23.  The Government submitted that the applicant had exceeded the limits of acceptable criticism and had accused Ms G.B. of taking bribes. Although criminal proceedings had been initiated against Ms G.B. on charges of breach of duty based on negligence, those proceedings had been postponed in accordance with Law no. 4616. Thus, in the circumstances of the case, Ms G.B. was entitled to be presumed innocent until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings against her. The domestic courts considered that even if Ms G.B. had been convicted of the charges, this would not mean that she had been bribed or that she had not behaved like a lady. When striking a balance between the conflicting interests, namely the applicant’s right to freedom of expression and the plaintiff’s right to be presumed innocent, the domestic courts had ruled in favour of the latter. The  <mask> in question had therefore been proportionate to the aim pursued and should be considered to fall within the margin of appreciation of the national authorities.


17.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> with the applicant’s freedom of expression, which had been based on Article 823 § 1 in conjunction with Article 1004 § 1 of the Civil Code, had been necessary to safeguard Dr St.’s personality rights, as enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention. By calling abortions unlawful the applicant had created the false impression that Dr St. had been operating outside of the legal framework in performing such procedures. Unlike the leaflet in the case of Annen (cited above) the leaflets in the present case did not point out that abortions are permitted in Germany under the terms of Article 218a of the Criminal Code and therefore not subject to criminal liability. Moreover, given the applicant’s goal of forced “pavement counselling”, the applicant had severely disturbed the relationship of trust between doctor and patient. The Court had already rejected an earlier application by the same applicant against a desist order against similar conduct (see Annen v. Germany (dec.), nos. 2373/07 2396/07, 30 March 2010). In the present case, the domestic courts had relied on the judgment of the Federal Court of Justice, which had been the subject matter of the earlier inadmissibility decision of the Court, and concluded that the circumstances had been comparable and had not warranted deviating from the existing case-law. When coming to that conclusion the domestic courts had paid attention to the fact that Dr St. had taken a public position in the abortion debate.


44.  The Government considered the reasons given, particularly by the District Court, to be relevant and sufficient. As to the sanction imposed, it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. They concluded that the  <mask> had been necessary in a democratic society in that it had complied with a pressing social need and had been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.


22.  The Government accepted that the applicant’s conviction had amounted to an  <mask> with her right to freedom of expression. They contended that the interference was based on the Criminal Code, which proscribed defamation, and that the conviction had pursued a legitimate aim – the protection of the reputation and rights of others. The impugned statement was factual, and its veracity could have been tested. The national courts had found that the statement had not been truthful, since Z.B. held Croatian citizenship and fulfilled all the conditions for being the head of a kindergarten, and that the applicant had not made an effort to verify her allegations. In a Croatian context, labelling someone a Yugoslav citizen was defamatory, since the army of the former Yugoslavia had carried out an armed offensive against Croatia. Given that the area at issue, Slavonia, had been particularly seriously affected by the armed conflict, and that the applicant’s statement had been aired by a local radio station, it had had a significant defamatory effect.


56.  The Government submitted that the criteria on which the NRTC had based its denial of a broadcasting licence had not included a religious element. Nor had the NRTC grounded its decision on the religious nature of the radio's proposed programme. On the contrary, it could be seen from the documents in the file that the authorities with competence for religious issues had endorsed Glas Nadezhda EOOD's licence application. However, that application, like any other, had to comply with the criteria published by the NRTC. The denial of the licence on the basis of its failure to meet these criteria had not amounted to an  <mask> with the applicants' right to manifest their religion or belief.


39.  The Government, while acknowledging the essential role played by the press as a “public watchdog”, asserted that in the present case the  <mask> with the applicant company’s freedom of expression had been necessary within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. They argued in particular that the domestic courts had had to weigh the applicant company’s interest in imparting information on an issue of public interest against the rights of the victim to the protection of her privacy which were equally protected by the Convention, namely the right to respect for her identity, protected by Article 8 as part of a person’s private life, as well as Article 31 § 1 (e) of the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse and various other instruments of the Council of Europe. The necessity to carry out such a weighing of interests was laid down in section 7a (1) subparagraph (1) of the Media Act.


36.  The Government and the applicant reached a settlement (see paragraph 7 above), which was rejected by the Court on 5 October 2004.  In this connection, the Court took note of the serious nature of the complaints made in the case regarding the alleged  <mask> with the applicant's freedom of expression. Because of this, the Court did not find it appropriate to strike the application out of the list of its cases. It considered that there are special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the further examination of the application on its merits (Articles 37 § 1 in fine and 38 § 1(b) of the Convention).


53.  The applicants also submitted that the impugned statements in the article, which they accurately reported, had been made by the chief executive and not by the journalists themselves. The applicants had not made any corruption allegations against W.D. but only referred the statement of the chief executive. In this respect they relied on the judgment Thoma v Luxembourg. In the applicants’ view, the  <mask> complained of was not necessary in democratic society and the authorities did not give relevant and sufficient reasons to justify it.


69.  The applicant company argued that the  <mask> with its freedom of expression – including its right to store information and to enable users to impart their opinions – was not prescribed by law. It submitted that there was no legislation or case-law stating that an intermediary was to be considered a publisher of content which it was not aware of. On the contrary, the applicable law expressly prohibited the imposition of liability on service providers for third-party content. In this connection, the applicant company referred to the Directive on electronic commerce, the Estonian Information Society Services Act and the Council of Europe Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet. The Directive provided for limited and notice-based liability with take-down procedures for illegal content. Service providers were exempted from liability where, upon obtaining actual knowledge of illegal activities, they acted expeditiously to remove or disable access to the information concerned. Such removal or disabling of access had to be undertaken in the observance of the principle of freedom of expression and of procedures established for this purpose at national level (Recital 46 of the Preamble to the Directive). The applicant company argued that this law was indisputably formulated with sufficient precision to enable a citizen to regulate his conduct. According to the applicant company, its behaviour had been in full compliance with the applicable law as it had removed the defamatory comments the same day it had been notified by the original plaintiff.


82.  The Government maintained that the  <mask> pursued one or more legitimate aims: the prevention of crime, in so far as the first applicant’s own safety was concerned by the bomb threats, and the interests of national security with regard to all the applicants. In each case the interference was moreover “necessary” for the achievement of the legitimate aim or aims pursued.


155.  The applicant failed, in the context of his written submissions under Article 10, to explain the nature of his challenge to the legality of the measures taken against him. Having regard to the Court’s finding in Lucas v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 39013/02. 18 March 2003, that the definition of the offence of breach of the peace as stipulated in Smith v. Donnelly (see paragraph 100 above) was sufficiently precise to provide reasonable foreseeability of the actions which might fall within the remit of the offence, the Court is satisfied that the  <mask> in the present case both had a sufficient legal basis in domestic law and was “prescribed by law” in the wider sense of having the quality required of “law” in a democratic society.


31.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> with the applicants' right to freedom of expression had been prescribed by law, notably Article 152 of the Civil Code which governed the protection of the professional reputation of both citizens and legal entities. The domestic courts found that the facts set out in the publications were not shown to have been true and that there were no grounds to exempt the applicants from responsibility by virtue of section 57 of the Mass-Media Act.


30.  The applicant association further submitted that the  <mask> with their Convention rights had not been necessary in a democratic society. The domestic courts had failed to consider that, under the Court’s case-law, freedom of expression constituted one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and that a special degree of protection was afforded to expressions of opinions which were made in the course of a debate on matters of public interest. The applicant association accepted that the historical background in Germany made it necessary to apply specific criteria enabling every person of Jewish origin to take steps against anti-Semitic discrimination. However, this approach was taken too far if every depiction of a person of Jewish origin was automatically considered collective insult.


32.  The Government submitted that there had been no  <mask> with the applicant's private life. He had not been allowed access to his office on Saturday 13 May 2000, but this had happened because he had failed to comply with the relevant formalities for entering the building at weekends. His employment had been terminated on 15 May 2000 and it had thus been normal for him not to have access to the building thereafter. On 23 May 2000 a commission had formally inspected his workplace and had drawn up an inventory, on which the applicant had commented. The present case did not concern the applicant's private life or home, because the applicant was not exercising a liberal profession, as had been the case in Niemietz v. Germany (judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 251‑B). Furthermore, the applicant's workplace did not belong to him, contrary to the position in Niemietz (cited above). The persons from the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office who had inspected his workplace had acted as representatives of his employer, not as public officials. They had carried out the inspection at a time when the applicant's employment had been terminated and in accordance with the internal rules of the institution.


17.  The Government accepted that the court decisions rendered against the applicant constituted  <mask> with his right to freedom of expression, but argued that the interference was provided for by law, notably Articles 206 of the Criminal Code and 998-999 of the Civil Code, and had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the victim’s reputation. They further contended that the courts had given sufficient reasons to justify the conviction. As for the applicant’s conduct, they considered that he had acted in bad faith with the intention of denigrating the victim and had presented no evidence to justify the accusations made, thus failing to observe press ethics. They relied on Flux v. Moldova (no. 6) (no. 22824/04, 29 July 2008) and Constantinescu v. Romania (no. 28871/95, ECHR 2000‑VIII).


30.  The Government, while acknowledging the essential role played by the press as a “public watchdog”, referred to the Court’s case-law that when assessing whether and to what extent any  <mask> was necessary in a democratic society, the national authorities enjoyed a certain margin of appreciation. The national courts had applied standards that were in accordance with the principles enshrined in Article 10 and they had based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the facts. In contrast with the article examined by the Court in Standard Verlags GmbH (cited above), the material at issue could not be qualified as a contribution to a current debate of public interest. It had essentially confined itself to describing the bank’s speculative losses and to related suspicions of criminal acts. The theme of the intertwining of politics and the speculative losses had only been discussed as a side issue. Even if it had been in the public interest to be informed about the events connected to the speculative losses, that had not justified disclosing the claimant’s name. Moreover, the claimant had to be protected against a “trial by the media” as the report had been published at a very early stage in the criminal proceedings, namely only five days after the information gathered by the Financial Market Authority had arrived at the public prosecutor’s office, which had been around six weeks prior to the institution of judicial investigation proceedings. The sanction imposed on the applicant company, compensation of EUR 3,000, was extremely moderate, taking into account the legal upper limit of EUR 20,000 and the magazine’s high circulation.


28.  The Government contested that argument. They conceded that the judicial decisions had constituted an  <mask> with the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article 10. However, they argued that the interference had been “prescribed by law” as it had been based on Article 152 of the Civil Code and Resolution no. 3 of the Plenary Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 24 February 2005 (section 7). It had also pursued a legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or the rights of others and had been proportionate to that aim.


46.  The Government pointed out that being A.'s female friend had not as such made her a person in a socially significant position whose right to private life could be narrowed. B.'s conduct had not in any way contributed to any discussion of general interest. Notwithstanding the incident of 4 December 1996 and B.'s subsequent sentence, the information published by the applicant had been of such a nature that it had been covered by the protection of B.'s private life. The reporting of the events could have been done without mentioning B. by name. The press could not overstep certain boundaries, particularly as regards the reputation and the rights of others. Bearing in mind the margin of appreciation, the Government argued that the  <mask> in the present case had been “necessary in a democratic society”.


22.  The applicant company argued that the domestic authorities’ conclusion that the commentary had praised or welcomed the death of the Polish President had been wrong and arbitrary. It asserted that the authorities had taken the reporter’s statement “I do not pity the Poles. I envy them” out of context. Such a statement had not been related to the President’s tragic death and had not condoned it per se. Rather, the applicant company’s reporter had expressed his opinion that the politics of Lech Kaczynski had been marked by extreme, intolerant and aggressive conservativism and he had welcomed the end of the political era that the President had represented. In this connection, the reporter had been comparing the politics of Poland and Slovakia. Since in the latter country the political status quo remained the same, the applicant company had “envied” the Poles for their upcoming change. In the applicant company’s opinion, the Slovakian authorities had unjustifiably sanctioned it for expressing its political views and the  <mask> with its freedom of expression had been unnecessary and disproportionate in a democratic society.


37.  The Government conceded that the denial of a broadcasting licence to Glas Nadezhda EOOD had amounted to an  <mask> with the applicants' freedom to impart information and ideas. In their view, however, this interference had been authorised under the third sentence of paragraph 1 of Article 10 of the Convention. The licensing of radio broadcasters had been specifically envisioned by the Radio and Television Act 1998. It had been entrusted to a special body, the NRTC, charged with protecting freedom of expression. Moreover, the law regulating licensing had been sufficiently clear in its terms. The NRTC's decision had been based on quite detailed and publicly announced criteria. The NRTC had clearly indicated, as could also be seen from the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 21 March 2002, which of those criteria had not been met by Glas Nadezhda EOOD. Some of the criteria were formal, while others had related to the utility and the feasibility of the proposed radio station. This could not be seen as unlawful, arbitrary or discriminatory, as indicated by the former Commission in its decision in the case of Verein Alternatives Lokalradio Bern et Verein Radio Dreyeckland Basel v. Switzerland (no. 10746/84, Commission decision of 16 October 1986, Decisions and Reports 49). The decision to refuse the licence had been based on the failure by Glas Nadezhda EOOD to meet a number of the announced criteria. This decision had been the result of a detailed examination and had been reviewed by two levels of court.


54.  The applicant complained that the decision of the Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow to bar her from holding judicial office in view of her critical public statements was incompatible with the principles enshrined in Article 10 of the Convention. She contended that judges, like other persons, enjoy the protection of Article 10 and that the  <mask> with her freedom of expression was not “prescribed by law”, did not pursue a legitimate aim and, finally, was not necessary in a democratic society. Her submissions under these heads may be summarised as follows.


52.  The Government’s submissions concentrated on the necessity of the  <mask>. They explained that section 78 of the Copyright Act required a weighing of the conflicting interests under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. Referring to the Court’s judgment in Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 59320/00, ECHR 2004‑VI), they emphasised that the Austrian courts applied a strict standard when it came to interference by the press with an individual’s private life, all the more so where the individual concerned was not known to the general public.


16.  The applicants complained under Article 6 of the Convention that their right of access to court was violated by the refusal to hold a hearing at which they could challenge the order made by the High Court of Justiciary on 15 February 2005. They further complained under Article 10 of the Convention that this was an unjustified  <mask> with their right to impart information as guaranteed by that Article. Finally, under Article 13 of the Convention, they complained that there was no effective remedy to challenge the making of an order under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1983.


32.  The Government acknowledged that there had been an  <mask> with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, but argued that it had been justified under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. In particular, they pointed out that the interference had been based on Article 152 of the Russian Civil Code, and had pursued the aim of the protection of the reputation and private life of the S. family members.


21.  The Government contended that the injunction issued against the applicant constituted an  <mask> with his rights under Article 10 of the Convention which was, however, justified under § 2 of this provision. It had a legal basis, namely Section 1330 of the Civil Code, and pursued the legitimate aim of protection of the reputation of others. As to the necessity of the interference, they argued that the Austrian courts classified the applicant's statements as statements of facts. An essential element for this classification was that the applicant had not given any explanation for his statements which was thus not discernible as a value judgment. There was no factual basis to enable the reader to evaluate himself why the applicant had come to his conclusions. Therefore, it appeared legitimate that the Austrian courts attributed to the statements at issue the meaning usually conveyed by similar reproaches, namely that the plaintiffs had been guided by improper and unlawful motives. The applicant himself had endorsed this interpretation as, in his appeal with the Regional Court, he had argued why the teachers' conduct had allegedly been unlawful. However, the Austrian courts, after comprehensive evaluation of all evidence, came to the conclusion that these accusations were factually incorrect. The measures taken by the Austrian courts were proportionate, as the applicant was merely ordered to refrain from making further such statements which did not hinder him to express his opinion in other less defamatory or insulting words. The Government finally argued that, even assuming that the statements at issue were value judgments, the interference was proportionate as the applicant's statements were unsubstantiated and the details of the underlying conflict were not known to the public. Such extremely harsh, excessive and generalising criticism was not justified by the applicant's interest in several-day excursions abroad.


70.  The Government claimed that the termination of the applicant’s judicial office was proportionate to the pursued legitimate aim and that it corresponded to a “pressing social need”. They referred to the Court’s case-law, which stated that “whenever civil servants’ right to freedom of expression is in issue the ‘duties and responsibilities’ referred to in Article 10 § 2 assume a special significance, which justifies leaving to the national authorities a certain margin of appreciation in determining whether the impugned  <mask> is proportionate to the above aim” (the Government cited Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995, § 53, Series A no. 323). They contended that the restrictions on judges’ freedom of expression had even greater importance than that of other civil servants. Accordingly, the State must be afforded an even wider margin of appreciation in imposing and enforcing limits on judges’ freedom of speech.


22.  The Government agreed that there had been an  <mask> with the applicant's right to freedom of expression, but submitted that the interference had been prescribed by law, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been necessary in a democratic society. The applicant had defamed V.P., not only in the letter addressed to the Prosecutor's Office, the President of Moldova and the Speaker of Parliament but also by spreading defamatory rumours amongst the villagers. The Government relied on the testimonies of witnesses called in the domestic proceedings by V.P. (see paragraph 11 above).


19.  The Government admitted that imposing a fine for a disciplinary offence amounted to an  <mask> with the applicant’s freedom of speech. However, they argued that the interference had been in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and been necessary in a democratic society. In particular, the decision to fine the applicant had been based on section 37 (a) of the Act on Attorneys at Law and meant to maintain the authority of the judiciary.


20.  The Government alleged that the  <mask> with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had been justified by the need to protect the victim’s reputation. The applicant had abused his freedom. He had begun a campaign aimed at denigrating the victim and had used expressions that had overstepped the boundaries of permissible exaggeration and had constituted personal insults, with no relevance for the public interest. He had used aggressive language by comparing the applicant to the Nazi Josef Mengele. They considered that the domestic courts had provided relevant and sufficient reasons to justify the outcome of the case. They also pointed out that the award of non-pecuniary damages had been reasonable as to its quantum and that the applicant had not been ordered to satisfy it alone, but together with the newspaper. Moreover, there was no indication that the applicant had actually paid the money.


27.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> had been in accordance with the law, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been necessary in a democratic society. The judgments of the Austrian Courts had likewise pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the rights and reputation of others. Moreover, the interference had been proportionate to its aim and the reasons adduced had been relevant and sufficient. The conviction had been based on Article 111 taken in conjunction with Article 117 (5) of the Criminal Code.


74.  The Government submitted that there had been no  <mask> with the applicants’ rights guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention. The Court observes in this connection that the applicants had permission to organise a meeting on the premises of the University on 3 July 2006 and that they had availed themselves of that opportunity. During the first phase of their protest on that day they gathered, as duly authorised by the University administration, in one of the lecture halls (see paragraph 11 above). They moved, however, soon afterwards to the acting Rector’s office, protesting against the ongoing University reform and demanding his resignation. The events which developed subsequent to their unauthorised entry to the Rector’s office do not represent, in the Court’s view, a standard situation of a “peaceful assembly” within the meaning of Article 11 of the Convention. As noted in Kudrevičius and Others, although not an uncommon occurrence in the context of the exercise of freedom of assembly in modern societies, physical conduct purposely obstructing the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities carried out by others is not at the core of that freedom as protected by Article 11 of the Convention (cited above, paragraph 97; see also Annenkov and Others v. Russia, no. 31475/10, §§ 123-128, 25 July 2017). Nevertheless, the Court notes that the applicants were not held responsible for using violence. While the events at issue happened in a situation of tension, the applicants’ conduct was not established to have been of a violent nature. The Court thus does not consider that the applicants’ protest on 3 July 2006, viewed as a whole, was of such a nature and degree as to exclude them from the scope of protection under Article 11 of the Convention, read in the light of Article 10.


24.  The applicant company maintained that the  <mask> with its right to freedom of expression was not necessary in a democratic society as required by Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. In particular, it asserted that the article had been published in the context of the upcoming elections of the chairman of the local tourism association and had contributed to a debate of general interest. Moreover, C.M. and J.M. were public figures on account of their activities in the political scene and the nature of the offices held by them. The applicant company also submitted that the courts had failed to evaluate the reproduction of the anonymous letter against the background of the article as a whole, which gave room to the statements of the two people concerned and duly distanced itself from the accusations made against them. Furthermore, the applicant company, citing Albert-Engelmann-Gesellschaft mbH v. Austria (no. 46389/99, 19 January 2006) contested the domestic courts’ view that the reproduction of an anonymous letter had to be distinguished from the quotation of a third person’s statement.


16.  The applicants agreed that the  <mask> was prescribed by law and had pursued a legitimate aim. However, it was not necessary in a democratic society because the impugned articles had merely disseminated statements made by third parties and had been part of a debate on an issue of distinct public importance, namely the management of public transport and alleged illegalities committed by public officials. The applicants had acted in good faith when publishing the article and verified the statements made by the third parties. They had considered the source to be reliable, since it was a letter addressed to the President of the country, contained many details, and official reports emanating from State transport authorities were attached to it. Of course it had been impossible for them to verify the statement according to which Mr Stepaniuc had telephoned the Minister of Public Transport.


192.  The applicant's complaint, as noted at paragraph 157 above, concerns the impact on it of a costs award which, under domestic law, included success fees calculated at almost twice most of the base costs of two appeals to the House of Lords. The Court considers, and it was not seriously disputed by the Government, that the requirement to pay these success fees, as an unsuccessful defendant in breach of confidence proceedings, constituted an  <mask> with the applicant's right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention.


124.  The Government responded that the applicants had not specified the particular ideas or matters of conscience which they wished to express. Accordingly, this aspect of the case was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. They had been convicted under Articles 68 and 70 of the Criminal Code for their anti-state activities not because of any manifestation of their beliefs. If there had been an  <mask> under these Convention provisions, it was justified for the protection of national security, public order and the rights and freedoms of others, as well as for the prevention and punishment of crime. The applicants were not prosecuted for their political beliefs or communist party affiliations, but for their anti-state activities, in contravention of Article 17 of the Convention, against which the young democracy of Lithuania had been entitled to defend itself (cf. the aforementioned Ždanoka case, § 100).


100.  The Government submitted that there was no  <mask> by the State with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the threats against her, installation of hidden cameras and wires in her flat, publication of secretly filmed videos, related press articles, and other related incidents. The investigation of the above-mentioned incidents has not identified the person or persons responsible for those incidents. Nevertheless, it has not revealed any link between the incidents and the State or its agents either.


57.   The Government submitted that the  <mask> was “prescribed by law”, as it had its basis in sections 1 and 7 of the Unfair Competition Act. Those provisions were formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct, as required by the Court’s case-law. In the field of competition law in particular, an absolutely precise formulation could not be expected, as business markets and ways of communicating would always be subject to change. In addition, the interference had pursued a legitimate aim.


33.  The Government maintained that the  <mask> with the applicants' right to freedom of expression was justified under the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 10. They argued that the content of the book incited hatred and hostility and praised terrorist crime. In their opinion, the measures taken against the applicants fell within the margin of appreciation of the authorities and were justified under the second paragraph of Article 10.


18.  The Government pointed to the national authorities' margin of appreciation in assessing the need for  <mask> and submitted that where the Convention referred to domestic law it was primarily the task of the national authorities to apply and interpret domestic law. They contended that in the present case the domestic authorities had not overstepped this margin of appreciation and had made use of it in good faith, carefully and in a reasonable way.


39.  The Government’s observations also concentrated on the necessity of the  <mask>. They conceded that, in a case like the present one, concerned as it was with the press exercising its role as “public watchdog” by criticising a politician, the limits of acceptable criticism were wider than in respect of a private individual and the State’s margin of appreciation was narrowly defined. However, the Austrian courts did not transgress their margin of appreciation in the present case.


29.  The applicant claimed that the penalty of 20 July 1999 confirmed that the domestic law applicable at the material time had prevented him, as a prisoner, from sending complaints and applications, on his own behalf and in the name of other prisoners, to the State authorities, media and non-public organisations. He stated that he had not been protected by the domestic law from an arbitrary  <mask> by the prison administration with the exercise of his right to correspondence. The impugned domestic provisions had allowed indiscriminate censorship of convicted prisoners’ correspondence. As a result, he had been afraid that his complaint about the detention conditions would have been censored if it had been sent through the prison administration.


50.  The applicants then observed that the present case did not require an examination of any  <mask> by the State with the exercise of their freedom of expression, but rather an analysis of its positive obligation under the Convention. They took the view that the national authorities, in the present case, had a positive obligation to provide them with a system that enabled them to obtain the performance of an undertaking from an individual and that the authorities had a duty to act with the requisite diligence to assist them in enforcing the judicial decision given in their favour on 6 December 2002, as a result of which they would have been able to exercise their profession as radio journalists. They pointed out that the Court had already noted the existence of such an obligation, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in cases concerning individuals’ obligations to act. In their view, the transposition of such an obligation to the subject-matter of Article 10 of the Convention would be consistent with the principle of proportionality between the general interest and the interest of individuals and would not represent an impossible or disproportionate burden for the State, given that no new obligations would be imposed on it. Lastly, the applicants took the view that, in determining the positive obligation in the present case, it had to be taken into account that freedom of expression was exercised by professional journalists and that the de facto obstacles complained of affected the diversity and plurality of means of expression. In addition, it was also necessary to take into account the situation of the press in Romania in the relevant period (2002-2004), as described in a number of reports by various national and international organisations.


67.  The applicant stated that by denying him access to the TEC’s premises, and by refusing to provide him in good time with information about the progress of the electoral process, the authorities had interfered with his right to collect such information. He further submitted that this  <mask> had not been lawful, had not pursued a legitimate aim and had not been necessary in a democratic society.


39.  The Government claimed that the  <mask> pursued the legitimate aim of the “protection of the reputation or rights of others”. The applicants and the third parties disagreed that public bodies and authorities, such as the courts' management department in the instant case, should fall within the meaning of “others” in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The third parties cited examples from jurisdictions around the world in which the courts prevented public authorities from suing in defamation because of the public interest in such authorities being open to uninhibited public criticism. The report to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the honouring of obligations and commitments by the Russian Federation also suggested that “the possibility of filing lawsuits against media and journalists by public authorities should be abolished as the latter per se cannot possess any dignity, honour, or reputation” (see paragraph 25 above). The Court acknowledges that there may be sound policy reasons to decide that public bodies should not have standing to sue in defamation in their own capacity; however, it is not its task to examine the domestic legislation in the abstract but rather consider the manner in which that legislation was applied to, or affected, the applicant in a particular case (see Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland, no. 53678/00, § 49, ECHR 2004‑X). Accordingly, this issue will also be examined in the analysis of the proportionality of the interference.


37.  The Government maintained that the  <mask> had also been “necessary in a democratic society”. The title and the text of the article in question had indirectly connected K.U. with a homicide and his name and photograph had been published nationwide in that context. Thus a large number of persons had become aware of the article. Even though K.U. had offered an interview about the same matter to another evening newspaper published on the same date, he had not consented to the publication of his name and photograph in the article in question. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeal had found that the article had given an erroneous impression that K.U. was linked to the homicide in question. Even taking into account that he was a public figure, there had been no justification for giving the impression that K.U. had been connected to the homicide.


43.  The Government noted that the contested article was published by the applicant company during the mayoral elections in which Mr Y. was one of the main candidates. Therefore, there had been an important public interest in holding fair elections. Furthermore, the domestic courts had been protecting the rights and reputation of Mr Y. which was not only a permissible ground for  <mask> under the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention but also protected one of the rights guaranteed by Article 8.


36.  The applicant association was therefore involved in the legitimate gathering of information of public interest. Its aim was to carry out research and to submit comments on draft laws, thereby contributing to public debate. Consequently, there has been an  <mask> with the applicant association’s right to receive and to impart information as enshrined in Article 10 § 1 of the Convention (see Társaság a Szabadságjogokért, cited above, § 28; see also Kenedi v. Hungary, no. 31475/05, § 43, 26 May 2009).


83.  The Government submitted that they were at a loss to understand the reason why the first applicant should claim at all that the Security Police’s registration and filing of information concerning threats against her were not in her best interests but, on the contrary, entailed a violation of her rights under the Convention. The information that had been released to the other four applicants was highly varied in nature. Most of it appeared to have been found in the public domain, such as the media. The Government were unaware of the origins of each and every piece of information, and therefore could not comment on that particular aspect. They noted, however, that from today’s perspective the information seemed either fairly old or quite harmless and that the  <mask> was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, namely the protection of national security.


48.  The Government did not contest that the decision by which the domestic court had ordered the applicant to pay non-pecuniary damage to N.C.I. represented an  <mask> with the applicant’s freedom of expression. They further submitted that the interference was based on Articles 998-999 of the Romanian Civil Code, as in force at the material time. The legitimate aim pursued by the domestic authorities was the protection of the reputation and dignity of others, as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention.


32.  The applicant argued that he had been deprived of his right to freedom of expression. Firstly, the domestic courts had not taken into account the evidence submitted by him. Secondly, the statements had been made in the public interest and during a political debate. Therefore, the  <mask> with his right to freedom of expression could not be justified under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.


10.  The applicant complained that the disciplinary punishment imposed on him for using “Kürt Halk Önderi” (the leader of Kurdish people) when referring to the imprisoned leader of the PKK in his letter, had constituted an unjustified  <mask> with his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant, based on the same facts, also invoked Article 9 of the Convention. The Court will examine these complaints solely under Article 10 of the Convention.


63.  The applicant complained of a violation of his right to freedom of speech. He maintained that as a serviceman he had been responsible for many years for giving legal advice to the Commander of the Armed Forces on the question of statutory penalties. His opinion on the statutory penalties the army imposed on soldiers often did not correspond to that of others at the Ministry of Defence. The applicant stated that he had made many proposals with the aim of improving, inter alia, servicemen’s procedural rights when the new Army Disciplinary Statute was being drafted. As his superiors and the State President had failed to take his proposals into account, the applicant had contacted the Kauno Diena daily and expressed his ideas to the press. The internal inquiry into his communication with the daily had been started the same day. Even though that inquiry had later been discontinued by the authorities’ acknowledgement that the applicant had not violated military discipline, the appeal to Kauno Diena and to the State President had had direct consequences for the applicant. He was dismissed from professional military service before the expiry of his contract. Most importantly, in order to avoid accusations of  <mask> with freedom of expression, the authorities at the Ministry of Defence chose to dismiss him not on the ground that he had appealed to the media, but formally, on the basis of Article 38 § 1 (7) of LMS, thus leaving no official trace of injustice. If that provision had been applied to others in the same manner, several hundred soldiers would have been dismissed from service, however none of them except the applicant had suffered the same consequences. The example of four soldiers (R.L., V.S., J.Š. and M.I.) he relied on during the administrative court proceedings confirmed that there were more soldiers who should have been dismissed from the army, but that this was not done. Lastly, he also challenged as misleading the two examples provided by the Government (see paragraphs 41 and 42 above).


40.  The Government also limited their submissions to the necessity of the  <mask> at issue. They conceded that, in a case like the present one, concerned as it was with the press exercising its role as “public watchdog” and criticising a leading politician, the State’s margin of appreciation was narrowly defined. However, the Austrian courts did not transgress their margin of appreciation in the present case.


175.  The Government contested that argument. They submitted, firstly, that the applicants had not been convicted of hooliganism for their expressing their opinions but because they had committed an offence punishable by the Criminal Code. The fact that while committing the offence the applicants had believed that they were expressing their views or had given a performance was not sufficient to conclude that the conviction had actually constituted an  <mask> with their freedom of expression. Any such interference had been of an indirect and secondary nature and had not fallen under the protection of Article 10. The Government referred in that regard to Kosiek v. Germany (28 August 1986, Series A no. 105) and Glasenapp v. Germany (28 August 1986, Series A no. 104).


129.  The applicant further argued that such an  <mask> was not “prescribed by law”, since the impugned legislative provisions were arbitrary, abusive, retroactive and incompatible with the principle of the rule of law. It was also difficult to conceive that there could be any “legitimate aim” at all pursued in imposing a punitive restriction on the proper fulfilment of legal duties incumbent on a State official such as the applicant, whose duty as head of the judiciary was to provide an opinion on the legislative reforms in question.


46.  The Government denied that there had been  <mask>, arguing that the second applicant had not been sentenced for making a press declaration, but for failing to comply with the Associations Act (Law no. 2908) which had been in force at the time. They maintained that, according to section 34 of that Act, associations could only form federations and confederations.


25.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had been prescribed by law. They noted that the applicant’s conviction had been based on section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. The Government further contended that the interference in question had pursued the aims of protecting national security, territorial integrity and public safety as well as the prevention of disorder or crime.


42.  The Government accepted that the requirement for the applicants to pay damages constituted an  <mask> with their right to freedom of expression. However, as the protection of the reputation or other rights of any physical or moral person could not be excluded from the scope of Article 10 § 2, the protection of the reputation of a Local Council could legitimately form the basis of an interference with this right. Moreover, the impugned interference was prescribed by law and was necessary in a democratic society for the purpose of responding to the pressing social need of protecting the reputation of others in terms of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.


24.  The applicant association argued that the public exhibition of a painting contributed to a debate between the artist, the exhibitor and the public and was therefore protected under Article 10 of the Convention. It accepted that the impugned  <mask> was prescribed by law, but maintained that the interference had been neither necessary nor proportionate. It submitted that the Government's submissions as regards the protection of morals were irrelevant as in the present case the domestic courts had based their decisions merely on Mr Meischberger's prevailing personal interests as protected under section 78 of the Copyright Act. Mr Meischberger could not, however, claim any personal interest worth protecting as the painting obviously did not state or suggest that the way in which he was portrayed corresponded to his actual behaviour. The painting presented the artist's personal history in an allegorical way and depicted, among several other well-known persons, the painter himself and some of his friends and benefactors. All these persons were depicted engaging in sexual acts, reflecting the painter's conception of the interrelation between power and sexuality. Mr Meischberger had been one of the figures who had characterised the history of the FPÖ party in the past few years, and he had been portrayed with the other three members as an allegory of that party, which had always strongly criticised the painter's work. Furthermore, Mr Meischberger and, in any event, the actions he considered libellous were not recognisable after the painting had been partly damaged. In the applicant association's view, the fact that he had instituted proceedings only after the painting had been partly damaged demonstrated that rather than protecting his personal interests he was aiming to discredit the painter's work.


51.  The applicant submitted that the  <mask> at issue did not pursue a legitimate aim, as required by Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, as the domestic courts could not clearly distinguish between value judgments and facts. The applicant maintained that it had criticised Mr Symonenko and Ms Vitrenko in respect of their activities as public persons and had not touched upon their private lives.


34.  The Government maintained that the  <mask> was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of others. They referred to case-law in which the Court had presupposed that a public body could also fall within “the protection of the reputation or rights of others”, for example, Romanenko and Others v. Russia, cited above, § 39; Lombardo and Others v. Malta, no. 7333/06, §§ 50 and 54, 24 April 2007; and Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992, Series A no. 239. They further contended that since it was recognised that the reputation of the police may be a legitimate aim, the same should apply to several other public bodies. The conditions at a public hospital constitute an issue of considerable public interest and entail a need for wider limits for public scrutiny, but this is partly for other reasons than for a public body exercising power in the traditional sense. Public interest may therefore be deemed to be interconnected with the relevance of the activities of the hospital to the life and health of individuals. Allegations made on a factually incorrect basis will affect the patient’s confidence in the treatment offered and may weaken the possibilities of the hospital to function in an optimal manner. In addition, it would amount to unfounded arbitrariness in the protection of the health interests of the contracting States if they were to have the possibility of interfering with attacks on the reputation of private hospitals but not of public hospitals.


23.  The applicants complained under Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention that their conviction following the publication of a newspaper article had not been fair and had amounted to unjustified  <mask> with their right to freedom of expression. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that this complaint does not raise a separate issue under Article 6 of the Convention and falls to be examined solely under Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


40.  The applicant argued that the  <mask> complained of was not prescribed by law. Investigation in defamation cases was normally instituted by way of a private prosecution. The investigation in the applicant’s case had been instituted ex officio, but the prosecutor had failed to provide reasons for which he had considered that the public interest required an investigation of the case.


19.  The Government acknowledged that there had been an  <mask> with the applicant's rights under Article 10 of the Convention. They contented, however, that it was prescribed by law and “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of § 2 of Article 10. They argued in the first place that the Court of Appeal considered in detail the applicant company's submissions and set out clearly why, in the present case, Mr Kabas' interest in protection of presumption of his innocence continued beyond the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against him. Furthermore, the interpretation of section 7b of the Media Act in conformity with Article 6 § 2 of the Convention called for an extensive understanding of the protection of the presumption of innocence. While there was certainly public interest in the discussion of the “police information affair”, Mr Kabas' right in the presumption of his innocence outweighed the applicant company's right to freedom of expression. In the impugned article the applicant company depicted Mr Kabas as already convicted and did not inform the reader that the charges against him had already thoroughly been examined by the Public Prosecutor's Office which had closed his file months ago. When weighing the respective interests, the domestic courts had furthermore had regard to the fact that Mr Kabas was not given the opportunity to comment. Moreover, the ex-post appraisal of the present case confirmed that the court's assessment was correct. As Mr Kreiβl and Mr Kleindienst were finally both acquitted, the alleged assistance of Mr Kabas in their criminal acts was impossible. The Government further argued that the measures taken by the Austria courts were also proportionate.


33.  The Government agreed that the facts of the case disclosed an  <mask> with the applicant's right to freedom of expression. The interference was nevertheless justified under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The applicant had been ordered to pay non-pecuniary damages for defamation on the basis of Articles 7 and 7 § 1 of the Civil Code. The interference was thus “prescribed by law” and the law was accessible and foreseeable. It served the legitimate aim of protecting the dignity of Mr Stepaniuc; furthermore, the measure was necessary in a democratic society.


138.  The applicant placed particular emphasis on the deficiencies of the reasoning adduced by the domestic authorities. Both parties have asked the Court to re-examine the proportionality of the “interference”, although they disagree about certain circumstances having significance for such an assessment. The Court, for its part, is not satisfied that the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify the “interference” under Article 10 of the Convention were sufficient for sentencing the applicant to two days’ detention. Faced with the domestic courts’ failure to give reasons that would be both relevant and sufficient to justify the  <mask>, the Court finds that the domestic courts cannot be said to have applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 or to have based themselves on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see, for a similar approach, Terentyev v. Russia, no. 25147/09, § 24, 26 January 2017, and Annenkov and Others v. Russia, no. 31475/10, § 139, 25 July 2017).


20.  The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. They submitted that the  <mask> with her right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of national security and public order, as well as the prevention of disorder and crime. The Government further submitted that in her speech the applicant had legitimised the PKK and called for a moment of silence for the terrorists who had died during the conflicts with the Turkish Armed Forces. Besides, following her speech, the crowd had made a “V” sign. The Government took the view that, having regard to the content of her speech and to the fact that the applicant was not a politician, her speech could not be protected as political discourse. They further submitted that the first-instance court had assessed the circumstances of the event as a whole and had had regard to the other speakers’ speeches and the slogans chanted by the crowd when it had convicted the applicant. The Government also contended that the investigation against the applicant had not only been based on her acts during the event of 21 March 2007 but also on the books and documents found in her house. They lastly noted that the applicant had been sentenced to imprisonment of only one year, the minimum possible sentence under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. In sum, the Government considered that the applicant’s conviction had been necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.


45.  The applicant alleged that his right to freedom of expression had been breached as a result of the administrative sanction applied to him. He contended that there had been an  <mask> with his rights guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention, but conceded that it had been “prescribed by law”. He doubted that the real aim of the sanction had been to protect the reputation of I.M. rather than to punish him for making many complaints against the region's leadership.


36.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> with the applicant's freedom of expression was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim, to which it was proportionate. In particular, they pointed out that the applicant had been acquitted and that there was no evidence that he had paid the damages or court fees imposed (they referred to Stângu v. Romania (dec.), no. 57551/00, 9 November 2004, and Stângu and Scutelnicu v. Romania, no. 53899/00, 31 January 2006). Moreover, the amounts imposed by the court had been moderate.


20.  The applicants submitted that the  <mask> with their right to freedom of expression had not been necessary in a democratic society as it had not been justified by a pressing social need. They maintained that what was at stake in the present case was not purely commercial interests but participation in a general debate. In such cases the existence of particularly strong reasons for restricting the freedom of the press in a democratic society was necessary and the national margin of appreciation was limited.


50.  The applicant contended that he was not aware of any relevant law regulating the matters of which he complained and that there was no legal protection against arbitrary  <mask> by the public authorities with his rights. In this connection he argued that the respondent Government had made no effort at all to indicate the grounds on which such interference might have been justified, nor had they shown it to be necessary in a democratic society.


113.  The applicant noted that he had been convicted under Articles 214.1 and 283 of the Criminal Code, despite the fact that he had committed none of the acts proscribed by those provisions. He had neither been involved in any terrorist activities, nor had he incited ethnic hostility. He had not aimed to create fear among the population or exert pressure on State authorities by committing or threatening to commit terrorist acts. He had merely published an analysis of possible future events, based on the information he had obtained from numerous other sources. The applicant also noted that the charges of tax evasion against him had been fabricated and that this should also be regarded as an  <mask> with his freedom of expression.


40.  The applicants maintained that the  <mask> constituted by section 36 of the Act of 29 July 1881 could not be regarded as necessary in a democratic society or, consequently, to have a legitimate objective, as its sole purpose was to prohibit any criticism of a head of State, even if it related only to his policies and whether or not it was founded. To accept the Government’s arguments that the aim pursued was legitimate would be tantamount to recognising that heads of foreign governments were entitled to a veritable privilege affording them immunity from any criticism of their conduct and actions in office, however blameworthy they might be, since such criticism was insulting by definition, as it attacked their character and reputation. The offence was made out even if the remarks proved accurate, since the relevant case-law precluded evidence of the truth of the allegations as a defence to a charge under section 36, in order to avoid embroiling the head of State in a debate that would undermine the respect due to his or her office. Under section 36 freedom of communication on matters of general interest was counterbalanced by the prestige of office and title, with the latter taking precedence.


30.  The Government agreed that the first applicant’s conviction, the fines imposed on him, and the obligation to pay compensation and legal expenses to the former Prime Minister constituted an  <mask> with his right to freedom of expression. However, the interference had a basis in Finnish law, in particular in Chapter 24, section 8, of the Penal Code which fulfilled the criteria of precision, clarity and foreseeability. The first applicant had consulted a lawyer before publishing the book and he had thus been aware of the legal risks connected with the publishing. The interference was thus “prescribed by law” and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the private life and reputation of others.


86.  The Government did not comment on this point since they considered that there had been no  <mask> in the present case. However, they provided explanations regarding the concepts of “Turkishness” and the “Turkish nation”. They maintained that following the amendment of the text of Article 301 the concept of “Turkishness” had been replaced by that of the “Turkish nation”. Yet these concepts did not have any racial or ethnic connotations. They should instead be understood as referring to Turkish citizenship as defined by Article 66 of the Turkish Constitution.


65.  The applicant also submitted that the  <mask> in question had not pursued any legitimate aim. He argued that his conviction had been an act of deterrence to punish him for publishing the articles, which had been highly critical towards the top politicians in Russia, including the President, and their politics, and to discourage him from making use of his right to freedom of expression.


137.  The applicant argued that the disclosure of the above-mentioned information constituted  <mask> by the State authorities, the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, with her right to private and family life. She argued that the interference had not been in accordance with the law: the domestic legislation actually prohibited disclosing information relating to a person’s private life (see paragraphs 64 and 67 above). Furthermore, in any event, the interference had not pursued any of the legitimate aims listed in paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention, and had not been necessary.


63.  The Government submitted that the right to hold demonstrations inside the premises of public institutions was not unlimited (see Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 44306/98, § 47, ECHR 2003‑VI). They referred in this connection to Article 9 § 1 of the Law on Assembly and Demonstrations, which provided that no assembly or demonstration could be held, inter alia, in a building of a governmental institution (see paragraph 45 above). They stated that there had been alternative venues at the disposal of the applicants and their supporters, such as the courtyard of the University, where they could have organised their protest. They stressed in this connection the idea that a university, being an educational establishment, was exclusively devoted to providing educational services; therefore, if the Government were to allow unrestricted demonstrations on its premises it would put a disproportionate burden on the educational establishment, jeopardising its proper functioning. They thus maintained that in the instant case, no  <mask> with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly had taken place at all.


181.  The applicants maintained that the criminal proceedings against them had constituted an  <mask> with their right to freedom of expression as they had been prosecuted for their performance. In their view, the Government’s argument to the contrary and, in particular the reference to Kosiek (cited above) was misconceived. They also argued that the cases of Otto-Preminger-Institut (cited above) and İ.A. v. Turkey (no. 42571/98, ECHR 2005‑VIII) had concerned entirely different situations. In any event, in both those cases the punishment had been much milder than that imposed on the applicants, being a ban on showing the film in question in the former case and a fine in the latter. The applicants further argued that the domestic courts had failed either to recognise that their song had an explicit political message or to assess the proportionality of the interference. Furthermore, the conclusion that their actions had been motivated by religious hatred was arbitrary and based on an incomplete assessment of the evidence owing to the refusal of their applications for additional evidence and to question additional witnesses.


33.  The Government pointed out that at the time of publishing the article in question B. had not yet been convicted. Moreover, being A.'s female friend had not as such made her a person in a socially significant position whose right to private life could be narrowed. B.'s conduct had not in any way contributed to any discussion of general interest but had been intended to satisfy public curiosity. Notwithstanding the incident of 4 December 1996 and B.'s subsequent sentence, the information published by the applicants had been of such a nature that it had been covered by the protection of B.'s private life. The reporting of the events could have been done without mentioning B. by name. Bearing in mind the margin of appreciation, the Government argued that the  <mask> in the present case had been “necessary in a democratic society”.


26.  The applicant party submitted that such  <mask> with the exercise of its rights was not “prescribed by law” in the sense attached to that expression by the Court, since the refusal of its application for authorisation on the basis of the penultimate subsection of section 11-4 of the Act of 11 March 1988 had not been foreseeable in that the first subsection of section 11-6 of the same Act did not envisage the “refusal” of an application for authorisation but the “revocation” of authorisation already obtained. Furthermore, the second paragraph of Article L. 52 of the Elections Code expressly provided that “legal entities, with the exception of political parties or groups, [could] not contribute to the funding of the election campaign ...” and section 11-4 (in its version as amended by the Act of 19 January 1995) of the Act of 11 March 1998 provided that “legal entities, with the exception of political parties or groups, [could] not contribute to the funding of political parties or groups ...”, and there was no statutory provision excluding foreign political parties. In addition, the penultimate subsection of section 11-4 referred to “foreign legal entities”, without specifying that this included foreign political parties.


34.  The Government further maintained that even if it were to be accepted that there had been  <mask> with the applicant company’s rights under Article 10 of the Convention, such interference had been prescribed by the domestic legislation, namely Article 15 § 2 of the Constitution, Article 3 § 1 (c) of Law No. 2328/1995, Articles 7 and 9 of Regulation 1/1991 and Article 2 § 3 of Regulation 2/1991 of the National Radio and Television Council, and Article 2 (b) and (f) of the Code on Journalistic Ethics (issued by the journalists’ union). Additionally, the Government asserted that any interference with the applicant company’s right to impart information had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and reputation of others – specifically A.C.’s right to private life, as protected under Article 8 of the Convention.


39.  The Government considered it indisputable that the judgment whereby the domestic courts had ordered the applicant company to pay damages to Judge B.B. had constituted an interference with the company’s freedom of expression. However, that interference had been in accordance with Article 10 § 2 of the Convention because it had been lawful, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been  <mask>.


36.  The applicant maintained that the impugned measures were based on factual statements, not on value judgments. She argued that the thrust of her articles concerned the alarming circumstances surrounding the death of a patient, possibly resulting from gross negligence on the part of medical staff. This was a matter of considerable public interest. The quality of her journalism had been impeccable and she had acted in good faith. No names of medical staff had been disclosed. The sanction inflicted on her was disproportionate to the legitimate aim invoked by the Government and was likely to discourage critical journalism or to curtail it in a manner which was not  <mask>.


43.  The applicant further submitted that the interference with his freedom of expression was not  <mask>. According to him, the article contained value judgments alone in regard to certain complainants and value judgments based on facts in regard to other complainants. The applicant argued that there had been no pressing social need for an interference with his freedom of expression and that the domestic courts did not adduce relevant and sufficient arguments to justify the interference.


19.  The Government agreed that the facts of the case disclosed an interference with the applicants' right to freedom of expression. The interference was nevertheless justified under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The applicants had been ordered to pay non-pecuniary damages for defamation on the basis of Articles 7 and 7 § 1 of the Civil Code. The interference had thus been “prescribed by law” and the law was accessible and foreseeable. It had served the legitimate aim of protecting the dignity of Mr Stepaniuc; furthermore, the measure had been  <mask>.


19.  The applicants complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings brought against them under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, and their subsequent conviction, had constituted a violation of their right to freedom of expression. Referring, in particular, to the Court’s judgments in Gül and Others v. Turkey (no. 4870/02, 8 June 2010) and Faruk Temel v. Turkey (no. 16853/05, 1 February 2011), the applicants claimed that their conviction was not  <mask>.


22.  The applicant maintained his complaint. He submitted that the excerpt from the article in question was merely an expression of his personal opinion based on facts known to him concerning the political scene in the region. When deciding on B.'s defamation claims, the District Court had failed to distinguish between a statement of fact and a value judgment. The court had disregarded the findings of the panel of experts, which had come to the conclusion that the excerpt in question had constituted the applicant's personal opinion, and had given an unfair judgment when resolving the dispute. In line with the provisions of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, in his article the applicant had discussed issues of public interest concerning the interaction of political groups in the region and criticised the actions of the regional prosecutor. The domestic courts had not substantiated the preference they had given to the protection of the personal rights of the regional prosecutor over the applicant's right to freedom of expression and the interest of the public in receiving information. Nor had it been shown that the applicant's statements had had a negative impact on B.'s professional career. On the contrary, B. had since been promoted and appointed deputy general prosecutor of the Far East (Dalnevostochniy) Region. In sum, the applicant argued that the interference of the Russian authorities with his freedom of expression had not pursued a legitimate aim and had not been  <mask>, in contravention of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.


38.  The Government took the view that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of the “reputation or rights of others” and of the “authority and impartiality of the judiciary”. They argued that it was also  <mask>, because the expressions used by the applicant in his circular letter had been offensive and had sought to denigrate X, who had been accused, in substance, of deliberately and knowingly taking an unfair decision, and of being arrogant, lacking in commitment and indifferent. X had thus been portrayed negatively and as a judge who showed total disregard for the fundamental ethical principles of his profession.


27.  The Government did not dispute the fact that the applicants' conviction for the offence of handling information protected by the secrecy of a judicial investigation or by a duty of professional confidence constituted interference with their right to freedom of expression. In their opinion, that interference was prescribed by law, namely by Articles 226-13 and 321-1 of the Criminal Code, which fulfilled the conditions of accessibility and foreseeability required by the Court (see Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, ECHR 1999‑I). The Government considered, however, that the interference constituted a measure that was  <mask> for the protection of the reputation or rights of others and for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Without disputing the fact that the aim of the applicants' work had been to inform the general public about an affair of state that was of interest to public opinion, they considered that it prejudiced the presumption of innocence in respect of G.M. The publication of the book just a few days after the death of François Mitterrand had given it a certain commercial and media impact, thereby increasing the prejudice sustained by G.M. Moreover, the affair had been a very sensitive one and the book had contained precise reproductions of a number of documents from the case file.


15.  The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. They submitted that he had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as he had not raised his Convention grievances before the domestic authorities. As regards the merits of the applicant’s complaint, the Government submitted that the interference with his right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting national security, public safety and the rights of others, as well as preventing disorder and crime. Noting that the applicant’s conviction had been based on his participation in an illegal demonstration which had turned into a propaganda event in favour of the PKK and on the fact that he had acted together with and led the other demonstrators, the Government claimed that the present case was different from the case of Faruk Temel v. Turkey (no. 16853/05, 1 February 2011). They concluded that the applicant’s conviction had responded to a pressing social need and had therefore been  <mask>.


18.  The Government further contend that the interference was  <mask>. In many countries, the Muftis are appointed by the State. Moreover, Muftis exercise important judicial functions in Greece and judges cannot be elected by the people. The Government submit that because there were two Muftis in Xanthi at the time, the courts had to convict the spurious one in order not to create tension among the Muslims, between the Muslims and Christians and between Turkey and Greece. The courts considered that the offence in Article 175 is committed when somebody actually discharges the functions of a religious minister. The courts also considered that the acts that the applicant engaged in fell within the administrative functions of a Mufti in the broad sense of the term.


17.  The Government agreed that the facts of the case disclosed interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression. The interference was nevertheless justified under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The applicant had been ordered to pay non-pecuniary damages for defamation on the basis of Articles 7 and 7 § 1 of the Civil Code. The interference was thus “prescribed by law” and the law was accessible and foreseeable. It served the legitimate aim of protecting the dignity of Valeriu Matei; furthermore, the measure was  <mask>.


27.  The Government argued that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had been in accordance with the law, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been  <mask>. In this respect they maintained that the applicant’s conviction had been based on Article 312 § 1 of the former Criminal Code. They further argued that the interference had been justified by the need to protect public order and to prevent crime as part of the fight against terrorism, since the materials found at HADEP’s office indicated the existence of a link between the applicant and the terrorist organisation PKK. The Government further considered that the interference had been proportionate to its aims, as the applicant had been sentenced to merely six months’ imprisonment.


24.  The applicant newspaper agreed that the interference was prescribed by law and had pursued a legitimate aim. However, it was not  <mask> because the impugned articles had merely disseminated statements made by third parties and had been part of a debate on an issue of distinct public importance, namely the management of public transport and the alleged illegal activities of public officials. The applicants had acted in good faith when publishing the article and verified the statements made by the third parties. They had considered the source to be reliable, since it was a letter addressed to the President of the country, contained many details, and official reports emanating from State transport authorities were attached to it.


34.  The applicants maintained that their conviction for publishing these articles was not  <mask>. In this regard, they pointed out that the first two articles concerned the author’s assessment on how to peacefully solve the Kurdish problem and that the third article criticised the prison policies of the State and, in particular, that of the Minister of Justice at the time of the events.


33.  The Government agreed that the facts of the case disclosed an interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression. The interference was nevertheless justified under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The applicant had been ordered to pay non-pecuniary damages for defamation on the basis of Articles 7 and 7 § 1 of the Civil Code. The interference was thus “prescribed by law” and the law was accessible and foreseeable. It served the legitimate aim of protecting the dignity of Mr Stepaniuc; furthermore, the measure was  <mask>.


156.  The Government further contended that rights and freedoms could not be used to destroy other rights and freedoms. In that context, emphasising that the offending articles by the applicant had promoted an armed terrorist organisation and had constituted incitement to violence, the Government maintained that the use of the media as a tool for destroying fundamental freedoms could not be tolerated. Accordingly, they submitted that the interference complained of had been proportionate and  <mask>.


33.  The Government further insisted that the interference complained of had been  <mask>. They submitted that the impugned paragraphs of the applicant’s article had clearly referred to the S. family; in particular, both paragraphs had been accentuated by bold letters, which had given a clear impression that they had been linked between themselves and to the headline of the article. Moreover, the paragraphs in question had revealed specific details of the S. family’s private life. In this respect, the Government pointed out that the impugned information had related not only to Mrs S.’s son, Mr S., who at that time had been standing as a candidate for the State Duma, and had therefore been a public figure, but also to other members of the S. family, including Mrs S.’s husband and daughter (respectively, Mr S.’s father and sister), who were not.


24.  The Government maintained that the interference was justified by the need to guarantee the authority and impartiality of the judiciary and was  <mask> as the applicant had gone beyond the bounds of acceptable criticism by making remarks about both the Constitutional Court and its judges that were defamatory and offensive. They stressed that, as a lawyer, the applicant had a duty of discretion towards the judiciary and so enjoyed more limited freedom of expression.


50.  The applicant contended that he was not aware of any relevant law regulating the matters of which he complained and that there was no legal protection against arbitrary interference by the public authorities with his rights. In this connection he argued that the respondent Government had made no effort at all to indicate the grounds on which such interference might have been justified, nor had they shown it to be  <mask>.


20.  The applicant maintained that his criminal conviction for the protest of 29 January 2013 had amounted to an interference with his right to freedom of expression. He argued that the interference had not been prescribed by law because Article 287 of the Criminal Code had not been applicable to his situation and that it had not been  <mask>.


30.  The Government argued that the letter contained factual allegations which the applicant had failed to prove, although she had been given an opportunity to do so in the domestic proceedings. The Government also submitted that the applicant did not complain about the amount she had been ordered to pay in compensation and that it was within the competence of the domestic authorities to determine other measures necessary to remedy the situation, including ordering the applicant to retract the statements by rescinding the impugned letter. Therefore, the Government stated that the interference had been  <mask> and was proportionate.


42.  The Government acknowledged that the applicant’s conviction for defamation constituted interference with his rights guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention. They maintained, however, that this interference was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of Mrs P.’s reputation, and was  <mask>. In this regard they submitted that the applicant had overstepped the limits of permissible criticism of a civil servant, in particular, as he had directly accused Mrs P. of having committed serious criminal offences, thereby undermining her right to presumption of innocence. Furthermore, the financial penalties imposed on the applicant had not been disproportionate to his income, and the prison sentence was not long and in any case the applicant had not served it.


23.  The applicant company contested the Government’s view and maintained that the interference with the applicant company’s right to freedom of expression had been un <mask>. In particular, the Austrian courts had disregarded that the letter to the editor contained value judgments which had a sufficient factual basis: Mr Paarhammer had publicly criticised the Pope in a radio interview in 1989 and in a press release in 1988. In the applicant company’s view, church-related matters were of public interest and formed an essential part of public discussion in Austria at the material time. Further, high-ranking church officials exposed themselves to the public as politicians do and had, thus, to display a high degree of tolerance against criticism. The applicant company further argued that Mr Paarhammer had no negative consequences to bear as a result of the letter to the editor at issue. On the contrary, he was considered to be a potential successor of the Salzburg or Innsbruck Archbishop. Since the domestic courts had found that criticism towards the Pope in respect of personnel policy matters was lawful, also critical remarks towards Mr Paarhammer in this respect ought to be admissible.


38.  The Government submitted that the interference complained of by the applicant had been prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate aim and had been  <mask> to achieve that aim. The restrictions imposed on the applicant had been necessary as they had met a pressing social need, namely the protection of the legal profession. This profession played a special role in the system of administration of justice. The decisions of the domestic courts constituted an appropriate reaction to defamatory accusations made by the applicant against advocate J.Z., accusations which had been devoid of any factual foundation and had been made in bad faith.


30.  The Government further considered that the interference had been  <mask>. They referred to Zana v. Turkey (25 November 1997, § 55, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VII), where the Court had stated that it had, with due regard to the circumstances of each case and a State’s margin of appreciation, to ascertain whether a fair balance had been struck between the individual’s fundamental right to freedom of expression and “a democratic society’s legitimate right to protect itself against the activities of terrorist organisations”. They pointed out that the Court had already had occasion to consider the situation in the Basque Country in the cases of Leroy (cited above, § 38) and Association Ekin v. France (no. 39288/98, ECHR 2001‑VIII).


98.  The Government noted that the material that had been seized from the applicant had been likely to promote racist and anti-Turkish propaganda and promote ill-will between the two communities on the island. Any limitation of the applicant’s rights had been prescribed by law and was justified under the second paragraph of Articles 9 and 10 as being  <mask> in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order and for the safeguarding of national security and/or territorial integrity.


35.  The Government contested this argument. They disputed the very fact that there could have been any interference, arguing that the journalist working for the applicant company had voluntarily cooperated in the measure in issue in order to demonstrate that he had taken the necessary steps within the meaning of Article 443 of the Criminal Code. In the alternative, the Government contended that the interference in question had been legally justified, had pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and crime and protecting the rights and freedoms of others, and that it had been  <mask>. Confronted with facts which had constituted prima facie evidence of offences, it had been incumbent on the judicial authorities to initiate the requisite investigation for ascertaining the circumstances of the case in hand. The Government submitted that publishing companies could not be exempted from the implementation of criminal legislation, and that the impugned article had been published under a name which did not appear in the list of journalists officially recognised in Luxembourg, a fact which had necessitated investigations in order to identify the author of the article. Moreover, the interference had been fairly unintrusive given that the police officers had not actively searched for documents, all the documents seized had been voluntarily handed over by the journalist and the search and seizure had actually been in the journalist’s and the publishing house’s best interests. Furthermore, the investigating judge had only being doing his duty, since he had been obliged to gather both incriminating and exonerating evidence and since seizure was the only way to take possession of objects, even where they were handed over voluntarily.


16.  The applicants agreed that the interference was prescribed by law and had pursued a legitimate aim. However, it was not  <mask> because the impugned articles had merely disseminated statements made by third parties and had been part of a debate on an issue of distinct public importance, namely the management of public transport and alleged illegalities committed by public officials. The applicants had acted in good faith when publishing the article and verified the statements made by the third parties. They had considered the source to be reliable, since it was a letter addressed to the President of the country, contained many details, and official reports emanating from State transport authorities were attached to it. Of course it had been impossible for them to verify the statement according to which Mr Stepaniuc had telephoned the Minister of Public Transport.


46.  The applicants argued that the protection of X’s identity was not  <mask>. There was no pressing social need to depart from the established practice and regulations. In a democratic State, legal proceedings were public and a defendant’s identity was public information; this also served to ensure the legal protection of defendants. The question of whether the disclosure of X’s identity had been necessary for the purpose of dealing with a socially important matter was irrelevant, since the provisions on the public nature of legal proceedings were not associated with matters of social significance. In any event, the proceedings against X had significance for society. Offences of tax and accounting fraud did not belong to private life, and fraud concerning a disability pension amounting to almost FIM 2.5 million was a major offence. X had ultimately received a heavy sentence. The criminal charges against X had been significant enough to justify the publication of her name.


37.  The Government submitted that the measures were  <mask> and that the Court of Appeal gave sufficient and convincing reasons for its judgment. In particular it found that accusations of misappropriation and of serious mismanagement were statements of fact which could be proven by examining the accounting system and the book-keeping of a company by means of external audit reports. However, the Government agreed with the finding of the Court of Appeal that it had not been possible to establish that these accusations were in fact true. The Government further argued that the applicant company had failed to apply the necessary diligence in its research because it had not taken into account the negative effect the unproven statements would have on Mr Bruck’s reputation. Moreover, the applicant company had not given Mr Bruck a chance to defend himself, which undermined the principle of diligent journalism. Since the information had already been available for a year there had been no particular urgency in this issue that could have justified this lack of investigation.


37.  The applicants complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the restrictions on their right to freedom of expression had not been prescribed by law and had not been  <mask> for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.'s pictures and the facts mentioned in the articles had not fallen within the protection of private life. She had not been an innocent bystander but had participated actively in the incident of 4 December 1996. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest and the information in the articles had in every respect been correct. The restrictions imposed on the applicants had been grossly disproportionate, especially in view of their obligation to pay very considerable damages.


27.  The Government agreed that the facts of the case disclosed an interference with the applicants' right to freedom of expression. The interference was nevertheless justified under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The applicants had been ordered to pay non-pecuniary damages for defamation on the basis of Articles 7 and 7/1 of the Civil Code. The interference had thus been “prescribed by law” and the law was accessible and foreseeable. It had served the legitimate aim of protecting the dignity of Mr Stepaniuc; furthermore, the measure had been  <mask>.


33.  The Government maintained that the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression was  <mask>. In this regard, they submitted that, in the first two articles, the State was considered as waging a “dirty war” against the “oppressed” Kurdish nation and that in the third article the Minister of Justice was designated as the person responsible for the inconveniences and problems in prisons. They further pointed out that the article considered the Minister to be responsible for the death of two prisoners who were on hunger strike. Finally, they submitted that the applicants were sentenced to an insignificant fine which was never enforced and that their condemnations were eventually nullified.


34.  The Government submitted that Article 8 was not applicable in the present case as that provision did not guarantee a right to retain employment or to choose a profession. They further stated that, in any event, the application of the KGB Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of protecting national security and was  <mask>. According to the Government, the KGB Act constituted no more than a justified security screening measure intended to prevent former employees of a foreign secret service from working not only in State institutions but also in other spheres of activity which were important to the State’s national security. The KGB Act itself did not impose collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. It provided for individualised restrictions on employment prospects by way of the list of positions in the former KGB which warranted application of the restrictions under section 2 of the KGB Act (see paragraph 27 above). The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in section 3 of the KGB Act showed that there existed a well-founded suspicion that the applicants lacked loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Given that not all former employees of the KGB were affected by the KGB Act, Article 14 of the Convention was not applicable. Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 8 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.


46.  The applicant complained under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention that the allegedly arbitrary denial of Latvian citizenship through naturalisation was a punitive measure imposed on him because he had imparted ideas and exercised his right of assembly in order to criticise the government’s position. He further complained that the aforementioned infringements of his rights, contrary to the requirements of Article 10 § 2 and Article 11 § 2 of the Convention, were not prescribed by law, did not pursue a legitimate aim and were disproportionate and not  <mask>. Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention read as follows.


24.  The applicant company maintained that the interference with its right to freedom of expression was not  <mask> as required by Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. In particular, it asserted that the article had been published in the context of the upcoming elections of the chairman of the local tourism association and had contributed to a debate of general interest. Moreover, C.M. and J.M. were public figures on account of their activities in the political scene and the nature of the offices held by them. The applicant company also submitted that the courts had failed to evaluate the reproduction of the anonymous letter against the background of the article as a whole, which gave room to the statements of the two people concerned and duly distanced itself from the accusations made against them. Furthermore, the applicant company, citing Albert-Engelmann-Gesellschaft mbH v. Austria (no. 46389/99, 19 January 2006) contested the domestic courts’ view that the reproduction of an anonymous letter had to be distinguished from the quotation of a third person’s statement.


29.  The applicant additionally submitted that the interference had not been  <mask>. He referred to the principles developed in Court's case‑law on this issue and argued that he had been penalised solely for the ideas expressed in the association's articles. The association had not engaged in any action which could characterise it as propagating violence or undemocratic principles. The idea of a monarchy and the related insignia were not undemocratic or violent, as evidenced in particular by the fact that the name of the coalition which had ruled the country as between 2001 and 2005 had been “National Movement Simeon II”, after the former heir to the throne Simeon Saxe-Coburggotski, who had become prime minister. Even before his starting into office in 2001 Bulgaria's coat of arms had featured a crown, whereas the public debate over the form of government – republic or monarchy – continued. While the Constitution indeed needed stability, it was by no means carved into stone. Its amendment could be envisaged for the purpose of bringing it in line with the dominant public views on the form of government, whereas suppressing any ideas in this respect could harm democracy and constituted unfettered majority rule.


21.  The applicants complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the restrictions on their right to freedom of expression had not been prescribed by law and had not been  <mask> for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.'s name had not fallen within the protection of private life as the national courts had not declared any part of her criminal case file secret. She had been an active participant in the incident on 4 December 1996 and had subsequently been sentenced to a fine. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest and the information in the article had in every respect been correct. The Appeal Court had not even tried to indicate on what grounds freedom of expression could have been restricted in the present case. In any event, the restrictions imposed on the applicants had been grossly disproportionate, especially in view of their obligation to pay very considerable damages


186.  The Government further submitted that, in view of the events of 15 July 2016, the call for a military coup had to be regarded as a call for violence and not as being covered by freedom of expression. In that connection they cited the following comments by the applicant: “Within the State of the Republic of Turkey, there is probably another structure, whose components outside Turkey are closely observing and documenting all these events. It is not clear exactly when [it] will pull its hand out of the bag or how [it] will do so.” Noting that the applicant had made these comments one day before the attempted military coup, the Government contended that the interference complained of had been proportionate and  <mask>.