42.  The Government argued that the judgments in the applicant’s favour had been partly executed: E.T.’s property title had been invalidated and her ownership certificate had been declared void; USD 17,000 had been exacted from the applicant and placed in the DEJA’s bank account; E.T. had been evicted from the land; and the operation of the restaurant had been terminated. During the whole of the  <mask>, the DEJA had taken all possible steps to enforce the Court of Appeal’s judgments, but for objective and substantial reasons it had been impossible to complete the enforcement.


24.  The Government submitted that in her application to the Court the applicant had failed to specify that she had received the first payment on 24 March 2010 and the last on 14 May 2010, by which the  <mask> had ended. She had therefore failed to inform the Court of the course of her enforcement proceedings of which she should have been aware. Moreover, she had failed to inform the domestic courts of the same facts. This in the Government’s view amounted to the abuse of the right of individual application. The Government also pointed out that, irrespective of the absence of a final decision of the domestic courts confirming that the enforcement proceedings had ended which had been anyway only of a declaratory nature, the enforcement proceedings had in total lasted for one year and six months, which was the period between the applicant’s lodging of the application for enforcement and the final payment. That period, in the Government’s view, had not been excessive and thus the applicant had not had victim status and, in any event, her application had been manifestly ill-founded.


27.  The Government submitted that the second applicant was not the victim of the alleged violation. The judgment of 26 September 1994 had been made in favour of the first applicant alone and the second applicant had merely represented his interests in the  <mask>. She could not claim, therefore, that her “right to a court” or her property rights had been violated.


40. The Government claimed that the judgment of 31 January 2005 had not been enforced because of the applicants’ failure to submit the required documents to the Gurjaani Public Registry. Accordingly, the delay in the  <mask> was wholly attributable to the applicants. The Government further maintained that the Gurjaani Public Registry had never prevented the enforcement of the Gurjaani District Court decision of 31 January 2005. The sole purpose of the letter of 2 November 2005, according to the Government, had been to invite the applicants to produce a complete file necessary for registering the land. Hence, the applicants’ own behaviour had been the principal cause of the delay in execution.


214.  The Government submitted that one of the applicant bank’s main arguments in claiming that its property rights had been violated in the  <mask> was that the enforcement to the benefit of Retag had been inadmissible under the domestic law. In this connection the Government pointed out that on 11 November 2003 the applicant bank had instituted civil proceedings before the Karlovac Commercial Court against Retag, asking the court to declare the enforcement inadmissible (see paragraph 113 above). In so doing the applicant bank had in essence raised the same complaints as in its application to the Court. Given that those proceedings were still pending and that the final judgment on the admissibility of the enforcement was of key significance for the determination of whether the applicant bank’s complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention were well-founded, the Government invited the Court to declare these complaints inadmissible as premature.


40.  The applicant also complained under Article 13 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 thereof, that the Makarska Municipal Court had not complied with the orders of the Split County Court and the Supreme Court to complete the  <mask> within the specified time-limit. Therefore the remedies he had at his disposal were not effective. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


75.  The Government argued that the applicants had not exhausted the relevant domestic remedies. In the first place, they had not lodged an appeal against the enforcement order and had thus agreed to the sale of their house in the  <mask>. Had they lodged an appeal against the enforcement order, they could have further lodged a constitutional complaint whereby they could have put forward all the complaints they had submitted before the Court.


64.  The applicant claimed 32,019 Polish zlotys (PLN) in respect of pecuniary damage for the alleged breaches of Articles 6 § 1 and 10 of the Convention. That overall amount corresponded to the value of two awards made against the applicant (PLN 20,000), the court fees the applicant was ordered to pay by the Court of Appeal (PLN 1,500), and the fees and costs imposed in the  <mask> in respect of the award for non-pecuniary damage made in favour of Mr S.L. (PLN 4,019). Furthermore, the applicant claimed the reimbursement of the legal fees he had incurred in the proceedings before the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal (PLN 1,000), the Constitutional Court (PLN 1,000) and in the Strasbourg proceedings (PLN 4,500).


50.  The Government maintained that the  <mask> were conducted with due diligence, while the failure to enforce the judgment in question was primarily due to the debtor’s indigence. They further argued that the period of non-execution should not include the subsequent insolvency proceedings, which were conducted fairly and expeditiously, having regard to their particular complexity and the delays attributable to the applicant company who pursued its security claim.


114.  The Government submitted that the first applicant had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies, in so far as she had not asked a bailiff to enforce the judgment awarding child allowance to the second applicant. Consequently, she had not provided the State authorities with the opportunity to assist her in the enforcement of the said judgment. The enforcement mechanism put in place by domestic legislation had been both directly accessible to her and effective. They disagreed with the applicants’ argument that they should have been exempted from exhausting the available domestic remedies on account of their particular situation and because the authorities had displayed a discriminatory attitude towards them. They contended that some of the victims in the domestic proceedings had opened  <mask> before the authorities and that there was no evidence in the file that the enforcement authorities had displayed a discriminatory attitude towards them. Lastly, they submitted that the third applicant could not claim to be a victim of the alleged violation because she had not been awarded a child allowance by the domestic courts.


39.  The applicant contested the Government's argument concerning the complexity of the case stating that the former Yugoslav banking system had not had any influence to the case. He disagreed that he had created any delays in the proceedings by having recourse to the remedies available under domestic law. He also argued that the State had not referred to any national effective remedy concerning the length of the proceedings. As regards the conduct of the authorities, the applicant submitted that the higher courts had unreasonably remitted the case for re-examination instead of deciding it on the merits. He also disagreed that they had been active throughout the proceedings, referring in particular to the four-year interval before the trial court made its last decision. He stated that the  <mask> concerning the bank's request for counter-enforcement had not affected the proceedings complained of.


63.  The Government in their submissions disputed the assertion that the awards made by the domestic courts to the applicants constituted possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as they concerned payments for judicial benefits provided by the State. They further alleged that the claims in respect of the arrears granted did not even amount to legitimate expectations, as they had been directed against the wrong institution – the Ministry of Finance instead of the State Judicial Administration. The Government further referred to the difficult financial situation of the State (see Raimondo v. Italy, judgment of 22 February 1994, Series A no. 281‑A, §§ 27 and 30) and the technical complications encountered in the course of the  <mask>. Moreover, they contended that the State had taken active steps to solve the problem, as it had made a budgetary allocation of UAH 1,067,200[7] for the payment of the various arrears. They further asserted that these judgments had been enforced in full and without undue delay, and that accordingly there had been no infringement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


85.  The applicants submitted that the Enforcement Act, which had entered into force on 15 October 2012 when the  <mask> against them had still been pending, had not been applied in their case. The application of the Act would have benefited them since it provided that real estate could not be sold at public auction for less than half of its assessed value.


18.  The Government maintained that the responsibility of the State in this situation was limited to the organisation and proper conduct of  <mask> and that the length of the enforcement proceedings had been caused by the critical financial situation of the debtor company and the energy sector of the Ukrainian economy in general. The Government contended that the Bailiffs’ Service performed all necessary actions and cannot be blamed for the delay. The regularity of the enforcement proceedings in the present case was confirmed by the domestic courts. The Government finally argued that the State could not be considered responsible for the debts of its enterprises.


60.  The applicant complained that he had not been able to recover his car because of the bailiffs' inefficient conduct of the  <mask>. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Article 6 is cited above and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 reads as follows:


15.  The Government submitted in their initial observations that the judgment had been enforced in full on 9 July 2008. In their additional observations they cited 16 January 2009 as the date of the enforcement. They argued that it was through the applicant’s own negligence that the judgment had not been enforced earlier. First, the Government submitted, with reference to the statement of the command of the respondent military unit, that the unit “had not received a copy of the judgment for processing in accordance with the established procedure”. Nonetheless, the applicant had not taken any steps to notify the respondent military unit of the award in his favour. Second, they submitted that he had failed to obtain a writ of execution from the court or to seek the bailiffs’ service’s assistance to accelerate the  <mask>. Further, he did not lodge a claim for non-pecuniary damage with a court, and therefore failed to exhaust the domestic remedies. They invited the Court to strike the case out as an abuse of petition.


38.  The Government submitted that contrary to the requirements of the domestic law (Section 133 of the 2004 Federal Budget Act and Section 109 of the 2005 Federal Budget Act) the applicant submitted the warrant of execution directly to the debtor, whereas he was supposed to submit it with the competent department of the Federal Treasury. Therefore, the applicant was responsible for the non-enforcement of the judgment up until 5 October 2005 when the  <mask> were stayed pending the outcome of the supervisory review proceedings.


190.  The applicants further submitted that neither dispersal nor prosecution and conviction of the first to sixth applicants had been  <mask> since: (i) the protest action had been peaceful; the protesters had not attacked the loggers, the MG staff or the police, which meant that the authorities were required to display a degree of tolerance; the applicants referred to the cases of Oya Ataman v. Turkey (no. 74552/01, §§ 41 and 42, ECHR 2006‑XIV) and Bukta and Others v. Hungary (no. 25691/04, § 37, ECHR 2007‑III); (ii) the protest had taken place in a park and caused no disturbance to city life; and (iii) allowing private security guards to disperse a peaceful assembly could not be considered necessary in a democratic society and neither could the use of violence.


77.  The Government submitted the interference was justified as  <mask> and was proportionate to its objectives. The applicant had agreed to occupy the plot on the terms that neither he, his family nor guests would cause a nuisance and he had been warned by the Council that he was in breach. In the circumstances, the Council was entitled to revoke the licence. Similar terms would have applied to a secure housing tenant. Though the licence did not require the Council to give the applicant the opportunity to challenge the allegations of nuisance made against him, it was a public authority obliged to act lawfully, reasonably, fairly and for the proper purposes for which its powers were conferred. Its decisions were therefore amenable to judicial review and the applicant, who was legally represented, was able to challenge the decision in judicial review proceedings where the High Court found no evidence to doubt the reasonableness and procedural fairness of the Council’s decision. The Council had also taken into account the needs of the applicant and his family in the decision-making process. If there had been no proper basis for the eviction or the applicant had mounted a substantial factual challenge to the asserted justification, the domestic courts would have been able, through their scrutiny, to provide a remedy against arbitrary action. There was however no substantial dispute as to the primary facts as the applicant did not appear to deny that his sons and guests were causing a nuisance. This procedure therefore provided the applicant with a series of important safeguards. In addition to the remedy of judicial review, occupiers had, since 2000, a right of action under the Human Rights Act 1998, pursuant to which the courts can consider directly claims of violation of the Convention (see, for example, Somerset County Council v. Isaacs, paragraphs 47-50 above).


33.  The Government maintained that the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression was  <mask>. In this regard, they submitted that, in the first two articles, the State was considered as waging a “dirty war” against the “oppressed” Kurdish nation and that in the third article the Minister of Justice was designated as the person responsible for the inconveniences and problems in prisons. They further pointed out that the article considered the Minister to be responsible for the death of two prisoners who were on hunger strike. Finally, they submitted that the applicants were sentenced to an insignificant fine which was never enforced and that their condemnations were eventually nullified.


56.  The applicants argued that the order for their eviction issued by the Poreč Municipal Court had amounted to an interference with their right to respect for their home, notwithstanding the fact that they had not yet been evicted. They accepted that the interference in question was in accordance with the law, but argued that it was not  <mask>. They maintained that their house should have been exempted from the enforcement proceedings since it had been satisfying their basic housing needs.


78.  The Government admitted that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. However, they considered that such interference had been  <mask> and had been justified by the need to ensure public safety and to prevent any obstruction by the applicant of the investigation of the criminal case against him.


30.  The Government submitted that the applicants, together with other members of the National Bolsheviks Party, had effected a forcible and unauthorised entry into the premises of the President’s Administration, had held an unauthorised assembly there, had voiced unlawful demands for the President’s resignation, had hampered the normal functioning of the President’s Administration and had destroyed State property there. Their protest had not been peaceful and had amounted to a criminal offence of mass disorder. They had been therefore lawfully prosecuted for participation in mass disorder involving destruction of State property. Their arrest, detention and conviction had pursued the legitimate aim of investigating criminal offences and punishing those responsible and had been  <mask>.


68.  The applicant argued that the interference with her freedom of expression had been disproportionate within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention in view of the minor threat posed by the publication to the interests of the Lithuanian State or any ethnic groups living in Lithuania or the neighbouring countries. In this connection the applicant emphasised that “Lithuanian calendar” had been edited and officially distributed by her for 6 years in the whole territory of Lithuania, attracting no great attention from the public or from State institutions. Similarly, the 2,000 edition of “Lithuanian calendar” had been released in a very limited print run of 3,000 in the second half of the year 1999, and for the following five months had caused no significant interest or exaggerated reactions, up until the State authorities' intervention in January 2000 after they received a note from the embassy of the Russian Federation. The applicant likewise noted that the Prosecutor General had refused to start criminal proceedings against her as the publication had not had the elements of the criminal offence of instigation of ethnic or racial hatred. She also observed that the information published in “Lithuanian calendar 2000” had already been made public in other historical documents. The applicant also relied on the fact that the publication had contained mainly the expression of her own opinions on and assessment of various historical events, and the State had presented no evidence proving the necessity of such a serious interference. As a result of the proceedings, she had not only received an administrative penalty in the form of a warning, but had also lost the main source of her income, in view of the confiscation and destruction of all the unsold items of “Lithuanian calendar 2000” and her resultant inability to continue editing the publication she had created. The applicant further submitted that the authorities could have pursued means other than halting the distribution of the calendar, such as giving her the opportunity to make certain rectifications or announcements, if necessary, on the cover of the remaining, unsold, versions of the publication. Finally, the domestic courts' finding of a lack of intent on the part of the applicant, as well as the minor danger which the publication represented, were also to be taken into account in discarding the argument that the interference had been  <mask>.


35.  The applicant also complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the restrictions on his right to freedom of expression had not been  <mask> for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.'s pictures and the facts mentioned in the articles had not fallen within the protection of private life. She had not been an innocent bystander but had actively participated in the incident of 4 December 1996. A conviction was public information that could not fall within the scope of private life. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest. The applicant had only written the articles, and he had had no say in the manner in which they had been published. No intent had been shown. Moreover, the information in the articles had been in every respect correct. The courts had failed to strike a proper balance between the protection of private life and freedom of expression in the manner required by the Convention.


59.  The Government did not deny that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life and correspondence. They believed, however, that the interference at issue was prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate aim and was  <mask>. The interference had resulted from the interception of A.B.’s telephone conversations, which had been authorised under section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities. In the Government’s view this was sufficient to conclude that the criterion of lawfulness was met in the present case. Moreover, the lawfulness of the interception had subsequently been confirmed on several occasions by the prosecutor’s office in response to the applicant’s complaints (paragraphs 11-15 above). They claimed that it had also been verified by the relevant judge of the Criminal Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court (in the context of the criminal proceedings). Lastly, they referred to the findings of the Constitutional Court confirming that the said provision had been sufficiently clear and precise as to exclude arbitrariness. Namely, the said provision contained an exhaustive list of offences and the necessary precondition for its application was a situation requiring immediate action. Furthermore, the Government submitted that the interference at issue had pursued the legitimate aim of preventing crime, given that it had been carried out in the framework of criminal proceedings in connection with aggravated bribery. In response to the applicant’s argument, they further reiterated that owing to the rapid development of events from 27 to 30 December 2005 no measures other than the operational interception of telecommunications would have been efficient for gathering credible information about the details of and accomplices involved in the bribery scheme.


97.  The Government agreed that during the trial, which lasted from 1 August 2001 until 6 April 2004, the applicant had been denied family visits. Only on the latter date, after his conviction, was the applicant allowed a visit by his parents. The Government agreed that such a restriction constituted an interference with the applicant’s family life. They observed, however, that the applicant had been suspected of particularly serious crimes, including storing firearms and murdering a police officer in an attempt to conceal another crime. In their opinion, the gravity of the accusations, and the need to prevent his absconding from justice, justified the restriction on family visits during the investigation and trial. The Government noted that such a restriction was clearly provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the discretion given to the relevant authority in allowing or denying such visits was  <mask> in order to avoid the absconding of a suspect or an accused.


28.  The applicants argued that the refusal to register the Civic Committee had not been in accordance with the law, that it had not pursued a legitimate aim and had not been  <mask>. The applicants also alleged that their case concerned several aspects of the national legislation and administrative practice which run counter to the principles embodied in Article 11 of the Convention.


66.  The Government conceded that there was family life between the applicant and M. and that the impugned access restrictions, with the exception of those agreed, and the refusal to terminate the public care had amounted to interferences with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. However, the interferences had been in accordance with the law, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been  <mask>.


81.  The Government disagreed. They accepted that the first applicant’s psychiatric examination constituted interference with his private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. They argued, however, that this interference was justified under paragraph 2 of the provision at issue. In particular, the assessment had been carried out based on Mrs L.’s complaints about the first applicant’s deviant behaviour, which had posed a threat to her own safety and the safety of others. These complaints had not been unsubstantiated; in particular, in June 2000 the first applicant had injured Mrs L. Other villagers had also complained to various authorities about the first applicant’s provocative conduct. The Government submitted in this regard copies of complaints concerning the first applicant’s conduct signed by various individuals and dated 2000 – 2003. In the light of this, the first applicant’s psychiatric examination had pursued a legitimate aim – namely, protection of the rights of others. It had been  <mask> and was conducted in accordance with the law. In particular, the relevant provision was section 11 of the Law of Ukraine “On Psychiatric Assistance”, authorising forcible psychiatric assessments of persons manifesting real intention to commit acts putting others in danger. Lastly, the Government submitted that the lawfulness of the application of that provision in the first applicant’s case had been confirmed by judicial authorities of two levels in the course of the contested proceedings.


27.  The Government admitted that imposing a fine for contempt of court amounted to an interference with the applicant’s freedom of speech. However, they argued that the interference had been in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and had been  <mask>. The decision to fine the applicant had been based on section 110 of the Civil Procedure Act and sought to maintain the authority of the judiciary.


81.  The Government admitted that there was an interference with the applicant's family life. However, they considered that such interference was justified. They maintained that the issue of allowing family visits was foreseen by the domestic law, namely Article 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The refusal to allow such family visits during the investigation was in the interests of public safety and was  <mask>. They further noted that after the applicant's conviction he was allowed to see his mother and his wife on numerous occasions.


68.  The applicant maintained that the publication of the Commission’s decision on its website before it had become final had been unlawful and not  <mask>. The removal of such a decision from the Commission’s website if the administrative courts had set it aside would not have offset the adverse effects it had caused. In that connection, he submitted articles from newspapers and online portals after the Commission had posted its decision on its website and before it had been served on him. Lastly, he argued that the impugned publication had not pursued any legitimate aim.


34.  The applicants maintained that their conviction for publishing these articles was not  <mask>. In this regard, they pointed out that the first two articles concerned the author’s assessment on how to peacefully solve the Kurdish problem and that the third article criticised the prison policies of the State and, in particular, that of the Minister of Justice at the time of the events.


163.  The applicants claimed that the interference had not been prescribed by law or  <mask>. It had been established by the Presnenskiy District Court on 16 August 2002 that the Moscow Justice Department had not invoked the dissolution proceedings before the Golovinskiy District Court as a ground for refusing re-registration. Furthermore, the four criminal investigations between June 1996 and April 1998 had found no criminal activity on the part of the applicant community. In April 1999, after a detailed expert study, the Ministry of Justice had granted re-registration to the federal organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses, of which the applicant community had been a member. Likewise, 398 communities of Jehovah's Witnesses in other Russian regions had been granted registration or re-registration during the same period.


220.  The applicant argued that, since the criminal proceedings against him had been politically motivated, such interference could not be considered as prescribed by law. As regards the dispersal of the demonstration, none of the concerns raised in the Armenian Ombudsman’s report regarding the lawfulness of the police operation had been addressed either during the investigation or in the Government’s observations. All the evidence provided by the police had been considered reliable and their actions, without a proper examination and assessment, had been considered lawful by the courts, which had failed to carry out an objective and thorough establishment of the facts. Neither the interference with the expression of his political opinions, nor the dispersal of the demonstration were  <mask>. As regards the latter, a number of questions remained unanswered. In particular, the disproportionate manner in which the demonstration had been dispersed, resulting in more than one hundred persons injured; the failure of the police to communicate with the opposition leader when the latter proposed to listen to their demands; the reasons for choosing such an early hour to carry out such a large-scale police operation, moreover, assuming that it had been a search and seizure operation, it being prohibited under the rules of criminal procedure; the failure to video record a police operation involving such a large number of police officers, while hindering and restricting journalists from video recording those events; the reasons why all the participants in the sit-in had been dispersed, as well as why Freedom Square had remained closed for any gatherings by the opposition for the following 38 months, if the purpose of the police operation had only been to carry out a search and seizure of illegal weapons.


40.  The Government acknowledged that those who used the telephone had an expectation of privacy in respect of the numbers which they dialled and that obtaining detailed billing information concerning that telephone constituted an interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 8. The obtaining of the information was, however,  <mask> in the interests of public safety, for the prevention of crime and/or the protection of the rights of others, as the investigation concerned a very serious crime, the applicants had guns for use in the intended robbery and, as B. was surveillance-conscious, conventional surveillance would not suffice. The only use of the information was to corroborate the times recorded by police officers in respect of the covert listening device in the flat.


43.  The applicant company complained that the judgments by which the Prosecutor General's actions were upheld had had the effect of infringing its right to peaceful enjoyment of its possessions as secured by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The applicant argued that the interference was not provided by law since the guarantees provided by Article 6 of the Convention had been breached and that the interference was not  <mask>. The Government disputed the applicant's contention and argued that the applicant company received back the price paid for the shares bought in 2000 and that the applicant company was allowed to keep the profits earned between 2000 and 2007. In the Government's opinion, it was the State's right to property that had been breached as a result of the unlawful sale of the shares in 2000 and the applicant company had profited from the unlawful use of twenty-seven carriages by the quarry.


79.  The Government further maintained that the interference complained of had been  <mask> within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 to achieve the said legitimate aims. The child’s best interest had required the suspension of the applicant’s access. In balancing the competing interests and reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal had relied on the conclusive and carefully reasoned opinion of a competent expert, who had heard the applicant, G.S. and F. several times. After having questioned F. thoroughly, the expert had concluded that ordering contacts between her and the applicant were not in F.’s best interest. Under these circumstances, it had been reasonable for the expert not to confront F. with the applicant and not to explore their interaction. The court had also had regard to the minutes of the child’s questioning at first instance, in the course of which the child had firmly expressed her will not to see her father.


19.  The Government contested his argument. They submitted that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression had been prescribed by law, and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining national security and territorial integrity and prevention of disorder. The Government further contended that the interference had been  <mask>. They noted that in the article in question Abdullah Öcalan was referred to as “the ideological and political leader of the Kurdish movement” and the HPG, the PJA and the KONGRA-GEL were described as “facilitators of the military, political and ideological development formed under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan”. According to the Government, the publication of a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan holding a weapon demonstrated that the purpose of the publication of the article was to advocate and propagate terrorism. The Government lastly noted that the PKK was considered to be a terrorist organisation by a number of states and international organisations, such as the United Nations, NATO and the United States of America, and thus represented a serious threat not only to the internal security of Turkey but also to the international public order.


105.  The Government further submitted that the interference had been  <mask>. They outlined the complex and extremely hostile relationship between the applicant and the children’s mother, providing details of the pre-investigation inquiry carried out into her allegations against the applicant in connection with his visit to the school on 27 November 2012 (see paragraphs 15-16 above).


73.  The applicant associations further maintained that the interference with their Convention rights was not justified by any of the legitimate aims set out in Article 9 § 2 of the Convention. There could never be a justification for judging religious groups’ beliefs as contrasted to their actions. The Government had failed to submit any concrete facts which would allow the Court to verify the assumption that their movement was in any way dangerous or that urgent social needs necessitated the actions in question. Their movement could not be criticised for any activity which was illegal or contrary to public order and the existing legislation. Accordingly, their treatment by the political authorities had been persecutory and unjustified, and had not been  <mask>.


31.  The Government argued at the outset that the applicant had merely reiterated his Article 6 complaint (see paragraph 45 below). In any event, any interference that might have occurred in the case had been prescribed by law: under the provisions of Article 98 § 12 of the CCP the prosecutor had had to inform the court about the measures taken, but had not been obliged to obtain confirmation of those measures. Imposing such an obligation on the authorities, as the applicant alleged was necessary, would go beyond the legal framework. In the case at hand, the prosecutor had informed the court about the order to seize the correspondence. Moreover, the procedure whereby the order had been issued by the prosecutor had respected the legal requirements: it had been urgent and based on a solid justification. Furthermore, the measures taken by the prosecutor had been  <mask> for uncovering criminal activity regarding serious crimes of drug trafficking.


19.  The Government admitted that imposing a fine for a disciplinary offence amounted to an interference with the applicant’s freedom of speech. However, they argued that the interference had been in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and been  <mask>. In particular, the decision to fine the applicant had been based on section 37 (a) of the Act on Attorneys at Law and meant to maintain the authority of the judiciary.


28.  The applicant company complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the restrictions on its right to freedom of expression in its case had not been prescribed by law as the Penal Code provision applied had not defined adequately the scope of private life. Nor had the restrictions been  <mask> for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. B. had not been an innocent bystander but had participated actively in the incident of 4 December 1996. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest, especially since the case had been very newsworthy. Moreover, the information in the articles had in every respect been correct.


26.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim, as the proceedings against him had become time-barred. They therefore argued that there had been no interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. Alternatively, they submitted that the applicant had been prosecuted pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, and thus the interference, if any, had been prescribed by law. They further submitted that the domestic authorities had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting public order and national security. The Government lastly submitted that the interference had been  <mask>, given that the content of the book in question had promoted hatred, hostility, the use of arms, militancy and revenge.


27.  The Government did not dispute the fact that the applicants' conviction for the offence of handling information protected by the secrecy of a judicial investigation or by a duty of professional confidence constituted interference with their right to freedom of expression. In their opinion, that interference was prescribed by law, namely by Articles 226-13 and 321-1 of the Criminal Code, which fulfilled the conditions of accessibility and foreseeability required by the Court (see Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, ECHR 1999‑I). The Government considered, however, that the interference constituted a measure that was  <mask> for the protection of the reputation or rights of others and for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Without disputing the fact that the aim of the applicants' work had been to inform the general public about an affair of state that was of interest to public opinion, they considered that it prejudiced the presumption of innocence in respect of G.M. The publication of the book just a few days after the death of François Mitterrand had given it a certain commercial and media impact, thereby increasing the prejudice sustained by G.M. Moreover, the affair had been a very sensitive one and the book had contained precise reproductions of a number of documents from the case file.


47.  The applicant said that a tap had been put on his telephone immediately after his office had been sealed, as evidenced by the disturbances on the line. He had had no way of confirming or dispelling his misgivings in this regard, as under Bulgarian law such information could not be released. He also submitted that if there had been such tapping, it had been unlawful, because he had been merely a witness and the authorities had not had sufficient material to entertain a reasonable suspicion against him. In view of this, and of the applicant’s capacity as a lawyer, it had clearly not been  <mask> to intercept his telephone communications. He concluded that these circumstances had amounted to a breach of Article 8.


36.  The Government acknowledged that the use of this device interfered with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life. They submitted that it was justifiable under the second paragraph of Article 8 as being  <mask> in the interests of public safety, for the prevention of crime and/or for the protection of the rights of others. They referred, inter alia, to the serious nature of the crime under investigation, the fact that B. was regarded as being surveillance-conscious, rendering conventional forms of surveillance insufficient, and that the conversations proved that an armed robbery was being planned. They recalled, however, that in Khan v. the United Kingdom (no. 35394/97, §§ 26-28, ECHR 2000-V), the Court found that the Home Office Guidelines governing such devices did not satisfy the requirement of “in accordance with the law” and recognised that the Court was liable to reach the same conclusion in the present case.


46.  The Government acknowledged that the impugned measures interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life but submitted that they were “in accordance with the law” and pursued the protection of health and morals of the children in question, namely to provide them with stable and safe living conditions and secure their development. They further submitted that the measures were  <mask>. They pointed out that the national authorities had the benefit of contact with the persons concerned and that a parent was not entitled under Article 8 to have measures taken which would harm a child’s health or development.


28.  The Government submitted in the alternative that any interference with the applicant’s right under Article 8 had been carried out on the basis of section 48(A)(5) of Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. They provided the Court with extracts of this provision containing the amendments of 2008 (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). The Government also relied on section 39(1) of the Regulation on Private Tutoring Centres. They further contended that the applicant’s dismissal had pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining national security, territorial integrity, public safety, public order and preventing crime, and that it had been  <mask> in the circumstances of the case.


32.  The Government submitted that the interference in question had been prescribed by law and had pursued a number of legitimate aims, namely the protection of national security, territorial integrity, public safety, public order and prevention of crime. They also claimed that the restriction had been  <mask> because it had been carried out as a result of a pressing social need and had been proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. They concluded that, in the exercise of their discretion, the prison authorities had decided not to allow the impugned letter to be sent outside.


169.  The Government argued that the decision to prevent the applicant from making a fresh application for full legal capacity to be restored to her had been in accordance with Article 186 § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was in the interest of the applicant and the persons in her environment and was  <mask> in the circumstances of the case.


187.  The Government submitted that there had been an interference with the exercise of the applicants’ freedom of peaceful assembly within the meaning of Article 11 and their freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention, but that the interference had been in accordance with the law, in particular Article 71 of the Criminal Code. They submitted that the interference had been in the interests of public safety. They also argued that it had been  <mask>, particularly because the applicants’ actions during the events of 9 March 2001 had gone beyond the range allowed to be committed by an individual in exercising his rights under the Convention, as they had been accompanied by riotous damage, destruction of property and resistance towards the authorities. Their rally had therefore not been of a peaceful character.


86.  The Government submitted that the interference was  <mask> and proportionate to the aim pursued. It was aimed at preventing the applicant’s unlawful actions and avoiding social disorder. The sanction imposed was at the lower end of the scale of penalties prescribed for the offence committed by the applicant. The Contracting Parties enjoyed a margin of appreciation as far as the necessity of an interference was concerned and the reasons given by the domestic authorities were relevant and sufficient.


75.  The Government conceded that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. However, they argued that the interference in the form of the domestic courts’ refusal to order the return of the applicant’s son to the United States had been in accordance with the law, had pursued a legitimate aim, and had been  <mask>. In particular, the decision had been based on Article 13 § 1 (b) of the Hague Convention and had sought to protect the rights of others, namely the applicant’s son.


120.  The Government submitted that the interference complained of was  <mask>. In the first place, to recognise the applicant Church the State would have had to give up its position of neutrality in religious matters, and in religious conflicts in particular, which would have been contrary to the Moldovan Constitution and Moldovan public policy. It was therefore in order to discharge its duty of neutrality that the Government had urged the applicant Church to settle its differences with the Metropolitan Church of Moldova first.


35.  The applicants' conviction was not  <mask>. There was no German law which prohibited linking criticism to a particular person. This case had to be seen against the background of the broad social debate on the laws ruling abortions, which must not be compromised one-sidedly by the Government for the purpose of preserving other concepts and notions. The Government could not rely on the Court's decision on the second applicant's previous complaint (compare Annen v. Germany (dec.), no. 2373/07 and 2396/07, 30 March 2010), as the instant case concerned criminal convictions which weighed more heavily than the convictions to desist which formed the subject matter of the aforementioned proceedings.


42.  The Government submitted that the applicants had made discriminatory speeches based on religious beliefs, encouraged violence, and had provoked hostility and hatred among different segments of Turkish society. Furthermore, certain segments of Turkish society were invited to make an armed rebellion. In the Government’s opinion, the interference in the present case was  <mask> and the sentences were proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.


47.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression had been prescribed by law. They referred to the Advocacy Act and the Advocate's Code of Professional Conduct. It had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of the judiciary and had been  <mask>. The penalty imposed on the applicant had not been severe. It had been proportionate to the disciplinary offence committed by the applicant.


63.  The Government accepted that the police officers' entry into the front garden of the applicant's house constituted an interference with her right to respect for her home guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. However, the interference had been in “accordance with the law”. According to the Government, the interference had been based on section 13(19) of the Police Act of 18 December 1990, and in particular on provisions authorising the police to enter private houses without the consent of the owner and to inspect them in order to put an end to offences and to pursue persons suspected of having committed an offence. The Government also argued that the interference had pursued a legitimate aim and had been  <mask>.


67.  The Government submitted that the interference with the first applicant’s rights was in accordance with the law and  <mask> for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Government considered that deprivation of parental authority emanated from the issuance of the care order, which once in place transfers the exercise of powers with respect to care and custody to the Minister. It was therefore not the judgment of the Criminal Court that caused the interference. Thus, the Government considered the interference to have arisen from the issuance of the care order, which they submitted was in the best interests of the children, since at the time the first applicant had not been in a position to take proper care of her children. Moreover, her situation was subject to constant monitoring and review, which resulted in her having increased access to the children as approved by the Minister. This went to prove that all attempts were being made for an eventual reunification. In their view M.D. still enjoyed all remaining rights save for care and custody, which included visitation rights in accordance with her Article 8 rights.


70.  The applicant submitted that the domestic courts’ refusal to order the return of his son to the United States had amounted to an interference with his right to respect for his family life. That interference had been unlawful, it had not aimed to protect the interests of the child, but solely those of the mother, and thus it had not been  <mask>. In particular, as regards the requirement of lawfulness, the applicant argued that the domestic courts had construed the exception set out in Article 13 § 1 (b) of the Hague Convention too widely, an exception which must be interpreted strictly, and had misapplied that Article to the facts of the case.


37.  The applicants complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the restrictions on their right to freedom of expression had not been prescribed by law and had not been  <mask> for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.'s pictures and the facts mentioned in the articles had not fallen within the protection of private life. She had not been an innocent bystander but had participated actively in the incident of 4 December 1996. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest and the information in the articles had in every respect been correct. The restrictions imposed on the applicants had been grossly disproportionate, especially in view of their obligation to pay very considerable damages.


27.  The applicant submitted that his trial, which had lasted for more than seven years and which had resulted in his being convicted under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, had amounted to an interference with his right guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention. He also claimed that the interference in question had not been  <mask>. In that respect, he submitted that the book in question was like an historical novel and that, read in its entirety, it did not incite violence.


62.  The applicants furthermore maintained that physical force had been used against them by police, and that that force had not been  <mask> and had in any event been disproportionate to whatever legitimate aim the Government had claimed to be pursuing. While reiterating the Court’s reasoning in the case of Bukta and Others v. Hungary (no. 25691/04, § 37, ECHR 2007‑III), they submitted that the public authorities should have shown a certain degree of tolerance towards their peaceful gatherings at the University. Lastly, in their view, the imposition of administrative fines had only served to punish them for their having exercised their rights under Article 10 and Article 11 of the Convention and had been intended to have a “chilling effect” upon anyone who might have been willing to protest against the Government’s reforms in the educational sphere.


80.  The Government admitted that the practice of monitoring the applicant’s letters constituted an interference with his right to respect for his correspondence. They maintained, however, that the interference had been in accordance with the law and pursued the legitimate aim of preventing the applicant’s absconding from justice and obstructing the investigation of the crime he had been charged with. They further submitted that the interference had been  <mask> to achieve that aim. Lastly, they noted that as of 6 February 2003 the applicant’s letters to the Ombudsman had not been subject to review.


32.  The Government accept that there has been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life as guaranteed by Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. However, the measure was justified under Article 8 § 2, being in accordance with the law - Section 176 of the Civil Code - and having pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of health or morals and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Government further contend that the measure was  <mask> within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 and that the Austrian authorities have not overstepped their margin of appreciation.


121.  The applicants submitted that the refusal to recognise the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia was not  <mask>. They asserted that all the arguments put forward by the Government were without foundation and unsubstantiated and that they did not correspond to a “pressing social need”. There was nothing in the file to show that the applicants had intended or carried on or sought to carry on activities capable of undermining Moldovan territorial integrity, national security or public order.


109.  The applicant also argued that the occupation of his estate could not be deemed  <mask> and was disproportionate. He submitted that the authorities had not made any attempts to resolve the problem of quartering their personnel in any alternative way, such as settling them in public buildings or tents, and that even assuming that there had been a pressing need for the federal forces to move onto his estate, the authorities could have rented his property, or paid him compensation for the temporary occupation, but had refused to do so.


27.  The applicants contested the argument. In particular they considered that the interference with their family life had not been in accordance with the law or  <mask>. In their view, the authorities had not acted expeditiously for the return of the child and for the stay of the divorce proceedings, violating thus their obligations under Article 7 of the Hague Convention.


67.  The applicant stated that by denying him access to the TEC’s premises, and by refusing to provide him in good time with information about the progress of the electoral process, the authorities had interfered with his right to collect such information. He further submitted that this interference had not been lawful, had not pursued a legitimate aim and had not been  <mask>.


41.  The applicants considered that the existence of other legislative techniques in bringing about the same or similar results but in a manner less intrusive of the rights of the accused (the drawing of adverse inferences from a failure to answer questions, or establishing a statutory presumption of fact that the registered owner was the driver unless he or she provided evidence to the contrary) confirmed that the existing regime was not strictly  <mask>.


204.  The Government argued that the impugned decisions clearly stated that the applicant was charged with having committed certain crimes and that his  <mask> was sought with a view to prosecuting him on those charges. Moreover, the authorities explicitly stated that the issue of the applicant's criminal responsibility for the crimes for which his extradition was being sought was to be decided only by the courts of the requesting country.


88.  The applicant further maintained that there were no effective remedies that he was required to exhaust in order to challenge the GPO of Ukraine's decision to extradite him to Kazakhstan. In particular, the applicant stated that he had complained on various occasions to the domestic courts about the unreasonable length of his detention and its unlawfulness, the unlawful inactivity of the Governor of Kharkiv SIZO no. 27, who refused to release him, and about the  <mask> decision itself. The proceedings concerning these complaints and their unfavourable outcome showed that there were no domestic remedies available to the applicant.


147.  The Government contended that the applicant’s detention pending  <mask> complied with the domestic legislation, in particular with the provisions of Article 466 § 1 of the CCP. Referring to Constitutional Court decisions no. 101-O of 4 April 2006 and no. 333-O-P of 1 March 2007 and to Ruling no. 22 of 29 October 2009 of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (see paragraphs 90-91 and 94-95 above), they argued that the relevant provisions had been clear and foreseeable and had enabled the applicant to estimate the length of his detention pending extradition.


64.  The applicant maintained his complaint. He pointed out that the Government’s version that he had been ill-treated in Kazakhstan, before his  <mask>, had been refused by the official statements from the administration of the remand prison certifying that on 23 February 2006 he had not had any evidence of ill-treatment at the time of his arrival in Moscow (see paragraphs 10 and 27 above). Furthermore, his allegations of ill-treatment had been confirmed by the medical examinations of 1 March and 1 June 2006 (see paragraphs 29, 26 and 39 above), his consistent complaints to the authorities (see paragraphs 31, 32, 37, 39, 40, 42 and 47 above) and the domestic court’s findings of 3 October 2007 (see paragraph 41 above). He stressed that the Government neither provided a satisfactory explanation as to the origins of his injuries nor carried out an effective investigation into his complaints. The applicant further stated, in particular, that the inquiries conducted had been neither timely nor thorough; the authorities had not questioned him nor taken any steps to identify his torturers. Finally, he submitted that the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected by the police amounted to torture. In support of his allegations, the applicant referred to the documents submitted and the findings of the CPT of 13 March 2007 in respect of the human rights violations committed by the staff of the ORB-2 at the material time (see paragraph 61 above).


95.  The applicant complained under Article 2 § 1 of the Convention that there was a real risk that he would be liable to capital punishment in the event of his  <mask> to Kazakhstan. He alleged that the assurances given by the Government of Kazakhstan were insufficient as the moratorium imposed on capital punishment could be lifted at any time and the charges against him could be reclassified. This provision reads as follows:


27.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s allegations that he risked ill-treatment in the event of his  <mask> to Uzbekistan had been considered by the national authorities and dismissed on sufficient grounds. Referring to the decisions of the prosecution and immigration authorities and the domestic courts in the course of the extradition and expulsion proceedings, the Government asserted that his claims had been duly reviewed and found to be devoid of substance. In their opinion, the assurances presented to the Russian authorities by the Uzbekistani authorities were sufficient and compatible with the countries’ international obligations and domestic legal developments. As regards the expulsion proceedings, the expulsion order did not specify that the applicant was to be taken to Uzbekistan, but merely stated that he was to be removed from the territory of the Russian Federation. The Government concluded that a risk of the applicant’s treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention had not been convincingly established.


106.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s allegation of politically motivated persecution had been assessed by the Russian courts when examining his appeals against the  <mask> order, and rejected as unfounded. The Russian courts had relied on the statement from the Prosecutor General’s Office of Uzbekistan to the effect that the applicant would face no risk of ill-treatment if he were to be extradited to Uzbekistan and on the fact that the Russian authorities did not have any information confirming his allegation. Referring to the assurances from the Uzbek authorities, the Government argued that the applicant would not be subjected to ill-treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.


81.  The applicants alleged that they had not had a fair hearing in the criminal court that had ruled on the request for their  <mask>, in that they had been unable to gain access to all the material in the case file or to put forward their arguments concerning the characterisation of the offences they were alleged to have committed.


90.  The applicant has further claimed that he would risk persecution in Rwanda because of the fact that he is a Hutu. The Court notes that none of the decisions by the ICTR and national jurisdictions refusing transfer or  <mask> to Rwanda has been based, even in part, on such considerations. Nor has any evidence been submitted or found which gives reason to conclude that there is a general situation of persecution or ill-treatment of the Hutu population in Rwanda. Moreover, the applicant has not pointed to any particular personal circumstances which would indicate that he risks being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 due to his ethnicity.


108.  The Government stressed that, in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer Law and the repeated confirmations by the Rwandan authorities in the applicant’s case, the applicant would not be tried in the gacaca courts. The documents from gacaca courts, introduced by the applicant late in the proceedings, concerned damages, and the applicant had not explained the connection, if any, between the acts mentioned in those documents and the criminal acts pertinent to the  <mask> proceedings. In the Government’s view, the documents submitted had no bearing on the present case.


168.  The Government further stated that the applicant could have complained to the courts about his detention under section 17 of the Custody Act, but they failed to elaborate on that assertion. In any event, the Court has already held that the Custody Act derives from the Code of Criminal Procedure and concerns persons suspected or accused of criminal offences in Russia, and there is no indication that this Act applied at the material time to persons detained pending  <mask>. Hence, the Court is not certain that the remedy suggested by the Government bore any relation to the breaches alleged (see Muminov, cited above, § 115).


96.  The Government contested that argument. They stated that in the event of the applicant's  <mask> to Kazakhstan he would not be liable to capital punishment as the indictment in his case related to a criminal act under Article 96(1) of the Criminal Code and involved the offence of murder, not punishable by capital punishment. Furthermore, they stated that there had been a moratorium on capital punishment in Kazakhstan, that capital punishment was applied only in exceptional circumstances and that this sentence could not be enforced, even if one assumed that such a sentence would be passed in relation to the applicant.


135.  The applicant sought the reimbursement of the costs incurred in the  <mask> proceedings in Germany, amounting to EUR 4,827.11. He further claimed EUR 7,747.94 in respect of the proceedings before the Court. In particular, he submitted that the sum of EUR 3,500.16 (comprising EUR 3,033.88 for fees and EUR 466.28 for translations) had been incurred in connection with the Chamber proceedings, and that the subsequent proceedings before the Grand Chamber, including his lawyers' participation in the hearing on 12 October 2005, had cost EUR 4,247.78.


205.  The applicant submitted that in stating that his actions were “punishable under the Russian criminal legislation” the Russian authorities had declared him guilty before trial, which was further proved by the reply of the Russian Prosecutor General's Office of 30 December 2009, stating that it “had granted their Tajikistani counterpart's request for the applicant's  <mask> with a view to prosecuting him in connection with his participation in a prohibited religious organisation”. In the applicant's opinion, the wording used by the Russian authorities was even capable of influencing the Tajik courts.


162.  The Government contended that the applicant’s complaint should be rejected as unsubstantiated as he had been able to obtain a review of his detention. In particular, they pointed out that in its decision of 18 March 2009 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court had examined the applicant’s complaint. In addition, in their decisions of 2 February 2009 and 25 August 2009 the domestic courts had examined the applicant’s complaints and acknowledged that his detention pending  <mask> had been unlawful. The Government did not comment on the issue of the speediness of the judicial review of the applicant’s complaints.


131.  The applicants further noted that the Russian courts had denied the applicability of Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to detention pending  <mask> and had ruled that Russian law did not establish any time-limits for such detention or any procedure for its extension. The applicants argued that the absence of such a procedure had rendered their detention arbitrary and unlawful.


106.  The applicants maintained that they had argued before the Russian authorities that there existed a real risk of their ill-treatment and political persecution in Uzbekistan. They had submitted reports on Uzbekistan by the UN institutions and international NGOs, confirming that torture was widespread in detention facilities and that individuals charged in connection with the Andijan events were at an increased risk of ill-treatment. That information had not received proper assessment from the Russian authorities. They had rejected the applicants' arguments without giving any reasons except a reference to the assurances given by the Uzbek authorities. The applicants submitted that the Uzbek authorities had given the same assurances in the  <mask> proceedings of four Uzbek nationals from Kyrgyzstan and that those assurances had proved to be ineffective (see paragraph 78 above). As the Uzbek authorities refused to give representatives of the international community access to the extradited individuals, it was not possible to monitor their compliance with the assurances. Given the administrative practice of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan, the assurances by the Uzbek authorities were not reliable.


23.  The Government argued that the case was complicated as it concerned murder, involved two defendants both of which had to be extradited from different European countries, and the questioning of numerous witnesses. They contended that under the circumstances of the case, the authorities had acted with sufficient speediness and diligence. The proceedings were handled speedily at the court phase. They argued that the applicant should be held responsible for the delay until 1996, caused by his absconding and his  <mask> from the Czech Republic.


65.  The Government pointed out that in normal circumstances they complied with the measures indicated by the Court. Their failure to do so in the instant case was owed to the fact that the applicant had requested the interim measure too late, and had not given the Spanish authorities time to take the necessary steps to avoid the  <mask>. The application had been made on 6 August, whereas the applicant’s transfer was scheduled for the next day. The Government considered that there was no violation of Article 34 where, as in the instant case, they were given less notice than could objectively be considered necessary and reasonable.


64.  The Government argued that Article 3 was not to be construed in a way that would engage the extraditing State’s responsibility indefinitely. The State’s responsibility should end once the extradited person had been found guilty and had started to serve his or her sentence. It would be straining the language of Article 3 intolerably to hold that by surrendering a suspect in accordance with the terms of an  <mask> agreement, the extraditing State had subjected him to the treatment or punishment he received after his conviction and sentence in the receiving State. Such a decision would interfere with rights under international treaties and conflict with the norms of international judicial process, as it would entail adjudication on the internal affairs of foreign States that were not Parties to the Convention. There was a risk that it would cause serious harm to the Contracting State by restricting its ability to cooperate in the fight against international terrorism and organised crime.


175.  The applicant did not submit any claims for pecuniary damage. As regards non-pecuniary damage, he submitted that he had endured stress, frustration and anguish as a result of the high risk of being subjected to torture if extradited to Uzbekistan and of the eleven months of his unlawful detention pending  <mask> in inadequate conditions. He left the determination of the amount of compensation to the Court.


155.  The Government submitted that the Uzbek authorities had guaranteed that the applicants would not be prosecuted or punished for any offences committed before  <mask> which were not mentioned in the extradition request, and that they would not be ill-treated in order to obtain confessions or sentenced to death. The Government had also received assurances that the applicants' rights of defence would be respected and that they would be provided with counsel.


437.  The applicants' representatives alleged that the extradited applicants learned of their  <mask> before being driven to the airport. As the extradition orders of 2 October 2002 had not been served on them, they had been deprived of the possibility of bringing their complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention before a court. In addition, the extradition orders were not served on the applicants' lawyers before the domestic courts. The latter learned by chance on 3 October 2002 that the extraditions were imminent.


107.  The Government maintained that, as their  <mask> decision was not based on guarantees made by Rwanda but, instead, on an assessment that the extradition of the applicant – regardless of guarantees – would be consistent with Article 6, the issue of monitoring commitments was not relevant. However, in the letter of 12 August 2009 (see § 24 above), the Rwandan Minister of Justice had confirmed that Swedish authorities were welcome to monitor and evaluate the conditions of the applicant’s detention or imprisonment in Rwanda as well as his trial. While not considering that Sweden had an obligation to do so under international law, the Government stated that, due to the circumstances of the case, Sweden was prepared, if necessary, to take measures to monitor the legal proceedings and the applicant’s situation as a detainee.


149.  The Government further submitted that the domestic authorities had been obliged to hold the applicant in custody because the Strasbourg Court had applied Rule 39 and indicated to them to suspend his  <mask>. Referring to the Chahal case (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V), they stressed that paragraph 1 (f) of Article 5 of the Convention provided for a level of protection different from paragraph 1 (a)-(e), requiring only that extradition proceedings be pending. Hence, it was immaterial for that provision whether there existed sufficient grounds for holding the person in custody. Accordingly, the applicant's detention from 5 August 2008 onwards had been “lawful” within the meaning of the above provision.


156.  The applicant further argued that the domestic provisions regulating detention pending  <mask> were unclear and unforeseeable. In particular, the reply of the Prosecutor General's Office to the ombudsman acknowledged the lack of uniform judicial approach to the detention of persons pending extradition and clearly demonstrated that the domestic provisions did not satisfy the “quality of the law” requirement under the Convention. The uncertainty of the law was further demonstrated by the Prosecutor General's Office's statement that the maximum detention term of eighteen months, fixed by Article 109 of the CCrP, applied exclusively to persons detained pending extradition while the extradition check was in progress, and not to those persons in respect of whom the Prosecutor General's Office had already issued an extradition order. In the same vein, while the Government argued that Chapter 13 of the CCrP on preventive measures was to be applied to detention pending extradition, they did not take into acocunt the fact that his detention was in breach of the relevant provisions. The unsatisfactory quality of the law had made it impossible for the applicant to estimate the likely duration of his detention, which had in any event exceeded the maximum period of 18 months authorised by Article 109 of the CCrP.


126.  The Government disagreed with the applicant. They submitted that the detention and  <mask> of the applicant had been lawful and not arbitrary, as they were authorised to detain him according to the 1993 Minsk Convention and the relevant provisions of the domestic law, including section 11 § 5 of the Militia Act (see paragraphs 63 - 66 above). They repeated their arguments in the case of Soldatenko v. Ukraine (§§ 104 – 106, cited above). They further alleged that Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and (e) were not applicable to the present case as the applicant's detention had from the outset related to his extradition. The Government stated that the applicant remained in detention due to the Court's decision to suspend extradition and due to its examination of the case. Thus, they could not release the applicant and they could not extradite him.


107.  The applicant further argued that in examining his case the Russian authorities had disregarded his specific submissions concerning his religious and political persecution and relevant reports by independent NGOs, and had relied solely on “official sources of information”. The courts' conclusion that the applicant had voluntarily left Tajikistan was at variance with his consistent submissions that he had fled because of his persecution on religious grounds and the ill-treatment sustained in custody. Referring to other cases against Russia concerning expulsion and  <mask> and pending before the Court, the applicant insisted that the Russian courts consistently adopted the same formalistic approach in dealing with such complaints, which showed that the remedies suggested by the Government were ineffective in practice.


66.  The applicant pointed out that, in view of the Court’s practice in the matter, if he had requested the interim measure before 6 August, his request would have been disallowed because the date of his  <mask> had not yet been set. He was not convinced by the Government’s argument that they had not had enough time, alleging that two or three hours’ notice would have sufficed to take the necessary steps to prevent his extradition.


133.  The Government maintained that the applicants had been detained pending  <mask> to Uzbekistan pursuant to a court order issued in accordance with Article 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Their detention had therefore been lawful. The Government further noted that on 4 April 2006 the Constitutional Court had issued a decision in which it declared that the general provisions of Chapter 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were to apply to all forms and stages of criminal proceedings, including proceedings for extradition (see paragraph 85 above). The Supreme Court had noted in that respect that not only initial placement in custody, but also extensions of detention were to be ordered by a court on application by a prosecutor. However, no application for extension of detention had been made by the prosecutor in the applicants' case.


274.  The applicant complained that his application for interim liberty was not an effective remedy, noting that the respondent State had been obliged to seek his  <mask> from the Netherlands and that the application for interim release was made at the appeal stage, when he had already been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment with a tariff of twenty years. He pointed out that the court did not recognise the delay in his case as being unreasonable or in violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and contended that only by abandoning all attempts to secure a fair trial could he have achieved an early conclusion to the case.


35.  The Government contested the applicant’s allegations. They argued that the detention in question had been ordered in compliance with the  <mask> rules, as the Italian courts had found, and that its sole purpose had been for the applicant to be surrendered to the courts of the requesting State. They added that the applicant had not given his consent to the extradition, pointing out that consent would have accelerated the proceedings, and that the delay in the scheduling by the Court of Appeal of a hearing on the merits could be explained by the three applications for release that the applicant had filed within a period of three months. Lastly, they took the view that the proceedings in question, which had led the Italian authorities, both judicial and administrative, to authorise the extradition, had been conducted within the time-limits provided for by the rules of domestic and international law.


94.  The applicants’ representatives stated that, despite requests to the authorities, they had been unable to contact their clients following the latter’s  <mask>. The applicants had consequently been deprived of the possibility of having further inquiries made in order to obtain evidence in support of their allegations under Article 3. The applicants’ extradition had thus proved a real obstacle to the effective presentation of their application to the Court.


329.  The applicants' representatives also contended that the assurances provided by the Russian authorities to their Georgian counterparts had no value and that the undertakings given to the Court by the Russian Government were no more than signed pieces of paper. They pointed out that the CPT itself had stated in one of its statements that Russia was failing to respect the undertakings that it had signed (see paragraph 267 (e) above). In their opinion, the Georgian authorities had not ensured that the assurances provided had any real value. On the contrary, they had actively cooperated with their Russian counterparts to facilitate the extraditions. Thus, they had sent photographs of the applicants which were subsequently used to support the  <mask> request, and had kept the Russian authorities informed of changes in the applicants' identities. Assisted in this way, the Russian authorities had “updated” their extradition request, altering the applicants' names to reflect the changes in identification. The Georgian authorities had not taken the measure of either the political nature of the accusations made against the applicants by the Russian authorities or the latter's clear bias in the disputed extradition proceedings. They had not required any prima facie evidence of those accusations. The letters referred to by the Georgian Government (see paragraph 324 above) did not contain a guarantee that the applicants would not be sentenced to death, but simply an assurance that a moratorium was in force in Russia.


107.  The Government submitted that the  <mask> costs had not been related to the substance of his complaints to the Court. Ms Orozalieva’s fees in connection with the Strasbourg proceedings were not to be reimbursed because she had never been officially appointed as his representative before the Court. As to Ms Moskalenko’s fees, the Government submitted that the applicant had failed to produce any documents showing that these amounts had actually been paid.


87.  The applicant contested this view. In particular, he submitted that he had complained about his unlawful detention and  <mask> to the domestic courts. The applicant further stressed that the GPO of Ukraine decision of 27 September 2004 to extradite him had constituted a final decision for the purpose of exhaustion of domestic remedies. It was not amenable to appeal as to its lawfulness, as the domestic courts were allowed to review only the existence of the formal grounds for extradition and not the compliance of a decision to extradite with the obligations set out in Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. In that respect, he referred in particular to Resolution no. 8 of the Plenary Supreme Court of 8 October 2004 on issues related to the application of legislation governing the procedure and length of detention (arrest) of persons awaiting extradition, which summarised the domestic courts' practice on extradition issues.


158.  The applicants submitted that in his decisions to extradite the applicants the First Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation had unambiguously stated that the applicants had “committed” certain criminal offences. The  <mask> decision had been sent to the Prosecutor General's Office of Uzbekistan and had been included in the applicants' criminal files. The prosecutor's statements might influence the Uzbek courts and serve as evidence of the applicants' guilt. Therefore, their right to be presumed innocent had been violated.


29.  The applicant further submitted that there existed the administrative practice of substituting expulsion for  <mask> which was based on an unpublished order of the Moscow Region prosecutor, no. 86/81 of 3 July 2009, which provided that in every case of release of a detained individual because his extradition was impossible, it was mandatory to decide on his administrative expulsion from Russia. The applicant therefore maintained that his expulsion had been ordered to secure his rendition to the Uzbekistani authorities, that is to prevent him from being released and to secure either expulsion or extradition, as the case might be, and that his allegations of the risk of ill-treatment had not been thoroughly examined in the administrative expulsion proceedings.


107.  The applicants further asked the Court not to limit its examination to the establishment of the Government's failure to assess properly the risk of ill-treatment before taking the  <mask> decision. They argued that they had submitted sufficient information for the Court to rule that their extradition to Uzbekistan would be incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention. As additional proof of an increased risk of ill-treatment, they had produced a list of their relatives and business partners who had been convicted to long terms of imprisonment in connection with the Andijan events. They also maintained that the Uzbek authorities knew about their application for asylum and their application before the Court, which had further intensified the risk of torture.


117.  The Government submitted that the applicant did not raise his complaint about the lack of legal representation for an initial period of 13 months before the domestic courts. The applicant’s ex officio lawyer was informed of the bill of indictment on 16 March 2001 and he made no requests for additional time to study the case file. Upon  <mask>, the applicant was promptly informed of the charges against him. He reserved the right to appoint a lawyer of his choosing. At the hearing on the validation of his arrest, he decided to represent himself.


106.  The applicant claimed an unspecified amount for the costs incurred in connection with the  <mask> proceedings in Switzerland. Relying on documentary evidence, he further claimed 25,400 Russian roubles (RUR) for his representation before the domestic courts by Ms Moskalenko, and RUR 28,800 and RUR 28,925 for his representation in Strasbourg by Ms Moskalenko and Ms Orozalieva respectively. He further claimed the equivalent of USD 6,044.14 which he had spent on personal hygiene articles and food during his detention.


427.  The Government do not dispute that the applicants' lawyers were denied access to the  <mask> files. Having regard to the argument relied on in this connection by Mr Mskhiladze (see paragraph 177 above), the Court has no doubt that the employees of the Procurator-General's Office themselves needed to carry out a detailed examination of the documents submitted by the Russian authorities. However, this ground does not in itself justify refusing the applicants all access to documents which had direct repercussions on their rights and on which the exercise of the remedy set out in Article 5 § 4 of the Convention was contingent. The Court does not accept the Government's argument that, since the right not to be extradited is not guaranteed by the Convention, it was not the task of the Procurator-General's Office to grant the applicants access to the case files concerning their extradition (see paragraph 395 above). It points out that, while Article 5 § 2 does not require that the case file in its entirety be made available to the person concerned, the latter must nonetheless receive sufficient information so as to be able to apply to a court for the review of lawfulness provided for in Article 5 § 4 (see Fox, Campbell and Hartley, cited above, § 40; and Čonka, cited above, § 50).


150.  The Government disagreed, stating that such an effective procedure existed in the Ukrainian domestic law. They referred to Articles 106, 165-2 and 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which specified the procedure for examining appeals against preventive measures. They further maintained that on 8 October 2004 the Plenary Supreme Court had adopted a practice recommendation concerning review of complaints concerning  <mask> matters.


388.  The applicants' representatives claimed that their clients had never officially been detained with a view to their  <mask> and that their placement in custody on 6 and 7 August 2002 was a disguised form of detention for the purpose of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. Their transfer on those dates from the civilian hospital to prison (the prison infirmary in the case of Mr Margoshvili) was the result of a visit to Georgia on 6 August 2002 by the Russian Procurator-General, who had brought with him the request for the applicants' extradition (see paragraphs 58-60 and 62 above). Quite apart from the requirement of promptness set out in Article 5 § 2 of the Convention, the applicants were not informed either during their transfer to prison or subsequently that they had been arrested with a view to being handed over to the Russian authorities. The applicants had thus been deprived of the possibility of challenging the lawfulness of that detention. Submitting the same complaints, Mr Khadjiev relied on Article 5 § 2 and Article 6 § 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 235 above). He also complained that he had been questioned without an interpreter at the civilian hospital and that he had not been informed of the accusations against him when he was brought before a judge on 6 August 2002 (see paragraph 58 above).


107.  The applicant maintained that he had argued before the Russian courts that he faced a real risk of ill-treatment and political persecution in Uzbekistan. He had submitted reports on Uzbekistan by the UN institutions and international NGOs confirming that torture was widespread in detention facilities and that this information had not received proper assessment by the Russian authorities. He pointed out that the courts had rejected his arguments without giving any reasons except a reference to the assurances given by the Uzbek authorities. Finally, he referred to a number of cases examined by the Court in which it had been established that  <mask> to Uzbekistan of a person sought for political crimes would constitute a violation of Article 3.


134.  The Government insisted that Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which established time-limits for detention during a criminal investigation, was not applicable to persons held in custody with a view to  <mask>. There was no other legal provision that established time-limits for detention pending extradition. In the applicants' case, the custodial measure had been applied for the period which had been necessary for a decision on extradition to be taken. The applicants themselves had contributed to the prolongation of their detention by filing applications for refugee status and subsequently contesting the refusals before the Russian courts. During that entire period the applicants had enjoyed refugee status and their extradition had been prohibited by Russian law.


127.  The applicant maintained that the requirements of Article 5 § 1 did not dispense the State from fulfilling its international obligations regarding  <mask>, since such a ground for detention was clearly provided for in Article 5 § 1(f), which only required the detention to be in accordance with a procedure prescribed by the domestic legislation. The applicant submitted that the Minsk Convention did not provide for such a procedure. He further stated that his detention, from the moment of his apprehension on 23 August 2004 until the present date, lacked a legal basis, had been groundless and in breach of the procedure prescribed by law. He stated that his detention until 16 September 2004 should fall within the ambit of Article 5 § 1(c) of the Convention and after that date – it should be examined under Article 5 § 1(f).


155.  The applicant initially complained under Article 5 § 5 that he did not have an enforceable right to compensation as regards the violation of his rights under Article 5 §§ 1(c), (e) and (f), 2, 3 and 4 of the Convention. In particular, he mentioned that domestic law made no provision for compensation for unlawful detention pending  <mask>. Article 5 § 5 provides:


130.  The applicants submitted that Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure set the initial time-limit for detention at two months. As no extension of the applicants' detention had been ordered after the expiry of the two-month time-limit, the applicants' subsequent detention had been unlawful. The applicants referred in that respect to the Government's submissions in which it had been confirmed that the detention pending  <mask> was to be extended following the procedure established by Russian law for the extension of detention during the investigation and that that procedure had not been respected in the applicants' case (see paragraph 133 below).


129.  The applicant observed that he had been detained in Germany with a view to  <mask> from 22 September to 22 November 1999, a period of sixty-two days. If the Italian authorities had attempted to contact him in Germany at his officially registered address, that deprivation of liberty would not have occurred. He submitted that redress for the damage and inconvenience caused by his detention should be afforded at a rate of 100 euros (EUR) per day, and accordingly claimed a total sum of EUR 6,200.


53.  The Government submitted that land consolidation proceedings were complex by nature and involved a large number of parties in the instant case. The issuance of decrees on groundwater protection and of a regional development scheme concerning the  <mask> of sand and gravel of 21 November 1990 and 11 July 1994, respectively, increased its complexity. Nevertheless, the Austrian authorities conducted them expeditiously, whereas the applicant made use of all remedies available.


118.  The Government, the applicant and the third party further referred to their arguments with respect to the Government's objection as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. In particular, the third party stated that there were no effective remedies to complain about  <mask> contrary to Articles 2, 3 or 6 of the Convention. They maintained that the law at issue was not sufficiently accessible and precise, failing to avoid risks of arbitrariness. They referred in contrast to the experiences of Poland and the United Kingdom in this area, where the courts, as opposed to the prosecutor's office rule, on requests for extradition. They stated that the courts in the United Kingdom, acting under the Extradition Act 2003, assessed the following issues in assessing the requests for extradition: (a) the rule against double jeopardy; (b) extraneous considerations (whether a person was in fact extradited for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing him on account of his race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions, or whether if extradited he might be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions); (c) passage of time; (d) the person's age; (e) hostage-taking considerations; (f) specialty; (g) the person's earlier extradition to the United Kingdom from different territories; (h) human rights considerations arising from the 1998 Human Rights Act.


28.  The applicant submitted that he had raised the issue of his risk of being subjected to ill-treatment if returned to Uzbekistan in the  <mask>, expulsion and refugee-status proceedings, advancing a number of specific arguments, such as an increased risk of ill-treatment of persons who were, as was the applicant, accused of participation in a banned religious activity. The Russian courts failed to analyse the nature of the charges against the applicant, disregarded the link between the charges and the risk of ill-treatment and did not examine the information from various international organisation and from the Court’s judgments. The applicant rejected the Government’s argument that the decision on his administrative removal did not necessarily mean that he would be expelled to Uzbekistan. No other possibility had ever been discussed in the course of the administrative proceedings and, furthermore, there was no reason to believe that any other country would be willing to accept him. His placement in the detention facility foreclosed the possibility of his voluntary and independent departure from Russia and prevented him from choosing the country of destination.


150.  The Government did not contest that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 9 of the Convention. They maintained however that the measure was prescribed by law and served a legitimate aim, that is, the  <mask> and the rights of others. It was also proportionate, taking into account that the applicant was a teacher of religion by profession, who could have exercised his religion without the church attendances in question.


131.  The Government also relied on the  <mask> as a ground for the applicant’s detention. Indeed, the Court has previously accepted that, by reason of their particular gravity and the public reaction to them, certain offences may give rise to public disquiet capable of justifying pre-trial detention, at least for a certain time (see I.A. v. France, 23 September 1998, § 104, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑VII, and Bouchet v. France, no. 33591/96, § 43, 20 March 2001). In exceptional circumstances – and subject, obviously, to there being sufficient evidence – this factor may therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the Convention. However, this ground can be regarded as relevant and sufficient only provided that it is based on facts capable of showing that the defendant’s release would actually prejudice public order. In addition, detention will continue to be legitimate only if public order actually remains threatened; its continuation cannot be used to anticipate a custodial sentence (see Kemmache v. France, 27 November 1991, § 52, Series A no. 218, and Tomasi v. France, 27 August 1992, § 91, Series A no. 241-A).


21.  The Government argued that Article 6 was not applicable to the present case. Firstly, the offence in question was set out in the  <mask> Act, and not in the Penal Code. The proceedings were governed by the MOA, and not the Criminal Procedure Act. Secondly, the sanction prescribed for the offence in question was a fine of between EUR 625 and EUR 1,251 and the entry of the conviction in a register of administrative offences for a period of three years. The sanction was not of a punishing nature, but was aimed at preventing the applicant from reoffending. There was no possibility of imprisonment in the present case. Finally, the Government submitted that the offence in question was of a general nature and concerned an undefined group of people.


71.  The Government further submitted that the administrative courts’ decisions finding that they lacked jurisdiction to examine the applicant’s application had not infringed his right of access to a court for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention. Pointing out that the State had a certain margin of appreciation in this sphere, they asserted that the 1986 Law did not provide for any appeal against measures relating to the execution of sentences taken in accordance with the law. Once the ordinary courts had passed sentence, the Luxembourg legislature, which had not followed the French example of instituting a post-sentencing judge, sought to ensure that the implementation of that judicial decision was not controlled by the courts, and entrusted this task to the executive. This division of powers pursued a legitimate aim, namely the  <mask> and the prevention of crime. In that connection the Government stated that, while the 1986 Law was aimed at the gradual reintegration of prisoners into society, the sentence was designed to protect society from an individual who was liable to commit further offences outside prison. There was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved, given that prisoners had the possibility of applying for several periods of prison leave. Lastly, the Government stressed that the 1986 Law provided for other measures benefiting prisoners in the context of the enforcement of sentences, such as the semi‑custodial regime.


149.  The applicant complained that in the criminal proceedings against him he had not been afforded adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence and have confidential meetings and discussions with his lawyers throughout his trial, that the domestic courts had failed to ensure that he could exercise his right to examine witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the  <mask> as applied to witnesses against him, and that the appeal hearings in the Supreme Court had been held in his absence. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b), (c) and (d) of the Convention, which provides as follows: