded by 27 days did not break the causal connection between the applicant’s conviction and his continued preventive detention.


42.  The Government argued that the applicant’s detention had been ordered and extended in accordance with the relevant rules of criminal procedure and had therefore been lawful. The impugned decision of 10 June 2011 had been adopted by a  <mask>. Even though that decision had not set a time-limit for the applicant’s detention, that was prescribed by law, namely Article 106 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which stipulated two months.


48.  The Government submitted that the applicant's contention that his trial for and conviction of rape and attempted rape had been meant as a repression for his having emigrated from Bulgaria was completely unsubstantiated. Moreover, this contention sounded implausible in view of the applicant's numerous previous convictions. On the contrary, the applicant had been tried and convicted by a  <mask> and his detention in February 2000 had been effected for the purpose of enforcing his lawful sentence of imprisonment.


131.  The Government also submitted that Article 109 of the CCrP authorised up to eighteen months of detention for serious criminal offences (which is a category of gravity between minor and particularly serious offences). All detention ordered had indicated the authorised period of detention. The applicant had failed to use the procedural means available to appeal against decisions taken by a prosecutor or a court. An appeal court was empowered to  <mask>. The applicant’s detention after May 2011 had been justified with reference to the Court’s indication under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. All detention decisions had been issued in the presence of various lawyers appointed as defence counsel.


28.  The Government submitted that the purpose of Article 5 § 3 was to provide a safeguard against arbitrary detention by providing an independent scrutiny of the reasons for an accused’s detention and to ensure release if continued detention was not justified. The judicial officer concerned had to be independent and have the power to  <mask>. However, nothing in the text of Article 5 or in the Court’s jurisprudence required that the court before which an arrested person was to be brought had to be the same court that had the power to grant bail. The detained person had to be brought promptly before a court or officer authorised to exercise judicial power; he also had to have the opportunity to apply for bail. Only the first was required to be automatic; the second, the question of bail, only came into play when the arrest and detention were lawful and did not necessarily form part of the prompt automatic review of the merits.


30.  The Government submitted that there had been no breach of Article 5 § 4 as the applicants were legally entitled to release when and if the MHR Tribunal so recommended. They were entitled to have the merits of their continuing detention considered by the Tribunal, which had the power to recommend release and was independent. While it had no power to  <mask>, this was a matter of form not substance as in the case of technical lifers such as the applicants the practice and policy of the Secretary of State was to follow the recommendation of the Tribunal under section 74 of the 1983 Act in relation to discharge. They argued that compliance with Article 5 § 4 could be achieved by administrative practice and policy, citing the cases of Leander v. Sweden (judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, § 51) and Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61, §§ 88-89).


36.  The Government argued that as the Secretary of State followed a practice of following the Tribunal's recommendation this did not deprive the Tribunal's review of an effective decision-making function. While they have referred to previous cases concerning the relevance of administrative practices and policies, the Court observes that these judgments examined complaints under Article 8 of the Convention where issues arose as to whether certain measures were “in accordance with the law”. In that context, the existence of administrative practices may indeed have a bearing on the conditions of lawfulness of measures. Under Article 5 § 4 however, the plain wording of the provision refers to the decision-making power of the reviewing body. In this case, the power to  <mask> lay with the Secretary of State, even though he may have been under some constraints of administrative law as regarded the situations in which he could or could not depart from a policy that had created legitimate expectations. The ability of an applicant to challenge a refusal by the Secretary of State to follow his previous policy in the courts would not remedy the lack of power of decision in the Tribunal. Article 5 § 4 presupposes the existence of a procedure in conformity with its provisions without the necessity to institute separate legal proceedings in order to bring it about. Similarly, although both parties appear to agree that the Secretary of State, following entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, would not be able lawfully to depart from the Tribunal's recommendation, this does not alter the fact that the decision to release would be taken by a member of the executive and not by the Tribunal.  This is not a matter of form but impinges on the fundamental principle of separation of powers and detracts from a necessary guarantee against the possibility of abuse (see, mutatis mutandis, Stafford v. the United Kingdom, [GC] no. 46295/ 99, 28 May 2002, ECHR 2002-..., § 78).


86.  The Government considered that the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention were met by the original trial and appeal proceedings and that no new issues of lawfulness concerning the applicant's detention arose requiring the possibility of recourse to a court or similar body with power to  <mask>. The Secretary of State's determination of the tariff was an administrative procedure governing the implementation of a sentence and not part of the imposition of the sentence itself. Adult mandatory life prisoners convicted of murder were in a distinct category in domestic law, as was recognised in the Court's case-law (see, for example, Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell and V. v. the United Kingdom, cited above). The sentence was imposed because of the inherent gravity of the offence and not because of the presence of factors susceptible to change with the passage of time, such as mental instability or dangerousness. Parliament had decided that all adult murderers must be sentenced to life imprisonment, whether or not they were dangerous and whatever their circumstances, because such a grave crime deserved to be punished by loss of liberty for life. In any event, the Government pointed out that, when the applicant was recalled to prison on revocation of his life licence, the Parole Board enjoyed a power to direct the Secretary of State that he be immediately released. No such direction was made. That was sufficient in itself to ensure compliance with Article 5 § 4 in the circumstances of the case.


47.  The applicant referred to domestic case-law which showed that, domestically, the only questions which had to be addressed by the Court of Magistrates at the first hearing were whether the prosecution had a reasonable suspicion, whether what was alleged was according to Maltese law an arrestable offence and whether the person charged had been brought promptly before such court. It followed that the reasonable suspicion did not have to be shared by the magistrate. The applicant noted that in the cases of Aquilina v. Malta (see GC judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III) and T.W. v Malta (see GC judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports 1999-III) the Court found a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention on the ground that the Court of Magistrates had no power to establish whether the deprivation of the individual’s liberty was justified and to  <mask>. The Maltese law had consequently been amended, but the practice before the Court of Magistrates as a Court of Criminal Inquiry had remained substantially the same, as shown by the events in his own case. Appearing before a duty magistrate was a ritual and a mere formality. Indeed, the applicant failed to see how such a fundamental issue as jurisdiction could be considered as having no impact on the lawfulness of the arrest, given that an arrest not justified by jurisdiction was clearly unlawful. If there was no jurisdiction, then the courts lacked competence, and if the issue of jurisdiction was postponed then the element of promptness required by Article 5 § 3 would be disrespected.


82.  The applicant complained that, notwithstanding the new amendments to the law adopted pursuant to the Court’s judgments in Aquilina v. Malta ([GC], no. 25642/94, ECHR 1999‑III) and T.W. v. Malta ([GC], no. 25644/94, 29 April 1999), which conferred on the Court of Magistrates the power to establish whether the deprivation of an individual’s liberty was justified and to  <mask>, the applicant remained in detention. In his case the Court of Magistrates had refused to take cognisance of the question of jurisdiction, and this was further confirmed by the Constitutional Court judgment declaring that the question of jurisdiction could only be dealt with by the Criminal Court.


26.  The Government did not dispute that the lawfulness of the applicant's continued detention was not reviewed by a body with the power to  <mask> or with a procedure containing the necessary judicial safeguards as required by  Article 5 § 4. Insofar as they referred to the fact that the applicant in Stafford had been re-detained due to the likelihood of further non-violent offending rather than any risk of violence, this element was relevant rather to the Court's finding of insufficient causal connection for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 (a) between the original conviction and the subsequent re-detention and is not a material ground of distinction concerning this applicant's complaints under Article 5 § 4. Similarly, the fact that the Parole Board has never in fact recommended this applicant's release does not deprive him of the right to have a review by a body offering the requisite guarantees.


45.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention that there had been no grounds to detain him and that the domestic courts had not had due regard to the defence’s arguments. Under Article 5 § 3, he complained of a violation of his right to  <mask> and alleged that the detention orders had not been based on sufficient reasons. The relevant parts of Article 5 read as follows:


46.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings. However, he failed to lodge a complaint under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a  <mask> (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki).


38.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention that there had been no grounds to detain him and that the domestic courts had not had due regard to the defence’s arguments. Under Article 5 § 3, he complained that his right to  <mask> had been infringed and alleged that the detention orders had not been founded on sufficient reasons. The relevant parts of Article 5 read as follows:


67.  The applicant complained that her right to  <mask> or release pending trial had not been respected and that the gravity of the offences she had been charged with could not be regarded as a relevant and sufficient reason for the domestic courts repeatedly to extend her detention. She relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:


59.   The Government raised a preliminary objection, arguing that the applicant had not exhausted the domestic remedies available to him. He had failed to lodge a complaint under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a  <mask> (“2004 Act). He also had not lodged a civil action for damages under Article 417 of the Civil Code in respect of the length of the proceedings.


44.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention that there had been no grounds to detain her and that the domestic courts had not had due regard to the defence’s arguments. Under Article 5 § 3, she complained of a violation of her right to  <mask> and alleged that the detention orders had not been based on sufficient reasons. The relevant parts of Article 5 read as follows:


63.  The applicant failed to avail himself of any remedy provided for by Polish law. He had several remedies at his disposal, namely a complaint under sections 5 and 18 of the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a  <mask> as well as a civil action under Article 417 of the Civil Code read together with section 16 of the above-mentioned Law (as to the effectiveness of the latter remedy, see Krasuski v. Poland, judgment of 14 June 2005, no. 61444/00, § 72, ECHR 2005‑V (extracts).


43.  The applicant’s complaint concerns the detention pending trial, in respect of which this Court has constantly held that the presumption under Article 5 is in favour of release. As established in Neumeister v. Austria (27 June 1968, § 4, Series A no. 8), the second limb of Article 5 § 3 does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to  <mask> or granting him provisional release pending trial. Until conviction, he must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once his continuing detention ceases to be reasonable (as confirmed in McKay, cited above, § 41).


91.  The applicant complained that his right to  <mask> or release pending trial had not been respected and that the reasons relied on by the national authorities for ordering and extending his detention could not be regarded as relevant and sufficient. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:


81.  The applicant’s complaint concerns the detention pending trial, in respect of which this Court has constantly held that the presumption under Article 5 is in favour of release. As established in Neumeister v. Austria (27 June 1968, § 4, Series A no. 8), the second limb of Article 5 § 3 does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to  <mask> or granting him provisional release pending trial. Until conviction, he must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once his continuing detention ceases to be reasonable (as confirmed in McKay, cited above, § 41).


36.   The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention that there had been no grounds to detain him and that the domestic courts had not had due regard to the defence’s arguments. Under Article 5 § 3, he complained that his right to  <mask> had been infringed and alleged that detention orders had not been founded on sufficient reasons. The relevant parts of Article 5 read as follows:


100.  The Government contested that argument. They argued that the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been reasonable. The case had been complex. It had concerned seven defendants. The case file materials comprised 191 volumes. The trial court held ninety-eight hearings, which were scheduled and held regularly. There had been no unjustified adjournments or delays. The court had to examine voluminous evidence, including statements by over 400 witnesses. Lastly, the Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaint about the length of the criminal proceedings against him. In particular, as of 4 May 2010 the applicant could have applied for compensation had he considered that his right to a  <mask> had been infringed.


125.  The Government argued that the first applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies because he had not appealed to the courts against the decisions extending his detention after 2 June 2001. The Court reiterates that in the context of an alleged violation of Article 5 § 3 the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies requires that the applicant give the domestic authorities an opportunity to consider whether his right to  <mask> has been respected and whether there exist relevant and sufficient grounds continuing to justify the deprivation of liberty (see Shcheglyuk v. Russia, no. 7649/02, § 35, 14 December 2006).


114.  The applicant claimed that he had not benefited from a fair  <mask>. He complained that the District and City Courts had presumed him guilty because they had refused his requests for release by reference to the gravity of the charges, and that the trial judge had held personal prejudice against him. His co-defendant and the witness for the prosecution Mr E. had not been heard in the second trial because he had absconded, and the trial court had read out the written statements by the police officers. Finally, the applicant complained about allegedly unfair decisions on admissibility and assessment of evidence, and inaccuracy of the trial record.


64.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention that there had been no grounds to detain him and that the domestic courts had not had due regard to the defence’s arguments. Under Article 5 § 3, he complained about a violation of his right to  <mask> and alleged that detention orders had not been founded on sufficient reasons.


192.  The applicant's pre-trial detention infringed his right to be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power (see paragraph 167 above), his right to  <mask> or release pending trial (see paragraph 175 above) and his right to take proceedings by which all elements relevant to the lawfulness of detention could be decided by a court (see paragraph 187 above).


34.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention that there had been no grounds to detain him and that the domestic courts had not had due regard to the defence’s arguments. Under Article 5 § 3, he complained that his right to  <mask> had been infringed and alleged that detention orders had not been founded on sufficient reasons. The relevant parts of Article 5 read as follows:


42.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention that there had been no grounds to detain him and that the domestic courts had not had due regard to the defence's arguments. Under Article 5 § 3, he complained that his right to  <mask> had been infringed and alleged that detention orders had not been founded on sufficient reasons. The relevant parts of Article 5 read as follows:


50.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention that there had been no grounds to detain him and that the domestic courts had not had due regard to the defence’s arguments. Under Article 5 § 3, he complained of a violation of his right to  <mask> and alleged that the detention orders had not been based on sufficient reasons. The relevant parts of Article 5 read as follows:


46.  The applicant complained further under Article 6 § 1 about the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings against him. However, the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies available to him under Polish law, i.e. the 2004 Act, giving him the possibility of lodging a complaint about a breach of the right to a  <mask> with a domestic court. He made a complaint under the 2004 Act only in respect of the prolonged non-examination of his appeal against the decision of 28 October 2002 extending his pre-trial detention but not in respect of the overall length of the trial. For that reason the complaint about the unreasonable length of the proceedings must be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.


55.  The applicant contended that the requirement in section 22(3) of the 1985 Act (see paragraph 46 above) that the prosecution conduct itself with “all due diligence” amounted to the same requirement as “special diligence” in the context of Article 5 § 3. He recalled the need to interpret the provisions of the Convention in a manner which was practical and effective and not theoretical or illusory. It was open to Judge Norris, on 7 June 2002, to find that there had been prosecutorial delay but that this had not impacted on the ability to try the applicant within a reasonable time. The applicant pointed out that under the applicable domestic law at the time, it was clear that not every finding of a lack of diligence would result in the domestic courts refusing to extend the custody time limits (citing R (Quereshi and Others) – see paragraph 49 above). He submitted that in that case, Lord Bingham CJ's reference to the requirement for due diligence operating as a protection for defendants by ensuring that they were not kept in custody pending trial for longer than was justifiable was identical to the requirement in Article 5 § 3 that a defendant is entitled to  <mask> or release pending trial. The applicant argued that this must have been the approach adopted by Judge Norris on 7 June 2002 and that his refusal to extend the custody time limits must therefore have been due to his conclusion that the lack of due diligence by the prosecution had adversely impacted upon the possibility of his trial taking place within a reasonable time.


170.  The Government referred to Article 466 of the CCrP, which allows a prosecutor, in cases where a request for  <mask> is accompanied by an arrest warrant issued by a foreign court, to detain a person whose extradition is sought “without seeking confirmation of the validity of that order from a Russian court” (see paragraph 86 above). The Court notes, however, that the prosecutor’s detention order of 10 December 2009 did not refer to Article 466 of the CCrP, apparently because that Article, as follows from its wording, started to apply from the moment of the receipt of the extradition request. In the applicant’s case the extradition request was not received until 30 December 2009. The Court must therefore first examine what the legal basis for the applicant’s detention from 9 to 30 December 2009 was.


227.  The Government contested this argument. They stated that the second applicant’s detention with a view to  <mask> had been fully in accordance with the procedure and time-limits provided in domestic law. The second applicant and her lawyer had been present at all court hearings concerning her detention. Accordingly, the second applicant’s detention had been in compliance with both domestic law and Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention.


74.  The applicant asserted that the Government had not provided any detailed explanations regarding the alleged violation of this provision. He insisted that he had been deprived of “speedy” judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention on account of the delays in examining his appeals against the extension orders of 25 December 2012 and 25 March 2013 of forty-seven and fifty-six days, respectively. Furthermore, he alleged that Article 125 of the CCrP did not provide a reviewing court with the competence to order the release of a detainee, as required by Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. Lastly, the applicant claimed that Articles 108-10 of the CCrP did not allow him to apply for release on his own initiative and pointed out that he had been detained for two-and-a-half months after the final decision upholding the  <mask> order in his respect had been issued on 19 June 2013, which he asserted had amounted to a breach of his right to judicial review of his detention at “reasonable intervals”.


93.  The applicant complained that his detention pending  <mask> had been in breach of the requirement of lawfulness and in violation of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. He also claimed that he had lacked access to judicial review of his detention, in breach of the provisions of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. Article 5 reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


41.  The applicant replied that diplomatic assurances by the Uzbek authorities did not refute his arguments about high risk of ill-treatment (he referred to the Court’s established case-law: Abdulkhakov v. Russia, no. 14743/11, §§ 149-150, 2 October 2012, and Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, §§ 147-148, ECHR 2008). The Government’s claim that they had no information about anyone being ill-treated in Uzbekistan appeared to be false in the light of the recent reports by Amnesty International about the destiny of Mr Khamidkariyev who had been abducted in Russia and forcibly returned to Uzbekistan where he faced an unfair trial based on his confessions obtained by torture (see paragraph 33 above and the facts of application no. 42332/14). The mere fact of ratification of international human rights treaties by Uzbekistan does not in itself provide sufficient safeguards against ill-treatment because of the absence of any control mechanisms in relation to the country’s compliance with its commitments (here the applicant referred to the Court’s findings in: Ermakov v. Russia, no. 43165/10, § 204, 7 November 2013, and Khodzhayev v. Russia, no. 52466/08, § 98, 12 May 2010). The applicant deemed illogical the Government’s argument that his  <mask> had been refused in respect of some of the charges. What is important is that it was authorised for the offence of participation in an extremist organisation which put him in a vulnerable group systematically subject to torture. In view of the recent publications by international human rights organisations, the applicant submitted that there were no improvements in the sphere of human rights in Uzbekistan and that torture of persons suspected of prohibited religious activities had remained a widespread practice. However, the applicant’s allegations of an increased risk of torture were not examined at any stage of the domestic proceedings.


28.  The applicant submitted that he had raised the issue of his risk of being subjected to ill-treatment if returned to Uzbekistan in the  <mask>, expulsion and refugee-status proceedings, advancing a number of specific arguments, such as an increased risk of ill-treatment of persons who were, as was the applicant, accused of participation in a banned religious activity. The Russian courts failed to analyse the nature of the charges against the applicant, disregarded the link between the charges and the risk of ill-treatment and did not examine the information from various international organisation and from the Court’s judgments. The applicant rejected the Government’s argument that the decision on his administrative removal did not necessarily mean that he would be expelled to Uzbekistan. No other possibility had ever been discussed in the course of the administrative proceedings and, furthermore, there was no reason to believe that any other country would be willing to accept him. His placement in the detention facility foreclosed the possibility of his voluntary and independent departure from Russia and prevented him from choosing the country of destination.