27.  The Government referred to the Court's case-law which recognised that the need to protect the public interest may justify withholding certain evidence from the defence in criminal proceedings (amongst others, Edwards and Lewis v. the United Kingdom, nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98, § 53, 22 July 2003). In this respect, they underlined that in the instant case all evidence had been disclosed to the applicant. The only difficulty for the applicant had been related to the fact that part of the evidence had been confidential. However, the rules applied by the domestic courts regarding arrangements on access to the case file had respected the principle of  <mask>.


651.  The Government maintained that it was for the domestic authorities to assess the admissibility, reliability and relevance of evidence and to interpret it. The Russian courts at two instances had examined the objections of the defence as to the admissibility of a large number of items of evidence and dismissed them. The fact that the defence had not been satisfied with the decisions of the domestic courts in this respect did not mean that the principle of  <mask> had been breached.


40.  The Government alleged that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as he had not raised before the domestic courts, even in substance, the particular allegations regarding the unfairness of the lustration proceedings. In particular, neither at the appellate nor at the cassation stage had the applicant questioned the restrictions imposed on him concerning access to the case files; nor had he complained that he had been unable to submit his arguments in accordance with the principles of an adversarial hearing and  <mask>.


83.  The applicant made the following complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention: (i) his case had not been considered by an “independent and impartial tribunal”; (ii) the proceedings before the HCJ had been unfair, in that they had not been carried out pursuant to the procedure envisaged by Chapter 4 of the HCJ Act 1998, offering a set of important procedural guarantees, including limitation periods for disciplinary penalties; (iii) Parliament had adopted the decision on his dismissal at a plenary meeting by abusing the electronic voting system; (iv) his case had not been heard by a “tribunal established by law”; (v) the decisions in his case had been taken without a proper assessment of the evidence and important arguments raised by the defence had not been properly addressed; (vi) the absence of sufficient competence on the part of the HAC to review the acts adopted by the HCJ had run counter to his right to a court; (vii) the principle of  <mask> had not been respected.


44.  The applicant stressed that he had not requested a reclassification of his offence. The reduction of his sentence had not negated the fact that he had not been afforded an opportunity to participate effectively in the supervisory review hearing. Thus, he had not had sufficient time to prepare his comments on the prosecutor's application; in any event, although he had submitted them both to the prosecutor's office and the Presidium court, they had disregarded them which had been evident from the decision of 3 October 2001, which had not referred to any of his arguments. In the same vein, all his requests to attend the hearing had been disregarded, which had deprived him of an opportunity to attend the hearing and to defend his position. In his opinion, the decision, delivered after a hearing where he had not been able to present his arguments in person or through some form of legal representation, had breached his right to a fair trial and the principle of  <mask>.


60.  The applicant contested the Government's submissions. He stated that the President of the Regional Court lacked impartiality when lodging his protest against the ruling of 13 March 2001 and subsequently chairing its examination by the Presidium. The applicant also considered that the Presidium's decision of 27 June 2001 was incompatible with the principles of  <mask> and rule of law guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.


24.  The applicant argued that the principle of  <mask> had not been respected in his case. He had been hindered in his access to the case file and thus could not defend himself properly against the allegations raised by the Commissioner of the Public Interest. Furthermore, he had been entirely deprived of a possibility to participate in the proceedings before the Commissioner and to access the case file prepared by him. He could not question the Commissioner’s decision to choose the documents to be considered as evidence against him. He also complained about his lustration trial, in particular, about the rules governing the consultation of the case file in the secret registry. He referred to the case of Matyjek v. Poland and complained that he could not freely consult confidential documents and had been prevented from removing any notes he had made in the secret registry. The applicant submitted that he had been placed at a significant disadvantage vis-à-vis the Commissioner who had had access to all documents and archives.


50.  The applicant argued that the principle of  <mask> had not been respected in his case. He had been hindered in his access to the case file and thus could not defend himself properly against the allegations raised by the Commissioner of the Public Interest. Furthermore, he had been entirely deprived of a possibility to participate in the proceedings before the Commissioner who had failed to inform him about the institution of the proceedings against the applicant. He could not question witnesses heard by the Commissioner and had had no access to the case file at that stage. The applicant averred that the evidence obtained by the Commissioner, without any knowledge or possibility of mounting a challenge on his part, had been of crucial importance in the lustration proceedings. The applicant's situation had been more detrimental than that of a suspect in the pre-trial investigation. The applicant had been placed at a significant disadvantage vis-à-vis the Commissioner who had had access to all documents and archives.


197.  The applicant lastly submitted that all the evidence and submissions of the defence had been ignored by the courts. There had been no mention of them in the statement of facts in the courts’ judgments, nor any reference to them whatsoever in those judicial acts. He alleged that his situation was not unique as far as the prosecutions related to the events of 1 March 2008 were concerned. The overall conduct of the judiciary in such trials and their failure to live up to international fair trial standards regarding, inter alia, such questions as  <mask>, reliance on police evidence and refusal to call witnesses had been highlighted in the relevant PACE resolutions and the OSCE Trial Monitoring Report (see paragraphs 125-127 and 133 above).


5.  The Government further relied on the fact that, in further contrast to the Stran Greek case, the State was not itself directly party to the dispute which gave rise to the present case. This fact, again, is not in our view of central importance, the principle which precludes intervention by the legislature in pending legal proceedings being founded not only the requirement of  <mask> between the parties to the proceedings but also on more general requirements of Article 6 of the Convention relating to the rule of law and the separation of powers. In any event, while the State was not as such a party to the proceedings in question in the present case, we note that the participation of AP-HP, a public administrative establishment under the supervision of four Ministers, necessarily had major implications for the public finances and that the State was, accordingly, directly affected by the outcome of the proceedings to which the legislation expressly related.


40.  The applicant submitted that the principle of  <mask> had been breached because he had not been present at the Supreme Court’s hearing. He submitted that his representative had asked the Supreme Court to conduct a reopening hearing before its plenary formation (stage one of the procedure before that court) in the applicant’s presence. The Supreme Court had therefore had no reason to assume that the applicant had not wished to participate in the second stage of proceedings before that court.


73.  The applicants further complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the voice identification was ordered and carried out in breach of the relevant procedural rules. They also complained that the trial court refused to hear a further witness and to examine further material evidence. The applicants maintained that the proceedings before the Supreme Court to examine their appeals in cassation against their convictions had not respected the principle of  <mask>. The second applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody.


81.  The applicant further complained that he had not received a fair hearing in the determination of the charges against him. In particular, he claimed that the administrative proceedings had fallen short of  <mask>: they had not been public, and the applicant had been unable to participate in them effectively or to obtain the attendance of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as the witnesses against him. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, which provide, in so far as relevant, as follows:


10.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the principle of  <mask> had been infringed on account of his lack of access to the classified information submitted by the Ministry of Defence to the Supreme Military Administrative Court and the non-communication to him of the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor attached to this court. He further complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the secret security investigation conducted by the Ministry of Defence in relation to him and his family had breached his right to private life.


78.  The Government submitted that when suspects and accused people who faced detention on remand as a preventive measure were escorted to courthouses they were placed before the court on benches “behind a barrier (metal enclosure/cage)” measuring 355 cm in length, 225 cm in height and 115 cm in width. The metal enclosure was primarily intended to enforce the restrictions associated with the custodial measure, that is, to exclude the risk of flight, influencing witnesses or otherwise obstructing the administration of justice. The applicant’s confinement in the metal cage had not violated the principle of  <mask> and the presumption of innocence. The applicant had been able to communicate freely with the court, his lawyers, the victim and other participants at the trial and exercise his procedural rights without restrictions. When the applicant had not wanted to communicate with his lawyer in the presence of the escort, the court adjourned. Under no circumstances had the applicant’s confinement in the metal cage meant that the court had been predisposed to deliver a finding of guilt. The Government further submitted that the applicant’s confinement in the metal cage in the courtroom had not amounted to a violation of the applicant’s right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, because the measure in question had been a reasonable and indispensable restriction applied within the framework of the criminal procedure existing in Russia and had not reached the minimum level of severity to attain the threshold of Article 3 of the Convention.


112.  The applicant emphasised the importance of the principle of the  <mask> in civil proceedings. He furthermore pointed to the undesirability of an excessively formal application of domestic procedural rules, which had been held to be in danger of being contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention when the excessive formality operated to the disadvantage of one party to the civil proceedings (Miholapa, cited above, § 24). The applicant had explicitly requested the appeal courts to ensure his presence at the hearings. Given that the applicant was in detention, it had been the obligation of the courts to ensure his appearance. The fact that the appeal courts had failed to ensure that the applicant was transported to the hearings had placed him in a substantially disadvantageous position vis‑à‑vis the respondents.


48.  The Government submitted that the proceedings were fair. They maintained that the domestic courts had respected the  <mask> and addressed the parties' arguments by providing adequate reasons. According to the Government, the applicant's complaint mainly concerned the interpretation of the domestic law, which is a task of the national courts. In this connection, the Court of Appeal had decided against the applicant in the light of the Supreme Court's decision of 18 November 2002, which had upheld the applicant's dismissal. Consequently, the applicant was not entitled to any salary arrears.


83.  The applicants also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the District Court and the Appeal Court had not reasoned their judgments sufficiently, especially as far as the decision declaring the case file secret was concerned. They claimed that the name and photograph of a convicted person were not facts that fell within the scope of private life and that a case could not be declared secret on that basis alone. Moreover, the applicants complained that the Appeal Court had violated the principle of  <mask> as the applicants, in contrast to the public prosecutor and B, had had no access to, nor any possibility to comment on, the Supreme Court's case file in an earlier, related case which had been declared secret and which was quoted in the Appeal Court judgment.


55.  The Government, referring to the Court’s case-law, argued that protecting the public interest could justify withholding evidence from the defence when such evidence concerned sensitive information deserving special protection. It should not be the Court’s task to examine the reasons for classifying certain documents as confidential. Certain limitations in respect of the  <mask> were compatible with the requirements of a fair trial if they were justified by the need to protect the public interest or the fundamental rights of other participants in the proceedings.


28.  The Government observed that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention required proceedings concerning the review of the lawfulness of detention to be adversarial and to respect the principle of  <mask>. These requirements had been complied with in the present case. Adversarial hearings had been held in accordance with Article 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, the Code of Criminal Procedure ensured equality of arms in that it required the detainee to be represented by counsel at such hearings. Furthermore, it provided that all relevant documents had to be served on the prosecution and the defence without delay.


24.  The applicant complained that he was convicted of three counts of murder solely on the basis of hearsay evidence of a witness suffering from emotional instability and histrionic personality disorder and that the conviction was completely arbitrary and ran contrary to the guarantees of a fair trial, the right to the presumption of innocence and the principle of the  <mask>.


29.  The Government submitted that the refusal of the domestic courts to call several witnesses on the applicant’s behalf did not violate the principle of  <mask>. The District Court examining the applicant’s request had regard to the particular circumstances of the case, namely the minor age of the witnesses and the grounds of the applicant’s dismissal from her post.


72.  The applicants’ main argument rested on what they saw as discrimination between private parties and the State with regard to the way the limitation period was applied by the Lithuanian courts in general, and in their case in particular. They noted that under Lithuanian law the right to bring an action could be enforced from the date on which a person became aware or should have become aware of a violation of his or her rights (Article 86 of the old Civil Code and Article 1.127 of the new Civil Code). Accordingly, the principle of  <mask> required that the same interpretation of the above-mentioned provision be applied both in cases where the claimant was a private entity and when the claimant was the State, represented by its officials or institutions. However, the domestic courts’ decisions showed two different results in civil cases: when examining claims submitted by private entities, the limitation period for challenging the validity of a contract was considered to begin on the date when the parties became aware that the contract had been concluded (see paragraph 36 above), and when deciding claims lodged by State authorities, the courts took as the starting-point the date when the claimant had been provided with sufficient data to prove that a particular legal act or transaction was against the law, as in the case in issue (see paragraph 34 above).


65.  The applicant company contended that an extraordinary appeal was not directly available to the parties and that its use fell within the exclusive discretion of the PG without any judicial supervision. The effects of such an appeal in the applicant company’s case had been incompatible with the rule of law and the principle of legal certainty because the extraordinary appeal had been an ordinary appeal in disguise on behalf of the principal without any acceptable justification. It had not been admissible on any of the statutory admissibility grounds. No such grounds had even been invoked by the appellant and the appeal had had no motivation except the conflicting views on the substance of the dispute. By allowing that appeal and not even acknowledging the existence of the applicant company’s observations in reply, let alone giving them any consideration, the Supreme Court had sealed the violation of the applicant company’s right to a fair hearing, in particular its component of access to a court and  <mask>, and the principles of adversarial proceedings and legal certainty as an element of the rule of law.


34.  The Government submitted that two different lines of action had taken place prior to the court proceedings, namely the medical examination of E. and the pre-trial investigation of the applicant. E. had only been examined and interviewed by the medical authorities. The aim of those examinations, which had been recorded on videotape, had been to establish whether E. had been sexually abused or not. The doctors had concluded that such abuse had taken place. The guarantees of adversarial proceedings and  <mask> had not come into play until the commencement of the pre-trial investigation, which had aimed to establish the suspect. By the time the pre-trial investigation was initiated, E.’s therapy had already begun. Thus, she had not been interviewed anew by the police. Accordingly, neither the police nor the prosecutor had had a better opportunity than the applicant to put questions to E. Moreover, E. had only been 3-4 years old at the time which had justified, in terms of receiving evidence, lending more weight to the medical examinations than to the investigative measures in criminal proceedings. The Government further pointed out that, prior to the pre-trial investigation, Dr S. had given the applicant an opportunity to request additional examinations.


20.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of the administrative proceedings in question had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, that the Supreme Administrative Court’s interim decision of 30 October 2002 and the administration’s responses thereto had not been communicated to him, in breach of the principle of  <mask>, and that he had been denied a fair trial on account of the lack of an oral hearing before the Ankara Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court despite his explicit requests.


37.  The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention of the unfairness of the proceedings leading to the imposition of the custodial penalty on him. In particular, the applicant complained of a lack of impartiality on the part of judges in that the judges who had witnessed the impugned incident had later imposed the penalty for contempt of court. He also alleged in <mask> and a lack of objectivity on the part of the court in that he had had no time and facilities to prepare his defence, he had not been allowed to present arguments by the court or even, to be present when the penalty had been ordered. The applicant also complained that the decision on the imposition of the penalty for contempt of court had not been reasoned.


22.  The applicant alleged that there had been a violation of his right to a fair trial in the context of the proceedings to determine compensation before the expropriations judge and the Expropriations Division; he complained that the principle of  <mask> had been breached as a result of the priviliged position enjoyed by the Government Commissioner, and that there had been a breach of the adversarial principle. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides:


16.  The Government argued that the applicant should have brought an official liability action under section 349 of Act no. IV of 1959 on the Civil Code (see paragraph 13 above), which was an effective remedy in the circumstances. Submitting examples of similar and successful claims yielding compensation awards, they explained that there was established case-law in this field, in accordance with which the courts’ tort liability was considered well-founded whenever a procedural mistake had a bearing on the merits of a case, that is, when it was consequential. In the present application, the procedural mistake committed was clearly consequential, since the Supreme Court had found against the applicant without awaiting his pleadings although they had been submitted within the time-limit. This irregularity had amounted to a violation of the principle of  <mask> and had been aggravated by the fact that it had occurred before the highest judicial instance without any further remedies available.


75.  The applicant further submitted that the principle of  <mask> and the rights of the defence had been infringed in that during the trial neither the courts nor the parties had had the opportunity to examine VS, one of the two undercover agents involved in the case. He alleged a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d), the second of which provides:


46.  The applicant contended that the reports on his background check had been based on unverified and incorrect insinuations made by the police. Although he had asked for disclosure of the information on which the reports had been based, it had never been provided to him. Instead, the Administrative Court had reviewed it ex parte and thus prevented him from effectively arguing his case. In the applicant’s view, this had run counter to the requirements of  <mask> and adversarial trial under Article 6 of the Convention. The applicant also considered that he had sufficiently demonstrated that he had no problem of alcohol abuse and there had therefore been no reason not to renew his firearms licence.


40.  The applicant argued that she had not had a fair hearing of her case. She submitted that her relationship with her grandson J.B. had been very close, given the fact that his parents had avoided their parental responsibilities and that J.B. had lived with her. His death had caused her great mental suffering. Yet, when assessing the circumstances of her civil claim for damages, the Lithuanian courts had not ensured that the principles of adversarial proceedings and  <mask> were adhered to. Both at the stage of the criminal proceedings and during the civil litigation M.B. had been represented by a lawyer and thus had been able to effectively exercise his rights by responding to the applicant’s claim. In contrast, the applicant, being of old age, in poor health and a Russian speaker, having no understanding of legal matters, had been unable to use all the means theoretically available to her by law. She had pointed this out to the appellate and supreme courts, but with no success. For the applicant, such procedural inequality in a case entailing a great emotional toll had been in breach of the principle of adversarial proceedings.


48.  The Government argued that the principle of  <mask> had been respected in the instant case. They submitted that under section 52 (2) of the Protection of Classified Information Act and Article 156 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the evidence concerning the case was available to the parties only in the secret registry of the lustration court. They maintained that both parties to the proceedings, that is, the applicant and the Commissioner of the Public Interest, had been subject to the same strict rules governing access to the file deposited in the secret registry, in particular those regarding the taking of notes. The notes from the case file had to be made in a special notebook which was subsequently placed in an envelope, sealed and deposited in the secret registry. The same procedure applied to any notes made during hearings. The envelope with the notebooks inside could be opened only by the person who had made the notes in it.


11.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that their lack of access to the documents submitted by the Ministry of Defence to the Supreme Military Administrative Court had infringed their right to adversarial proceedings, together with the principle of  <mask>. The second applicant, Mr Yıldırım (application no. 46287/07), also complained that his expulsion from the military school on the basis of a secret security investigation, the results of which had not been disclosed to him, had been unfair.


132.  The Government submitted that Article 6 § 1 spoke about the possibility to participate effectively in a trial and not about the feelings that a person may experience. The applicant's placement in the cage did not in itself violate the principle of  <mask>. The applicant failed to mention any circumstance showing that he was placed in an unequal position vis-à-vis his opponents. In reality he was able to participate effectively in the trial, to submit evidence, to call and examine witnesses, to examine the witnesses against him, to file motions and to communicate without any restrictions with his two lawyers, who were not placed in a cage. In support of their submissions, the Government referred to the case of Auguste v. France (no. 11837/85, Commission Report of 7 June 1990, Decisions and Reports 69, p. 104).


17.  The applicant complained in the first place that he had not received a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Ankara State Security Court. The applicant further maintained that the principle of  <mask> had been violated since he had not been notified of the public prosecutor’s observations at the appeal stage. In this connection, he invoked Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


52.  The Government contended that the applicant’s telephone conversations had been tapped in the framework of the MIT’s counter‑intelligence activities as permitted by Article 4 of Law no. 2937. Article 6 of the said law permitted MIT members to carry out counter‑intelligence activities and granted them the rights and powers enjoyed by the regular police. The MIT officers had decided to intercept and record the applicant’s conversations with a view to protecting  <mask>. The measure in question had complied with the requirements of proportionality. Furthermore, the recorded telephone conversations of the applicant were not the sole evidence against him. The photographs of military bases, two maps, one of which was designated “top secret”, telephone and credit cards found in the applicant’s possessions had constituted the basis of his conviction. Given that the applicant’s defence rights protected by Article 6 of the Convention had been respected, his complaints under this heading should be declared inadmissible.


39.  The Government further argued that the dispersal of the assembly had been necessary in the interests of  <mask>, for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and the prevention of disorder or crime, and had been proportionate to the aims pursued. They submitted in particular that the police had not intervened in the assembly until the moment when participants had started to disturb public order. Besides, the first applicant herself had admitted in the court proceedings that she had insulted public authorities during the protest.


56.  The Government contested that the telephone tapping constituted interference with the applicant’s rights. Even assuming that such interference occurred, they argued that it was done in accordance with the law, the  <mask> Act. Relying on Klass and Others v. Germany (6 September 1978, § 49, Series A no. 28), they stated that the Court had accepted that national security concerns could justify, in exceptional circumstances, measures of secret surveillance. Furthermore, the measure was authorised by the prosecutor and the applicant had the possibility to have the tapes thus obtained examined by an expert.


44.  The applicants complained in particular that the charges against them had been altered at the last hearing of their trial. They had initially been accused of separatism and undermining the integrity of the State but on the day of the judgment, 8 December 1994, the  <mask> Court had asked them on the spot to prepare their defence against a new charge, namely belonging to an illegal armed organisation. It had then dismissed their application for additional time to prepare their defence against the new charge. The applicants submitted that they had not been able to defend themselves properly and present their evidence against the new charge.


124.  The Government responded that the applicants had not specified the particular ideas or matters of conscience which they wished to express. Accordingly, this aspect of the case was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. They had been convicted under Articles 68 and 70 of the Criminal Code for their anti-state activities not because of any manifestation of their beliefs. If there had been an interference under these Convention provisions, it was justified for the protection of  <mask>, public order and the rights and freedoms of others, as well as for the prevention and punishment of crime. The applicants were not prosecuted for their political beliefs or communist party affiliations, but for their anti-state activities, in contravention of Article 17 of the Convention, against which the young democracy of Lithuania had been entitled to defend itself (cf. the aforementioned Ždanoka case, § 100).


147.  The Government also insisted that any interference pursued a legitimate aim. The Government emphatically denied, in this regard, the applicant's allegation that interception was being used to intimidate him and undermine his business activities. The three relevant objectives set out in section 5(3) RIPA, namely safeguarding  <mask>, preventing or detecting serious crime and safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, were all legitimate aims for the purposes of Article 8(2).


143.  The Government's argument that a more detailed examination by the applicant of the material relating to the acts of the other members of the PKK would not have permitted him to find evidence to assist him in his defence as he had already acknowledged responsibility for the acts of the PKK also warrants examination by the Court. It should be noted that while the applicant admitted before the  <mask> Court that he was the leader of the PKK, an armed separatist organisation, and responsible for the general policy of that organisation, he did not specifically comment on each act of violence committed by PKK members. He did say in his defence, however, that certain acts of violence had been committed against his will or beyond his control.


188.  The Government produced photographs which in their submission showed that the applicant's cell was suitably furnished. They pointed out that the applicant had been tried and convicted of being the head of a major armed separatist organisation that continued to regard him as its leader. All the restrictions imposed on his telephone communications were intended to prevent the applicant from continuing to run the organisation from his prison cell, and that was a  <mask> issue. However, he was able to read books and daily newspapers of his choice and to listen to the radio. No restrictions had been placed on his written communications with the outside world. As to the applicant's health, he was examined frequently by doctors and psychologists, whose daily medical reports were sent to the Court on a regular basis.


62.  The Government noted that, according to Article 138 of the Military Court Organisation and Proceedings Law, hearings before military courts were public. However, the military court could hold hearings in camera if public morality and safety so required. In the instant case, since the applicant had been tried on charges of military espionage, exclusion of public was necessary for the purposes of  <mask>.


80.  The applicant further argued that the interference did not pursue a legitimate aim. The authorities did not seek to protect  <mask>, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, or to prevent disorder or crime. As to the protection of the health and morals of others, there was no indication that the applicant represented a threat to the rights of third parties. Finally, with regard to the applicant himself, the Government did not suggest that the incapacitation had had a therapeutic effect on the applicant. Nor was there any evidence that the authorities had sought to deprive the applicant of his capacity because he would otherwise have carried out actions which would result in a deterioration of his health. With regard to his own pecuniary interests, the protection of a person’s own rights is not a ground listed in Article 8 § 2, and it cannot therefore serve as a justification for interfering with a person’s rights as protected under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. In sum, the interference with his private life did not pursue any of the legitimate aims listed in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


19.  The Government contested his argument. They submitted that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression had been prescribed by law, and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining  <mask> and territorial integrity and prevention of disorder. The Government further contended that the interference had been necessary in a democratic society. They noted that in the article in question Abdullah Öcalan was referred to as “the ideological and political leader of the Kurdish movement” and the HPG, the PJA and the KONGRA-GEL were described as “facilitators of the military, political and ideological development formed under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan”. According to the Government, the publication of a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan holding a weapon demonstrated that the purpose of the publication of the article was to advocate and propagate terrorism. The Government lastly noted that the PKK was considered to be a terrorist organisation by a number of states and international organisations, such as the United Nations, NATO and the United States of America, and thus represented a serious threat not only to the internal security of Turkey but also to the international public order.


133.  The applicant argued that the Court's decisions in Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 30 July 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑V; Huvig v. France, 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176‑B; Kruslin v. France, 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176‑A; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, ECHR 2000‑II; Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963/99, 20 June 2002; and Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, ECHR 2000‑V had expanded on the issue of “foreseeability” and indicated a departure from the narrower scope of earlier decisions which tolerated the restrictive extent to which  <mask> had imposed blanket secrecy on the publication of surveillance procedures. This broader approach had been confirmed by the Court's recent ruling in Liberty and Others, cited above. The applicant argued that the RIPA scheme remained “unnecessarily opaque” and that further details about the operation, beyond those currently included in the Code, should be made available in order to comply with the Convention requirements regarding clarity and precision.


101.  The Government maintained that the issuance of the clearance had had a clear legal basis in the Lustration Act and had been necessary in the interests of  <mask>. The Lustration Act afforded comprehensive substantial and procedural guarantees, in the light of which the issuance of the applicant’s clearance was to be considered proportionate. Moreover, as from 1 January 1997, the Lustration Act had lost any legal force in Slovakia. It thus no longer prevented the applicant from living his life as he saw fit.


111.  The Government further maintained that the applicant himself had had no doubts about the independence and impartiality of the  <mask> Court. He had in fact expressed his confidence in that court at a hearing at which the military judge had been present. It mattered little that the applicant's lawyers had subsequently contradicted Mr Öcalan's remark in their submissions. The most important point was that that remark – which had been made of the applicant's own free will and expressed his confidence in the court – had been sincere.


40.  The applicant accepted that matters of  <mask> could encroach on the rights of the defence, but considered that such interference had to be compensated for by other procedural means, which had not been the case in the criminal proceedings under review. He further alleged that he had not relied on his capacity as SRI informant as a mere defence argument, but rather to provide an explanation of why he had been present at the crime scene: namely that he had been there solely to collect information for the SRI.


32.  The Government submitted that the interference in question had been prescribed by law and had pursued a number of legitimate aims, namely the protection of  <mask>, territorial integrity, public safety, public order and prevention of crime. They also claimed that the restriction had been necessary in a democratic society because it had been carried out as a result of a pressing social need and had been proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. They concluded that, in the exercise of their discretion, the prison authorities had decided not to allow the impugned letter to be sent outside.


36.  The Government contended that Article 6 does not guarantee the right for a civilian to be tried by a civilian criminal court, but simply the right to trial by an independent and impartial tribunal. The applicant’s case should be distinguished from Incal v. Turkey, (judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports 1998‑IV), where the applicant had been charged with an offence directly concerning a threat to the security of the country, and was tried by a  <mask> court specifically set up to deal with cases affecting Turkey’s territorial integrity. In the present applicant’s case the charge was an ordinary offence of murder, not an offence specially created to combat a threat to the Government, nor one which affected the military any more than the civilian population. The offence did not contain any special characteristics which might encourage the military members of the court-martial to take into account irrelevant considerations.


137.  The Government submitted that any interference which may have arisen in the present case satisfied the requirements of Article 8 § 2. The Government emphasised the duty of democratic governments to uphold the criminal law and protect citizens from terrorist threats and organised crime. In order to discharge this duty, the power to intercept the communications of specific targets was necessary. They pointed to the Commissioner's consistent conclusions that the interception powers under RIPA were an invaluable weapon for the protection of  <mask> and the fight against organised crime (see paragraphs 64 and 72 above). Further, in order for interception to yield useful intelligence, the fact of the interception, as well as the methods by which it could be effected, had to be kept secret. If possible targets were able to gain insight into sensitive interception techniques and capabilities, then they would be able to take steps to undermine the usefulness of any intelligence gathered against them. The Government explained that they had had experience of information about surveillance techniques being put in the public domain, which had led directly to the loss of important sources of intelligence. They insisted that their policy of “neither confirm nor deny” was important to ensure the overall effectiveness of surveillance operations.


136.  The Government's argument before the Grand Chamber that the applicant's lawyers had not asked to see him at more frequent intervals must also be rejected. The Court reiterates that waiver of the exercise of a right guaranteed by the Convention must be established in an unequivocal manner (see, mutatis mutandis, Pfeifer and Plankl v. Austria, judgment of 25 February 1992, Series A no. 227, pp. 16-17, § 37). It notes that there was in fact a complaint by the applicant's lawyers to the  <mask> Court about the difficulties they had encountered in communicating with their client.


60.  The Government considered that, while it was for the national courts to determine the necessity of non-disclosure, certain interests were regarded as sufficiently important to justify a limitation on disclosure such as  <mask>, witness protection, keeping police investigations confidential and prosecuting serious subversive crime. It had to be determined whether the evidence of the Chief Superintendent was sole or decisive (Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, ECHR 2011): the nature of the evidence in question as well as the significance of evidence other than the belief evidence, would be important factors. There had to be commensurate countervailing procedural safeguards and factors.


46.  The applicant also submitted that subjecting a programme, which posed no threat to  <mask>, did not undermine the protection of the personal rights of others, did not entail a criminal offence and did not breach the legislation on unfair competition, to particular scrutiny in order to ensure its “objectivity” was tantamount to rendering Article 10 § 2 devoid of purpose and imposing a legal requirement to toe the government line on a television broadcaster which necessarily had a monopoly on the provision of information at national level.


63.  The applicant accepted that  <mask> considerations might justify withholding information from the defence. Praying in aid Edwards and Lewis v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98, ECHR 2004‑X, and A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, ECHR 2009, he submitted that strict necessity for so doing should be shown; that the restrictions on access to the information should be the least intrusive possible; and that counterbalancing procedures should be in place.


145.  The Government emphasised that information concerning the arrangements put in place under section 15 RIPA had been published in the Code. However, in order to maintain the operational effectiveness of interception techniques, it was not possible to publish full details of the arrangements. In the view of the Government, the publication of any more detail than had already been published would be contrary to  <mask> and prejudicial to the prevention and detection of serious crime. They argued that the decision as to how much information on safeguards could safely be put in the public domain without undermining the interests of national security or prejudicing the prevention and detection of serious crime fell within their margin of appreciation. It was also significant that the full details of the arrangements in place were made available to the Commissioner, who was required to keep them under review. The Government emphasised that the Commissioner's approval was sought and given in respect of the safeguard documents either before or shortly after the entry into force of RIPA (see paragraph 63 above). They further emphasised that the Commissioner had expressed his satisfaction with the section 15 safeguards in every report prepared since 2000. They referred in particular to the Commissioner's 2002 and 2004 reports (see paragraphs 68 to 69 above).


28.  The Government submitted in the alternative that any interference with the applicant’s right under Article 8 had been carried out on the basis of section 48(A)(5) of Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. They provided the Court with extracts of this provision containing the amendments of 2008 (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). The Government also relied on section 39(1) of the Regulation on Private Tutoring Centres. They further contended that the applicant’s dismissal had pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining  <mask>, territorial integrity, public safety, public order and preventing crime, and that it had been necessary in a democratic society in the circumstances of the case.


43.  The Government submitted that the sentences imposed on the applicant had had a legal basis, specifically section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713. The interference had pursued legitimate aims within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, namely the protection of  <mask>, territorial integrity or public safety and the prevention of disorder and crime. According to the Government, the domestic courts referred to “the list of confiscated books and periodicals which were in the possession of the accused Ömer Güner”. Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, they left the final assessment in respect of the necessity of the interference to the discretion of the Court.


135.  The applicant argued that no justification had been advanced by the authorities for holding the trial in a remote and barely accessible high security prison. He maintained that the holding of the trial in a distant location was an attempt to prevent, as much as possible, the attendance of the public and to keep the proceedings “away from public scrutiny”. There was no indication that the applicant was dangerous or could abscond or that, in the course of the trial, there could be any threat to public order or  <mask>. As the case concerned the applicant's “re-trial” following his recognition as a political prisoner by the Council of Europe, the authorities had a particular responsibility in respect of the trial's openness and should have made a particular effort to make it accessible and open to the public.


211.  The applicant observed that, after Chahal, cited above, SIAC and the system of special advocates had been designed to allow the Secretary of State to present her case as to why a particular returnee was a risk to  <mask>, not to allow secret evidence on safety on return. A ministerial assurance to that effect had been given to Parliament when it passed the 1997 Act (Hansard, HC Deb 26 November 1997 vol 301, at 1040).


97.  The Government did not contest that the telephone tapping had constituted interference with the applicant’s rights. However, it had been carried out in accordance with the law, the  <mask> Act. Relying on Klass and Others (cited above, § 49), they stated that the Court had accepted that national security concerns could justify, in exceptional circumstances, measures of secret surveillance. Furthermore, the measure had been authorised by the prosecutor and the applicant had had the opportunity – of which she had availed herself – to obtain an expert examination of the evidence thus obtained.


23.  The applicant complained that she had been unable to challenge the refusal to grant her security clearance for access to State secrets on the basis of which her employment contract with the  <mask> Service had been terminated. She further complained that the validity of this refusal had not been subject to scrutiny in the court proceedings on her dismissal. Relying on Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention, she alleged that, as a result, she had been denied access to a court.


47.  The Government argued for their part that the  <mask> Court could not be criticised for making use of its right to reclassify the offences with which the applicants had been charged to arrive at a characterisation that was less serious for the applicants than the charge initially preferred by the prosecution. They pointed out that the offences covered by Article 125 of the Criminal Code carried the death penalty whereas those covered by Article 168 carried prison sentences. In their view, it was wrong in the instant case to talk of a recharacterisation of the offence in so far as Articles 125 and 168 appeared in the same section of the Criminal Code entitled “Crimes against the State”. Article 168 was a “common provision” relating to all the other provisions in that section and covered anyone who “form[ed] an armed gang or organisation … with the intention of committing any of the offences defined in Article 125 ...”. Article 125 defined a crime in terms of the ends pursued, requiring a serious prejudice, whereas Article 168 defined a crime in terms of the means deployed to achieve those ends. The truth was that the applicants’ conviction on the basis of Article 168 of the Criminal Code rather than that of Article 125 had been the result of the criminal courts’ assessment of the evidence and their consideration of the defence’s arguments.


78.  The Government did not contest the fact that the present case concerned a “dispute” between the applicant as a former holder of security clearance and the  <mask> Authority, a central authority responsible for decisions regarding security clearance. They agreed with the Chamber that the main subject of the dispute had been the reliability of the applicant from a security point of view (see paragraph 50 in fine of the Chamber judgment).


34.  The applicants argued that by refusing to register Ilinden the authorities had infringed their rights under Article 11 of the Convention. The refusal of the courts had been based on deliberately erroneous findings in respect of the relevant facts and a misconstruction of the applicable law. It was clear that freedom of association could not be subjected to restrictions other than those which were provided for by law for the protection of  <mask> and public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


203.  The Government submitted that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression carried with it duties and responsibilities and could be subject to formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties in the interests of  <mask>, territorial integrity or public safety. According to the Court’s case‑law, the disclosure of the State’s interest in a given weapon and that of the corresponding technical knowledge, which may give some indication of the state of progress in its manufacture, were capable of causing considerable damage to national security (they referred to Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, 16 December 1992, § 45, Series A no. 252). The conviction of an individual for such a disclosure could not be seen as a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The State had not violated Article 10 by holding the applicant criminally liable for disclosure of State secrets of a military nature to a foreign intelligence service. The circumstances of the case, as established by the domestic courts, showed that the applicant had used his research skills to damage Russia’s external security for the purpose of obtaining financial compensation. The fact that he had not had access to State secrets did not relieve him of criminal liability for divulging classified data to a foreign state. The classified information could have been received by any means. Through his education and the post he occupied at the Institute of the USA and Canada, the applicant had professional contacts with a number of officials in the Ministry of Defence, who had had access to State secrets. He had been purposefully eliciting classified information from them. In his videoed statements to FSB officials, which were used as evidence at the trial, the applicant had repeatedly affirmed that he had realised that his interlocutors were agents of foreign intelligence services; however, he had continued to transmit information to them because of his difficult financial situation. As an educated person and a scientist, the applicant could and should have known of the restrictions on his right to impart information. His argument that the relevant information had been publicly available was untenable. It had been established at the trial that the information could not have been received from open sources and its divulgence had damaged Russia’s security and defence.


180.  The applicant recalled that restrictions on court proceedings could only be compatible with Article 6 § 1 where they pursued a legitimate aim and there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be pursued. Further, limitations could not impair the very essence of fair trial rights and any restrictions had to be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities (citing Rowe and Davis v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28901/95, § 61, ECHR 2000‑II). Although the applicant appeared to accept that the restrictions on the procedure before the IPT pursued the legitimate aim of securing that information was not disclosed contrary to the public interest,  <mask> or the detection and prevention of serious crime, he argued that they were not proportionate and impaired the very essence of his right to a fair hearing. In particular, the applicant contended that Rule 6(2) to (5) (restrictions on disclosure and evidence), Rule 9 (secrecy of proceedings) and section 68 RIPA together with Rule 13 (the refusal to provide any reasons to unsuccessful complainants) were contrary to the principle of equality of arms.


33.  The applicants submitted that the  <mask> courts were special courts. They asserted that the military judges who sat on those courts were dependent on the executive, being appointed by a joint decree of the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister, subject to the approval of the President. The assessment, promotion and security of tenure of those judges were within the control of the executive branch and, in turn, the army. The ties binding them with the executive and the army made it impossible for them to discharge their functions on the bench in an independent and impartial manner.


31.  The applicants complained that the criminal proceedings before the Ankara  <mask> Court were unfair, that that court was not independent and impartial, and of infringements of their freedom of expression and freedom of association; they also asserted that in the enjoyment of the rights thus breached they had been the victims of discrimination on the ground of their political opinions.


131.  The Government submitted that the overwhelming majority of domestic laws allowed the parties access to classified documents, irrespective of their security level and without the need to declassify them, where they were to be used as evidence. A different approach had been adopted for certain very specific proceedings whose salient feature was a close link to the vital interests of  <mask>. That approach applied to judicial review proceedings in such fields as cross-border trade with military equipment, entrance to aerodrome premises subject to increased protection and to proceedings issuing and revoking security clearance. For those proceedings the principles concerning a party’s access to confidential documents applied mutatis mutandis. Only exceptionally, as a last resort, where intelligence services’ or the police’s activities could otherwise be jeopardised or seriously disrupted, did the law permit the application of more restrictive rules providing that, in extreme cases, a party could be completely denied access to such evidence. Moreover, in those exceptional cases the judicial authorities were required to be particularly vigilant and compensate effectively any disadvantage caused to the opposing party by their own course of action so as to forestall any arbitrariness or abuse of process in the authorities’ decision-making.


29.  The Government argued that the measure satisfied the criteria of paragraph 2 of Article 8. In their submission, it had been in accordance with the law, namely, Emergency Ordinance no. 194/2002 published in the Official Gazette, and therefore fulfilled the condition of accessibility. The Government considered that the criterion of foreseeability had also been satisfied in that section 83 of the above-mentioned ordinance provided that aliens could be banned from the country only in strictly defined circumstances, that is, if they had engaged, were engaged or had the intention of engaging in activities capable of endangering  <mask> or public order.


50.  The Government submitted that the domestic legislation regulating freedom of assembly had been precise and foreseeable. They also submitted that the demonstration had been organised in breach of the provisions of national law. The Government argued that the dispersal of the demonstration had pursued the aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and preventing disorder, and had been in the interests of  <mask>.


23.  The applicant submitted that the decision of the Director of the  <mask> Service to revoke his right to hold a security clearance permit had resulted in his automatic dismissal. Given that this decision was not amenable to any judicial review in itself, he was placed in a situation that was in breach of Article 6 offering him a right to a fair trial.


42.  The Government conceded that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. They submitted that the retroactive classification of the documents in question pursued the legitimate aim of  <mask>, in which field States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. Moreover, it was the applicant’s own fault that the study in question had not been accomplished since, intransigently, he had insisted on having completely unrestricted access. The applicant contested these views.


102.  The Government contested the Chamber's finding of a violation in respect of this complaint. They pointed out that at the material time the Turkish rules of criminal procedure permitted police custody to be extended to seven days when the person detained was suspected of terrorist-related offences. In the instant case, the applicant had been arrested on 16 February 1999 and taken into police custody for an initial period of four days ending on 20 February 1999. On the latter date, a court order had been made extending the period to be spent in police custody by three days, that is to say until 23 February 1999. Owing to adverse weather conditions (there was a storm in the region), the representatives of the public prosecutor's office and judge of the  <mask> Court did not reach the island of İmralı until 22 February 1999. The public prosecutor had questioned the applicant that same day. The applicant had appeared before the judge the following day (23 February 1999) and the judge had ordered his detention pending trial after hearing his representations.


26.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim, as the proceedings against him had become time-barred. They therefore argued that there had been no interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. Alternatively, they submitted that the applicant had been prosecuted pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, and thus the interference, if any, had been prescribed by law. They further submitted that the domestic authorities had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting public order and  <mask>. The Government lastly submitted that the interference had been necessary in a democratic society, given that the content of the book in question had promoted hatred, hostility, the use of arms, militancy and revenge.


65.  The Government submitted that the classification of the case file as confidential and the restriction of public access to the hearings had been decided on by the Supreme Administrative Court in the exercise of its unfettered discretion to assess whether reasons existed justifying the restriction of public access to the proceedings under Article 105 § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the instant case the restriction had been justified by the fact that the file had included documents containing classified information. In the Government’s view it had therefore been imposed in the interests of public order and  <mask> and had not rendered the proceedings unfair.


114.  The applicant complained of the unfairness of the proceedings before the administrative courts which he had brought following the revocation, by the  <mask> Authority, of the security clearance issued to him to enable him to carry out his duties at the Ministry of Defence (see paragraphs 11-14 above). In his submission, he had lost his function and subsequently his employment as a result of the decision revoking his security clearance (see paragraphs 93-95 above).


61.  The Government asserted that the witnesses concerned had not been listed among those that the applicants had asked to be examined during the hearing in the  <mask> Court. They added that the court had also taken account of other evidence when establishing that the applicants belonged to the PKK. Its refusal to examine some of the witnesses for the prosecution had been justified by the threats that had been made against them, not excluding their physical elimination by the PKK, as had happened to a witness against one of the applicants’ co-defendants, killed in prison by other inmates who were members of the PKK.


75.  The Government contested that argument. They submitted that partial exclusion of the public in the present case had been justified on  <mask> grounds. The Government argued that the course of the proceedings had been determined by the fact that a part of the evidence examined by the court had been considered “top secret” under the applicable legislation. Consequently, some of the hearings, at which the court had examined classified documents or heard witnesses whose statements had to be kept confidential, had been held without the public. On the other hand, other hearings had been public. Furthermore, W.C., the main witnesses in the case, had been discharged from the obligation of confidentiality in respect of the subject matter of the proceedings, so he could be heard during a public hearing. The applicant disagreed with the Government's submissions.


107.  The applicant asked the Grand Chamber to uphold the Chamber's finding of a violation on this issue. He said that a judge holding the rank of colonel in the army had sat on the bench of the  <mask> Court during most of the proceedings. The military judge had been replaced by a civilian judge just one week before the applicant's conviction and two months after the hearings before the National Security Court had started. In the meantime, in a case that concerned a conflict between the organisation led by the applicant and the army in which the military judge was an officer, the military judge had taken part in important interlocutory rulings and discussed the case with the other judges, thereby potentially influencing the conduct and outcome of the proceedings.


18.  The applicant complained that he had been unable to challenge the decision to revoke his right to hold a security clearance for access to State secrets on the basis of which his employment contract with the  <mask> Service had been terminated. He further complained that the validity of this revocation had not been subject to scrutiny in the court proceedings on his dismissal. Relying on Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention, he alleged that, as a result, he had been denied access to a court.


181.  The applicant submitted that even where  <mask> was at stake, a domestic court could not infringe the fair hearing principle in a blanket and uncritical manner. He argued that less restrictive measures were available to achieve the aim pursued, including arrangements to protect witnesses' identities, disclosure of documents with redactions approved by the IPT, provision of a summary of particularly sensitive material under the supervision of the IPT and appointment of special advocates to whom disclosure of sensitive material could be made. He referred to a recent report on secret evidence published in June 2009 by the non-governmental organisation, JUSTICE, which called for the strengthening of disclosure procedures and increased transparency in court proceedings.


34.  The Government emphasised the need to have particular regard to the  <mask> context in Turkey when the decision was taken to establish national security courts, pursuant to Article 143 of the Constitution. In view of the experience of the armed forces in the anti-terrorism campaign, the authorities had considered it necessary to strengthen those courts by including a military judge who was supposed to provide them with the necessary expertise and knowledge to deal with threats to the security and integrity of the State. The Government asserted that the impartiality and independence of military judges sitting on national security courts had been guaranteed by the Constitution.


41.  The Government submitted that only in exceptional circumstances was a civilian tried in a military court in Turkey. On that point, they maintained that the applicant was tried by a military court because he was charged with an offence concerning  <mask>. The Government further maintained that the domestic law provided necessary safeguards to guarantee the independence and impartiality of military courts. Finally, they pointed out that, with the adoption of Law no. 4963, Turkish legislation had been amended to bring it into line with the Convention.


202.  The applicant complained, invoking Article 7 of the Convention, that he had been convicted in the absence of criminal intent, as one of the constituent elements of the offence of espionage, and that he should instead have been acquitted. Thus, he had not realised that he was dealing with information containing State secrets, since he had received that information from open publications. Questions had not been put to the jury as to whether he transmitted information containing State secrets and whether he collected it from closed or open sources; the jury therefore found that he had transferred non-classified information to foreign intelligence – acts which were not embraced by the corpus delicti of espionage. Furthermore, it had not been established by the jury verdict that he had had criminal intent to damage the  <mask> of the Russian Federation by abetting foreign intelligence services. Hence, the presiding judge should have acquitted him on the basis of such a verdict by the jury. The applicant concluded that the presiding judge had manipulated the questions to the jury, having disregarded the request by the defence to change their formulation, and had changed the constituent elements of the offence of espionage to his detriment. The applicant further disagreed with the application of domestic law in his case. He argued that the Official Secrets Act defining the list of classified information, which had in any event been rather vague, had not been applicable to him since he had never had admission or access to State secrets by virtue of his office; that the list of classified information had also been defined by presidential decree no. 1203 of 30 November 1995, although under Article 29 of the Constitution such a list was to be defined in a federal law; and that the expert assessment of the secrecy of the transmitted information of 18 July 2002 had been carried out on the basis of unpublished Ministry of Defence decrees nos. 055 and 015 of 10 August 1996 and 25 March 2002 respectively, to which he had not had access. The applicant considered that this situation had contributed to his arbitrary conviction by the presiding judge. The applicant further complained that all of the above had also led to a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. Articles 7 and 10 of the Convention provide:


176.  The Government finally noted that the IPT's ruling was issued before the Court's judgment in Association for European Integration and Human Rights, cited above, § 106, in which the Court reached the conclusion that Article 6 § 1 did not apply to such proceedings. It was clear that secret powers of interception which were used solely in the interests of  <mask> or in order to prevent and detect serious crime formed part of the “hard core of public authority prerogatives”, such that it was inappropriate to classify any related rights and obligations as “civil” in nature (citing Ferrazzini, § 29; and Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, § 61, ECHR 2007‑IV).


28.  The Government maintained that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression was compatible with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 10. The interference was based on Article 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the applicant’s conviction was necessary in order to maintain  <mask> and public safety. The Government also stressed that the applicant’s speech contained provocative views.


63.  The applicant asked the Grand Chamber to uphold the Chamber's finding that he had not had an effective remedy by which to have the lawfulness of his detention in police custody decided. He said that during the first ten days of his detention he had been held incommunicado and had been unable to contact his lawyers. He did not have the legal training that would have enabled him to lodge an appeal without the assistance of his lawyers. Nor had he been given access to the documents concerning his arrest that he needed to enable him to prepare such an appeal. The applicant maintained that in his case an application to a district judge or a judge of the  <mask> Court would have been an inadequate and illusory remedy that was bound to fail.


121.  The applicants submitted that the refusal to recognise the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia was not necessary in a democratic society. They asserted that all the arguments put forward by the Government were without foundation and unsubstantiated and that they did not correspond to a “pressing social need”. There was nothing in the file to show that the applicants had intended or carried on or sought to carry on activities capable of undermining Moldovan territorial integrity,  <mask> or public order.


20.  The Government contended that there was another characteristic which distinguished the present case from the previous judgments of Sidabras and Džiautas and Rainys and Gasparavičius, in which the Court had found a violation of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8. In the latter cases the statutory restrictions on holding certain jobs, functions or tasks were automatically applied to the applicants merely on the ground that at a certain time they had worked for the Committee of State Security of the Lithuanian SSR. However the Law applied to the applicant in the present case did not impose unconditional restrictions on a person’s employment. First, the person had to have intentionally collaborated in secret with the special services of the former USSR. Secondly, by the statutory deadline, the individual concerned had to have failed to confess to the State authorities about his or her secret collaboration. Thirdly, after the failure to confess, the fact of that person’s secret collaboration had to have been published in the “Official Gazette”. The Government maintained that 1,500 people had appeared before the Commission to admit their collaboration within the six-month period prescribed by the Law. The applicant had been free to take this step – if he had confessed, he would have avoided the unfavourable legal consequences. However, as the applicant had intentionally chosen not to confess about his past collaboration within the above-mentioned period, the State had had the right and duty to apply to him the employment-related restrictions. Moreover, under Article 8 of the Law, information concerning persons who had confessed about their collaboration in the past was to be classified as a State secret and the State assumed the obligation to protect them against possible blackmail and the declassification of information. Taking this into consideration, the Government argued that the State had not overstepped its margin of appreciation and that the Law constituted a proportionate measure to safeguard  <mask> and to protect the applicant’s rights under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention.


104.  The Government stressed that the second applicant had been free to choose whether or not to supply the information requested, and had decided not to complete the questionnaire. In their view, a fair balance had been struck in the instant case between respect for the individual’s private life and the requirements of the protection of  <mask> and public order.


76.  The Government submitted that on 17 September 2001, by virtue of Article 18 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, the Moscow City Court had decided to exclude members of the public from the trial in the interests of  <mask> because the case file contained information classified as State secrets. On 25 December 2001 the City Court confirmed its decision to hold the trial in camera, citing the need to guarantee the safety of victims and witnesses in view of the gravity of the charges against the applicant and his co-defendants. The Government pointed out that although the City Court had not directly relied on the grounds laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the proceedings had not been public because publicity could have prejudiced the interests of justice.


132.  The applicant relied on the Court's judgment in Liberty and Others, cited above, as to the lack of clarity of the relevant provisions of RIPA's predecessor, the Interception of Communications Act 1985, and argued that the changes introduced to the surveillance regime by RIPA were inadequate to address the flaws identified in that case. He concluded that any interference therefore automatically failed to meet the requirement that it must be in accordance with the law and relied in this regard on the conclusions of a report by a surveillance law expert instructed by him, Dr Goold, appended to his submissions. He further highlighted the conclusion of the Court in Liberty and Others, cited above, § 68, that the fact that extracts of the code of practice adopted under section 71 RIPA were in the public domain suggested that it was possible for a State to make public certain details about the operation of a scheme for external surveillance without compromising  <mask>.


50.  The applicant claimed 104,938 Turkish liras (TRY[1] – approximately 25,000 euros (EUR)), reflecting the market value of her land, for pecuniary damage in respect of her complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. She did not submit any claim relating to her complaint in respect of her  <mask> under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Neither did she submit any claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage.


79.  The applicant alleges two violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. First, he alleges that his  <mask> was breached in that the Latvian authorities did not properly obtain a consent from the United States authorities to put him on trial for murder. Second, he complains about the length of proceedings that, according to him, were unreasonably long. Insofar as it is pertinent in the present case, Article 6 § 1 reads as follows:


28.  The applicant complained that the quashing under supervisory review procedure of the judgment of 29 August 2000 and the consequent quashing of the judgment of 5 December 2002 violated his  <mask> guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


52.  The applicant complained that he had been deprived of his  <mask> and of the resulting restrictions on the rights of the defence, in that he had been deprived of the opportunity to clear his name. The Court considers that the complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:


29.  The Government maintained that there was no violation of the applicant's  <mask> in that his claims were considered in a public hearing by a competent tribunal established by law. The reversal of the May 2001 judgment gave the City Court a power to review the case in its totality, including the assessment of evidence and determination of the amount of the award. The domestic court considered the case properly and gave a reasoned judgment.


100.  The applicant submitted that the Constitutional Court changed its interpretation of the Salduz judgment in 2012 and 2013 (see relevant domestic law) and different conclusions were then arrived at. He noted that these conflicting judgments ran counter to the principle of legal certainty. It was the Constitutional Court’s role to create certainty; however, concerning the subject matter it had done just the opposite. The applicant relied on the case of Beian, cited above. He noted that in The Police vs Alvin Privitera of 11 April 2011, The Police vs Esron Pullicino of 12 April 2011, and The Police v Mark Lombardi, also of 12 April 2011, the Constitutional Court held that the claimants had suffered a breach of their  <mask> under Article 6 of the Convention in so far as they had not been legally assisted. This interpretation was reversed in the judgment in the names of Joseph Bugeja vs The Attorney General, 14 January 2013; The Police vs Tyron Fenech, 22 February 2013; and The Police vs Amanda Agius, also of 22 February 2013, as well as in his own case. The interpretation was again reversed in The Republic of Malta vs Alfred Camilleri of 12 November 2012, albeit that decision was once again overturned.


48.  The applicant complained that the failure on the part of domestic authorities to enforce the final judgment taken by the Astrakhan Regional Court on 14 December 1999 violated his  <mask> guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and his right to a peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. These Articles, in so far as relevant, provide as follows:


27.  The Government alleged that the applicant’s  <mask> had not been breached. They noted that the right to take part in proceedings was not absolute. Article 6 of the Convention did not guarantee a right to appear in person before a civil court but rather a more general right to present one’s case effectively before the court and to enjoy equality of arms with the opposing side. States had a free choice of means to be used in guaranteeing those rights to parties in a case (see, among other authorities, Gryaznov v. Russia, no. 19673/03, § 45, 12 June 2012).


90.  The applicant further argued that by forcing him against his will to produce evidence of an offence the authorities had violated his right not to incriminate himself and therefore his  <mask>. The principle against self-incrimination was not limited to statements obtained by coercion, but extended to objects so obtained. Moreover, the facts of his case were distinguishable from those in Saunders v. the United Kingdom (17 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI). Unlike the cases of blood or DNA testing referred to by the Court in its judgment in that case, the administration of emetics entailed the use of chemical substances that provoked an unnatural and involuntary activity of the body in order to obtain the evidence. His refusal to swallow the emetics was overcome by the use of considerable force. Therefore, the evidence that had been obtained had not existed independently of his will and he had been forced to contribute actively to his own conviction. The administration of emetics was comparable to the administration of a truth serum to obtain a confession, a practice which was expressly forbidden by Article 136a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He referred to the judgment of the Frankfurt (Main) Court of Appeal of 11 October 1996 in support of his contention.


32.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 that the discontinuation of disciplinary proceedings infringed his  <mask>, because no decisions on the merits of the cases were rendered. Under the same provision he also complained that the disciplinary panel was not impartial, because it refused to open proceedings against Dr K., President of the Vienna Bar Chamber, whose law firm had lodged a disciplinary complaint against the applicant in the proceedings.


65.  The applicant argued that at the time of the facts, police practice was not to admit solicitors to attend with an accused person during police interviews. To vindicate his Constitutional right to a trial in due process of law and his  <mask> under Article 6 of the Convention, the State ought to have ensured that he was entitled to have a solicitor present during his interrogation. The applicant submitted that he was vulnerable as he was inexperienced in the interrogation process. The absence of his solicitor from the interrogations meant that the police were able to pressure him to give his confession which was ultimately relied upon at trial. The applicant recognised that he had been cautioned and advised of his right to remain silent at the beginning of each interview. He argued, however, that the interviewers sought to undermine his caution in a manner calculated to instil fear and anxiety and erode his will not to self-incriminate. In view of the above, he was deprived of a fair trial.


26.  The applicant complained that the proceedings before the Family Court and Family Court of Appeal were unfair and thus in violation of her  <mask> as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention. She also complained that the failure of the Court of Appeal to properly consider her appeal meant she was deprived of her right of access to Court, in further breach of Article 6. Where relevant, that article provides:


42.  The applicant alleged that he had been denied the  <mask> by the involvement of an agent provocateur in the commission of the offence. He further alleged violations of the principle of equality of arms and of his defence rights since the Court of Appeal had refused to call Mr O. to give evidence and had ignored the statements of other witnesses relevant to his case. He also complained that the domestic courts’ decisions had not been sufficiently reasoned. In this connection, he alleged a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:


69.  The applicant finally alleged that his  <mask> had been impaired as a whole since the statements he had given on 23 August 2001 in the absence of legal assistance were used by the trial court to secure his conviction. He also noted that one of the grounds on which the trial courts based his conviction for the murder was the alleged inconsistency between the statements he had given during pre-trial investigation and those at his trial. Stressing the courts’ failure to specify the alleged inconsistencies, the applicant maintained that if he had been legally represented from the very outset of the investigation, his lawyer would have made sure that he focussed on the issues important to the case, as with the passage of time he had naturally forgotten some of the details of the events.


128.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that Judge A.K. had been assigned to examine their case in the trial court in breach of Articles 350 § 1 and 351 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They argued that this entailed a violation of their right to have their case examined by an independent and impartial tribunal and/or their  <mask>.


44.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that their  <mask> had been violated. They alleged that they had been convicted on the basis of unlawfully obtained evidence, notwithstanding its exclusion by the trial court. They also alleged that the rights of the defence had been significantly impaired because they had had only restricted access to the case file and the written reasons for the judgments and could not take any notes of the contents of the case file. Article 6, in so far as relevant, provides:


20.  The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that he had been denied the  <mask> since the defendant’s observations in reply to his appeals had not been communicated to him, and since the courts had not considered his arguments and had decided solely on the basis of evidence submitted by the defendant. He further complained that they had not provided sufficient reasons for their decisions, that they had been biased and that the proceedings had not complied with the “reasonable time” requirement. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


18.  The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that her  <mask> had been violated stating, inter alia, that she was unable to lodge an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 15 October 2007 since she could not afford the services of an advocate licensed to act before the Court of Cassation. The Court considers that the applicant’s complaint essentially raises an issue of access to court and should therefore be examined from the standpoint of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


41.  The Government further argued that the delays caused by the changes in the composition of the District Court should be attributed to the applicant, because he had successfully petitioned for them. Bearing in mind the prominent place which the  <mask> by an independent and impartial tribunal holds in a democratic society (see, inter alia, De Cubber v. Belgium, judgment of 26 October 1984, Series A no. 86, p. 16, § 30), the Court considers that the State should bear the responsibility for a delay incurred through a successful challenge of the trial bench by a party to the proceedings. If a court accepts a party's request for a change in the composition of the bench, it inevitably means that the fears of that party as to the impartiality and independence of the tribunal are justified (see Sidorenko v. Russia, no. 4459/03, § 32, 8 March 2007). The Court further reiterates that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention imposes on Contracting States the duty to organise their judicial system in such a way that their courts can meet the obligation to decide the cases within a reasonable time (see, among other authorities, Löffler v. Austria (No. 2), no. 72159/01 § 57, 4 March 2004). Therefore, the responsibility for an aggregated delay of approximately ten months caused by changes in the composition of the Ivolginskiy District Court and the transfer of the case to Sovetskiy District Court rests ultimately with the State (see Marchenko v. Russia, no. 29510/04, § 39, 5 October 2006).


48.  The applicant submitted that, in accordance with the domestic law, the reopening of the proceedings and referral of the case to the Plenum was within the exclusive competence of the Supreme Court’s President. Any additional cassation appeal was to be submitted to the Supreme Court’s President and not directly to the Plenum. The Plenum had no competence to examine the case of its own motion in the absence of a referral by the President of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the applicant submitted that the examination of the case by the Plenum after the Supreme Court’s President’s refusal to reopen the proceedings had been unlawful under the domestic law and in breach of her  <mask> under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention.


56.  The applicant complained that in breach of Article 6 § 1 none of the arguments that militated against holding her liable to pay compensation had been rendered in the judgment. This had also made it impossible to verify whether these arguments had been considered. A reduced duty to provide reasons for making a compensation award in the event of an acquittal was unsustainable and was inconsistent with the  <mask>. The principle of presumption of innocence could not justify an exemption being made to the requirement to state reasons. On the contrary, the High Court ought to have rendered and discussed the arguments in question. These were clearly objective arguments, namely that it had been her uncle and aunt who had injured the children. Her aunt was known to have lied in five police interviews and a witness had stated that the uncle had confided that he had attempted to kill the daughter. In this respect she also referred to certain requirements to state reasons set out in Article 19-6 (4) and (5) of the Code of Civil Procedure 2005 (tvisteloven).


27.  The applicant submitted that neither he nor his counsel had been informed of the supervisory review proceeding and of their outcome. The telegram of 4 May 2006 which he received on 23 May 2006 stated that a hearing of his case would take place on 29 June 2006, but it did not say what kind of hearing it would be. Furthermore, the Government did not submit any proof that his counsel had received that notice. Therefore, it cannot be said that his counsel was duly informed of the appeal hearing. Furthermore, four years had elapsed since the date of the first appeal hearing and the contract concluded between the applicant and his counsel had expired. The authorities were under an obligation to verify whether the applicant was still represented, and provide him with another representative if necessary. The applicant concluded that the authorities’ failure to inform him about the developments in his case and failure to notify his counsel of the appeal hearing of 29 June 2006 violated his  <mask> and had not provided appropriate redress for their failure to notify him and his counsel of the appeal hearing of 15 August 2002.


15.  The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. They argued that the applicant had no victim status to complain about the length of the proceedings, given that any delay had been taken into account as a mitigating factor in the imposition of his sentence. They further endorsed the Supreme Court’s finding of no violation of the applicant’s  <mask> within a reasonable time, for the reasons stated in that court’s decision of 1 June 2004.


42.  The applicant complained that neither he nor a lawyer appointed for him had been granted an opportunity to examine R.K., the victim of and only direct witness to the offences of which the Arnsberg Regional Court had found him guilty. He alleged a breach of his  <mask>, including the right to examine or have examined witnesses against him, as provided in Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


37.  The applicants complained that the length of the criminal proceedings against them had contravened the “reasonable time” requirement. They further complained that they had been deprived of their  <mask> by the domestic courts’ failure to abide by the statutory time-limit for the imposition of confiscation orders. They invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


28.  The applicant submitted that Judge M.G., who had been the president of the trial panel of the Zagreb County Court which had convicted him and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment, had also been part of a three-judge panel of the same court which had on 2 September 2004 extended his pre-trial detention in a decision worded in a manner that had expressed the judge’s prejudice as to the applicant’s personality and propensity to commit criminal offences. Therefore, in the applicant’s view, the fact that Judge M.G. had been the president of the trial panel which had convicted him had violated his  <mask> before an impartial tribunal. The applicant also stressed that he had never asked for Judge M.G. to be disqualified because he had considered that that would not have been an effective avenue to pursue in his case.


77.  The applicant submitted that she had been deprived of her right of access to court, as she had not received the plaintiff’s claim or summonses to the hearings. Hence, she had been unaware of the divorce proceedings. As a result, she had been deprived of other procedural rights emanating from the right to fair trial, such as the right to take part in the proceedings, present her arguments and evidence, consult the case file, contest the arguments and evidence of the other party, appeal against the judgment, and so forth. Also her right to an oral hearing and right to equality of arms had been violated. Besides, the conclusion of the Senate of the Supreme Court that Article 6 of the Convention had not been applicable to the instant case, merely because it had viewed the case as having no prospects of success, had constituted a serious violation of her  <mask>.


22.  The applicants complained under article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention that their defence rights had been violated as they had been denied access to a lawyer during the preliminary investigation stage. The first two applicants further complained that there had been no interpreter to assist while they were in police custody, violating their  <mask>. The applicants lastly complained that the length of the criminal proceedings against them had been excessive. The Court will examine their complaints under Article 6 §§ 1, 3 (c) and 3 (e) of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:


36.  The applicant alleged that his  <mask> had not been respected in the present case, in view of the fact that his conviction by the Assize Court had not included a statement of reasons and could not be appealed against to a body competent to hear all aspects of the case. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:


48.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had been denied a fair hearing in that the domestic court had taken into account unlawful evidence, gathered through other persons’ conversations, without there being a decision to intercept his telephone conversations. He also argued that his police statements had been taken under duress and that their use by the trial court in his conviction violated his  <mask>.


16.  The applicant company complained that its  <mask> was violated as a result of the quashing by means of an application to set aside the judgment of 12 August 2009 (by which the fiscal authority was ordered to pay all the legal costs it had incurred in the enforcement proceedings). It invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads in its relevant parts as follows:


90.  The applicant alleged that the fact of being deprived of access to a lawyer while he was in police custody, without being given sufficient information on his right to remain silent and not to incriminate himself, together with the fact that no lawyer was present during the subsequent police interviews, examinations by an investigating judge and other investigative acts in the course of the pre-trial investigation, had breached his  <mask> as secured by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention. Those provisions read as follows:


37.  The Government argued that the applicant’s  <mask> and the principle of quality of arms had been fully respected. The applicant had had full access to all documents constituting evidence in her case, could take notes from them and use these notes at the hearings. Under the provisions of the Lustration Act procedural guarantees provided for by the Code of Criminal Proceedings were applicable to the lustration proceedings. The Constitutional Court had examined these guarantees on several occasions and found that they were compatible with the requirements of the fair hearing. Likewise, in her appeals the applicant complained about the alleged unfairness of the proceedings, but her appeals were dismissed by the domestic courts.


96.  The applicant argued that the Court’s case-law guaranteed strong protection to the freedom of expression of lawyers, who played a key role in the administration of justice and the upholding of the rule of law, with any restriction having to remain exceptional. Such protection could be explained by two reasons: firstly, no special circumstances could justify affording a wide margin of appreciation to States, bearing in mind that European and international texts, on the contrary, protected lawyers in the activity of defending their clients; secondly, their freedom of expression was linked to their clients’  <mask> under Article 6 of the Convention. He further observed that the right of lawyers to make press statements as part of their clients’ defence was expressly acknowledged and that, in principle, there was, at European level, significant tolerance of lawyers’ criticism of judges, even when made in a public and media setting. He submitted, however, that the Chamber judgment highlighted some major uncertainties and vagaries in the case-law that affected the exercise of such freedom, especially outside the courtroom. He hoped that his case would enable the Grand Chamber to clarify the interpretation of the Convention on that point and to secure the protection of lawyers’ speech.