54.  The applicant accepted that his detention prior to 7 June 2002 fell within the respondent State's margin of appreciation. His complaint related to the period after 7 June 2002, at which point, he contended, the finding that the prosecution authorities had failed to act with the requisite diligence entitled him to  <mask>. In the applicant's view, at this point, the balancing exercise between the public interest in continued detention and the presumption of innocence tipped in favour of the latter. He did not dispute that the charges against him were serious, but argued that there were a number of flaws in the prosecution case including the delay in the making of the complaint to the police and inconsistent telephone record data. He further emphasised that he had no previous convictions for failing to surrender, for interfering with witnesses or for otherwise obstructing the course of justice and that his previous convictions did not support the conclusion that he was likely to commit further offences while on bail.


43.  The applicants each claimed the sum of 10,000 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage in respect of their detention in police custody for a period of seven days before being brought before the public prosecutor. Moreover the first applicant claimed the sum of EUR 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage arising from the delay in reviewing his application for  <mask>.


17.  The applicant maintained that the Istanbul State Security Court relied on the “nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the duration of the detention” when it rejected his requests for  <mask>, without having discussed the possibility of his destroying evidence or absconding. The applicant maintained that the grounds given by the Istanbul State Security Court for his continued detention on remand had been insufficient.


48.  The Government maintained that the applicant was accommodated in the Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre. The reason for the applicant's placement in this centre was the authorities' need for his surveillance pending deportation proceedings. The Government contended that this practice was based on section 23 of Law no. 5683 and section 4 of Law no. 5682. They further contended that the applicant had been informed of his situation on 25 January 2008, when he had been questioned by the police following his  <mask>. As regards the applicant's complaints under Article 5 §§ 4 and 5, the Government submitted that the applicant could have applied to the administrative courts.


183.  The applicant reiterated his complaint and argued that it was arbitrary and irrational to continue detaining him rather than order his  <mask>, if necessary conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. He contended that there had been no risk that he would abscond or seek to interfere with the criminal proceedings and that, even if there had been such a risk, non-custodial preventive measures should have been considered.


107.  The Government noted that all the relevant decisions had been taken by judges vested with full competence and corresponding to the requirements of independence and impartiality. In taking their decisions, those judges personally heard the applicant. Finally, those judges had the power to order the applicant’s  <mask>. In this latter respect, the Government submitted that according to Article 27 § 1 h) of the Law on Judicial Organisation the President of the Court could, as an exception in the case of the reasoned absence of the investigating judge, appoint another experienced judge to perform the same functions (see paragraph 56 above).


63.  The applicants raised a number of generic complaints which can be summarised as follows: (i) that no reasonable suspicion against them had been established with a basis in admissible evidence to justify their detention; (ii) that they had not been brought before a judge within twenty‑four hours of their arrest as required under the Charter of Basic Rights and Freedoms; (iii) that, on account of the discrepancy in the applicable time-limits, the relevant law lacked the required quality; (iv) that they had arbitrarily been denied  <mask>; (v) that the decisions in respect of their remand and first request for release had lacked adequate reasoning and the procedure preceding them had fallen short of the applicable requirements; and (vi) that the procedure in respect of their appeal against detention and their request for release had not been speedy.


63.  The Government submitted that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention provided for the right of a detained person to  <mask> and not for an obligation on the part of Contracting States to bring such persons before a court. In this regard they noted that there was an important distinction between the wording of Article 5 § 4 and Article 5 § 3 and submitted that the Court had consistently drawn a firm distinction between the automatic judicial control required under Article 5 § 3 and the right to institute proceedings conferred by Article 5 § 4. According to the Court’s case-law, what was required was that a review be available at reasonable intervals, and not that a review take place in every case (see, for example, Winterwerp, cited above, § 55, X v. the United Kingdom, Appl. no. 7215/75, 24 October 1981).


53.  The applicant maintained his complaint concerning the length of the appeal proceedings against the judgment of 15 December 2015 in so far as it concerned the detention matter. He also maintained his complaint concerning the lack of a possibility to  <mask> for a review of his continued detention after January 2016. As an example, he referred to his case against the bailiff service, in particular the fact that it had taken some three months to obtain an appeal decision (see paragraph 15 above).


51.  The applicant complained that her right to “ <mask> by which the lawfulness of [her] detention shall be decided speedily by a court and [her] release ordered if the detention is not lawful” under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention was violated by the United Kingdom in two important respects: first, that the 1983 Act made no provision for the automatic referral to an Article 5 § 4 compliant court of patients such as her who lacked capacity to institute proceedings for themselves; and, secondly, that domestic legislation made no provision for a patient, whether incapacitated or not, to take proceedings before an Article 5 § 4 compliant court in circumstances where his or her detention was authorised under section 29 (4) of the 1983 Act.


144.  The applicant noted in reply that neither the first-instance court, in its decision of 31 July 2013, nor the appeal court on 18 September had considered his arguments. In any event, his complaint concerned not the initial decision on his detention pending administrative removal, but the fact that it had been impossible to obtain a review of that decision after a certain lapse of time. He maintained that he had been unable to  <mask> so as to obtain a review of the lawfulness of his ongoing detention, in breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.


192.  The applicant's pre-trial detention infringed his right to be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power (see paragraph 167 above), his right to trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial (see paragraph 175 above) and his right to  <mask> by which all elements relevant to the lawfulness of detention could be decided by a court (see paragraph 187 above).


59.  The applicant submitted, at first, that she could not apply to administrative courts as she was unable to appoint an advocate in the absence of any valid identity documents. In her submissions dated 16 April 2009 she contended that, following her recognition as a refugee under the UNHCR's mandate, she could now empower an advocate to  <mask> on behalf of her with a notarised power of attorney. Accordingly, her advocate applied to Ankara Administrative Court and requested her release. In her submissions made in May and June 2009, the applicant maintained that the proceedings in question were not sufficiently speedy.


231.  The applicants contended that Article 6 was the lex specialis of the fair-trial guarantee. The regime under consideration represented the most serious form of executive measure against terrorist suspects adopted within the member States of the Council of Europe in the post-2001 period. It was adopted to enable the United Kingdom to  <mask> against individuals on the basis of reasonable suspicion alone, deriving from evidence which could not be deployed in the ordinary courts. That alone warranted an analysis under Article 6. The proceedings were for the determination of a criminal charge, within the autonomous meaning adopted under Article 6 § 1, and also for the determination of civil rights and obligations. The use of closed material gave rise to a breach of Article 6.


261.  The applicant complained that, contrary to Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, he had not had an opportunity to  <mask> by which the lawfulness of his house arrest could be reviewed. The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention entitles detained persons to institute proceedings for a review of compliance with the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the “lawfulness” of their deprivation of liberty (see A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, § 202, 19 February 2009, with further references).When the decision is made by a court at the close of judicial proceedings, the supervision required by Article 5 § 4 is incorporated in the decision (see De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 18 June 1971, § 76, Series A no. 12). Article 5 § 4 does not guarantee to the detainee a right to obtain a full review of the detention, with all concomitant guarantees of procedural fairness, whenever he wants it, but only at “reasonable intervals” (see Lebedev v. Russia, no. 4493/04, § 79, 25 October 2007).


52.  The applicant submitted, at first, that he could not apply to administrative courts as he was unable to appoint an advocate in the absence of any valid identity documents. In his subsequent submissions, he stated that, by means of a notarially recorded power of attorney, he had empowered an advocate to  <mask>. Accordingly, his advocate had applied to the Ankara Administrative Court and requested his release. In his submissions of September 2009, the applicant maintained that the proceedings in question were not sufficiently speedy.


197.  The applicant submitted that his complaint concerned not so much the initial decision on his detention pending administrative removal, as the fact that it was impossible to obtain a review of that decision after a certain lapse of time. His counsel’s attempt to obtain such a review by means of lodging an application for clarification under Article 31.8 of the Code of Administrative Offences had been unsuccessful, and the courts had never actually examined it but had rejected it by a simple letter sent after a four-month delay. Therefore, the applicant had been unable to  <mask> so as to obtain a review of the lawfulness of his ongoing detention, in breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.


157.  The Government claimed that the applicant could initiate proceedings before the Constitutional Court to challenge the compliance of specific legal provisions contained in the Law on Social Services and Social Assistance, the Civil Law and the Law on Custodial Court with provisions of superior force. The Court, being mindful of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 27 December 2010, notes however that the present applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention relates to his inability to obtain release from the Īle Centre and not to the issue of his legal capacity. In this connection, the Court reiterates that the Constitutional Court in Latvia is empowered to repeal legal provisions which it finds unconstitutional, but not to adopt new legal procedures or to close an alleged legislative gap (see Liepājnieks v. Latvia (dec.), no. 37586/06, §§ 73 and 75, 2 November 2010). This conclusion is further supported by the Constitutional Court ruling of 27 December 2010, whereby some legal provisions of the Latvian Civil Law relating to the legal capacity of individuals were declared null and void with effect from 1 January 2012. Parliament therefore had to come up with a legislative solution to comply with the Constitutional Court’s ruling and to establish a system of partial legal capacity for individuals in Latvia. This was done two years after the Constitutional Court’s ruling and the new regulation is applicable from 1 January 2013. In such circumstances the Court fails to see how the present applicant’s recourse to the Constitutional Court would enable him “to  <mask> at reasonable intervals” to determine the lawfulness of his continued deprivation of liberty. The Government did not suggest that there were any other venues available to the applicant to obtain a review of the lawfulness of his detention in the institution.


111.  The applicant complained that the Constitutional Court had either refused to examine the merits of his complaints concerning the lawfulness and reasonableness of his pre-trial detention or dismissed them without providing any relevant reasoning. Therefore, he had not had been able to  <mask> before the Constitutional Court to effectively challenge the lower courts’ decisions on his detention. This had resulted in him being detained without relevant and sufficient reasons for a considerable period of time. In the applicant’s view, the Constitutional Court’s practice of declaring complaints against decisions on detention inadmissible merely because a new decision on detention had been adopted in the meantime had had detrimental consequences for the effective respect for human rights in Croatia. In his particular case, that practice had allowed the lower courts to continue to extend his detention without relevant reasons, which had rendered the protection he was entitled to before that court ineffective.


198.  The applicant was detained pursuant to the same legal provisions as Mr Gorshkov, and the Court sees no reason to depart from its finding in the above judgment. It considers, therefore, that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 in respect of the applicant’s inability to  <mask> to test the lawfulness of his confinement in a psychiatric institution by a court.


55.  The applicant argued that Article 5 § 4 was to be read as creating a right of access to a court. Where a patient lacked capacity to  <mask> herself, the safeguard provided by Article 5 § 4 would be deprived of any substance, and the right to take proceedings would become theoretical and illusory, unless there was some provision by which such a patient’s case was automatically referred to an Article 5 § 4 court. Consequently, the applicant submitted that Article 5 § 4 should be construed as requiring an automatic reference to the Mental Health Review Tribunal, which she accepted was an Article 5 § 4 compliant body.


120.  The applicants Vaja Berdzenishvili (application no. 14594/07), Tengiz Kbilashvili (application no. 14597/07), Abram Givishvili (application no. 14976/07), Liana Nachkebia (application no. 14978/07), Eka Chkaidze, David Jaoshvili (application no. 15221/07) and Inga Gigashvili (application no. 16706/07) further complained that their  <mask> decisions were based on unfair trials, not complying with the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


46.  The Government acknowledged a violation of Article 5 § 1 (f) in respect of the time period after 5 February 2013, the date on which the letter from the Embassy of Uzbekistan made it clear that the applicant’s  <mask> to Uzbekistan was impossible. As regards the preceding period, the Government submitted that the lengthy detention was accounted for by an “objective reason”, notably the absence of information from the Embassy of Uzbekistan. The domestic authorities had shown “special diligence” in the conduct of the expulsion proceedings.


48.  The applicant asserted that her detention had not been necessary and that the Austrian authorities had disregarded her specific situation. She had had no intention of entering Austria illegally, as she had simply not been aware that the document issued by the French police following her declaration of the theft of her passport was insufficient for the purpose of travelling. It had been clear that she had no intention of staying in Austria illegally. In fact she had been stopped by the Hungarian border police when trying to leave Austria. Given these circumstances, it had not been necessary to take her into detention with a view to her  <mask>, as less intrusive measures would have sufficed to secure the expulsion procedure. The applicant also complained that the authorities had not acted diligently. In particular, the Romanian embassy had issued the provisional travel document on 13 March 2002, but she had not been expelled until more than a week later, on 22 March 2002.


104.  The Government submitted that the complaints were inadmissible since the applicant had lost his victim status as a result of the quashing of the extradition order and the decision to discontinue the  <mask> proceedings. Furthermore, the applicant had been granted temporary asylum in Russia for one year. Thus, he no longer ran the risk of ill-treatment in case of his extradition or administrative removal to Uzbekistan.


36.  The applicant complained that his detention pending  <mask> had been in breach of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention on account of its excessive length and the obvious impossibility to enforce the order for his expulsion to Uzbekistan. He further complained under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that he had been unable to obtain a judicial review of his detention. The relevant parts of Article 5 provide as follows:


22.  The applicants maintained in reply that they had not been notified of the decision to deport them prior to their  <mask>. They further contended that, even if they had been served with deportation orders, application to the administrative courts for the annulment of a deportation decision did not automatically have a suspensive effect and therefore did not constitute an effective remedy.


68.  The applicant also submitted a press statement made by eight non‑governmental organisations in Turkey on 23 February 2015 condemning the  <mask> of Uzbek nationals, including women and children, to Syria. According to the press statement, in August 2014 and January and February 2015, a number of Uzbek and Chechen nationals who had been held in a removal centre in south Turkey were expelled to a region of Syria controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) without having had access to their lawyers and the opportunity to challenge the removal orders. According to the press statement, three of these foreign nationals were executed by ISIS. The applicant’s lawyer also submitted some news articles dated 22 January and 10 February 2015, according to which Uzbek refugees were detained in foreigners’ removal centres for no reason. The lawyer argued that, in view of these developments, the applicant was now under the threat of deportation to Uzbekistan, Iran or Syria.


47.  The applicant emphasised that the domestic authorities had failed to properly examine his allegations of the risk of ill-treatment in Kyrgyzstan. He noted that the Code of Administrative Offences did not stipulate an obligation to assess a risk of ill-treatment in the course of  <mask> proceedings. The Appeal Court had refused to examine in detail the allegations made in the appeal statement referring to territorial jurisdiction; thus, the applicant’s serious claims of risk of the proscribed treatment had been left unscrutinised. Nor had these claims been analysed in the course of the proceedings relating to the application for refugee status.


226.  The Government observed that the Chamber had referred to “refoulement” (refusal of entry) and to “expulsion” (deportation), without pointing out the distinction between the two notions, which in reality corresponded to different procedures in domestic legislation, more specifically under Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 (see paragraph 33 above). In particular, “refusal of entry at the border” was a decision by the border guards to turn away aliens arriving at border crossings without papers and without meeting the requirements for admission to Italy. The “deferred refusal-of-entry” procedure, ordered by the Chief of Police (questore), applied where an alien had entered the country illegally and had been allowed to stay temporarily to receive protection. Lastly, “deportation” corresponded to a written and reasoned decision whereby the competent administrative or judicial authorities ordered the removal from the country of an alien who did not have, or no longer had, leave to remain in the country. The Italian legal system made no provision for collective  <mask> and Article 19 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 prohibited the return of an alien to a State where he or she might be subjected to persecution. The Government explained that in the present case the applicants had been issued with “refusal-of-entry and removal” orders and had not been subjected to a measure of “expulsion” (i.e., deportation). Therefore, in the Government’s view, it could not have been a “collective expulsion”.


62.  The applicant emphasised that both the Zyuzinskiy District Court and the Moscow City Court had failed to consider his arguments relating to Article 5 of the Convention and that no time-limit for his detention had been stipulated in the  <mask> order. With reference to the Court’s previous findings (in particular, in the case of Azimov, cited above, §§ 153‑54), he maintained that Russian law did not provide for a periodic review of the lawfulness of detention following a decision on administrative expulsion.


114.  The applicant complained, under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, that his detention between 24 and 30 July 2013 had been unlawful. He further complained under that head that his detention pending administrative removal after 31 July 2013 had not been based on sufficiently foreseeable legal norms and that the  <mask> decision had not set a time-limit for his detention. Article 5 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


45.  The Government submitted that in examining Mr Raza’s application for judicial review the Supreme Administrative Court had fully and objectively analysed the factual and legal grounds for the  <mask> order, and had given convincing reasons why the interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 8 of the Convention was justified in the circumstances. Its decision was well‑founded and lawful.


124.  The applicant claimed 2,000 euros (EUR) per month of preventive detention since 9 February 2007 in respect of pecuniary damage for loss of earnings. At the time of the submission of his just satisfaction claims (Rule 60 § 2), his claim amounted to a total of EUR 92,000. He argued that, having regard to his previous salary as a mechanic, he could have earned some EUR 2,000 per month had he been released on 9 February 2007, when his placement in a psychiatric hospital had been terminated. He stressed that following his  <mask> from Germany, he could have sought employment not only in Romania, but also in other EU Member States in which he could have had a higher income.


72.  The applicant submitted in reply that he had consistently raised the grievance concerning the risk of ill-treatment at all stages of the extradition, the  <mask> and the refugee-status proceedings. He maintained that the administrative-removal proceedings had been used by the authorities in order to circumvent the guarantees available to the applicant in extradition proceedings. For instance, the CAO did not contain any provisions obliging the authorities concerned to consider the risk of ill-treatment allegations in a removal case. The refugee-status proceedings had not had any suspensive effect in relation to the administrative expulsion. He further argued that a supervisory-review appeal against the final administrative removal order would not have suspensive effect either, and therefore could not be regarded as an effective remedy.


157.  The applicant argued that the Russian law on detention pending  <mask> was not sufficiently clear and foreseeable. In particular, the applicant complained that his arrest for the purposes of expulsion had been ordered to circumvent the requirements of the domestic law, which established a maximum time-limit for detention pending extradition. On the contrary, detention pending expulsion was not limited in time under Russian law. He noted that administrative removal proceedings had been initiated only when the authorities faced the need to release the applicant. In addition, since the application of Rule 39 by the Court, the applicant’s detention pending expulsion had no legitimate purpose and was therefore arbitrary, since he could no longer be expelled.


90.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s fears were groundless in view of the prohibition in section 44a of the Aliens Act 1998 on the  <mask> of aliens to a country where their health or life would be in jeopardy. The order to expel him had been intended to protect the national security of Bulgaria. However, its enforcement was subject to the provisions of section 44a, which coincided with the principles underlying Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention. The practice in such cases was for the competent authorities, which worked in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and non‑governmental organisations, to verify the issue upon expulsion of their own motion. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs kept an updated list of safe third countries that could receive individuals in the applicant’s position. The authorities were thus complying with the absolute prohibition of Article 3 of the Convention, and, unlike the situation obtaining in Saadi v. Italy ([GC], no. 37201/06, ECHR 2008‑...), were not seeking to balance national security considerations against the risk of ill‑treatment faced by the applicant. The bar in section 44a applied to all aliens, including those subject to expulsion orders on national security grounds.


62.  The Government submitted that the detention pending  <mask> had been lawful, as it had been ordered by a court, and that even though no time-limit for the applicants’ detention had been set, the maximum duration of an administrative penalty was two years. The applicants could seek supervisory review of the expulsion and ensuing detention orders in the event of a significant change in their circumstances.


14.  The applicants argued that had section 55(3) of the Asylum Act been applied properly, their release should have been initiated by the refugee authority once the asylum proceedings had reached the in-merit phase. Its failure to do so had rendered their continued detention unlawful. In any case, the ambiguous wording of section 55(3) entailed a discretionary administrative practice, inasmuch as the release of those asylum-seekers whose cases were admitted to the in-merit phase was, as a pattern, not initiated by the refugee authority. In their view, the expression “at the initiative of the refugee authority” must be interpreted as establishing an obligation on the refugee authority’s side, otherwise there was inadmissible legal uncertainty in this field. Moreover, in view of section 51(2) of the Third Country Nationals Act, their  <mask> was not imminent while the asylum proceedings were still in progress, which made their continued detention unjustified. Lastly, the District Court’s procedure resulting in a laconic decision upholding their continued detention solely on the formal ground that the refugee authority had not initiated their release had not qualified as “proceedings by which the lawfulness of [their] detention [was] decided speedily by a court”, for the purposes of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.


105.  The applicant maintained that on 12-13 March 2013 he had not in fact been released from detention, and that his detention had constituted an uninterrupted period from 13 September 2012. He argued that administrative‑removal proceedings had been initiated only when the authorities had faced the need to release him and the administrative detention had been aimed solely at keeping him under the authorities’ exclusive control after the expiry of the term of his detention pending extradition. Further, after 9 April 2013, the date of the formal refusal of his extradition to Uzbekistan, he had been kept in detention so that the authorities could organise his removal to the requesting country. He further argued that the Russian law on detention pending  <mask> was not sufficiently clear and foreseeable. In particular, he submitted that his arrest for the purpose of expulsion had been ordered in order to circumvent the requirements of the domestic law, which prescribed a maximum time‑limit for detention pending extradition. In contrast, detention pending expulsion was not limited in time under Russian law.


115.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been able to challenge the order for his  <mask> in judicial review proceedings, in the course of which he had been able to acquaint himself with all documents in the case file and seek to rebut the assertions of the authorities. In judicial review proceedings, the courts reviewed whether the administrative decision had been issued by a competent authority, in due form, and in compliance with the rules of administrative procedure and substantive law. In the applicant’s case, the Supreme Administrative Court had done just that. It had examined the arguments of the parties and had given reasons for finding against the applicant. It is true that the question whether the applicant faced a risk of ill‑treatment upon expulsion had been raised before that court. However, since the proceedings concerned the lawfulness of the expulsion order, the court had deemed that question to be irrelevant. Domestic courts could review only specific administrative decisions. The applicant did not claim that there existed a tacit or an express refusal to stay the enforcement of the order for his expulsion by reference to section 44a.


25.  The Government submitted that the lawfulness of the period of detention from the date on which it had been ordered and until the date of  <mask> ought to be presumed. Any alleged breaches of the requirements of good faith or due diligence were amenable to a judicial review in the proceedings under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure governing complaints about unlawful actions of State officials.


41.  The applicant submitted that no actions could have been taken in respect of his  <mask> after the application of the interim measure by the Court. Therefore, there had been no grounds for his detention after 17 June 2016. The applicant furthermore referred to the case of Azimov v. Russia (cited above), where the Court had found that the suspension of the domestic proceedings owing to the indication of an interim measure by the Court should not result in a situation where the applicant in question remained in detention for an unreasonably long period. The applicant also noted that the absence from the court’s decisions of any time-limit for his detention demonstrated that his detention had been arbitrary. Referring to the case of Azimov, the applicant also submitted that under Russian law, the maximum deprivation of liberty for an administrative offence was thirty days and that detention with a view to expulsion should not be punitive in nature, unlike in his case, in which the “preventative” measure in question had been much graver than the “punitive” one stipulated in law.


86.  The Government submitted that the measures taken against the first applicant pursued a legitimate aim and were necessary. The Contracting States were entitled to expel an alien regardless of his or her level of integration. The first applicant’s removal from Bulgaria would not impose a disproportionate burden on the applicants, because they would be able to continue their family life outside the country. The circumstances in which the first applicant’s  <mask> had been ordered showed that the authorities had not failed to strike a balance between the applicants’ rights and the public interest; they had carried out their duty to protect public order and national security. The expulsion order had not yet been put into effect, and the applicants’ family life could not therefore be regarded as already affected by it. The first applicant’s detention pending removal had not been disproportionate either, because the other applicants had been able to visit him in custody.


27.  The applicants argued that their detention under section 54(1)b of the Third Country Nationals Act had been unlawful in that it could not serve the purpose of securing their  <mask>, since they had arrived in Hungary under the Dublin II procedure – rather than illegally – as asylum seekers, which had constituted a legal obstacle to their expulsion. The non-viability of their expulsion was also reflected by the fact that it was eventually suspended on account of technical difficulties. In any event, their detention could not possibly be longer than six months (cf. section 54(4) of the Third Country Nationals Act) whereas the pending asylum proceedings had been very unlikely to finish in this time frame, given the statistics.


107.  The applicant further argued that in examining his case the Russian authorities had disregarded his specific submissions concerning his religious and political persecution and relevant reports by independent NGOs, and had relied solely on “official sources of information”. The courts' conclusion that the applicant had voluntarily left Tajikistan was at variance with his consistent submissions that he had fled because of his persecution on religious grounds and the ill-treatment sustained in custody. Referring to other cases against Russia concerning  <mask> and extradition and pending before the Court, the applicant insisted that the Russian courts consistently adopted the same formalistic approach in dealing with such complaints, which showed that the remedies suggested by the Government were ineffective in practice.


108.  The Government claimed, firstly, that the applicant had not been resident in Russia because he had flown in from Cyprus. Secondly, they alleged that his visa had no longer been valid and his residence had therefore been unlawful, referring to the Commission’s decision in the Voulfouvitch and Oulianova v. Sweden case (no. 19373/92, Commission decision of 13 January 1993). Thirdly, they maintained that the decision on the applicant’s exclusion had been taken “in accordance with the law”, namely section 27 § 1 of the Entry Procedure Act, and that an alien could be expelled before being able to exercise his procedural rights if this was necessary “in the interests of public order or is grounded on reasons of national security”. The Government did not state the reasons underlying the  <mask> decision, referring to “generally accepted international practice”. They lastly pointed out that the right to admit aliens to its territory was a universally recognised sovereign right of a State.


240.  The applicant, relying on the Čonka judgment (cited above), submitted that he had been the subject of a collective  <mask> operation. In his view, the intention of the authorities had been to deal with a group of individuals, namely Syrian Kurds, collectively. This had been evident from all the circumstances of the case. The relevant meetings that had been held by the authorities concerned the handling of the situation of Syrian Kurdish failed asylum-seekers. The Minister of the Interior had given instructions to proceed with the deportation of Syrian Kurdish failed asylum-seekers with the exception of those who were Ajanib or Mahtoumeen. The police had been instructed to use discreet methods of arrest and execute the deportation orders starting with the leaders of the protest. As a result, the police had carried out an operation on 11 June 2010 against the whole group of protesters, including women and children. According to the Government only those whose asylum applications had still been pending were released. The rest had been kept in detention pending deportation. However, in reality, the asylum procedure had not been completed for the applicant as well as a number of other protesters whom the Government had intended to deport. If it had not been for the application of Rule 39 by the Court they would all have been deported. In fact, some of the protesters had been released by the authorities following the application of Rule 39 and had had their deportation orders annulled. The applicant also noted that the authorities had issued deportation orders against stateless Syrian Kurds and that some of the asylum-seekers concerned had had their asylum applications dismissed purely on procedural grounds without having benefited from an examination of the merits of their claim.


77.  The Government of Georgia reiterated the arguments submitted in Georgia v. Russia (I) (cited above) and referred to the reports of international organisations mentioned in the judgment. It further maintained that the  <mask> of the present applicants had been based on their national and ethnic origin and not on their situation under the immigration rules of the Russian Federation.


68.  The applicants alleged a breached of Article 3 of the Convention on account of their forced  <mask> from their village. They had mentally suffered as a result of the actions of the members of security forces, who had burned their family houses. Under Article 8 of the Convention, they complained about the destruction of their property. Furthermore, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, they maintained that the destruction of their houses and their forced eviction from the village had violated their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. The provisions of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention are set out above at paragraph 59, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides, insofar as relevant, as follows:


11.  The Government argued that the application should be declared inadmissible because the applicants had not submitted to the domestic courts all those arguments about the alleged unlawfulness of their detention which they had submitted to the Court; in particular, before the Nyírbátor District Court, they had not specifically argued under section 54(4b) of the Third Country Nationals Act that their detention should be terminated since their  <mask> could not be executed. Moreover, they had not introduced a motion under section 20 of the Administrative Procedure Act which would have been a judicial remedy capable of redressing their grievances.


24.  The applicant complained that his  <mask> to Syria, if carried out, would be in breach of his right to life and the prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment provided in Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. He also complained, under Article 13 of the Convention, that he had not had at his disposal effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaints under Articles 2 and 3. The relevant provisions read as follows:


376.  The applicant further complained under Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the destruction of his and the Orhans' home, property and possessions represented a serious violation of their right to respect for their private and family lives and their homes and of their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. He also argued that his  <mask> from his home, village and community represented a separate and serious violation of his rights under these provisions. The Government disputed that there was any such military operation in Deveboyu as alleged or at all.


29.  The applicant further submitted that there existed the administrative practice of substituting  <mask> for extradition which was based on an unpublished order of the Moscow Region prosecutor, no. 86/81 of 3 July 2009, which provided that in every case of release of a detained individual because his extradition was impossible, it was mandatory to decide on his administrative expulsion from Russia. The applicant therefore maintained that his expulsion had been ordered to secure his rendition to the Uzbekistani authorities, that is to prevent him from being released and to secure either expulsion or extradition, as the case might be, and that his allegations of the risk of ill-treatment had not been thoroughly examined in the administrative expulsion proceedings.


79.  The Government submitted that the allegation of religious persecution against the applicant had been checked by the migration authorities when examining his refugee application and had been rejected as unfounded. The migration authorities had relied on the statement from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that there was no risk of ill-treatment for persons who committed criminal offences in Uzbekistan. The Government noted, however, that the applicant had not raised his complaint under Article 3 before the district judge who had ordered his  <mask>. With reference to assurances from the Uzbek authorities and Uzbek legislation (see paragraphs 75 and 77 above), the Government argued that the applicant would not be subjected to any ill-treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.


81.  The applicant’s representative argued that his allegations of a risk of ill-treatment had not been examined by the Russian authorities. She relied on several reports by United Nations agencies and international and regional organisations and argued that the applicant had run and continued to run a risk of torture in Uzbekistan on account of his religious beliefs. She gave examples of cases when Muslim detainees had been ill-treated, and in certain cases killed, because of their religious beliefs, or unjustifiably subjected to disciplinary penalties such as placement in punishment cells without food or water, in particular because of their attempts to pray. She also referred to recent reports on the allegedly appalling conditions of detention and the lack of monitoring of detention facilities in Uzbekistan. The applicant’s representative also relied on the third-party interveners’ submissions before the Court in the cases of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, ECHR 2005‑I) and Ismoilov and Others v. Russia (no. 2947/06, 24 April 2008). According to the applicant’s representative, the applicant’s  <mask> had been in fact “an extradition in disguise”, as a result of which the applicant had been convicted of the offences in respect of which the Russian authorities had refused extradition. The applicant had been expelled in flagrant violation of Russian law before his appeals against the expulsion order and the dismissal of his refugee application could be examined. Besides, no diplomatic assurances had been obtained from the Uzbek authorities in the present case and, even if they had been obtained, they could not have been effective in the context of an administrative expulsion formally unrelated to any pending criminal proceedings against an applicant. With reference to the Court’s judgment in the case of Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia (no. 36378/02, ECHR 2005‑III), it was argued that the respondent Government’s failure to comply with an indication under Rule 39 should not necessarily prevent the Court from examining on the merits a complaint under Article 3. Otherwise, it would be less burdensome for a respondent State to remove an applicant from its territory in cases in which Rule 39 was applied and to be held in violation of Article 34 of the Convention than to comply with Rule 39 and to be found to have breached Article 3 and/or Article 6.


68.  The applicant did not question before the Court the lawfulness of his detention in the extradition proceedings from 17 April to 17 October 2013. As regards the detention imposed in the  <mask> proceedings, he admitted that he had violated the immigration rules and failed to register his residence in Russia within the statutory time-limit, but claimed that the authorities had become aware of that fact on 17 April 2013, when he was arrested and found not to have a passport. However, it was not until six months later that the prosecutor instituted expulsion proceedings against him. The applicant claimed that the real purpose of the expulsion proceedings was to keep him under the authorities’ control in order to organise by any means his return to the country which sought his extradition. Other than the requirement that the expulsion order be executed within the two-year time-limit, the Code of Administrative Offences did not contain any provisions governing the length of detention pending expulsion and therefore lacked legal certainty. Moreover, the relevant provisions were open to the interpretation that by the expiry of that two-year time-limit the applicant would again be liable to expulsion and, consequently, to detention on that ground. Lastly, the applicant claimed that such a long stay in detention significantly exceeded the maximum custodial sentence permissible under the Code of Administrative Offences and that his detention pending expulsion was of a punitive, rather than preventive, nature.


99.  The Government argued that the detention period in  <mask> proceedings was too short to be susceptible to judicial review. In this relation the Court observes that on 7 June 2005 the applicant was detained for a period of ten days, thus the maximum period for which an official of the State Border Guard Control could detain an alien without a judicial decision, irrespective of the grounds on which the detention had been ordered. The Court emphasises that where detention is ordered by an administrative authority for a period of several days, Article 5 § 4 requires an opportunity to challenge it before a judicial authority (see, mutatis mutandis, Shamsa v. Poland, nos. 45355/99 and 45357/99, § 59, 27 November 2003, and Čonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, § 55, ECHR 2002‑I. Accordingly the Court dismisses the Government’s argument.


129.  The applicants listed the following elements as the basis for their complaint under this head: verbal abuse and physical violence by the detention centre staff, limited privacy, limited access to an interpreter and legal aid, lack of opportunity to take walks and have outdoor exercise, and a lack of medical treatment. They referred to their complaints and the affidavits made by themselves and to their representatives. They believed that the cumulative effect of these factors amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. They also referred to the Courts’ previous findings of a violation of Article 3 on account of the conditions of confinement in detention centres for foreign nationals pending  <mask> and argued that conditions there, as a rule, were substandard to the requirements of the Convention.


63.  The Government further noted that the applicant had not been admitted to a social therapy in Erlangen Prison as that prison had considered that in view of the enforceable  <mask> order against him, the applicant could not be accepted for treatment under the administrative rules relating to section 9 of the Execution of Sentences Act (see paragraph 38 above). A therapy could not attain its aims in those circumstances as its key elements comprised preparations of the detainee for release, including the search for a job, and an offer of care after his release which could not be realised if the detainee was not to reside in Germany after his release. In any event, given the applicant’s dangerousness, relaxations in the conditions of his detention, which were also part of the social therapy, had not been possible, irrespective of his foreign nationality.


144.  The applicants stressed that the court decisions did not stipulate the maximum length of this detention. Other than the requirement that the  <mask> order be executed within the two-year time-limit, the Code of Administrative Offences did not contain any provisions governing the length of detention pending expulsion, and therefore lacked legal certainty. Moreover, there was a conflict between the position of the Federal Bailiff Service, which was of the opinion that the expulsion could not be carried out and sought to amend the relevant court decisions, and the court decisions confirming the validity of the measure ordered (see paragraphs 15-17 above). Lastly, the applicants claimed that such a long stay in detention significantly exceeded the maximum custodial sentence permissible under the Code of Administrative Offences, and that their detention pending expulsion was of a punitive rather than preventive nature.


32.  The Government emphasised that Hungarian law did not prohibit the  <mask> or the ensuing alien policing detention of applicants for asylum per se. It only provided, in accordance with EU law, that no one could be detained on the sole ground of being an asylum seeker. However, the applicants were not detained because they were asylum seekers. Their illegal first entry to Hungary and continued journey to the Netherlands with the assistance of traffickers had posed a threat to the public order warranting their expulsion and detention – even if the deportation could not be enforced until the completion of the asylum proceedings.


227.  The Government did not accept that Article 5 could be relied in an  <mask> case (the Court had doubted that it could be in Tomic v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 17837/03, 14 October 2003). Even if it could, no issue arose in the present case because the applicant would not be detained for a lengthy period before being brought before a court. SIAC had found that it was likely he would be brought before a “judicial authority” within 48 hours, even if this were only a prosecutor with judicial status. The report of Mr Al-Khalili and Mr Najdawi confirmed that the Public Prosecutor was a judicial officer; they had also reported that the 48 hour period in which the police had to notify the legal authorities of any arrest had been reduced to 24 hours (see paragraphs 95 and 96 above). SIAC had also found that extensions of detention up to fifty days were unlikely to be sought (see paragraph 41 above). Both of SIAC’s findings had been upheld by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. In the House of Lords, Lord Phillips had also found that 50 days’ detention fell far short of a flagrant breach of Article 5 (see paragraph 58 above) and, although they did not accept that detention for fifty days was likely, the Government relied upon his conclusion.


20.  The Government argued that the application should be declared inadmissible because the applicants had failed to bring their claim concerning the alleged unlawfulness of their detention before any of the Hungarian authorities either prior to or after the termination of their detention. In particular, they had not challenged their  <mask> in court or requested judicial review of the lawfulness of their detention. Furthermore, they had failed to avail themselves of a remedy under section 20 of the Administrative Procedure Act, by virtue of which it could have been clarified whether the asylum authority’s failure to initiate their release had indeed been contrary to the law. Lastly, the applicants could have sought the determination of the unlawfulness of their detention and the payment of compensation for it in an official liability action under section 349 of the Civil Code, but they had not done so.


40.  The applicant submitted that Russian law does not provide for any possibility to obtain a meaningful judicial review of the detention of an individual who is detained pending administrative  <mask> (he referred, by way of comparison, to Tabesh v. Greece, no. 8256/07, § 62, 26 November 2009). Such detention may last up to two years but there is no periodic judicial review of it. His applications for review were dismissed in a summary fashion first by the Sestroretsk Town Court and later by the Krasnoselskiy District Court. In both cases, the St Petersburg City Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions.


141.  The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the alleged breaches of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention. He submitted that his impending  <mask> to Lebanon, entailing a risk for his life, and the lack of procedural safeguards in that regard, had caused him stress, fear and a sense of helplessness. He claimed a further EUR 20,000 in respect of the alleged breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, emphasising the excessive duration of his detention in poor conditions. He claimed EUR 10,000 in respect of an alleged breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, submitting that he suffered frustration on account of the lack of speedy and effective judicial review of his detention. Lastly, he claimed EUR 10,000 in respect of the alleged breaches of Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention, submitting that the formal manner in which the courts had reviewed the order for his expulsion and the impossibility for him to lead a normal life in Bulgaria, even if released from detention, had given rise to feelings of injustice and humiliation.


260.  The applicants alleged that it had not been possible for them to submit to the Italian authorities a complaint about the degrading conditions to which they had been subjected during their deprivation of liberty. They added that the refusal-of-entry orders had provided for the possibility of an appeal, within a period of sixty days, to the Agrigento Justice of the Peace. However, such a remedy would not have stayed the execution of the removal. The applicants argued that it was clear from the Court’s case-law (they referred in particular to Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, § 206) that the suspensive nature of a remedy was, in such matters, a condition of its effectiveness. That was merely a logical consequence of the hermeneutic principle that, to be effective, Convention provisions must be interpreted in a manner which guaranteed rights that were practical and effective and not theoretical and illusory. In the applicants’ view, the assessment of the lawfulness of the  <mask> must therefore take place before the measure is enforced.


112.  The applicant complained that the domestic authorities, both administrative and judicial, had failed to consider effectively his arguments concerning the risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan, and that the domestic courts had confirmed the validity of the  <mask> order before the completion of the asylum proceedings. He further complained that he had not had effective domestic remedies at his disposal against the inhuman and degrading detention conditions. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


33.  The Government further submitted that the applicant’s allegations about the risk of ill-treatment in the event of execution of the  <mask> order of 18 October 2013 were speculative and “could not be considered by the [domestic] court during the administrative proceedings”. Nevertheless, they had been thoroughly reviewed and found to be unsubstantiated by the Moscow City Court. In any event, the expulsion order did not specify that the applicant was to be expelled to Uzbekistan, but merely stated that he was to be removed from the territory of the Russian Federation. The Government concluded that a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention had not been convincingly established.


148.  The Government first of all suggest distinguishing two separate procedures – the  <mask> as a result of conviction and the expulsion as a result of the breach of the administrative provisions regarding the entrance and stay of foreigners in Latvia. The Government state that in the present case the applicant was expelled as a result of the breach of the afore-mentioned administrative provisions.


69.  The applicants submitted that Mr Raza’s deprivation of liberty was unlawful because it had lasted an unreasonably long time. At the material time Bulgarian law, in breach of the applicable European standards, did not limit the duration of detention pending deportation. Save for sending several letters to the Pakistani embassy, the authorities had done nothing to expedite Mr Raza’s  <mask>. Given that he had a family, a place to live and financial means to support himself, and could be kept under police supervision, there had been no need to keep him in custody for so long.


29.  The applicant argued that his detention under section 54(1)(b) of the Third Country Nationals Act had been unlawful in that it could not serve the purpose of securing his  <mask>, since he had submitted an asylum application on arrival and these pending proceedings had constituted a legal obstacle to his expulsion. In any event, his detention could not possibly be longer than six months (cf. section 54(4) of the Third Country Nationals Act) whereas those pending proceedings had been very unlikely to finish in this time frame, given the statistics.


402.  The applicants submitted that the deliberate destruction of their homes, property and possessions and the resulting arbitrary  <mask> from their homes and village represented a serious violation of their right to respect for private and family life and of their right to respect for their home, as well as a serious interference with their way of life. They further claimed that the destruction of their homes and family life was part of a practice and that, therefore, they had suffered an aggravated violation of their rights under Article 8 of the Convention.


174.  The applicant admitted that he had failed to regularise his stay in Russia before his arrest in March 2012 and had therefore violated the migration laws. He also conceded that the authorities had become aware of that fact upon his arrest on 17 March 2012. He argued, however, that as the authorities had taken no measures in this regard while he was in custody pending extradition, they had then abused their powers by ordering his detention within the framework of administrative proceedings solely with a view to ensuring his return to Uzbekistan notwithstanding the refusal of the extradition request. The applicant considered that his detention pending administrative removal had in any event been unlawful, as the Code of Administrative Offences set no time-limits for such detention. Even though the execution of the decision on his administrative removal had been suspended on account of the application of Rule 39 by the Court, in the applicant’s view this did not remedy the absence of clear provisions in domestic law governing such detention. With reference to Azimov, cited above, §§ 172-73, the applicant argued that detention pending  <mask> must not exceed the maximum term for detention as an administrative penalty, as otherwise it constituted a punitive rather than preventive measure.


27.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s allegations that he risked ill-treatment in the event of his extradition to Uzbekistan had been considered by the national authorities and dismissed on sufficient grounds. Referring to the decisions of the prosecution and immigration authorities and the domestic courts in the course of the extradition and  <mask> proceedings, the Government asserted that his claims had been duly reviewed and found to be devoid of substance. In their opinion, the assurances presented to the Russian authorities by the Uzbekistani authorities were sufficient and compatible with the countries’ international obligations and domestic legal developments. As regards the expulsion proceedings, the expulsion order did not specify that the applicant was to be taken to Uzbekistan, but merely stated that he was to be removed from the territory of the Russian Federation. The Government concluded that a risk of the applicant’s treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention had not been convincingly established.


62.  The Government further contested that the applicant had not been offered any suitable treatment in Straubing Prison in view of the enforceable  <mask> order against him. Having regard to the findings of the experts consulted by the courts, in particular those made by expert A. in his reports dated 15 October 1996 and 20 June 1997, the applicant should first have completed a social therapy in prison in order to ensure that he was motivated to undergo further treatment before making a therapy for sexual offenders. The applicant, however, had repeatedly rejected offers for a suitable therapy made to him. In particular, between 1997 and 1999 he had refused participating in a psychoanalytic discussion group for sexual offenders offered in Straubing Prison which would have been appropriate to start his treatment. In March 2003 he had confirmed that he was unwilling to apply for a therapy for sexual offenders.


90.  The applicants argued that the question of their  <mask> to Syria had been considered and decided primarily within the framework of the administrative proceedings, in which they had submitted extensive documents and arguments pointing to the danger of a violation of Articles 2 and 3 in the event of their return. The judicial decisions of 15 and 16 April and 27 May 2014 had failed to take these arguments into account and had made no effort to dispel them. In the April hearings in the District Court, they had raised their fears of returning to Syria. During the hearing of 27 May 2014, they had submitted extensive and detailed information about the conflict there and the danger they would face if returned. These documents included UNHCR and FMS documents, other relevant information and their own detailed statements. The applicants stressed that L.M. was a stateless Palestinian and was therefore in particular need of international protection, while A.A. and M.A. were from Aleppo, where fierce fighting had been raging since 2013. A.M specified in addition that several of his family members had been killed by the opposition forces. Following the decision taken at that hearing, the decisions to expel them had entered into force.


64.  The Government submitted that the applicant was apprehended on 22 October 2006 by officers of the Department of the Interior of the Kuzminski district of Moscow and was brought before the Kuzminskiy District Court on 23 October 2006. The court fined the applicant for not observing the applicable registration procedure and ordered the applicant’s  <mask>. The Government also stated that neither the Federal Migration Service nor the Department of the Ministry of the Interior had any records or information about any subsequent detention of the applicant and that the applicant was not forcibly removed from the Russian Federation, but left on his own on 24 October 2006.


91.  The applicant replied that the Government failed to say anything about the risk that he faced in Lebanon. As for their reliance on section 44a, there existed no mechanism to ensure its effective application. The only opportunity for him to invoke that provision to prevent his  <mask> to Lebanon had been in the proceedings for judicial review of the expulsion order. However, the Supreme Administrative Court had held that the point was irrelevant. In any event, the only procedure in which the applicant could prove that he risked death or ill‑treatment were asylum proceedings. When examining his asylum request, the State Refugees Agency had found that risk to be real, based as it was on the applicant’s personal circumstances and the general situation in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. On that account it had granted him humanitarian protection. The risk could therefore be regarded as established. However, he could not benefit from such protection, as he fell within the exclusion clauses of sections 4(4) and 67(3) of the Asylum and Refugees Act of 2002.


126.  The applicant submitted that there was no indication that the authorities had been actively pursuing his  <mask> or that it was at all possible. The only thing that the authorities had done had been to contact the Lebanese embassy in Sofia with a view to obtaining travel documents for the applicant to allow him to enter Lebanon. They had not tried to contact the embassies of any safe third countries. In the applicant’s view, detention pending deportation should be allowed to reach the maximum eighteen‑month period allowed by law only in exceptional cases.


47.  The applicant submitted that the Russian authorities had not conducted the  <mask> proceedings with due diligence. This lack of due diligence on their part was exemplified in several ways. Firstly, no effort had been made to contact the Uzbek authorities in the first four months and eleven days of his detention. Secondly, the Russian authorities had sent no fewer than four letters to the Embassy of Uzbekistan in Moscow, but a first reply was received more than one year and two months after the despatch of the first letter. Thirdly, there had been no justification for the applicant’s detention after 5 February 2013, when the Russian authorities had become aware that he was not an Uzbek national. Finally, the applicant pointed out that he had been kept in detention pending expulsion: thus, there had been no complex extradition proceedings and the only issue to be determined had been whether at least one State was willing and able to receive him.


28.  The applicant submitted that he had raised the issue of his risk of being subjected to ill-treatment if returned to Uzbekistan in the extradition,  <mask> and refugee-status proceedings, advancing a number of specific arguments, such as an increased risk of ill-treatment of persons who were, as was the applicant, accused of participation in a banned religious activity. The Russian courts failed to analyse the nature of the charges against the applicant, disregarded the link between the charges and the risk of ill-treatment and did not examine the information from various international organisation and from the Court’s judgments. The applicant rejected the Government’s argument that the decision on his administrative removal did not necessarily mean that he would be expelled to Uzbekistan. No other possibility had ever been discussed in the course of the administrative proceedings and, furthermore, there was no reason to believe that any other country would be willing to accept him. His placement in the detention facility foreclosed the possibility of his voluntary and independent departure from Russia and prevented him from choosing the country of destination.


19.  The Government submitted that the detention pending  <mask> had been lawful, as it had been ordered by a court, and that even though no time-limit for the applicant’s detention had been set, the maximum duration of an administrative penalty was two years. The applicant could seek supervisory review of the expulsion and ensuing detention orders in the event of a significant change in their circumstances.


87.  The applicants did not comment on the effects of the enforcement of the order for the first applicant’s  <mask> on their family life. They submitted that the first applicant’s detention, which had lasted in total more than twenty‑two months, had been in breach of their right to respect for their family life, because it had been unlawful, in particular because of the first applicant’s refugee status; too lengthy; unnecessary; and not subject to judicial review. The first applicant had at all times remained at the authorities’ disposal and had not tried to flee. He could have been simply required to report to the police on a daily basis instead of being detained. That would have allowed him to remain with his family and to take care of his minor children.


98.  The applicant finally complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 that she had not been allowed to exercise the procedural safeguards against her extradition. The Court notes that, according to Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 7, this provision uses the concept of  <mask> “in a generic sense as meaning any measure compelling the departure of an alien from the territory but does not include extradition” (ETS no. 117, § 10). Since in the present case the applicant was subject to extradition proceedings, Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 finds no application. It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.


126.  The Government contested the amount claimed by the applicant in respect of pecuniary damage for loss of earnings. They stressed that it was uncertain whether the applicant would have found a job after his long detention and that, in view of the final  <mask> order against him, he could only legally have worked in Romania where he could have earned only a much lower salary.


60.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s  <mask> was justified in the light of the European Parliament’s Resolution on Cults in Europe of 29 February 1996, in which it had expressed concern over certain cults “engaging in activities of an illicit or criminal nature and in violations of human rights, such as maltreatment, sexual abuse, unlawful detention, slavery, the encouragement of aggressive behaviour or propagation of racist ideologies, tax fraud, illegal transfers of funds, trafficking in arms or drugs, violation of labour laws, the illegal practice of medicine”. The Government also referred to the same effect to Recommendation 1178 (1992) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on sects and new religious movements and the Committee of Ministers’ supplementary reply to that Recommendation, adopted on 17 February 1994 (doc. 7030). The Government inferred from those documents that States had the right and obligation to exercise vigilance and caution in such sensitive matters as spreading religious teachings. The applicant’s activity as a coordinator of Rev. Moon’s groups had been merely a “motive” rather than a “ground” for the Russian authorities “to exercise vigilance and make use of existing legal instruments”. The grounds for the applicant’s exclusion were the results of the operational and search measures as reflected in the report by the Stavropol Regional Branch of the Federal Security Service, dated 18 February 2002, concerning the banning of the applicant from the Russian Federation. As the Moscow City Court had pointed out in its judgment of 25 March 2003, the applicant’s activities in the Russian territory were “of a destructive nature and pose[d] a threat to the security of the Russian Federation”. The Government emphasised that the threat resulted from the applicant’s activities rather than his religious beliefs.


133.  The applicant submitted that even if removal had in fact been possible in the circumstances of the case, the duration of her detention had been excessive. It had become possible for the immigration authorities to deport the applicant from 11 February 2011. She considered that the fact that she had been serving a sentence of imprisonment for part of the time after that date (from 17 February to 16 June 2011) should not, in itself, have been an obstacle to the initiation of removal proceedings. Indeed, Article 14 (2) of the Act allowed the Minister to order the  <mask> from Malta of a person serving a prison sentence, prior to the completion of such sentence.


163.  The applicant, however, argued that the real purpose of that last detention order had been to keep him detained after the maximum period of detention pending extradition had expired, and that the authorities had used  <mask> proceedings as a pretext to circumvent the requirements of the law. The first question before the Court is therefore whether or not the authorities acted in good faith when detaining the applicant within the expulsion proceedings.


71.  The applicant submitted that on 7 October 2006, after her husband Tengiz Kbilashvili, who is also an applicant (application no. 14597/07), had been deported, she went to the local passport department, to arrange her departure from the Russian Federation. In the local passport department her passport was taken from her and she was transferred to a militia department for detention. Later that day, she was transferred to the Centre for Temporary Detention of Aliens no. 2, where she was detained until her  <mask> on 17 October 2006.


161.  The Government is of the opinion that the order on the applicant's  <mask> from Latvia has been issued “in accordance with law”. Moreover, the Government underline that whether the judgment of the Riga Regional Court had or had not come into force was of no legal relevance since the applicant was not expelled on the basis of the judgment.


71.  The Government argued first that this provision was not applicable because since 20 January 2005 the applicant could not be considered “lawfully resident” in the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. In this respect they noted that on 20 January 2005 he had lost the right to lawfully reside in the territory of Latvia, and that the subsequent withdrawal of the applicant’s permanent residence permit and his  <mask> were merely the legal consequence of the decision of the Minister of Interior of 20 January 2005 to include the applicant in the blacklist.


67.  The applicant initially submitted that at the end of September 2006 she had submitted her passport and several other documents to her University, for the renewal of her registration. On 8 October 2006 she received a call from the University, informing her that there were problems with her passport and that she had to go to the Presninski Passport Department. When she went there the next day, she was notified about a decision to expel her, owing to her visa-related offence in 2004. On 11 October 2006 she returned to the passport department to prove that she was an internally deplaced person and had a right to stay in the Russian Federation. In the evening on the same day she was taken to the Presninski District Court, which confirmed her  <mask>. Subsequently she was brought to the Police Department of the Presninski District, where she was detained until midnight. During the following hours the police attempted to bring her to several different detention centres, where she was not admitted as they were already full or only for men or for convicted persons. At around 6 o’clock in the morning of 11 October 2006 she was admitted to a Women’s Immigration Reception Centre, near Butirskaia prison, and was detained until her expulsion. On 17 October 2006 the applicant was brought to Domodedova airport and flown to Georgia by an aircraft belonging to the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation.


36.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been residing in Russia illegally since 1 September 2013, using his brother’s passport, and he had not taken any steps to legalise his status in the country for several years. His complaint under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. In particular, he had not appealed against the removal decision issued by the court on 12 May 2015, even though his right to appeal had been explicitly noted in the text of the decision. Furthermore, the applicant’s arguments concerning his poor knowledge of the Russian language and his lack of understanding of the  <mask> proceedings were inaccurate and contradictory, since he had been assisted by an interpreter during the expulsion hearing, had resided and worked in Russia since 2013, and his application for temporary asylum had been submitted in Russian. Moreover, even assuming that a lawyer had assisted him in submitting his request for temporary asylum, that lawyer could also have asked to restore the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the expulsion decision at that time. However, he had only done so on 12 February 2016 and the appeal court had refused his request, stating that the expulsion decision had been served on the applicant on the day when it had been issued, and the lack of any action on the part of the applicant was unjustified. Moreover, the applicant had not appealed against the immigration authorities’ refusal to grant him temporary asylum. Lastly, his request for refugee status had been ongoing at the time of his application to the Court.


60.  The applicant further submitted that Article 5 had been breached in that he had persistently been refused a social therapy in view of his impending  <mask> as an Austrian national or in view of his age. He had therefore been refused any suitable therapy in Germany. At the same time, his preventive detention had not been suspended and he had not been expelled as the domestic courts had considered that there was a risk that he might reoffend as he had not completed a therapy. Under these circumstances, his continued preventive detention was disproportionate.


43.  The Government considered that the applicant had not acted in good faith but had abused his right of petition as he had submitted to the Court information concerning his  <mask> proceedings only selectively. They noted, in particular, that he had failed to inform the Court about his alleged loss of his passport and his further attempts to hinder the completion of the expulsion proceedings, including his refusal to fill out the necessary forms for identity documents to be issued. He had been aware of the fact that the Russian authorities had not accepted the solution suggested by the Estonian authorities that the latter issue the applicant a temporary travel document.


151.  The Government further submit that the applicant's  <mask> from Latvia did not limit his access to court as he could rectify the deficiency of his complaint and continue the proceedings before the Central District Court of the City of Riga through his lawyer. In case the applicant's presence was considered mandatory by the court, it would have summoned him, according to Article 2395 of the Civil Procedure Code. The court's summons would have been a valid basis for issuing a visa to the applicant.


213.  The Government noted that the applicant had provided a breakdown of the work performed by his representatives, but had submitted no agreement concerning legal assistance, or other documents setting out their hourly rates. Furthermore, as the applicants’ representatives specialise in cases involving extradition and  <mask> to the CIS States, the Government expressed doubts as to whether the present case required research and preparation to the extent claimed by the applicant.


63.  The Government further argued that the applicant had failed to use the appropriate remedies in respect of each particular decision adopted by the competent State authorities within his  <mask> proceedings. By relying on the case-law of the Administrative Cases Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court, the Government argued in particular that the expulsion proceedings for the person concerned constituted a “uniform process” and that the administrative court, when examining a particular decision adopted in the course of expulsion proceedings, cannot address each particular decision in isolation. Accordingly, the applicant should have made an application to the administrative courts and should have lodged appeals with the administrative court against the decision adopted by the Minister of Interior on 13 June 2005 (see paragraph 23 above) and the decision adopted by the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs on 11 July 2005 (see paragraph 36 above). The Government further contended that after the legislative changes of 1 July 2005 the applicant had to ask the Minister of Interior for re-examination of the decision to put his name on the blacklist.


92.  The applicants argued that their detention was not only arbitrary but did not serve the purpose of ensuring the applicants’  <mask>. According to the applicants their detention was based on a xenophobic attitude towards Georgian nationals. Moreover, they submit that they had no practical opportunity to challenge the legality of the action taken against them, since they were denied the right to obtain legal advice and were deported without having the opportunity to challenge the court decisions, with which they were not provided and which were based on deeply flawed proceedings.


223.  The Government alleged that no collective  <mask> had taken place. They observed that the applicants had been returned according to the fast-track procedure provided for in the agreement with Tunisia (see paragraphs 36-40 above), which could be regarded as a “readmission” agreement within the meaning of the Return Directive (see paragraph 41 above). They argued that this agreement had contributed to the repression of migrant smuggling, as called for by the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. Moreover, Tunisia was a safe country which respected human rights, this being shown by the fact that the applicants had not reported experiencing persecution or violations of their fundamental rights after their return.


23.  The Government submitted that the lawfulness of the period of detention from the date on which it had been ordered and until the date of  <mask> ought to be presumed. Any alleged breaches of the requirements of good faith or due diligence were amenable to a judicial review in the proceedings under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure governing complaints about unlawful actions of State officials.


20.  The applicants were of the view that their detention after the asylum proceedings began (i.e. 10 November 2011) and, at the latest, from the asylum authority’s decision to admit the case to the “in-merit phase” (i.e. after 12 December 2012) had been unlawful. In particular, they submitted that their detention with a view to ensuring the enforcement of the  <mask> order (section 54 (1) of the Immigration Act) had no longer been justified under the domestic law once they had filed an asylum request, since from then on the expulsion could only take place after a decision by the asylum authority rejecting the request (section 51 (2) of the Immigration Act), and certainly no longer justified once the asylum authority had determined that there was no safe third country (since from then on it was no longer possible for the immigration authority to take steps with a view to the applicants’ expulsion to Serbia in the light of section 51 (1) of the Immigration Act). In these circumstances, the detention should have been terminated (as per section 54 (6) b) of the Immigration Act). In other words, their continued detention notwithstanding the suspension of the deportation process amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty.


63.  The applicant complained that the real reason for her repatriation was the quarrel that she had had with the commander of Police Precinct no. 19, in violation of her right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention the applicant complained that she had been expelled from Romania although she had been granted a temporary visa valid from 5 to 12 May 2000 and that her  <mask> had taken place before she had had the opportunity to challenge the measure.


53.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his preventive detention was unlawful as he had been refused a social therapy or relaxations in the conditions of his detention in view of his future  <mask>. However, at the same time his sentence was not suspended because the prosecution authorities argued that he was not impressed by the execution of his sentence and had not changed his attitude towards his offences. Relying on Article 14 of the Convention, he further argued that he had suffered discrimination because of his Bulgarian origin as a result of the refusal of the said measures when the order for the execution of his preventive detention was made.


49.  The applicant’s detention had also been necessary for the speedy examination of his asylum request, and because he had posed a danger to public order and security under Article 13 § 2 (b) and (c) and Article 13 § 4 of Presidential Decree no. 114/2010. The Government drew the Court’s attention to the fact that, in accordance with the national law, lodging an asylum request suspends the enforcement of an  <mask> decision but not the enforcement of a detention decision. They referred to a series of judgments against Greece in which the Court had considered that lodging an asylum request did not render detention arbitrary. In any event, the applicant had been released on 13 November 2013, twenty-six days after filing an asylum request. In view of the factors mentioned above, the Government submitted that the domestic authorities’ good faith in relation to the issuance of the decisions on the basis of which the applicant had been detained could not be disputed.


72.  The applicant complained under Article 6 that he did not understand the charges against him during his deportation. The Court notes that there were no judicial proceedings concerning the applicant’s removal from the territory of Ukraine and that any such proceedings would fall outside the scope of Article 6 of the Convention (see Maaouia v. France [GC], no. 39652/98, § 40, ECHR 2000‑X). Despite its findings that the applicant’s  <mask> has appearances of extradition in disguise (see paragraph 58 above), the Court considers that this does not preclude it from examining the question of whether the removal of the applicant from the territory of Ukraine, which was formally presented as expulsion, complied with the Convention requirements. Being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, the Court decides to examine the problem raised by the applicant under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7, which reads as follows:


84.  The applicants complained that their  <mask> to Syria, if carried out, would be in breach of their right to life and the prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, as provided in Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. They also stressed that they had no effective domestic remedies in respect of these violations, in breach of Article 13. The provisions read as follows, in so far as relevant:


220.  The applicants submitted that the key issue in the present case was whether an individual interview was necessary prior to their  <mask>. They observed in this connection that only two aspects distinguished their case from Hirsi Jamaa and Others (cited above), namely the fact that they had actually been identified and that they had received identical “deferred refusal-of-entry” orders. Even though the similarity between the orders did not, in itself, lead to the conclusion that there had been a collective expulsion, it was an indication to that effect. In addition, in Sharifi and Others (cited above) the Court had found a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 in respect of one of the applicants who had been expelled (Mr Reza Karimi) even though he had been identified, because there was no evidence that, at the time of the identity check, an interpreter or independent legal adviser had been present, those being indications of an individual interview. Where there was evidence of such an interview, however, the Court had excluded any violation of that provision in the cases of M.A. v. Cyprus (no. 41872/10, ECHR 2013); Sultani v. France (no. 45223/05, ECHR 2007-IV); and Andric v. Sweden ((dec.) no. 45917/99, 23 February 1999). In the applicants’ view, to exclude the need for an individual interview would render meaningless the procedural safeguard of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, because an expulsion could be justified purely on the basis that the alien’s nationality – that is, the fact of belonging to a group – had been established.


158.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s detention pending  <mask> had been lawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (f). The applicant was detained with a view to enforcement of the court order for his administrative removal from the country under Article 18.8 § 1 of the CAO. Referring to the reasons given by the courts for the applicant’s expulsion and detention, the Government argued that the expulsion proceedings had nothing to do with the extradition proceedings. The law on detention pending expulsion was sufficiently clear and foreseeable.


146.  The Government contended that States have a fundamental right under international law to control the entry, residence and  <mask> of aliens. Clear language would be required to justify the conclusion that the Contracting States intended through the Convention to give up their ability to protect themselves against a risk to national security created by a non-national. As a matter of ordinary language, “action being taken with a view to deportation” covered the situation where a Contracting State wished to deport an alien, actively kept that possibility under review and only refrained from doing so because of contingent, extraneous circumstances. In Chahal v. the United Kingdom (15 November 1996, Reports 1996‑V), a period of detention of over six years, including over three years where the applicant could not be removed because of an interim measure requested by the Commission, was held to be acceptable under Article 5 § 1 (f).


39.  The applicant rejected the Government’s argument that the decision on his administrative removal did not necessarily mean that he would be expelled to Uzbekistan. No other possibility had ever been discussed in the course of the administrative proceedings and, furthermore, there was no reason to believe that any other country would be willing to accept him. His placement in the detention facility foreclosed the possibility of his voluntary and independent departure from Russia and prevented him from choosing the country of destination. He disagreed with the Government’s submission that his  <mask> had been made necessary because of his failure to abide by the Russian migration laws and the absence of family ties in Russia. Article 3 prohibited ill-treatment in absolute terms and there could be no justification for imposing a sanction that would expose him to a real risk of torture.


45.  The Government admitted that the applicants had been deprived of their liberty for a short period of time. However, that deprivation had been justified under the second limb of sub-paragraph (f) of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention and effected for the purpose of the applicant’s  <mask> under supervision from the territory of the Republic of Moldova in accordance with the decision of the BMA to bar them from the territory. The Government also submitted that at the time of their transfer to Turkey the applicants had not opposed being expelled to their country of origin and that they had not claimed that they had risked being tortured or subjected to inhuman treatment if sent to that country. Moreover, the Moldovan authorities had not been in possession of any such information.


104.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s detention pending  <mask> had been lawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (f). The applicant was detained with a view to enforcement of the court order for his administrative removal from the country under Article 18.8 § 1 of the CAO. Referring to the reasons given by the courts for the applicant’s expulsion and detention, the Government argued that the expulsion proceedings had nothing to do with the extradition proceedings. The law on detention pending expulsion was sufficiently clear and foreseeable. The applicant’s detention was necessary to ensure the administrative removal, because he could have absconded from the authorities if released.


51.  The Government maintained that the applicant’s detention had been lawful under domestic law. The only purpose of his detention had been his  <mask> from Estonia; this was demonstrated by the pertinent court decisions as well as by the other steps taken by the authorities. The applicant’s refusal to co-operate had only extended the period of his detention. The Government pointed out that the feasibility of expulsion could not be assessed on the basis of whether the person concerned wished to leave the country or not. They also emphasised that in 2006 and 2007 the Estonian authorities could legitimately presume that after the entry into force of the EU-Russia readmission agreement on 1 June 2007 there would be an additional basis for the applicant’s expulsion. The Estonian authorities could not have foreseen that the Russian party would not comply with its obligations under that agreement.


58.  The Government provided several documents with regard to administrative proceedings concerning the applicant. These include an administrative offence report from the Leninskiy district dated 13 October 2006, indicating the applicant’s arrest on the same day at 10 o’clock and a decision of the Vidnoye Town Court of the Moscow Region, also dated 13 October 2006, fining the applicant (RUB 1,000) for not observing the applicable registration procedure, and ordering the applicant’s  <mask>. The Court decision also indicates that the applicant shall be held at the Reception Centre of Serpukhov until his expulsion. Furthermore, the judgment shows a stamp of Domodova airport, dated 17 October 2006.


122.  The Government’s case was that the issue of risk would be examined upon the enforcement of the  <mask> order against the applicant and that the authorities would not remove him from Bulgaria without ensuring that this would not fall foul of the prohibition set out in section 44a of the Aliens Act 1998 (see paragraph 38 above). However, the Court has already found that there are no guarantees that before proceeding with the expulsion the authorities would subject the applicant’s claims under Article 3 of the Convention to rigorous scrutiny (see paragraphs 105 and 106 above). More importantly, the Government did not point to any procedure whereby the applicant would be able to challenge their assessment of those claims. From the provisions of the Aliens Act 1998 and the regulations for its application it does not appear that it is possible to bring a separate legal challenge against the enforcement of the expulsion order, let alone that there exists an avenue of redress that meets the two requirements set out in paragraph 120 above. The Court would emphasise in that connection that the existence of remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, and that it falls to the respondent State to establish that (see, among other authorities, McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333/06, § 107, ECHR 2010‑...).


173.  The Government submitted, with a reference to Alim v. Russia, no. 39417/07, § 54, 27 September 2011, that administrative removal constituted “expulsion” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. They further pointed out that under Article 3.10 § 5 of the Code of Administrative Procedure a judge could place a person subject to administrative removal in custody in a special detention centre, where the person was detained pursuant to section 34 § 5 of the Foreigners Act until the execution of the decision on administrative removal. The Government also noted that according to the Constitutional Court’s decision no. 6-R of 17 February 1998, a person subject to administrative-removal proceedings could be detained without a court order for up to forty-eight hours. As on 17 September 2012 the applicant had been arrested on the ground of having committed an administrative offence punishable by administrative removal, and on 19 September 2012 the Meshchanskiy District of Moscow had found him guilty of that offence and ordered his administrative removal and detention in a special facility pending the execution of the decision, the applicant’s detention had fully complied with the domestic law. Moreover, when the Court had applied Rule 39, instructing the Russian Federation to suspend the applicant’s  <mask> to Uzbekistan, the competent authorities had taken measures to comply with the Court’s request.


113.  The Government submitted that the sums claimed by the first applicant were exorbitant, and that there were no reasons to award anything to the other applicants. They pointed out that the order for the first applicant’s  <mask> had not been enforced, and said that there was noting to prevent the other applicants from following him to another safe country. In those circumstances, the finding of a violation would amount to sufficient just satisfaction.


95.  The applicant claimed that his detention, which commenced on 28 January 2015, had been arbitrary and thus unlawful from the outset. In any event, it would have ceased to be lawful once the  <mask> proceedings had been suspended. The CAO did not establish any time-limits for detention of persons awaiting administrative removal; the domestic courts had failed to specify any time-limits in their judgments; accordingly, the applicant could not foresee the length of his detention. Noting that his detention had largely exceeded the maximum penalty in the form of deprivation of liberty under the CAO and referring to the case of Azimov v. Russia (no. 67474/11, §§ 172-73, 18 April 2013), the applicant claimed that his detention pending expulsion was of a punitive nature rather than of a preventive one. The applicant also noted that the Appeal Court had failed to analyse his allegations of the breach of his right to liberty. Lastly, the applicant reiterated that he had had no possibility to initiate judicial review of the lawfulness of his prolonged detention as required by Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.


78.  The Government contended that the applicant had fully exercised his procedural rights, because his complaint against the  <mask> order of 13 June 2005 had been duly examined by the Head of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs, who had adopted a decision on 11 July 2005. They also argued that Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 did not imply that prior to the expulsion the person concerned ought to be served with a decision reached as a result of the review proceedings.