42.  The applicants observed at the outset that they could in theory approach a notary to request that he or she draw up a civil union contract in accordance with the impugned Law. However, if the notary, against all expectations, were to agree to their request, he or she would be liable to disciplinary action for a breach of official duty. Accordingly, it was extremely unlikely that any notary would dare break the law in order to accede to the applicants’ request. Furthermore, the applicants pointed out that notaries in Greece were members of a liberal profession. Consequently, any legal action before the administrative courts would have no prospect of success since notaries were not agents of the State. As to an action in the civil courts, that would have no greater chance of success, as a notary who refused to draw up a notarised instrument in respect of a same- <mask> couple would not incur any liability in tort as a result. Such a refusal would be neither unlawful nor intentional, as required by the domestic legislation in order for an individual to incur liability in tort.


162.  The applicants noted that to avoid a finding of a violation the Government argued that same- <mask> couples were in fact protected (by means of cohabitation agreements). The reality was that the public authorities were reluctant to advance the rights of same-sex couples, and the few rights which had been gained over the past decade were the result of litigation and court proceedings. Thus, such protection deriving from case-law and not legal statute constituted only an indirect protection. It was also left to the judge to decide when such protection was required after the same‑sex couple had proved that i) they were cohabiting in a stable relationship, ii) that the right they were seeking to enjoy was a right enjoyed by heterosexuals, and that a different degree of protection was unreasonable. Such discretion created uncertainty and would often need direction by the Constitutional Court. Moreover, it burdened persons in the applicants’ situation with having to go to court and prove cohabitation in order to obtain the relevant protections. In that connection the applicants noted the relevance of having their marriage registered (and thus having the validity of their marriage controlled and certified by the authorities) to enable them to fulfil the burden of proof concerning the stability of their relationship. They also noted that this approach to protection did not distinguish between cohabiting same-sex couples and married same-sex couples, despite the latter being granted recognition and protection in all jurisdictions in which same-sex marriage was regulated.


51.  The Government pointed out that the only differences between marriage and registered partnership appeared in two areas: establishment of paternity on the basis of marriage did not apply to registered partnerships, nor did the provisions of the Adoption Act or the Names Act regarding the family name of the spouse. However, a registered partner could adopt the other partner’s child. Those exceptions were applicable only to those cases in which parenthood had not been established beforehand. Paternity presumed on the basis of marriage or established paternity could not be annulled on the ground that the man later underwent gender reassignment and became a woman. Nor did the father’s gender reassignment have any legal effects on his responsibility for the care, custody or maintenance of a child as such responsibility was based on parenthood, irrespective of  <mask> or form of partnership. The applicant was not even claiming that her legal rights and obligations would be reduced were her marriage turned into a registered partnership, but rather relied on the social and symbolic significance of marriage. The Government stressed that the applicant’s legal rights and obligations vis-à-vis her child arising either from paternity or parenthood would not be altered and the applicant had not produced any evidence to the contrary. Finnish law did not impose compulsory divorce on the applicant, nor annulment or dissolution of marriage. Nor was there any evidence of possible implications for the applicant’s private or family life as she could continue her family life without any interference.


165.  The Government submitted that same- <mask> couples wishing to give a legal framework to various aspects of their community life could enter into cohabitation agreements. Such agreements enabled same-sex couples to regulate aspects related to, for example: the manner of dealing with joint expenses and the opening of joint bank accounts; the criteria for the allocation of ownership of assets acquired during the cohabitation; the procedure for the distribution of assets in the event of termination of cohabitation; as well as acts of testamentary disposition in favour of the cohabiting partner (as for example the right to continue a lease following the decease of a partner, as established by judgment no. 404/1998). Furthermore, under Article 408 of the Civil Code it was possible to nominate a person living under the same roof as guardian in the event of incapacitation, as had in fact been done by Mr D.P. and Mr G.P. In the Government’s view cohabitation agreements were the appropriate juridical instrument to give their union the status of family before the law, without any discrimination based on their sexual orientation.


17.  The applicants complained, under Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8, of discrimination based on their  <mask> and sexual orientation on account of their exclusion from the registered partnership, claiming that marriage was not a suitable alternative for them. They did not rely on Article 8 taken alone, so the Court considers that there is no need for it to examine this issue of its own motion.


67.  The applicants noted the Government’s argument that Austrian adoption law was aimed at protecting the interests of the child. According to the Court’s case-law, it was for the Government to show that the exclusion of same- <mask> couples from second-parent adoption was necessary to achieve that aim. There was a far-reaching scientific consensus that same-sex couples were as capable as different-sex couples of ensuring the positive development of children. From among the studies they submitted, the applicants referred at the hearing to a large-scale study entitled “The life of children in same-sex civil partnerships” commissioned by the German Ministry of Justice (Marina Rupp (ed.), Die Lebenssituation von Kindern in gleichgeschlechtlichen Lebenspartnerschaften, Cologne, 2009).


56.  The applicant argued that he had been discriminated against on the grounds of his  <mask> because he, as a man convicted of serious and particularly serious crimes, started serving his sentence in a closed prison. Women convicted of the same crimes started serving their sentence in partly-closed prisons. Accordingly, male and female prisoners who had been convicted of the same crimes and given the same sentences were subjected to different prison regimes, and the rights of these two groups of prisoners were restricted to a different extent. Most notably, prisoners serving their sentence in closed prisons were not eligible for prison leave, while prisoners in partly-closed prisons, like female prisoners in a situation similar to the applicant’s, did have such a right.


96.  The Government referred to the Court's previous case-law (the above-cited Rees, Cossey and Sheffield and Horsham judgments) and maintained that neither Article 12 nor Article 8 of the Convention required a State to permit a transsexual to marry a person of his or her original  <mask>. They also pointed out that the domestic law approach had been recently reviewed and upheld by the Court of Appeal in Bellinger v. Bellinger, the matter now pending before the House of Lords. In their view, if any change in this important or sensitive area were to be made, it should come from the United Kingdom's own courts acting within the margin of appreciation which this Court has always afforded. They also referred to the fact that any change brought the possibility of unwanted consequences, submitting that legal recognition would potentially invalidate existing marriages and leave transsexuals and their partners in same-sex marriages. They emphasised the importance of proper and careful review of any changes in this area and the need for transitional provisions.


87.  The applicant Mr V.V. indicated that he had lived with his partner Mr X since 2007. The Government’s claim that the evidence of their relationship has not been tested in the domestic proceedings sits ill with the actual findings of the Russian courts, which had taken that evidence but refused to recognise that their same- <mask> relationship amounted to a family or at least a social link (see paragraphs 38 and 45 above). On the strength of the material produced by Mr V.V., which included family photographs and travel vouchers, the Court is satisfied that V.V. and Mr X have been living in a stable de facto partnership which falls within the notion of “private life” and that of “family life” (see Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, § 73, ECHR 2013 (extracts)).


130.  The applicants submitted that both before the domestic courts and before the Court they had produced certified copies of their marriage certificates released by the competent authorities of the place of the celebration of their marriages. It followed that they had submitted sufficient proof as to the validity of their marriages. Furthermore, the refusal of the Italian authorities had solely been based on the fact that they were same‑ <mask> couples, and not because of any doubt as to the validity of the marriages contracted.


94.  The applicant claimed that Article 12 of the Convention should either be interpreted restrictively to cover only the contracting of marriage or more broadly to cover also the continued existence of a marriage. In the former case, Article 12 would not be relevant to the applicant’s situation as her marriage to her wife had been contracted when they were a different- <mask> couple. In the latter case, however, the test whether the “forced” divorce injured “the very substance of the right to marry” would have to be satisfied. In the applicant’s submission, the latter interpretation applied since the Government’s ability to interfere with a marriage in a manner such as in the present case would render the right to marry largely ineffective. Thus construed, Article 12 of the Convention would apply to the present case and require an examination under that Article.


159.  The applicants submitted that it could no longer be said that same‑ <mask> marriage was against public order (as confirmed by the Court of Cassation judgment no. 4184/12). Indeed it was not the Italian public order that was at issue in the present case but the international public order, as the norms to be interpreted were norms of international private law. As the Court of Cassation had pointed out (decision of 26 April 2013, no. 10070, which quoted another two decisions of the Court of Cassation of 6 December 2002, no. 17349 and of 23 February 2006, no. 4040), it is the “international public order” which is included in the principles of international private law. Therefore the applicants argued that the international public order did not merely mirror Italian fundamental legal principles as provided by the Constitution or by other Italian legal statutes. Instead, it encapsulated the Italian fundamental principles that in turn derive from a plurality of sources of law and in particular from the interaction of the Italian system with the Charter and the Convention.


157.  The Government had ignored that they were European citizens, and that Article 9 of the European Charter did not distinguish between married same- <mask> or different-sex couples (for example, in application of Article 9 and Directive 2004/38/EC recognising the right of EU citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of member states, the decision of 13 February 2012 of the Tribunal of Reggio Emilia, paragraph 85 above) and that each European citizen who was married was entitled to free movement within the EU, regardless of who he or she was married to and where they married. It followed that the European norms concerning married couples also applied in Italy and must apply to the applicants, who were legally married in another EU state. Thus, contrary to that held by the Court of Cassation in judgment no. 4184/12, same-sex marriage celebrated abroad produced legal effects in the Italian system every time the marital status represented a pre-requisite for the application in Italy of EU norms (as explained in the Reggio Emilia Tribunal’s judgment). In connection with the last-mentioned judgment the applicants considered that since an Italian citizen’s marriage to a non-EU same-sex partner was registered, the failure to register their marriage discriminated against them on the basis of their nationality (as they were both Italian).


149.  The applicants submitted that as a same- <mask> couple married abroad they were undoubtedly in the same position as different-sex couples married abroad as regards their request for registration of their marriage. Yet they had suffered different, disadvantageous treatment, as they had been refused registration of their marriage. This refusal also amounted to an interference with their rights to family life and to marry, since the decisions of public authorities jeopardised a relationship of marriage that two adult and consenting persons had created to regulate their private and family life (they referred, mutatis mutandis, to Negrepontis-Giannisis v. Greece (no. 56759/08, § 57, 3 May 2011).


11.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities’ refusal to pay him the social security benefit to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Wpt and WMA constituted discrimination against him on grounds of  <mask> contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and/or Article 8 of the Convention.


65.  The applicants asserted that they had indeed been treated differently in the proceedings in issue. Before the domestic courts, they had argued that the refusal by the second applicant’s father to consent to the adoption was not justified as he had been acting against the interests of the child. Consequently, the second applicant’s interest in the adoption outweighed his father’s interest in objecting to it. Thus, they argued that the court should have overridden the father’s refusal in accordance with Article 181 § 3 of the Civil Code. In the case of an opposite- <mask> couple, the District Court would have carried out a detailed examination and would have had to deliver a separate decision on this issue. However, in the applicants’ case it had denied them any inquiry of the facts on the ground that the adoption requested by them was in any case not possible under Austrian law. This position had been explicitly confirmed by the Supreme Court.


23.  The applicants submitted that they had been victims of discrimination because of the refusal of the Austrian authorities to extend the second applicant's health and accident insurance to the first applicant on grounds of their sexual orientation. This had also been acknowledged in substance by the Constitutional Court in its judgment of 10 October 2005. They maintained that, despite the Constitutional Court's judgment of 10 October 2005 and the subsequent amendment to the CSSAIA, they were still victims because same- <mask> partners were still excluded from joint insurance if they did not raise children in the common household. Moreover, the transitional provision guaranteed the joint insurance to those (male/female) couples who were entitled to it before the amendment, irrespective of whether they raised children or not. Given that this was not the case for same-sex partners they were continuously victims of discriminatory legislation.


36.  The applicants submitted that they had been victims of discrimination because it had been impossible to have the cover of the second applicant's health and accident insurance extended to include the first applicant. This was because, under section 56(6) of the CSSAIA, as in force until 1 August 2006, such an extension was only open to cohabitees of the opposite  <mask> and because this discriminatory situation did not effectively change after the entry into force of an amendment to the relevant provisions which imposed conditions they could not fulfil.


66.  The Government then proceeded to analyse the rights and obligations arising out of civil unions and concluded that the applicants’ property and personal status had in no way been affected by their exclusion from the scope of the legislation on civil unions. With regard to property issues, the Government reiterated their arguments concerning the admissibility ratione personae of the complaint. They observed that civil unions did not produce any automatic and binding effects with regard to the partners’ property status. As to social security matters, same- <mask> couples were in an identical position to different-sex couples who decided to enter into a union. As far as maintenance and inheritance issues were concerned, these could be regulated within a same-sex couple without a civil union, by means of a contractual agreement.


33.  The applicant stated that adoption by homosexuals fell into three quite distinct categories: first, it might be a single person seeking to adopt, in a member State where adoptions by single persons were permitted (even if only in exceptional cases), in which case any partner the individual might have acquired no parental rights as a result of the adoption (individual adoption); second, one member of a same- <mask> couple might seek to adopt the child of the other partner, so that both partners had parental rights vis-à-vis the child (second-parent adoption); and lastly, both members of a same-sex couple might seek to jointly adopt a child with no prior connection with either partner, so that both partners simultaneously acquired parental rights vis-à-vis the child (joint adoption). The applicant specified that she had applied for individual adoption, which was the simpler legal option.


44.  The applicants argued that in today’s society civil marriage was a union of two persons which encompassed all aspects of their lives, while the procreation and education of children was no longer a decisive element. As the institution of marriage had undergone considerable changes there was no longer any reason to refuse same- <mask> couples access to marriage. The wording of Article 12 did not necessarily have to be read in the sense that men and women only had the right to marry a person of the opposite sex. Furthermore, the applicants considered that the reference in Article 12 to the relevant “national laws” could not mean that States were given unlimited discretion in regulating the right to marry.


76.  The applicants maintained that the heart of their complaint was that they were discriminated against as a same- <mask> couple. Agreeing with the Government on the applicability of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, they asserted that just like differences based on sex, differences based on sexual orientation required particularly serious reasons by way of justification. In the applicants’ contention, the Government had failed to submit any such reasons for excluding them from access to marriage.


49.  The applicant submitted that the facts of her case should be examined under the concepts of private and family life under Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, she stressed that it clearly followed from the Court’s case-law that a stable de facto relationship between same- <mask> couples should be considered as family life under that provision. In her case, she was in a stable relationship with D.B. with whom she maintained a relationship by constant visits for the periods of three months in which she was allowed to stay in Croatia without a residence permit.


53.  The Government further submitted that even if the analogy could be established, the difference in treatment was objectively justified by the fact that the child support and welfare systems established a completely different set of benefits and burdens for same- <mask> partners and opposite-sex partners. Furthermore, there was at the relevant time, as the Court had said in the Mata Estevez case, a wide margin of appreciation for States regarding whether and how to afford formal recognition of same-sex relationships. There had been a progression in attitudes to same-sex couples in recent years in society and in European and domestic law. As had been acknowledged in the House of Lords, though, the whole issue of the recognition of same-sex relationships called for a wider consideration of how the disparate legal regimes should be amended. This culminated in the Civil Partnership Act, which introduced comprehensive and thoroughgoing reform, addressing the myriad of issues raised by the decision to recognise same-sex relationships in the United Kingdom. In the Government's view, this initiative had not been required by the Convention. While there was gathering momentum across Europe on this issue, it was still within the margin of appreciation of States when the United Kingdom introduced the relevant reforms. Even though it was not the first Contracting State to do so, it could not be said that it had lagged behind other Contracting States. It remained the case that most of these either provided a less comprehensive set of rights to same-sex couples, or did not recognise them at all. The scale of the change provided justification for the transitional period of one year between the adoption of the Act and its entry into force, during which time the necessary practical arrangements were made. There was a strong public interest in an orderly transition in relation to complex legal and administrative regimes. The Government concluded that the House of Lords had correctly held that the operation of the detailed child support rules prior to the coming into force of the Civil Partnership Act was objectively justified, and that the difference in treatment of which the applicant complained was within the United Kingdom's margin of appreciation.


28.  The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the court decisions refusing joint custody had infringed his right to respect for his family life, and under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention that the application of Article 1626a § 2 of the Civil Code amounted to unjustified discrimination against unmarried fathers on the grounds of  <mask> and in comparison with divorced fathers.


51.  The Government pointed out that it was within the State’s margin of appreciation to decide how to construe and treat the concepts of family and private life of individuals who entered into a relationship, in particular when it concerned same- <mask> couples. Moreover, the State had a wide margin of appreciation in matters of immigration. In the Government’s view, in the case at issue the applicant had failed to demonstrate that she had had family life with D.B. In particular, she had not lived with D.B. or otherwise demonstrated their mutual commitment to a family life. The fact that she wanted to move and live with D.B. and to start their common business could not amount to the recognition of a de facto family life. Moreover, the Government did not wish to speculate as to whether the matter concerned the applicant’s private life, since the right to a residence permit in Croatia could not be considered under the applicant’s right to respect for her private life. In any case, the Aliens Act clearly listed instances in which family reunification could be sought and there had therefore been no reason for the applicant to consider that her situation could fall within these requirements.


63.  The Government further submitted that Law no. 3719/2008 was aimed at regulating an existing social phenomenon, that of unmarried different- <mask> couples who had children. Greek law differed in that respect from the legislation in other European countries providing for civil unions. The Greek legislature had stated expressly in the explanatory report on the Law that it was not seeking to regulate all forms of de facto partnership but rather to protect children born to different-sex couples in such partnerships, as well as the parents themselves if they did not wish to marry. In the Government’s view, the whole structure of the Law and the content of its provisions were designed to reflect this. Consequently, the introduction of civil unions for same-sex couples would require a separate set of rules governing a situation which was analogous to, but not the same as, the situation of different-sex couples.


14.  The applicant complained that the national authorities’ refusal to allow her to bear only her maiden name after her marriage amounted to a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. She also contended that the fact that Turkish law allows married men to bear only their own surname after marriage and not married women constituted discrimination on grounds of  <mask> and was incompatible with Article 14 of the Convention. The applicant further submitted that the Turkish domestic courts, by disregarding the Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey judgment (cited above) given by the Court and failing to make the necessary amendments to the domestic law, had breached her right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention.


69.  The applicants submitted a further argument based on the 2008 European Convention on the Adoption of Children (“the 2008 Convention”), the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation of 31 March 2010 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. In all these texts the key notion in respect of adoption was the best interests of the child and not the gender or the sexual orientation of the parents. Finally, they contested the Government’s argument that there were sufficient alternative possibilities under Austrian law for giving legal recognition to the relationship between a child and his or her parent’s same- <mask> partner.


79.  The Government accepted that Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention applied to the present case. Thus far, the Court’s case-law had considered homosexual relationships to fall within the notion of “private life”, but there might be good reasons to include the relationship of a same- <mask> couple living together within the scope of “family life”.


80.  The applicant further argued that the ban on wearing clothing designed to conceal the face in public, which undoubtedly targeted the burqa, generated discrimination in breach of Article 14 of the Convention on grounds of  <mask>, religion and ethnic origin, to the detriment of Muslim women who, like her, wore the full-face veil. In her view this was indirect discrimination between Muslim women whose beliefs required them to wear the full-face veil and other Muslim women, and also between them and Muslim men. The exception provided for by the Law of 11 October 2010, according to which the ban did not apply if the clothing was worn in the context of “festivities or artistic or traditional events” was also, in her view, discriminatory, in that it created an advantage for the Christian majority: it allowed Christians to wear in public clothing that concealed their face in the context of Christian festivities or celebrations (Catholic religious processions, carnivals or rituals, such as dressing up as Santa Claus) whereas Muslim women who wished to wear the full-face veil in public remained bound by the ban even during the month of Ramadan.


59.  The applicant submitted that the amendments were introduced after she had been refused a refugee card and after she had lodged the present application. As such, they did nothing to negate the  <mask> discrimination she had suffered; if anything those amendments showed that the previous system was discriminatory. Whatever those changes, the original difference in treatment remained without reasonable and objective justification.


39.  The applicant submitted that he had suffered discrimination in the enjoyment of his rights under Article 8 on the ground of his illegitimate status and/or the  <mask> of his Maltese parent. Indeed, had the applicant’s parents been married, he would have fallen within the parameters of section 5(2)(b) of the Maltese Citizenship Act; However, he fell outside that provision because of his illegitimacy. Moreover, had the applicant’s mother been Maltese the applicant could have obtained citizenship; he failed to do so because it was his father who was Maltese. The applicant was in an analogous situation to any other child with a Maltese father and a foreign mother and who fulfilled all the criteria of section 5(2)(b), and like them would have become a Maltese citizen had it not been for his illegitimate status. This status transpired from his birth certificate, and irrespective of whether his father had voluntarily recognised him or whether there had been a judicial determination to that effect, he was not eligible for citizenship owing to his status.


96.  The applicants in application no. 29381/09 claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) jointly in respect of the non-pecuniary damage they had allegedly sustained on account of the violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 and the lack of an effective remedy in that regard. They also requested the Court to make specific recommendations to the Government with a view to amending Law no. 3719/2008 and extending the application of civil unions to same- <mask> couples.


11.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities’ refusal to pay him the social security and tax benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Widow’s Payment (“Wpt”), Widowed Mother’s Allowance (“WMA”), Widow’s Bereavement Allowance (“WBA”) and Widow’s Pension (“WP”) constituted discrimination against him on grounds of  <mask> contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and/or Article 8.


13.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities’ refusal to pay him the social security and tax benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Widow’s Payment (“Wpt”), Widow’s Bereavement Allowance (“WBA”) and Widow’s Pension (“WP”) constituted discrimination against him on grounds of  <mask> contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and/or Article 8.


52.  The Government maintained that the applicant had not suffered discrimination. In the first place, it argued that the situation of same- <mask> couples at the material time had not been analogous to that of heterosexual couples since the child support legislation and the wider legislative regime for social security benefits treated the groups according to fundamentally different principles for all purposes. This entailed both beneficial and detrimental effects for the two groups. It was therefore artificial and inappropriate for the applicant to isolate just one element of a much wider interlocking set of rules governing entitlement to a variety of State benefits. In many respects, the situation before the entry into force of the Civil Partnership Act had been advantageous for same-sex couples. To properly assess the applicant's situation, it would be necessary to take account of the entirety of the benefits and burdens in the system as a whole. But as soon as the wider perspective was adopted, the applicant could no longer be regarded as being in a comparable or analogous situation for the purpose of analysis under Article 14. If the applicant's arguments were to be accepted, it would follow that heterosexual couples would be able in turn to complain of any provision of the child support and State welfare system that treated them less favourably than the members of a same-sex couple. This would create a “ratchet effect” whereby in the end everyone would have to be assessed on the best possible basis that anyone might have at any stage in the calculation. This would lead to a situation where everyone would receive every available benefit, and any burden would be disregarded altogether.


164.  The Government referred to the domestic jurisprudence on the matter which they considered relevant for their defence of the present case. They noted that the domestic courts had acknowledged the existence of same- <mask> couples and their right to protection in specific circumstances and to equal treatment, which could be guaranteed by the courts acting in line with their common sense (judgments no. 559/1989 and 404/1998 in relation to leases and state housing in respect of cohabitations more uxorio). This notion of family was further confirmed by the Court of Cassation in its judgment no. 4184/12, which prompted various communes and regions to create a register of civil unions, or a register of de facto unions, which served to register the existence of such couples, an action in fact taken by Mr Gianfranco Goretti and Mr Tommaso Giartosio. However, the existence of such measures of registration in various regions and communes did not oblige the State to recognise such unions as a marriage, but solely to consider their existence as a family within a regulatory framework in line with the internal order of the State – the only requirement of the Convention (as interpreted in jurisprudence) on the subject matter.


31.  The Government contended that the concept of private life was very broad and did not lend itself to an exhaustive definition. An individual’s physical and moral integrity fell within the notion of “private life” and was protected by Article 8 of the Convention. In that regard, they noted that the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court had sought, inter alia, to provide the applicant with adequate compensation for the damage caused by the surgical procedure to her physical and psychological integrity, which had had an impact on both her health and her well-being. In addition, the Government observed that the applicant had complained of discriminatory treatment on the grounds of  <mask> and age, elements which formed part of an individual’s personality and therefore included the concept of private life. The Government concluded therefore that the circumstances of the case fell within the scope of Article 8.


40.  The applicants complained of the refusal of the first applicant’s application to adopt her partner’s daughter. They alleged that the reason given for that refusal, namely the legal consequences of such adoption, which would deprive the child’s mother of parental responsibility, definitively ruled out adoption only for same- <mask> couples, who – unlike opposite-sex couples – could not marry and thereby take advantage of the provisions of Article 365 of the Civil Code. They submitted that the refusal to grant the first applicant a simple-adoption order in respect of A. for reasons of principle had infringed their right to respect for their private and family life, in a discriminatory manner.


39.  The Government further contended that an action for damages in the administrative courts under section 105 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code would have constituted an effective remedy in the instant case. Under that provision, the State was obliged to provide redress for damage caused by the acts or omissions of its organs in the exercise of public authority. The sole condition was that the act or omission had to be unlawful, that is to say, it had to infringe a rule of law establishing a specific individual right or interest. In the present case the applicants could have complained before the domestic courts under Articles 57, 914 and 932 of the Civil Code, read together with section 105 of the Introductory Law, of a breach of their personality rights and of their social marginalisation on account of their exclusion as same- <mask> couples from the scope of Law no. 3719/2008. In the Government’s view, this remedy would have enabled the applicants to claim compensation for any damage caused by the impugned legislation and at the same time to challenge its constitutionality. They observed that, according to the case-law of the domestic courts, the latter could interpret the constitutional principle of equality broadly, extending a legislative provision favourable to a specific category of persons to cover another category in a similar situation. As authority, the Government cited two judgments of the Court of Cassation (nos. 60/2002 and 9/2004) concerning the salaries and allowances of different categories of employees, an issue that the court had examined from the standpoint of the equality principle.


63.  The applicants noted that second-parent adoption was open to married couples. Same- <mask> couples were not allowed to marry under Austrian law. Even if they became registered partners, second-parent adoption was explicitly prohibited by section 8(4) of the Registered Partnership Act. However, the applicants stressed that they did not wish to assert a right which was reserved to marriage-based families.


116.  The applicant submitted that, in her case, the prosecutors had put undue emphasis on the absence of physical violence and had not taken into account the fact that, at the age of 14, she had never taken important decisions herself, particularly under the pressure of time. The prosecutors had failed to have regard to the unlikelihood of a 14-year-old girl who had never had sexual intercourse consenting to  <mask> with two men in a row.


46.  The applicants’ core submission was that there was a fundamental difference in the level of justification required for a progressive move to eradicate existing  <mask> discrimination in the pension system and the introduction, from 1986, of new discrimination in relation to industrial injury benefits which had existed on equal terms for men and women for almost forty years. The labour market had already changed by 1986, and ten years earlier the Sex Discrimination Act 1976 and the European Community’s Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EEC had rendered discrimination in the field of employment unlawful. The assumption that a woman’s working life would be five years shorter than a man’s was therefore entirely illegitimate.


68.  The applicants submitted that they had been discriminated against on the basis of their sexual orientation. Referring to Schalk and Kopf (cited above, § 103), in which the Court had considered it unnecessary to examine whether the lack of any means of legal recognition for same- <mask> couples in Austria prior to 1 January 2010 constituted a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, they observed that in their joint dissenting opinion Judges Rozakis, Spielmann and Jebens had found that there had been such a violation. In the applicants’ submission, that opinion applied by definition to one of the rights deriving from a marriage, namely, the possibility for the cohabiting partner who was a national of a non-EU State to obtain a residence permit for family reasons.


12.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities’ refusal to pay him the social security and tax benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Widow’s Payment (“Wpt”), Widowed Mother’s Allowance (“WMA”), Widow’s Bereavement Allowance (“WBA”) and Widow’s Pension (“WP”) constituted discrimination against him on grounds of  <mask> contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and/or Article 8.


11.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities’ refusal to pay him the social security and tax benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Widow’s Payment (“Wpt”), Widowed Mother’s Allowance (“WMA”), Widow’s Bereavement Allowance (“WBA”) and Widow’s Pension (“WP”) constituted discrimination against him on grounds of  <mask> contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. and/or Article 8.


41.  The Government argued that the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision to decrease the amount awarded by the first-instance court in respect of non-pecuniary damage had not been governed by prejudice or an intention to discriminate against the applicant on the grounds of her  <mask> or age. On the contrary, it had been based on the fact that the Supreme Administrative Court had considered that the medical intervention had not been the only cause of the physical and psychological damage which the applicant had complained of. In that regard the Government emphasised that the amount awarded by the Supreme Administrative Court had been attributable to the fact that the applicant’s gynaecological problem had developed a long time earlier, that she had already been treated unsuccessfully several times and that she had already been suffering unbearable pain and symptoms of depression before the operation. For the Supreme Administrative Court, therefore, the applicant’s complains had not been new and surgery had merely aggravated what had already been a difficult situation. Moreover, the Government pointed out that the Supreme Administrative Court had also taken into account the fact that the applicant had become very unhappy and that she had felt “diminished as a woman” in the wake of the injury she had suffered.


48.  The applicants disagreed with the Government’s submissions. They observed that, in Schalk and Kopf (cited above, § 94), the Court had clearly departed from the Commission’s earlier case-law in stating that the relationship of a cohabiting same- <mask> couple living in a stable de facto partnership fell within the notion of “family life”. In their submission, the refusal to issue the second applicant with a residence permit had deprived them of any possibility of living in Italy as a couple and had resulted in a legal obligation for the second applicant to leave the country. In their view, it followed that the facts of the present case fell within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention, thus Article 14 was also applicable.


51.  The applicant also complained that the United Kingdom authorities' refusal to pay him the widow's payment and widowed mother's allowance to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position constituted discrimination on grounds of  <mask> contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8. He made an identical complaint as regards his future non-entitlement to a widow's pension.


33.  The applicant contested that argument by submitting that the sole reason she had been refused the post in question had been her  <mask>. The applicant also disagreed with the Government that the difference in the treatment of female and male candidates could be justified by taking into account the dangerous factors implied in the occupation of a security officer. She submitted in that connection that many women in Turkey were successfully employed in dangerous occupations, such as police officers, army pilots and prison guards.


18.  The Government argued that the domestic authorities’ and courts’ decisions denying the applicants the right to enter into a registered partnership had been based only on section 2 of the Registered Partnership Act, which excluded different- <mask> couples from registered partnerships. The different legal consequences of marriage and the registered partnership which the applicants complained about were – in so far as they actually existed – based on provisions which had not been the subject matter of the domestic proceedings, such as those relating to divorce and the declaration of death of a spouse. Referring to Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (cited above, § 109), the Government argued that the question whether those provisions might have an effect on the applicants in the future was merely hypothetical. Contesting in substance the applicants’ victim status, the Government claimed that the application was inadmissible in so far as it sought an in abstracto review of legal provisions which did not directly concern the applicants.


74.  The applicant contends that he has been discriminated against on the grounds of  <mask>, as male and female inmates are subjected to different prison regimes resulting in a differentiation on the basis of sex with regard to the right to prison leave. The Court notes that “sex” is explicitly mentioned in Article 14 as a prohibited ground of discrimination.


151.  The applicants submitted that as adduced by the competent authorities the only reason for the refusal was the same- <mask> nature of their marriage. Thus, the aim allegedly pursued by the refusal of registration was the protection of the “internal” public order (as per Circular no. 2 of 26 March 2001, mentioned above). This aim was rather general, as it allegedly included fundamental, ethical, economic, political and social principles of the legal order. However, the Government had failed to explain which specific fundamental principles had to be defended against the registration of same-sex marriages. Thus, it could only be deduced that the difference in treatment was aimed solely at protecting a concept of marriage as a heterosexual legal institution and an abstract idea of traditional family. Nevertheless, the applicants noted that the Court of Cassation (judgment no. 4184/12) acknowledged that a foreign same-sex marriage may no longer be considered non-existent. It had found that the refusal of its registration was simply a consequence of the fact that it could not be recognised as a marriage in the Italian legal order (marriage being defined as a union between a man and a woman), irrespective of any considerations relating to the protection of public order. The applicants noted that in such a context the Civil Status Offices and the domestic courts were prevented from carrying out a proportionality assessment, namely whether giving publicity to a same-sex union would jeopardise internal public order. The situation was such that the lack of recognition of same-sex unions, despite a constitutional obligation on the legislature to fill this gap, also prevented domestic authorities from registering the marriage deed at least as a civil union, while reserving the institution of marriage to opposite-sex couples. It followed that the refusal was not genuinely aimed at protecting fundamental principles of legal order, which in fact do not oppose, but actually require, the recognition of same-sex unions.


52.  The applicants submitted, further, that a residence permit for family reasons had been issued by the Reggio Emilia Court to a Uruguayan national who had married an Italian citizen in Spain. They added that, since that decision, thirty other identical residence permits had been issued to other non-EU nationals in same- <mask> couples with Italian citizens on the basis of marriage or a civil partnership contracted in EU countries other than Italy.


51.  The applicant argued that according to the Court's case-law, a difference in treatment based on sexual orientation required very weighty reasons if it was to be accepted as compatible with the Convention. The Government had not been able to point to any legitimate aim served by the different treatment of same- <mask> couples. The reasoning of the majority in the House of Lords did not constitute an objective justification for the purposes of the Convention. The fact that it took much time and effort to draft, discuss and implement the Civil Partnership Act could not justify the previous discriminatory situation. The applicant also criticised the Government's reliance on the Mata Estevez decision. In her view, this had been superseded by the Court's judgment in Karner, which should be treated as a statement of general principle applicable to any comparisons between heterosexual and homosexual couples in analogous circumstances. Moreover, as that case arose out of a judgment of the Austrian Supreme Court of 1996, and since the Court did not attach any temporal limitation to the effects of its reasoning, it followed that equal treatment should have been secured as of that date. The applicant rejected the Government's argument that she could not complain of just one element of the child support system. Such an argument was repugnant to any modern equality law paradigm. The mere fact that, at the relevant time, the situation of heterosexual couples was subject to different principles did not explain why no comparison between the two groups was possible. Rather, the difference existed because of discrimination, and so could not be relied upon by the Government to defeat the applicant's claim.


44.  The applicant stated that he faced a very significant risk that he would, within the next few years, be deprived on the grounds of his  <mask> of a widow's pension to which he would otherwise have been entitled. He argued that he was already suffering detriment due to his being deprived of the possibility of ever applying for a widow's pension.


36.  The applicants alleged that the fact that the civil unions introduced by Law no. 3719/2008 were designed only for couples composed of different- <mask> adults infringed their right to respect for their private and family life and amounted to unjustified discrimination between different-sex and same-sex couples, to the detriment of the latter. They relied on Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8. Those provisions read as follows:


55.  The applicants argued that the wording did not necessarily imply that a man could only marry a woman and vice versa. The Court observes that, looked at in isolation, the wording of Article 12 might be interpreted so as not to exclude the marriage between two men or two women. However, in contrast, all other substantive Articles of the Convention grant rights and freedoms to “everyone” or state that “no one” is to be subjected to certain types of prohibited treatment. The choice of wording in Article 12 must thus be regarded as deliberate. Moreover, regard must be had to the historical context in which the Convention was adopted. In the 1950s marriage was clearly understood in the traditional sense of being a union between partners of different  <mask>.


42.  The Government submitted that Article 14 was not applicable in the present case. In their view, in S. v. the United Kingdom (no. 11716/85, Commission decision of 14 May 1986, Decisions and Reports (DR) 47, p. 274) and Röösli v. Germany (no. 28318/95, Commission decision of 15 May 1996), the Commission had indicated that the protection of the family was a legitimate aim capable of justifying a difference in treatment and that a stable homosexual relationship between two men did not fall within the scope of the right to respect for family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. The Commission had also found that the deportation of an alien who was in a same- <mask> relationship with a person in the host State did not amount to an interference with the right guaranteed by that provision (see X and Y v. the United Kingdom, no. 9369/81, Commission decision of 3 May 1983, DR 32, p. 223; W.J. and D.P. v. the United Kingdom, no. 12513/86, Commission decision of 13 July 1987; and C. and L.M. v. the United Kingdom, no. 14753/89, Commission decision of 9 October 1989).


95.  The applicant complained that although she currently enjoyed a full physical relationship with a man, she and her partner could not marry because the law treated her as a man. She argued that the Corbett v. Corbett definition of a person's  <mask> for the purpose of marriage had been shown no longer to be sufficient in the recent case of Bellinger v. Bellinger and that even if a reliance on biological criteria remained acceptable, it was a breach of Article 12 to use only some of those criteria for determining a person's sex and excluding those who failed to fulfil those elements.


49.  The applicant alleged that he had been discriminated against on grounds of  <mask> because he had been refused the possibility of obtaining a stay of execution of his prison sentence, as under Article 453 § 1 b) of the CCP only convicted mothers of children under the age of one could seek a stay of execution. He relied on Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 and on Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention.


86.  The Government observed that the applicant had become liable to the payment of a fine because he had chosen to ignore his summons for jury service. He had not complained of an unfair trial or of a lack of independence or impartiality of the domestic tribunal. Nor had he complained that the situation would have been different if he had been a woman. Therefore, no discrimination on the ground of  <mask> could be disclosed.


24.  The applicants also pointed out that, although it is true that the Member States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation when regulating such matters, the equality of the sexes is a major goal of Council of Europe. Therefore, there must be a compelling reason advanced before a difference in treatment on grounds of  <mask> could be regarded as being compatible with the Convention. In their view, the Government had failed to put forward such an argument.


43.  The Government then submitted that, while acknowledging that the States enjoyed a margin of appreciation regarding the protection of the traditional family, in 2010 the Court had started examining under Article 8 of the Convention forms of cohabitation between same- <mask> couples (see, inter alia, Kozak v. Poland, no. 13102/02, 2 March 2010). In the case of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (no. 30141/04, ECHR 2010) the Court had acknowledged that same-sex couples could rely on their right to respect for family life, but pointed out that the Convention did not guarantee them the right to marry. It had also observed that where a State chose to provide same-sex couples with an alternative means of recognition, it enjoyed a certain margin of appreciation as regards the exact status conferred (see, inter alia, Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25951/07, § 66, ECHR 2012).


22.  The applicant complains that the national authorities’ refusal to allow her to bear only her maiden name after her marriage amounted to a breach of Articles 6, 8 and 46 of the Convention. She also contends that the fact that Turkish law allows married men to bear their own surname after marriage and not married women constitutes discrimination on grounds of  <mask> and is incompatible with Article 14 of the Convention. The applicant further refers to the Court’s Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey judgment (cited above) and submits that the Turkish domestic authorities should have complied with this judgment.


86.  The applicant submitted that his homosexual orientation had been the single ground on which he had been denied the right to succeed to the tenancy of the flat in which he had lived with the late T.B. He had been refused the status of a person who had remained in actual marital cohabitation only because they had formed a same- <mask> couple. In contrast to heterosexual common-law partners, who could at the material time enjoy the right to succeed to a tenancy, homosexual relationships had been excluded on the basis of the well-established and categorical interpretation of the notion “de facto marital cohabitation” as covering only a different-sex relationship. For that reason, the courts, having established the fact that he and T.B. had remained in a homosexual relationship, had not even given him a chance to prove his compliance with the remaining statutory conditions laid down in section 8(1) of the 1994 Act.


39.  The Government considered that the applicant's arguments to the effect that the difference of treatment of same- <mask> couples was demonstrative of a lack of respect by the State for a most intimate aspect of private life, and that it exerted a coercive effect on her freedom to make decisions about her sexual orientation, were theoretical constructs rather than factual observations. The implication of these arguments would be that any difference in treatment referable in any way to sexual orientation would engage Article 14 even in the absence of a link to substantive Convention rights. The correct approach was to have regard to the real factual implications of the circumstances of each given case and take account of how remote the facts were from the core value of the substantive right at issue. Here there was no discernible impact on the applicant's private life. She was effectively inviting the Court to dispense with any ambit threshold and establish a free-standing prohibition on discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.


12.  The applicant, at domestic level and before the Court, thus complained about the allegedly discriminatory nature of the applicable Latvian prison regime writ large. However, the only complaint which this Court could consider on the merits was the specific complaint as formulated in the domestic proceedings and before this Court, namely that when refused permission to attend his father’s funeral “he had [...] been discriminated against on the basis of  <mask>, as women in his situation would have been able to attend the funeral.”[13]


147.  The Government advanced another argument to justify the difference in treatment complained of. Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, they asserted that the margin of appreciation was a wide one in the sphere of adoption law, which had to strike a careful balance between the interests of all the persons involved. In the present context it was even wider, as there was no European consensus on the issue of second-parent adoption by same- <mask> couples.


30.  The applicant complained that the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment in her case had discriminated against her on the grounds of her  <mask> and age. She complained, in particular, about the reasons given by the Supreme Administrative Court for reducing the amount awarded to her in respect of non-pecuniary damage and about the fact that it had disregarded the importance of a sex life for her as a woman. She relied on Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention, which read as follows:


13.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities’ refusal to pay him the social security and tax benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Widow’s Payment (“Wpt”), Widowed Mother’s Allowance (“WMA”), Widow’s Bereavement Allowance (“WBA”) and Widow’s Pension (“WP”) constituted discrimination against him on grounds of  <mask> contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and/or Article 8.


156.  The applicants stressed that the fact that it was impossible for them to register their marriage obtained abroad amounted to discriminatory treatment. They considered that a) the marriage registered abroad was valid and produced all legal effects and consequences which are proper of a legal marriage recognised and regulated by the law of the State in which the marriage was registered or celebrated; b) it was a marriage that in all its characteristics and aspects is identical to marriage as legally recognised by Italian law; c) in addition, contrary to the submission by the Italian Court of Cassation and as explained below, the marriage registered abroad would produce full legal consequences within the Italian legal system. This did not, however, mean, inter alia, that the State had the duty to allow same- <mask> marriage in Italy, or to extend to same-sex couples the full legal protection given to heterosexual married couples.


28.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities' refusal to pay him the social-security benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely a widowed mother's allowance and a widow's payment, constituted discrimination against him and his wife on grounds of  <mask> contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He made an identical complaint as regards his future non-entitlement to a widow's pension.


70.  The Government submitted that a fair balance had therefore been struck between the rights of the individual and the general interest of the community. To the extent that there were situations where a transsexual may face limited disclosure of their change of  <mask>, these situations were unavoidable and necessary e.g. in the context of contracts of insurance where medical history and gender affected the calculation of premiums.


64.  The applicants maintained that the French courts’ refusal to grant the first applicant a simple-adoption order in respect of A. infringed their right to respect for their private and family life in a discriminatory manner. They alleged that, as a same- <mask> couple, they had been subjected to an unjustified difference in treatment compared with heterosexual couples, whether married or not.


42.  The applicant submitted that national legislation together with the Constitution and the Convention gave him the right to freely choose his  <mask>, to express it and change it, without having to prove it. The requirement that he had to prove his religious affiliation was contrary to Article 9 and he was treated differently from other citizens, effectively as a second class degree citizen, contrary to Article 14 as a result.


99.  The Government conceded that, through being subjected to a regime that those wishing to marry in the Church of England would not have been subjected to, the applicants' rights under Article 14, read together with Article 12, had been breached. The Government therefore accepted that the Certificate of Approval scheme was discriminatory on the ground of  <mask>. With regard to the failure to remove the discriminatory aspect of the scheme, the Government submitted that they did not act following the judgment of Mr Justice Silber because they were reluctant to rush to remedy the Article 14 incompatibility until a final judgment on the whole of the scheme was available. Following the House of Lords' judgment, they entered into discussions with a view to bringing the Church of England within the scheme. In spite of the discussions, however, no agreement could be reached. The Government now plan to abolish the Certificate of Approval scheme in 2011. In the meantime, as the scheme was contained in legislation passed by Parliament, it would be contrary to the rule of law and the separation of powers for the Home Office to instruct registrars not to comply with it.


67.  The Government pointed out that the District Court's judgment of 7 August 2001 refusing re-registration of the applicant had had a lawful basis. The law required the original charter and registration certificate, the information on the basic tenets of  <mask>, and the document indicating the legal address of the organisation. However, the applicant had failed to produce these documents and therefore the decision not to process the application for re-registration had been lawful. The Government claimed that the applicant is not precluded from lodging a new application for re-registration.


103.  The applicant submitted that  <mask> could only be used as a criterion if a special right was granted on that basis and activated in accordance with the wishes of the person enjoying that right, and not the reverse, that is to say at the discretion of the State. In her view, the automatic application of the special right by the courts according to religious criteria gave rise to a discriminatory difference in treatment.


75.  The Government observed that the issue of whether or not pupils followed religion/ethics courses was a delicate one, since the parents' choice, taken in conformity with their own convictions, might cause their child to belong to a minority in a certain class or school. The authorities should do their utmost to minimise the risk of a child's stigmatisation because he or she did not follow a religion/ethics course. It was the school's duty to provide pupils who did not follow a class in  <mask> or ethics with care and supervision whenever they were on the school premises. It was also the school's duty to react to all manifestations of intolerance towards such children. The Government claimed that those obligations had been complied with in the present case. They also noted that, owing to the nature of the issue, it was not only the school which had positive obligations with respect to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; it was first and foremost the parents' duty to ensure that their children understood the choice made by them as regards religion/ethics education at school. The Government observed that the press articles attached to the application lodged by Mr and Mrs Grzelak did not support the assertion that it was their intention to protect their personal beliefs from being disclosed.


170.  The applicants on their part argued that the attacks, intimidation and assault, the theft and the violence in general perpetrated against them had been carried out with complete impunity and had been tolerated by the State because the victims’ faith was different from that of the majority of the population. According to the applicants, this amounted to discrimination on the ground of  <mask>. The applicants drew the Court’s attention to the fact that the authorities had refused to apply the Criminal Code in their respect simply because they belonged to a religious minority.


97.  The Government submitted that the applicants had not been convicted for their religious beliefs but for their membership of a terrorist organisation, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami. In particular, they had distributed leaflets and brochures promoting the superiority of Muslims over adherents of other religions, calling for a confrontation between Islamic fundamentalists and all others, for the violent overthrow of non-Muslim governments and for universal Islamisation of mankind. Hizb ut-Tahrir rejected the possibility of participating in the democratic political process and chose to conduct its activities in an illegal and clandestine manner. The interference with the applicants’ freedoms of  <mask>, expression and association had therefore been “necessary in a democratic society”. Moreover, given the terrorist and extremist nature of the organisation and its intention to create hostility between adherents of different religions, to foster disunity in society and to undermine the constitutional foundations of the Russian Federation, the applicants’ actions within that organisation had been aimed at destroying the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. Referring to Article 17 of the Convention, the Government argued that the applicants could not therefore claim the protection afforded by Articles 9, 10 and 11.


53.  The Government claimed that the third applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies with regard to his allegations of discriminatory treatment because no class in ethics had been provided as an alternative to religious instruction and because of the form of the school reports. They submitted that the Ordinance regulated in a comprehensive manner the duties of school authorities regarding the organisation of classes in  <mask> or ethics. It imposed no obligation on schools to provide a class in ethics, as that depended on parents or pupils requesting it and on there being sufficient numbers of interested pupils. If Mr and Mrs Grzelak had considered that their son was being discriminated against by the school authorities on account of the absence of a course in ethics, they should have challenged the provisions of the Ordinance which did not provide for compulsory teaching of ethics instead of religious instruction. In their view, the applicant should have lodged a constitutional complaint against the manner of organising classes in ethics provided for in paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Ordinance.


56.  The applicants complained that the refusal of the Austrian authorities to grant legal personality to the first applicant by conferring on it the status of a religious society under the Recognition Act violated their right to freedom of  <mask>. They further submitted that the legal personality conferred on the first applicant under the Religious Communities Act was limited and insufficient for the purposes of Article 9 of the Convention. The applicants also relied on Article 11 of the Convention. These provisions read as follows:


70.  The Government argued that the third applicant's situation in the present case was very similar to the Saniewski case. The school report was an official document which contained objective information as to the attendance and assessment of a pupil's achievements in courses which had been organised and had been attended by him or her. It might happen that a pupil did not attend some courses for various reasons, for instance because he or she was exempted from physical education on health grounds. Where pupils did not attend a given course, such as a course in  <mask> or ethics or physical education, this was normally reflected in the standard school reports, as it would be unreasonable to expect that those pupils should receive their reports in a different form.


81.  The Government admitted that, even though it was formulated in general terms, the ban introduced by the Law of 11 October 2010 could be seen as a “limitation”, within the meaning of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention, on the freedom to manifest one’s  <mask> or beliefs. They argued, however, that the limitation pursued legitimate aims and that it was necessary, in a democratic society, for the fulfilment of those aims.


45.  The applicant complained that she had not had a fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in that the Court of Appeal had refused to order a social inquiry report. She also claimed that there had been interference with her freedom of  <mask> within the meaning of Article 9, that this interference was discriminatory within the meaning of Article 9 taken in conjunction with Article 14, and referred in the submissions in support of her arguments to Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.


19.  The applicant complained that the fact that he was not exempt from military service or alternative civilian service, while assuming a function within the Federation of Evangelical Communities in Austria (Bund Evangelikaler Gemeinden in Österreich) which was comparable to those of members of recognised religious societies who were exempt from such service, constituted discrimination on the ground of his  <mask>, as prohibited by Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 9.


57.  The applicants submitted that the refusal of the Austrian authorities to grant legal personality to the first applicant by conferring on it the status of a religious society recognised under the Recognition Act violated their right to freedom of  <mask>. In particular, before July 1998, the first applicant could not have been established as a legal entity and, thus, could not have entered into legal relations, concluded contracts or acquired assets. The first applicant had, thus far, no internal autonomy, could not hire the necessary religious ministers and was not entitled to perform its pastoral work for believers in hospitals or prisons. The second to fifth applicants, as leading executives of the first applicant, were also limited in exercising their right to freedom of religion. Neither the Basic Law 1867 nor the 1998 Religious Communities Act provided explicitly for the internal autonomy of a religious community. The Constitutional Court had found (in its judgment of 3 March 2001, B1713/98 – see paragraph 34 above) that registered religious communities, unlike recognised religious societies, did not enjoy the right to comprehensive organisation and administration of their internal affairs without State interference. Lastly, the applicants contested that they would have had the possibility of forming an association under the Associations Act. They referred to the Constitutional Court’s finding of 1929 (VfSlg. 1265/1929), confirming the administrative authorities’ practice not to allow religious societies to form an association, and thus refusing the request of the Jehovah’s Witnesses (Ernste Bibelforscher) to set up an association. Thereafter the Jehovah’s Witnesses had not tried again to form an association, but auxiliary associations (Hilfsvereine) with specialised religious aims had been created. The two examples of associations submitted by the Government were likewise merely auxiliary associations. It was not until the enactment of the 2002 Associations Act that religious societies had been allowed to set up an association.


54.  The Government considered that the finding of a violation in itself would constitute sufficient and appropriate redress in the present case. They submitted that in the case of Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others the Court had granted the applicants compensation in the amount of EUR 10,000 for damage resulting from the violation of their rights to the free exercise of their  <mask> under Article 9 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention (cited above, § 129). In any event, they submitted that the amount of non-pecuniary damage claimed was excessive and the sum claimed as pecuniary damage would in any event be refunded to the applicant community following a judgment of the Constitutional Court of 2 July 2009 (B 1397/08), in which it had found, in a subsequent case brought by the applicant community, that the levying of inheritance and gift tax on the applicant community was unconstitutional.


28.   The applicant contested this view and maintained that if the relevant domestic legislation provided for exemptions from military or alternative civilian service, it should do so without any discrimination. During the time of his civilian service he had had to work forty hours a week and, thus, had been unable to perform his functions as a deacon and preacher and had had to limit the practice of his  <mask> to his spare time.


66.  The Government further submitted that there was no violation of the applicant's right to freedom of  <mask> or any restriction on that right. The penalty imposed on the applicant “was not harsh and was not motivated by religious factors, but by a failure to submit to the Religions Act and violation of the administrative procedure”. The refusal of re-registration of the applicant did not entail a ban on its activity. Members of the applicant continued to profess their faith, hold services of worship and ceremonies, and guide their followers.


36.  The applicant complained that the fact that he was not exempt from military service while assuming a function with the Jehovah’s Witnesses which was comparable to those of members of recognised religious societies who were exempt from military service constituted discrimination on the ground of his  <mask>, prohibited by Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 4.


59.  The Government maintained that the status conferred on the first applicant as a registered religious community under the 1998 Religious Communities Act complied with the requirements of Article 9; it only provided a legal status and in no way restricted the exercise or enjoyment of the right to freedom of  <mask>. In conclusion, there had been no interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 9 of the Convention.


136.  The applicants argued that, in dismissing Ms M.’s action seeking the limitation of D.C.’s contact rights by the final judgment of 5 February 2004, the domestic courts had mainly relied on Ms M.’s religious affiliation. At the same time, the first-instance court had accused Ms M. of bringing her son up in accordance with the precepts of her  <mask> and the Court of Appeal had not distanced itself from the judgment of the aforementioned court, which according to the applicants had been partial and subjective. Moreover the domestic courts had failed to provide objective reasons for dismissing the medical and testimonial evidence which had proved that D.C. had sexually assaulted the second applicant. Lastly, the domestic courts had also failed to allow Ms M.’s action contesting the award of D.C.’s contact rights which had ended by the final judgment of 1 June 2005, in spite of the available evidence concerning the abuse that the second applicant had been subjected to.


40.  The applicant complained that the fact that he was not exempt from military service while assuming a function with the Jehovah’s Witnesses which was comparable to those of members of recognised religious societies who were exempt from military service constituted discrimination on the ground of his  <mask>, prohibited by Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 9.


43.   The applicant contested this view and maintained that if the relevant domestic legislation provided for exemptions from military or alternative civilian service, it should do so without any discrimination. During the time of his civilian service he had had to work forty hours a week, and thus had been unable to perform his functions as a deacon and preacher and had had to limit the practice of his  <mask> to his spare time.


71.  The Government questioned the reliance on various media and other reports in substantiating the applicant's complaints and considered them immaterial to the case. Nevertheless, in respect of the media campaigns, the Government contended that they did not infringe on the applicant's right to freedom of  <mask>. To the contrary, they considered them a legitimate exercise of the media's right of freedom of expression, in so far as they were expressing the reservations of the public towards members of a religious organisation allegedly proselytising among the pupils of the School with the tacit support or approval of the institution's former principal. In any event, the Government considered that the media's singling out of the applicant had not, in itself, infringed her right to freedom of religion.


45.  The Government accepted that the administrative liability imposed on the applicants for holding demonstrations constituted an interference with their right to freedom of expression. However, they considered that the restrictions on the promotion of homosexuality in general and the enforcement of these restrictions against the applicants in particular had been in accordance with law and had been necessary in a democratic society for the protection of health and morals and the rights of others. In the present case, the Government claimed to have enjoyed the wide margin of appreciation generally available to the Contracting States when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially,  <mask>.


94.  The applicant re-affirmed his complaint, adding that it was clear that the police had considered him “strange”, uncooperative and even anti-social merely because of his  <mask>. Apart from the questioning of a group of skinheads in 2001, the respondent State's authorities seemed more interested in discussing the “suspicious” nature of the Hare Krishna community rather than in uncovering the religious aspect of the attacks in question.


38.  The applicant complained that the fact that he was not exempt from military service while assuming a function within a religious community which was comparable to that of members of recognised religious societies who were exempt from military service constituted discrimination on the ground of his  <mask> prohibited by Article 14 of the Convention, taken together with Article 4.


74.  The applicant complained for the same reasons of a violation of her right to respect for her private life, her right to freedom to manifest her  <mask> or beliefs and her right to freedom of expression, together with discrimination in the exercise of these rights. She relied on Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention, taken separately and in conjunction with Article 14. Those first three Articles read as follows.


60.  The Government relied on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guaranteed individuals respect for and protection of their religious and moral beliefs and the right to bring up their children in accordance with them. They claimed that authorising gay parades would breach the rights of those people whose religious and moral beliefs included a negative attitude towards homosexuality. They further noted that in the case of Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (20 September 1994, §§ 52 and 56, Series A no. 295‑A) the Court had recognised the great role of  <mask> in people's everyday life, which should be taken into account in order to prevent religious beliefs from becoming the subject of unreasonable and insulting accusations. They concluded on that basis that the State must take into account the requirements of the major religious associations and that “the democratic State must protect society from destructive influence on its moral fundamentals, and protect the human dignity of all citizens, including believers”. In the present case, the ideas of the event organisers were not neutral to the rest of society, but had actually encroached on the rights, lawful interests and human dignity of believers.


58.  The applicant complained that the fact that he was not exempt from military service while assuming a function with the Jehovah’s Witnesses which was comparable to those of members of recognised religious societies who were exempt from military service constituted discrimination on the ground of his  <mask> prohibited by Article 14 of the Convention, taken together with Article 4.


177.  The Government in reply merely submitted that the applicants’ complaints were unsubstantiated. This general statement is particularly striking in view of the fact that although all the applicants explicitly complained that they had been subjected to violence because of their  <mask>, the Georgian authorities took no steps whatsoever to investigate the alleged religious motive (see paragraphs 141-142 above). Furthermore, various police officers made tendentious remarks in relation to the applicants’ religion throughout the proceedings. The Court has already established on several occasions that such remarks may disclose a general discriminatory attitude of the authorities (see Cobzaru v. Romania, no. 48254/99, §§ 97-100, 26 July 2007).


30.  The applicant’s complaint concerns the rating status of its temple in Preston. This building is considered by the members of the applicant Church to constitute its most sacred centre. It is used as a place of congregational religious worship by those who have established their devotion and been accorded a “recommend” (see paragraphs 6-7 above).  In the domestic proceedings, the opinion of the majority of the House of Lords was that the subject-matter of complaint did not come within the ambit of Article 9 of the Convention, with the consequence that Article 14 did not apply, since the refusal of the tax exemption did not prevent Mormons from manifesting their  <mask> and since the tax exemption rules were applied neutrally to all religious groups and not directed specifically at the applicant Church (see paragraph 11 above). The Court can well understand such an assessment by the national courts of the facts of the present case, although it may be that in certain circumstances issues concerning the operation of religious buildings, including expenses incurred as a result of the taxation status of such buildings, are capable of having an impact on the exercise of the right of members of religious groups to manifest religious belief (see, mutatis mutandis, Association Les Témoins de Jéhovah v. France, no. 8916/05, §§ 48-54, 30 June 2011). The Court does not, however, need to decide whether, in the particular circumstances, the applicant’s complaint about the application to it of the tax exemption legislation falls within the ambit of Article 9, so that Article 14 applies, since for the reasons given below it has come to the conclusion that the claim of discrimination is unfounded on its merits.


34.  The Government denied that the State had in this case deprived the applicant of his right to manifest his  <mask> freely. The Chief of the Islamic Community had not stated that a believer should abstain from working during Islamic religious holidays as an expression of religion or that working during such holidays was contrary to their beliefs. Absence from work during certain Muslim holidays therefore was not a manifestation or expression of religious beliefs in the sense protected by the Convention.


25.  The applicant complained that the fact that he was not exempt from military service while assuming a function with the Jehovah’s Witnesses which was comparable to those of members of recognised religious societies who were exempt from military service constituted discrimination on the ground of his  <mask>, prohibited by Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 9.


27.  The Government acknowledged that the Court of Appeal's judgment had condemned the results of the Jehovah's Witnesses' precepts regarding child-rearing in general terms, but asserted that the mere fact of the applicant's religious beliefs had not been the basis of this decision. According to the Government, the basis of the Court of Appeal's judgment, which had specified the damage suffered by the children, lay in the disadvantages already experienced by them, in that the medical certificate pointed to the existence of a degree of frustration due to the  <mask> imposed by their mother, no medical certificate to the contrary having been submitted to invalidate the psychiatrist's opinion. In addition, the judgment noted that the applicant took her children with her when attempting to spread her religious beliefs, and that numerous witnesses had confirmed the children's wish to live with their father. Consequently, the Government considered that the Court of Appeal had ruled with reference to the particular circumstances and had justified its decision objectively and reasonably.


30.  The applicant complains of discrimination under Article 14. He alleges that his rights under Article 6 § 1 have been subject to discrimination on the grounds of  <mask>, political opinion or association with a national minority. He further complains that in breach of Article 13, he has not had any effective remedy before a national authority in respect of his alleged violations of his rights and freedoms.


33.  The applicant argued that the Government’s criticisms of his conduct were unsubstantiated. He had not been unjustifiably absent since he had given notification in advance of his absence. He also had not celebrated Orthodox holidays; businesses however closed on such days and he could not work. As concerned his name, this had been given to him at birth and beliefs could legitimately vary afterwards. He had never been interviewed or seen eating by any officials from the relevant authorities and it was not substantiated that his diet or knowledge of Islam was lacking. In any event it was of limited relevance and it would have been immoral and uncivilized to put him to some kind of test in this way, in particular as no one else had been required to prove their assertions of faith. He also argued that this would prevent uneducated people from joining a  <mask> and allow the educated to join many.


94.  The applicants alleged that the Moldovan authorities’ refusal to recognise the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia infringed their freedom of  <mask>, since only religions recognised by the government could be practised in Moldova. They asserted in particular that their freedom to manifest their religion in community with others was frustrated by the fact that they were prohibited from gathering together for religious purposes and by the complete absence of judicial protection of the applicant Church’s assets. They relied on Article 9 of the Convention, which provides:


54.  The applicant branch pointed out that it had never claimed that the requirement to bring the founding documents into compliance with the existing law interfered with its rights as such. Its rights had been violated by the arbitrary and unlawful application and interpretation of that requirement by the Moscow Justice Department and the domestic courts. The classification of The Salvation Army as a paramilitary organisation and the assumption that its members would inevitably break the law were not founded on any factual evidence and represented an impermissible judgment about the legitimacy of the  <mask> practised by the applicant branch.


101.  The applicant submitted that no law in the Greek legal system denied Greek citizens of Muslim faith access to the civil courts, and that only a series of Court of Cassation judgments had deemed the jurisdiction of the muftis compulsory. However, those judgments were based on non-legal considerations treating the Muslim minority as a population to which Sharia law was mandatorily and exclusively applicable. In her submission, imposing on someone, against his or her wishes, a right protecting the religious minority to which he or she belonged encompassed an element of discrimination on grounds of  <mask> and did not pursue a legitimate aim.


141.  The applicants further complained that the refusal to recognise the applicant Church was preventing it from acquiring legal personality, thus depriving it of its right of access to a court, as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, so that any complaint relating to its rights, and in particular its property rights, could be determined. In addition, they alleged that the refusal to recognise, coupled with the authorities’ stubborn persistence in holding to the view that the applicants could practise their  <mask> within the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, infringed their freedom of association, contrary to Article 11 of the Convention.


97.  The Government accepted that the right to freedom of  <mask> included the freedom to manifest one’s religion through worship and observance, but considered that in the present case the refusal to recognise the applicant Church did not amount to a prohibition of its activities or those of its members. The members of the applicant Church retained their freedom of religion, both as regards their freedom of conscience and as regards the freedom to manifest their beliefs through worship and practice.


58.  The Government contested that there had been an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of  <mask>. Since the entry into force of the 1919 Treaty of St Germain, all Austrian inhabitants had been allowed to practise publicly and privately their thought, religion and beliefs, irrespective of whether their religious society, community or church was recognised or had legal status. The right to autonomous administration of the entity’s internal organisation was likewise guaranteed. Referring to a judgment of the Constitutional Court (VfSlg. 10.915/1986), the Government contended that the refusal of recognition did not impede the applicants’ exercise of their right to freedom of religion within the meaning of Article 9 of the Convention. Against this background, they contested that the first applicant had no legal personality in Austria, was legally non-existent and could not acquire assets or enter into legal relations, because these allegations concerned the first applicant’s situation before it had obtained legal personality as a registered religious community on 11 July 1998. Even before the entry into force of the 1998 Religious Communities Act, the first applicant had had the possibility of setting up an association with a religious purpose under the Associations Act, as the Federation of Evangelical Municipalities in Austria (Bund Evangelikaler Gemeinden in Österreich) had on 21 March 1992, and the Church of Scientology in Austria (Scientology Kirche Österreich) on 20 May 1984. However, the applicants did not appear to have made any efforts to that end.


80.  The applicant further argued that the ban on wearing clothing designed to conceal the face in public, which undoubtedly targeted the burqa, generated discrimination in breach of Article 14 of the Convention on grounds of sex,  <mask> and ethnic origin, to the detriment of Muslim women who, like her, wore the full-face veil. In her view this was indirect discrimination between Muslim women whose beliefs required them to wear the full-face veil and other Muslim women, and also between them and Muslim men. The exception provided for by the Law of 11 October 2010, according to which the ban did not apply if the clothing was worn in the context of “festivities or artistic or traditional events” was also, in her view, discriminatory, in that it created an advantage for the Christian majority: it allowed Christians to wear in public clothing that concealed their face in the context of Christian festivities or celebrations (Catholic religious processions, carnivals or rituals, such as dressing up as Santa Claus) whereas Muslim women who wished to wear the full-face veil in public remained bound by the ban even during the month of Ramadan.


51.  The Government further argued that while celebration of a religious marriage was also one of the forms of manifestation of  <mask> as it amounted to “observance” within the meaning of Article 9 § 1 of the Convention, the recognition of such marriages as equal to civil marriages in terms of their effects was not among the rights guaranteed by that Article. In other words, a religion was manifested through celebration of a religious marriage, and not through the official recognition of such a marriage.


44.  The applicant complained about the refusal to grant him a retirement pension because, in spite of the integration of protestant ministers in the general Social Security scheme, he had been unable to use his years of service as a minister to make up the minimum period of contributions required in order to qualify for a pension, whereas Catholic priests did have that option. He considered that this amounted to discrimination on grounds of  <mask>, which was contrary to Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


43.  The applicant complained that the fact that he was not exempt from military service while assuming a function with the Jehovah’s Witnesses which was comparable to those of members of recognised religious societies who were exempt from military service constituted discrimination on the ground of his  <mask>, prohibited by Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 4.


32.  The applicant submitted that the Government had failed to show why he should be required to prove that he belonged to a particular  <mask> and suffer particular consequences if he failed. The requirement for unspecified evidence was an imposition on his inner conscience and made him feel of an inferior status as no others had been subject to additional conditions in order to join the Muslim religion. No other citizen had ever been required to prove their membership of a certain religion. In his case, he had been penalised for failing to prove his faith and the penalty interfered with the manifestation of his religious beliefs, namely his active involvement and celebration of the Bayram festival.


26.  The applicant community argued that if the relevant domestic legislation provided for an exemption from its provisions governing the employment of aliens it should do so without any discrimination. The fact that the applicant community had been subject to this regime if it wished to employ ministers who were not Austrian citizens in order to care for the specific needs of certain groups of its believers, whereas other religious communities which had the status of religious societies had not been subject to the regime, had constituted discrimination on account of  <mask> which was prohibited by the Convention.


84.  The applicant alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, she submitted that by applying Sharia law to her husband’s will instead of Greek civil law, the Court of Cassation had deprived her of three-quarters of her inheritance. Under Article 6 § 1, she complained that the Court of Cassation had refused in her case to apply the ordinary law applicable to all Greek citizens and had adjudicated the dispute on the basis of Sharia law, even though her husband’s will had been drawn up under the provisions of the Greek Civil Code. Relying on Article 6 § 1 read in conjunction with Article 14, she also claimed to have suffered a difference in treatment on grounds of  <mask>.


110.  The Government noted that the applicant had not personally suffered any discrimination on grounds of  <mask>. None of the judicial decisions had referred to her religion as grounds for applying Sharia law to her situation or refusing to recognise her as inheriting all the bequeathed property. The application of Sharia law to the applicant’s case had been based not on her own situation, but on the specific category of property concerned. The decision not to apply Article 1724 of the Civil Code had been based on the nature of the estate, which consisted of property “held in full ownership”.


16.  The applicant complained that the fact that he was not exempt from military service while assuming a function with the Jehovah’s Witnesses which was comparable to those of members of recognised religious societies who were exempt from military service constituted discrimination on the ground of his  <mask>, prohibited by Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 9.


61.  The applicant further submitted that the danger of her employer learning about her past identity was real. It was possible for the employer to t <mask> back her employment history on the basis of her NI number and this had in fact happened. She claimed that her recent failure to obtain a  promotion was the result of the employer realising her status.