46.  The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that his  <mask> led to a separation from his wife and children. While the measure might have had a legitimate aim, namely the prevention of disorder and crime, it had not been necessary in a democratic society. In this respect he stressed that he – having lived for more than 27 years in Germany – had fully integrated into German society and that he did not have any remaining links to Turkey other than his nationality, also lacking sufficient knowledge of the Turkish language. He maintained that he had been employed during the major part of his adult life and that he had been working in Germany from January 2001 until his second deportation in August 2003. His children could not be expected to accompany him to Turkey, as they would not be able to follow school there because of their poor knowledge of the Turkish language.


70.  The Government attached crucial importance to the judgment by the Supreme Court of 25 August 2006 convicting the applicant of twenty-six counts of drugs-related offences involving 2.68 kg of heroin and cocaine, for which he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. Hence the offences were extremely serious, a fact which had led the Court in numerous cases to find an  <mask> justified by weighty interests of public order (see, inter alia, Lagergren v. Denmark (dec.), no. 18668/03, 16 October 2006, and Mccalla v the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 30673/04, 31 May 2005).


126.  The applicant submitted that there was no indication that the authorities had been actively pursuing his  <mask> or that it was at all possible. The only thing that the authorities had done had been to contact the Lebanese embassy in Sofia with a view to obtaining travel documents for the applicant to allow him to enter Lebanon. They had not tried to contact the embassies of any safe third countries. In the applicant’s view, detention pending deportation should be allowed to reach the maximum eighteen‑month period allowed by law only in exceptional cases.


73.  The Government acknowledged that the applicant’s  <mask> would amount to an interference with his right to respect for his family life. However, such an interference was in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society. During the period of his residence in the Russian Federation, the applicant had been convicted twice of criminal offences. In particular, on 18 November 1999 the Shuya Town Court of the Ivanovo Region had found him guilty of extortion committed by a group of persons (a serious crime) and theft of a passport (a minor offence) and sentenced him to three years and one month’s imprisonment. On 26 April 2005 the Town Court had found him guilty of theft (an offence of medium gravity) and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. The Government stressed that the fact that the applicant committed the theft shortly after having served his first prison sentence should not be overlooked, as it showed his firm propensity to commit crimes against property. Furthermore, on 19 June 2007 and 8 July 2010 the applicant had been held administratively liable for failing to have his residency in Russia duly authorised. According to the information from the police, the applicant was a member of an organised criminal gang, was actively involved in drug dealing and was a drug addict himself. He was unemployed and did not support his wife and children. Accordingly, his expulsion would not have any bearing on his family’s financial situation. His wife had been aware of his convictions prior to marrying him. She had never met her parents-in-law in person. She maintained contact with them by telephone or via the internet.


28.  The applicant claimed that the Swiss authorities had not complied with their obligations, inherent in Article 8 of the Convention, to allow him to reside in Switzerland, thereby enabling him to enjoy family and private life in that country. He submitted that his personal interests in remaining in Switzerland outweighed the State’s interest in securing public order and safety, and that his  <mask> for an undetermined period of time was a disproportionate measure under Article 8 of the Convention. He alleged that the facts of his case were comparable to those in Emre v. Switzerland (no. 42034/04, 22 May 2008) because he too had been living in Switzerland for a long time, had established strong social and professional ties to that country and no longer had ties with his home country, Peru. In addition, he was enjoying family life in Switzerland since he had been residing there with his second wife between 2005 and 2008, and several of his brothers and sisters were living in the respondent State. Furthermore, by contrast to Emre (cited above), he had been sentenced only once.


65.  The applicant referred to the reality of the situation in French Guiana, where 10,000 of the 40,000 illegal aliens present were removed every year. In the applicant’s submission, such figures made it impossible to review each individual situation prior to  <mask>. Most of the removal orders were executed within forty-eight hours, with only very cursory formal verification, and were simply signed in bulk, as revealed by an investigation carried out by the National Commission for Policing Ethics (see paragraphs 45 and 46 above). They concerned all sorts of cases, including parents obliged to leave their children behind, who were then placed in care, irremediably affecting their family life. The potential for irreversible effects was all the greater in that no prior verifications were made by the authorities or the courts.


97.  The Government pointed out, as stressed by the Aliens Appeals Board in its judgment of 27 November 2010 (see paragraph 46 above), that a stay of execution could also be obtained by means of a different combination of remedies. This involved first an application to set aside and a request for a stay of execution under the ordinary procedure to be lodged within thirty days of notification of the impugned decision, followed by a request for interim measures as a matter of extreme urgency once the alien concerned was made the subject of a coercive measure. The Aliens Appeals Board then had a statutory duty to examine simultaneously, within seventy‑two hours, the request for extremely urgent interim measures and the ordinary request for a stay of execution that had already been lodged. The request for extremely urgent interim measures, once lodged, automatically suspended enforcement of the  <mask> measure.


52.  The applicants claimed the following amounts: 1) 19,200 euros (EUR) for rent paid between January 2006 and December 2009 by the first applicant for an apartment rented by him in Thessaloniki; 2) 13,000 United States dollars (USD) borrowed by the first applicant to cover his living expenses; and 3) EUR 9,539.10 paid by the four applicants for plane and bus tickets after the first applicant's  <mask>. In support of these claims they presented a declaration signed by the first applicant's landlord in Thessaloniki and concerning the rent paid, a declaration by the first applicant to the effect that he had borrowed USD 13,000, copies of plane tickets showing that the first applicant had travelled to Paris and to Amritsar, India, and bank statements.


148.  The Government first of all suggest distinguishing two separate procedures – the  <mask> as a result of conviction and the expulsion as a result of the breach of the administrative provisions regarding the entrance and stay of foreigners in Latvia. The Government state that in the present case the applicant was expelled as a result of the breach of the afore-mentioned administrative provisions.


45.  The Government claimed that the applicants had not exhausted the domestic remedies available to them. In particular, they had not pursued the appeal against the 2013  <mask> decision which was at the origin of their subsequent administrative detention; had not challenged the detention measure under Article 246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; had not appealed against the decision of the Kętrzyn District Court of 4 February 2014; had not appealed against the respective decisions of the head of the Aliens Office of 19 February and 18 April 2014; and had not brought an action for compensation for unjustified detention in a guarded centre under section 407 of the Aliens Act of 12 December 2013.


217.  The applicants submitted that, if they had been ethnically Armenian and Christian rather than Azerbaijani Kurds and Muslim, they would not have been forcibly displaced from their homes by the Armenian-backed forces. They referred to the report by Mr David Atkinson and the Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly, according to which “the military action, and the widespread ethnic hostilities which preceded it, led to large-scale ethnic  <mask> and the creation of mono‑ethnic areas which resemble the terrible concept of ethnic cleansing” (see paragraph 64 above). Alternatively, the applicants submitted that they had been subjected to indirect discrimination by Armenia, since the actions taken by the Armenian military and the Armenian-backed Karabakh forces had disproportionately affected Azerbaijani Kurds, who were individuals belonging to an identifiable group.


108.  The Government claimed, firstly, that the applicant had not been resident in Russia because he had flown in from Cyprus. Secondly, they alleged that his visa had no longer been valid and his residence had therefore been unlawful, referring to the Commission’s decision in the Voulfouvitch and Oulianova v. Sweden case (no. 19373/92, Commission decision of 13 January 1993). Thirdly, they maintained that the decision on the applicant’s exclusion had been taken “in accordance with the law”, namely section 27 § 1 of the Entry Procedure Act, and that an alien could be expelled before being able to exercise his procedural rights if this was necessary “in the interests of public order or is grounded on reasons of national security”. The Government did not state the reasons underlying the  <mask> decision, referring to “generally accepted international practice”. They lastly pointed out that the right to admit aliens to its territory was a universally recognised sovereign right of a State.


68.  The applicants alleged a breached of Article 3 of the Convention on account of their forced  <mask> from their village. They had mentally suffered as a result of the actions of the members of security forces, who had burned their family houses. Under Article 8 of the Convention, they complained about the destruction of their property. Furthermore, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, they maintained that the destruction of their houses and their forced eviction from the village had violated their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. The provisions of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention are set out above at paragraph 59, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides, insofar as relevant, as follows:


31.  The Government stressed that, since the applicant’s stay in Norway had been unlawful, the impugned  <mask> did not constitute an interference with her right to respect for her family life for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention. The question was rather whether the Norwegian authorities “were under a duty to allow the .., applicant to reside” in Norway, “thus enabling [her] to maintain and develop family life” in that country (see, Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, no. 50435/99, § 38, ECHR 2006‑I). In other words, the case should be regarded as “one involving an allegation of failure on the part of the respondent State to comply with a positive obligation” (ibid.).


35.  The applicant submitted that his  <mask> constituted not only an interference with his “private life”, but also his “family life” within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention, because he had a very close relationship with his daughter. He argued that the interference was not justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention, as it was disproportionate. He had been polysubstance-dependent when he committed the crimes in order to finance his drug habit. The criminal offences had not been of such a nature as to cause anyone severe harm. He had not committed a crime since 2009. Rather, he had graduated from school (see paragraph 14 above) and successfully fought his polysubstance dependence since.


50.  The applicant submitted that the deportation order had interfered with his right to enjoy his family life, without being justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8. He pointed out that he had lived with his wife and their child before and following his detention. His wife and daughter could not reasonably be expected to follow him to Morocco and occasional contacts were insufficient to maintain the family relationship. He further stressed that he had not committed any further offences following his release from prison and that his  <mask> would deprive the couple of the possibility of undergoing pertinent therapy and thus solving the problems which had initially led to the offence in question.


21.  The Government argued that there had been no interference with the applicants' family life, as it was open to them to settle in Greece where the first applicant is currently residing. In any event, they considered that if there was interference, it met the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, they contended that the national courts had exercised full judicial review and had duly examined the grounds relied on by the executive in relation to the first applicant's  <mask>.


43.  The applicants have been married since 2011 and have had a child together, born in 2012. The second applicant and the child are Russian nationals who were born in Russia and have been living there all their lives. In addition, the first applicant’s parents settled in Russia in the early 2000s and have since acquired Russian nationality. The first applicant’s  <mask> was ordered in administrative proceedings, a decision declaring his presence in Russia undesirable was issued with reference to the same proceedings and his residence permit was revoked. The Court considers that the measures taken by the domestic authorities against the first applicant constituted an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life (compare with Liu v. Russia, no. 42086/05, § 51, 6 December 2007, with further references).


39.  The Government acknowledged that the judicial decision of 15 November 2011 amounted to an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life. However, the interference was prescribed by Article 6.9 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences and section 25.10 of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act, and the Federal Service for Drug Control had authority to issue the decision declaring the first applicant’s presence in Russia undesirable. The interference pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of public order and was necessary to prevent the first applicant and other persons from re-offending. The Government disputed that the first applicant could be considered a long-term or settled migrant because he had taken up legal residence in Russia in 2001 at the age of twenty. The applicants’ marriage had been a very recent event, having taken place in August 2011. The applicants had not shown that they would not be able to continue their life in Georgia where the first applicant had spent a major part of his life, where he could receive specialist treatment and find employment as a driver. The Government further pointed out that the first applicant had been held criminally responsible and found guilty on ten counts of administrative offences before the decision of 15 November 2011 and on seven counts after that date. Having regard to the first applicant’s age, the length of the period of his criminal and immoral behaviour, as well as the seriousness of the crime and administrative offences he had committed, those deeds could not be regarded as “acts of juvenile delinquency” (here the Government referred to Balogun v. the United Kingdom, no. 60286/09, 10 April 2012). The Government attached particular weight to the fact that the first applicant had committed drug-related offences. Lastly, they submitted that the first applicant would not be able to return to Russia for five years following his administrative  <mask> and submitted that, in their view, that period was not excessively long (here they referred to Samsonnikov v. Estonia, no. 52178/10, 3 July 2012, in which the Court found no violation in respect of a three-year period, and Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, ECHR 2008, in which the Court found a violation in respect of a ten-year period).


60.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s  <mask> was justified in the light of the European Parliament’s Resolution on Cults in Europe of 29 February 1996, in which it had expressed concern over certain cults “engaging in activities of an illicit or criminal nature and in violations of human rights, such as maltreatment, sexual abuse, unlawful detention, slavery, the encouragement of aggressive behaviour or propagation of racist ideologies, tax fraud, illegal transfers of funds, trafficking in arms or drugs, violation of labour laws, the illegal practice of medicine”. The Government also referred to the same effect to Recommendation 1178 (1992) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on sects and new religious movements and the Committee of Ministers’ supplementary reply to that Recommendation, adopted on 17 February 1994 (doc. 7030). The Government inferred from those documents that States had the right and obligation to exercise vigilance and caution in such sensitive matters as spreading religious teachings. The applicant’s activity as a coordinator of Rev. Moon’s groups had been merely a “motive” rather than a “ground” for the Russian authorities “to exercise vigilance and make use of existing legal instruments”. The grounds for the applicant’s exclusion were the results of the operational and search measures as reflected in the report by the Stavropol Regional Branch of the Federal Security Service, dated 18 February 2002, concerning the banning of the applicant from the Russian Federation. As the Moscow City Court had pointed out in its judgment of 25 March 2003, the applicant’s activities in the Russian territory were “of a destructive nature and pose[d] a threat to the security of the Russian Federation”. The Government emphasised that the threat resulted from the applicant’s activities rather than his religious beliefs.


171.  The Government recalled that in March 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court had found that no family life within the meaning of Article 8 had existed between the applicant and E. Any interference with such family life on account of the applicant’s  <mask> order and the enforcement thereof was, and would be, grounded on the Aliens Act and further a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 8 § 2.


15.  The Government claimed in addition that the Bulgarian authorities had “proven” that the first applicant’s  <mask> had been justified and that it was “indisputable” that he had posed a threat to national security. They considered that the Supreme Administrative Court had conducted a “thorough and comprehensive” review of the allegations against the first applicant, giving “convincing, albeit laconic”, reasons for its decision to uphold the expulsion order.


34.  The Government contested the allegation of a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. Reference was made to sections 7(1), 10(1) and 11(3) of the Aliens’ Domicile and Residence Act as well as to Article 16 § 3 of the ordinance implementing the Act, all of which had been duly published and which provided a sufficient legal basis for the interference. According to these provisions, the residence permit of the foreign spouse of a Swiss citizen would not be renewed if there was a ground for  <mask>. The Swiss authorities were called upon to examine the proportionality of the measure. Given the offences which the applicant had committed in Switzerland, there could be no doubt that the refusal not to renew the residence permit was called for in the interests of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


113.  The Government submitted that the sums claimed by the first applicant were exorbitant, and that there were no reasons to award anything to the other applicants. They pointed out that the order for the first applicant’s  <mask> had not been enforced, and said that there was noting to prevent the other applicants from following him to another safe country. In those circumstances, the finding of a violation would amount to sufficient just satisfaction.


45.  The Government submitted that in examining Mr Raza’s application for judicial review the Supreme Administrative Court had fully and objectively analysed the factual and legal grounds for the  <mask> order, and had given convincing reasons why the interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 8 of the Convention was justified in the circumstances. Its decision was well‑founded and lawful.


43.  The Government submitted that the first applicant’s  <mask> would be justified under Article 8 § 2 as being in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society. They emphasised that the applicant had been the subject of several criminal convictions and that his expulsion would pursue the legitimate aim of the prevention of crime and the protection of the rights of others.


122.  The Government’s case was that the issue of risk would be examined upon the enforcement of the  <mask> order against the applicant and that the authorities would not remove him from Bulgaria without ensuring that this would not fall foul of the prohibition set out in section 44a of the Aliens Act 1998 (see paragraph 38 above). However, the Court has already found that there are no guarantees that before proceeding with the expulsion the authorities would subject the applicant’s claims under Article 3 of the Convention to rigorous scrutiny (see paragraphs 105 and 106 above). More importantly, the Government did not point to any procedure whereby the applicant would be able to challenge their assessment of those claims. From the provisions of the Aliens Act 1998 and the regulations for its application it does not appear that it is possible to bring a separate legal challenge against the enforcement of the expulsion order, let alone that there exists an avenue of redress that meets the two requirements set out in paragraph 120 above. The Court would emphasise in that connection that the existence of remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, and that it falls to the respondent State to establish that (see, among other authorities, McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333/06, § 107, ECHR 2010‑...).


51.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a “victim” in terms of Article 34 of the Convention. They contended that an applicant could be considered a victim only if the State had already decided to take steps against him, and interference would come about only upon the execution or implementation of that decision. In the present case, despite the lack of any interim measure by the Court, no removal order was awaiting execution or implementation, as no such order had been issued, and no practical steps had been taken by the authorities in order to remove the applicant from Malta. The Government referred to Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France (27 August 1992, § 46, Series A no. 241‑B), in which the Court had distinguished the applicants’ case from that of the applicant in Soering v. the United Kingdom (7 July 1989, Series A no. 161), since in the former case no  <mask> order had been made in respect of the applicants. They explained that deprivation of Maltese citizenship did not mean that the person so deprived would be removed from Malta. In order for the person to be removed from Malta, a removal order would have to be issued. Such an order had not been issued in the case of the applicant in the present case.


20.  The Government argued that the application was time-barred, as it had not been submitted within six months of the date on which the order for the applicant’s  <mask> was issued (6 November 2006) or of the date on which the applicant had left Bulgaria (29 October 2006). The Government were of the view that the six-month time-limit under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention had started running on one of these dates, because at that time the Aliens Act did not provide expressly for judicial review of expulsion orders based on national security grounds. The Government relied in this regard on the Court’s findings in the case of Danawar v. Bulgaria ((dec.), no. 52843/07, 20 January 2015).


56.  The applicants initially complained that the first applicant’s  <mask> to Turkey would entail a violation not only of Article 8 but also of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. However, after his expulsion to Turkey on 16 July 2011, they submitted in their pleadings to the Court of 18 October 2011 that they only maintained their complaint under Article 8 of the Convention.


49.  The Government contended that the applicants’ claims were generally exaggerated and not supported by any evidence. They noted that the first applicant’s detention with a view to his  <mask> was not at issue in the present proceedings and could therefore not give rise to any claims. As regards the remaining items of pecuniary damage, the Government submitted that there was no causal link between the first and second applicants’ alleged loss of earnings and the breach of the Convention at issue. In any case the applicants’ claims in this respect were not corroborated in any way. The same applied in respect of the telephone costs claimed.


376.  The applicant further complained under Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the destruction of his and the Orhans' home, property and possessions represented a serious violation of their right to respect for their private and family lives and their homes and of their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. He also argued that his  <mask> from his home, village and community represented a separate and serious violation of his rights under these provisions. The Government disputed that there was any such military operation in Deveboyu as alleged or at all.


67.  The Government did not argue in their written observations that the Court should not have regard to facts which occurred after the final domestic decision in January 2008. The Court recalls that according to its established case-law under Article 3 of the Convention, the existence of a risk faced by an applicant in the country to which he is to be expelled is assessed by reference to the facts which were known or ought to have been known at the time of the  <mask>; in cases where the applicant has not yet been deported, the risk is assessed at the time of the proceedings before the Court (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, § 133, ECHR 2008‑...). The Court sees no reason to take a different approach to the assessment of the proportionality of a deportation under Article 8 of the Convention and points out in this regard that its task is to assess the compatibility with the Convention of the applicant’s actual expulsion and not of the final expulsion order (see Maslov, cited above, § 93). Any other approach would render the protection of the Convention theoretical and illusory by allowing Contracting States to expel applicants months, even years, after a final order had been made notwithstanding the fact that such expulsion would be disproportionate having regard to subsequent developments. The Government have not explained whether further remedies within the domestic legal system are now available to allow the applicant to challenge his deportation a second time, nor have they suggested that the Court is precluded from examining developments on the basis that the applicant has failed to exhaust domestic remedies. In the circumstances, it is appropriate for the Court itself to assess the effect of this additional lapse of time on the proportionality of the applicant’s deportation.


51.  The applicant’s second wife, Y, from his marriage under Islamic law in 2002, was an Iraqi woman of Kurdish origin. They married before the offences at issue were committed. Thus, the criterion of whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship does not come into play in the present case. In respect of their marriage it is noteworthy, though, that they divorced in May 2013, before the District Court’s decision of 3 June 2013 to refuse to revoke the  <mask> order. Accordingly, the criterion relating to the seriousness of the difficulties which spouse Y is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled does not apply. Y and the applicant had three children together, born between 2003 and 2009. The children had Danish nationality and their legal status was not affected by the applicant’s expulsion order.


27.  The applicants alleged that the  <mask> of the second applicant to Italy in 2012 violated Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. They alleged that if the second applicant were to be expelled again there would be another violation of Articles 3 and 8. Relying on Article 13 of the Convention, the applicants also claimed that they did not have an effective remedy at national level as the FAC did not take into account their family relationship when upholding the administrative decision not to examine the second applicant’s asylum request on the merits.


82.  The applicants claimed 60,000 euros (EUR) (EUR 20,000 each) in respect of the non‑pecuniary damage arising out of the violation of Article 8 of the Convention. They submitted that their physical separation had engendered feelings of loneliness and hopelessness. The second applicant had had to take sedatives for a year after the  <mask> of her husband. The relationship between the first applicant and his daughter had suffered serious damage as a result of their being apart. This had been exacerbated by the fact that the third applicant had epilepsy, which had grown worse as a result of the stress caused by her father’s absence. The option for the whole family to settle in Turkey was not viable because there, unlike in Bulgaria, the costly medication needed for the third applicant’s epilepsy would not be provided free of charge. Moreover, neither the second nor the third applicant spoke Turkish.


31.  The Government stated at the outset that the applicant did not dispute that the exclusion order and subsequent  <mask> had been based on the law and had pursued a legitimate aim. At the same time, the Government did not dispute that these measures had constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life under Article 8 of the Convention.


69.  The applicants submitted that Mr Raza’s deprivation of liberty was unlawful because it had lasted an unreasonably long time. At the material time Bulgarian law, in breach of the applicable European standards, did not limit the duration of detention pending deportation. Save for sending several letters to the Pakistani embassy, the authorities had done nothing to expedite Mr Raza’s  <mask>. Given that he had a family, a place to live and financial means to support himself, and could be kept under police supervision, there had been no need to keep him in custody for so long.


58.  The applicant disagreed. In respect of the exhaustion issue he argued that the Government had failed to refer to any domestic case-law demonstrating the effectiveness of challenging the  <mask> order considering that he had already been expelled from Estonia. Indeed, during the proceedings before the Strasbourg Court, a first-instance administrative court had dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the expulsion order. As concerns the possibility of reapplying for a residence permit, the applicant noted that the Government had not specified what circumstances had changed in the meantime and argued that since his application had been rejected by the migration authorities and the courts, he was not required to make another similar application in order to comply with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies before applying to the Court.


402.  The applicants submitted that the deliberate destruction of their homes, property and possessions and the resulting arbitrary  <mask> from their homes and village represented a serious violation of their right to respect for private and family life and of their right to respect for their home, as well as a serious interference with their way of life. They further claimed that the destruction of their homes and family life was part of a practice and that, therefore, they had suffered an aggravated violation of their rights under Article 8 of the Convention.


30.  The applicant submitted that since she had lost her residence rights, the assurance given by the Government did not make her situation any less insecure, even if her removal would require a fresh  <mask> order and the German authorities were not, for the time being, planning to take any decision to expel her to Pakistan. She did not respond to the Government’s request for the application to be struck out.


52.  The applicant did not dispute that she had entered Norway illegally on 19 July 1996 contrary to a re-entry ban imposed on her in March 1996. Although her first  <mask> in March 1996 had been implemented very speedily without access to a lawyer and she was relatively young (20 years) when re-entering and marrying a Norwegian citizen soon thereafter, she had never denied her full responsibility for her unlawful re-entry in July 1996. It had not been until the expiry in March 1998 of the first re-entry ban that the spouses could have resided together in Norway lawfully. Nor did she dispute that, since the first prohibition on re-entry had been an obstacle to obtaining lawful residence, the residence permits issued to her on the basis of her marriage to a Norwegian citizen from 1996 onwards had been issued on erroneous grounds due to her failure to provide correct information. She therefore conceded that the situation in her case had differed from that of the applicant mother in Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer (cited above), where no formal obstacles had existed to the latter’s obtaining a residence permit had she applied. The breaches of national immigration rules in question in the present case were of a more serious nature than those at issue in the aforementioned case.


56.   The Government considered that the application was inadmissible because the domestic remedies had not been exhausted. They pointed out that the judicial proceedings related to the applicant’s  <mask> order and his actual expulsion were pending before administrative courts. Moreover, the applicant could also submit a new application for a residence permit once the circumstances changed. The Government also noted that the applicant had not contested the prohibition on entry to the Schengen area applied by Sweden and that Estonia had to adhere to that restriction.


35.  The Government pointed out that it was the ties between the applicant and her two children that had to be considered when examining “the extent to which family life [would be] effectively ruptured” by her  <mask> (see Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer, cited above, § 39). While the Government did not dispute that the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration in such cases, it was by no means an “extraordinary” circumstance that children were affected by expulsion measures. Hence, the mere fact that the applicant had children in Norway could not preclude expulsion, even having regard to the protection of “family life” provided for in Article 8 of the Convention. In this regard the Government subscribed to the approach of the Supreme Court set out in paragraph 62 of its judgment:


29.  The applicant expressed the view that the criminal charge brought against him in 2006 should not have been taken into account by the Swiss authorities when assessing whether he constituted a risk to public safety because the criminal proceedings had ended in a nolle prosequi and he had been declared innocent. He added that the domestic authorities and the Government had given too much weight to his conviction and the criminal charges brought against him, while disregarding all other elements. He maintained that his  <mask> from Switzerland had not been necessary in a democratic society under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


43.  The applicants complained that the exclusion order against the first applicant gave rise to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The applicants further complained that their separation as a result of the exclusion order caused both of them irreparable mental harm and therefore constituted inhuman and degrading treatment pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention. The Court considers that the complaint concerning the effects of the  <mask> on the applicants’ mental health also falls under Article 8 (see Bensaid v. the United Kingdom, no. 44599/98, §§ 46-47, ECHR 2001‑I, with further references), and will consequently examine it under that head. Article 8 reads as follows:


32.  The applicant submitted that the decision not to grant him a new temporary residence permit and the resulting  <mask> order infringed Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, he claimed that that decision was based solely on the allegation that he posed a “threat to national security” contained in the file provided by the State Security Department and classified as “secret”. However, he was never informed of the contents of that file. He argued that he was genuinely integrated into life in Lithuania, where he had a business and had registered a non-governmental organisation Ibrahimas ir draugai (“Ibrahimas and friends”), the aim of which was to foster the cultural traditions of Azeris residing in Lithuania. The applicant stressed that from 1993 he had lived in Lithuania with SG, a Lithuanian citizen, whom he had married in 2001 and with whom he had two children, both of whom were also Lithuanian citizens and still underage. He was the main source of income in the household and his expulsion deprived them of financial support.


45.  The Government admitted that the applicants had been deprived of their liberty for a short period of time. However, that deprivation had been justified under the second limb of sub-paragraph (f) of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention and effected for the purpose of the applicant’s  <mask> under supervision from the territory of the Republic of Moldova in accordance with the decision of the BMA to bar them from the territory. The Government also submitted that at the time of their transfer to Turkey the applicants had not opposed being expelled to their country of origin and that they had not claimed that they had risked being tortured or subjected to inhuman treatment if sent to that country. Moreover, the Moldovan authorities had not been in possession of any such information.


31.  The applicant argued that the decision to revoke his permanent residence permit and to order his  <mask> constituted a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for family life. He submitted that the criminal courts were of the opinion that the homicide he committed and his guilt were not serious as they sentenced him to five years and three months’ imprisonment while the maximum penalty possible was twenty years’ imprisonment. Moreover, he was twenty years old at the time he committed that offence on which the expulsion order was mainly based. The circumstances of the offence, a car race, were typical of an offence committed by adolescents. He claimed that he had matured since, also due to a therapy he underwent and relied on expert reports stating that there was a low risk that he would reoffend. The applicant emphasised that he had not offended in the years between the commission of the offence in 2000 and the commencement of his prison sentence in 2006 and that he served his sentence in a semi-custodial regime (offener Vollzug). All of these factors bore testimony to the fact that he did not constitute a threat to public safety. He also argued that the length of time between the commission of the offences in 2000 and the first service of the expulsion order in 2009 had to be taken into account.


77.  The Government submitted that the Austrian authorities had carefully examined all legal conditions regarding the proceedings to lift the applicant’s asylum status, and had weighed the competing interests involved in line with the Boultif criteria (see Boultif v. Switzerland, no. 54273/00, § 48, ECHR 2001‑IX). After a thorough evaluation of the proportionality of the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life, the authorities came to the decision that the  <mask> was proportionate to the aim pursued, especially in view of the applicant’s entry into the country as an adult, the lack of effort on his part to integrate into Austrian society, and the offences committed.


33.  The Government acknowledged that the applicant was enjoying family life with his wife and children in Switzerland. Arguing that the decision to revoke his permanent residence permit and order his  <mask> constituted a justified interference with his family life, they submitted that the applicant was convicted of criminal offences several times, including in 2007 while serving his prison sentence. They emphasised that the homicide committed by the applicant was characterised by a high degree of recklessness, as he engaged in a car race and drove his car at a speed of at least 170 kilometres per hour, posing a threat to public safety. They argued that the domestic courts had thoroughly assessed expert reports on the risk of the applicant’s reoffending and submitted that these reports did not entirely exclude the possibility that he would engage in a car race again and commit similar offences, despite his maturation process.


47.  The Government further submitted that the applicant had failed to integrate into the social and economic environment in Germany. Having finished his training as a car mechanic, he had not shown any inclination to find appropriate employment. His family of origin had not prevented him from committing criminal offences. In so far as his social prospects had improved through the founding of his own family, that could not be taken into account in the proceedings relating to his  <mask>. The Government did not attach credence to the applicant's allegation that he had not maintained any contact with Turkey and that he did not have sufficient knowledge of the Turkish language. They pointed out that during his detention on remand he had written letters to his mother in Turkish.


161.  The Government is of the opinion that the order on the applicant's  <mask> from Latvia has been issued “in accordance with law”. Moreover, the Government underline that whether the judgment of the Riga Regional Court had or had not come into force was of no legal relevance since the applicant was not expelled on the basis of the judgment.


84.  The applicant alleged that she had not had an effective remedy in respect of her complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention by which to challenge the order to leave the country. As her application to the Aliens Appeals Board to set aside that order, which was still pending, did not suspend her  <mask>, she had lodged a request with that court under the extremely urgent procedure for a stay of execution of the order to leave the country, with a view to obtaining a ruling on the merits of her complaints before she was expelled. However, that procedure had proved fruitless because she had not been in detention and could therefore not establish the urgency of the situation. She stressed that the Aliens Appeals Board applied the same case-law when examining requests for interim measures as a matter of extreme urgency in the context of requests for a stay of execution under the ordinary procedure.


31.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> order was “in accordance with the law” and pursued the legitimate aim of preventing disorder and crime. As to the question of whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”, the Government emphasised that the Danish courts had struck a fair balance between the opposing interests and carefully assessed the applicant’s personal circumstances in accordance with Article 8 and the Court’s case-law, including Maslov v. Austria, cited above. In making an overall assessment, they had attached significant weight to the two robberies committed, one in a private home and one a bank robbery, and to the circumstance that the applicant had prior convictions for robberies, including two convictions after he had attained the age of 18 (see also Boujlifa v. France, 21 October 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VI). Having regard to the subsidiarity principle, the Court should therefore be reluctant to disregard the outcome of the assessment made by the national courts.


46.  The applicants disputed the Government's argument that their case fell outside the scope of protection of Article 8 of the right to respect for private and family life. They pointed out that the first and second applicants had been married during the period when a stay of execution had been granted in respect of the first applicant's  <mask> and were thus lawfully residing in Norway. A marriage, even if entered into in breach of the criteria for contracting marriage, should be regarded as having been legally contracted and as implying the same rights as other marriages entered into in Norway. Spouses of Norwegian citizens who had applied for family reunion had a right to make such an application from Norway and to live with their spouse in the country pending final decision on their application. Thus the first applicant had established and enjoyed family life with a permission to reside in Norway, which was sufficient to trigger the protection of Article 8 of the Convention. Referring to the Court's case-law in this area (notably Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, no. 13178/03, ECHR 2006‑...; and Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, no. 50435/99, ECHR 2006‑...), the applicants argued that the Article 8 guarantees applied also where the person concerned did not hold a formal residence permit but nevertheless lived and had family life in the respondent State.


100.  The applicant alleged that in thus rejecting her request for a stay of execution, the Aliens Appeals Board, contrary to the Court’s case-law on Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention, had deprived her of the only possibility under Belgian law of obtaining automatic suspension of the  <mask> measure, which was liable to be enforced at any time after 22 December 2010.


151.  The Government further submit that the applicant's  <mask> from Latvia did not limit his access to court as he could rectify the deficiency of his complaint and continue the proceedings before the Central District Court of the City of Riga through his lawyer. In case the applicant's presence was considered mandatory by the court, it would have summoned him, according to Article 2395 of the Civil Procedure Code. The court's summons would have been a valid basis for issuing a visa to the applicant.


61.  The Government further argued that, by contrast to Shala v. Switzerland, no. 52873/09, § 55, 15 November 2012, the applicant had not arrived in Russia at a young age. He arrived at the age of twenty-four having completed all his studies in Georgia where he had obtained two university degrees. Therefore, the Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1504 (2001) on the non- <mask> of long-term immigrants did not apply to him. Furthermore, the applicant’s parents and sister kept living in Georgia and he maintained social, cultural and linguistic connections with his home country. As regards the fact that, according to the Russian law, the applicant could not re-enter Russia within five years after his removal, in the Government’s view this did not constitute an excessively long period, especially given that the applicant had previously left Russia for a similar period in the 1990s of his own accord (see paragraph 12 above).


39.   The applicants also claimed that the Swiss authorities had disregarded completely the situation to which the three children would be exposed if sent back to Kosovo. Even if they were still socially and culturally attached to their home country, which the applicants contested, they disputed that there was any proof that the children’s grandmother or other relatives would be able to care for them. They explained that the grandmother only temporarily took care of the children between 2007 and 2009 on condition that they would join the applicants in Switzerland as soon as the second applicant had obtained residence permits for them. Therefore, in the event of  <mask> to their country of origin, the children would be at risk of spending their lives in an orphanage. This would be contrary to the children’s best interests and in violation of their rights under Article 3(1), 8(1), 9(1) and 10(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (see above §33).


48.  The applicants claimed compensation for damages of altogether ATS 689,188.80 (equivalent to EUR 50,085.20). This sum includes ATS 251,188.80, equivalent to EUR 18,254.50, for pecuniary damage, in particular costs of the first applicant’s detention with a view to his  <mask> in 1995, loss of earnings suffered by the first applicant after he left Austria in July 1997 and by the second applicant when she stayed in Turkey in 2001 and telephone costs incurred during their separation. Furthermore, it includes ATS 438,000, equivalent to EUR 31,830.70 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, in particular compensation for the first applicant’s suffering on account of his detention with a view to his expuslion and for all three applicants’ suffering due to being separated.


17.  The Government argued that the application was inadmissible for two reasons. First, as in the case of Abulail and Ludneva v. Bulgaria ((dec.), no. 21341/07, 13 November 2014), the first applicant had not raised in the domestic judicial proceedings a complaint under Article 8 of the Convention. Second, he could have brought a tort action against the State, in view of the fact that the decisions concerning his detention pending  <mask> had been quashed.


37.  The applicant specified that he was not complaining regarding the issuance of the ban prohibiting his return to Austria. His complaint to the Court solely concerned the withdrawal of his subsidiary protection status and his subsequent  <mask> to Kosovo, which, in his view, had violated his right to respect for his private and family life as set out in Article 8 of the Convention, which reads:


29.  The applicant submitted that it had not been justified only to take into account the seriousness of his criminal offences. In his view, his good behaviour during and after the serving of his prison sentence, the extent of his social, cultural and family ties in Austria, the lack of such ties with Turkey, his long-term residence in Austria, his overall living conditions and his interest in improving his private and family life weighed much more than the State’s interest in his  <mask>.


16.  The applicants disagreed. They pointed out that they had lived as a family in Bulgaria and that there was no doubt that the first applicant’s  <mask> represented an interference with their right to family life. They argued that the measures against the first applicant had been arbitrary, since the allegations against him had remained unproven and had been unsupported by any evidence. Moreover, according to the applicants it was doubtful whether some of the actions alleged on the first applicant could indeed be seen as impinging upon the national security of Bulgaria. Lastly, the Supreme Administrative Court had applied a formalistic approach, failing to verify the executive’s allegations against the first applicant, and had failed to respond in a meaningful manner to his arguments related to his right to family life.


3.  The applicant’s  <mask> order received comprehensive and exhaustive examination by the domestic courts in Norway, where Article 8 was also examined. The decision of the Directorate of Immigration was reviewed by the Immigration Appeals Board (§§ 14, 15 and 19), by the Oslo City Court (§ 20), by the Borgarting High Court (§§ 20 and 21) and by the Supreme Court (§§ 22 et sequens). At all these levels the domestic courts took into account and examined all the submissions advanced by the parties for and against the deportation order. We find it difficult to understand how and why, given the considerable margin of appreciation given to States in connection with immigration policy, and the fact that the domestic courts are best suited to appreciate the particular local exigencies on the one hand and the actual situation of the persons affected by the authorities’ decision on the other hand[1], the Court found it necessary in this case to interfere in the final decision of the Supreme Court and go against it. In our view, the Supreme Court’s decision was based on relevant and sufficient reasons and considerations. It is true that the Borgarting High Court quashed the Board’s decision of the 23 February 2007. However it is clear that this is due to the fact that Norwegian law (section 29(2) of the Immigration Act 1988, see § 26) required a twofold and separate assessment of the proportionality or otherwise of the deportation measure – one vis-à-vis the foreign national to be deported, and another vis-à-vis “the closest members” of his/her family. This dichotomy is artificial in the light of what must necessarily be a unitary concept of family life in Article 8. In any case, although the Borgarting High Court found that the measure would not be disproportionate as regards the applicant but that it would be disproportionate as regards the children, it nonetheless “assumed that the decision of the 23 February 2007 was not incompatible with Article 8 of the Convention.” (§ 20).


46.  The Government argued, further, that the common denominator of State measures that could be regarded as interference with private and family life – such as refusal to recognise the biological link between a child and its mother or father; intervention in a child’s personal relationships with its parents; the  <mask> of a family member; or even measures motivated by a person’s sexual orientation – was the fact that they were all taken against the will or without the knowledge of at least one of the people concerned. They must therefore be clearly distinguished from the circumstances of this case, in which the parties accused, namely the social worker and the registrar, believed that they were acting in accordance with the wishes expressed by the applicant. The registrar had thus decided in good faith to order the burial of the stillborn child in the applicant’s absence, believing that that decision reflected the parents’ wishes.


24.  The applicant pointed out in addition that he and Ms M. did constitute a family “in the most traditional sense of the word”, that they had a child, and that they had been living together prior to his  <mask> from Bulgaria in 2006. To substantiate the latter point, the applicant submitted statements by his son and by two neighbours. The applicant pointed out that his application concerned in addition his right to private life. He had arrived in Bulgaria in 1995, at the age of 29, and had lived in the country for eleven years, establishing social connections and developing his business.


31.  The Government reiterated that the refusal of the residence permit and the  <mask> order against the applicant were justified measures under Article 8 of the Convention. They submitted that the circumstances which had led to the applicant’s conviction in 2001 were so serious that the immigration measures had been necessary in a democratic society in order to preserve public order and safety. They also considered that the applicant had shown neither remorse nor the necessary respect towards the victim during the criminal proceedings.


44.  The Government argued that the applicant had retained social, linguistic and cultural ties with his home country. He had stated during the  <mask> proceedings that he still had relatives in Kosovo, and that his father owned some land and three shops there. Moreover, the applicant had entered Austria as an adult and had spent a major part of his life in his home country.


31.  The Government have accepted that the applicant’s deportation would interfere with his private life as reflected in his relationship with his mother and brothers, and the Court endorses this view.  The Court also recalls that, as Article 8 also protects the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world and can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual’s social identity, it must be accepted that the totality of social ties between settled migrants such as the applicants and the community in which they are living constitutes part of the concept of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8. Regardless of the existence or otherwise of a “family life”, and having regard to the considerable period of time he has lived in the United Kingdom, the  <mask> of the applicant would therefore constitute an interference with his right to respect for his private life. The Court recalls that it will depend on the circumstances of the particular case whether it is appropriate for the Court to focus on the “family life” rather than the “private life” aspect (see Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, ECHR 2008 § 63).


39.  The applicant submitted that, at the time of his first conviction, he had already been living in Austria for nine years. At the time of his  <mask> in 2013, he had been living in the country for fifteen years. He spoke German very well and had been socially and economically integrated in Austria. Both he and his wife had been employed and living in stable circumstances. His children had been born and raised in Austria and had no ties to Kosovo. He complained that these factors had not been duly taken into account by the authorities.


54.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted all available domestic remedies since he failed to request that the  <mask> order be revoked under section 50, subsection 1, of the Aliens Act. He could thus have submitted that material changes in his circumstances had occurred after the original expulsion order and relied, for example, on the fact that time had passed since the Supreme Court judgment of 12 October 2011 and that he had divorced.


75.  The applicant emphasised that the Austrian authorities, when examining the decision to lift his asylum status and to expel him, in respect of a possible interference with his right to respect for family life overlooked the fact that his wife and the two children, born in 2004 and 2007, had independent asylum status in Austria. In those asylum decisions, the Independent Asylum Panel explicitly stated that the applicant’s wife had a well-founded fear of independent persecution if she returned to the Russian Federation. It followed that the applicant’s wife and children could not reasonably be expected to follow the applicant to the Russian Federation to maintain family life; in fact, an  <mask> of the applicant to the Russian Federation would render any effective family relations impossible.


90.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s fears were groundless in view of the prohibition in section 44a of the Aliens Act 1998 on the  <mask> of aliens to a country where their health or life would be in jeopardy. The order to expel him had been intended to protect the national security of Bulgaria. However, its enforcement was subject to the provisions of section 44a, which coincided with the principles underlying Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention. The practice in such cases was for the competent authorities, which worked in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and non‑governmental organisations, to verify the issue upon expulsion of their own motion. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs kept an updated list of safe third countries that could receive individuals in the applicant’s position. The authorities were thus complying with the absolute prohibition of Article 3 of the Convention, and, unlike the situation obtaining in Saadi v. Italy ([GC], no. 37201/06, ECHR 2008‑...), were not seeking to balance national security considerations against the risk of ill‑treatment faced by the applicant. The bar in section 44a applied to all aliens, including those subject to expulsion orders on national security grounds.


150.  The Government submitted that, although it was acknowledged in the Court’s case-law that the responsibility of a Contracting Party could be engaged under Article 3 on account of the  <mask> of an alien and his exposure to a risk of a breach of his economic and social rights, it nevertheless had to be taken into consideration that, where the person concerned suffered from an illness, neither the returning State nor the receiving State could be held directly responsible for the shortcomings of the health-care system and the repercussions on the health of the individual concerned. The case-law demonstrated that in order for the threshold of severity required by Article 3 to be attained in such cases the extreme nature of the applicant’s living conditions or his or her extreme vulnerability had to be established. The circumstances contrary to human dignity had to be exceptional to such a degree that the person concerned, owing to his or her critical condition prior to removal, would inevitably be placed in a situation of intense suffering solely on account of the removal procedure and the complete absence of care and treatment in the receiving country. Human rights were not synonymous with compelling humanitarian considerations and a general obligation to provide social welfare assistance could not be inferred from Article 3 even in the name of human dignity.


72.  The applicant also argued that his  <mask> amounted to a severe interference with his family life both with his partner and his father. He had lived with V. since August 2009, they had made attempts to register their marriage, V. had regularly visited him while he had been in custody and they had maintained close contact after his expulsion, V. having visited him in Russia three times. The applicant further submitted that owing to his medical condition and his father’s age they had been dependent on each other; he had also supported his father financially. Although the applicant’s father and V. did not need a visa for travelling to Russia, they could only stay there for up to ninety days a year, otherwise their residence permits in Estonia could be revoked. Both his father and V. had strong family ties in Estonia. Like the applicant, V. had been born in Estonia, lived there all her life and knew no one in Russia apart from the applicant.


48.  The Government submitted that no support could be found, either in the Convention or in the Court’s case-law, for the idea that the  <mask> of aliens belonging to the category of second-generation or long-term immigrants was always disproportionate and discriminatory. Such a premise would entirely eliminate the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State when assessing individual immigration cases. The principle of non-discrimination did not, in any event, come into play, as the situation of nationals and non-nationals was not equal.


115.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been able to challenge the order for his  <mask> in judicial review proceedings, in the course of which he had been able to acquaint himself with all documents in the case file and seek to rebut the assertions of the authorities. In judicial review proceedings, the courts reviewed whether the administrative decision had been issued by a competent authority, in due form, and in compliance with the rules of administrative procedure and substantive law. In the applicant’s case, the Supreme Administrative Court had done just that. It had examined the arguments of the parties and had given reasons for finding against the applicant. It is true that the question whether the applicant faced a risk of ill‑treatment upon expulsion had been raised before that court. However, since the proceedings concerned the lawfulness of the expulsion order, the court had deemed that question to be irrelevant. Domestic courts could review only specific administrative decisions. The applicant did not claim that there existed a tacit or an express refusal to stay the enforcement of the order for his expulsion by reference to section 44a.


25.  The Government submitted that even if the  <mask> order interferes with the applicant's family life, it discloses no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. Given the seriousness of the offence which the applicant committed in Denmark the measure of expulsion was called for in the interest of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and was necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. The Government drew attention to the fact that the applicant has very strong ties with his country of origin since he was already an adult when he left Iran and had his entire school education in Iran. He masters the local language, he served part of his compulsory military service and he has family there. In comparison, the applicant does not have strong ties with Denmark. At the time the expulsion order was made he had resided for only eight years in Denmark. Moreover, in the Government's view, there is no evidence to prove that the applicant's spouse, the children of the marriage, and the spouse's child of another relationship will not be able to accompany the applicant to Iran.


32.  The applicant’s argument that the low prison terms applicable to breaches of the Immigration Act suggested that her offences had been of a trivial nature was flawed. The gravity of her offences could not really be assessed in criminal law terms. The legislator had consciously chosen not to make criminal sanctions the principal reaction to such breaches, which were primarily met with administrative sanctions, i.e.  <mask> or refusal or withdrawal of permits. This had been based, inter alia, on the view that where the foreigner would in any event be forced to leave the country strict penalties would be redundant. The imposition of criminal sanctions might in fact slow down expulsion procedures and thus be counter-productive rather than beneficial to an effective enforcement of immigration law (see the quote from the travaux préparatoires at paragraph 50 of the Supreme Court’s judgment at paragraph 23 above). Accordingly, as confirmed by the Supreme Court majority (see paragraph 49 of the said judgment, ibid.), the applicable prison terms did not reflect the gravity of the applicant’s infringements of the Immigration Act.


29.  The Government invited the Court to strike the case out of its list of cases pursuant to Article 37 § 1 (b) of the Convention on the ground that the applicant no longer ran any risk of being expelled to Pakistan on the basis of the  <mask> order of 4 June 2009. They explained that even though the assurance they had given could not eradicate that order, the latter was no longer enforceable and the assurance in question could be relied on to prevent any attempt to enforce it. The Government emphasised that the applicant could henceforth only be expelled on the basis of a possible new expulsion order taking account of her state of health and the time which had passed since the 2009 expulsion order. They added that the German authorities would tolerate the applicant’s residence in Germany under section 60a of the Residence Act pending the potential adoption of a new expulsion order with final effect.


20.  The applicants argued that they had had a genuine family life in Bulgaria, which had been disrupted by the first applicant's  <mask>. They conceded that this expulsion had been formally in line with the applicable provisions of the 1998 Aliens Act, but argued that domestic law failed to provide sufficient safeguards against arbitrary action on ostensible national security grounds. In particular, although the first applicant had been able to challenge before a court the order for his expulsion, the courts had failed to properly scrutinise that order and to exercise full judicial review. The first applicant had not been informed of the factual grounds that had led the authorities to the conclusion that he represented a threat to national security and in the judicial proceedings he had not been given a meaningful opportunity to disprove these allegations. Furthermore, the courts had failed to examine the proportionality of the first applicant's expulsion in view of the applicants' right to family life guaranteed under the Convention.


39.  The applicant further submitted that her  <mask> from the Netherlands would not only entail a separation from her husband and son, but also from her husband's relatives – namely his mother and six siblings – all of whom are living in the Netherlands where Mr G.'s entire family group was granted admission in 1977. Also two siblings of the applicant herself are living in the Netherlands. As, according to the applicant, family ties are more important for Roma than for many other people, such a separation would be emotionally very burdensome.


35.  The Government submitted that following the Court’s judgment in the case of Al-Nashif (cited above), the domestic courts had started examining applications for judicial review of  <mask> orders. In the instant case the Plovdiv Regional Court and the Supreme Administrative Court had thoroughly assessed the factual and legal grounds for the orders made against the first applicant. Their analysis had been fully consistent with the principles of the Convention, and their judgments fully reasoned. The applicants’ insinuations that these courts had examined the case in a formalistic fashion were groundless. The national courts’ practice had later been confirmed by the April 2007 amendment to the 1998 Aliens Act.


55.  The applicant was still a minor when, on 9 August 2005, she applied to be reunited with her family in Denmark. She had reached the age of majority when the refusal to reinstate her residence permit became final on 19 January 2008, when leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused. The Court has accepted in a number of cases concerning young adults who had not yet founded a family of their own that their relationship with their parents and other close family members also constituted “family life”. Furthermore, Article 8 also protects the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world and can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual’s social identity, it must be accepted that the totality of social ties between settled migrants and the community in which they are living constitutes part of the concept of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8. Regardless of the existence or otherwise of a “family life”, the  <mask> of a settled migrant therefore constitutes an interference with his or her right to respect for private life. It will depend on the circumstances of the particular case whether it is appropriate for the Court to focus on the “family life” rather than the “private life” aspect (Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, §§ 62-63, 23 June 2008.


44.  The applicants maintained that the first and second applicants had had a relationship since the spring of 2001 and had been married since 2 February 2003. On 20 September 2006 a child had been born from their union, the third applicant. In the event of the first applicant's being expelled to Nigeria it would not be possible for the second and third applicants to follow him to settle there. The  <mask> of the father would lead to the family being split, which would have particularly adverse consequences for the wife and the child and would amount to a disproportionate interference with the applicants' right to respect for private and family life.


43.  The applicant stated that the domestic courts could not examine the applicability of Article 44a of the Aliens Act as their review was limited solely to the issue of the lawfulness of the order. He further claimed that the only procedure where the applicant’s grievances under Article 3 could be considered was the asylum procedure. However, possible proceedings under the Law on Asylum and Refugees were not capable of barring the  <mask> of individuals who were considered a threat to national security.


33.  The applicants said that they had had a genuine family life in Bulgaria, which had been disrupted by the first applicant’s  <mask>. They conceded that this expulsion had been formally in line with the applicable provisions of the 1998 Aliens Act, but argued that domestic law had failed to provide sufficient safeguards against arbitrary action on ostensible national security grounds. In particular, while the first applicant had been able to institute judicial review proceedings against the order for his expulsion, the courts had not properly scrutinised this decision and had refused to examine its proportionality. The only piece of evidence used to justify the conclusion that he was a national security risk had been a “proposal” containing information allegedly gathered through secret surveillance. However, the primary material from that surveillance had not been made available to the courts. The courts had thus surrendered their function of reviewing the exercise of the executive’s discretion and the lawfulness of its actions, thereby depriving the applicants of the minimum degree of protection against arbitrariness.


52.  The applicant further complained of a violation of the presumption of innocence, as provided for in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. He claimed that the domestic authorities, when deciding on the immigration measures against him, had considered that his behaviour after his conviction in 2001 had not been irreproachable even though the criminal charge brought against him in 2006 had been withdrawn and he had been declared innocent. Therefore, the refusal of the residence permit and the  <mask> from Swiss territory had breached his rights not only under Article 8 but also under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.


25.  The applicants contended that the order for the first applicant’s  <mask> was arbitrary and based on unspecified information contained in a secret internal document. They further stated that during the proceedings the authorities failed to present any other information or documents in support of their allegations. Lastly, the applicants claimed that the domestic courts failed to examine the credibility of the executive’s assertions and the necessity of the first applicant’s expulsion.


47.  The applicant further emphasised that contact between the children and him, their biological father, was in the children’s best interest in the circumstances of the case. The independent expert consulted in the proceedings before the District Court had confirmed this and found that contact with him was important for the children to develop their own identity, in particular because it was visible that Mr B. was not the twins’ biological father. Being African-German, they needed their father in order to understand why they were different. The applicant underlined that Mr and Mrs B. had not challenged the expert for bias in the proceedings before the domestic courts and that the family courts had not considered the expert biased. The denial of access to his children would result in his  <mask> from Germany, which in turn would render impossible any future contact between him and the children.


93.  The Government argued that there was nothing uncertain in the applicant’s situation in connection with the administrative case concerning his  <mask> from the Republic of Lithuania. Contrary to the Court’s judgment in Shevanova v. Latvia (no. 58822/00, 15 June 2006), where the applicant had undergone a period of seven years of uncertainty and insecurity owing to her illegal stay in Latvia, the applicant in the instant case had been residing in Lithuania legally, that is, his stay had been regularised ever since the final loss of Lithuanian citizenship. In particular, by the decisions of the Migration Department of 10 September 2004, 1 September 2005, 4 September 2006 and 19 September 2007, the applicant had been issued with one-year, temporary residence permits until the end of the examination of his administrative case. On that basis he could legally reside in the country.


24.  The Government maintained that the factual grounds for the first applicant’s deportation were based on information lawfully obtained by the competent administrative body, the National Security Service. This information was not refuted during judicial review at two levels of jurisdiction. The balance between the first applicant’s rights and the public interest had been respected. Furthermore, in case of  <mask> the applicants could settle in the first applicant’s country of origin or another country of their choice.


82.  The applicants further contended that the authorities’ failure to assist the first applicant amounted to a de facto  <mask> from school, and implicitly a denial of education. However, they observed that their case was not exceptional, that children with disabilities were more likely to be segregated in special schools where they received education of inferior standard, and that the lack of inclusive education was a systemic problem in the respondent State. Lastly, they reiterated the Commissioner’s findings concerning inclusive education after his 2013 visit to Romania, and in particular the overreliance on special schools; the low level of attendance in mainstream schools; the high drop-out rates and the poor data collection concerning the education of children with disabilities; the lack of trained teachers and appropriate teaching methods; the lack of funding for assisting pupils with disabilities, which often forced the parents to bear the costs; the reported practice of mainstream schools refusing enrolment to children with disabilities; and the ill-treatment of children with a disability by their educators and peers. The applicants concluded that this information offered sufficient prima facie evidence of discrimination in the present case. They further relied on the findings of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017 report), the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights (report on the mission to Romania, 8 April 2016), the European Committee of Social Rights (2016 report), UNICEF (2015 report), and on the Government’s Disability Strategy 2016-2020.


63.  The applicants complained that  <mask> of the children to their home country would be in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, because they would be separated from their immediate family and sent to their home country, where they have no one to care for them. They would probably be sent to an orphanage and would depend on social services in Kosovo. Their expulsion would therefore put them at risk of inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.


49.  The Government accepted that the  <mask> order interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life within the meaning of Article 8 § 1. In the Government’s view, the measure at issue was justified under § 2 of that same provision as being in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society. They pointed out that the domestic authorities, on request, generally set a time-limit to the ban to re‑enter German territory, as provided by section 8 of the Aliens Act. While the applicant had lodged such a request, he did not appear to have made sustained efforts to pursue it. In particular, he had not answered to the Regional Government’s letter of 30 January 2004.


127.  The applicant complained that the decision ordering his  <mask> had been contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 and that the domestic law did not provide for the procedural safeguards required by that provision. In particular, the decisions of 17 March and 18 May 2010 on his expulsion had been taken in his absence and without giving him a possibility to submit any arguments in his defence. The applicant also complained that he had been ordered to leave Ukraine despite the fact that at the time he had had a valid residence permit.


71.  The applicant argued, in the first place, that he had not requested to be provided with a stamped copy of his outgoing mail, while he certainly could not have made such a request in respect of his incoming correspondence, which was also censored. Secondly, the mere existence of an obligation to submit opened letters to the prison authorities in all situations was a clear interference with the prisoners’ right to respect for their correspondence since there was no guarantee that these letters would not be subjected to some sort of censorship and/or monitoring. Thirdly, the applicable domestic legislation was overly vague, which is why the said interference could not have been “in accordance with the law”, as required by the second paragraph of Article 8. Fourthly, the Government provided no substantiation as to why their interference with the applicant’s correspondence was indeed  <mask>. Finally, the applicant noted that the recently adopted legislation referred to by the Government had not significantly improved the situation, as it had also failed to indicate with reasonable clarity the scope of the discretion conferred on the public authorities.


40.  The Government acknowledged that those who used the telephone had an expectation of privacy in respect of the numbers which they dialled and that obtaining detailed billing information concerning that telephone constituted an interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 8. The obtaining of the information was, however,  <mask> in the interests of public safety, for the prevention of crime and/or the protection of the rights of others, as the investigation concerned a very serious crime, the applicants had guns for use in the intended robbery and, as B. was surveillance-conscious, conventional surveillance would not suffice. The only use of the information was to corroborate the times recorded by police officers in respect of the covert listening device in the flat.


28.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s eviction had been in accordance with the law, it had pursued legitimate aims provided for in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention, and had been proportionate and  <mask>. The present case differed from Croatian cases concerning the eviction of applicants (Ćosić v. Croatia, no. 28261/06, 15 January 2009, and Paulić v. Croatia, no. 3572/06, 22 October 2009). The applicants in those cases had moved into their flats on lawful grounds and had had no alternative accomodation. After their eviction, the flats had become the property of the State. The applicant in the present case had moved into the flat unlawfully, without obtaining the written consent of her uncle. The State had not been a party to the proceedings in question, and after the applicant’s eviction the flat in question had been given to a private individual – A., a minor. Prior to being registered as living in her grandmother’s flat, the applicant had been registered as living in her mother’s flat, and after her eviction she had been registered as living in a room – belonging to her husband – in a communal flat. Therefore, after her eviction from the disputed flat, the applicant had not been deprived of the opportunity to move into different housing. Under domestic law, being registered as living in a particular dwelling did not give rise to any rights or obligations in respect of that dwelling.


46.  The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that his expulsion led to a separation from his wife and children. While the measure might have had a legitimate aim, namely the prevention of disorder and crime, it had not been  <mask>. In this respect he stressed that he – having lived for more than 27 years in Germany – had fully integrated into German society and that he did not have any remaining links to Turkey other than his nationality, also lacking sufficient knowledge of the Turkish language. He maintained that he had been employed during the major part of his adult life and that he had been working in Germany from January 2001 until his second deportation in August 2003. His children could not be expected to accompany him to Turkey, as they would not be able to follow school there because of their poor knowledge of the Turkish language.


29.  The Government admitted that the rejection of the applications for leave to attend the funerals constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. However, they asserted that it was an “inherent and unavoidable consequence ... of the detention on remand”. Furthermore, the interference was in accordance with the law as it was based on Articles 59 § 1 and 88 § 2 of the Code of Enforcement of Sentences. In addition, it was  <mask> in the interest of public safety and for the prevention of disorder or crime.


58.  The applicants submitted that they had lived in Moldova together with their families for long periods of time. After their extradition to Turkey their families had remained in Moldova without sources of income. Their families could not return to Turkey for fear of reprisals and therefore all contact with them had been interrupted. Thus, there had been an interference with their private and family lives. That interference had not been in accordance with the law because the law on the basis of which they were expelled from Moldova did not offer any guarantees against abuse and arbitrariness. Moreover, the interferences had not been  <mask>.


32.  The Government accept that there has been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life as guaranteed by Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. However, the measure was justified under Article 8 § 2, being in accordance with the law - Section 176 of the Civil Code - and having pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of health or morals and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Government further contend that the measure was  <mask> within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 and that the Austrian authorities have not overstepped their margin of appreciation.


60.   The applicant submitted that the registration of his name in the Surveillance Database had interfered with his private life because it had permitted the police to collect information about his trips. That interference had been unlawful because the ministerial orders governing the creation and maintenance of the database had never been published. Moreover, the interference had not been  <mask>. There had been no reason to register his name in the database as he was a law-abiding citizen and had never been suspected of any criminal or administrative offences. According to the applicant, the Surveillance Database contained information on more than 3,800 persons, the majority of whom, like the applicant himself, had been included in that database because of their public and human rights activities.


28.  The Government also submitted that the interference had been  <mask>. While reiterating that the Court’s case-law did not prohibit the collection and retention of personal data by States as long as there were appropriate and sufficient guarantees, they stressed three points: States had some discretionary powers in this field, and these powers should be reinforced in the case of straightforward fingerprints; the FAED was a major contribution to the success of investigations into and detection of identity theft; and the management of the FAED was surrounded by extensive safeguards. Where these safeguards were concerned, the Government specified that the data registered were exhaustively listed and that the database could only be consulted on the basis of print comparisons (not with reference to a name or address). Moreover, only authorised police and gendarmerie officers could consult it. Data processing was placed under the supervision of both the public prosecutor attached to the Court of Appeal and the National Commission on Data Processing and Civil Liberties (CNIL), which was an independent administrative authority. While limiting the period of retention of data to twenty-five years, the Decree also provided that the person concerned could request deletion of the data, and a judicial remedy to that end was available should the public prosecutor refuse deletion. In the instant case the Government noted that the applicant had had recourse to this remedy, applying to the judge responsible for civil liberties and detention matters and then to the First President of the Court of Appeal. They also submitted that the Court of Cassation had considered the applicant’s appeal on points of law from the angle of a fair trial, even though it had declared the appeal inadmissible.


81.  The Government admitted that there was an interference with the applicant's family life. However, they considered that such interference was justified. They maintained that the issue of allowing family visits was foreseen by the domestic law, namely Article 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The refusal to allow such family visits during the investigation was in the interests of public safety and was  <mask>. They further noted that after the applicant's conviction he was allowed to see his mother and his wife on numerous occasions.


42.  The Government argued that the interference had been  <mask>, owing to the low level of interference and the seriousness of the crimes under investigation. They argued that due consideration had been given to the special status of the applicant as a lawyer, as the CCP provided sufficient protection for the lawyer-client relationship. Under Article 160a § 4 of the CCP, this protection was only lifted if a lawyer were suspected of being a participant in an offence or aiding and abetting following the commission of an offence. In the present case, such suspicion had been substantiated by certain facts, since the applicant had received money from the applicant’s fiancée, who herself was suspected of having received money stemming from illegal activities. The Government also pointed out that Article 160a § 4 of the CCP did not require there to be a formal investigation against the applicant, a fact which could be inferred from the discussions during the legislative procedure.


34.  The Government submitted that Article 8 was not applicable in the present case as that provision did not guarantee a right to retain employment or to choose a profession. They further stated that, in any event, the application of the KGB Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of protecting national security and was  <mask>. According to the Government, the KGB Act constituted no more than a justified security screening measure intended to prevent former employees of a foreign secret service from working not only in State institutions but also in other spheres of activity which were important to the State’s national security. The KGB Act itself did not impose collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. It provided for individualised restrictions on employment prospects by way of the list of positions in the former KGB which warranted application of the restrictions under section 2 of the KGB Act (see paragraph 27 above). The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in section 3 of the KGB Act showed that there existed a well-founded suspicion that the applicants lacked loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Given that not all former employees of the KGB were affected by the KGB Act, Article 14 of the Convention was not applicable. Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 8 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.


35.  The Government contested this argument. They disputed the very fact that there could have been any interference, arguing that the journalist working for the applicant company had voluntarily cooperated in the measure in issue in order to demonstrate that he had taken the necessary steps within the meaning of Article 443 of the Criminal Code. In the alternative, the Government contended that the interference in question had been legally justified, had pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and crime and protecting the rights and freedoms of others, and that it had been  <mask>. Confronted with facts which had constituted prima facie evidence of offences, it had been incumbent on the judicial authorities to initiate the requisite investigation for ascertaining the circumstances of the case in hand. The Government submitted that publishing companies could not be exempted from the implementation of criminal legislation, and that the impugned article had been published under a name which did not appear in the list of journalists officially recognised in Luxembourg, a fact which had necessitated investigations in order to identify the author of the article. Moreover, the interference had been fairly unintrusive given that the police officers had not actively searched for documents, all the documents seized had been voluntarily handed over by the journalist and the search and seizure had actually been in the journalist’s and the publishing house’s best interests. Furthermore, the investigating judge had only being doing his duty, since he had been obliged to gather both incriminating and exonerating evidence and since seizure was the only way to take possession of objects, even where they were handed over voluntarily.


93.  The applicants complained that their removal from Latvia had violated their rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention in that the measures taken against them in that connection had not respected their private life, their family life and their home in Latvia. They claimed that those measures had not been in accordance with the law, had not pursued any legitimate aim and could not be regarded as  <mask> within the meaning of Article 8 § 2. The Court must first determine whether the applicants are entitled to claim that they had a “private life”, “family life” or “home” in Latvia within the meaning of Article 8 § 1, and, if so, whether their removal from Latvia amounted to an interference with their right to respect for them.


79.  The Government further maintained that the interference complained of had been  <mask> within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 to achieve the said legitimate aims. The child’s best interest had required the suspension of the applicant’s access. In balancing the competing interests and reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal had relied on the conclusive and carefully reasoned opinion of a competent expert, who had heard the applicant, G.S. and F. several times. After having questioned F. thoroughly, the expert had concluded that ordering contacts between her and the applicant were not in F.’s best interest. Under these circumstances, it had been reasonable for the expert not to confront F. with the applicant and not to explore their interaction. The court had also had regard to the minutes of the child’s questioning at first instance, in the course of which the child had firmly expressed her will not to see her father.


109.  The applicant also argued that the occupation of his estate could not be deemed  <mask> and was disproportionate. He submitted that the authorities had not made any attempts to resolve the problem of quartering their personnel in any alternative way, such as settling them in public buildings or tents, and that even assuming that there had been a pressing need for the federal forces to move onto his estate, the authorities could have rented his property, or paid him compensation for the temporary occupation, but had refused to do so.


32.  The Government submitted that Article 8 was not applicable in the present case as that provision did not guarantee a right to retain employment or to choose a profession. They further stated that, in any event, the application of the Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of protecting national security and was  <mask>. According to the Government, the Act constituted no more than a justified security screening measure intended to prevent former employees of a foreign secret service from working not only in State institutions but also in other spheres of activity which were important to the State's national security. The Act itself did not impose collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. It provided for individualised restrictions on employment prospects by way of the adoption of “the list” of positions in the former KGB which warranted application of the restrictions under Article 2 of the Act. The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in Article 3 of the Act showed that there existed a well-founded suspicion that the applicants lacked loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Given that not all former employees of the KGB were affected by the Act, Article 14 of the Convention was not therefore applicable. Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 8 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.


31.  The Government were convinced that the measure was also  <mask>. They took the view that, having regard to the quality of the drugs transported (257 grammes of pure cocaine) and the harsh sentences (4 then 42 months imprisonment for drugs offences), the first applicant’s case was a serious one. They pointed out in this connection that the Court had always been very strict vis-à-vis individuals who had been convicted of drug-related offences.