24.  The applicant maintained that he had challenged in particular the District Court’s evaluation of the testimonies and had requested that the Appeal Court reassess them. It was clear that the outcome of the case could only be based on the credibility of oral evidence. The applicant claimed that the girls’ testimonies had not been credible. Also the fact that one of the judges had found the applicant’s account of the facts to be more reliable and had given a dissenting opinion showed that the court had not been unanimous in evaluating the evidence. An  <mask> in the Appeal Court could have revealed more facts of the case. Also the pre-trial investigation had been conducted in a very light manner as the applicant had not been questioned immediately after the events and the taxi driver had not been questioned at all.


34.  The Government, on the other hand, asserted that the principle of equality of arms had been respected in the criminal proceedings conducted against the applicant. They referred to the detailed opinion submitted by the court-appointed psychiatric expert and the fact that the applicant and his counsel had been afforded the possibility to question the expert at length during the  <mask>. Moreover, the court-appointed expert had supplemented his opinion during the oral hearing and had responded in substance to the criticism voiced by the private expert. The domestic court had further thoroughly reasoned its dismissal of the request for a second expert opinion on the grounds of the conclusiveness of the opinion of the court-appointed expert. To allow an applicant in domestic proceedings to call a private expert as a witness would only lead to an unnecessary repetition of evidence with the goal of obtaining a more beneficial outcome for the defendant. Furthermore, the private expert could in any event assist the defendant and his counsel during the proceedings and guide them through the questioning of the court-appointed expert. While it was true that this possibility had only been introduced into the law with the criminal procedural reform in 2008, that particular provision had been the codification of what had already been the practice of the Supreme Court. The Government further stated that any decisions dismissing witness requests had been thoroughly and convincingly reasoned by the domestic courts.


112.  The applicant claimed EUR 1,177 for the proceedings before the Chamber, including EUR 850 for written pleadings, EUR 250 for translation of documents and EUR 77 for administrative costs, and EUR 2,193 for the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, including EUR 850 for written submissions, EUR 350 in connection with the preparation of the legal aid request, EUR 300 for preparation of the address to the Grand Chamber, EUR 250 for translation of written pleadings, EUR 300 for the appearance at the  <mask> and EUR 143 for administrative costs.


30.  The Government argued that the applicant had had a fair trial with the possibility of an oral and public hearing at which the witnesses could have been cross-examined. The fact that he did not have such a hearing is not a result of a structural problem or deficiency in domestic legislation. A hearing had not been held because there had been no need for an oral presentation of the applicant’s arguments. The applicant did not request an  <mask> or ask for any particular evidence to be examined by the court, nor did he submit arguments which would call for a hearing. In his request for judicial review, the applicant admitted in substance that he had grabbed P.’s neck. This was sufficient for the court to find that he had committed the respective regulatory offence. It would appear that the applicant’s defence was based on the fact that he had been acting in defence of P.’s child. The court dismissed this argument. The remaining arguments concerned merely legal questions. The applicant therefore could not be said to have challenged the facts as established by the officers, neither did he challenge the legal qualification of his conduct or the sanction.


48.  The Government submitted that the lustration proceedings in the applicant’s case had been in line with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention. The applicant had used all available means in the administrative proceedings to contest the initial findings of the Commission. That the courts had not given weight to his evidence did not mean that the proceedings had not been adversarial or had violated the principle of equality of arms. Any concerns as to the authenticity of the information in his file should have been decided, as stated by the Administrative Court, in separate proceedings before a competent court and “before the impugned decision had been delivered”. The Government also argued that the applicant had not requested an  <mask>. Furthermore, it had been possible to decide all the issues of fact and law on the basis of documentary evidence and so holding an oral hearing would have been in conflict with the principles of economy and efficiency. Lastly, they maintained that the courts had provided sufficient reasons for their decisions. The courts had accepted the documentary evidence on which the Commission had based its decision as authentic and had regarded it as “facts”.


28.  The Government stressed that the first applicant never requested the domestic courts to hear him in person. He did not attend even the District Court hearing in person. It could be considered that the first applicant had unequivocally waived his right to be present in person at the  <mask>. The punishment imposed on the first applicant had not been severe. As concerned the applicant company, the public prosecutor had already in his letter of appeal to the Appeal Court requested that the profit gained by the applicant company be forfeited to the State. This request could therefore not have come as a surprise to the applicants.


28.  The Government submitted that the applicant, who was represented by counsel, had failed to request a hearing in his complaints with the Constitutional Court and Administrative Court and must therefore be deemed to have waived his right thereto. In any event a hearing before these courts had not been necessary. Moreover, since matters subject to official secrecy are as a rule discussed in disciplinary proceedings and as the civil servant charged with a disciplinary offence is not restricted in his defence by the duty of official secrecy, the exclusion of the general public from an  <mask> was therefore justified.


21.  The Government concede that the authorities and courts dealing with the applicant’s case had to determine a criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and that no  <mask> was held. However, in the Government’s view, the applicant should have requested an oral hearing before the Administrative Court as that court was competent to determine the matter by way of a review satisfying the requirements of both Article 6 § 1 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7. Since the applicant made no such request, he implicitly waived his right to a hearing.


18.  The applicant complained that the lack of an  <mask> in his case, including the fact that he was denied an opportunity to have witnesses called to give evidence on his behalf, constituted a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Moreover, he complained under this provision that the competent courts had failed to carry out an examination of the merits of his Article 6 § 1 complaint. In so far as is relevant this provision reads:


22.  The Government argued that a hearing held in the absence of the defendant did not violate Article 6 of the Convention if the defendant was not punished for his absence in the proceedings and if his right to legal assistance was not restricted, on account of the fact that the defendant was represented in the proceedings by legal counsel. Moreover, the presence of the defendant at an  <mask> was not necessary when the only questions addressed were those which merely required an assessment of evidence and did not relate to the personality of the defendant. According to the applicant's written submission, which was completely identical to the counsel's oral pleadings, he merely claimed that he had left the motor vehicle with a third person and that therefore the applicant's presence was not necessary. Moreover the IAP took full account of the applicant's submissions. Lastly, the Government argued that the applicant had waived his right to attend the hearing on 22 February 2005, since he had not presented any medical certificate as evidence of his sudden illness.


24.  The applicant submitted that the legal conclusion of the courts in the second and third set of proceedings regarding the ownership of the property in question on the critical date, that is 25 February 1948, had been based on the 1947 decision. However, that piece of evidence had not been brought to the attention of the parties during the  <mask> before the Regional Court and they had not able to comment on whether it even existed or was authentic.


59.  The Government submitted that, in the national proceedings, the costs and expenses which related to the present complaint, namely those concerning the request for an  <mask>, may amount to a maximum of EUR 2,000 (including VAT). As to costs and expenses before the Court, they considered the claim somewhat high taking into consideration that there was only one complaint to deal with. Accordingly, in the Government’s view, EUR 7,000 (including VAT) was reasonable for these costs and expenses.


62.  The Government observed that, when examining the applicant company’s case, the Supreme Administrative Court had considered that the matter was comparable in principle to criminal charges to which Article 6 of the Convention applied. Both the Market Court and the Supreme Administrative Court had held an  <mask> in the matter to hear witnesses, and the applicant company had actively used its right to cross-examine those witnesses. The applicant company had not asked the Supreme Administrative Court to hear any witnesses other than those it had heard.


24.  The applicant submitted that in its decisions refusing to hear G., the Court of Appeal had stated that it would provide reasons in the final judgment, implying that the court had known the reasons when it had made its decision not to hear G. Had the applicant been provided with the reasons sooner, he would have been able to express his opinions on those reasons during the hearings. It appeared to the applicant that the court either had not known what G. could have testified about or that it had decided that his testimony was irrelevant. What struck the applicant was the fact that the appellate court had arrived at the conclusion that G. need not be heard as a witness before it had received any oral evidence or before any evidence had been discussed at the  <mask>. The applicant considered that the court's behaviour suggested that it was pre-disposed to find him guilty.


49.  The Government considered the number of hours of work stated by the applicant to be excessive. Noting that the invoices submitted were not specified and that the translation costs were not supported by any documentation, they submitted that the legal fees incurred in the domestic proceedings seemed to relate to the case as a whole and not only to work pertaining to the requests for an  <mask>. As regards the work undertaken in the proceedings before the Convention organs, the Government pointed out that part of the application had been declared inadmissible by the Court on 4 May 2000 and contended that the change of counsel had entailed additional costs. If the Court were to find a violation in regard to the question of an oral hearing, they regarded as appropriate the award of a sum not exceeding SEK 31,500 in respect of costs and expenses.


43.  The Government also adduced that nothing in the case indicated that H. had not fulfilled his obligations as defence counsel by providing the applicant with effective legal assistance. In seeking to have H. replaced by S., the applicant had given the District Court no reasons for his request and had not referred to any co-operation difficulties or lack of confidence in H. before the Court of Appeal. Moreover, he had not brought to the attention of the courts any particular shortcomings in the defence conducted by H. Although told by the District Court to state the reasons for his replacement request in writing, the applicant did not do so. A formal request for H. to be replaced by S. was not made until the case was pending before the Court of Appeal, at which stage of the proceedings a change of public defence counsel would have entailed substantial additional costs. The Government were further of the opinion that the assessment made by the courts of the need to replace defence counsel must clearly be considered as falling within the margin of appreciation afforded to a Contracting State when examining a question of this character. They also submitted that the minutes of the  <mask> before the Court of Appeal did not indicate that the applicant had objected to H.’s attendance as public defence counsel or that the applicant had been prevented from conducting his own defence.


19.  The Government submitted that there was no breach of Article 6 because, in the particular circumstances of the case, an  <mask> before the domestic courts had not been necessary. Referring to the Court’s case‑law in Pákozdi v. Hungary (no. 51269/07, § 27, 25 November 2014) they found an oral hearing dispensable where the court was able to clear up the matter fairly and reasonably on the basis of the parties’ submissions and other written materials. The possibility of refraining from hearing the concerned party in person was not limited to rare, exceptional cases (with reference to Fexler v. Sweden, no. 36801/06, § 57, 13 October 2011). Referring to the Court’s case-law in Suhadolc v. Slovenia ((dec.), no.  57655/08, 17 November 2011) the Government argued that instances in which the domestic law places the question of whether or not to hold a hearing at the discretion of the courts having jurisdiction, complied with the Convention. In his application to the Regional Court the applicant had not raised any question of fact or law which could not be dealt with adequately on the basis of the file. The documents handed in were not sufficient proof to alter the case-law of the Regional Court as to the general assessment of the case, particularly as regards the character of the expropriation proceedings and the issue of whether the applicant’s father had been subject to an arrest warrant.


31.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings for return of the child had been unfair. In particular, he complained that (a) the adversarial principle had been breached, in that the first-instance court had not informed him of the decision to obtain an opinion from a forensic expert, and he had not been involved in the expert’s assessment; and (b) there had been a breach of his right to an  <mask>, in that the courts had not held a single hearing in the case. The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads as follows:


25.  The Government, referring to the Court's case-law, argued that under exceptional circumstances the domestic courts, for reasons of efficiency, could refrain from holding a public and  <mask> where only questions of law or highly-technical questions were to be determined or where questions of fact or law raised by the applicant did not require such a hearing. Since both the facts and the question of law had been determined in the light of the Administrative Court's constant case-law, it could abstain from holding a public hearing, thus avoiding further procedural delays. Furthermore, the applicant had failed to indicate why he considered a public hearing necessary.


51.  The Government submitted that, under Georgian law, the primary role of the Supreme Court in cassation was to review the lawfulness of appellate decisions (Article 408 § 3 of the CCP; paragraph 26 above). Thus, where the cassation court could not inquire into the circumstances of the case and was only called upon to assess the already established facts from a legal point of view, the parties' participation at an  <mask> might not always be necessary. This rule could be justified by such legitimate considerations as the right to a hearing within a reasonable time and the demands of economy.


11.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that they had not had an  <mask> before the Adana Assize Court for the determination of their compensation claims. They further claimed under the same provision that the proceedings did not comply with the “reasonable time” requirement and that the amount of compensation awarded to them had been too low.


31.  The applicants claimed that the length of the proceedings had been excessive, in particular as the duration of the proceedings in such a simple matter had exceeded eight years. It had taken eighteen months for the Office of the Prosecutor-General to decide on charges and that decision had finally been made three years after the pre-trial investigation had been completed. It had taken almost one year and ten months for the Appeal Court to examine the case although no  <mask> had even been held.


45.  The Government submitted that the Supreme Court's final decision of 9 December 2002 had been sent to the applicant on 9 January 2003. As proof, they submitted a copy of the record acknowledging the dispatch of that decision to the applicant's address on the above-mentioned date by registered post.  As the application was lodged on 16 August 2003, that is more than seven months after the final decision was sent to the applicant, the complaint about the absence of an  <mask> did not satisfy the six months' requirement of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Furthermore, the Government claimed that the relevant domestic law did not require the domestic court to obtain delivery records of its dispatches. They argued that, had the decision not reached the addressee, the postal services would have returned it to the Supreme Court. The Government also submitted a letter, dated 18 April 2007, from the Head of the Zestafoni post office, stating that the impugned decision was delivered to the applicant's address on 13 January 2003. This statement was not supported by any evidence.


22.  The applicant maintained that there were no exceptional reasons capable of justifying the refusal to grant him an  <mask>. His appeal against the Social Insurance Office's decision had raised both issues of fact and of law. These could not be determined solely on the basis of the medical records and opinions, since his claim for disability benefits was based not solely on his reduced functional capacity but also on his need for assistance and on the extra costs he had incurred. At an oral hearing the applicant would have been able to supplement the evidence by explaining his medical condition and its consequences in his daily life before he had reached the age of 65. Moreover, it would have enabled the national courts to put supplementary questions on these aspects to the applicant and to the witnesses he had requested be heard.


22.  The applicants complained that their right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention had been violated as the Appeal Court had convicted the first applicant and ordered the forfeiture of the profit gained by the applicant company without holding an  <mask> and the Supreme Court had upheld this judgment. Due to the lack of an oral hearing, the applicants had not been able to present all evidence in the case.


33.  The Government acknowledged, nevertheless, that hearings on appeal to the Court of Audit from a judgment of the regional audit office levying a surcharge against a public accountant were not public and that the parties were neither invited to attend nor even notified of the date. They pointed out, however, “as a preliminary point”, that, as the applicant had neither requested that the appeal be heard in public nor sought leave to address the Court of Audit before it ruled on his appeal, he was “not justified in complaining of the lack of an  <mask> on the appeal before the Court of Audit”. Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing on an appeal against a judicial audit of accounts was not, in any event, they argued, contrary to the requirements of Article 6 § 1 given the “objective” and highly technical nature of judicial audits of public accounts (in connection with this point, the Government referred to the following authorities: Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263; Ernst and Others v. Belgium, no. 33400/96, 15 July 2003; and Varela Assalino v. Portugal (dec.), no. 64336/01, 25 April 2002). Verification of the voluminous accounts submitted annually by public accountants, and of the existence and validity of the supporting documents produced for every sum spent or unrecovered, was far better dealt with in writing than orally. Moreover, the Government added, compliance with the adversarial character of proceedings was also guaranteed, at first instance, by the aforementioned “double judgment” rule, which protected the rights of the defence in particular. They went on to point out that, generally speaking, the public finance courts did not rule on charges brought against an accountant by a public body, but themselves identified, where applicable, operations that might engage the accountant’s liability. They did not reach their decision until the end of adversarial and written proceedings, which placed the parties in a wholly identical position since judgments and interim rulings were served on them in accordance with the same formal requirements and gave them the same opportunity to reply; the public body concerned did not take part in hearings when these were not public either. In short, in the instant case the applicant had not suffered any disadvantage in the presentation of his case before the public finance courts compared with the school of which he was the accountant.


24.  The applicant submitted that the Administrative Court should have held a hearing in which questions of facts and law had to be discussed. He submitted that the relevant provisions of the Lower Austria Building Act required that an  <mask> be held before the building authorities. The Administrative Court should therefore have held one. In addition, there was nothing to indicate that he should have given reasons for wanting an oral hearing.


28.  The Government argued that the applicants had not sustained a significant disadvantage owing to the failure of the Constitutional Court to hold an oral and public hearing. An  <mask> would not have contributed to the establishment of new or different facts. The relevant facts regarding the applicants’ removal from the Parliament gallery had been undisputed between the parties and could have been established on the basis of written evidence submitted in support of the applicants’ constitutional complaint.


55.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that they had not been tried by an independent and impartial tribunal and that they had been denied an  <mask> before the Court of Cassation. They further alleged that they had not had adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence as safeguarded under 6 § 3 (b) of the Convention, because the State Security Court refused to grant them an extension of the time-limit for the preparation of their initial defence against the indictment by the public prosecutor.


23.  The Government, referring to the Court's case-law, argued that under exceptional circumstances the domestic courts, for reasons of efficiency, could refrain from holding a public and  <mask> where only questions of law or highly technical questions were to be determined or where questions of fact or law raised by the applicant did not require the conduct of such a hearing. As the questions in the present case merely concerned the correct application of the relevant provisions of the Lower Austria Building Act, the Administrative Court could forego an oral hearing as those questions could adequately be decided on the basis of the case file. Moreover the applicant had not given any specific reasons why a hearing before the Administrative Court was necessary. In particular, he had not requested the Administrative Court to hear him in person.


102.  The Government reiterated that, whilst section 9-15(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure stated that appeals against interlocutory orders and decisions should normally be determined following a written procedure, section 9-15(2) provided: “An  <mask> shall be held if required out of regard to the need to ensure sound and fair legal proceedings” [emphasis added]. In the present case, after having considered whether an oral hearing was required by the fair hearing guarantee in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the High Court decided to determine the applicant’s appeal on the basis of the written case-file.


52.  The applicant was therefore in principle entitled to an  <mask> before the Constitutional Court, because none of the exceptions laid down in the second sentence of Article 6 § 1 applied (see Håkansson and Sturesson v. Sweden, 21 February 1990, § 64, Series A no. 171‑A). However, no hearing was held before the Constitutional Court, even though the applicant had explicitly requested one and, moreover, the Constitutional Court did not give any reasons why it had considered that no hearing was necessary.


29.  The Government pointed out that the County Court in its judgment of 3 December 2010 had thoroughly assessed all the positions submitted by the applicant. It had justified the extent to which it agreed either with the plaintiff or the defendant and the reasons why. The court’s decision to dispense with an  <mask> in this case could not have had any effect on the content of the final judgment. Subsequently both the Court of Appeal and ultimately the Supreme Court had arrived at the conclusion that no manifestly incorrect application of substantive law or a manifest and significant violation of procedural rights had occurred.


23.  The Government were of the view that there were exceptional circumstances in this particular case that justified dispensing with an  <mask>. As could be seen from the County Administrative Court's reasoning in its decision of 15 January 1998, it had decided the issue in accordance with domestic law, in the light of the subject-matter to be determined by it and having regard to all the written material that was already available in the case. The main issue to be determined was whether the applicant's need for assistance and additional costs had reached the level required for a disability allowance under the 1962 Act. However, one prominent feature was that the assessment as to whether the applicant was entitled to a disability allowance had to be made in relation to a particular point in time in the past, namely when he had retired at the age of 65. That was in 1983, 13 years before the matter was brought before the courts. This fact alone indicated that the relevant basis for the assessment was the written material from that time.


48.  The Government submitted that, even if the Court were to find that Article 6 was applicable, there had been no violation of the applicant company’s right to an  <mask> before a tribunal as the special features of the proceedings constituted “exceptional circumstances” which justified the absence of a hearing. The Government noted in that connection that in their submissions to the Administrative Court the applicants had not substantiated their complaint relating to the maximum quota or their request for an oral hearing. The Administrative Court had, therefore, been in a position in which it could decide the case on the basis of the case-file.


20.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that his right to a fair trial had been violated as the Appeal Court had not made a full examination of his case and had not organised an  <mask> but had used instead the so-called filtering procedure. According to the case-law of the Finnish Supreme Court, the filtering procedure could not be used if the adjudication of the case depended on the credibility of oral evidence. He claimed that this had been the situation in his case as the District Court had not been unanimous as far as the evaluation of the evidence was concerned.


67.  The Government pointed out that there was no causal link between the applicant’s pecuniary damage claims and the alleged violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. As to the non-pecuniary damage, the Government considered that the applicant’s claims were excessive as to quantum and that the compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of the lack of an  <mask> should not exceed EUR 1,300 and in respect of the excessive length EUR 800.


110.  The Government noted that at the material time the Law of Civil Procedure provided for a mandatory  <mask> before the appeal court. However, the parties’ attendance in appeal hearings was not compulsory and courts were free to proceed with the examination of cases in the absence of one or both of the parties unless the parties had not been adequately informed of the time and the place of the hearing or had failed to appear for justified reasons (section 209 of the Law of Civil Procedure, cited in paragraph 55 above). The Government observed that the domestic procedural law gave the domestic courts absolute discretion to decide whether to adjourn a hearing because of the failure of one or both of the parties to appear. In this regard the Government pointed out that it was primarily for the domestic courts to interpret and apply the procedural rules (Miholapa v. Latvia, no. 61655/00, § 24, 31 May 2007).


28.  The Government maintained that in the present case the purpose of the applicant’s request for an  <mask> was to challenge the reliability and accuracy of the report on the tax inspection by cross-examining the tax inspector and the expert. They noted that the Administrative Court took the measure of inviting written observations from the tax inspector and after that a statement from an expert chosen by the applicant. An oral hearing was manifestly unnecessary as the information provided by the applicant himself formed a sufficient factual basis for the consideration of the case. The issue at hand was rather technical, being based on the report of the tax inspector. Such a dispute could be better dealt with in writing than in oral argument. There was nothing to indicate that questions of fact or law would have emerged which could not have been adequately resolved on the basis of the case file and the written observations of the applicant, the tax inspector and the expert. No additional information could have been gathered by hearing, as required by the applicant, the tax inspector or the expert in person. Furthermore, the applicant was given the possibility of putting forward any views in writing which in his opinion would be decisive for the outcome of the proceedings. He also had the possibility to comment on all the information provided by the tax authorities throughout the proceedings. Further, he was able to appeal to the County Administrative Court and Supreme Administrative Court, both of which had full jurisdiction on questions of fact and law and could quash the decisions of the tax authorities. The Government concluded that there were circumstances which justified dispensing with a hearing in the applicant’s case.


33.  The applicant alleged in general that the quality and the conclusions of the court-appointed expert’s opinion had been wrongly assessed by the domestic courts. As to the private expert opinion, he considered that the fact that the court-appointed expert had been made aware of the private expert’s comments did not suffice for the respect of the principles of a fair hearing, but that the court itself ought to have examined the private opinion in substance and taken a reasoned decision on which opinion to follow in its judgment. However, in the present case the domestic court had refused to admit the private expert opinion into the proceedings as evidence. The applicant also observed that the possibility for a private expert to assist a defendant and counsel during the hearing had only been introduced into the amended Code of Criminal Procedure in 2008. Further, the applicant claimed that allowing the private expert opinion would not have led to a repetition of evidence. The applicant alleged that the private expert was more experienced and had submitted a more extensive opinion based on his examination of him. He also asserted that in view of the unfair decision regarding the private expert opinion by the domestic court, the dismissal of the request to admit B.S., J.H. and A.U. as witnesses to testify regarding the applicant’s character had been especially unjust. Lastly, the applicant complained that the Regional Court had not allowed him to put “numerous questions” to the court-appointed expert in the course of the  <mask>.


76.  The Government concluded that the applicant had been given a fair trial. In addition to the complaints made in separate proceedings, the complaints about the alleged violation of the applicant’s  <mask> had been raised in the main proceedings before the courts at three levels of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Tallinn Court of Appeal had excluded all the applicant’s statements made during the pre-trial investigation from the body of evidence. That evidence had not been taken into consideration in reaching the judgment.


17.  The Government contended that the applicant had lost his victim status in so far as by the final decision of 17 October 2003 the Târgu Mureş Court of Appeal had expressly admitted that the applicant’s  <mask> had been breached in that he had been questioned without a lawyer, and implicitly admitted that he had not had adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence. They observed that in application of that decision the case had been sent back to the prosecutor, who had then taken a statement from the applicant in the presence of a lawyer.


25.  The applicant considered misleading the Government’s assessment that the evidence classified as secret had constituted only a minor part of his file. He submitted that some very important documents remained classified as secret and that he had a very limited access to them. These included the Militia’s files which had constituted the main evidence against the applicant, receipts that he had accepted the money, the documents in which he had allegedly agreed to cooperate etc. Moreover, all the documents presented to the court by the Commissioner had been photocopies made from microfilms, which raised doubts as to their quality and genuineness. The applicant maintained that the classified evidence in his case covered documents produced by the former security services a long time ago which were no longer important for protecting the State’s interest. Their confidentiality, however severely curtailed the applicant’s  <mask> in the lustration proceedings. As a result, he could not challenge the version of events put forward by the Commissioner.


26.  The applicant submitted that he had not had a fair trial and that he had been deprived of the right to put questions to M.H., whose statements played a decisive role in his conviction, in breach of Article 6 § 3 of the Convention. The applicant argued that his  <mask> had been restricted to an extent incompatible with the requirements of this Article.


28.  The Government also submitted that there was a marked difference between the present case and the case of F. and M. v. Finland (no. 22508/02, § 60, 17 July 2007), where the Court found a violation of the applicant’s  <mask>. In the said case, not a single interview between the psychologist and the complainant child had been recorded on audio or videotape.


28.  The applicant complained that he did not have a fair trial and that his  <mask> had been violated since he had had no opportunity to examine or have examined, both during the investigation and at the trial, any of the witnesses against him. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provide:


41.  The Government considered that the applicant was able to defend himself through counsel of his choice and no restrictions on exercising the  <mask> were imposed on counsel in the proceedings. The applicant’s obligation to participate in the hearing was not related to the exercise of the right of defence but constituted a legitimate requirement that the defendant had to attend the court hearing and the foreseeable consequence of the failure to comply with this obligation was the refusal to examine the complaint. The Government noted that counsel could not give statements about the misdemeanour matter at the court hearing instead of the applicant.


120.  The Government further submitted that Mr Berisha was unsuccessfully summoned on a number of occasions to give evidence. However, he was not a decisive witness either for the prosecutor or the applicant. He enjoyed parliamentary immunity, the lifting of which by Parliament was a precondition to testifying. Relying on A. v. the United Kingdom (no. 35373/97, ECHR 2002-X), the Government contended that Mr Berisha’s parliamentary immunity did not impose a disproportionate restriction on the applicant’s  <mask>. Moreover, security reasons had accounted for his non-appearance. In light of an attempt to murder Mr Berisha, his personal security could not be secured at trial.


27.  The Government observed that the applicants had given their statements to the public prosecutor in the presence of a lawyer. Furthermore, they were reminded of their rights under Article 135 of the Code of Criminal Code by the Bandırma Criminal Court. However, the applicants had opted to defend themselves and had not requested a lawyer before the Bandırma Criminal Court, which had taken their statements under delegated powers, pursuant to Article 226 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They submitted that the applicants had thus enjoyed their  <mask>. They further alleged that the applicants' statements were not the only evidence on which the Niğde Criminal Court had based its finding.


155.  The Government submitted that the Uzbek authorities had guaranteed that the applicants would not be prosecuted or punished for any offences committed before extradition which were not mentioned in the extradition request, and that they would not be ill-treated in order to obtain confessions or sentenced to death. The Government had also received assurances that the applicants'  <mask> would be respected and that they would be provided with counsel.


22.  The applicant further complained about the unfairness of the proceedings as his  <mask> had not been observed, and alleged that the presumption of his innocence had been infringed. The Court recalls that the question of whether court proceedings have been fair, as required by Article 6 § 1, can only be answered by examining the proceedings as a whole, i.e., only once they have been concluded (see H. v. France, judgment of 24 October 1989, Series A no. 162 A, p. 23, § 61 and Vass v. Hungary, no. 57966/00, § 47, 25 November 2003).


27.  The applicant contends that neither he nor his lawyer was informed of the opinion the principal public prosecutor submitted to the Court of Cassation. Accordingly, he did not have the opportunity to respond to the prosecutor’s opinion and to present his own arguments. Therefore, his rights to procedural equality and his  <mask> were breached, with the result that he had an unfair trial.


105.  The applicant complained that on the night of 3 May 2001, the prosecutor had not informed her of the charges made against her or of her right to remain silent, thus breaching irremediably the  <mask>. She argued that the fact that she had been a criminal lawyer at that time should not come into play, as the law did not institute derogation from the right of defence for those in legal professions. She pointed out that the law prohibited the use of evidence obtained through compulsion or against the will of the accused.


195.  The applicant complained that the presiding judge had acted arbitrarily in deciding on the issues of admissibility of evidence and  <mask>, in breach of the principle of equality of arms, the guarantee to examine defence witnesses under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses, and, more generally, the right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides:


30.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that they had been deprived of their right to a fair and public hearing in the determination of the criminal charges against them. They stressed the fact that the courts had determined their case without holding a hearing. The applicants further alleged a breach of Article 6 § 3 (a) of the Convention in that they had not been informed promptly of the accusations against them as the public prosecutor's indictment had not been communicated to them. They also maintained that they had been deprived of their rights to defend themselves in person or through a lawyer, and to submit counter‑arguments and evidence, including the  <mask>, within the meaning of Article 6 § 3 (b), (c) and (d).


25.  The Government argued that, in the assessment of the relationship between the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention and the obligation to withhold information pertaining to ongoing police operations from the parties to court proceedings, a difference should be made between the withholding of facts not affecting nor relating to the case and the withholding of facts affecting or relating to the case. The right of everyone “to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and  <mask> on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him” under Article 6 § 3 (d) cannot be considered to extend to the examination of witnesses in respect of facts which do not affect or relate to the case.


114.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing as a result of the domestic courts' admission of statements obtained from him under torture and in the absence of a lawyer during his detention in police custody. The applicant maintained also that he had not been informed promptly of the nature and cause of the accusations against him and that he had not been able to secure the attendance and  <mask> on his behalf in the proceedings brought against him.


16.  The applicant complained under Article 6 that the principle of equality of arms had been violated and the length of the proceedings had been excessive. He complained that, unlike the public prosecutor, he had been deprived of the opportunity to attend the session of 2 November 2005 before the Court of Appeal; that the witnesses' statements to the company's management had been communicated to him with a one-year delay, which had put him at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the prosecution; that the  <mask> on 6 May 2004 had occurred in his absence; that the courts had refused his request for a re-examination and that the courts had examined only 6 witnesses for the defence – far fewer than for the prosecution. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


45.  The Government, after emphasising that there was no provision of domestic law which would prevent the President of the Republic from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party, in the course of his term of office, pointed out that, in accordance with the Court’s case-law (Perna v. Italy [GC], no. 48898/99, ECHR 2003‑V), it would not be useful to hold an adversarial  <mask> for each side if the conviction was not based on witness statements. The Government observed that in the present case, it could not be seen from the decisions of the domestic courts that the arguments developed by Mr Sarkozy, particularly in his criminal complaint, had been used in evidence against the applicant. His conviction had been based on other findings, in particular the statements of another defendant and his own confessions. Moreover, he had never asked for testimony to be taken from the President.


74.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the instant application was an exceptional case in which the applicant had been denied each and all of the basic fair-trial guarantees provided for in Article 6 of the Convention. The violations of her rights included inter alia a failure to inform the applicant promptly, in a language that she understood, of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, to provide her with adequate time and facilities to find a lawyer of her own choosing and to prepare her defence, to allow the cross- <mask> and to provide the applicant with proper interpretation and a transcript of the trial.


35.  The Government noted that the applicant’s lawyer had requested that witnesses residing in another State be examined, and therefore he had to be aware of the procedural rights guaranteed to the defence under two relevant international legal instruments: the Minsk Convention and the European Convention. However, it does not follow from the applicant’s submissions or available materials that the applicant’s defence counsel had ever requested to participate in the  <mask> in accordance with Article 48 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine. Furthermore, should his request have been accepted the lawyer could have either participated himself or instructed local lawyer in Russia to participate on his behalf in the examination of the witnesses. They asserted that the trial court could not interfere in such a matter by arranging for such participation of its own motion. Therefore, the Government considered that the applicant had failed to avail himself of the remedy envisaged by the international conventions on legal assistance in criminal matters; in particular, he had not requested that his defence counsel be allowed to participate in the execution of the letters rogatory for examination of the witnesses residing outside Ukraine.


22.  The applicant argued that the refusal of the Court of Appeal to hear G. as a witness had deprived him of his right to obtain the attendance and  <mask> on his behalf. G. had been of crucial importance to his case as the documents allegedly drawn up by him had been decisive in leading the Court of Appeal to conclude that there had been an intentional plan or conspiracy to commit the offences. G. had managed all the companies which had allegedly transferred assets abroad illegally and could have provided crucial information. G. had not even been heard in the pre-trial investigations, which had made it impossible to verify the content of the documents allegedly drawn up by him.


149.  The applicant complained that in the criminal proceedings against him he had not been afforded adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence and have confidential meetings and discussions with his lawyers throughout his trial, that the domestic courts had failed to ensure that he could exercise his right to examine witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and  <mask> on his behalf under the same conditions as applied to witnesses against him, and that the appeal hearings in the Supreme Court had been held in his absence. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b), (c) and (d) of the Convention, which provides as follows:


86.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the instant application was an exceptional case in which the applicant had been denied each and all of the basic fair-trial guarantees provided for in Article 6 of the Convention. The violations of his rights included inter alia a failure to inform the applicant promptly, in a language that he understood, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to provide him with adequate time and facilities to find a lawyer of his own choosing and to prepare his defence, to allow the cross- <mask> and to provide the applicant with proper interpretation and a transcript of the trial.


22.  The applicants complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention about the lack of a fair hearing as they were not allowed to obtain the attendance and  <mask> on their behalf as the identity of the police officers who had been at the place of the events at issue was not revealed to them by N. during the District Court proceedings, and as the Court of Appeal refused to hold an oral hearing or to refer the case back to the District Court.


27.  The applicant made several complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention that the proceedings against her were unfair. In particular, she submitted that (1) the principle of equality of arms was violated, because she was in an unequal position in comparison to the prosecution; (2) the court was biased; (3) it heard primarily witness testimonies which supported the police's version of events; (4) it failed to give adequate reasoning in its judgment and did not perform a thorough analysis of the presented evidence; (5) she was not informed promptly and in detail of the nature and cause of the accusation against her; (6) she did not have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of her defence as a result of the proceedings having been organised very quickly and in view of the fact that after her arrest she had been held in isolation at the police station; (7) she was not provided the opportunity to retain an attorney of her own choosing; and, (8) she was denied the right to obtain the attendance and  <mask> on her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against her even though she indicted she could do this on several occasions during the court hearing of 8 September 1999.


129.  The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that his right to a fair and public hearing during the appellate proceedings had been restricted, that he had been unable to obtain  <mask> prepared to testify on his behalf, and that the court had been biased in favour of the prosecution and had rejected the majority of his petitions without justification. Article 6 provides, where relevant, as follows:


34.  The applicant complained about the outcome of the proceedings against her, stating that they had been unfair. In particular, she submitted that the proceedings had not been public, that she had not been provided with adequate time and facilities to prepare her defence, and that she had not been able to obtain the attendance and  <mask> on her behalf, since she had not been informed in advance of the hearing of 6 November 2000 and had not been able to consult a lawyer. She argued that the court-appointed lawyer was not her lawyer of choice. The applicant invoked Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b), (c), and (d) of the Convention in this regard.


89.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the instant application was an exceptional case in which the applicant had been denied each and all of the basic fair-trial guarantees provided for in Article 6 of the Convention. The violations of her rights included inter alia a failure to inform the applicant promptly, in a language that she understood, of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, to provide her with adequate time and facilities to find a lawyer of her own choosing and to prepare her defence, to allow the cross- <mask> and to provide the applicant with proper interpretation and a transcript of the trial. Lastly, there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that the “court” which tried the applicant was neither impartial nor fair.


31.  The Government argued that the fairness of the criminal proceedings had to be assessed in view of the proceedings in their entirety. They pointed out that in legal practice in Estonia the obligation to make an initial assessment of the evidence lay with the court of first instance. Pursuant to Article 15 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a county court judgment could only be based on evidence which had been orally presented and directly examined in the court hearing and noted in the court records. However, under Article 15 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an appellate court, unlike a county court, could also base its judgment only on the evidence which had been directly examined in a county court and disclosed in appeal proceedings. The Government distinguished legal systems where the domestic law allowed additional  <mask> in the appeal proceedings from those where that was not allowed. Under Estonian legislation, the accused or his counsel could also request witnesses to be summoned to the hearing in an appellate court. The right of the accused under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention to directly examine the witnesses against him was thereby secured.


31.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that they had been deprived of their right to a fair and public hearing in the determination of the criminal charges against them. They stressed the fact that the courts had determined their case without holding a hearing. The applicants further alleged a breach of Article 6 § 3 (a) of the Convention in that they had not been informed promptly of the accusations against them as the public prosecutor's indictment had not been communicated to them. Finally, they complained that they had been deprived of their right to submit counter-arguments and evidence, including the  <mask>, within the meaning of Article 6 § 3 (b) and (d).


47.  The Government further submitted that examining the witness under the general rules for  <mask> would not have added anything to the process of establishing the facts. Furthermore, the applicants were not prevented from presenting their version of the events and stating their arguments concerning the witness’s testimony. Their conviction was based neither solely nor to a decisive extent on the evidence produced by that witness. That was confirmed by the domestic courts, which ruled on the basis of the principle of free assessment of evidence (правило на слободна оценка на доказите). They analysed the evidence produced by the undercover witness carefully and assessed its credibility in relation to other available evidence, in particular the audio material. Furthermore, the witness was warned about the legal consequences of false testimony.


83.  The Government submitted that the concealment of the identity of the undercover agent who had given oral evidence at the trial had been justified in view of the respondent State’s struggle against organised crime. It was not disputed that the undercover witness had been an agent employed in the DEA’s Athens office. He had also been authorised by the Macedonian public prosecutor to be used in the operation against the applicant. The applicant had not contested, either in the domestic proceedings or in the proceedings before the Court, the need for protection of the identity of this witness. Even if his identity had been disclosed or he had been examined under the general rules for  <mask> it would not have added anything to the process of establishing the facts. In this connection, they submitted that the applicant’s conviction had been based neither solely nor to a decisive extent on the evidence produced by this witness. The admissibility of that evidence had been confirmed by the domestic courts, which had ruled on the basis of the principle of free assessment of evidence (правило на слободна оценка на доказите). They had analysed the available evidence carefully and had provided sufficient reasons for having regarded the evidence produced by the undercover witness as credible. The trial judge had known the identity of that witness; she had established that the witness had been involved in the events recorded on the video material; she had followed his behaviour during examination and drawn conclusions about his reliability. That the applicant and his lawyers had not attended the oral examination of this witness had been in compliance with the applicable rules at the relevant time. Live streaming media, with the possibility for face and voice distortion, had become available later. The public prosecutor, although present at the oral examination, had not put any questions to this witness, as evident from the relevant court record. Furthermore, the witness had been warned about the legal consequences of false testimony.


95.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the instant application was an exceptional case in which the applicant had been denied each and all of the basic fair-trial guarantees provided for in Article 6 of the Convention. The violations of her rights included inter alia a failure to inform the applicant promptly, in a language that she understood, of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, to provide her with adequate time and facilities to find a lawyer of her own choosing and to prepare her defence, to allow the cross- <mask> and to provide the applicant with proper interpretation and a transcript of the trial. Lastly, there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that the “court” which tried the applicant was neither impartial nor fair.


29.  The Government submitted that the case had been of some complexity as it required the determination of a number of questions concerning the persons whose property rights could have been affected by the proceedings at issue; it also involved the assessment of intricate factual circumstances and had been complicated by the fact that the applicant on several occasions amended her claims and had been involved in other proceedings closely related to the dispute in question. In this respect the applicant submitted, first of all, that the essence of her complaint was to challenge the decisions of the local administration and the lawfulness of the sale contract, which did not represent any particular complexity from the standpoint of legal analysis. The case did not call for any lengthy process of establishing the factual circumstances,  <mask> or performing complex expert examinations. Secondly, the parties to the proceedings were determined as early as 25 February 1999, and no modifications in this regard were made by the end of the proceedings. The proceedings relating to other claims filed by the applicant did not obstruct the proceedings in question as they were not directly linked to the merits of the complaint at issue. Thirdly, neither the issue of succession after the decease of the applicant’s mother could impede the proceedings, given that it had been settled as early as 1996-97. Since then the applicant had been acting on her own behalf. Finally, after the judgment of 19 November 1997 had been quashed by way of supervisory review it took the domestic courts one or two hearings to decide on the merits of the case.


124.  The Government noted in their observations that under the domestic law courts should always allow the  <mask> who had arrived at court and were prepared to give evidence. As to witnesses who were absent, courts had discretion as to whether or not they should be called. Mr M., at the moment of the applicant’s trial, had been serving his prison sentence in the penitentiary institution. His name had not been specified “in the list of witnesses subpoenaed” for the defence. Consequently, the District Court had decided that his appearance was not necessary.


10.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that they had been unable to defend themselves in person or through legal assistance, as there had been no public hearing in their case. They further stated that the indictment of the public prosecutor had not been served on them. In this respect, they complained that they had been denied adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence and the possibility of submitting counter arguments and evidence, including the  <mask>, in breach of Article 6 § 3 (a), (b) and (d) of the Convention.


127.  The Government submitted that the first and third applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of the part of the complaint relating to the alleged lack of impartiality of the Assize Court’s judges. They further submitted that the third applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of the parts of the complaint relating to the  <mask>, the provision of adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence, and the right to effective legal representation.


32.  The applicant maintained his complaints. He submitted that after being removed from the courtroom he was unable to participate in the  <mask> and the assessment of other evidence, in violation of Article 6 of the Convention. Nor had the court appointed a lawyer to represent him during the trial despite his requests. In response to the Government's submissions regarding his victim status, the applicant argued that the measures taken by the Russian authorities did not constitute adequate redress. According to the applicant, such redress should have included monetary compensation since the appeal judgment had not been quashed until three years later. Nor had his rights been restored in full. Merely appointing a lawyer to represent him during the appeal hearing had not been sufficient to restore his rights.


99.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the instant application was an exceptional case in which the applicant had been denied each and all of the basic fair-trial guarantees provided for in Article 6 of the Convention. The violations of his rights included inter alia a failure to inform the applicant promptly, in a language that he understood, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to provide him with adequate time and facilities to find a lawyer of his own choosing and to prepare his defence, to allow the cross- <mask> and to provide the applicant with proper interpretation and a transcript of the trial. Lastly, there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that the “court” which tried the applicant was neither impartial nor fair.


27.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 3(d) that he was refused the attendance and  <mask> on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him, that the Court of Appeal refused him an oral hearing and subsequently the right to supplement his appeal after he had been denied a hearing and that the Court of Appeal ignored his written evidence.


82.  The Government observed that the depositions of the witnesses in question had been taken on commission, a measure justified by the concern to safeguard their physical integrity in view of the poor level of road safety. They further noted that domestic law had made clear provision for that method of examining witnesses and that the applicant had been perfectly entitled to apply to the courts delegated to take evidence in order to attend the  <mask> and to be confronted with them (see paragraphs 61 and 62 above). They added that the trial court had also taken other evidence into consideration in establishing the applicant's guilt.


98.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the instant application was an exceptional case in which the applicant had been denied each and all of the basic fair-trial guarantees provided for in Article 6 of the Convention. The violations of her rights included inter alia a failure to inform the applicant promptly, in a language that she understood, of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, to provide her with adequate time and facilities to find a lawyer of her own choosing and to prepare her defence, to allow the cross- <mask> and to provide the applicant with proper interpretation and a transcript of the trial. Lastly, there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that the “court” which tried the applicant was neither impartial nor fair.


58.  The Government contended that the applicant had been assisted by one or more chosen legal representatives during the proceedings. He had denied having committed the offence from the beginning of the investigation and had had the opportunity to examine witnesses and to obtain the attendance and  <mask> on his behalf under the same conditions of witnesses against him.


22.  The applicant argued that the refusal of the Court of Appeal to hear G. as a witness had deprived him of his right to obtain the attendance and  <mask> on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him. G. had been of crucial importance to his case as the documents allegedly drawn up by him had been decisive in leading the Court of Appeal to conclude that there had been an intentional plan or conspiracy to commit the offences. G. had managed all the companies which had allegedly transferred assets abroad illegally and could have provided crucial information. G. had not even been heard in the pre-trial investigations, which had made it impossible to verify the content of the documents allegedly drawn up by him.


83.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the instant application was an exceptional case in which the applicant had been denied each and all of the basic fair-trial guarantees provided for in Article 6 of the Convention. The violations of her rights included inter alia a failure to inform the applicant promptly, in a language that she understood, of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, to provide her with adequate time and facilities to find a lawyer of her own choosing and to prepare her defence, to allow the cross- <mask> and to provide the applicant with proper interpretation and a transcript of the trial.


54.  The Government observed that the applicant had not indicated the identity of the witnesses whom he had been unable to have reheard, but they presumed that he was referring to the witnesses whom he had wished to cross-examine a second time according to the submissions he had filed at the hearing on 12 December 2003, namely S.N, J.M., L.L. and A.R. Those witnesses had all given evidence to the Assize Court and the applicant and his counsel had been able to put to them any questions they wished and to challenge any evidence adduced by the prosecution and the civil parties. With regard to the persons not featuring on the list of witnesses submitted to the Assize Court before the start of the trial and the witness who had refused to appear in court, the Government pointed out that the Assize Court had held that the examination of those witnesses would tend to prolong the proceedings needlessly and would not produce any results. They noted that Article 6 § 3 (d) in principle left it to the domestic courts to decide whether the  <mask> was necessary.


51.  The applicants bore the burden of proving the truth of a large number of allegations covering a wide range of difficult issues. In addition to the more obvious disadvantages of being without experienced counsel to argue points of law and to conduct the examination and cross- <mask> in court, they had lacked sufficient funds for photocopying, purchasing the transcripts of each day's proceedings, tracing and proofing expert witnesses, paying the witnesses' costs and travelling expenses and note-taking in court. All they could hope to do was keep going: on several occasions during the trial they had to seek adjournments because of physical exhaustion.


51.  The applicant also submitted that the Land Office or the Municipal Court had not considered the fact that although the lands in issue had been expropriated in 1949 and assigned to the natural persons in 1957, they had remained under the control of the State Forest Enterprise or agricultural cooperative. The natural persons had thus formally owned the lands but had never used them. The applicant argued that the administrative file had not contained any documents which would have given any detail concerning the owners of the lands. In these circumstances, it could not be said that the facts of the case had correctly been established by the Land Office. However, as it applied section 250(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Municipal Court deprived the applicant of the possibility of raising these objections at a  <mask>.


29.  The applicant complained about the length of the civil proceedings. It further complained that there had been no  <mask> before the Supreme Court which on 28 February 2002 and 26 October 2004 had quashed the decisions of the first-instance court and returned the case to the latter court. It also complained that the Constitutional Court, by partly dismissing its complaint, had breached its right of access to a court. It relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


60.  The applicant argued that, before the Constitutional Court rendered its decision of 30 April 2009, she had not known, nor could have known, that judges M.J. and D.Š. would sit in the case. This was so for two reasons. First, given that under section 68 of the Constitutional Court Act that court, as a rule, decided on constitutional complaints in a panel of six judges and only exceptionally in a plenary session (see paragraph 25 above), she could not have known in advance in what formation the Constitutional Court would be sitting when deciding on S.B.’s constitutional complaint. In fact, she could not even have imagined that judges M.J. and D.Š. would sit in the case after having acted as (third/interested) parties in the proceedings before the Administrative Court and after having expressed their opinion that her request had been unfounded and that the election of the Constitutional Court judges had been in accordance with the law (see paragraph 11 above). Rather, those judges should have been ex lege disqualified from sitting. Second, given the lack of an oral and  <mask>, the applicant could not have requested judges M.J. and D.Š. to withdraw before the decision had been taken.


41.  The Government objected to this view. They contended that the applicant’s conviction was not based to a decisive extent on Mr N.L.’s depositions. The courts disposed of an ample array of sources of evidence, including numerous witnesses and several forensic assessments. However, even assuming that the initial depositions by Mr N.L. had provided a basis, among other sources of evidence, for the applicant’s conviction, the use of these depositions was not unfair. In particular, before resorting to the depositions in question as a means of establishing the facts, the authorities had reasonably attempted to locate Mr N.L. and bring him before the court. As these attempts had been unsuccessful, the trial court had first consulted with the parties as to whether it was feasible to start the trial in Mr N.L.’s absence and, subsequently, whether they had any objections to the examination of his earlier statements. The defence had never objected to these proposals. After all, Mr N.L.’s depositions had been read out at a  <mask> and the applicant had had every opportunity to challenge them.


56.  The Government acknowledged that the notice in question had contained a clerical error because it had indicated that the case would be heard in a  <mask> in writing (see paragraph 22 above) instead of a public oral hearing. However, they argued that this did not preclude the applicants from being informed of the oral hearing because they had not asked their case to be examined in writing and the Court of Appeal had not adopted such a decision. The Government also argued that the applicants had received the notice on 25 June 2009 that a hearing would take place on 6 October 2009 but had only sent a letter to the Court of Appeal about their inability to participate on 2 October 2009 (received by the court on 7 October 2009). The Government also stated that the second applicant had not been summoned to the other proceedings and the fact that there had been another hearing at the same time that day should not have prevented him from participating in the hearing.


42.  The Government submitted that the case was heard in the course of a  <mask>, since the public were not excluded from it and the participation of the applicant and / or his representative was not obligatory, pursuant to the legislation in force. The applicant was properly informed about the time and place of the hearing and his absence cannot be attributable to the State.


20.  The Government submitted that the court’s decisions to hold the trial in camera had been in compliance with domestic law and the Convention. In particular, it had been necessary to ensure the security of the parties to the proceedings. In any event, in the Government’s opinion, the applicants failed to show that the court’s decision to hold the trial in camera had had an adverse impact on the fairness of the criminal proceedings against them. As regards the first applicant’s case, the Government pointed out that the court had decided to dispense with the  <mask> only in response to the complaints lodged by the witnesses who had received threats and whose reputation had been damaged as a result of the publications about the trial.


10.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that they had been unable to defend themselves in person or through legal assistance, as there had been no  <mask> in their case. They further stated that the indictment of the public prosecutor had not been served on them. In this respect, they complained that they had been denied adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence and the possibility of submitting counter arguments and evidence, including the examination of witnesses, in breach of Article 6 § 3 (a), (b) and (d) of the Convention.


33.  The applicant submitted that the trial court had exercised undue pressure on him in order to induce him to waive his right to appeal. The court had, in particular, declared that it would sentence him to fourteen years’ imprisonment if he rejected the agreement, which had included the waiver of the right to appeal. The agreement reached between the applicant, the prosecution and the Regional Court had been invalid, because it had not complied with the requirements set forth by the Federal Court of Justice. Amongst other things, it had violated the principle of a  <mask> because it had been concluded outside the main hearing and its content had not been read out in court and recorded in the court transcript. Referring to a number of documents submitted in proceedings instituted after the termination of the relevant criminal proceedings, the applicant alleged that the public prosecutor had taken part in the deliberations concerning the agreement and that the submissions made by the Government as to the conduct of the negotiations were contradictory.


62.  The applicants maintained that the proceedings under consideration concerned a wide scope of complex legal issues relating to the lawfulness of their deprivation of property. Such issues could not be determined in a fair manner without hearing the parties. They contended, with reference to the Constitutional Court’s finding that Article 250f of the Code of Civil Procedure was contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that their right to a  <mask> before a tribunal had not been respected.


36.  The applicants conceded that during their police investigation they had an opportunity to familiarise themselves with the police reports on M.’s and R.’s statements. Nevertheless, they pointed out that all the evidence should be produced in the presence of the accused at a  <mask> with a view to adversarial argument. The applicants should have had a right to put questions to M. and R.


23.  The applicant considered that the trial court's decision to dispense with a  <mask> of his case had been in contravention of domestic laws. He further reasoned that the domestic judicial authorities had failed to strike a balance between his right to a public trial and the protection of other interests at stake, namely security of the courtroom and prevention of disclosure of information concerning private life. He believed that the trial court could have employed alternative measures to ensure security and to ensure that there were no weapons in the courtroom. He further noted that the law expressly provided that the court bailiffs were under an obligation to carry out weapon screening to prevent anyone from secretly bringing a weapon into the courtroom. The applicant further submitted that the circumstances of the alleged rape had not been subject to the examination by the trial court and that the alleged rape victim had not been questioned on the issue. He concluded that the authorities' failure to employ alternative measures to ensure security of the courtroom had resulted in the violation of his right to a public and fair trial.


34.  The Government further submitted, in particular, that the proceedings had not been pending for an unreasonably long period of time before the Constitutional Court, whose judges did not work full time. The applicants had considerably delayed the proceedings by repeatedly submitting observations the day before or on the day fixed for the final deliberations and had not suffered any prejudice from the proceedings’ duration as they had been aware that their complaint had no prospects of success. Moreover, the adoption of the final text of the judgment following a  <mask> instead of deliberations in camera had been more difficult.


45.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that there had been no  <mask> before the Supreme Court which on 28 February 2002 and 26 October 2004 had quashed the first‑instance decisions and returned the case to the Regional Court. It also complained that the Constitutional Court, by partly dismissing its complaint, had breached its right of access to a court.


18.  The applicant complained that public access to the courtroom during the first, second and third-instance proceedings had been unnecessarily restricted. Only those creditors who had submitted their written observations objecting to the settlement with the bank were allowed into the courtroom. Access for members of the public and for those creditors who had either failed to submit their written observations beforehand or had not received notice in good time was not permitted. The applicant contended that the failure to hold a  <mask> undermined the transparency of the proceedings.


50.  The applicants, for their part, argued that the proceedings concerning the administrative offences had failed to comply with the guarantees of a fair and  <mask>, alleging that the principle of equality of arms had not been secured in that the witnesses for the defence had not been called, and that the public had been excluded from the trial of the first applicant.


54.  The applicant replied that the lack of a  <mask> in the present case had not been predicated by urgency given that the Government themselves accepted that the impugned proceedings had lasted an unreasonably long time. She further argued that owing to the failure to hold a public hearing in the case, the public was prevented from observing the administration of justice.


77.  The applicant maintained that there had been a breach of Article 6 § 1 because the proceedings had not been public. In particular, he argued that the Moscow City Court had not provided any reasons for its decision of 17 September 2001 to hold the trial in camera. Furthermore, at no point in the proceedings had the City Court cited “interests of national security” or “State secrets” as a ground for excluding the public. As regards the decision of 25 December 2001, the applicant noted that Article 18 of the CCrP had contained an exhaustive list of grounds for a decision not to hold a  <mask>. The need to protect the safety of victims and witnesses had not been among them.


25.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he did not have a fair and  <mask> in the determination of the criminal charges against him. He stressed the fact that the courts had determined his case without holding a hearing. He further alleged a breach of Article 6 § 3 and stated that he had not been informed promptly of the accusations against him as the public prosecutor's indictment had not been communicated to him. Article 6, in so far as relevant reads as follows:


20.  The applicant complained that the proceedings on her motion of 22 March 1993 had been unfair in that, contrary to the applicable procedural rules and established judicial practice, the courts had not examined her motion diligently ex officio but had expected her to substantiate the claims herself and had arbitrarily and unjustly construed the lack of substantiation of her claims to her disadvantage. The applicant further complained that there had been no  <mask> before a court and that she had thus been deprived of an adequate possibility to present her case. The applicant also complained that the length of these proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement. She relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


37. The applicant complained that the District Court’s decisions of 27 April 1994 and 29 October 1996 (see paragraphs above) had been given in private despite her request for a  <mask>. She further alleged that the judges sitting in her case were biased, as Mr T.P., the former District Court’s judge sitting in her case in November 1992, had subsequently represented the defendants. In addition, family members of Mr. T.P. were employed in the Štip courts, a fact that had affected the latter’s impartiality. The applicant also complained that the courts had reached different decisions during the proceedings and that the enforcement of the Court of Appeal’s decision of 11 March 2003 had been unlawfully suspended.


75.  The Government contested that argument. They submitted that partial exclusion of the public in the present case had been justified on national security grounds. The Government argued that the course of the proceedings had been determined by the fact that a part of the evidence examined by the court had been considered “top secret” under the applicable legislation. Consequently, some of the hearings, at which the court had examined classified documents or heard witnesses whose statements had to be kept confidential, had been held without the public. On the other hand, other hearings had been public. Furthermore, W.C., the main witnesses in the case, had been discharged from the obligation of confidentiality in respect of the subject matter of the proceedings, so he could be heard during a  <mask>. The applicant disagreed with the Government's submissions.


49.  The Government submitted that the Code of Criminal Procedure did not require a  <mask> before the first-instance court when ordering a temporary suspension from a post. However, the decision of the first-instance court could be appealed, and the appellate court was required to hold a public hearing. The Government contended that such a practice was in line with the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, especially since the proceedings in question had not concerned the determination of the applicant’s guilt but only a temporary restriction of her rights.


40.  The Government emphasised that both parties had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to present their case, including evidence, under conditions that had not placed them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their adversary. There was no doubt, either, that the status of the parties had been equal and that they had had the same opportunities to adduce evidence and to submit questions to the SMLB. The equal right of the parties to have questions put to the SMLB had been fully respected, and both had exercised that right. They had also had unlimited and equal access to the evidence and the case had been argued orally at a  <mask>.


30.  The Government further maintained that the principle of producing all evidence in the presence of an accused at a  <mask> is not absolute and might be subject to exceptions, particularly when a case concerns a sexual offence. The Government conceded that M.H. “could indeed be regarded as a ‘principal’ witness in the criminal case against the applicant”. For this reason she was questioned twice by the prosecutor, on 12 June and 5 July 2000, and afterwards heard in court on 6 July 2000. The prosecutor sent a summons to the applicant’s address to inform him about that hearing, but at that time he had been in hiding in an attempt to avoid prosecution. The Government maintained that the applicant had not participated in the questioning of M.H. on 6 July 2000 by his own choice; therefore, he had deprived himself of the opportunity to put questions to her.


53.  The applicant submitted that the proceedings, seen as a whole, had to be regarded as unfair because the Regional Court had violated the principles of a  <mask>, the protection of confidentiality and the court’s obligation to examine relevant facts on its own motion. The Regional Court’s judgment had been based on insufficient and inconclusive evidence which had not been properly introduced into the proceedings, a fact which he had only learned of later on when he had been granted access to the case files. Furthermore, the public prosecutor had omitted to introduce relevant evidence into the proceedings, thus violating the principle of equality of arms.


25.  The applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention about the unfairness and outcome of the first set of proceedings and about the lack of  <mask> in the Supreme Court. He also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that he could not privatise the land on which his house stood and that he had been deprived of his house without any compensation. The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the authorities’ attempts to have the court decisions adopted in the course of the second set of proceedings reviewed.


52.  The applicant further complained of the failure of the Federal Constitutional Court to reason its decision and of the lack of a  <mask> regarding the negotiation of the agreement with a view to terminating the criminal proceedings. He also claimed that the waiver of his rights to the confiscated goods had violated the presumption of innocence (Article 6 § 2). Under Article 14 he complained that his waiver of the right to appeal would have been held to be invalid had his appeal on points of law been reviewed by a different Chamber of the Federal Court of Justice. Citing Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicant also complained of the alleged content of the agreement and of his wife’s waiver of any rights to the confiscated goods.


26.  The Government acknowledged that, contrary to the domestic rules of criminal procedure, the trial court had not furnished any reasons for its decision to conduct the trial in camera. Nevertheless, they considered the lack of a  <mask> in the present case had not amounted to a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In their opinion, there had been no infringement of the applicant’s procedural rights, including the right to defence. The Government further submitted that the trial court’s decision to conduct the trial in camera had been based on moral and security considerations. The applicant and some other defendants had been members of a gang of skinheads. They had been accused of having murdered K. out of national and racial hatred. K.’s brother had attended the trial. In those circumstances, it had been necessary to prevent other gang members who had been still at large having access to the courtroom.


145.  The Government submitted that the applicants’ claim that their case had not been examined in a  <mask> before the Turin Court of Appeal was false. Pursuant to section 23 of Law no. 689 of 1981, all of the hearings held before that court were open to the public. As to the statements signed by the Administrative Director of the Registry of the First Section of the Court of Appeal and submitted by the applicants (see paragraph 142 above), the Government argued that they did not reflect the reality of the situation. In counter-argument, they produced five statements signed by the President of the First Section of the Turin Court of Appeal and by the Administrative Director of the same Section, stating that, in the five sets of proceedings concerning the applicants and challenging the penalties imposed by the CONSOB, only the hearings concerning the urgent measures (sub procedimento cautelare) had been held in private, all of the other hearings having been public. In those statements, dated 6 September 2013, the President of the First Section of the Court of Appeal indicated that, at the relevant time, he had not been assigned to that body (he had taken up his duties on 1 March 2013), but that he had been able to reconstitute the sequence of events by examining the registers and case files, and on the basis of information provided directly by the staff of the registry and by the judges who had dealt with the cases in question. In particular, the applicants’ cases had been added to the list of non-contentious cases (registro volontaria giurisdizione). Further, Law no. 62 of 18 April 2005 stated that proceedings in respect of Article 187 of Legislative Decree no. 58 of 1998 were to be held in accordance with the conditions laid down in section 23 of Law no. 689 of 1981 (which did not provide for the holding of a hearing in private). Although the applicants’ cases had remained on the list of non-contentious cases, the procedure followed had been that required by Law no. 62 of 2005.


29.  The Government maintained that there was no violation of the applicant's right to a fair trial in that his claims were considered in a  <mask> by a competent tribunal established by law. The reversal of the May 2001 judgment gave the City Court a power to review the case in its totality, including the assessment of evidence and determination of the amount of the award. The domestic court considered the case properly and gave a reasoned judgment.


47.  The Government maintained that the Court had ruled that an accused’s presence was not required at hearings before courts which examine appeals on points of law. They explained that the procedure before the Supreme Court required that parties be represented by their own lawyers, who make submissions in writing and orally at a  <mask>. They submitted that the applicant had been duly represented by counsel, as required by law, before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had not examined any matters or evidence that would have necessitated his presence at the hearing. At the end of the proceedings, the Supreme Court, observing that the Court of Appeal had misinterpreted the provisions concerning the use of the summary procedure, had decided to uphold the District Court’s judgment. In the Government’s view this marked the difference between the instant application and the Court’s judgment in the case of Kremzow v. Austria, cited above.


69.  The applicant alleged a violation of Article 6 of the Convention on the ground that the criminal proceedings were unfair because the additional security measures had prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury and therefore breached the principle of the presumption of innocence and/or his right to a  <mask>; because the prosecution had failed to comply with its continuing duty of disclosure and/or because the law governing disclosure in the United Kingdom did not comply with Article 6 of the Convention; and because the trial judge had erred in allowing the statements of VO to be read to the jury.


168.  The applicant also complained that the disciplinary proceedings concerning her had been confidential, and more specifically that neither the proceedings before the CSM nor those before the Supreme Court had been public. In her submission, neither the CSM nor the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court had ever held a  <mask> in disciplinary proceedings. Hence, although the applicant had formally requested a public hearing before both the CSM and the Supreme Court (in the proceedings in issue in application no. 74041/13), her request had been refused on each occasion, despite the existence of a dispute as to the facts, namely the content of her alleged remarks. In her view it had been necessary, in order to assess the evidence, to test the credibility of the statements of the only witness against her, the judicial investigator F.M.J. Against that background, in her submission, the taking of evidence on this point had been essential in order to secure her defence rights.


20.  The applicant maintained that his right to a fair and  <mask> was breached on three counts: firstly, he was never afforded an oral hearing in the determination of his compensation claim; secondly, he was never given an opportunity to reply to the Public Prosecutor's written opinion submitted to the Bergama Assize Court and to the written opinion of the Principal Public Prosecutor submitted to the Court of Cassation on the merits of his appeal and, thirdly, on account of the low amount of compensation awarded to him in respect of non-pecuniary damage.


78.  The applicants maintained their complaints that the manner in which the courts had examined their criminal case had been arbitrary and alleged that they had not received a fair and  <mask> in the determination of the criminal charges against them. They complained of arbitrary interpretation of the law by the domestic courts and of the unforeseeable legal classification of the criminal offences of which they were convicted. They stated that they had only learned of the change of legal classification from fraud to commercial fraud when they had received the judgment and had therefore not been able to prepare their defence at first instance accordingly. Furthermore, they pointed out that whatever the classification, the offences of which they had been charged were indistinguishable from regular commercial activities and that the courts had failed to indicate the specific acts which had constituted the offence of fraud.


88.  The applicant complained that she had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Van State Security Court which tried and convicted her. She further complained under the same head that her right to a  <mask> as well as free legal assistance had been infringed. Finally, the applicant claimed that the principle of “equality of arms” had not been respected, since the bill of indictment was not in a language she could understand. The applicant relied on Article 6 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:


18.  The applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal as the Supreme Military Administrative Court had been composed of military judges and that it had acted as a first and only instance court, which had also infringed his right to an effective remedy. He further maintained under Article 6 § 1 that he had been denied a  <mask> due to the lack of reference to the principal public prosecutor’s name in the court decisions. The applicant contended that his expulsion from the military academy had amounted to a punishment without a law, in violation of Article 7 of the Convention. Lastly, he maintained under Article 14 of the Convention that he had been expelled from the military academy by reason of his father’s affiliations with a certain trade union, which amounted to discrimination.


24.  The applicant complained of the procedure by which his tariff was set after considerable delay by the Secretary of State. He submitted that it was contrary to Article 6 § 1 for the decision to set the tariff to be taken by the executive in an administrative procedure and not by the judiciary. The decision by the tribunal for the purpose of this provision should be legally binding rather than purely advisory. The procedure was also fundamentally flawed as it failed to provide for a  <mask>. It was irrelevant to that failure that his tariff had now expired.


78.  The Government conceded that the Constitutional Court had found in the present proceedings that the principle of a  <mask> was a vital aspect of the right to a fair trial. Thereby, that court closed a gap in the Liechtenstein catalogue of fundamental rights which did not expressly protect that principle. It had further found that the right to a fair trial was also laid down in Article 6 of the Convention and was not directly covered by a reservation on ratification.


27.  The Government submitted that the applicant had a fair and  <mask>. He had failed to submit any proof in support of his allegation that the judge was not impartial. The applicant had been promptly provided with detailed information concerning the charge against him. Furthermore, he had been afforded adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence. In particular, the applicant had been familiarised with the materials of the case against him and informed about his procedural rights, including his right to file motions, to call witnesses and to have a lawyer, which he did not wish to do.


25.  The Government, referring to the Court's case-law, argued that under exceptional circumstances the domestic courts, for reasons of efficiency, could refrain from holding a public and oral hearing where only questions of law or highly-technical questions were to be determined or where questions of fact or law raised by the applicant did not require such a hearing. Since both the facts and the question of law had been determined in the light of the Administrative Court's constant case-law, it could abstain from holding a  <mask>, thus avoiding further procedural delays. Furthermore, the applicant had failed to indicate why he considered a public hearing necessary.


32.  The applicant asserted that during the trial the national courts had deliberately prevented him from challenging in an effective manner the evidence which his accusers had been required to produce; an effective assessment of the authenticity and relevance of that evidence should have been carried out in order to satisfy the requirements of a fair and  <mask>. All the other evidence had been contradictory and had not formed a sufficient basis for a conviction. Despite the fact that his conviction had been limited to fraud, it was clear from the courts’ reasoning that that offence had been held to have been committed by means of forged cheques.