38.  The Government submitted that the circumstances of the case should be examined in the light of their complexity, the conduct of the applicants and that of the authorities. They further advocated that the domestic authorities had fulfilled their  <mask> to ensure the enforcement of the final judgment in favour of the applicants. They also argued that on 5 September 2003 the company became the subject of insolvency proceedings and it could no longer fulfil its obligations in respect of the applicants. The Government submitted that the State did not have shares or other forms of participation in the debtor company and therefore could not be held responsible for its debts. They pointed out that the bailiff had taken reasonable steps and had even seized and auctioned the company’s assets; however, the auctions had later been annulled at the request of third companies.


100.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of  <mask> and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


106.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of  <mask> and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


73.  The applicants took the view that the impugned measure had not been taken “subject to the conditions provided for by law”. They observed that, within the meaning of the Court’s settled case-law, the notion of “lawfulness” necessarily implied the  <mask> of the legal consequences of the provision in question and that such foreseeability had been lacking in the present case. In this connection they first asserted that the Latvian authorities had not applied the ordinary procedure provided for by the General Expropriation Act, under which compensation had to be determined by agreement and to correspond to the value of the expropriated property, and, secondly, that the final sum had not been decided by the competent court but by the State Land Authority.


115.  The applicant company submitted that the refusal to allocate it any broadcasting frequencies amounted to interference with the exercise of its rights under Article 10 § 1 of the Convention (Meltex Ltd and Movsesyan, cited above, and Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov, cited above). The interference had not been prescribed by law, as required by the Convention, on account of the un <mask> of the transitional legislation passed by the national parliament. The applicant company further pointed out that the Italian courts had applied the legislation in question and had found that compensation should be calculated with effect from 1 December 2004, contrary to what the ECJ had held in its judgment.


27.  The applicants contended that, contrary to the respondent Government’s assertions, the deceased, Ms Polikseni Pistika, had owned the immovable property in question since the Turkish courts had issued her a certificate of inheritance and all three buildings had been registered in her name at the local land registry office upon payment of the requisite tax. Polikseni had only been deprived of her property following unlawful confiscation by the Turkish authorities on the basis of a secret Government decree of 1964 which had already been annulled in 1988. Thus, the confiscation of the property of Polikseni had been illegal, arbitrary and abusive even under the domestic law of Turkey. Furthermore, the annulment of the certificate of inheritance had not met the requirements of precision and  <mask> implied by the concept of law within the meaning of the Convention. Had it not been for this unlawful act and the respondent Government’s continuous reliance on reciprocity, the applicants would have inherited the property in question as the sole heirs of Polikseni.


109.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of  <mask> and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


118.  The Government claimed that in any event the damage to the applicant's property was lawful, as section 21 of the Law on Suppression of Terrorism “permits the deliberate inflicting of damage on legally-protected interests, including property rights”. In the Government's submission, the legal act had been duly published and therefore met the requirements of clarity, accessibility and  <mask>. They also insisted that the interference in question had pursed a legitimate aim, as the counter-terrorist operation had been launched in order to suppress criminal and terrorist activity, ensure security of individuals, and protect their rights and freedoms.


289.  The Government pointed out, first of all, that the relevant applicants had not adduced any documents proving their title to the houses, or any detailed description of the property allegedly lost by them. The Government argued that it was incumbent on the relevant applicants to have their property rights confirmed under domestic law by the competent national authorities. They further argued that the alleged interference with the relevant applicants’ rights secured by Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been lawful, as the counter-terrorism operation in the Chechen Republic, in the context of which the strikes of 19 October 1999 had been executed, had been launched and carried out on the basis of Presidential Decrees nos. 2137, 2166 and 2155c of 30 November and 9 December 1994 and 23 September 1999 respectively, Governmental Decree no. 1360 of 9 December 1994, and the Suppression of Terrorism Act of 25 July 1998. In the Government’s submission, the aforementioned decrees, except for certain provisions, had been found compatible with the Russian Constitution by the Russian Constitutional Court. The Government insisted that all the aforementioned legal instruments had met the requirements of  <mask> and accessibility.


143.  The Government insisted that the applicants had had at their disposal effective domestic remedies as they could have claimed compensation from the State under the Civil Code. Compensation so awarded had to be paid from the federal budget and could not be at the respondent authority’s expense. Referring to the Constitutional Court’s and the Supreme Court’s position (see paragraphs 96-97 and 101 above), the Government maintained that the exclusion of the present cases from the Compensation Act did not prevent the applicants from using the Civil Code provisions, which complied with the requirements of clarity,  <mask> and certainty. Thus, the applicant Ms Kostyleva obtained two judgments by the domestic court acknowledging unlawful inaction on the part of the respondent administration and awarding substantial compensation in that regard (see paragraphs 82 and 84. above). The Government also provided three similar decisions by the courts of general jurisdiction awarding compensation for non-enforcement of judgments against the State authorities concerning the provision of housing: the judgment of 6 June 2008 by the Nevskiy District Court of Saint-Petersburg awarding RUB 30,000 to each applicant for an enforcement delay of eight years, the judgment of 19 April 2012 by the Syktyvkar Town Court awarding RUB 35,000 for an enforcement delay of four years, and the judgment of 1 September 2010 by the Iglinskiy District Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan awarding RUB 50,000 to each applicant for an enforcement delay of five years. The courts justified their awards by reference to the Constitution, the Convention and the Court’s case-law.


74.  The Government went on to argue that the domestic courts’ decisions in the present case were fully in accordance with the law, as they had both been in line with the relevant provisions of the Enforcement Act and had met the Convention standards of lawfulness in terms of  <mask>, precision and accessibility. They rejected the applicant’s argument that after 2 May 2011, when he had made the last payment, the enforcement court should have discontinued the enforcement proceedings (see paragraph 69 above). In their view, the court could not have done so because the applicant’s share in the property had already been sold before that date, on 17 March 2011 when the second public auction had been held (see paragraph 21 above). It was then that the applicant had lost his share in the property and the enforcement had essentially been completed. The decisions rendered later had only represented implementation or “technical” rulings, aimed at formally ending the proceedings. The applicant, who had been represented by an advocate throughout the enforcement proceedings, must have been aware of that. In fact, according to the Government, he himself did not contest that his share in the property had already been sold at the second auction, but tried to argue why the enforcement court should have nevertheless, after he had paid the debt in full, discontinued the proceedings and ordered restitution.


110.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of  <mask> and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


166.  The applicants complained that the authorities' failure to maintain the mud-defence infrastructure, to monitor the hazardous area, to provide an emergency warning or to take other reasonable measures to mitigate the risk and the effects of the natural disaster also constituted a violation of their right to  <mask>. They complained, in particular, that they had not received adequate compensation in respect of their losses. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which provides:


74.  The applicant further alleged that in its decision of 12 November 1996 the Kaunas City Municipality had unlawfully reduced the size and modified the location of the plot of land assigned to him. In particular, he contended that on 17 November 1992 the Kaunas City Board had restored his property rights to 1/12 of the plot of land adjacent to the disputed premises, measuring 1,288 sq. m. However, the aforementioned decision of 12 November 1996 specified that the overall size of the plot in question was 950 sq. m. The applicant invoked the right to the  <mask> under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


49.  The Government submitted further that the interference with the applicant’s property rights was in proportion to the legitimate aim sought to be realised. The issue of the proportionality of the 1993 Act had been discussed at length in the Standing Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament as well as in its Standing Legal Affairs Committee. They had emphasised the need to give due consideration to the  <mask> provided for in the 1919 Constitution, meaning above all that the weakening of the creditors’ position, although inevitable, should not lead to unreasonable results. It was noted that a private individual was not released from his or her liability to reimburse a debt even when declared bankrupt. The effects of debt adjustment on the position of creditors therefore had to be assessed in the light of their ability to obtain payment from the debtor’s future income and assets. As the debt would be reduced and the debtor freed from his or her liability to reimburse a debt only where debt adjustment by other means was not possible, such an adjustment would not in reality weaken the position of creditors.


14.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to  <mask> had been based on law and pursued the general interest of securing the collection of outstanding tax debts. It had moreover been necessary and proportionate in that the share held by the applicant had been attached for want of other seizable assets. In their view, the applicant had not been able to show that the attachment, in its value, had significantly exceeded the amount it had owed; therefore, the measure could not be regarded as excessive.


53.  The applicant contested that submission, arguing that by complaining about a breach of his human rights and the unlawful seizure of the car in the criminal proceedings, he had in substance complained also about an unlawful interference with his possessions. Furthermore, there was nothing in the Constitutional Court’s decision to suggest that it had not dealt with the right to  <mask>.


103.  The Government submitted that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 guaranteed the  <mask> which was in an individual’s lawful possession. The mere fact that Land Certificates no. 30020006 and no. 300200006 had been issued in Mr Zhigalev’s name did not suffice for him to be considered as the lawful owner of the plots of 30.9 and 315 hectares of land.


23.  The applicant argued that the interference with his property rights could not be justified under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The policies of the “TRNC” could not furnish a legitimate aim since the establishment of the “TRNC” was an illegitimate act condemned by the Security Council. For the same reason, the interference could not be found to be in accordance with the law and the  <mask>. Nor had the interference been proportionate. The need to re-house displaced Turkish Cypriots could not justify the complete negation of the applicant’s property rights. This conclusion was reinforced by evidence showing that much of the property taken from Greek Cypriots had been used to house settlers from mainland Turkey.


27.  The applicants argued that the policies of the “TRNC” could not furnish a legitimate aim since the establishment of the “TRNC” was an illegitimate act that had been condemned by the UN Security Council. For the same reason, the interference could not be found to have been in accordance with the law and the  <mask>. Nor had it been proportionate. The need to rehouse displaced Turkish-Cypriots could not justify the complete negation of their property rights.


64.  The applicants argued that the interference with their property rights could not be justified under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The policies of the “TRNC” could not furnish a legitimate aim since the establishment of the “TRNC” had been an illegitimate act condemned by the UN Security Council. For the same reason, the interference could not be found to be in accordance with the law and the  <mask>. Nor had it been proportionate. The need to rehouse displaced Turkish Cypriots could not justify the complete negation of the applicants' property rights. This conclusion was reinforced by the existence of evidence that much of the property taken from Greek Cypriots had been used to house settlers from mainland Turkey. In particular, the applicants' properties had not been used to house displaced Turkish Cypriots from the south, as since 1974 Famagusta had become a ghost town.


28.  The Government submitted that the application was manifestly ill-founded. They accepted that charging VAT to the applicant constituted interference with the applicant’s property rights. However, this interference was justified under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, providing that the States should not be prevented from enforcing such laws as they deem necessary to control the use of property in the public interest and to  <mask>.


78.  The Government maintained that the relevant legislation regulating the use of prisoners’ money was compatible with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They argued that that provision did not impair the right of States to adopt such laws as they deemed necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to  <mask> and other contributions or penalties.


37.  The Government considered that the interference amounted to a control of the use of property to  <mask>, that it thus fell under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and that it was compatible with that Article in so far as the measure was lawful and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.


106.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of foreseeability and  <mask> required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


110.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of foreseeability and  <mask> required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


289.  The Government pointed out, first of all, that the relevant applicants had not adduced any documents proving their title to the houses, or any detailed description of the property allegedly lost by them. The Government argued that it was incumbent on the relevant applicants to have their property rights confirmed under domestic law by the competent national authorities. They further argued that the alleged interference with the relevant applicants’ rights secured by Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been lawful, as the counter-terrorism operation in the Chechen Republic, in the context of which the strikes of 19 October 1999 had been executed, had been launched and carried out on the basis of Presidential Decrees nos. 2137, 2166 and 2155c of 30 November and 9 December 1994 and 23 September 1999 respectively, Governmental Decree no. 1360 of 9 December 1994, and the Suppression of Terrorism Act of 25 July 1998. In the Government’s submission, the aforementioned decrees, except for certain provisions, had been found compatible with the Russian Constitution by the Russian Constitutional Court. The Government insisted that all the aforementioned legal instruments had met the requirements of foreseeability and  <mask>.


118.  The Government claimed that in any event the damage to the applicant's property was lawful, as section 21 of the Law on Suppression of Terrorism “permits the deliberate inflicting of damage on legally-protected interests, including property rights”. In the Government's submission, the legal act had been duly published and therefore met the requirements of clarity,  <mask> and foreseeability. They also insisted that the interference in question had pursed a legitimate aim, as the counter-terrorist operation had been launched in order to suppress criminal and terrorist activity, ensure security of individuals, and protect their rights and freedoms.


109.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of foreseeability and  <mask> required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


100.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of foreseeability and  <mask> required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.


57.  The Government submitted that the court’s decision on costs in a final judgment depended on the outcome of the proceedings, in particular the extent to which the applicant had won the case. They submitted that the applicant had claimed compensation of a very significant amount, although a party to civil proceedings who requests exemption from court fees is obliged to bring claims of a balanced amount. Relying on the Court’s case Kupiec v. Poland (no. 16828/02, 3 February 2009), the Government argued that applicants who deliberately inflate the value of their claims for compensation cannot be expected to be exempted entirely from the payment of court fees or from the requirement to contribute a reasonable amount toward the costs of taking the action. They stressed that the applicant’s success in the proceedings amounted to only six and a half per cent of his claim. The decision on court fees met the requirements of transparency, predictability and  <mask>.


74.  The Government went on to argue that the domestic courts’ decisions in the present case were fully in accordance with the law, as they had both been in line with the relevant provisions of the Enforcement Act and had met the Convention standards of lawfulness in terms of foreseeability, precision and  <mask>. They rejected the applicant’s argument that after 2 May 2011, when he had made the last payment, the enforcement court should have discontinued the enforcement proceedings (see paragraph 69 above). In their view, the court could not have done so because the applicant’s share in the property had already been sold before that date, on 17 March 2011 when the second public auction had been held (see paragraph 21 above). It was then that the applicant had lost his share in the property and the enforcement had essentially been completed. The decisions rendered later had only represented implementation or “technical” rulings, aimed at formally ending the proceedings. The applicant, who had been represented by an advocate throughout the enforcement proceedings, must have been aware of that. In fact, according to the Government, he himself did not contest that his share in the property had already been sold at the second auction, but tried to argue why the enforcement court should have nevertheless, after he had paid the debt in full, discontinued the proceedings and ordered restitution.