69.  The Government argued that Article 10 of the Convention had not been violated. According to them it is of essential importance that the freedom of expression not only stipulates the right to hold opinions, but also imposes duties and responsibilities, and therefore cannot be interpreted as allowing the promotion or dissemination of the ideas of ethnic hatred, hostility and the superiority of one nation vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. The Government admitted that by imposing an administrative punishment there was interference with the applicant's freedom of expression; however it had been justified by the necessity to protect the democratic values on the basis of which Lithuanian society is based. Stressing the sensitivity of the questions related to national minorities and  <mask> after the re-establishment of independence on 11 March 1990, the Government submitted that “Lithuanian calendar 2000” was clearly promoting the extreme ideology of nationalism, which rejected the idea of the integration of civil society, incited ethnic hatred and intolerance, and questioned territorial integrity and promoted national superiority, which had been proved by the notes sent by the embassies of the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation. By withdrawing the publication from distribution and imposing an administrative warning on the applicant, the authorities had sought to prevent the spreading of ideas which might violate the rights of ethnic minorities living in Lithuania as well as endanger Lithuania's relations with its neighbouring countries. In view of the clear threat to these legitimate interests posed by the publication, as well as the minor nature of the penalty ordered against the applicant, the Government considered that the interference had been compatible with the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention.


19.  The Government contested the applicant’s argument. They submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting national security, public safety and  <mask>, as well preventing crime. The Government further submitted that the applicant had intended to encourage the public to engage in violence and resistance against the Turkish authorities and to manipulate the crowd. Besides, following his speech, the crowd had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK. The Government further submitted that the first-instance court had applied the principles embodied in Article 10, basing itself on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts. They lastly noted that the applicant had been sentenced to prison only for ten months and he had served part of that sentence. In sum, the Government considered that the applicant’s conviction had been necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.


16.  The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. They submitted at the outset that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies, as he had failed to raise his Convention grievances before the domestic authorities. As regards the merits of the applicant’s complaint, the Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting national security, public safety and  <mask>, as well preventing disorder and crime. The Government further submitted that the slogans chanted had incited violence and that the concert had turned into a meeting of a terrorist organisation. The Government also noted that the applicant had been on the concert’s organising committee, and not simply a member of the audience. According to the Government, the applicant had had a responsibility to prevent disorder and to protect public safety: a responsibility which he had failed to discharge, as he had manipulated the crowd by chanting slogans. Noting that the applicant’s conviction had been based on his participation in a propaganda event in favour of the DHKP/C ‑ a terrorist organisation that had committed heinous acts – and on his chanting slogans in favour of that organisation, the Government concluded by stating that the applicant’s conviction had responded to a pressing social need and had therefore been necessary in a democratic society.


68.  The Government submitted that in democratic societies, in which several religions coexisted within one and the same population, it was necessary to place restrictions on the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs were respected. Rules in this sphere could vary from one country to another in accordance with national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order. Accordingly, the choice of the extent and form such regulations took had to be left up to a point to the State concerned, as it depended on the specific domestic context. They referred in this context to Leyla Şahin v. Turkey ([GC], no. 44774/98, §§ 106-09, ECHR 2005‑XI). The Government interpreted the cases of Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France ([GC], no. 27417/95, § 84, ECHR 2000‑VII) and Wingrove v. the United Kingdom (25 November 1996, § 58, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V) to mean that where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions were at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society might differ widely, the role of the national decision-making body had to be given special importance. Given that Said Nursi’s books incited religious discord and proclaimed religious superiority and could therefore provoke serious religious clashes with unpredictable negative consequences, the ban on their publication and dissemination had pursued the aims of protecting  <mask> and public safety in Russia, public order and the rights of others. Moreover, it had been necessary in a democratic society, taking into account the tense ethnic situation in the country and the possible negative impact of those books on non-religious citizens.


19.  The Government contested his argument. They submitted that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression had been prescribed by law, and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining national security and  <mask> and prevention of disorder. The Government further contended that the interference had been necessary in a democratic society. They noted that in the article in question Abdullah Öcalan was referred to as “the ideological and political leader of the Kurdish movement” and the HPG, the PJA and the KONGRA-GEL were described as “facilitators of the military, political and ideological development formed under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan”. According to the Government, the publication of a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan holding a weapon demonstrated that the purpose of the publication of the article was to advocate and propagate terrorism. The Government lastly noted that the PKK was considered to be a terrorist organisation by a number of states and international organisations, such as the United Nations, NATO and the United States of America, and thus represented a serious threat not only to the internal security of Turkey but also to the international public order.


58.  The Government submitted that the complaint under Article 10 was manifestly ill‑founded. They maintained that the restrictions on the applicant’s freedom of expression had been prescribed by law (Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code) and had served the aim of maintaining the authority of the judiciary. In the long term it had also served the aim of maintaining  <mask> and prevention of crimes. They emphasised that the authority of the justice system, its stability and credibility were of essential value in maintaining public order and combating crimes. These restrictions had been necessary within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention in order to maintain the authority and the credibility of the justice system (cf. Skałka v. Poland, no. 43425/98, § 40, 27 May 2003).


16.  The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. They submitted at the outset that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies, as he had failed to raise his Convention grievances before the domestic authorities. As regards the merits of the applicant’s complaint, the Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting national security,  <mask> and territorial integrity, as well preventing disorder and crime. The Government further submitted that the slogans chanted had incited violence and that the concert had turned into a meeting of a terrorist organisation. The Government also noted that the applicant had been on the concert’s organising committee, and not simply a member of the audience. According to the Government, the applicant had had a responsibility to prevent disorder and to protect public safety: a responsibility which he had failed to discharge, as he had manipulated the crowd by chanting slogans. Noting that the applicant’s conviction had been based on his participation in a propaganda event in favour of the DHKP/C ‑ a terrorist organisation that had committed heinous acts – and on his chanting slogans in favour of that organisation, the Government concluded by stating that the applicant’s conviction had responded to a pressing social need and had therefore been necessary in a democratic society.


15.  The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. They submitted that he had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as he had not raised his Convention grievances before the domestic authorities. As regards the merits of the applicant’s complaint, the Government submitted that the interference with his right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting national security,  <mask> and the rights of others, as well as preventing disorder and crime. Noting that the applicant’s conviction had been based on his participation in an illegal demonstration which had turned into a propaganda event in favour of the PKK and on the fact that he had acted together with and led the other demonstrators, the Government claimed that the present case was different from the case of Faruk Temel v. Turkey (no. 16853/05, 1 February 2011). They concluded that the applicant’s conviction had responded to a pressing social need and had therefore been necessary in a democratic society.


20.  The Government argued that the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression had been in accordance with the law, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been necessary in a democratic society. The applicants’ convictions had been based on Article 215 of the Criminal Code and had been justified by the need to protect national security,  <mask> and to prevent disorder and crime. The Government further considered that the interference had been proportionate to its aims, as the applicants had received minor fines and the second applicant’s sentence had subsequently been suspended for five years.


25.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had been prescribed by law. They noted that the applicant’s conviction had been based on section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. The Government further contended that the interference in question had pursued the aims of protecting national security, territorial integrity and  <mask> as well as the prevention of disorder or crime.


40.  The Government argued that the exercise of the right of freedom of expression demanded from the user some duties and responsibilities, which could be subject to restrictions and penalties as were prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of – with respect to the present case –  <mask>, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others or for maintaining the authority of the judiciary. The statements made by the applicant were broadly reported by the mass media to whom he gave a press conference.


29.  The Government submitted that the interference had pursued several of the legitimate aims listed in the second paragraph of Article 10: the protection of  <mask>, prevention of disorder or crime, and the protection of the reputation or rights of others, namely those of the victims of the crimes committed by the applicant and of their families. On the latter point, they emphasised that the applicant’s release on licence had caused much emotion not only among the victims’ families but also, more broadly, within the local population, particularly because, on the one hand, on leaving the prison the applicant had given a speech in Basque stating that his joy at being free was not complete because the French State did not recognise the Basque Country, and on the other hand, a few months later he had taken part in a demonstration in support of Basque prisoners, during which he had denounced the injustice of the situation of those political prisoners and stated that they should be released. According to the Government, therefore, the aim had been to prevent any act or comment likely to offend the victims’ families and any further criminal activity. With reference to the judgment in the case of Leroy v. France (no. 36109/03, § 36, 2 October 2008), the Government observed that in the Court’s view, the legitimacy of the aims pursued by the interference should be assessed in the light of the sensitivity of the endeavour to combat terrorism and the need for the authorities to remain vigilant about acts liable to increase the attendant violence.


28.  The Government maintained that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression was compatible with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 10. The interference was based on Article 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the applicant’s conviction was necessary in order to maintain national security and  <mask>. The Government also stressed that the applicant’s speech contained provocative views.


115.  The applicant's conviction for publication of the second article indisputably amounted to an interference with the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. The Court accepts that this interference was prescribed by law; in particular, by Articles 214.1 and 283.2.2 of the Criminal Code. For the purposes of the following analysis, the Court will also accept the Government's submission that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining  <mask>. Accordingly, it remains to be determined whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”.


113.  The Government alleged that in view of the temporary and transient nature of the “detention”, there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to her private life or home. In any event, any interference by the authorities had been in accordance with the law and necessary in the interests of national security,  <mask>, and for the prevention of disorder or crime. The authorities had not transgressed the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.


125.  The Government also argued that, even assuming there had been interference with the applicant’s rights, such interference was prescribed by sections 7 and 8 of the Public Gatherings Act; it aimed at ensuring  <mask>, preventing disorder and protecting the rights of others. The interference had been necessary since the applicant had made unsubstantiated statements accusing judges of criminal offences, attacking their reputation and honour, and thus undermining the authority of the judiciary. The dispersal of the demonstration had also been justified, since the applicant and others had acted in violation of the Public Gatherings Act. In any event, the Public Gatherings Act expressly prohibited public events in the immediate vicinity of court buildings, including the buildings of the Supreme Court of Russia.


68.  The Government submitted that in democratic societies, in which several religions coexisted within one and the same population, it was necessary to place restrictions on the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs were respected. Rules in this sphere could vary from one country to another in accordance with national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order. Accordingly, the choice of the extent and form such regulations took had to be left up to a point to the State concerned, as it depended on the specific domestic context. They referred in this context to Leyla Şahin v. Turkey ([GC], no. 44774/98, §§ 106-09, ECHR 2005‑XI). The Government interpreted the cases of Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France ([GC], no. 27417/95, § 84, ECHR 2000‑VII) and Wingrove v. the United Kingdom (25 November 1996, § 58, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V) to mean that where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions were at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society might differ widely, the role of the national decision-making body had to be given special importance. Given that Said Nursi’s books incited religious discord and proclaimed religious superiority and could therefore provoke serious religious clashes with unpredictable negative consequences, the ban on their publication and dissemination had pursued the aims of protecting territorial integrity and  <mask> in Russia, public order and the rights of others. Moreover, it had been necessary in a democratic society, taking into account the tense ethnic situation in the country and the possible negative impact of those books on non-religious citizens.


48.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s rights had been lawful, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been proportionate to that aim. The domestic legal provisions governing the notification and conduct of public events struck a fair balance between the interests of the organisers of and participants in such events on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of all others – in particular, by providing for adequate measures to prevent and punish infringements of public order and  <mask>.


38.  The Government considered that the restriction was proportionate to the aims pursued. Granting access only to specific websites that constituted the official databases of legislation and the database of judicial decisions was justified by the demands of security. Making additional websites available and technically as secure as possible would incur additional expense. In view of the fact that all websites contained references, search engines, links (including to social networks), and the like, and having regard to the fact that websites were updated on a daily basis, it was impossible to completely avoid or prevent security vulnerabilities. It could not be ruled out, for technical reasons, that prisoners could misuse the Internet. Thus, granting prisoners access to additional websites would increase the risk that they might obtain information prejudicial to the realisation of the objectives of imprisonment. The effort needed to reduce the risks arising from such additional access – such risks could not be completely eliminated – would be excessive in comparison with the benefits gained by granting prisoners wider access to the Internet. Thus, the distinction between permitted and prohibited websites was a carefully weighed compromise between the applicant’s rights and  <mask>.


24.  The Government contested the applicant’s argument. They claimed at the outset that the applicant did not have victim status, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, given that the pronouncement of his conviction had been suspended. They further claimed that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, given that the proceedings against him had ended with the suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment. The Government submitted that should the Court conclude that there had been an interference, that interference had been prescribed by law and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining national security, territorial integrity and  <mask>, as well as preventing disorder and crime. The Government claimed that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression had been necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, as a politician, the applicant had showed his support for a terrorist organisation’s activities by chanting the slogans noted in the first-instance judgment. Taking into account the necessity to fight against terrorism, the Government contended that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had corresponded to a pressing social need and had been proportionate.


19.  The Government contested their argument. They claimed at the outset that the applicants did not have victim status, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, given that the pronouncement of their conviction had been suspended. They further submitted that the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression had been prescribed by law, and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining national security and  <mask> as well as the prevention of disorder and crime. The Government claimed that the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression had been necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, by referring to Abdullah Öcalan as a “leading figure” and an interlocutor for the State of Turkey, the applicants had conveyed to the public the idea that their client was still active. Moreover, their statements contained expressions referring to the strategy of a terrorist organisation. Noting that the applicants had not been imprisoned or subjected to any other restrictions, the Government contended that the interference in question had therefore not been disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.


98.  The Government noted that the material that had been seized from the applicant had been likely to promote racist and anti-Turkish propaganda and promote ill-will between the two communities on the island. Any limitation of the applicant’s rights had been prescribed by law and was justified under the second paragraph of Articles 9 and 10 as being necessary in a democratic society in the interests of  <mask>, for the protection of public order and for the safeguarding of national security and/or territorial integrity.


31.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim as the proceedings against him had ended, due to being time-barred. They therefore considered that there had been no interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. Alternatively, they submitted that the applicant had been prosecuted pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and thus the interference, if any, was prescribed by law. They further submitted that the domestic authorities had pursued the legitimate aims of protection of national security, territorial integrity and  <mask> as well as prevention of crime. As to the necessity of the interference in a democratic society, the Government stated that they were aware of the Court’s case-law in that field. They nevertheless noted that the applicant had been convicted of generating propaganda in favour of the PKK, an organisation which was considered to be a terrorist organisation by a number of international organisations and states, such as the United States of America, the United Nations, the NATO and the European Union.


19.  The Government contested the applicant’s argument. They submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting national security,  <mask> and territorial integrity, as well preventing crime. The Government further submitted that the applicant had intended to encourage the public to engage in violence and resistance against the Turkish authorities and to manipulate the crowd. Besides, following his speech, the crowd had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK. The Government further submitted that the first-instance court had applied the principles embodied in Article 10, basing itself on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts. They lastly noted that the applicant had been sentenced to prison only for ten months and he had served part of that sentence. In sum, the Government considered that the applicant’s conviction had been necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.


36.  The Government further submitted that the interference complained of had been justified in order to safeguard order and security within the penitentiary, which included preventing criminal offences and thwarting escape attempts. The interference thus pursued the legitimate aims of protecting  <mask>, the prevention of disorder or crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as set out in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


39.  The applicant emphasised that the self-declarations did not advocate the use of violence against the State or against individual persons. As the Government themselves had confirmed, the PKK's activities had been largely peaceful at the relevant time. The national courts did not establish a real threat to public order or safety by the PKK in general or the self declaration campaign, nor did they examine or find any proven actual impact of the PKK on the national security or  <mask>. None of the decisions reviewed the legality of the ban on the PKK or questioned its necessity in a democratic society. Insofar as the Government relied on the European Union's list of terrorist organisation, the applicant submitted that these listings, according to the case-law of the European Court of Justice, were unlawful and could not be the basis for criminal consequences on individuals. The national courts had failed to determine whether the interference with freedom of expression reflected a pressing social need in the individual case. Regardless of necessary considerations on other levels, for instance the determination of the penalty, they had ruled that freedom of speech had to generally take second place and there was no weighing on this stage.


92.  The applicants considered that national law did not provide sufficient safeguards against censorship or undue political influence. Thus, neither the national legislation nor TRM's internal regulations defined the concept of “editorial policy”. They claimed that the State had not discharged its  <mask> under Article 10 because it had failed to enact legislation which would offer safeguards against abusive interferences by public authorities and which would clearly indicate the scope and the limits of the discretion enjoyed by those authorities. Moreover, the Parliament, by refusing to modify Law No. 1320-XV in the way recommended by the Council of Europe, had maintained the State's control over the Public Company, which was precisely the cause of censorship. By these actions and omissions the State had also infringed the right of the population to be informed. The Parliamentary Assembly and the international experts' reports supported the view that national law was unsatisfactory in that it gave overall control of TRM to the Government and did not provide adequate safeguards of independence.


157.  The applicant considered that the State had failed to provide him with access to information in violation of his rights under Article 8. The Court observes that, in addition to the primarily negative undertakings in Article 8 of the Convention, there may be  <mask> inherent in effective respect for private life. In determining whether or not such a positive obligation exists, it will have regard to the fair balance that has to be struck


23.  The Government claimed that the intelligence agency did not hold the information requested (they referred to the intelligence agency’s letter of 23 September 2008 mentioned in paragraph 10 above). They added that freedom to receive information merely prohibited a State from restricting a person from receiving information that others wished or might be willing to impart to him; that freedom could not be construed as imposing on a State, in the circumstances of the present case,  <mask> to collect and disseminate information of its own motion (see Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, § 53, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I).


66.  The Government submitted that in the event that the Court was minded to find Article 10 applicable to the case, the State’s authorities would be responsible only in respect of their  <mask> arising under that provision and not for any direct interference with the applicant’s rights. In the present case these obligations had been fully complied with. In the Polish legal system all individuals were free to express their views. Private parties were free to create and shape their relations in compliance with the principle of freedom of economic activity that governed commercial relations in the free market in a democratic society.


23.  The applicant further maintained that States have  <mask> under Article 10 of the Convention. Since, in the present case, the Hungarian authorities had not needed to collect the impugned information, because it had been ready and available, their only obligation would have been not to bar access to it. The disclosure of public information on request in fact falls within the notion of the right “to receive”, as understood by Article 10 § 1. This provision protects not only those who wish to inform others but also those who seek to receive such information. To hold otherwise would mean that freedom of expression is no more than the absence of censorship, which would be incompatible with the above-mentioned positive obligations.


83.  The Government further took the view that, as the Chamber had found in paragraph 78 of its judgment, the present case had to be examined from the perspective of the State’s  <mask> (in the light of Rommelfanger v. Germany, no. 12242/86, Commission decision of 6 September 1989, Decisions and Reports 62). The Government argued that the State had fulfilled its obligations in the present case.


110.  The Government contended that the applicants could not rely on the moratorium on the Act on the Re-establishment of the State of Lithuania as it never came into effect since the precondition of the USSR opening bilateral negotiations was not respected (paragraphs 14-17 and 67-68 above). The applicants were aware of this as they and the Soviet Union had continued to insist that Lithuania renounce that Act (paragraphs 14, 19 and 20 above). In any event, the Act itself did not fall within the proposed moratorium and its validity remained unaffected. Moreover, the Supreme Council did not suspend any of its legislative or other activities aimed at consolidating the restoration of independence. The conditional moratorium thus had no impact on the  <mask> of the criminal nature of the applicants’ behaviour. Instead they sought to prevent negotiations with the USSR, preferring the use of force. The recognition of this situation by the USSR and the applicants is demonstrated by the repeated demands during the periods of 29 June - 28 December 1990 and January - August 1991 that Lithuania renounce its legislation of 11 March 1990 and reinstate the Soviet Constitution.


155.  The applicant failed, in the context of his written submissions under Article 10, to explain the nature of his challenge to the legality of the measures taken against him. Having regard to the Court’s finding in Lucas v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 39013/02. 18 March 2003, that the definition of the offence of breach of the peace as stipulated in Smith v. Donnelly (see paragraph 100 above) was sufficiently precise to provide reasonable  <mask> of the actions which might fall within the remit of the offence, the Court is satisfied that the interference in the present case both had a sufficient legal basis in domestic law and was “prescribed by law” in the wider sense of having the quality required of “law” in a democratic society.


30.  The Government agreed that the first applicant’s conviction, the fines imposed on him, and the obligation to pay compensation and legal expenses to the former Prime Minister constituted an interference with his right to freedom of expression. However, the interference had a basis in Finnish law, in particular in Chapter 24, section 8, of the Penal Code which fulfilled the criteria of precision, clarity and  <mask>. The first applicant had consulted a lawyer before publishing the book and he had thus been aware of the legal risks connected with the publishing. The interference was thus “prescribed by law” and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the private life and reputation of others.


38.  The applicants argued that the domestic legislation concerning the liability of the press for defamation lacked clarity and  <mask> and that the domestic courts had disregarded the relevant legislative guarantees against punishment for unverified statements made by journalists. They submitted that the courts had not taken into account the fact that they had not disseminated information about G. T., that the second applicant had not given his permission for the publication of the material, that they had sufficiently distanced themselves from the publication, and that G. T. had not used the opportunity of asking the editorial board for a retraction before bringing defamation proceedings in the courts.


27.  The Government did not dispute the fact that the applicants' conviction for the offence of handling information protected by the secrecy of a judicial investigation or by a duty of professional confidence constituted interference with their right to freedom of expression. In their opinion, that interference was prescribed by law, namely by Articles 226-13 and 321-1 of the Criminal Code, which fulfilled the conditions of accessibility and  <mask> required by the Court (see Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, ECHR 1999‑I). The Government considered, however, that the interference constituted a measure that was necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others and for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Without disputing the fact that the aim of the applicants' work had been to inform the general public about an affair of state that was of interest to public opinion, they considered that it prejudiced the presumption of innocence in respect of G.M. The publication of the book just a few days after the death of François Mitterrand had given it a certain commercial and media impact, thereby increasing the prejudice sustained by G.M. Moreover, the affair had been a very sensitive one and the book had contained precise reproductions of a number of documents from the case file.


115.  The applicant company submitted that the refusal to allocate it any broadcasting frequencies amounted to interference with the exercise of its rights under Article 10 § 1 of the Convention (Meltex Ltd and Movsesyan, cited above, and Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov, cited above). The interference had not been prescribed by law, as required by the Convention, on account of the un <mask> of the transitional legislation passed by the national parliament. The applicant company further pointed out that the Italian courts had applied the legislation in question and had found that compensation should be calculated with effect from 1 December 2004, contrary to what the ECJ had held in its judgment.


82.  The applicant disputed, in essence, that the domestic law applied in his case had met the criteria of  <mask> and accessibility, or, in other words, that his conviction had been “lawful” within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. In this connection, the Court notes firstly that, as it has already held above, the State Secrets Act, taken together with Presidential Decree no. 1203, were in themselves sufficiently precise to enable the applicant to foresee the consequences of his actions. In so far as the applicant complained of the extensive and therefore unforeseeable interpretation of the said legal instruments by the domestic courts, which had allegedly relied on an unpublished ministerial decree, it is clear from the facts of the present case that the applicant, by virtue of his office, had access to Decree no. 055, read it and signed a document to that effect in autumn 1996 (see paragraph 19 above), that is, prior to the commission of the offences imputed to him. Against this background, the Court rejects the applicant's argument concerning the alleged lack of accessibility and foreseeability of the domestic law applied in his case.


59.  The applicant company submitted that there had been a disproportionate interference with its freedom of expression. At the end of the proceedings, it had had to pay Ms L. a very high sum in damages (more than fifty times the average annual wage in Ireland) as well as her high legal costs, including those incurred on appeal. It was a very far-reaching interference with its right to freedom of expression that was not “prescribed by law” within the meaning of this Court’s case-law, since the domestic legal framework failed to meet the criteria of accessibility,  <mask> and clarity. The domestic law in force at the time allowed the jury in a defamation case practically unlimited discretion in assessing damages. According to the applicant company, as seen in the present case, the trial judge was not permitted to offer any useful or meaningful guidance to the jury, such as relevant comparisons or even a range of figures. While the 2009 Act provided for guidance to be given to juries in relation to damages, it did not fundamentally alter the domestic system. There was even a risk that the amount given to Ms L. would be taken as setting a benchmark in future defamation cases.


46.  The applicants did not dispute that the District Court’s judgment had a basis in national law, namely the Law on Civil Wrongs (Cap. 148, see paragraph 35 above). However, they maintained that the relevant national law failed to satisfy the  <mask> requirement because in their view the test concerning the defence of qualified privilege, as applied by the district court and Supreme Court in the present case, was too vague and uncertain.


69.  The applicant further submitted that Russian law did not define the term “campaign for participation”. The Constitutional Court had explained in its Ruling no. 15-П of 30 October 2003 that “campaigning” meant “calling for participation”. It did not explain, however, the difference between “calling for participation” and disseminating information about a forthcoming public event, its preparation and the advancement of the approval procedures. In the absence of clear legal criteria for distinguishing between “campaigning” and “disseminating information”, any information about a public event, its aims, type, location, time and estimated number of participants could be qualified by the authorities as campaigning for participation in that event. The domestic law therefore lacked clarity and  <mask>.


14.  The applicant complained under Article 10 of the Convention that there had been an unjustified interference with his right to freedom of expression on account of, inter alia, the national courts' failure to state by which laws the continued confiscation was justified. He submitted that, by virtue of the lack of certainty, neither the accessibility nor the  <mask> requirements of that provision had been satisfied. Article 10 of the Convention reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


53.  The applicant contended that the legal basis for the restriction of his freedom of expression was not sufficiently foreseeable as required by the Court’s case-law. He alleged, in particular, that Slovakian law, as interpreted and applied by the domestic courts, does not adequately define what is defamation in that it does not distinguish between value judgments and facts and between public officials and private persons. The  <mask> of the restriction could also be questioned because the applicant had justifiably believed that the national courts would proceed in compliance with the case-law under the Convention relating to the notions of fair comment and burden of proof in similar cases.


23.  The Government argued that the case did not concern the applicants’ freedom of expression as such but a particular form of political expression falling within the scope of Article 11 governing freedom of assembly. They had not been prevented from expressing their political views in public or sanctioned for having done so. Rather, they had been prosecuted for deliberately disregarding the rules governing the exercise of the freedom of assembly. The restriction imposed on the applicants’ freedom of peaceful assembly had been based on section 6 of the Assembly Act and section 152 of the Act on Administrative Offences. Undisputedly, they had expressed a political opinion on public ground (which fell under the jurisdiction of the Assembly Act) although characterising their action as a form of artistic expression which, as a cultural event, would fall outside the scope of the Assembly Act, but would have been subject to an authorisation from the municipality, never obtained. The fact that the applicants had labelled their action as a “performance”, a term foreign to the Assembly Act, was irrelevant since in the domestic jurisprudence it was the aim (i.e. the joint expression of a political opinion), the venue (i.e. public ground) and the organised nature of an event which was decisive to qualify it as an “organised event” falling under section 6. Obviously, the different forms which an assembly might take or the labels attached to them by the organisers could not be enumerated with absolute precision in the law but it was not contrary to the requirement of  <mask> to define an assembly by its purpose and to clarify the scope of the law by judicial interpretation. The interference was therefore prescribed by law.


27.  The Government agreed that the applicant’s conviction and the fines imposed on her constituted an interference with her right to freedom of expression. However, the interference had a basis in Finnish law, in particular in Chapter 24, section 8, of the Penal Code which fulfilled the criteria of precision, clarity and  <mask>. The applicant and the publisher had consulted a lawyer before publishing the book and they had thus been aware of the legal risks connected with the publication. The interference was thus “prescribed by law” and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the private life and reputation of others.


75.  The applicant company contended that the law in force lacked  <mask>. Article 96a of the Code of Criminal Procedure gave the public prosecutor and the police an unfettered discretion to determine whether to order the surrender of information, without any limits as to the grounds on which to do so or the methods to be used. In particular, it was entirely silent on the subject of interferences with the journalistic privilege of source protection.


79.  The Government argued that Article 96a of the Code of Criminal Procedure satisfied the requirements of  <mask> and accessibility. In defining the groups entitled to specific protection, the third paragraph of that Article referred to other Articles of that Code, namely Articles 217, 218 and 219, none of which mentioned journalists. Moreover, guidance as to the interpretation of that provision was to be found in its drafting history and in a policy rule accessible to the public.


39.  The Government argued that the interference served legitimate aims, namely the  <mask> and the non-disclosure of confidential information. The applicant association argued that these interests could have been protected by anonymising the copies of the decision. The Court considers that the interference in question can be seen as having pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the rights of others.


41.  The Government drew attention to the Constitutional Court’s findings that the restriction at issue, having regard to the historical experience of Hungarian society, had been a response to a “pressing social need” in pursuit of the legitimate aims of the prevention of disorder and the  <mask>. That court had been satisfied that these aims could not have been achieved by less severe means than those of the criminal law. Moreover, it had found that the restriction had been proportionate to the aims pursued since it had been limited in scope, extending only to some well-defined forms of the public use of such symbols, which entailed identification with, and the intention to propagate, the totalitarian ideologies represented by them. It had been satisfied that the use of such symbols for scientific, artistic, educational or informational purposes was not prohibited.


25.  The Government acknowledged the existence of an interference in the instant case but submitted that it was justified under the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention. The interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression had been based on Article 6 of Law no. 3713 as well as Additional section 2 of Law no. 5680. The interference had been in the interests of national security, territorial integrity and the  <mask> owing to the disclosure of the identities of certain public officials.


101.  The Government acknowledged that the applicant's conviction and sentence constituted an interference with the applicant's freedom of expression under Article 10 § 1. However, that interference was justified under Article 10 § 2. It was “prescribed by law” (Article 127 of the CC) and had pursued a legitimate aim (the  <mask> to elect the President of Ukraine on the basis of free and fair voting arrangements). The interference had also been “necessary in a democratic society”. As to the last point, they stated that the Court's case-law (Ahmed and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports 1998‑VI, p. 2376, § 52) stressed the importance of ensuring the free will of the people during elections and the need to protect democratic society from interferences, such as the one at issue, with that process. The dissemination of information about a presidential candidate was in the interests of the electorate. However, where false information was imparted, this could have a damaging effect on a candidate's reputation and effectively prevent him from conducting an efficient electoral campaign.


81.  The Government were of the opinion that the restriction on access to the requested information had served the legitimate aim of the  <mask>. The protection of personal data constituted a legitimate aim in itself, irrespective of whether the reputation of the person concerned had also been at stake. The measure could also be regarded as necessary for the protection of the reputation of others within the meaning of Article 10, since the research carried out by the applicant NGO was critical of the professional activities of ex officio defence counsel.


33.  The Government submitted that the contested provision had been inserted into the Criminal Code because twentieth-century dictatorships had caused much suffering to the Hungarian people. The display of symbols related to dictatorships created uneasy feelings, fear or indignation in many citizens, and sometimes even violated the rights of the deceased. To wear the symbols of a one-party dictatorship in public was, in the Government’s view, tantamount to the very antithesis of the rule of law, and must be seen as a demonstration against pluralist democracy. In line with the Constitutional Court’s position in the matter, the Government contended that the measure in question pursued the legitimate aims of the prevention of disorder and the  <mask>.


56.  The applicant also disagreed with the Government that the interference had pursued the legitimate aim of prevention of crime and  <mask>. She emphasised that the information she had reported on served a legitimate public interest and contributed to the public debate on solidarity regarding the implementation of austerity measures. No personal information that did not serve that purpose had been revealed and no claims had been lodged in that regard by the individuals concerned. Therefore, there had been no reason to consider that any further disclosure of data by the applicant would be in breach of any Article 8 rights. After all, if the aim had been to prevent further disclosure of personal data, why had the police, having copied all the files, returned the data storage devices to the applicant without deleting any files or information contained therein?


55.  The Government argue that the display was irritating, while the applicant insisted that the display was lawful (see paragraphs 24 and 27 above). The Court will therefore examine if the display could have created a pressing social need to restrict the use of the symbol, for the  <mask>. The Court emphasises at this juncture that in the interpretation of the meaning of an expression, for the determination of the proportionality of a specific restrictive measure, the location and the timing of the display of a symbol or of other expressions with multiple meanings play an important role.


36.  The Government in turn reiterated the above position in their observations before the Court, acknowledging that part of the applicant’s actions, namely his complaints to various authorities, were protected under Article 10 of the Convention. However, they emphasised that the applicant’s conduct had also involved the public dissemination of damaging statements in respect of a third party. Such action was not covered by the protection of Article 10 and the sanctions that had been imposed were justified as they fell within the permissible limitations on the right to freedom of expression, had pursued a legitimate aim, namely  <mask>, and had been proportionate to the applicant’s conduct in the circumstances of the case.


52.  The applicant accepted that preventing the “disclosure of information received in confidence” was one of the grounds which justified interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 10. However, he did not share the respondent Government’s view that publication of the paper had jeopardised “national security” and “public safety”. In his view, the disclosure of the report had not been liable to undermine the country’s fundamental and vital interests. In addition, the applicant argued that Article 293 of the Swiss Criminal Code did not encompass the  <mask> and hence, in the instant case, the reputation of the ambassador who had written the report in question. He added that the relevant authorities had not instituted any defamation proceedings against him, although they could have done so.


183.  The Government maintained that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. First of all, they submitted that the interference complained of had been prescribed by law. It had been based on Law 7(I)/1998 and the relevant regulations. The relevant provisions were clear and their effects reasonably foreseeable, especially with the assistance of a lawyer. Secondly, the Government argued that the interference with the applicant’s right pursued legitimate aims and in particular the  <mask>. In this respect, they emphasised the need to safeguard the rights and interests of viewers, including children, who were vulnerable, and to protect them from abusive practices. The Government relied on the reasoning given by the CRTA in its decisions concerning the broadcasts in question. They further highlighted the need to regulate the mass media in view of the significant influence they had on people and society at large. The measures taken by the CRTA had been necessary in securing compliance with the relevant legal provisions and regulations.


41.  The Government conceded that there had been an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression, albeit one prescribed by law and pursuing the legitimate aim of the  <mask>. In their view, the authorities had acted within their margin of appreciation essentially because by displaying the comments the applicants had exceeded the limits of freedom of expression as guaranteed under the Convention.


46.  The Government acknowledged that there had been an interference with the first applicant’s right to freedom of expression. They further submitted that that interference had been based on Article 484 of the Civil Code. The legitimate aim pursued by the authorities had been the  <mask> and the authority and impartiality of the judiciary, as provided by the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention.


81.  The Government were of the opinion that the restriction on access to the requested information had served the legitimate aim of the protection of the rights of others. The protection of personal data constituted a legitimate aim in itself, irrespective of whether the reputation of the person concerned had also been at stake. The measure could also be regarded as necessary for the  <mask> within the meaning of Article 10, since the research carried out by the applicant NGO was critical of the professional activities of ex officio defence counsel.


51.  The applicant submitted that the domestic courts had failed to strike a fair balance between the right to freedom of expression and the  <mask>. They had wrongly regarded the allegations, which he had made on behalf of and as spokesperson of his political party, as statements of fact and had required that he prove their veracity to the criminal standard. However, he had neither possessed nor been able to obtain any evidence to prove his allegations (сомневање). Given his prior experience in a similar case, in which the same trial judge had refused to admit proposed evidence (see paragraphs 31 and 32 above), the applicant had had no reasonable grounds to believe that the court would take a different approach in the impugned proceedings. In any event, the factual basis for his allegations which were the subject of application no. 64659/11 had been the fact that Mr S.M. had belatedly submitted his declaration of assets, failing to specify the origin of shares worth EUR 300,000 (see paragraph 8 above). He further referred to public rumours, which have been shown to be true in 2015, that wiretapping equipment had, in fact, been misused. His questions had been based on allegations that had been brought to his attention and had fallen within the limits of acceptable criticism in the context of the political debate, which, as was commonly known, the political opposition had launched at the time regarding the issues in dispute. The submitted material (see paragraphs 9 and 22 above) sought to assist the Court to obtain a clearer picture about that debate. In any event, the domestic courts had not been bound by the parties’ proposals and had been entitled to establish all the facts and adduce the relevant evidence of their own motion. However, they had based their findings about the falsity of the applicant’s allegations only on Mr S.M.’s statement. If the opposition could only hold press conferences if there was irrefutable evidence about irregularities by State officials, it would be deprived of its crucial role of informing and alerting the public about allegations of irregular conduct by officials.


42.  The Government pointed out that the possibility of terminating a contract of employment in the event of attacks on the employer or workers was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim: the  <mask>. The Spanish courts had considered that the applicants had gone beyond the limits inherent in the exercise of their freedom of expression, to the extent of damaging the reputation of the employer and of other workers. The comments had not been published in the media but in the confined environment of a company, and concerned individuals working there, namely the human resources manager and work colleagues, that is to say persons with no public duties. The extent of acceptable criticism when directed against a private individual was narrower than that directed against authorities or public institutions (contrast Dink v. Turkey, nos. 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 and 7124/09, § 133, 14 September 2010). That context had aggravated the damage caused by the newsletter to the reputations of the persons concerned, since all its potential addressees knew the individuals who were criticised or caricatured.


25.  The Government argued that according to the “quotation case-law” of the Austrian courts, the publication of a statement which satisfies the definition of an offence may lead to sanctions against the medium concerned unless there is any objective reason, such as e.g. the protection by a basic right, justifying such statement. In the present case, having carefully weighed the freedom of expression against the  <mask>, the second instance court set out comprehensively the arguments in favour of the application of section 33 of the Media Act. It rightly considered that the statement “spiritually depraved” amounted to an offence and violated the concerned person's right to reputation. Referring to case-law of the Court of Appeal, the Government asserted that the correct quotation of an insult of one person by another person was protected by Article 10 of the Convention and did not justify forfeiture. In the present case, however, the applicant company had not reported about the pending defamation proceedings in a neutral way but had identified itself with the content of the quoted statements. The Government referred in this regard to the Court of Appeal's findings as regards the structure and style of the article and, furthermore, to the article's subtitle which wording between the lines in their opinion called the rejection of the reproach of being “spiritually depraved” into question. A victim's right would be almost completely void without an adequate protection against abuse of quotations, if a medium was free to publish and add to defamation by third persons. The applicant company had not been deprived of the possibility to inform the public about the fact that criminal proceedings against Mr Heller were pending. Finally, the forfeiture was principally a safeguarding measure containing elements of minor punishment. It appeared proportionate as most of the issues of the weekly magazine had, in any way, already been published. The applicant company had not sufficiently substantiated the alleged damage resulting from the forfeiture.


21.  The Government contended that the injunction issued against the applicant constituted an interference with his rights under Article 10 of the Convention which was, however, justified under § 2 of this provision. It had a legal basis, namely Section 1330 of the Civil Code, and pursued the legitimate aim of  <mask>. As to the necessity of the interference, they argued that the Austrian courts classified the applicant's statements as statements of facts. An essential element for this classification was that the applicant had not given any explanation for his statements which was thus not discernible as a value judgment. There was no factual basis to enable the reader to evaluate himself why the applicant had come to his conclusions. Therefore, it appeared legitimate that the Austrian courts attributed to the statements at issue the meaning usually conveyed by similar reproaches, namely that the plaintiffs had been guided by improper and unlawful motives. The applicant himself had endorsed this interpretation as, in his appeal with the Regional Court, he had argued why the teachers' conduct had allegedly been unlawful. However, the Austrian courts, after comprehensive evaluation of all evidence, came to the conclusion that these accusations were factually incorrect. The measures taken by the Austrian courts were proportionate, as the applicant was merely ordered to refrain from making further such statements which did not hinder him to express his opinion in other less defamatory or insulting words. The Government finally argued that, even assuming that the statements at issue were value judgments, the interference was proportionate as the applicant's statements were unsubstantiated and the details of the underlying conflict were not known to the public. Such extremely harsh, excessive and generalising criticism was not justified by the applicant's interest in several-day excursions abroad.


56.  The Government emphasised that the applicants had not been convicted for expressing strong criticism of the police, but exclusively for having taken it upon themselves to make the very specific, unsubstantiated and extremely serious accusation against the named chief superintendent that he had intentionally suppressed evidence in the murder case. The Danish Supreme Court had fully recognised that the present case involved a conflict between the right to impart ideas and the right to freedom of expression and the  <mask>, and it had properly balanced the various interests involved in the case in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 of the Convention.


41.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s disciplinary punishment had been lawful and justified for the  <mask> and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. They argued that the applicant had complained to the public prosecutor that the prison authorities had breached the law by refusing to give him the parcel, which had not been true. The Government further stressed that, in imposing the sanction, the authorities had taken into consideration the applicant’s overall conduct, notably his previous disciplinary offences and the fact that he had submitted other complaints or requests containing denigrating language to various institutions.


82.  The Government maintained that the interference pursued one or more legitimate aims: the  <mask>, in so far as the first applicant’s own safety was concerned by the bomb threats, and the interests of national security with regard to all the applicants. In each case the interference was moreover “necessary” for the achievement of the legitimate aim or aims pursued.


42.  The Government further submitted that the civil injunction was necessary to protect the C. company’s personality rights as well as its right to respect for its home and to its freedom of occupation. The interference with these rights was of a particular weight because the film footage had been unlawfully made under false pretences. The injunction was further necessary for the  <mask>. The applicant association had agitated against the C. company to such a degree that criminal offences had already been committed. There were fears that the further dissemination of the film by the applicant association would lead to the commitment of further crimes. Finally, the civil injunction was necessary for the prevention of disorder, as the danger existed that the dissemination of the film material by the applicant could lead to demonstrations involving violent acts.


76.  The Government agreed that there had been an interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. However, they submitted that it had been lawful, as it had been based on the provisions of the Code of Administrative Offences, and had pursued the legitimate aims of (i) maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary and (ii) the  <mask>. As to whether the interference had been “necessary in a democratic society”, the Government argued that the applicant, when raising her challenge, should have presented arguments regarding alleged bias with caution, rather than in a manner that had undermined the court’s authority; moreover she should have abstained from making offensive statements. However, the applicant had cited personal reasons for her distrust of Judge M., which had come across as disrespectful of the judge and the court in general. None of the reasons she had given for her challenge had been supported by any evidence – indeed, they had gone far beyond what had been needed to support the challenge and into general unproven allegations about the judge’s conduct. When the judge had warned the applicant that making false statements could constitute grounds for holding her in contempt, the applicant had not desisted but rather had continued making her statements, and had embarked upon a dispute with the judge. As to proportionality, although the maximum punishment possible had been fifteen days of imprisonment, the applicant had been sentenced to five days only. The appropriateness of this punishment had been confirmed by the First Vice‑President of the Court of Appeal.


31.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim as the proceedings against him had ended, due to being time-barred. They therefore considered that there had been no interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. Alternatively, they submitted that the applicant had been prosecuted pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and thus the interference, if any, was prescribed by law. They further submitted that the domestic authorities had pursued the legitimate aims of protection of national security, territorial integrity and public safety as well as  <mask>. As to the necessity of the interference in a democratic society, the Government stated that they were aware of the Court’s case-law in that field. They nevertheless noted that the applicant had been convicted of generating propaganda in favour of the PKK, an organisation which was considered to be a terrorist organisation by a number of international organisations and states, such as the United States of America, the United Nations, the NATO and the European Union.


56.  The applicant also disagreed with the Government that the interference had pursued the legitimate aim of  <mask> and protection of the rights of others. She emphasised that the information she had reported on served a legitimate public interest and contributed to the public debate on solidarity regarding the implementation of austerity measures. No personal information that did not serve that purpose had been revealed and no claims had been lodged in that regard by the individuals concerned. Therefore, there had been no reason to consider that any further disclosure of data by the applicant would be in breach of any Article 8 rights. After all, if the aim had been to prevent further disclosure of personal data, why had the police, having copied all the files, returned the data storage devices to the applicant without deleting any files or information contained therein?


81.  The applicant said that while university authorities, including vice-chancellors’ offices and deaneries, were unquestionably at liberty to use the powers vested in them by law, the scope of those powers and the limits on them were also defined by law, as were the procedures by which they were to be exercised and the  <mask> of authority. In the instant case, the Vice-Chancellor had not possessed the authority or power, either under the laws in force or the Students Disciplinary Procedure Rules, to refuse students “wearing the headscarf” access to university premises or examination rooms. In addition, the legislature had at no stage sought to issue a general ban on wearing religious signs in schools and universities and there had never been support for such a ban in Parliament, despite the fierce debate to which the Islamic headscarf had given rise. Moreover, the fact that the administrative authorities had not introduced any general regulations providing for the imposition of disciplinary penalties on students wearing the headscarf in institutions of higher education meant that no such ban existed.


30.  The applicant contended, first of all, that the refusal to register the newspaper under the suggested title amounted to an interference with his  <mask> and ideas. Such interference was not “prescribed by law” since the national law, including the Mass Media Act, did not permit refusal of registration for the reasons referred to by the Government. A newspaper title could not reasonably be defined as “true” or “false”, or be otherwise consistent with “the real state of affairs”. Furthermore, Russian law contained no clear requirement for strict coherence between the title of a newspaper and its specialisation. The applicant further argued that, even if it had been lawful, the refusal of registration was not “necessary in a democratic society”.


37.  The Government conceded that the denial of a broadcasting licence to Glas Nadezhda EOOD had amounted to an interference with the applicants'  <mask> and ideas. In their view, however, this interference had been authorised under the third sentence of paragraph 1 of Article 10 of the Convention. The licensing of radio broadcasters had been specifically envisioned by the Radio and Television Act 1998. It had been entrusted to a special body, the NRTC, charged with protecting freedom of expression. Moreover, the law regulating licensing had been sufficiently clear in its terms. The NRTC's decision had been based on quite detailed and publicly announced criteria. The NRTC had clearly indicated, as could also be seen from the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 21 March 2002, which of those criteria had not been met by Glas Nadezhda EOOD. Some of the criteria were formal, while others had related to the utility and the feasibility of the proposed radio station. This could not be seen as unlawful, arbitrary or discriminatory, as indicated by the former Commission in its decision in the case of Verein Alternatives Lokalradio Bern et Verein Radio Dreyeckland Basel v. Switzerland (no. 10746/84, Commission decision of 16 October 1986, Decisions and Reports 49). The decision to refuse the licence had been based on the failure by Glas Nadezhda EOOD to meet a number of the announced criteria. This decision had been the result of a detailed examination and had been reviewed by two levels of court.


47.  The applicants submitted that the judgment against a news magazine for having published information that had already been disclosed in other media and for illustrating it with related photographs amounted to an interference in its  <mask> of public interest. They considered that this judgment was extremely serious and unprecedented, and that it had to be regarded as an excessive interference with its freedom of expression and information, with a clearly chilling effect.


119.  The applicant company submitted firstly that it had sustained pecuniary damage as a result of the permanent loss of the programme in issue. Since the programme concerned a topical issue and had not been screened within a short time after being produced, it would now never be broadcast. However, it was difficult for the applicant company to put a precise figure on the damage sustained and to produce relevant supporting documents. That being so, the Court considers that the finding of a violation of the Convention will constitute sufficient redress for the damage sustained under this head, and the same applies to the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant company as a result both of the restriction of its  <mask> and of the impact which the interference may have had on the programme’s reputation for credibility.


110.  The applicant company alleged a violation of its right to freedom of expression, and especially its  <mask> and ideas. It complained in particular that for a period of almost ten years the Government had not allocated it any frequencies for analogue terrestrial television broadcasting. It submitted that the failure to apply Law no. 249/1997 (see paragraphs 56-61 above), the failure to enforce the Constitutional Court’s judgments nos. 420/1994 and 466/2002 (see paragraphs 54-55 and 62 above) and the duopoly existing in the Italian television market were in breach of Article 10 of the Convention, which provides:


124.  The Government observed that the applicant company currently offered its customers a series of channels broadcasting varied content, including horror films and adult films. In practical terms, it operated a limited system, since its programmes could be viewed only by using a decoder which it supplied to its customers. This served to illustrate the manner and scope of the benefit drawn by the applicant company from its  <mask> and ideas in a democratic society.


83.  The Government submitted that both Article 10 of the Convention (in referring to “duties and responsibilities” as well as to formalities, conditions and penalties) and the domestic law permitted the State to put in place a framework containing the procedure of and conditions of the information flow. While Article 10 of the Convention included the  <mask>, Russian law provided for constitutional “freedom of mass information” along with the freedom of expression and freedom of thought. The Constitutional Court also recognised a higher degree of responsibility relating to the exercise of the freedom of mass information on a professional scale.


76.  The applicant company submitted that the advance viewing of the programme in issue by the Brussels Court of Appeal in order to monitor its content before it was broadcast, and the subsequent banning of the programme as a preventive measure, had infringed freedom of expression, freedom of the press and  <mask>, all of which were guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention, which provides:


56.  The applicants also claimed that the principle of the free choice of the means of imparting information – the corollary of  <mask> – could not be contested without emptying that freedom of its substance. In that connection, they alleged that they had been free to illustrate the impugned article with relevant photographs. This had indeed been the case for the published photographs. With regard to the consequences of the article, the applicants denied that it could have disclosed anything that had not already been revealed to the public by the British, American, German and French press and audio-visual media and on the Internet. They therefore urged that the impact of the article be placed in perspective. They also argued that after the contested publication the Prince had officially acknowledged his paternity in a large-scale media operation, at the same time acknowledging the existence of another child.


25.  The applicants complained that their  <mask> had been breached because the restrictions imposed on them either had not been prescribed by law or had been more far-reaching than necessary in a democratic society. Moreover, they claimed that the consequences – the eviction from their flat and the move to another town – had been disproportionate to the aims pursued. They relied on Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


23.  The Government claimed that the intelligence agency did not hold the information requested (they referred to the intelligence agency’s letter of 23 September 2008 mentioned in paragraph 10 above). They added that  <mask> merely prohibited a State from restricting a person from receiving information that others wished or might be willing to impart to him; that freedom could not be construed as imposing on a State, in the circumstances of the present case, positive obligations to collect and disseminate information of its own motion (see Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, § 53, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I).


69.  The Government submitted that the aim pursued by the interference had been twofold –  <mask> arising from the Christian faith and shared by a substantial part of the Lithuanian population, and protection of the right of religious people not to be insulted on the grounds of their beliefs (see paragraph 54 above). The applicant company did not contest that submission (see paragraph 60 above). The Court therefore accepts that the impugned interference sought a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.


24.  The applicant association argued that the public exhibition of a painting contributed to a debate between the artist, the exhibitor and the public and was therefore protected under Article 10 of the Convention. It accepted that the impugned interference was prescribed by law, but maintained that the interference had been neither necessary nor proportionate. It submitted that the Government's submissions as regards the  <mask> were irrelevant as in the present case the domestic courts had based their decisions merely on Mr Meischberger's prevailing personal interests as protected under section 78 of the Copyright Act. Mr Meischberger could not, however, claim any personal interest worth protecting as the painting obviously did not state or suggest that the way in which he was portrayed corresponded to his actual behaviour. The painting presented the artist's personal history in an allegorical way and depicted, among several other well-known persons, the painter himself and some of his friends and benefactors. All these persons were depicted engaging in sexual acts, reflecting the painter's conception of the interrelation between power and sexuality. Mr Meischberger had been one of the figures who had characterised the history of the FPÖ party in the past few years, and he had been portrayed with the other three members as an allegory of that party, which had always strongly criticised the painter's work. Furthermore, Mr Meischberger and, in any event, the actions he considered libellous were not recognisable after the painting had been partly damaged. In the applicant association's view, the fact that he had instituted proceedings only after the painting had been partly damaged demonstrated that rather than protecting his personal interests he was aiming to discredit the painter's work.


38.  The applicant complained that the refusals by the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot authorities to allow him to cross the “green line” in order to participate in bi-communal meetings had prevented him from exercising his right to freedom of expression, including the  <mask> and ideas and to receive and impart information, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


50.  The applicants complained of an interference with their  <mask>, the opinion in question being that an employee should be allowed to choose to be represented by a trade union in negotiations with the employer. The Court does not, however, consider that any separate issue arises under Article 10 that has not already been dealt with in the context of Article 11 of the Convention. It is not, therefore, necessary to examine this complaint separately.


68.  The applicant NGO contended that, in view of the Court’s case-law, Article 10 was applicable in the circumstances of the present case. In the applicant NGO’s view, unless access to information was included in the right to receive and impart information and the right to  <mask>, States could easily render these rights devoid of substance by denying access to important data on matters of public interest. Access to information was a conditio sine qua non for the effective exercise of the right to freedom of expression, just as without access to a court, the right to a fair trial would be meaningless (see Golder v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, § 35, Series A no. 18). The applicant NGO argued that access to information was inherent in the right to freedom of expression, since rejecting access to data impeded the realisation of that freedom.


45.  The Government accepted that the administrative liability imposed on the applicants for holding demonstrations constituted an interference with their right to freedom of expression. However, they considered that the restrictions on the promotion of homosexuality in general and the enforcement of these restrictions against the applicants in particular had been in accordance with law and had been necessary in a democratic society for the  <mask> and morals and the rights of others. In the present case, the Government claimed to have enjoyed the wide margin of appreciation generally available to the Contracting States when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion.


124.  The Government submitted that all rallies planned by Ilinden had in fact taken place. As the time and the place of those rallies had coincided with official ceremonies celebrating historical events, the authorities had tried to balance the rights of the applicants with those of the other organisations and participants in those events. The authorities had complied with their  <mask> under Article 11 and had ensured that the events proceeded smoothly.


39.  The Government submitted that the planned rally had in fact taken place, with the participation of about three thousand people, tourists and officials, including representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. The authorities had complied with their  <mask> under Article 11 and ensured that the event proceeded smoothly. The web page of UMO Ilinden – PIRIN indicated that all events planned by them for 2008 had taken place normally.


83.  The Government further took the view that, as the Chamber had found in paragraph 78 of its judgment, the present case had to be examined from the perspective of the State’s  <mask> (in the light of Rommelfanger v. Germany, no. 12242/86, Commission decision of 6 September 1989, Decisions and Reports 62). The Government argued that the State had fulfilled its obligations in the present case.


54.  The Government further argued that the bans had been prescribed by law, namely section 12(2)(2) of the Meetings and Marches Act. Also, the measures complained of had pursued a wide range of legitimate aims: protecting national security and public safety, guaranteeing public order in the local community, protecting the rights and freedoms of others and preventing disorder and crime. They had also been necessary in a democratic society, because the authorities had acted in conformity with the laws of the country, their actions had not been arbitrary and they had complied with their  <mask> to guarantee the citizens’ rights under Article 11 of the Convention. Referring to the case of Gustafsson v. Sweden (judgment of 25 April 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑II, pp. 652‑53, § 45), the Government submitted that the Contracting States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in their choice of the means to be employed to attain a legitimate aim.


39.  The Government further argued that the dispersal of the assembly had been necessary in the interests of  <mask>, for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and the prevention of disorder or crime, and had been proportionate to the aims pursued. They submitted in particular that the police had not intervened in the assembly until the moment when participants had started to disturb public order. Besides, the first applicant herself had admitted in the court proceedings that she had insulted public authorities during the protest.


44.  The applicants complained in particular that the charges against them had been altered at the last hearing of their trial. They had initially been accused of separatism and undermining the integrity of the State but on the day of the judgment, 8 December 1994, the  <mask> Court had asked them on the spot to prepare their defence against a new charge, namely belonging to an illegal armed organisation. It had then dismissed their application for additional time to prepare their defence against the new charge. The applicants submitted that they had not been able to defend themselves properly and present their evidence against the new charge.


124.  The Government responded that the applicants had not specified the particular ideas or matters of conscience which they wished to express. Accordingly, this aspect of the case was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. They had been convicted under Articles 68 and 70 of the Criminal Code for their anti-state activities not because of any manifestation of their beliefs. If there had been an interference under these Convention provisions, it was justified for the protection of  <mask>, public order and the rights and freedoms of others, as well as for the prevention and punishment of crime. The applicants were not prosecuted for their political beliefs or communist party affiliations, but for their anti-state activities, in contravention of Article 17 of the Convention, against which the young democracy of Lithuania had been entitled to defend itself (cf. the aforementioned Ždanoka case, § 100).


37.  The Government further argued that the interference with the applicant’s rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, if any, was prescribed by law. The applicant’s conviction had been based on Article 220 § 7 of the Criminal Code and the wording of that provision met the accessibility and foreseeability requirements within the meaning of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. The interference in question had the legitimate aims of protecting  <mask> and public order as well as preventing crime.


21.  The applicant also contended that the fact that the domestic courts had considered that the principles promoted by the association had been very general and had given rise to the possibility of their being classified as belonging to the domain of political parties could not have amounted to sufficient and compelling evidence of a threat to  <mask> or to public safety and order. There had also been no similarity between the activities listed by the founding members of the association in the organisation’s articles of association and the activities carried out by political parties as defined by Law no. 14/2003 on political parties.


54.  The Government further argued that the bans had been prescribed by law, namely section 12(2)(2) of the Meetings and Marches Act. Also, the measures complained of had pursued a wide range of legitimate aims: protecting  <mask> and public safety, guaranteeing public order in the local community, protecting the rights and freedoms of others and preventing disorder and crime. They had also been necessary in a democratic society, because the authorities had acted in conformity with the laws of the country, their actions had not been arbitrary and they had complied with their positive obligations to guarantee the citizens’ rights under Article 11 of the Convention. Referring to the case of Gustafsson v. Sweden (judgment of 25 April 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑II, pp. 652‑53, § 45), the Government submitted that the Contracting States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in their choice of the means to be employed to attain a legitimate aim.


82.  The Government maintained that the interference pursued one or more legitimate aims: the prevention of crime, in so far as the first applicant’s own safety was concerned by the bomb threats, and the interests of  <mask> with regard to all the applicants. In each case the interference was moreover “necessary” for the achievement of the legitimate aim or aims pursued.


83.  The Government submitted that they were at a loss to understand the reason why the first applicant should claim at all that the Security Police’s registration and filing of information concerning threats against her were not in her best interests but, on the contrary, entailed a violation of her rights under the Convention. The information that had been released to the other four applicants was highly varied in nature. Most of it appeared to have been found in the public domain, such as the media. The Government were unaware of the origins of each and every piece of information, and therefore could not comment on that particular aspect. They noted, however, that from today’s perspective the information seemed either fairly old or quite harmless and that the interference was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, namely the protection of  <mask>.


93.  The applicant submitted, firstly, that the requirements of minimum membership and regional representation were not justified under the second paragraph of Article 11. In particular, they were unreasonable and did not pursue any legitimate aim. The imposition of such requirements on political parties could not be justified by the interests of  <mask> or public safety. Nor were they necessary for the prevention of disorder or crime or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


47.  The Government contended that the very fact that after its registration the applicant party could effectively strive towards power and thus get hold of the mechanisms to achieve its separatists ideas posed an immediate threat to  <mask>, the State’s sovereignty, the country’s territorial integrity and the nation’s unity. This threat was much graver than that stemming from the holding of a meeting. In the light of all the evidence, the Constitutional Court’s findings that the applicant party treated the Pirin region as non‑Bulgarian land and that its activity was going as far as attempting the secession of this territory from Bulgaria were fully warranted.


46.  The applicants further submitted that, contrary to what was suggested by the Government, HADEP had never done anything to damage the indivisible unity of Turkey or harboured that aim. What it had sought to achieve in particular was to ensure that citizens of Kurdish origin had the rights to be educated in their mother tongue, to listen to radio and watch television programmes in the Kurdish language, to sustain their culture and to exercise their democratic right to participate in the political arena. Furthermore, HADEP had always advocated democracy as well as equality between people. By doing so it had never posed a danger to  <mask>. Nevertheless, the cliché “indivisible unity of the State with its nation” had always been used as a legal obstacle to curtail the above-mentioned democratic rights.


34.  The applicants argued that by refusing to register Ilinden the authorities had infringed their rights under Article 11 of the Convention. The refusal of the courts had been based on deliberately erroneous findings in respect of the relevant facts and a misconstruction of the applicable law. It was clear that freedom of association could not be subjected to restrictions other than those which were provided for by law for the protection of  <mask> and public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


47.  The Government argued for their part that the  <mask> Court could not be criticised for making use of its right to reclassify the offences with which the applicants had been charged to arrive at a characterisation that was less serious for the applicants than the charge initially preferred by the prosecution. They pointed out that the offences covered by Article 125 of the Criminal Code carried the death penalty whereas those covered by Article 168 carried prison sentences. In their view, it was wrong in the instant case to talk of a recharacterisation of the offence in so far as Articles 125 and 168 appeared in the same section of the Criminal Code entitled “Crimes against the State”. Article 168 was a “common provision” relating to all the other provisions in that section and covered anyone who “form[ed] an armed gang or organisation … with the intention of committing any of the offences defined in Article 125 ...”. Article 125 defined a crime in terms of the ends pursued, requiring a serious prejudice, whereas Article 168 defined a crime in terms of the means deployed to achieve those ends. The truth was that the applicants’ conviction on the basis of Article 168 of the Criminal Code rather than that of Article 125 had been the result of the criminal courts’ assessment of the evidence and their consideration of the defence’s arguments.


44.  The applicant contested the Government’s argument that the dissolution of the Association had pursued a legitimate aim in the interests of  <mask> or public safety, that is, for the prevention of disorder and crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others within the meaning of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. In his view, the courts had failed to establish any instances of actual disorder or any violation of the rights of others. He stressed that the domestic decisions had referred to a merely hypothetical danger whose prevention could not be seen as a legitimate aim under the Convention.


33.  The applicants submitted that the  <mask> courts were special courts. They asserted that the military judges who sat on those courts were dependent on the executive, being appointed by a joint decree of the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister, subject to the approval of the President. The assessment, promotion and security of tenure of those judges were within the control of the executive branch and, in turn, the army. The ties binding them with the executive and the army made it impossible for them to discharge their functions on the bench in an independent and impartial manner.


31.  The applicants complained that the criminal proceedings before the Ankara  <mask> Court were unfair, that that court was not independent and impartial, and of infringements of their freedom of expression and freedom of association; they also asserted that in the enjoyment of the rights thus breached they had been the victims of discrimination on the ground of their political opinions.


50.  The Government submitted that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly had been precise and foreseeable. They also submitted that the demonstration had been organised in breach of the provisions of national law. The Government argued that the dispersal of the demonstration had pursued the aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and preventing disorder, and had been in the interests of  <mask>.


52.  The Government did not argue that there had not been an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of assembly other than to submit that the case was not within the scope of Article 11. Even assuming that the applicant’s acts had fallen within the scope of Article 11, they submitted that the State authorities’ acts and decisions had had the legitimate aims of protecting  <mask>, territorial integrity, public safety and public order as well as the prevention of crime. They argued that interfering with the demonstrations in question, which had incited people to violence and which had been organised by members of the PKK, a terrorist organisation, had corresponded to a pressing social need and had been necessary in a democratic society. They stressed that the applicant had not been convicted for taking part in a funeral.


61.  The Government asserted that the witnesses concerned had not been listed among those that the applicants had asked to be examined during the hearing in the  <mask> Court. They added that the court had also taken account of other evidence when establishing that the applicants belonged to the PKK. Its refusal to examine some of the witnesses for the prosecution had been justified by the threats that had been made against them, not excluding their physical elimination by the PKK, as had happened to a witness against one of the applicants’ co-defendants, killed in prison by other inmates who were members of the PKK.


34.  The Government emphasised the need to have particular regard to the  <mask> context in Turkey when the decision was taken to establish national security courts, pursuant to Article 143 of the Constitution. In view of the experience of the armed forces in the anti-terrorism campaign, the authorities had considered it necessary to strengthen those courts by including a military judge who was supposed to provide them with the necessary expertise and knowledge to deal with threats to the security and integrity of the State. The Government asserted that the impartiality and independence of military judges sitting on national security courts had been guaranteed by the Constitution.


121.  The applicants submitted that the refusal to recognise the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia was not necessary in a democratic society. They asserted that all the arguments put forward by the Government were without foundation and unsubstantiated and that they did not correspond to a “pressing social need”. There was nothing in the file to show that the applicants had intended or carried on or sought to carry on activities capable of undermining Moldovan territorial integrity,  <mask> or public order.


24.  The applicants submitted that the interference was not prescribed by law because the national courts failed to give them clear indications on how to proceed to obtain registration, and construed arbitrarily the constitutional restrictions on freedom to associate. The interference was not necessary in a democratic society either, because the national courts did not have before them any evidence showing that the registration of Ilinden would endanger Bulgaria’s sovereignty or  <mask>. However, those courts accepted uncritically the “official position” on the so‑called “Macedonian question” and justified the refusal on grounds that had nothing to do with the principles of democracy.


50.  The applicant contended that he was not aware of any relevant law regulating the matters of which he complained and that there was no legal protection against arbitrary interference by the public authorities with his rights. In this connection he argued that the respondent Government had made no effort at all to indicate the grounds on which such interference might have been justified, nor had they shown it to be  <mask>.


190.  The applicants further submitted that neither dispersal nor prosecution and conviction of the first to sixth applicants had been  <mask> since: (i) the protest action had been peaceful; the protesters had not attacked the loggers, the MG staff or the police, which meant that the authorities were required to display a degree of tolerance; the applicants referred to the cases of Oya Ataman v. Turkey (no. 74552/01, §§ 41 and 42, ECHR 2006‑XIV) and Bukta and Others v. Hungary (no. 25691/04, § 37, ECHR 2007‑III); (ii) the protest had taken place in a park and caused no disturbance to city life; and (iii) allowing private security guards to disperse a peaceful assembly could not be considered necessary in a democratic society and neither could the use of violence.