34.  The Government contested the allegation of a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. Reference was made to sections 7(1), 10(1) and 11(3) of the Aliens’ Domicile and Residence Act as well as to Article 16 § 3 of the ordinance implementing the Act, all of which had been duly published and which provided a sufficient legal basis for the interference. According to these provisions, the residence permit of the foreign spouse of a Swiss citizen would not be renewed if there was a ground for expulsion. The Swiss authorities were called upon to examine the proportionality of the measure. Given the offences which the applicant had committed in Switzerland, there could be no doubt that the refusal not to renew the residence permit was called for in the interests of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime and for the  <mask>, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


protection of the rights and freedoms of others

689.  The Government contended that the search of the homes and offices of certain applicants, and the confiscation of personal items and files, was in accordance with the law, namely Article 11 of the Law on the State of Emergency No. 2935, Article 3 of Decree No. 430 for the state of emergency region and Articles 90 to 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They were necessary under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention in the interests of national security, public safety, for the prevention of disorder and crime, and the  <mask> from terrorist attack. Furthermore, these matters did not raise any issue under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as any interference with the applicants' property was justified in the public interest, within the meaning of that provision. In this connection, the Government emphasised that the searches in the present case were part of an operation against the PKK, an illegal terrorist organisation responsible for thousands of atrocious murders and maimings, as well as serious economic and social losses.


28.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant complaints were only in respect of “field plots” and not in respect of her “home”. Moreover, she was no longer living in the area where she alleged she had had her “home”. In any event, the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with her rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, for the prevention of disorder and for the  <mask>.


31.  The Government contended that the interference complained of had been in accordance with the law, both domestic and international, and legitimate in its aim of serving the interests of public safety and the  <mask>. As regards its proportionality, they submitted first of all that execution of the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 2010 had been complicated by difficulties in establishing the applicant’s address and identifying the items seized in 2009 that belonged to him. As he had been advised at the domestic level, it was open to him to claim restitution of further items provided he could establish title to them. As for the re-seizure, the Slovakian authorities had been implementing an Austrian letter rogatory, knowing that the items in question had been in the possession of the applicant’s lawyer. They had opted for a request that he surrender them, which was a less stringent measure than its alternative, physical seizure. It was true that the lawyer had been threatened with a fine and with disciplinary proceedings. However, such a fine was appealable and the PPS did not in fact have disciplinary authority in relation to the lawyer. In view of the digital form of the information that had been seized again, it had not been possible without the applicant’s assistance to distinguish which part of it was business related and which was private. Such a distinction could only be made by the Austrian authorities in the proceedings for the purposes of which that material had been seized again. As to the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 2010, it could not be seen as constituting an absolute obstacle to the re‑seizure of the material originally seized in 2009, in particular on grounds of lawyer-client privilege, since no such matters had been addressed in the 2010 judgment. In sum, the Government argued that the Slovakian authorities had preserved a fair balance between the various interests at stake.


54.  The Government submitted that the prosecutorial requests for information had served the purpose of preventing criminal acts, and this was not challenged by the applicant. The Court accepts that the interference aimed to investigate a criminal act and thereby served the legitimate aims of the prevention of crime, the  <mask>, and also the economic well-being of the country (compare M.N. and Others v. San Marino, cited above, §75).


36.  The Government further submitted that the interference complained of had been justified in order to safeguard order and security within the penitentiary, which included preventing criminal offences and thwarting escape attempts. The interference thus pursued the legitimate aims of protecting public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime and the  <mask>, as set out in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


42.  The Government accepted, on the other hand, that the applicant enjoyed private life in the United Kingdom and that his deportation would represent an interference with that private life. However, that interference would be justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8, being in accordance with law and taken in pursuit of the legitimate aims of protecting public safety, the prevention of crime, and the  <mask>. The Government also contended that the interference was proportionate given the nature and seriousness of the applicant’s offences, which were, for the most part, drugs offences, which the Government considered to be particularly grave given the issues of public protection that they raised. The Government pointed in particular to the fact that the applicant’s last offence had been of sufficient gravity to attract a sentence of three years’ imprisonment. The applicant had committed his offences when he was already an adult and his case could therefore be distinguished from that of the applicant in Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, 23 June 2008, whose offences by contrast could be characterised as “juvenile delinquency”. The Government considered the young age at which the applicant had entered the United Kingdom and the fact that he had stronger ties with that country than with Nigeria to be relevant factors, but maintained that his deportation would have a relatively minor impact on the applicant given that he did not have family life in the United Kingdom and could re-establish private life in Nigeria. In this regard, the Government pointed to the applicant’s good health, high intelligence and the fact that he had lived alone since the age of eighteen with little support. As such, and having regard to the importance of protecting the public from drugs-related crime, the Government were of the view that the applicant’s deportation to Nigeria would represent a proportionate interference with his private life in terms of Article 8.


27.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant was no longer living in the area where he allegedly had had his “home”. In any event, the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with his rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, for the prevention of disorder and for the  <mask>.


71.  The Government contested that argument. They submitted that the applicant’s circumstances were not capable of coming within the ambit of private life under Article 8 of the Convention as the provision did not provide a right to choose the country in which a person sought to reside and work without regard to that country’s immigration laws. Even assuming that the applicant had established private life in the United Kingdom and that it had been interfered with, such interference was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim, namely the maintenance and enforcement of immigration control, inter alia, for the preservation of the economic well‑being of the country, the protection of health and morals and the  <mask> and was proportionate in the circumstances.


68.  The Government submitted that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life, but that that interference had been justified by at least two legitimate aims: the prevention of disorder or crime and the  <mask>. According to the Government, the interference complained of had been proportionate in the light of the requirements set forth in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. Furthermore, the strip searches had been performed in the presence of two officers of the same sex with no third persons present. The applicant had not been treated in a humiliating way and nobody had used abusive or offensive language towards him.


60.  The Government replied that the reason for the refusal to record the particulars of the US birth certificates in the French register of births, marriages and deaths was that this would have given effect to a surrogacy agreement, which was formally forbidden under a domestic public-policy provision and constituted a punishable offence if performed in France. French law accordingly reflected ethical and moral principles according to which the human body could not become a commercial instrument and the child be reduced to the object of a contract. In their submission, the “legitimate aims” of the interference were the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health and the  <mask>. They added that the reason the public prosecutor’s office had requested that the particulars of the birth certificates of the third and fourth applicants be recorded was precisely to enable it to request subsequently that these entries be annulled. In doing so it had complied with Article 511 of the general circular on civil status of 11 May 1999, which prescribed automatic registration where public policy was concerned, particularly where it was necessary to annul a civil-status document concerning a French national that had been drawn up abroad in accordance with local procedures.


32.  The Government accepted that the judgments of the Austrian courts on the applicants request for visiting rights constituted an interference with their right to respect for their family life. That interference was in accordance with the law, that is, it was based on Article 148 (4) of the Civil Code, and it also served a legitimate aim, namely the  <mask>, that is, the child concerned and his biological mother. The interference was also necessary in a democratic society. The Austrian courts had carefully balanced the interest of the applicants in further personal contact with their former foster child against the interest of the biological mother of the child in re-constituting and protecting an undisturbed and fruitful mother-child relationship, as well as taking into account the welfare of the child himself. Austrian law attributed a particularly high priority to the welfare of the child in decisions on family-law matters and the interests of adults had often to give way to this priority.


35.  The Government accepted that there had been an interference with the applicant's private life but maintained that this interference had been in accordance with the law and that it had been necessary in a democratic society for the  <mask>. The purpose of the Paternity Act was to guarantee equality in law between children, irrespective of descent, and for this reason it was retroactive. The limitation of retroactivity to five years only concerned those cases where paternity was to be established by a court decision. According to the preparatory works of the Paternity Act, the requirement of legal certainty required rapid elimination of uncertainty about possible claims to be made against putative fathers. The restriction concerning the death of the man was justified on the grounds that it was no longer possible to obtain sufficient evidence of the man's paternity if he were deceased. The child welfare supervisor could only initiate paternity proceedings in respect of a child who had been born before the entry into force of the Paternity Act if the child was under fifteen years of age and the mother or the legal guardian had expressed the wish for such proceedings to be initiated.


54.  The Government emphasised that it was not in dispute that from 1980 until 1991 the applicant had worked as a driver in the KGB. Furthermore, the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life was in accordance with law and it was necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety and for the  <mask>. The Government pointed out that for the transfer from a totalitarian regime to a democratic system, Estonia took various measures which, in aggregate, had to ensure the development and security of the democratic system. Criminal liability for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed under the totalitarian regime was established and an obligation to take an oath of conscience was introduced for those seeking the highest offices in the country. The Disclosure Act dealt with the persons who had not committed any crimes but had been employed by or collaborated with the intelligence or counterintelligence authorities of the States which had occupied Estonia. It was found that such persons had to come to terms with their past and not to try to forget, conceal or be silent about it. There was also a significant public interest in the publicity of information relating to the past; this had to guarantee transparency and clarity as well as overall internal peace in the society. Obtaining complete information about the members and agents of the security and intelligence authorities which had operated on the territory of Estonia was also important for the protection of independence and security of the Republic of Estonia. Estonia was lacking the relevant information; such information, including the lists of persons who had worked in the KGB, was in the hands of foreign States. There could be attempts to recruit former staff of the security authorities and make them perform security or intelligence tasks, or they could be subject to blackmailing. Such situation was dangerous and damaging for Estonia. The Government referred to recent cases where former employees or collaborators of the KGB had provided a foreign country with state secrets leading to their conviction of treason.


67.  The Government submitted that the interference with the first applicant’s rights was in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society for the  <mask>. The Government considered that deprivation of parental authority emanated from the issuance of the care order, which once in place transfers the exercise of powers with respect to care and custody to the Minister. It was therefore not the judgment of the Criminal Court that caused the interference. Thus, the Government considered the interference to have arisen from the issuance of the care order, which they submitted was in the best interests of the children, since at the time the first applicant had not been in a position to take proper care of her children. Moreover, her situation was subject to constant monitoring and review, which resulted in her having increased access to the children as approved by the Minister. This went to prove that all attempts were being made for an eventual reunification. In their view M.D. still enjoyed all remaining rights save for care and custody, which included visitation rights in accordance with her Article 8 rights.


78.  The Government admitted that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. However, they considered that such interference had been necessary in a democratic society and had been justified by the need to ensure  <mask> and to prevent any obstruction by the applicant of the investigation of the criminal case against him.


193.  The Government argued that the applicants had failed to bring a relevant challenge in the domestic courts by way of judicial review within the procedural time-limits. The courts had refused to grant permission to seek judicial review on well-established principles reflecting the importance of legal certainty having regard to the delay in bringing the challenge and the consequent prejudice and detriment to good administration that would have been caused by allowing their challenge to proceed so long after the grant of the permissions. The applicants’ allegations regarding  <mask> were not such as to override the public interest considerations, particularly having regard to the assessments carried out by the HSE and MHPA. Thus the refusal by the courts to allow the applicants to proceed out of time was for a legitimate public interest purpose and was proportionate.


54.  The Government emphasised that it was not in dispute that from 1980 until 1991 the applicant had worked as a driver in the KGB. Furthermore, the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life was in accordance with law and it was necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,  <mask> and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Government pointed out that for the transfer from a totalitarian regime to a democratic system, Estonia took various measures which, in aggregate, had to ensure the development and security of the democratic system. Criminal liability for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed under the totalitarian regime was established and an obligation to take an oath of conscience was introduced for those seeking the highest offices in the country. The Disclosure Act dealt with the persons who had not committed any crimes but had been employed by or collaborated with the intelligence or counterintelligence authorities of the States which had occupied Estonia. It was found that such persons had to come to terms with their past and not to try to forget, conceal or be silent about it. There was also a significant public interest in the publicity of information relating to the past; this had to guarantee transparency and clarity as well as overall internal peace in the society. Obtaining complete information about the members and agents of the security and intelligence authorities which had operated on the territory of Estonia was also important for the protection of independence and security of the Republic of Estonia. Estonia was lacking the relevant information; such information, including the lists of persons who had worked in the KGB, was in the hands of foreign States. There could be attempts to recruit former staff of the security authorities and make them perform security or intelligence tasks, or they could be subject to blackmailing. Such situation was dangerous and damaging for Estonia. The Government referred to recent cases where former employees or collaborators of the KGB had provided a foreign country with state secrets leading to their conviction of treason.


174.  The applicant did not appear to deny that the impugned restrictions were imposed in pursuit of legitimate aims. The Court finds it established that those restrictions pursued one or more of the legitimate aims enumerated in Article 8 § 2: firstly, they sought to prevent crime, and, secondly, as the relevant Security Council resolutions had been adopted to combat international terrorism under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (“Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”), they were also capable of contributing to Switzerland’s national security and  <mask>.


31.  The applicant argued that the decision to revoke his permanent residence permit and to order his expulsion constituted a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for family life. He submitted that the criminal courts were of the opinion that the homicide he committed and his guilt were not serious as they sentenced him to five years and three months’ imprisonment while the maximum penalty possible was twenty years’ imprisonment. Moreover, he was twenty years old at the time he committed that offence on which the expulsion order was mainly based. The circumstances of the offence, a car race, were typical of an offence committed by adolescents. He claimed that he had matured since, also due to a therapy he underwent and relied on expert reports stating that there was a low risk that he would reoffend. The applicant emphasised that he had not offended in the years between the commission of the offence in 2000 and the commencement of his prison sentence in 2006 and that he served his sentence in a semi-custodial regime (offener Vollzug). All of these factors bore testimony to the fact that he did not constitute a threat to  <mask>. He also argued that the length of time between the commission of the offences in 2000 and the first service of the expulsion order in 2009 had to be taken into account.


31.  The Government contended that the interference complained of had been in accordance with the law, both domestic and international, and legitimate in its aim of serving the interests of  <mask> and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. As regards its proportionality, they submitted first of all that execution of the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 2010 had been complicated by difficulties in establishing the applicant’s address and identifying the items seized in 2009 that belonged to him. As he had been advised at the domestic level, it was open to him to claim restitution of further items provided he could establish title to them. As for the re-seizure, the Slovakian authorities had been implementing an Austrian letter rogatory, knowing that the items in question had been in the possession of the applicant’s lawyer. They had opted for a request that he surrender them, which was a less stringent measure than its alternative, physical seizure. It was true that the lawyer had been threatened with a fine and with disciplinary proceedings. However, such a fine was appealable and the PPS did not in fact have disciplinary authority in relation to the lawyer. In view of the digital form of the information that had been seized again, it had not been possible without the applicant’s assistance to distinguish which part of it was business related and which was private. Such a distinction could only be made by the Austrian authorities in the proceedings for the purposes of which that material had been seized again. As to the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 2010, it could not be seen as constituting an absolute obstacle to the re‑seizure of the material originally seized in 2009, in particular on grounds of lawyer-client privilege, since no such matters had been addressed in the 2010 judgment. In sum, the Government argued that the Slovakian authorities had preserved a fair balance between the various interests at stake.


56.  The Government acknowledged that the use of closed overalls amounted to an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life. The interference had a basis in national law, especially in Section 9d of the Act on Execution of Sentences and in other orders and rules in force at the relevant time, and it pursued the legitimate aims of  <mask>, prevention of disorder or crime and protection of health and rights and freedoms of others.


29.  The Government admitted that the rejection of the applications for leave to attend the funerals constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. However, they asserted that it was an “inherent and unavoidable consequence ... of the detention on remand”. Furthermore, the interference was in accordance with the law as it was based on Articles 59 § 1 and 88 § 2 of the Code of Enforcement of Sentences. In addition, it was necessary in a democratic society in the interest of  <mask> and for the prevention of disorder or crime.


28.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with his rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of national security,  <mask>, for the prevention of disorder and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


29.  The applicant expressed the view that the criminal charge brought against him in 2006 should not have been taken into account by the Swiss authorities when assessing whether he constituted a risk to  <mask> because the criminal proceedings had ended in a nolle prosequi and he had been declared innocent. He added that the domestic authorities and the Government had given too much weight to his conviction and the criminal charges brought against him, while disregarding all other elements. He maintained that his expulsion from Switzerland had not been necessary in a democratic society under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


40.  The Government argued that the exercise of the right of freedom of expression demanded from the user some duties and responsibilities, which could be subject to restrictions and penalties as were prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of – with respect to the present case –  <mask>, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others or for maintaining the authority of the judiciary. The statements made by the applicant were broadly reported by the mass media to whom he gave a press conference.


46.  The Government submitted that the decision ordering the demolition of the house in which the applicants lived was lawful. It had been judicially reviewed and upheld. It was also necessary for the protection of  <mask>. The national authorities had a wide margin of appreciation to tackle the problem of illegal construction. The impossibility to legalise unlawful buildings had been put in place in view of the strong public interest to ensure the safety, hygiene and aesthetics of construction. The demolition of a building because it had been erected without a permit was a proportionate measure required in all cases and not capable of being eschewed at the discretion of the building control authorities. Those authorities had acted straight away when apprised of the illegality of the house inhabited by the applicants, and had not tolerated an illegal situation for a long time: the applicants had started inhabiting the house at the earliest in 2009 and the demolition procedure had started in 2011. The applicants had constructed the house knowing full well that they had not obtained the required permit. All such buildings, unless falling under the transitional amnesty provisions of the 2001 Act, were subject to demolition; the courts had inquired into that point in the applicants’ case. The authorities had allowed the first applicant to comment on the intended demolition, and had invited her to comply with the demolition order of her own accord. In as much as she argued that she had no other place to live, it had to be noted that in June 2013, after the beginning of the demolition proceedings, she had donated a flat that she owned in Burgas and that, although the authorities did not have an obligation to provide the applicants, who did not belong to a particularly vulnerable group, with alternative accommodation, they had explored the possibility of settling them in a municipal flat. The second applicant was in receipt of a sufficiently high pension and the first applicant was able to work. They could thus afford to pay market rent in Sinemorets, and their personal circumstances were not as dire as they sought to paint them. The authorities had endeavoured to take all these matters into account when sending a social worker to interview the first applicant. It was equally possible to have the proportionality of the demolition reviewed in proceedings under Article 278 of the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006. The interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their home was therefore proportionate. Article 8 of the Convention could not be construed as precluding the enforcement of the building regulations in respect of those who sought to flout them, or as requiring the authorities to provide persons in the applicants’ situation with a place to live.


30.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with his rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of national security,  <mask>, for the prevention of disorder and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


84.  The applicants argued that since the domestic law did not define any clear criteria and procedure for allocating a convicted person to a penal facility by the federal penal authority, which was left completely to the discretion of the latter, no court action under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure had offered them any prospects of success. Therefore, they had not had any domestic remedies to exhaust. The applicants considered that their allocation to penal facilities far from home constituted a continuing situation, because they continued to suffer the negative consequences of the interference with their rights under Article 8 of the Convention, and that the six-month time-limit for lodging their complaint with the Court had been complied with. The applicants submitted on the merits of the case that their placement in penal facilities far from their home region had amounted to an interference with their right to respect for their family life. The interference had not been in accordance with the law, since the law did not satisfy the “quality of law” requirement, and had not pursued a legitimate aim. Even if there had been no appropriate penal facilities in the Chechen Republic there should have been such facilities in the adjacent regions. The applicants pointed to the existence of at least one facility in the Chechen Republic, IK-2, which, although a normal-security prison, had a high-security wing. Furthermore, it was unclear how their allocation to remote penal facilities could have served to protect  <mask> in the Chechen Republic. Even assuming that the interference had pursued a legitimate aim, it had been disproportionate as it had unnecessarily limited their opportunity to preserve family and social ties after their conviction.


32.  The Government acknowledged that after his release on parole, the applicant had made efforts to reintegrate into society and to take control of his life. He had regularly attended interviews with the cantonal authorities, which attested to his willingness to collaborate, he had continued his psychiatric treatment and had paid the victim compensation as ordered in the criminal judgment, and he had found a job as a chauffeur. However, he had not proven that his behaviour had changed in the long term. In the Government’s view, the new charge brought against him in 2006 weighed heavily, especially as it related again to offences against the sexual integrity of persons incapable of resistance and showed that, despite his psychiatric treatment, the applicant still had difficulties in controlling his sexual behaviour towards women in vulnerable situations. Although the public prosecutor had discontinued the criminal investigations, those facts could be taken into account as they had either been recognised by the applicant himself or established by evidence. In the light of those circumstances, the Government concluded that the applicant was still a threat to  <mask> in Switzerland.


36.  The Government acknowledged that the use of this device interfered with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life. They submitted that it was justifiable under the second paragraph of Article 8 as being necessary in a democratic society in the interests of  <mask>, for the prevention of crime and/or for the protection of the rights of others. They referred, inter alia, to the serious nature of the crime under investigation, the fact that B. was regarded as being surveillance-conscious, rendering conventional forms of surveillance insufficient, and that the conversations proved that an armed robbery was being planned. They recalled, however, that in Khan v. the United Kingdom (no. 35394/97, §§ 26-28, ECHR 2000-V), the Court found that the Home Office Guidelines governing such devices did not satisfy the requirement of “in accordance with the law” and recognised that the Court was liable to reach the same conclusion in the present case.


87.  The Government submitted that the interception of the applicant’s telephone communications had been ordered by a court as required by law. It transpired from the court orders that the police had intelligence information about the applicant being the leader of a criminal gang. The transcripts of his telephone conversations had been admitted as evidence in the criminal proceedings against him. The tapping of his telephone had therefore been lawful and proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting  <mask> and the rights and freedoms of others.


32.  The Government submitted that, to the extent that the drafting of the report was to be regarded as an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention, it had been in accordance with the domestic legislation in force at the material time. Furthermore, it had been necessary in a democratic society in the interests of  <mask> and the prevention of disorder.


33.  The Government acknowledged that the applicant was enjoying family life with his wife and children in Switzerland. Arguing that the decision to revoke his permanent residence permit and order his expulsion constituted a justified interference with his family life, they submitted that the applicant was convicted of criminal offences several times, including in 2007 while serving his prison sentence. They emphasised that the homicide committed by the applicant was characterised by a high degree of recklessness, as he engaged in a car race and drove his car at a speed of at least 170 kilometres per hour, posing a threat to  <mask>. They argued that the domestic courts had thoroughly assessed expert reports on the risk of the applicant’s reoffending and submitted that these reports did not entirely exclude the possibility that he would engage in a car race again and commit similar offences, despite his maturation process.


689.  The Government contended that the search of the homes and offices of certain applicants, and the confiscation of personal items and files, was in accordance with the law, namely Article 11 of the Law on the State of Emergency No. 2935, Article 3 of Decree No. 430 for the state of emergency region and Articles 90 to 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They were necessary under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention in the interests of national security,  <mask>, for the prevention of disorder and crime, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others from terrorist attack. Furthermore, these matters did not raise any issue under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as any interference with the applicants' property was justified in the public interest, within the meaning of that provision. In this connection, the Government emphasised that the searches in the present case were part of an operation against the PKK, an illegal terrorist organisation responsible for thousands of atrocious murders and maimings, as well as serious economic and social losses.


20.  The Government admitted that there had been an interference with the applicant’s family life. However, they considered that such interference was justified. They maintained that the issue of authorisation for family visits was foreseen by the domestic law, namely Article 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The refusal to allow such family visits during the investigation stage was in the interests of  <mask> and was necessary in a democratic society.


27.  The applicant challenged the submission that the ban in question satisfied the condition laid down in paragraph 2 of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention of necessity in a democratic society in the interests of  <mask>, for the prevention of disorder, the protection of health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. With regard to the aim of “living together” in a democratic society, it was the opposite reasoning – that of openness and tolerance – which should take precedence in a pluralist democratic society as was evidenced by the tolerance that there had always been of dress codes rejecting the living together principle. At best, it could be regarded as a praiseworthy political objective, but one that could not be achieved by some stigmatising by-laws that were contrary to the Convention. In her submission, the factors justifying the ban on safety grounds had been advanced exclusively with regard to the full-face veil, were non-existent and the real aim being pursued by the by-laws was the prohibition of the full-face veil in public places. She argued, lastly, that the issue of dignity and gender equality was irrelevant to justification on grounds of “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” since the exercise of the freedom and wishes of women themselves was hindered.


102.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s dwelling was “inspected” rather than “searched”. This action was governed by Article 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960, which allowed the police to enter and inspect a dwelling on the basis of its resident’s consent. The inspection in the present case was lawful, as prior written consent had been received from the applicant, and pursued the legitimate aim of investigating a crime. Regard being had to the suspicions that the applicant had engaged in sexual activity with minors in the venue at issue, this inspection was justified in the interests of  <mask> and did not constitute a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s rights.


81.  The Government admitted that there was an interference with the applicant's family life. However, they considered that such interference was justified. They maintained that the issue of allowing family visits was foreseen by the domestic law, namely Article 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The refusal to allow such family visits during the investigation was in the interests of  <mask> and was necessary in a democratic society. They further noted that after the applicant's conviction he was allowed to see his mother and his wife on numerous occasions.


32.  The Government submitted that the interference in question had been prescribed by law and had pursued a number of legitimate aims, namely the protection of national security, territorial integrity,  <mask>, public order and prevention of crime. They also claimed that the restriction had been necessary in a democratic society because it had been carried out as a result of a pressing social need and had been proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. They concluded that, in the exercise of their discretion, the prison authorities had decided not to allow the impugned letter to be sent outside.


64.  The Government submitted that any interference was “in accordance with the law” in that it fell within section 163 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (“the 1994 Act”) and section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972 (“the 1972 Act”), both of which provisions complied with the Convention's “quality of law” requirements. They added that any interference pursued a legitimate aim: as accepted during the judicial review proceedings, the Council's intention in installing and operating the CCTV system and in disclosing footage to the media was the detection and prevention of crime, thereby securing  <mask> and private property.


18.  The Government agreed that the refusal to grant the applicant leave to attend his grandmother’s funeral amounted to an interference with his right to respect for his private and family life. They argued, however, that this interference had been in accordance with the law, as it was based on Article 141a of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences and pursued a legitimate aim of protecting  <mask> and preventing disorder or crime.


27.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant was no longer living in the area where he allegedly had had his “home”. In any event, the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with his rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of national security,  <mask>, for the prevention of disorder and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


59.  The Government maintained that the State authorities had had no intention to insult or degrade the applicant. He had been kept behind bars on a legal basis, namely the Instruction on the Procedure for Escorting Accused or Convicted Persons to and from, or in, the Courts at the Judicial Authorities’ Request, and solely in the interests of  <mask>. The bars were intended to separate defendants upon whom a preventive measure of detention had been imposed from the judges’ bench and from those present in the courtroom, so that such persons were guarded securely during hearings.


48.  The Government noted that the necessity of the measure had been assessed twice, with a possibility of rejection – first by the Attorney General and subsequently by the Vilnius Regional Court. The contested operational measure had been necessary and had been applied in the interests of national security,  <mask> and the prevention of crime. The authorities had had operational information about the applicant’s possible involvement in criminal activities. The applicant had close connections with J.B. and persons from J.B.’s milieu. Most importantly, in the course of the operational investigation in respect of J.B., the authorities had learned about his threats to the State President. That information had later been confirmed when intercepting the applicant’s telephone conversation with J.B., in which the latter used psychological pressure and demanded that his requirements be reported to the head of State. Subsequently, J.B. had been convicted of having threatened the State President. The Government also observed that both J.B. and the applicant had had close relations with the State President and had played a significant role in the political activities of the President’s political party and his electoral campaign; at the time of surveillance the applicant had been a member of the Vilnius City Municipal Council. In this connection the Government also referred to the Court’s judgment in Craxi v. Italy (no. 2) (no. 25337/94, § 64, 17 July 2003), submitting that politicians inevitably and knowingly laid themselves open to close scrutiny by both journalists and the public at large. Therefore, even acknowledging that no investigation had been carried out by the SSD in order to reveal the circumstances in which the journalists had obtained the recording of the intercepted conversation, the question of fulfilment of the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention could not arise.


61.  The Government agreed that the refusal to grant the applicant prison leave in order for him to attend his father’s funeral had interfered with his right to family life, as guaranteed under Article 8 of the Convention. This interference had, nonetheless, been based on law and had pursued the aim of furthering the interests of  <mask>, preventing crime and protecting the rights or freedoms of others. According to the Government, this restriction had been based on an individual assessment, as after an inmate had served a certain proportion of the sentence, a special body could decide to transfer him to a lower-security prison. It also drew the Court’s attention to the opinion of the Ombudsperson emphasising the dangerous nature of the inmates to whom this restriction applied (see paragraph 14 above). Furthermore, in the light of the cases of Laduna v. Slovakia (no. 31827/02, ECHR 2011) and Dickson v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 44362/04, ECHR 2007‑V) a wide margin of appreciation applied in questions of prisoners, penal policy and social strategy and, according to Khoroshenko v. Russia ([GC], no. 41418/04, ECHR 2015), the gravity of a sentence could be tied, a least to some extent, to a type of a prison regime. Hence, the Government considered that this interference had corresponded to a pressing social need and had been proportionate to the legitimate aim, thereby being justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


36.  The Government further submitted that the interference complained of had been justified in order to safeguard order and security within the penitentiary, which included preventing criminal offences and thwarting escape attempts. The interference thus pursued the legitimate aims of protecting  <mask>, the prevention of disorder or crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as set out in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


86.  The Government also alleged that the applicant’s father had, on the applicant’s instructions, assisted him in removing incriminating evidence in relation to the crime for which he was serving a sentence at the time of his failure to return from home leave. Accordingly, they argued that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring  <mask> and the prevention of crime and disorder.


28.  The Government submitted in the alternative that any interference with the applicant’s right under Article 8 had been carried out on the basis of section 48(A)(5) of Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. They provided the Court with extracts of this provision containing the amendments of 2008 (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). The Government also relied on section 39(1) of the Regulation on Private Tutoring Centres. They further contended that the applicant’s dismissal had pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining national security, territorial integrity,  <mask>, public order and preventing crime, and that it had been necessary in a democratic society in the circumstances of the case.


42.  The Government accepted, on the other hand, that the applicant enjoyed private life in the United Kingdom and that his deportation would represent an interference with that private life. However, that interference would be justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8, being in accordance with law and taken in pursuit of the legitimate aims of protecting  <mask>, the prevention of crime, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Government also contended that the interference was proportionate given the nature and seriousness of the applicant’s offences, which were, for the most part, drugs offences, which the Government considered to be particularly grave given the issues of public protection that they raised. The Government pointed in particular to the fact that the applicant’s last offence had been of sufficient gravity to attract a sentence of three years’ imprisonment. The applicant had committed his offences when he was already an adult and his case could therefore be distinguished from that of the applicant in Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, 23 June 2008, whose offences by contrast could be characterised as “juvenile delinquency”. The Government considered the young age at which the applicant had entered the United Kingdom and the fact that he had stronger ties with that country than with Nigeria to be relevant factors, but maintained that his deportation would have a relatively minor impact on the applicant given that he did not have family life in the United Kingdom and could re-establish private life in Nigeria. In this regard, the Government pointed to the applicant’s good health, high intelligence and the fact that he had lived alone since the age of eighteen with little support. As such, and having regard to the importance of protecting the public from drugs-related crime, the Government were of the view that the applicant’s deportation to Nigeria would represent a proportionate interference with his private life in terms of Article 8.


34.  The Government contested the allegation of a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. Reference was made to sections 7(1), 10(1) and 11(3) of the Aliens’ Domicile and Residence Act as well as to Article 16 § 3 of the ordinance implementing the Act, all of which had been duly published and which provided a sufficient legal basis for the interference. According to these provisions, the residence permit of the foreign spouse of a Swiss citizen would not be renewed if there was a ground for expulsion. The Swiss authorities were called upon to examine the proportionality of the measure. Given the offences which the applicant had committed in Switzerland, there could be no doubt that the refusal not to renew the residence permit was called for in the interests of  <mask>, for the prevention of disorder or crime and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


40.  The Government acknowledged that those who used the telephone had an expectation of privacy in respect of the numbers which they dialled and that obtaining detailed billing information concerning that telephone constituted an interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 8. The obtaining of the information was, however, necessary in a democratic society in the interests of  <mask>, for the prevention of crime and/or the protection of the rights of others, as the investigation concerned a very serious crime, the applicants had guns for use in the intended robbery and, as B. was surveillance-conscious, conventional surveillance would not suffice. The only use of the information was to corroborate the times recorded by police officers in respect of the covert listening device in the flat.


40.  The Government submitted that if the Court concluded that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life and correspondence, which they disputed, then the alleged interference had been in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society for the protection of national security and the prevention of disorder or crime. Additionally, the alleged “legislative interference” had been justified in the interests of  <mask> and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as set forth in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


80.  The applicant further argued that the interference did not pursue a legitimate aim. The authorities did not seek to protect national security,  <mask> or the economic well-being of the country, or to prevent disorder or crime. As to the protection of the health and morals of others, there was no indication that the applicant represented a threat to the rights of third parties. Finally, with regard to the applicant himself, the Government did not suggest that the incapacitation had had a therapeutic effect on the applicant. Nor was there any evidence that the authorities had sought to deprive the applicant of his capacity because he would otherwise have carried out actions which would result in a deterioration of his health. With regard to his own pecuniary interests, the protection of a person’s own rights is not a ground listed in Article 8 § 2, and it cannot therefore serve as a justification for interfering with a person’s rights as protected under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. In sum, the interference with his private life did not pursue any of the legitimate aims listed in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


25.  The Government submitted that even if the expulsion order interferes with the applicant's family life, it discloses no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. Given the seriousness of the offence which the applicant committed in Denmark the measure of expulsion was called for in the interest of  <mask>, for the prevention of disorder or crime, and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and was necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. The Government drew attention to the fact that the applicant has very strong ties with his country of origin since he was already an adult when he left Iran and had his entire school education in Iran. He masters the local language, he served part of his compulsory military service and he has family there. In comparison, the applicant does not have strong ties with Denmark. At the time the expulsion order was made he had resided for only eight years in Denmark. Moreover, in the Government's view, there is no evidence to prove that the applicant's spouse, the children of the marriage, and the spouse's child of another relationship will not be able to accompany the applicant to Iran.


28.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant complaints were only in respect of “field plots” and not in respect of her “home”. Moreover, she was no longer living in the area where she alleged she had had her “home”. In any event, the applicant’s inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with her rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of national security,  <mask>, for the prevention of disorder and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


right to respect for private and family life

183.  The applicant further argued that her ability to build and sustain relationships had also been limited due to restrictions placed on her capacity to receive visitors and telephone calls. The applicant has had very little contact with members of the community outside the facility. Outsiders’ visits are generally limited and most visitors may not be received in private. The director of the Kėdainiai Home had in the past restricted visits from outsiders after the applicant’s institutionalisation, upon a request from her guardian. The list of visitors maintained by the Kėdainiai Home showed that between 2 August 2004 and 25 December 2006 only the applicant’s adoptive father had visited her, with few exceptions. Before the applicant got her own mobile phone, she had had to use the facilities provided by the institution. At that time, she had only been able to receive calls through the Kėdainiai Home’s switchboard. She relied upon the  <mask> under the above-cited Article 8 of the Convention.


41.  The applicants complained of a continuing violation of their  <mask> as a result of the issuing of permits for two feasts a year in their locality. The CoP had failed to consider the area a restricted area for the relevant law purposes, against the relevant experts’ advice on the matter. Moreover, this procedure denied them the opportunity to make submissions on the matter. Thus, they considered that the recurring firework displays close to their residence (minimum 150m) constituted undue interference with their right to respect for private and family life.


34.  The applicant maintained that deportation interfered with his  <mask>. He contended in particular that he was a young adult who had not yet founded a family of his own and argued that his relationship with his mother and sisters constituted family life. He further disputed that the interference with his private and family life was limited.


31.  The applicant maintained that the relevant passage of the High Court's judgment amounted to an affirmation of suspicion that he had committed sexual abuse. Referring to a medical statement of 7 June 2003 (see paragraph 21 above) the applicant submitted that, having been labelled a sexual abuser, he had suffered serious psychological and social problems. He also invoked a psychiatrist's statement of 4 September 2006 (see paragraph 22 above). The impugned passage entailed an unjustified interference with his  <mask> in violation of Article 8 of the Convention.


232.  The applicants essentially requested the Grand Chamber to reverse the Chamber’s finding in so far as the Chamber had declared the application inadmissible with regard to Mr Petreš and Mr Jovanović. The mere regularisation of their legal status after many years of unlawful interference with their  <mask> could not be considered to afford “adequate” and “sufficient” redress for their complaints under Articles 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention (they cited Aristimuño Mendizabal v. France, no. 51431/99, § 79, 17 January 2006). The two applicants were also unable to seek adequate reparation before the domestic courts or the State Attorney’s Office for the damage sustained over a long period of time.


68.  The Government acknowledged that the decisions to order the applicant to undergo a psychiatric examination and to arrest her constituted an interference with her  <mask>. However, they considered that the interference was in accordance with the law, namely Article 65 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1969, and was justified and proportionate to the legitimate aim of enforcing lawful court orders, in compliance with the Convention. Furthermore, the Government submitted that all applications for leave to visit the applicant lodged by the members of her family were allowed.


66.  The Government conceded that the right of parents not to be separated from their children, unless this was justified in the child's interests, formed part of the  <mask>. They cited in that connection the judgment in K.A.B. v. Spain (no. 59819/08, 10 April 2012, §§ 95-96). They further observed that the Court's task was not to take the place of the domestic authorities, but rather to review under the Convention the decisions taken by those authorities in the exercise of their power of appreciation. They referred in that regard to the case-law set forth in paragraph 71 below.


91.  The applicant complained that his  <mask>, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, had been breached in view of his proposed deportation and the uncertainty of his situation owing to judicial proceedings which started in 2004 and ended only in 2010. Invoking Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant further argued that the delay in resolving his case had been caused by political pressure on the courts.


46.  The applicants disputed the Government's argument that their case fell outside the scope of protection of Article 8 of the  <mask>. They pointed out that the first and second applicants had been married during the period when a stay of execution had been granted in respect of the first applicant's expulsion and were thus lawfully residing in Norway. A marriage, even if entered into in breach of the criteria for contracting marriage, should be regarded as having been legally contracted and as implying the same rights as other marriages entered into in Norway. Spouses of Norwegian citizens who had applied for family reunion had a right to make such an application from Norway and to live with their spouse in the country pending final decision on their application. Thus the first applicant had established and enjoyed family life with a permission to reside in Norway, which was sufficient to trigger the protection of Article 8 of the Convention. Referring to the Court's case-law in this area (notably Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, no. 13178/03, ECHR 2006‑...; and Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, no. 50435/99, ECHR 2006‑...), the applicants argued that the Article 8 guarantees applied also where the person concerned did not hold a formal residence permit but nevertheless lived and had family life in the respondent State.


402.  The applicants submitted that the deliberate destruction of their homes, property and possessions and the resulting arbitrary expulsion from their homes and village represented a serious violation of their  <mask> and of their right to respect for their home, as well as a serious interference with their way of life. They further claimed that the destruction of their homes and family life was part of a practice and that, therefore, they had suffered an aggravated violation of their rights under Article 8 of the Convention.


49.  The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that, following his decision to move to the North of Finland in order to live with his former foster parents, the powers of his mentor had been enlarged to encompass matters pertaining to his person. His wishes had not been respected and it had been impossible to have his mentor replaced in matters concerning his place of residence and his education, even though he had lost confidence in her. All these measures violated his  <mask>.


44.  The applicants maintained that the first and second applicants had had a relationship since the spring of 2001 and had been married since 2 February 2003. On 20 September 2006 a child had been born from their union, the third applicant. In the event of the first applicant's being expelled to Nigeria it would not be possible for the second and third applicants to follow him to settle there. The expulsion of the father would lead to the family being split, which would have particularly adverse consequences for the wife and the child and would amount to a disproportionate interference with the applicants'  <mask>.


38.  The Government agreed that there could have been an interference with the applicant's  <mask> in view of his detention. However, in their opinion this interference was justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. They further submitted that during the applicant's detention he had had regular contact with his family. Between 8 June 2007 and 2 May 2008 the applicant had been visited by his wife on twelve occasions, that is, once a month on average. Between 19 September 2006 and 15 April 2008 the applicant had also been visited by his daughter on fifteen occasions. Lastly, he had been visited by his parents on 22 November 2006 and 12 July 2007. In addition, the Government stressed that on sixteen occasions the applicant had contacted the members of his family by telephone. They concluded that there was no violation of Article 8 in the present case.


48.  The applicants complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the eviction order of 14 April 2010 had infringed their right to respect for their private and family life. On 15 August 2017 the applicants asked the Court to take into account that there had also been an interference with the  <mask> of children born after the application had been lodged with the Court in 2011 (see paragraph 30 above).


54.  The applicant disputed the Government’s claim that his marriage to a German national would be capable of remedying what he regarded, for his part, as a serious and flagrant breach of Article 8: in his view, the  <mask> was not a correlative right but a predicate, individual right, which should be recognised regardless of the marital situation, failing which any termination of marriage would necessarily entail the loss of the right to respect for private and family life.


47.  The applicant complained that the investigations carried out by the child welfare services, despite a first such investigation showing that his former wife's allegations were groundless, had constituted an unjustified interference with his  <mask> under Article 8 of the Convention. He moreover complained that, because of dismissal of his case by the Norwegian courts, and hence their refusal to review the merits of his case, he had been denied access to a court and an effective remedy, in breach of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, respectively.


39.  The Government further contended that an action for damages in the administrative courts under section 105 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code would have constituted an effective remedy in the instant case. Under that provision, the State was obliged to provide redress for damage caused by the acts or omissions of its organs in the exercise of  <mask>. The sole condition was that the act or omission had to be unlawful, that is to say, it had to infringe a rule of law establishing a specific individual right or interest. In the present case the applicants could have complained before the domestic courts under Articles 57, 914 and 932 of the Civil Code, read together with section 105 of the Introductory Law, of a breach of their personality rights and of their social marginalisation on account of their exclusion as same-sex couples from the scope of Law no. 3719/2008. In the Government’s view, this remedy would have enabled the applicants to claim compensation for any damage caused by the impugned legislation and at the same time to challenge its constitutionality. They observed that, according to the case-law of the domestic courts, the latter could interpret the constitutional principle of equality broadly, extending a legislative provision favourable to a specific category of persons to cover another category in a similar situation. As authority, the Government cited two judgments of the Court of Cassation (nos. 60/2002 and 9/2004) concerning the salaries and allowances of different categories of employees, an issue that the court had examined from the standpoint of the equality principle.


85.  The Government noted moreover that, at the material time, teachers of religious education received their pay directly from the Catholic Church, to which the State paid the necessary funds in the form of grants. Even though the legal regime of religious-education teaching had changed and salaries were now paid directly by the  <mask>, one essential factor had not changed, namely the need for a certificate of suitability issued by the Church, without which the teacher could not be appointed to a post. The Government were of the view that this was merely a feature of the way in which the State organised the financing of the teaching of various religions in Spain and also that a wide margin of appreciation should be afforded to States in the organisation of their education systems.


88.  The applicant also appeared to suggest that the BBC, acting under Royal Charter, was a  <mask> as was Anglia Television which acted under the authority of the ITC constituted under the Broadcasting Act 1990. Even assuming that those media could rely on their rights under Article 10 of the Convention, their broadcasts, he argued, also constituted unjustified interferences with his private life. The Government did not consider that the applicant had, in fact, made that submission and, in any event, denied that either the BBC or Anglia Television could be regarded as State bodies or public authorities within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. They relied, inter alia, on relevant domestic provisions and the conclusions to be drawn from the inclusion in Article 10 of the Convention of the phrase concerning the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.


35.  The Government maintained the position that there had been no interference by a  <mask>. The police had merely indicated to Mrs S. a way of obtaining evidence against the applicant, and had provided technical assistance. At the decisive moments Mrs S. had acted of her own free will. She had not performed any actions that, in the context of a criminal investigation, were reserved for the police or the criminal justice authorities. There had been nothing to prevent her from using a cassette tape recorder to record her telephone conversations with the applicant.


86.  The applicants argued that the impugned legislation constituted a direct interference with their rights under Article 8 because, in the absence of such legislation, the medical treatment they were seeking – in vitro fertilisation with donated ova or sperm – was a common and readily available medical technique. In the Government’s view, the question whether the measure at issue should be deemed to be an interference by a  <mask> or an alleged breach of a positive duty could be left open because both obligations were subject to the same principles.


48.  The applicants refer to the inquiry report's findings of various failures of one  <mask> to pass on to another information about the risks Richard Linford presented. In particular, although the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the magistrates were all aware that he was dangerous and prone to violence, no formal warning was passed on to the prison, nor was any information made available about his past criminal or medical records. In addition, the positive obligation imposed by Article 2 rests on all public authorities, not only the prison authorities. The test should not be construed narrowly to focus on the particular agency or officer dealing with the victim at the time of the incident, but should take into account systemic failure involving a number of different authorities.


51.  The applicants contended that there was no opportunity before the County Court to test the proportionality of the interference with their Article 8 rights because the gateway (b) defence (see paragraph 20 above) was insufficiently broad to permit the issue of proportionality to be considered by the county court and because, in any event, the facts relevant to the issue of proportionality were not determined by the court. The only defences available in a case such as the applicants' were that the relevant law was incompatible with Article 8 of the Convention or that the decision of the  <mask> to recover possession was one that no reasonable person would consider justifiable, which set a higher threshold than that required under the Article 8 § 2 test of proportionality.


97.  The applicant further stated that matters relating to pregnancy and delivery and the extent of women’s freedom in this regard also raised significant gender issues. Women’s reproductive rights stood for an inherently feminine area which had been oppressed by men, inter alia through the relocation and transformation of childbirth by the medical profession, thus weakening women’s natural responsibilities. This relocation had brought a new notion of hierarchy into the field of pregnancy and childbirth, such a notion being at odds with midwife-based care arising from a holistic, feminine approach to childbirth. In the masculine-driven field of biomedical obstetrics, a woman’s body forfeited its fundamental privacy and became vulnerable when faced with a male medical expert acting as a sort of  <mask>.


71.  The Government have argued that, as subsequent case-law demonstrated, the gateway (b) test in Kay (that the decision of the  <mask> to recover possession was an improper exercise of its powers at common law on the ground that it was a decision that no reasonable person would consider justifiable – at paragraph 110 of Lord Hope's opinion) was wide enough to ensure respect for occupiers' Article 8 rights.


94.  The Government submit that the proper approach is for the Court to examine the full range of remedies which were available. The applicants had a combination of mechanisms by which the responsibility of any  <mask> for the death of their son could be established, in particular the independent inquiry, which provided a thorough and effective investigation into the circumstances surrounding his death. The applicants could have brought a claim for negligence against the prison or other authorities on behalf of his estate. The applicants also had a remedy available for any loss of dependency. They argue that the fact that a person could not bring a case because of legal advice that it was not economic did not mean that an effective remedy was not available or that the Contracting State had failed to comply with its obligation under Article 13. Nor, in their view, was there any right to a particular form of remedy or any particular amount of compensation. Article 13 left a certain discretion to the Contracting States as to how they complied with its requirements.


176.  The Government finally noted that the IPT's ruling was issued before the Court's judgment in Association for European Integration and Human Rights, cited above, § 106, in which the Court reached the conclusion that Article 6 § 1 did not apply to such proceedings. It was clear that secret powers of interception which were used solely in the interests of national security or in order to prevent and detect serious crime formed part of the “hard core of  <mask> prerogatives”, such that it was inappropriate to classify any related rights and obligations as “civil” in nature (citing Ferrazzini, § 29; and Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, § 61, ECHR 2007‑IV).


55.  The Government contended that the interference with the applicants' rights under Article 8 was “necessary in a democratic society”. They submitted that the effect of the decision of the House of Lords in Kay was that while an eviction would involve an “interference” for the purposes of Article 8 § 1, such interference would ordinarily be justified under Article 8 § 2 in circumstances where the person was evicted in accordance with the domestic law of property and contract. However, a defence in eviction proceedings could be available where: (1) the occupier challenged the domestic law itself as being incompatible with Article 8; or (2) the occupier challenged the decision of the  <mask> to seek possession as being unlawful on public law grounds. As to the nature of the public law challenge under (2), the Government referred to Lord Hope's comments in Kay (paragraph 114), where he noted:


77.  The Government submitted the interference was justified as necessary in a democratic society and was proportionate to its objectives. The applicant had agreed to occupy the plot on the terms that neither he, his family nor guests would cause a nuisance and he had been warned by the Council that he was in breach. In the circumstances, the Council was entitled to revoke the licence. Similar terms would have applied to a secure housing tenant. Though the licence did not require the Council to give the applicant the opportunity to challenge the allegations of nuisance made against him, it was a  <mask> obliged to act lawfully, reasonably, fairly and for the proper purposes for which its powers were conferred. Its decisions were therefore amenable to judicial review and the applicant, who was legally represented, was able to challenge the decision in judicial review proceedings where the High Court found no evidence to doubt the reasonableness and procedural fairness of the Council’s decision. The Council had also taken into account the needs of the applicant and his family in the decision-making process. If there had been no proper basis for the eviction or the applicant had mounted a substantial factual challenge to the asserted justification, the domestic courts would have been able, through their scrutiny, to provide a remedy against arbitrary action. There was however no substantial dispute as to the primary facts as the applicant did not appear to deny that his sons and guests were causing a nuisance. This procedure therefore provided the applicant with a series of important safeguards. In addition to the remedy of judicial review, occupiers had, since 2000, a right of action under the Human Rights Act 1998, pursuant to which the courts can consider directly claims of violation of the Convention (see, for example, Somerset County Council v. Isaacs, paragraphs 47-50 above).


76.  The applicant further stated that due to his asylum status in Austria, his links with Chechnya had weakened considerably. Finally, compared to the offences committed in the cases of Amrollahi and Üner (see Amrollahi v. Denmark, no. 56811/00, § 15, 11 July 2002, and Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410/99, § 18, ECHR 2006‑XII), the applicant’s convictions for aggravated bodily harm, for which he received a twelve-month prison sentence, and for resistance to  <mask>, for which he received an eight-month sentence, must be considered less severe.


54.  The applicants further emphasised the ambiguity over the scope of conventional judicial review grounds. Lord Hope in Kay (at paragraph 114 of that judgement – see paragraph 21 above) suggested that such grounds extended to consideration of whether the measure was disproportionate but Lords Walker and Mance in Doherty clearly saw a distinction between conventional judicial review grounds and human rights grounds as being critical to the difference between the majority and minority approaches in Kay (at paragraphs 107 and 133 to 136 respectively of the House of Lords judgment– see paragraphs 35 and 36 above). Although the distance between conventional judicial review grounds and Human Rights Act grounds appeared to be narrowing, the extent to which conventional judicial review grounds could be said to encompass proportionality remained unclear. Accordingly, the scope of the defence that the Government allege was open to the applicants remained uncertain even after Doherty. In the applicants' view, the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Doran and Taylor had added to the general confusion at domestic level as to the approach to be taken in possession cases. They pointed to the different approach taken by Waller LJ in Taylor, compared to Toulson LJ's approach in Doran, as regards the relevance of personal circumstances and the extent to which the  <mask> was required to inquire before seeking a possession order (see paragraphs 38 to 43 above). They emphasised that the lower courts were required to apply both of these decisions, notwithstanding the divergent approaches. In any event, clarifications in post-Kay judgments were of limited assistance and relevance to consideration of the applicants' cases.


86.  The Government thus submitted that, even though the non-renewal decision in the present case had been taken by the  <mask>, it constituted a “mandatory decision”. The public authority could not ignore the failure to fulfil one of the prerequisites for renewal, namely the Catholic Church’s nomination and declaration of suitability. The public authority’s decision had therefore been a mere formality.


76.  The applicant also pointed out that the amount of compensation and the procedure for claiming damages from a  <mask> on account of an unlawful administrative act or unlawful action by a public authority were prescribed by the Law on compensation for damage caused by public authorities and not by the Civil Law. An action under the former law, however, would also have been time-barred.


50.  The Government agreed that there was an interference by a  <mask> with the exercise of the applicants’ freedom of expression on account of the coercive measures taken against them. In their view the interference was prescribed by law. As the seizures mainly served the purpose of obtaining evidence the Freedom of the Press Act was not applicable. The conditions for the search as prescribed by the Coercive Measures Act were met, given that the investigation concerned suspected public defamation which carried a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment. It was true that the records of the coercive measures taken in the homes of Ms Soini and Ms Mikola only referred to “other investigations”. This deficiency – due to the number of different offences of which a large number of persons were suspected – was corrected in the proceedings before the District Court.


21.  The Government submitted that Article 8 of the Convention was inapplicable on the grounds that at the material time or at the time of introduction of the application the SNCF could not be regarded as a  <mask> within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 8 and that there had been no interference with the exercise of the applicant’s right to respect for his private life within the meaning of that provision.


105.  The applicant pointed to paragraph 9.3 of the Revised Code, which provided that each  <mask> had to ensure that arrangements were in place for the secure handling and destruction of material obtained through directed or intrusive surveillance. This was the function of the PSNI Service Procedure, which went much further than the Code in providing for limits on dissemination, storage, access, retention and destruction. However, it was not in force at the relevant time and, in any case, the applicant contended that such important matters should not be left to the discretion of the individual public authorities.


52.  The applicants pointed to the fact that the Article 8 issue came before the courts by way of an application that it be struck out of the pleaded defences on the basis that it had no reasonable prospect of success after the decision of the House of Lords in Qazi. They argued that such an application would ordinarily be dealt with by consideration of the pleaded material and oral argument. They contended that in their cases, the proportionality issue should have been determined by the court hearing the possession proceedings after it had carried out a fact finding exercise: the authority would advance reasons for seeking possession and the applicants would refer to facts which they alleged rendered the decision to seek possession disproportionate. The factual issues likely to be raised by the applicants included their lengthy occupation of the properties, the improvement works carried out by them, their personal and family circumstances, the factual correctness (or otherwise) of the authority's reasons for seeking possession and whether there was a need for vacant possession. However, in their cases no oral evidence was given and there was no cross-examination or determination of the facts relevant to the Article 8 issues. The county court had simply to accept the facts as found by the  <mask> landlord. The applicants argued that the Government's contention that it was sufficient that there existed the possibility for a court to consider whether a local authority had come to a decision which no reasonable authority would consider justifiable did not accord with this Court's decisions in Connors v. the United Kingdom and McCann v. the United Kingdom, both cited above.


80.  The Government pointed out that, as a matter of well-established international law and subject to its treaty obligations, a State had the right to control the entry of non-nationals into its territory as a manifestation of the interest of the  <mask>. The Government noted that the Danish model of society was based on a universal welfare state with generous welfare schemes, such as free healthcare and education at all levels for everyone and considerable financial support for families with children, childcare and old-age care. These welfare services were financed to a small extent by insurance schemes and user charges and to a very great extent by general taxes and duties, which were among the highest in the world. Welfare spending on individual citizens would therefore be higher than the citizen’s tax payment in many cases, depending on which of the welfare services offered were used by the individual citizen. By no means were all taxpayers net contributors to the national economy. This also applied to spouses who had been reunited as a family, where the resident spouse provided financial security for the maintenance of his or her newly arrived spouse. The willingness of the Danes to finance the universal welfare state and the high degree of redistribution was based on values such as a strong spirit of solidarity and community in Danish society. Consequently, if a large number of people were not financially and/or socially well-integrated into society, this might affect support for the existing Danish model of society in the long term. These circumstances gave rise to particular issues with regard to immigration control and integration, and in this connection great importance was attached to the prospect of the successful integration of newcomers, both in each individual case and seen from a more general perspective. The rules on ties with Denmark as a condition for family reunion had to be understood in this light, among others.


63.  The applicant was ordered to vacate the flat in question by the national courts under Croatian laws regulating specially protected tenancy, in particular section 99(1) of the Housing Act. The aim of that provision was to terminate specially protected tenancies held by individuals who no longer lived in the socially owned flats allocated to them, with a view to subsequently redistributing such flats to others in need. It was therefore intended to satisfy the housing needs of citizens and thus pursued the legitimate aims of promoting the  <mask> and protecting the rights of others.


80.  The applicant further argued that the interference did not pursue a legitimate aim. The authorities did not seek to protect national security, public safety or the  <mask>, or to prevent disorder or crime. As to the protection of the health and morals of others, there was no indication that the applicant represented a threat to the rights of third parties. Finally, with regard to the applicant himself, the Government did not suggest that the incapacitation had had a therapeutic effect on the applicant. Nor was there any evidence that the authorities had sought to deprive the applicant of his capacity because he would otherwise have carried out actions which would result in a deterioration of his health. With regard to his own pecuniary interests, the protection of a person’s own rights is not a ground listed in Article 8 § 2, and it cannot therefore serve as a justification for interfering with a person’s rights as protected under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. In sum, the interference with his private life did not pursue any of the legitimate aims listed in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


56.  The Government further contended that, even assuming that they had owed any duty vis-à-vis the applicant under Article 8 of the Convention, they had taken all reasonable actions to ensure a fair balance between her interests and those of the community. Firstly, K. Street had served as a through road since 1983. In 1998 the street’s status as part of the motorway had merely been confirmed during the stocktaking project. The Government should therefore not be held responsible for the decision to route the traffic via K. Street. Secondly, following the entry of the Convention into force, the authorities had been contemplating the construction of a new through road, bypassing residential streets. However, they had had no choice but to use the existing road until the necessary funding could be found, as closing it off would have caused considerable detriment to the  <mask>. Contrary to the applicant’s argument, the use of the road had not been at odds with applicable law, because paragraph 1.9 of the State Construction Guidelines had recommended, but had not required, that major motorways be constructed outside populated communities.


54.  The Government submitted that the prosecutorial requests for information had served the purpose of preventing criminal acts, and this was not challenged by the applicant. The Court accepts that the interference aimed to investigate a criminal act and thereby served the legitimate aims of the prevention of crime, the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and also the  <mask> (compare M.N. and Others v. San Marino, cited above, §75).


21.  The applicant maintained her complaint. She submitted that the psychiatrists had acted in response to the letter they had received from the police. Neither the police nor the Government had shown that there had been any actual complaints about the applicant’s behaviour. The interference with her private life had neither been in accordance with law nor necessary in a democratic society. The head of the police department had acted in contravention of the Federal Police Act, which contained an exhaustive list of the circumstances allowing the collection of personal data by the police. The applicant’s situation had not fallen within the ambit of the relevant provisions. The applicant had not been a threat to national security or public order or to the  <mask>. Nor had the authorities been in possession of any information to the contrary. The aim of the police had been to put an end to the applicant’s activities. For years she had been a human rights activist. She had lodged many complaints about inactivity and corruption of the municipal authorities acting in the interests of the persons living in the area. As regards the wording of the letter of 15 January 2014, the applicant submitted that, according to the Ozhegov Dictionary of the Russian Language, the term “to examine (check) (проверить)” meant


69.  The applicants repeated their submission before the Chamber that for Danish citizens applying for family reunion with their non-Danish spouse living abroad, the 28-year rule did not pursue a legitimate aim because, allegedly, it had been introduced to target Danish citizens of non-Danish ethnic or national origin. The applicants thus called into question the argument that the aim had been to assist the integration of newcomers or to control immigration. They also disagreed with the argument that the aim related to the  <mask>. In their view, spousal family reunion had no financial implication for the State, because the resident spouse was obliged to provide for the other spouse.


39.  The applicant was ordered to vacate the flat in question by the national courts under Croatian laws regulating ownership, which allow an owner to seek repossession of his or her property when the possessor has no legal grounds for possession. The Court, noting that its power to review compliance with domestic law is limited (see, among other authorities, Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 25 October 1989, Series A no. 163, p. 17, § 57), is thus satisfied that the national courts' decisions ordering the applicant's eviction were in accordance with domestic law and in particular the relevant legislation related to the disposal of the housing stock (see §§ 17-19). The interference in question therefore pursued the legitimate aim of the  <mask>.


118.  The applicants alleged, however, that the applicable law lacked the clarity and  <mask> required by the concept of lawfulness as enshrined in the Convention, since it authorised the Ministry of the Interior to deport persons who had never been convicted or investigated on the basis of orders issued without examination of evidence, without the possibility of adversarial proceedings, and without giving reasons.


147.  The applicant further argued that section 28(6) identified a broad range of circumstances in which covert surveillance of consultations with an appropriate adult could take place, and those circumstances were ill-defined in the legislation; the statutory scheme entitled an extensive number of public authorities to engage in such surveillance and therefore reduced the level of  <mask> in terms of an individual being able to regulate their conduct; the number of individuals within those public authorities who could authorise the use of directed surveillance was not narrowly circumscribed; there were no meaningful limitations on the circumstances in which such material could be deployed; and there was a significant absence of any limits in relation to the retention, storage, transmission, dissemination and destruction of such material.


46.  The Government's observations focus on the existence and quality of the domestic law authorising the taking of video film of suspects for identification purposes, submitting that an adequate basis for the measure existed in the provisions of PACE and its Code which set out detailed procedures and safeguards. While the police were required to obtain authorisation under the Home Office Guidelines (a form of instruction found in previous cases not to satisfy requirements of  <mask> and accessibility), they sought to distinguish the procedure for the police to obtain consent to use the camera as such from the statutory authority for the taking and use of the film.


48.  The applicant further argued that the prohibition order complained of was based solely on an internal instruction issued by the Burgomaster to the police. This instruction had not been published. Members of the public could therefore not be aware of the nature of the conduct likely to induce the Burgomaster to issue a prohibition order, nor could they be aware that sanctions in the nature of prohibition orders even existed. Moreover, since issuing the instruction in 1983 the Burgomaster had never made public any decision declaring that an exceptional situation existed in any particular area. The only information available was that supplied in individual cases by police officers. In these circumstances the  <mask> requirement enshrined in the concept of “law” had not been met.


121.  The applicants submitted that their claims concerned a civil right recognised under domestic law, namely, that the local authority carried out its duties in a manner so as to prevent foreseeable damage to those to whom it was responsible. The proceedings brought by the second applicant concerned a dispute of a genuine and serious nature concerning the exercise of a right and determined that right. However, as a result of the immunity conferred on local authorities by the House of Lords in X. and Others v. Bedfordshire County Council ([1995] 3 AER 353), the second applicant’s case was struck out. This disclosed a denial of access to court, which did not pursue a legitimate aim and was disproportionate, in particular since the immunity applied regardless of the damage alleged or the  <mask> of the damage. They referred to the Court’s judgment in the case of Osman v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII).


131.  The applicant did not dispute that the surveillance of internal communications in the United Kingdom had a basis in domestic law, namely the provisions of RIPA. Nor did he dispute that both the relevant legislation and the Code were publicly available. However, he argued that the RIPA provisions, and in particular sections 5, 8 and 15 on the issuing of warrants and the relevant safeguards, were not in accordance with the law as required by Article 8 § 2 of the Convention as they did not meet the  <mask> requirement set out in the Court's jurisprudence. In particular, he alleged that section 8(1) RIPA, which stipulated the basic contents of an interception warrant, did not indicate with sufficient clarity how decisions as to which individuals were to be put under surveillance were made; that RIPA did not define the categories of persons who could have their telephones tapped; and that it did not clarify the procedures in place to regulate the interception and processing of intercept material. He contended that the safeguards referred to in section 15 RIPA were inadequate as they were subject to unknown “arrangements” considered necessary by the Secretary of State. The other procedural safeguards in place including the possibility of launching proceedings before the IPT, were, in the applicant's view, also inadequate to protect against abuse.


111.  The Government further submitted that the relevant legal framework ensured legal certainty and  <mask> as it laid down unambiguous and precise requirements that had to be fulfilled when assisting at any planned delivery, regardless of whether such assistance was provided by a midwife or a doctor. Contrary to the Hungarian law which had been criticised by the Court for its lack of foreseeability in the case of Ternovszky v. Hungary (no. 67545/09, 14 December 2010), the Czech legislation provided that health professionals, including midwives, could assist at deliveries only in adequately equipped premises with clearly defined requirements that had to be fulfilled for the provision of such health care.


57.  The Government argued that, even assuming that the surveillance of the applicant via GPS was considered an interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life, that interference had been justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8. It had been based on Article 100c § 1 no. 1 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a legal provision which met the necessary qualitative requirements, in particular that of  <mask>. They took the view that the principles developed in the Court's case-law on the law's foreseeability in the context of cases concerning the interception of telecommunications could not be transferred to the present case concerning the surveillance via GPS as the latter interfered to a much lesser extent with the private life of the person concerned than telephone tapping. As had been confirmed by the domestic courts, it had been sufficiently clear that the term “other special technical means intended for the purpose of surveillance” under Article 100c § 1 no. 1 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereby the legislator intended to authorise the use of future surveillance techniques, covered a surveillance via GPS.


74.  The applicant questioned whether a search and seizure at a law firm’s offices was at all allowed under Swedish law, in particular the Code of Judicial Procedure. In any event, the relationship between the Coercive Measures Act and the applicable laws and regulations regarding the protection of information subject to client confidentiality was allegedly unclear, resulting in the law failing to meet the requirements of  <mask> and compatibility with the rule of law. Even if there was a domestic legal basis for the search of the applicant’s office, the applicable legislation had not been precise enough.