150.  The Government did not contest that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 9 of the Convention. They maintained however that the measure was prescribed by law and served a legitimate aim, that is, the  <mask> and the rights of others. It was also proportionate, taking into account that the applicant was a teacher of religion by profession, who could have exercised his religion without the church attendances in question.


86.  The Government submitted that the impugned interference, if any, could be regarded as pursuing the legitimate aims of protection of the rights and freedoms of others and the  <mask>, within the meaning of Article 9 § 2, namely, by eliminating entities claiming to pursue religious ends but in fact striving only for financial benefits. The applicants contested this view.


34.  The applicant submitted that under Article 9 of the Convention the State was obliged to respect and support the individual's freedom to practice his or her religion. Any limitations could be set only in the interest of public safety, for the  <mask>, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. In the applicant's opinion observing vegetarianism could not be described as a threat to public safety, health, morals or the rights and freedoms of others.


protection of the rights and freedoms of others

59.  The Government accepted that in the registration proceedings, which had not involved an interpretation of the applicant association’s doctrinal sources, the refusal of the domestic authorities to register the applicant association had amounted to an interference with the applicants’ freedom of association and religion. However, that interference had been in accordance with the law and had pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of the  <mask>. Furthermore, it had been proportionate to the aim sought to be achieved and the reasons adduced by the authorities had been relevant and sufficient.


37.  The Government agreed that the refusal of the domestic courts to register the applicant association had amounted to an interference with its rights under Article 11 of the Convention. The refusal had been lawful and had pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of the  <mask>, in particular adherents of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Furthermore, the reasons adduced by the courts had been relevant and sufficient. In this connection they averred that in the domestic case file there had been no proof attesting to the Macedonian nationality of the applicant association’s founders, a fact which the applicants had failed to remedy in the impugned proceedings.


27.  The applicant challenged the submission that the ban in question satisfied the condition laid down in paragraph 2 of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention of necessity in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the prevention of disorder, the protection of health or morals or the  <mask>. With regard to the aim of “living together” in a democratic society, it was the opposite reasoning – that of openness and tolerance – which should take precedence in a pluralist democratic society as was evidenced by the tolerance that there had always been of dress codes rejecting the living together principle. At best, it could be regarded as a praiseworthy political objective, but one that could not be achieved by some stigmatising by-laws that were contrary to the Convention. In her submission, the factors justifying the ban on safety grounds had been advanced exclusively with regard to the full-face veil, were non-existent and the real aim being pursued by the by-laws was the prohibition of the full-face veil in public places. She argued, lastly, that the issue of dignity and gender equality was irrelevant to justification on grounds of “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” since the exercise of the freedom and wishes of women themselves was hindered.


25.  The Government conceded that the refusal of the domestic courts to register the applicant association amounted to an interference with its rights under Article 11 of the Convention. However, the refusal had been lawful and had pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of the  <mask>. Furthermore, the reasons adduced by the courts had been relevant and sufficient. In this connection they submitted that the language used in the minutes of the constituent assembly (see paragraph 4 above) demonstrated that the applicant association was disrespectful of the MOC and offended the religious beliefs of its adherents.


35.  The applicant took the view that the interference with the exercise of his freedom to manifest his religion did not correspond to any of the aims listed in Article 9 § 2. The Government maintained, for their part, that the impugned measure pursued two legitimate aims: to protect the rights and freedoms of others; and to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. The Court notes that the second paragraph of Article 9 does not refer expressly to the second of those aims. As regards the first of the aims invoked – to ensure the  <mask> – the Government referred to the principle of secularism and the need to promote tolerance in a post-conflict society. The Court has already held that secularism is a belief protected by Article 9 of the Convention (see Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 30814/06, § 58, ECHR 2011) and that an aim to uphold secular and democratic values can be linked to the legitimate aim of the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” within the meaning of Article 9 § 2 (see Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, § 99, ECHR 2005‑XI, and Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey, no. 41135/98, § 43, 23 February 2010). There is no reason to decide otherwise in the present case.


34.  The applicant submitted that under Article 9 of the Convention the State was obliged to respect and support the individual's freedom to practice his or her religion. Any limitations could be set only in the interest of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the  <mask>. In the applicant's opinion observing vegetarianism could not be described as a threat to public safety, health, morals or the rights and freedoms of others.


76.  The Government accepted that the refusal of the authorities to register the applicant association amounted to an interference with its rights under this head. In doing so they relied on the 1997 and 2007 Acts, as applicable at the material time, and stated also that the refusal had pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of the  <mask>.


86.  The Government submitted that the impugned interference, if any, could be regarded as pursuing the legitimate aims of  <mask> and the protection of public order, within the meaning of Article 9 § 2, namely, by eliminating entities claiming to pursue religious ends but in fact striving only for financial benefits. The applicants contested this view.


38.  The Government considered that this interference could be regarded as satisfying at least two of the legitimate aims provided for in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. The family-affairs judge had certainly been required to take account of the  <mask>, because the applicant’s alcoholism had been considered as part of the cause of the violence he had been inflicting on his wife at the time, and the judge had also had a duty to protect the health and morals of the children, in respect of whom a right of visiting and staying contact had been granted to their father.


42.  The Government also alleged that the mere fact of providing children with  <mask> on the Muslim faith could not in itself raise a question under the Convention, so long as the lessons were taught in an objective, pluralist and neutral manner. There were legitimate grounds in contemporary Turkish society for granting more time to the study of Islam than to other religions and philosophies of life. This was particularly so given that Turkey was a secular State and that schools were therefore the most appropriate institution for transmitting such knowledge.


33.  The Government submitted that there had been no interference in the exercise by the applicant of his right to freedom of religion, because no direct connection could be made between the indication of religion on identity cards and freedom of religion and conscience. It could not be construed as a requirement to disclose one’s religious beliefs or as a restriction on the freedom to manifest one’s religion in worship,  <mask>, practice and observance.


90.  The Government submitted that in the present case the reasons had been strictly religious and concerned the duty of loyalty and coherence which had to be observed by the applicant in work that he had freely chosen and which, moreover, differed from the  <mask> of another subject such as mathematics or history. The Government thus requested the Court to bear in mind that the relationship of loyalty in the present case was on a higher plane than that existing in a case concerning a church organist (as in Schüth, cited above), a child-minder in a Church school (as in Siebenhaar, cited above), or a Church public-relations manager (as in Obst, cited above).


18.  The Government pointed out that Article 9 a § 3 of the Federal Constitution provided that every male Austrian citizen was liable to perform military service. Exemptions from this obligation were set out in section 24(3) and were linked to membership of a recognised religious society. However, there were also further criteria which the applicant did not satisfy either. The applicant had stated that his function was comparable to those of persons who were involved in spiritual welfare or in clerical  <mask> after graduating in theological studies or who were preparing to assume such functions. In this connection, the Government stressed that the applicant had not stated at any time during the domestic proceedings that he had studied theology at a university or any equivalent institution. Therefore, notwithstanding his religious denomination, the applicant had failed to prove that he complied with any of the four criteria set out in the above-mentioned provision. Thus, there was no need to consider whether or not the applicant had been discriminated against on the ground of his faith. In addition, members of recognised religious societies who did not comply with the criteria laid down in section 24(3) of the Military Service Act were not exempt from military service.


85.  The Government noted moreover that, at the material time, teachers of religious education received their pay directly from the Catholic Church, to which the State paid the necessary funds in the form of grants. Even though the legal regime of religious-education  <mask> had changed and salaries were now paid directly by the public authority, one essential factor had not changed, namely the need for a certificate of suitability issued by the Church, without which the teacher could not be appointed to a post. The Government were of the view that this was merely a feature of the way in which the State organised the financing of the teaching of various religions in Spain and also that a wide margin of appreciation should be afforded to States in the organisation of their education systems.


41.  The Government pointed out that Article 9 a § 3 of the Federal Constitution provided that every male Austrian citizen was liable to perform military service. Exemptions from this obligation were set out in section 24(3) and were linked to membership of a recognised religious society. However, there were also further criteria which the applicant did not satisfy either. The applicant had stated that his function was comparable to those of persons who were involved in spiritual welfare or in clerical  <mask> after graduating in theological studies or who were preparing to assume such functions. In this connection, the Government stressed that the applicant had not stated at any time during the domestic proceedings that he had studied theology at a university or any equivalent institution. Therefore, notwithstanding his religious denomination, the applicant had failed to prove that he complied with any of the four criteria set out in the above-mentioned provision. Thus, there was no need to consider whether or not the applicant had been discriminated against on the ground of his faith. Also members of recognised religious societies who did not comply with the criteria laid down in section 24(3) of the Military Service Act were not exempt from military service.


21.  The Government pointed out that the obligation to perform civilian service was a substitute service for conscientious objectors who refused military service. Section 13a § 1 of the Civilian Service Act stipulated exemptions from this obligation which were linked to membership of a recognised religious society. However, there were also further criteria with which the applicant did not comply either. The applicant had stated that his function would be comparable to that of persons involved in spiritual welfare or in clerical  <mask> after graduating in theology or who were preparing for such functions. In this connection, the Government stressed that the applicant had not stated during the domestic proceedings that he would study theology at a university or any equivalent institution. Furthermore, the applicant's submissions that he would perform divine service and engage in preaching activity had not been substantiated and were, in any event, irrelevant, as he had started doing that work long after the impugned decisions in the present case were issued. In his application the applicant had stated that he was still a “student”. Therefore, notwithstanding his religious denomination, the applicant had failed to prove that he complied with the criteria of the above provision. Thus, there was no need to consider whether or not the applicant had been discriminated against on account of his confession. Furthermore, members of recognised religious societies who did not comply with the criteria laid down in section 13a § 1 of the Civilian Service Act were not exempt from civilian service.


38.  The applicants challenged the argument that the subject contained no information of a religious nature on the doctrine and rituals of a specific religion. In reality, the syllabus and textbooks used in the schools and all the information concerning the implementation of the syllabus showed that the main aim of the classes was to strengthen the pupils' Islamic culture, which was also the main theme in the  <mask>. The applicants had no doubt that these classes were intended to provide cultural teaching and to transmit a set of beliefs. The fact that morality was also taught was merely a method of dissimulating the hidden aim of these classes.


45.  The Government also pointed out that the  <mask> was dispensed under the supervision of the administrative courts, which strictly monitored compliance with the principle of secularism. In addition, the teachers responsible for primary school classes were trained in universities and had obtained diplomas in the discipline of “knowledge of religious culture and morality”. Teachers responsible for these classes at secondary level had a Masters-level degree from a faculty of theology.


76.  The applicants noted that “religious groups”, as defined in the Religions Act, could operate without State interference. However, the status of a “religious group” entailed severe restrictions on community religious practice. A “religious group” had no legal personality; it could not acquire rights or obligations, and it could not protect its interests in court. Given the list of rights reserved to registered religious organisations in sections 15-24 of the Religions Act – including such fundamental aspects of “worship,  <mask>, practice and observance” as the right to establish places of worship, the right to hold religious services in other places accessible to the public, and the right to produce and/or acquire religious literature – a “religious group” was not a religious community with any substantial rights or “autonomous existence”, an issue which the Court had found to be “at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords” (see Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, no. 45701/99, § 118, ECHR 2001‑XII).


43.  The applicants conceded that the  <mask> of gymnastics and sport was compulsory on the basis of Article 68 § 3 of the Constitution, taken together with section 2 (2) of the Federal Act encouraging gymnastics and sports, in all compulsory schools. They added that sports education in Switzerland was not defined by federal legislation and that it was therefore the cantonal law which was to be applied.


113.  The Government acknowledged that the right to practise a religion in accordance with the Osho  <mask> fell within the scope of Article 9 of the Convention. They also did not deny that from 8 May 2003 the applicant had been held at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital unlawfully, as established by both the Vilnius Regional Court and the Court of Appeal.


141.  The Government stated that there had been no interference with the first applicant's right to teach religion. His deportation had not been a reaction against his religious classes - which had been lawful - but had been based on the assessment that his religious activities had constituted a thread to national security. Furthermore, Mr Al-Nashif had voluntarily abandoned  <mask> after service of the deportation order and would not be able to restart as new instructions issued by the Chief Mufti Office after his deportation prohibited religious instruction by persons lacking appropriate religious education. The Government further stated that religious freedoms in Bulgaria were guaranteed and that the authorities strictly adhered to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of religious communities and regularly allowed visits by foreigners coming to teach religion.


44.  The applicants further observed that, at the cantonal level, point 9.2.4 of the primary-school curriculum for the Canton of Basle Urban included swimming, and point 9.2.5 included ice-skating. According to the applicants, however, ice-skating was not taught at all in practice. Thus, again according to the applicants, it could not be claimed on the basis of this curriculum that swimming classes formed part of the compulsory  <mask> of gymnastics and sport. They added that, furthermore, not all schools in the Canton of Basle Urban offered swimming lessons.


53.  The Government claimed that the third applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies with regard to his allegations of discriminatory treatment because no class in ethics had been provided as an alternative to religious instruction and because of the form of the school reports. They submitted that the Ordinance regulated in a comprehensive manner the duties of school authorities regarding the organisation of classes in religion or ethics. It imposed no obligation on schools to provide a class in ethics, as that depended on parents or pupils requesting it and on there being sufficient numbers of interested pupils. If Mr and Mrs Grzelak had considered that their son was being discriminated against by the school authorities on account of the absence of a course in ethics, they should have challenged the provisions of the Ordinance which did not provide for compulsory  <mask> of ethics instead of religious instruction. In their view, the applicant should have lodged a constitutional complaint against the manner of organising classes in ethics provided for in paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Ordinance.


77.  The applicant pointed out that the “scandal” argument given by the Bishop had been based on the appearance in the press of a photograph showing the applicant and his family. In this connection he noted that he had never spoken in his religious -education classes against the teachings of the Church, including the celibacy of priests. He mentioned the note of support from the director of the secondary -education institution where he had been  <mask>.


30.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be the victim of a violation of his right to freedom to manifest his religion. They argued that the denial of the applicant’s request did not impair the essence of his right to manifest his religion, because the indication of religion on the identity card could not be interpreted as a measure compelling all Turkish citizens to disclose their religious beliefs and convictions and as a restriction on the freedom to manifest their religion in worship,  <mask>, practice and observance. Furthermore, referring to the case-law of the Turkish courts (see paragraph 16 above), the Government argued that anyone wishing to delete the relevant information in its entirety could apply to the civil courts.


33.  The Government submitted that there had been no interference in the exercise by the applicant of his right to freedom of religion, because no direct connection could be made between the indication of religion on identity cards and freedom of religion and conscience. It could not be construed as a requirement to disclose one’s religious beliefs or as a restriction on the freedom to manifest one’s religion in worship, teaching, practice and  <mask>.


43.  The applicant submitted that the refusal to provide him with a meat‑free diet in prison in accordance with his religious precepts infringed his right to manifest his religion through  <mask> of the rules of the Buddhist religion. The Government argued that in the present case, vegetarianism could not be considered an essential aspect of the practice of the applicant's religion, since the strict Mahayana school to which the applicant claimed to adhere only encouraged vegetarianism but did not prescribe it.


128.  The applicant complained that his detention had been unlawful. The Court’s case-law in respect of the requirement of lawfulness referred primarily to the  <mask> of domestic law. Since the applicant’s detention had been ordered by “MRT courts”, created in breach of the relevant Moldovan legislation (see paragraphs 69-70 above), it could not be considered “lawful” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. Moreover, the principle of ex injuria jus non oritur dictated that acts which were contrary to international law could not become a source of legal acts for the wrongdoer.


30.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be the victim of a violation of his right to freedom to manifest his religion. They argued that the denial of the applicant’s request did not impair the essence of his right to manifest his religion, because the indication of religion on the identity card could not be interpreted as a measure compelling all Turkish citizens to disclose their religious beliefs and convictions and as a restriction on the freedom to manifest their religion in worship, teaching, practice and  <mask>. Furthermore, referring to the case-law of the Turkish courts (see paragraph 16 above), the Government argued that anyone wishing to delete the relevant information in its entirety could apply to the civil courts.


84.  The applicants submitted that the status of a registered religious community was inferior to that of a religious society and insufficient. They contended that the first applicant was subject to State control in respect of its religious doctrine, its rules on membership and the administration of its assets pursuant to sections 3-5 and 11 of the 1998 Religious Communities Act. They repeated in essence their above complaints. In particular, the applicants disputed the necessity of the ten-year waiting period, as the recognition of the Coptic Orthodox Church by a specific law in 2003 (see paragraph 45(e) above) proved the contrary. The Coptic Orthodox Church had only existed in Austria since 1976 and had been registered as a religious community in 1998. The applicants argued that most of the registered religious communities and even most of the recognised religious societies did not fulfil the criterion for the minimum number of adherents, which showed that this requirement was unnecessary for the  <mask> of public duties, contrary to what the Government maintained. Since the first applicant, which was the fifth largest religious community in Austria and was thus even bigger than most recognised religious societies, also complied with the necessary number of adherents, it should have been recognised a long time ago. Further, the requirement of the use of income and other assets for religious purposes, including charity activities, was discriminatory as it interfered in an unjustified way with the first applicant’s internal administration and organisation, in breach of both Article 9 of the Convention and Article 15 of the Basic Law 1867. The prerequisite of a positive attitude towards society and the State was discriminatory as it was not required in respect of any other natural or legal personality in Austria. Further, it did not meet the “prescribed by law” requirement under Article 9 § 2 of the Convention. The same applied to the criterion of non-interference with other religious societies. Moreover, under Austrian law, recognised religious societies enjoyed privileged treatment in various fields which did not extend to religious communities.


97.  The Government accepted that the right to freedom of religion included the freedom to manifest one’s religion through worship and  <mask>, but considered that in the present case the refusal to recognise the applicant Church did not amount to a prohibition of its activities or those of its members. The members of the applicant Church retained their freedom of religion, both as regards their freedom of conscience and as regards the freedom to manifest their beliefs through worship and practice.


29.  The Government were in agreement with the applicant that the ban on wearing the skullcap in the courtroom had amounted to a “limitation” on the manifestation of his religion. They relied in this connection on the case-law of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and General Comment No. 22 on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Committee on 27 September 1993, according to which “The  <mask> and practice of religion or belief may include ... the wearing of distinctive clothing or headcoverings” (document no. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, § 4). That said, the Government argued that the limitation was lawful. The House Rules on which the domestic decisions had relied should be read in conjunction with Article 242 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, affording trial judges wide discretion with regard to questions of court decorum (see paragraph 17 above). As regards the aim of the limitation, the Government maintained that the trial judge had simply enforced a generally accepted rule of civility and decent behaviour that skullcaps were not permitted in the courtroom in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the trial judge had acted to protect the principle of secularism, which was of vital importance in multicultural societies, such as that of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Considering also that the impugned measure had been taken in the context of a sensitive and complex case regarding a terrorist attack against the Embassy of the United States, the Government argued that the limitation in question had been proportionate.


91.  The Government claimed that the “fifteen-year rule” incorporated in the Religions Act complied with “universally accepted principles and rules of international law, provisions of the Russian Constitution and contemporary legal  <mask> in democratic States”. They maintained that the grounds for refusing State registration had been “purely legal” and prescribed by the Religions Act, that the decision had not been motivated by religious considerations and that there had been no causal link between the decision and the enjoyment of the right of citizens to freedom of religion and association. There had been no evidence of arbitrariness or discrimination on the ground of religion. The Government relied in that connection on the Court’s finding that “States have a right to satisfy themselves that an association’s aim and activities are in conformity with the rules laid down in legislation” (see Sidiropoulos and Others, cited above, § 40).


100.  The applicant contested the Chamber’s findings. In her observations of 27 September 2004 and her oral submissions at the hearing, she argued that the notions of “democracy” and “republic” were not alike. While many totalitarian regimes claimed to be “republics”, only a true democracy could be based on the principles of pluralism and broadmindedness. The structure of the judicial and university systems in Turkey had been determined by the successive coups d’état by the military in 1960, 1971 and 1980. Referring to the Court’s case-law and the  <mask> that had been adopted in a number of countries in Europe, the applicant further submitted that the Contracting States should not be given a wide margin of appreciation to regulate students’ dress. She explained that no European State prohibited students from wearing the Islamic headscarf at university and added that there had been no sign of tension in institutions of higher education that would have justified such a radical measure.


30.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be the victim of a violation of his right to freedom to manifest his religion. They argued that the denial of the applicant’s request did not impair the essence of his right to manifest his religion, because the indication of religion on the identity card could not be interpreted as a measure compelling all Turkish citizens to disclose their religious beliefs and convictions and as a restriction on the freedom to manifest their religion in worship, teaching,  <mask> and observance. Furthermore, referring to the case-law of the Turkish courts (see paragraph 16 above), the Government argued that anyone wishing to delete the relevant information in its entirety could apply to the civil courts.


97.  The Government accepted that the right to freedom of religion included the freedom to manifest one’s religion through worship and observance, but considered that in the present case the refusal to recognise the applicant Church did not amount to a prohibition of its activities or those of its members. The members of the applicant Church retained their freedom of religion, both as regards their freedom of conscience and as regards the freedom to manifest their beliefs through worship and  <mask>.


60.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s expulsion was justified in the light of the European Parliament’s Resolution on Cults in Europe of 29 February 1996, in which it had expressed concern over certain cults “engaging in activities of an illicit or criminal nature and in violations of human rights, such as maltreatment, sexual abuse, unlawful detention, slavery, the encouragement of aggressive behaviour or propagation of racist ideologies, tax fraud, illegal transfers of funds, trafficking in arms or drugs, violation of labour laws, the illegal  <mask> of medicine”. The Government also referred to the same effect to Recommendation 1178 (1992) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on sects and new religious movements and the Committee of Ministers’ supplementary reply to that Recommendation, adopted on 17 February 1994 (doc. 7030). The Government inferred from those documents that States had the right and obligation to exercise vigilance and caution in such sensitive matters as spreading religious teachings. The applicant’s activity as a coordinator of Rev. Moon’s groups had been merely a “motive” rather than a “ground” for the Russian authorities “to exercise vigilance and make use of existing legal instruments”. The grounds for the applicant’s exclusion were the results of the operational and search measures as reflected in the report by the Stavropol Regional Branch of the Federal Security Service, dated 18 February 2002, concerning the banning of the applicant from the Russian Federation. As the Moscow City Court had pointed out in its judgment of 25 March 2003, the applicant’s activities in the Russian territory were “of a destructive nature and pose[d] a threat to the security of the Russian Federation”. The Government emphasised that the threat resulted from the applicant’s activities rather than his religious beliefs.


76.  The applicants noted that “religious groups”, as defined in the Religions Act, could operate without State interference. However, the status of a “religious group” entailed severe restrictions on community religious  <mask>. A “religious group” had no legal personality; it could not acquire rights or obligations, and it could not protect its interests in court. Given the list of rights reserved to registered religious organisations in sections 15-24 of the Religions Act – including such fundamental aspects of “worship, teaching, practice and observance” as the right to establish places of worship, the right to hold religious services in other places accessible to the public, and the right to produce and/or acquire religious literature – a “religious group” was not a religious community with any substantial rights or “autonomous existence”, an issue which the Court had found to be “at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords” (see Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, no. 45701/99, § 118, ECHR 2001‑XII).


2.  The Government submitted that section 16 § 5 of the Religions Act, interpreted in conjunction with section 7 § 1 of the Public Gatherings Act, required the organisers of religious assemblies in non-residential premises to notify the local authorities, in writing and in advance. Moreover, the Government claimed that section 5 § 1 of the Education Act prohibited religious assemblies from being held in educational establishments. Both justifications are unfounded, and have already being rejected by this Court in Kuznetsov and Others[3]. More specifically, in that seminal case the Court found a violation of Article 9 of the Convention on account of the disruption of an indoor religious meeting. The Court found that the State’s interference was not even prescribed by law, since the Government neither specified the nature of the allegedly missing documents in accordance with the Religions Act, nor produced any documents relating to the official powers of the commissioner and two senior police officers to interrupt and disperse the indoor religious meeting. In addition, the fact of holding the religious meeting on college premises outside normal college hours had not been contrary to the Education Act. In that same judgment, the Court referred to the case-law of the Russian Supreme Court, dating from at least 1999, to the effect that religious assemblies do not require any prior authorisation from, or notification to, the public authorities[4]. There is no valid reason to change this precedent[5]. On the contrary, as will be shown, the subsequent  <mask> of the respondent State justifies insistence on this case-law[6].


44.  The applicants further observed that, at the cantonal level, point 9.2.4 of the primary-school curriculum for the Canton of Basle Urban included swimming, and point 9.2.5 included ice-skating. According to the applicants, however, ice-skating was not taught at all in  <mask>. Thus, again according to the applicants, it could not be claimed on the basis of this curriculum that swimming classes formed part of the compulsory teaching of gymnastics and sport. They added that, furthermore, not all schools in the Canton of Basle Urban offered swimming lessons.


87.  The applicant union submitted that priests and clerical staff of the Romanian Orthodox Church had a similar status to civil servants. Like civil servants, they were recruited by competitive examination. They were then appointed by the bishop by means of a decision setting out their rights and obligations. They took an oath upon their ordination and their salaries were set in the law governing the remuneration of all public servants and reduced by the same proportion in the event of an economic crisis. They paid contributions to the general social security scheme and were entitled to the full range of welfare benefits. Furthermore, similarly to universities, the Romanian Orthodox Church was allocated funds from the State budget to pay its employees’ wages. Accordingly, the applicant union submitted that neither the Romanian Orthodox Church’s  <mask> of not signing employment contracts with its staff nor the fact that it paid part of their wages from its own funds could affect the actual nature of the relationship between the Church and its employees, since the relationship entailed all the aspects of an employment contract and was similar to that between civil servants and the institution employing them.


78.  The applicant further complained that the failure of the domestic authorities adequately to protect him from the demonstrators and properly to investigate the incident amounted to a violation of his rights under Article 9 of the Convention. This was because, in his submission, the domestic authorities’ failures prevented him from exercising his Article 9 right to peacefully  <mask> his beliefs in the company of fellow worshippers. Article 9 provides:


43.   The applicant contested this view and maintained that if the relevant domestic legislation provided for exemptions from military or alternative civilian service, it should do so without any discrimination. During the time of his civilian service he had had to work forty hours a week, and thus had been unable to perform his functions as a deacon and preacher and had had to limit the  <mask> of his religion to his spare time.


43.  The applicant submitted that the refusal to provide him with a meat‑free diet in prison in accordance with his religious precepts infringed his right to manifest his religion through observance of the rules of the Buddhist religion. The Government argued that in the present case, vegetarianism could not be considered an essential aspect of the  <mask> of the applicant's religion, since the strict Mahayana school to which the applicant claimed to adhere only encouraged vegetarianism but did not prescribe it.


24.  The Government submitted that, in contrast to the facts found in Boychev and Others, cited above, there was no evidence in the present case to support the view that the police action of 27 September 1995 interrupted a religious meeting. As could be seen from the summons requiring the applicant to appear at the police station, she was informed of the search well in advance. The summons was issued under the Public Education Act and decree no. 367/194 of the Supreme Prosecution Office (see paragraph 8 above) and was aimed at regulating educational activities. It followed, in the Government’s view, that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of religion. In addition, the Government argued that the law in force at the material time allowing for interference with the rights under Article 9 should be assessed in context. Arguments had been put forward at the relevant time to suggest that followers of Word of Life, particularly minors, were at risk of isolation and lower standards of protection in medical, educational and civil terms. The prosecutorial authorities were part of the judiciary, not the executive and the police took action as sanctioned by the prosecutor’s office. The actions of the police were well founded and fully in compliance with the Supreme Court’s judgment of 1 April 1994, refusing registration of the three organisations affiliated with Word of Life (see paragraph 6 above). Moreover, the lack of registration as a religious denomination had never been an obstacle for its followers to profess their religion or  <mask> their activity.


29.  The Government argued that the applicant could have, but had not, made use of the remedies of a compensatory nature governed by the provisions of Articles 23 and 24 of the Civil Code, in conjunction with Article 445 or Article 448 of the Civil Code, in order to bring an action for compensation for incarceration in conditions that were not in conformity with his religious beliefs. In their opinion, a person deprived of his or her liberty and who suffered a violation of his or her personal rights as a result of the authorities' failure to provide food in conformity with religious beliefs was entitled to bring a civil action against the State Treasury. The Government did not refer to any examples of judicial  <mask> in this connection.


57.  The applicants submitted that the refusal of the Austrian authorities to grant legal personality to the first applicant by conferring on it the status of a religious society recognised under the Recognition Act violated their right to freedom of religion. In particular, before July 1998, the first applicant could not have been established as a legal entity and, thus, could not have entered into legal relations, concluded contracts or acquired assets. The first applicant had, thus far, no internal autonomy, could not hire the necessary religious ministers and was not entitled to perform its pastoral work for believers in hospitals or prisons. The second to fifth applicants, as leading executives of the first applicant, were also limited in exercising their right to freedom of religion. Neither the Basic Law 1867 nor the 1998 Religious Communities Act provided explicitly for the internal autonomy of a religious community. The Constitutional Court had found (in its judgment of 3 March 2001, B1713/98 – see paragraph 34 above) that registered religious communities, unlike recognised religious societies, did not enjoy the right to comprehensive organisation and administration of their internal affairs without State interference. Lastly, the applicants contested that they would have had the possibility of forming an association under the Associations Act. They referred to the Constitutional Court’s finding of 1929 (VfSlg. 1265/1929), confirming the administrative authorities’  <mask> not to allow religious societies to form an association, and thus refusing the request of the Jehovah’s Witnesses (Ernste Bibelforscher) to set up an association. Thereafter the Jehovah’s Witnesses had not tried again to form an association, but auxiliary associations (Hilfsvereine) with specialised religious aims had been created. The two examples of associations submitted by the Government were likewise merely auxiliary associations. It was not until the enactment of the 2002 Associations Act that religious societies had been allowed to set up an association.


28.   The applicant contested this view and maintained that if the relevant domestic legislation provided for exemptions from military or alternative civilian service, it should do so without any discrimination. During the time of his civilian service he had had to work forty hours a week and, thus, had been unable to perform his functions as a deacon and preacher and had had to limit the  <mask> of his religion to his spare time.


42.  The applicant argued that he had never declared himself as Christian Orthodox. He was born in the former USSR, where christening children was not a common  <mask>. He was raised as an atheist and embraced the Buddhist faith later in life. In detention, he relied on the vegetarian food his family sent him by post, but after the adoption of the Minister of Justice’s order no. 3042/2007 he could no longer receive parcels by post. His family had difficulty travelling to the prison regularly. When he was refused a vegetarian diet by the prison authorities he adopted a diet of bread and margarine and sometimes marmalade. He maintained that the Rahova prison authorities’ failure to provide him with a vegetarian diet amounted to a violation of his freedom of religion.


19.  The applicant association argued that a constitutional appeal was not an effective remedy for its complaints. Under the applicable rules and the established  <mask> of the Constitutional Court, only physical persons had standing to bring a constitutional appeal. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court had never embarked on a thorough review of the specific circumstances of a particular case, but had rather accepted the grounds provided by the lower courts. The reasons for which that court had rejected O.M.’s appeal had clearly demonstrated that it declined jurisdiction to decide the issues complained of.


29.  The Government were in agreement with the applicant that the ban on wearing the skullcap in the courtroom had amounted to a “limitation” on the manifestation of his religion. They relied in this connection on the case-law of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and General Comment No. 22 on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Committee on 27 September 1993, according to which “The observance and  <mask> of religion or belief may include ... the wearing of distinctive clothing or headcoverings” (document no. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, § 4). That said, the Government argued that the limitation was lawful. The House Rules on which the domestic decisions had relied should be read in conjunction with Article 242 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, affording trial judges wide discretion with regard to questions of court decorum (see paragraph 17 above). As regards the aim of the limitation, the Government maintained that the trial judge had simply enforced a generally accepted rule of civility and decent behaviour that skullcaps were not permitted in the courtroom in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the trial judge had acted to protect the principle of secularism, which was of vital importance in multicultural societies, such as that of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Considering also that the impugned measure had been taken in the context of a sensitive and complex case regarding a terrorist attack against the Embassy of the United States, the Government argued that the limitation in question had been proportionate.


33.  The Government submitted that there had been no interference in the exercise by the applicant of his right to freedom of religion, because no direct connection could be made between the indication of religion on identity cards and freedom of religion and conscience. It could not be construed as a requirement to disclose one’s religious beliefs or as a restriction on the freedom to manifest one’s religion in worship, teaching,  <mask> and observance.


58.  The Government submitted that in 2003 Armenia had enacted a law on alternative service as part of the commitments undertaken upon joining the Council of Europe. Unfortunately, it had transpired that there were a number of omissions in that law and inconsistencies with the European standards. However, in deciding on the applicants’ criminal cases, the domestic courts had been bound to apply the law as in force at the material time. Referring to the findings of the Criminal Court of Appeal, the Government argued that the alternative labour service available at the material time had been of a civilian nature and contained only a few formal elements of military supervision in theory, not being directly controlled by the military in  <mask>. Thus, the interference was legitimate and prescribed by law.


174.  The applicants’ allegations of religious motivation behind the respondent State’s actions found by the Court to have occurred in the current case are supported by the following factual circumstances: the largest religious gatherings of the applicants, all Jehovah’s Witnesses, were disrupted with the direct involvement of various State officials or by their acquiescence and connivance (see criminal cases nos. 1, 2 and 4, paragraphs 105-112, 115-121, and 122-125 above); the police refused to intervene to protect the applicants as soon as they learnt about their religious background and individual applicants were additionally subjected to religious insults when lodging their complaints with the police (see criminal cases nos. 3, 7, 15-18, 22 and 26, paragraphs 24-25, 37, 46, 49, 51, 54, 61, 65 and 68 above); subsequently, the national authorities showed absolute indifference towards the applicants’ numerous complaints concerning various acts of aggression. Indeed, as the Court has concluded above, there was a systematic  <mask> on the part of the Georgian authorities of tolerating religious violence against Jehovah’s Witnesses (see paragraphs 145‑146 above).


27.  The Government submitted that there were serious reasons for the local authorities not to enforce the final judgment in the applicants’ favour: the existence of an on-going dispute as to the church property between two competing denominations; the risk that registering the applicants’ denomination could provoke unrest; and the fact that another denomination with the same name had already been registered in the same town. Moreover, in  <mask> the applicants had not been prevented from exercising their religious rights, as they did not need registration for that purpose. They considered that the refusal of the Regional Council to issue the relevant document had been based on clear legal provisions, notably the prohibition on registering two organisations with the same name and the same address. Moreover, after 17 August 2007 no confirmation in a separate document had been required.


72.  The Government explained that forty-two religious communities had been registered in Croatia and that, in  <mask>, it was not feasible to allow each of them to provide religious education in public schools and nurseries or to have religious marriages they performed officially recognised. For this reason, the State had to enjoy a margin of appreciation as regards the conditions to be fulfilled by religious communities in order to be granted those privileges.


100.  The Government and the third party expressed doubts as to whether the case was about freedom of religion. They alleged that the applicants’ concern was not the  <mask> of religion but their ambition to control property and gain power to administer the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. The Government also stated that it was not the Court’s role to decide who the legitimate leader of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was and expressed the view that for that reason the case did not concern human rights.


85.  The Government contended that there had been no discrimination of the applicants in respect of the first applicant’s status as a registered recognised community, as the criteria introduced by section 11 of the 1998 Religious Communities Act had already corresponded to the administrative authorities’  <mask> for granting recognition under the 1874 Recognition Act before the entry into force of the 1998 Act. In respect of the ten-year waiting period for registered religious communities, the Government referred to the Constitutional Court’s finding of 3 March 2001 (VfSlg. 12.102/2001) that that requirement served the legitimate aim of ensuring that the competent authority could verify during this period of time whether the religious community was ready to integrate into the existing legal order, in particular whether it performed unlawful activities as a consequence of which legal personality had to be withdrawn (section 9(2) and section 5(1) of the Religious Communities Act). Examples of such unlawful activities were incitement to commit criminal offences, endangering the psychological development of minors, violating the psychological integrity of persons or using psychotherapeutic methods to disseminate its religious beliefs.


93. The Government further submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available to him in respect to his complaint concerning visiting the prison church and possessing religious literature. They noted in this connection that the detainees’ right to  <mask> their religion, including visiting a church and possessing religious literature, was clearly provided by Article 9 of the Pre-Trial Detention Act. The SIZO had a chapel which detainees had been free to visit. According to the Government, in a case of a violation of the rights set forth in the mentioned Article, the applicant should have complained about it to the prosecutor or directly to the administrative court.


34.  The applicant submitted that under Article 9 of the Convention the State was obliged to respect and support the individual's freedom to  <mask> his or her religion. Any limitations could be set only in the interest of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. In the applicant's opinion observing vegetarianism could not be described as a threat to public safety, health, morals or the rights and freedoms of others.


25.  The applicant complained under Article 9 of the Convention that the measures taken against her, namely her questioning by the police, the search and seizure and the warning order, interfered with her right to  <mask> collectively with like-minded adherents of the Evangelical faith in a home environment. In addition, the denial of legal registration to her church was done is a spirit which lacked any semblance of State neutrality. At all stages, the State authorities acted on the basis of discriminatory value judgments rather than evidence. The applicant considered that the measures were not prescribed by law, since they were arbitrary and based on legal provisions which allowed an unfettered discretion to the executive. Finally, the measures were not necessary in a democratic society. There was no evidence that that the religious beliefs of the members of the applicant’s church were responsible for family separation, isolation and suicide. The action of the state authorities failed to respect the need for true religious pluralism, which is inherent in the concept of a democratic society.


54.  The Government claimed, firstly, that the applicants had failed to produce – in the domestic proceedings or before this Court – any evidence in support of their allegation that the meeting had been disrupted. In their submission, Mr Kuznetsov, confronted with the request to produce documents demonstrating the lawfulness of the community meeting, realised that “the meeting should not be held” and indicated to the congregation that the meeting should end. The Government also asserted that the founding documents of the Jehovah's Witnesses religious organisations did not provide for the forms of  <mask> mentioned by the applicants – a “worship meeting” or “religious meeting”.


66.  The Government further submitted that there was no violation of the applicant's right to freedom of religion or any restriction on that right. The penalty imposed on the applicant “was not harsh and was not motivated by religious factors, but by a failure to submit to the Religions Act and violation of the administrative procedure”. The refusal of re-registration of the applicant did not entail a ban on its activity. Members of the applicant continued to profess their faith, hold services of  <mask> and ceremonies, and guide their followers.


42.  The applicant claimed non-pecuniary damages of EUR 20,000 in respect of the mental suffering she had experienced as a result of her questioning by the police about her deeply-held faith and the subsequent search of her flat and seizure of her possessions. These measures had also left her in doubt as to whether she was free to continue to  <mask> in her own home with other members of her church.


68.  The applicant challenged the Government's assertions that the applicant “possessed the full capacity as a legal entity” and that it “exercised financial, economic and other activity in full measure” as untrue. The result of the obstruction of the Moscow Justice Department, as upheld by the Presnenskiy District Court on 1 September 2003, was that the applicant had been “frozen in time” and deprived of a possibility to modify its founding documents – and, accordingly, its aims, structure and internal organisation – in accordance with the law and its changing needs. For example, the applicant had been barred from introducing into its charter the right to establish places of  <mask> and new procedures for election and dismissal of its president. Furthermore, the Press Ministry had denied registration of its newspaper for no other reason than the on-going uncertainty as regards the applicant's rights created by the refusal of re-registration. In that context, the entering of the applicant on the Unified State Register of Legal Entities had been made due to internal administrative reforms and did not constitute re-registration for the purposes of the Religions Act.


166.  The Government further submitted that there was no violation of the applicants' right to freedom of religion or any restriction on that right. The penalty imposed on the applicant community “was not harsh and was not motivated by religious factors, but by a failure to observe the law and a violation of the administrative procedure”. Members of the applicant community continued to profess their faith, hold services of  <mask> and ceremonies, and guide their followers. Thus, from 5 to 7 July 2002 the applicant community had held a regional congress of Jehovah's Witnesses which had been attended by up to 24,000 believers.


33.  The Government submitted that there had been no interference in the exercise by the applicant of his right to freedom of religion, because no direct connection could be made between the indication of religion on identity cards and freedom of religion and conscience. It could not be construed as a requirement to disclose one’s religious beliefs or as a restriction on the freedom to manifest one’s religion in  <mask>, teaching, practice and observance.


43.  The Government claimed firstly that the service of  <mask>, involving, as it did, many participants, had created noise and disturbed the public order and that the police had acted in response to a complaint about that disturbance. Secondly, they submitted that the Academy of Agriculture was not a “religious building” within the meaning of section 16 § 2 of the Religions Act. That section allowed believers to carry out services and rites on “other premises which were provided for that purpose” but it did not specify what premises fell into that category. The Government further pointed out that section 5 § 1 of the Education Act prohibited political and religious organisations from being set up or operating in educational establishments. Moreover, by law the two religious groups which had conducted the service on 12 April 2006 could only use premises provided by their members, whereas the rental contact for the premises in question had been entered into between the Academy and the Administrative Centre of Jehovah’s Witnesses. In such circumstances, the applicants had to exercise their constitutional right to freedom of assembly in accordance with section 16 § 5 of the Religions Act, that is, in compliance with the procedure established for holding public gatherings. Section 7 § 1 of the Public Gatherings Act required the organisers to notify the local authorities in advance in writing, which the applicants had failed to do. In the Government’s view, failure to provide advance notice was contrary to the principle of lawfulness in section 3 § 1 of the Public Gatherings Act and was a sufficient ground for its termination on account of its unlawfulness.


42.  The applicants complained that the premature termination of their religious meeting on account of the arrival of the police amounted to a violation of Articles 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. The Court reiterates that, where the nature of a meeting is primarily religious, as it was in the present case, where the applicants had gathered for a service of  <mask>, a complaint about the disruption of the meeting is to be examined from the standpoint of Article 9 alone (see Kuznetsov and Others v. Russia, no. 184/02, § 53, 11 January 2007), which reads as follows:


30.  The applicant’s complaint concerns the rating status of its temple in Preston. This building is considered by the members of the applicant Church to constitute its most sacred centre. It is used as a place of congregational religious  <mask> by those who have established their devotion and been accorded a “recommend” (see paragraphs 6-7 above).  In the domestic proceedings, the opinion of the majority of the House of Lords was that the subject-matter of complaint did not come within the ambit of Article 9 of the Convention, with the consequence that Article 14 did not apply, since the refusal of the tax exemption did not prevent Mormons from manifesting their religion and since the tax exemption rules were applied neutrally to all religious groups and not directed specifically at the applicant Church (see paragraph 11 above). The Court can well understand such an assessment by the national courts of the facts of the present case, although it may be that in certain circumstances issues concerning the operation of religious buildings, including expenses incurred as a result of the taxation status of such buildings, are capable of having an impact on the exercise of the right of members of religious groups to manifest religious belief (see, mutatis mutandis, Association Les Témoins de Jéhovah v. France, no. 8916/05, §§ 48-54, 30 June 2011). The Court does not, however, need to decide whether, in the particular circumstances, the applicant’s complaint about the application to it of the tax exemption legislation falls within the ambit of Article 9, so that Article 14 applies, since for the reasons given below it has come to the conclusion that the claim of discrimination is unfounded on its merits.


19.  The applicant reasoned that the Preston temple and its curtilage, including the vestry or dressing room, utility rooms, office space used for temple administration and refectory used for dining by temple worshippers, ought to be exempt from business rates. However, it emphasised that its dispute with the Government concerned the principle of the exemption in relation to the temple, rather than its precise extent. The tax provisions at issue resulted in differential treatment. They imposed a tax burden on the applicant’s temple which was not applied to other religious structures. More importantly, they excluded the applicant’s most sacred space and rituals from eligibility for tax exemption, while granting exempt status to the full range of  <mask> for other denominations. Implicit in this differentiation were non-neutral State assumptions, stereotypes and stigmatisation that operated prejudicially against the applicant and those if its members who chose to engage in temple worship.


76.  The applicants noted that “religious groups”, as defined in the Religions Act, could operate without State interference. However, the status of a “religious group” entailed severe restrictions on community religious practice. A “religious group” had no legal personality; it could not acquire rights or obligations, and it could not protect its interests in court. Given the list of rights reserved to registered religious organisations in sections 15-24 of the Religions Act – including such fundamental aspects of “ <mask>, teaching, practice and observance” as the right to establish places of worship, the right to hold religious services in other places accessible to the public, and the right to produce and/or acquire religious literature – a “religious group” was not a religious community with any substantial rights or “autonomous existence”, an issue which the Court had found to be “at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords” (see Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, no. 45701/99, § 118, ECHR 2001‑XII).


85.  The applicants stated that the Religious Denominations Act 2002 in itself constituted an arbitrary interference with their rights under Article 9 of the Convention. They characterised as misleading and inappropriate the Government’s argument that the new legal regime resembled the rules governing the status of the predominant religions in other European countries, such as Denmark and Italy. The crucial difference in the present case was, in the applicants’ view, that the ex lege recognition of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church had been introduced in the Religious Denominations Act 2002 in the context of an ongoing dispute between two leaderships and had, moreover, been aimed at putting an end to this dispute by favouring one of the two leaderships to the exclusion of the other. The applicants referred to the Court’s case-law, according to which the use of legislation and decrees to place a religious community under a single leadership and the removal of the opposing group from places of  <mask> or other property constituted arbitrary State interference with the internal organisation of the religious community. The applicants considered that the heavy-handedness and discriminatory intent of the Bulgarian Government in the present case not only mirrored their approach criticised by the Court in Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria ([GC], no. 30985/96, ECHR 2000‑XI), but far surpassed it in gravity.


97.  The Government accepted that the right to freedom of religion included the freedom to manifest one’s religion through  <mask> and observance, but considered that in the present case the refusal to recognise the applicant Church did not amount to a prohibition of its activities or those of its members. The members of the applicant Church retained their freedom of religion, both as regards their freedom of conscience and as regards the freedom to manifest their beliefs through worship and practice.


104.  The applicants asserted that, according to Moldovan law, only religions recognised by the State may be practised and that refusing to recognise the applicant Church therefore amounted to forbidding it to operate, both as a liturgical body and as an association. The applicants who are natural persons may not express their beliefs through  <mask>, since only a denomination recognised by the State can enjoy legal protection.


30.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be the victim of a violation of his right to freedom to manifest his religion. They argued that the denial of the applicant’s request did not impair the essence of his right to manifest his religion, because the indication of religion on the identity card could not be interpreted as a measure compelling all Turkish citizens to disclose their religious beliefs and convictions and as a restriction on the freedom to manifest their religion in  <mask>, teaching, practice and observance. Furthermore, referring to the case-law of the Turkish courts (see paragraph 16 above), the Government argued that anyone wishing to delete the relevant information in its entirety could apply to the civil courts.


21.  The applicant contended that its temple  <mask> should be treated with the same respect and accorded the same tax exempt treatment as the worship facilities of the Church of England and other denominations. Temple worship, by its very nature as understood by its believers, required that only those who voluntarily lived by the kinds of commitments made in the temple should be allowed to participate. This was not a case of worship being made private for the purposes of being exclusive or to provide private benefit; it was because the very nature of the worship as understood by its believers required privacy to promote the sacred character of the worship. The relevant analogy would be to insist that the tax exemption be denied to space devoted to confessionals or to the area behind the iconostasis in Orthodox churches. Just as an invitation to the general public to enter these spaces would disrupt sacred practices, so the nature of temple worship would be destroyed if there were a general requirement that the public be able to sit in. It was inappropriate for State officials to engage in drawing lines that discriminated between religions on the basis of mistaken understandings of the nature and impact of religious practices or merely because such practices are different from those of more familiar religions.


27.  The applicant challenged the submission that the ban in question satisfied the condition laid down in paragraph 2 of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention of necessity in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the prevention of disorder, the  <mask> or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. With regard to the aim of “living together” in a democratic society, it was the opposite reasoning – that of openness and tolerance – which should take precedence in a pluralist democratic society as was evidenced by the tolerance that there had always been of dress codes rejecting the living together principle. At best, it could be regarded as a praiseworthy political objective, but one that could not be achieved by some stigmatising by-laws that were contrary to the Convention. In her submission, the factors justifying the ban on safety grounds had been advanced exclusively with regard to the full-face veil, were non-existent and the real aim being pursued by the by-laws was the prohibition of the full-face veil in public places. She argued, lastly, that the issue of dignity and gender equality was irrelevant to justification on grounds of “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” since the exercise of the freedom and wishes of women themselves was hindered.


78.  The Government admitted that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. However, they considered that such interference had been necessary in a democratic society and had been justified by the need to ensure  <mask> and to prevent any obstruction by the applicant of the investigation of the criminal case against him.


14.  The Government submitted that the applicants’ conviction had had a legal basis and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting national security,  <mask>, public order and the rights of others, as well as preventing crime. The applicants had been convicted of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation and not for a manifestation of their beliefs. The venue chosen – the premises of a political party – had not been an appropriate venue for a religious ceremony.


34.  The applicant submitted that under Article 9 of the Convention the State was obliged to respect and support the individual's freedom to practice his or her religion. Any limitations could be set only in the interest of  <mask>, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. In the applicant's opinion observing vegetarianism could not be described as a threat to public safety, health, morals or the rights and freedoms of others.


68.  The Government submitted that in democratic societies, in which several religions coexisted within one and the same population, it was necessary to place restrictions on the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs were respected. Rules in this sphere could vary from one country to another in accordance with national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order. Accordingly, the choice of the extent and form such regulations took had to be left up to a point to the State concerned, as it depended on the specific domestic context. They referred in this context to Leyla Şahin v. Turkey ([GC], no. 44774/98, §§ 106-09, ECHR 2005‑XI). The Government interpreted the cases of Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France ([GC], no. 27417/95, § 84, ECHR 2000‑VII) and Wingrove v. the United Kingdom (25 November 1996, § 58, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V) to mean that where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions were at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society might differ widely, the role of the national decision-making body had to be given special importance. Given that Said Nursi’s books incited religious discord and proclaimed religious superiority and could therefore provoke serious religious clashes with unpredictable negative consequences, the ban on their publication and dissemination had pursued the aims of protecting territorial integrity and  <mask> in Russia, public order and the rights of others. Moreover, it had been necessary in a democratic society, taking into account the tense ethnic situation in the country and the possible negative impact of those books on non-religious citizens.


27.  The applicant challenged the submission that the ban in question satisfied the condition laid down in paragraph 2 of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention of necessity in a democratic society in the interests of  <mask>, for the prevention of disorder, the protection of health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. With regard to the aim of “living together” in a democratic society, it was the opposite reasoning – that of openness and tolerance – which should take precedence in a pluralist democratic society as was evidenced by the tolerance that there had always been of dress codes rejecting the living together principle. At best, it could be regarded as a praiseworthy political objective, but one that could not be achieved by some stigmatising by-laws that were contrary to the Convention. In her submission, the factors justifying the ban on safety grounds had been advanced exclusively with regard to the full-face veil, were non-existent and the real aim being pursued by the by-laws was the prohibition of the full-face veil in public places. She argued, lastly, that the issue of dignity and gender equality was irrelevant to justification on grounds of “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” since the exercise of the freedom and wishes of women themselves was hindered.


77.  The applicant further argued that the interference was not necessary in a democratic society. Firstly, the fact that he – a conscientious objector who was committed to living peacefully with his neighbours and who had a blank criminal record – was imprisoned and treated like a dangerous criminal was totally unnecessary in a democratic society. In particular, he had been subjected to a harassing search process, had later been arrested and locked up in a cell without any bedding and with six others detained for various crimes, and had been subjected to insults and verbal abuse by the guards. Secondly, he had been subjected to wholly disproportionate punishment and treatment considering that he was simply exercising his fundamental right to  <mask>, conscience and religion. Thirdly, his imprisonment had not been necessary also because the Armenian authorities had pardoned other individuals in a similar situation. Lastly, the military protection of the country would not be disorganised and weakened if persons like him were not punished. In particular, Armenia had 125,000 active conscripts in 2007 and 551,000 potential ones, while only 41 Jehovah’s Witnesses were imprisoned. Moreover, since 2002 only three individuals belonging to other religions had decided to become conscientious objectors. Such insignificant numbers could not have a negative impact on the military capacity of Armenia.


59.  The Government further submitted that the present case was to be distinguished from the Bayatyan case, since the applicants in the present case had had the possibility of substituting military service with alternative service of a civilian nature. Nevertheless, taking into account the shift in the case-law brought about by the Bayatyan judgment and a number of opinions and recommendations of various international bodies, including the Venice Commission, the domestic law had been amended on 2 May 2013 in order to provide a possibility for those who objected not only to the carrying of arms or performing other military activities but also to serving under any type of military command in general. In conclusion, there had been no interference with the applicants’ right to  <mask>, conscience or religion and there had been no violation of Article 9 of the Convention.


97.  The Government claimed that the interference in the form of dissolution of the applicant community had been justified, prescribed by law and had also pursued a legitimate aim. They referred to the Court's position to the effect that the State was “entitled to verify whether a movement or association carries on, ostensibly in pursuit of religious aims, activities which are harmful to the population” (Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, 26 September 1996, § 40, Reports 1996‑IV) and also “may legitimately consider it necessary to take measures aimed at repressing certain forms of conduct... judged incompatible with respect for the  <mask>, conscience and religion of others” (Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, § 47, Series A no. 295‑A).


75.  The Government observed that the issue of whether or not pupils followed religion/ethics courses was a delicate one, since the parents' choice, taken in conformity with their own convictions, might cause their child to belong to a minority in a certain class or school. The authorities should do their utmost to minimise the risk of a child's stigmatisation because he or she did not follow a religion/ethics course. It was the school's duty to provide pupils who did not follow a class in religion or ethics with care and supervision whenever they were on the school premises. It was also the school's duty to react to all manifestations of intolerance towards such children. The Government claimed that those obligations had been complied with in the present case. They also noted that, owing to the nature of the issue, it was not only the school which had positive obligations with respect to  <mask>, conscience and religion; it was first and foremost the parents' duty to ensure that their children understood the choice made by them as regards religion/ethics education at school. The Government observed that the press articles attached to the application lodged by Mr and Mrs Grzelak did not support the assertion that it was their intention to protect their personal beliefs from being disclosed.


29.  The Government were in agreement with the applicant that the ban on wearing the skullcap in the courtroom had amounted to a “limitation” on the manifestation of his religion. They relied in this connection on the case-law of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and General Comment No. 22 on the right to  <mask>, conscience and religion adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Committee on 27 September 1993, according to which “The observance and practice of religion or belief may include ... the wearing of distinctive clothing or headcoverings” (document no. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, § 4). That said, the Government argued that the limitation was lawful. The House Rules on which the domestic decisions had relied should be read in conjunction with Article 242 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, affording trial judges wide discretion with regard to questions of court decorum (see paragraph 17 above). As regards the aim of the limitation, the Government maintained that the trial judge had simply enforced a generally accepted rule of civility and decent behaviour that skullcaps were not permitted in the courtroom in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the trial judge had acted to protect the principle of secularism, which was of vital importance in multicultural societies, such as that of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Considering also that the impugned measure had been taken in the context of a sensitive and complex case regarding a terrorist attack against the Embassy of the United States, the Government argued that the limitation in question had been proportionate.


79.  The Government agreed that the Convention was a “living instrument”. However, the question of whether Article 9 of the Convention was applicable to the present case was to be considered from the point of view of the interpretation of the Convention existing at the material time. The applicant had been convicted in the years 2001-02 and his conviction at that time had been in line with the approach of the international community and was considered to be lawful and justified under the Convention as interpreted by the Commission and the Court. In particular, the Commission had found in Peters v. the Netherlands (no. 22793/93, Commission decision of 30 November 1994, unreported) and Heudens v. Belgium (no. 24630/94, Commission decision of 22 May 1995, unreported), which were the latest decisions on the matter, that the right to  <mask>, conscience and religion guaranteed by Article 9 did not concern exemption from compulsory military service on religious or political grounds. The Court had not even recognised the applicability of Article 9 in its more recent judgments, where it had not found it necessary to examine the issue (see, for example, Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], no. 34369/97, § 43, ECHR 2000-IV, and Ülke v. Turkey, no. 39437/98, §§ 53-54, 24 January 2006). The Armenian authorities had therefore acted in compliance with the requirements of the Convention. Given the established case-law on this matter, they could not have foreseen the possibility of a new interpretation of Article 9 by the Court and consequently could not have made their actions comply with that possible “new approach”.


78.  The Government submitted that the rights guaranteed by the Convention and the Armenian Constitution, including the right to  <mask>, conscience and religion, were to be applied to everyone equally and without discrimination. The applicant, an Armenian citizen, was obliged under the Constitution to perform compulsory military service regardless of his religious convictions and the fulfilment of such obligation could not be considered an interference with his rights. The law did not include such grounds for exemption from military service as being a Jehovah’s Witness. Thus, exemption from compulsory military service on a ground not prescribed by law would have been in breach of the principle of equality and non-discrimination.


81.  The applicant said that while university authorities, including vice-chancellors’ offices and deaneries, were unquestionably at liberty to use the powers vested in them by law, the scope of those powers and the limits on them were also defined by law, as were the procedures by which they were to be exercised and the  <mask> of authority. In the instant case, the Vice-Chancellor had not possessed the authority or power, either under the laws in force or the Students Disciplinary Procedure Rules, to refuse students “wearing the headscarf” access to university premises or examination rooms. In addition, the legislature had at no stage sought to issue a general ban on wearing religious signs in schools and universities and there had never been support for such a ban in Parliament, despite the fierce debate to which the Islamic headscarf had given rise. Moreover, the fact that the administrative authorities had not introduced any general regulations providing for the imposition of disciplinary penalties on students wearing the headscarf in institutions of higher education meant that no such ban existed.


72.  The Government’s warning and indoctrination campaign had had no legal basis. Neither of the constitutional norms quoted by the Government was sufficiently clear to allow the infringement of the applicant associations’ Convention rights. They considered that the principle of proportionality did not set sufficiently clear limits to the exercise of the Government’s discretionary power where interferences with the freedom of religion derived directly from other constitutional rights. The importance of the right to freedom of religion required a strict adherence to legal principles and at least some procedural rules concerning the involvement of the religious communities in the process of defining the scope of the State powers and  <mask> of authority. In the applicant associations’ view the authorities had failed in their duty to enact an adequate legal framework in this respect.


97.  The Government accepted that the right to freedom of religion included the freedom to manifest one’s religion through worship and observance, but considered that in the present case the refusal to recognise the applicant Church did not amount to a prohibition of its activities or those of its members. The members of the applicant Church retained their freedom of religion, both as regards their  <mask> and as regards the freedom to manifest their beliefs through worship and practice.


125.  The Government submitted that the interference was lawful. In particular, they noted that the Ukrainian legislation contained certain requirements as to the statutes of religious organisations. These requirements were of a general nature and formulated in such a way as to avoid State interference with religious freedom. The Government referred, in particular, to section 12 of the  <mask> and Religious Organisations Act (hereinafter the “Act”), which had particular requirements concerning the statutes of religious organisations. It was because of the failure of these documents to comply with the applicant association's statute that the Kyiv City State Administration had refused to register the amendments (see paragraph 42 above).


44.  The Government submitted that the refusal to renew the applicant’s contract had been necessary in a democratic society. The principle of the neutrality of public services required that employees could not wear any religious symbol, of any form, even if they did not engage in proselytism. In this connection they referred to the Court’s case-law with regard to civil servants and their duty of discretion and choice of attire (specifically, Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995, § 53, Series A no. 323, and Kurtulmuş v. Turkey (dec.), no. 65500/01, ECHR 2006‑II). They emphasised the particular importance of the principle of neutrality in the circumstances of this case, where it was difficult to assess the impact that a particularly visible external sign could have on the  <mask> of fragile and impressionable patients. The Government added that certain patients had specifically refused to meet the applicant, and that this situation had created a general climate of tension and difficulties within the unit, requiring the applicant’s colleagues and some social workers to handle sensitive situations. It was in the light of this general climate that the CASH had taken the contested decision, after reminding the applicant on several occasions of the duty of neutrality, and not on account of the latter’s professional skills, which had always been acknowledged. The Government considered that the contested decision had complied with the requirement to weigh up the interests at stake; it had been the consequence of the applicant’s refusal to comply with the rules applicable to every public employee, of which she had been perfectly aware, and not, as she alleged, on account of her religious beliefs. Lastly, although the applicant’s wearing of the religious symbol had been accepted by the hospital until 2000, this factor did not, in the Government’s view, render the contested interference unnecessary. They reiterated that “the fact that an existing rule is applied less rigorously because of a specific context does not mean that there is no justification for the rule or that it is no longer binding in law” (citing Kurtulmuş, cited above).


40.  The Government also referred to the effects of this behaviour on the other pupils in the applicant's class, the applicant being only eleven years old at the time. In that connection the Government referred to the case of Dahlab v. Switzerland (no. 42393/98, ECHR 2001‑V) in which the Court had pointed to the difficulty in assessing the impact that a powerful external symbol such as the wearing of a headscarf might have on the  <mask> and religion of young children, who were more easily influenced, and its proselytising effect, although admittedly in that case it was a teacher who had worn the headscarf and not a pupil and the children in question were aged between four and eight.


75.  The Government observed that the issue of whether or not pupils followed religion/ethics courses was a delicate one, since the parents' choice, taken in conformity with their own convictions, might cause their child to belong to a minority in a certain class or school. The authorities should do their utmost to minimise the risk of a child's stigmatisation because he or she did not follow a religion/ethics course. It was the school's duty to provide pupils who did not follow a class in religion or ethics with care and supervision whenever they were on the school premises. It was also the school's duty to react to all manifestations of intolerance towards such children. The Government claimed that those obligations had been complied with in the present case. They also noted that, owing to the nature of the issue, it was not only the school which had  <mask> with respect to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; it was first and foremost the parents' duty to ensure that their children understood the choice made by them as regards religion/ethics education at school. The Government observed that the press articles attached to the application lodged by Mr and Mrs Grzelak did not support the assertion that it was their intention to protect their personal beliefs from being disclosed.


86.  The applicants considered that the verbal and physical abuse to which they had been subjected amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. They further claimed that the Georgian authorities were responsible, via the conduct of their agents, for the violent dispersal of several large religious gatherings of Jehovah’s Witnesses in 2000-2001. On a wider scale, the Georgian authorities failed to fulfil their  <mask> under Article 3 of the Convention, as they had taken no measures capable of preventing the widespread extension of religious violence against Jehovah’s Witnesses in the country and had refused to conduct prompt and efficient investigations into acts of violence of which they were fully aware and which had been perpetrated not only by private individuals but also by representatives of the State.


83.  The Government further took the view that, as the Chamber had found in paragraph 78 of its judgment, the present case had to be examined from the perspective of the State’s  <mask> (in the light of Rommelfanger v. Germany, no. 12242/86, Commission decision of 6 September 1989, Decisions and Reports 62). The Government argued that the State had fulfilled its obligations in the present case.


70.  The Government submitted that the Article 3 threshold had not been reached in this case. There was no evidence that the applicant was a victim of physical ill-treatment. Nor were the psychological effects of the demonstration so serious as to meet the Article 3 threshold: however reprehensible, the conduct of the demonstrators was not prolonged or systemic; this was a one-off demonstration which lasted only an hour and a half. Even if the Article 3 threshold had been met, by properly policing the demonstration, the domestic authorities had complied with their  <mask> under that Article. Finally, the criminal investigation undertaken after the demonstration had complied with the State’s procedural obligations under the Article.


35.  The applicants pointed out that the sole reason for the St Petersburg City Court’s upholding the refusal to register the applicant group as a religious organisation had been the lack of a reliable document confirming its presence in St Petersburg for fifteen years. They contended that the refusal had not been “prescribed by law” because the law did not meet the standards of clarity and  <mask> required under the Convention. Referring to Article 132 of the Russian Constitution and sections 7(2) and 11(5) of the Religions Act, the applicants submitted that the law expressly authorised local authorities to issue letters confirming the length of a group’s existence and that the courts’ rejection of the confirmation letter on the basis of an alleged lack of authority was unreasonable. Furthermore, whereas the Religions Act required only formal presentation of a confirmation letter, the courts had rejected it as “unreliable” with reference to arbitrary criteria that were not prescribed by law and had imposed an unforeseeable and unattainable threshold.


118.  The applicants alleged, however, that the applicable law lacked the clarity and  <mask> required by the concept of lawfulness as enshrined in the Convention, since it authorised the Ministry of the Interior to deport persons who had never been convicted or investigated on the basis of orders issued without examination of evidence, without the possibility of adversarial proceedings, and without giving reasons.


110.  The Government contended that the applicants could not rely on the moratorium on the Act on the Re-establishment of the State of Lithuania as it never came into effect since the precondition of the USSR opening bilateral negotiations was not respected (paragraphs 14-17 and 67-68 above). The applicants were aware of this as they and the Soviet Union had continued to insist that Lithuania renounce that Act (paragraphs 14, 19 and 20 above). In any event, the Act itself did not fall within the proposed moratorium and its validity remained unaffected. Moreover, the Supreme Council did not suspend any of its legislative or other activities aimed at consolidating the restoration of independence. The conditional moratorium thus had no impact on the  <mask> of the criminal nature of the applicants’ behaviour. Instead they sought to prevent negotiations with the USSR, preferring the use of force. The recognition of this situation by the USSR and the applicants is demonstrated by the repeated demands during the periods of 29 June - 28 December 1990 and January - August 1991 that Lithuania renounce its legislation of 11 March 1990 and reinstate the Soviet Constitution.


53.  The applicant contended that the legal basis for the restriction of his freedom of expression was not sufficiently foreseeable as required by the Court’s case-law. He alleged, in particular, that Slovakian law, as interpreted and applied by the domestic courts, does not adequately define what is defamation in that it does not distinguish between value judgments and facts and between public officials and private persons. The  <mask> of the restriction could also be questioned because the applicant had justifiably believed that the national courts would proceed in compliance with the case-law under the Convention relating to the notions of fair comment and burden of proof in similar cases.


19.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the judgment of 27 November 2002, as upheld on 20 January 2003, by way of supervisory review had violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the  <mask> under Article 1 of Protocol no. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


19.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the final judgment of 11 December 2001 made in his favour had violated his “right to a court” and his right to  <mask>. The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in this connection. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


210.  The applicants further maintained that the third applicant’s right to respect for her home under Article 8 of the Convention and their right to  <mask> under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated, as the means employed by the authorities had been disproportionate to the aims sought to be achieved. They also referred to the domestic courts’ decisions by which the first applicant’s claim for compensation had been rejected and argued that the right to compensation for the destroyed property established, according to the Government, in a number of legal instruments, was illusory and not enforceable in practice.


22.  The applicant complained that the quashing of the judgment of 15 September 2004 by way of supervisory review proceedings had violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the  <mask> under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


17.  The applicant replied that the judgments of 10 September and 19 December 2002 had been quashed more than three years after becoming binding. He contested the Presidium's finding of the “fundamental defect” allegedly committed by the lower courts in the original judgments. The applicant considered that their quashing had irremediably impaired the principle of legal certainty and violated his right to  <mask>, as the amount of his retirement pension had been reduced by three thereafter.


109.  The applicants further submitted that as a result of the violation of their right to  <mask> and the restrictions on their property, they were unable to dispose of the houses and receive economic benefit. This situation resulted in negative consequences for the normal commercial activity of the applicant company, loss of trust of its customers, long-term decrease in turnover, loss of revenue and pecuniary damage to the company, and increase in expenses and mortgage interest rates, as the houses were mortgaged in connection with the company’s loan from a bank. The applicants alleged that the applicant company’s building activity, which was directed at the creation of a residential district which would accommodate the needs of numerous families, should have been recognised by the domestic authorities as a “general interest”, rather than the private interests of two individuals, G.G. and M.N., being caused to prevail.


34.  The applicant complained that non-enforcement of the judgments of 19 June 2000, 14 March 2001 and 28 May 2002 violated his “right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the  <mask> as guaranteed in Article 1 of Protocol  No. 1. These Articles in so far as relevant provide as follows:


101.  The applicant emphasised that the High Court had found that an interference with his right to  <mask> had occurred (see paragraphs 36-37 above). Although the judgment of the High Court on the issue under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been reversed on appeal, Auld LJ had accepted that if he had found the applicant’s inclusion on the Performers List to be a possession, then the suspension would have amounted to an interference with that possession (see paragraph 49 above).