28.  The applicants submit that the injunction at issue was not  <mask>. The interference was not foreseeable because the detailed, casuistic and confusing case-law of the Austrian courts on Section 1330 of the Civil Code leads to unpredictable results. In the present case, the Austrian courts qualified the statements in the impugned article as statements of fact although, in accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, they should have qualified them as value judgments.


31.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicants' right to freedom of expression had been  <mask>, notably Article 152 of the Civil Code which governed the protection of the professional reputation of both citizens and legal entities. The domestic courts found that the facts set out in the publications were not shown to have been true and that there were no grounds to exempt the applicants from responsibility by virtue of section 57 of the Mass-Media Act.


37.  The applicant further observed that Genoa District Court had given him a custodial sentence not  <mask>, and that although he had no criminal record he had not been granted general mitigating circumstances (attenuanti generiche). The applicant alleged that he had sent his circular letter to a number of judges at Lucca District Court solely to avoid undermining the reciprocal relationships of friendship and esteem between him and those judges, and to protect himself against any distortion of the content of his letter to the CSM. He also stated that the conduct of X, who had refused any attempt to reach a friendly settlement to the dispute, had been driven by feelings of animosity towards him.


37.  The applicants complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the restrictions on their right to freedom of expression had not been  <mask> and had not been necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.'s pictures and the facts mentioned in the articles had not fallen within the protection of private life. She had not been an innocent bystander but had participated actively in the incident of 4 December 1996. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest and the information in the articles had in every respect been correct. The restrictions imposed on the applicants had been grossly disproportionate, especially in view of their obligation to pay very considerable damages.


48.  The applicants argued that the interference was not  <mask>, because the Law on non‑governmental organisations (public associations and foundations) (“the NGO Act”), being vague and imprecise, gave the Ministry of Justice an unlimited discretion to issue warnings to public associations without specifying clearly the scope of such discretion. This situation allowed the Ministry to request dissolution of an association for anything that it deemed to be a breach of the requirements of the NGO Act, even if it was relatively minor. Therefore, the NGO Act was not formulated with sufficient precision, which made it impossible to foresee, to a reasonable degree, the specific actions (or omissions) that could entail the forced dissolution of the Association.


34.  The applicant argued that his liability for the defamatory comments published on the news website, as established by the Supreme Court, was not  <mask> because there was no legal provision concerning liability of editors of web-based media. The Government submitted that the interference had a basis in domestic law and practice and referred, inter alia, to the Articles of the Penal Code, Section 26 of the Tort Law and the responsibility of the media in a democratic society.


27.  The Government submitted that the first applicant had been prosecuted under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and thus any interference had been  <mask>. They further submitted that the domestic authorities had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting national security and public order as well as preventing crime. As to the necessity of the interference in a democratic society, the Government stated that by referring to the security forces’ struggle against terrorism as a “war” in the title of the exhibition, the first applicant had disseminated propaganda in favour of the PKK. The Government further noted that members of the PKK were defined as “guerrillas” by persons who had connections with or supported the PKK, and that by referring to the deceased members of the PKK as guerrillas the first applicant had considered them heroes. The Government submitted that the first applicant had not defined the persons whose photographs had been displayed as members of a terrorist organisation. The Government also argued that the exhibition had not reflected any sociological work, and that the content of the visitors’ book showed that the first applicant had encouraged the public to participate in the terrorist organisation. The Government lastly noted that the exhibition had been held in Diyarbakır, where the authorities had to be alert to acts capable of fuelling violence.


19.  The Government acknowledged that there had been an interference with the applicant's rights under Article 10 of the Convention. They contented, however, that it was  <mask> and “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of § 2 of Article 10. They argued in the first place that the Court of Appeal considered in detail the applicant company's submissions and set out clearly why, in the present case, Mr Kabas' interest in protection of presumption of his innocence continued beyond the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against him. Furthermore, the interpretation of section 7b of the Media Act in conformity with Article 6 § 2 of the Convention called for an extensive understanding of the protection of the presumption of innocence. While there was certainly public interest in the discussion of the “police information affair”, Mr Kabas' right in the presumption of his innocence outweighed the applicant company's right to freedom of expression. In the impugned article the applicant company depicted Mr Kabas as already convicted and did not inform the reader that the charges against him had already thoroughly been examined by the Public Prosecutor's Office which had closed his file months ago. When weighing the respective interests, the domestic courts had furthermore had regard to the fact that Mr Kabas was not given the opportunity to comment. Moreover, the ex-post appraisal of the present case confirmed that the court's assessment was correct. As Mr Kreiβl and Mr Kleindienst were finally both acquitted, the alleged assistance of Mr Kabas in their criminal acts was impossible. The Government further argued that the measures taken by the Austria courts were also proportionate.


46.  The applicant submitted that the interference at issue was not  <mask>. The interference was not foreseeable because the provisions of the Civil Code 1963 and the Section 42 of the Media Act (paragraphs 23 and 26 above) could be interpreted in a number of different ways. In the present case, the Ukrainian courts qualified the statements in the impugned articles as statements of fact although, in accordance with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, they should have qualified them as value judgments.


19.  The Government contested his argument. They submitted that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression had been  <mask>, and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining national security and territorial integrity and prevention of disorder. The Government further contended that the interference had been necessary in a democratic society. They noted that in the article in question Abdullah Öcalan was referred to as “the ideological and political leader of the Kurdish movement” and the HPG, the PJA and the KONGRA-GEL were described as “facilitators of the military, political and ideological development formed under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan”. According to the Government, the publication of a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan holding a weapon demonstrated that the purpose of the publication of the article was to advocate and propagate terrorism. The Government lastly noted that the PKK was considered to be a terrorist organisation by a number of states and international organisations, such as the United Nations, NATO and the United States of America, and thus represented a serious threat not only to the internal security of Turkey but also to the international public order.


24.  The applicant newspaper agreed that the interference was  <mask> and had pursued a legitimate aim. However, it was not necessary in a democratic society because the impugned articles had merely disseminated statements made by third parties and had been part of a debate on an issue of distinct public importance, namely the management of public transport and the alleged illegal activities of public officials. The applicants had acted in good faith when publishing the article and verified the statements made by the third parties. They had considered the source to be reliable, since it was a letter addressed to the President of the country, contained many details, and official reports emanating from State transport authorities were attached to it.


23.  The Government argued that the case did not concern the applicants’ freedom of expression as such but a particular form of political expression falling within the scope of Article 11 governing freedom of assembly. They had not been prevented from expressing their political views in public or sanctioned for having done so. Rather, they had been prosecuted for deliberately disregarding the rules governing the exercise of the freedom of assembly. The restriction imposed on the applicants’ freedom of peaceful assembly had been based on section 6 of the Assembly Act and section 152 of the Act on Administrative Offences. Undisputedly, they had expressed a political opinion on public ground (which fell under the jurisdiction of the Assembly Act) although characterising their action as a form of artistic expression which, as a cultural event, would fall outside the scope of the Assembly Act, but would have been subject to an authorisation from the municipality, never obtained. The fact that the applicants had labelled their action as a “performance”, a term foreign to the Assembly Act, was irrelevant since in the domestic jurisprudence it was the aim (i.e. the joint expression of a political opinion), the venue (i.e. public ground) and the organised nature of an event which was decisive to qualify it as an “organised event” falling under section 6. Obviously, the different forms which an assembly might take or the labels attached to them by the organisers could not be enumerated with absolute precision in the law but it was not contrary to the requirement of foreseeability to define an assembly by its purpose and to clarify the scope of the law by judicial interpretation. The interference was therefore  <mask>.


54.  The applicant further contested the assertion that the interference was  <mask> and pursued a legitimate aim. Firstly, he contended that the legal basis on which the interference was grounded fell short of the requisite quality in that the court had assessed facts that were not included in the notice of termination (uzteikums). In particular, he drew the Court’s attention to the fact that even though the notice of termination referred solely to his email sent on 20 March 2010, the Riga Regional Court had reached its conclusions by relying on other events which had taken place before and after the impugned email. He also noted that it was only after the LETA news agency had published his views that his employer had found the email to be threatening and contrary to good morals.


44.  The Government acknowledged that the impugned court decisions had amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. However, the interference had been  <mask> and had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of A.L., as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. Referring to Kasabova v. Bulgaria (no. 22385/03, § 54, 19 April 2011) and Axel Springer AG (cited above, §§ 85-86, 89), the Government also claimed that the interference had been proportionate. They maintained that the States must be given a certain margin of appreciation in striking the appropriate balance between the right to freedom of expression and the right to respect for private life (Kasabova, cited above, § 60).


32.  The Government acknowledged that the decisions of the domestic courts amounted to an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression. They were of the view that that the interference was  <mask> and pursued a legitimate aim. The assertions made in the article concerned the conduct of a politician. It was accepted in the Court’s case-law that the limits of acceptable criticism were wider with regard to a politician than with regard to a private individual. Where, as in the present case, journalists considered that it was their duty to alert public opinion to an important issue in the general interest, namely the alleged acceptance of a bribe, they were under an obligation to provide a sufficient factual basis for their allegations. The domestic courts had accepted, having regard to the fact that the applicants referred in their pleadings to their freedom of expression, that they had been motivated by the protection of the general interest. Moreover, the courts had focused on the essential aspect of the case, namely on the allegations of corruption advanced by the applicants.


49.  The applicants complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the restrictions on their right to freedom of expression had not been  <mask> and had not been necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.’s name had not fallen within the protection of private life as the national courts had not declared any parts of her criminal case file secret. She had been an active participant in the incident of 4 December 1996 and had subsequently been sentenced to a fine. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest, especially in this type of case where the person concerned had been a defendant in a high-profile criminal case. Moreover, the information in the articles had been correct in every respect. The Appeal Court had not even tried to indicate on what grounds freedom of expression could have been restricted in this case. In any event, the restrictions imposed on the applicants had been grossly disproportionate, especially in view of their obligation to pay very substantial damages in the case.


31.  The applicant political party submitted that the voters’ posting photographs showing their participation in the referendum and the way they had cast their votes had constituted the expression of opinions on political matters, as protected under Article 10 of the Convention. It also maintained that providing a forum for voters to express their opinions, in the form of using a mobile telephone application, fell under the scope of the right to freedom of expression. Thus, the restriction on, and penalisation of, the use of the application had constituted an interference with its right to freedom of expression, which had neither been  <mask> nor had pursued a legitimate aim.


40.  The Government argued that the exercise of the right of freedom of expression demanded from the user some duties and responsibilities, which could be subject to restrictions and penalties as were  <mask> and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of – with respect to the present case – public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others or for maintaining the authority of the judiciary. The statements made by the applicant were broadly reported by the mass media to whom he gave a press conference.


42.  The Government accepted that the requirement for the applicants to pay damages constituted an interference with their right to freedom of expression. However, as the protection of the reputation or other rights of any physical or moral person could not be excluded from the scope of Article 10 § 2, the protection of the reputation of a Local Council could legitimately form the basis of an interference with this right. Moreover, the impugned interference was  <mask> and was necessary in a democratic society for the purpose of responding to the pressing social need of protecting the reputation of others in terms of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.


70.  The applicant argued that her message on VKontakte had not contained any calls for participation; it had simply informed the readers about her intention to hold a meeting. The domestic authorities had not, however, attempted to draw a distinction between “campaigning” and “informing”. Moreover, the District Court’s conviction judgment had contradicted its previous decision that the refusal to approve the meeting had been unlawful. The interference with the applicant’s rights had not therefore been  <mask>.


19.  The Government contested their argument. They claimed at the outset that the applicants did not have victim status, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, given that the pronouncement of their conviction had been suspended. They further submitted that the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression had been  <mask>, and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining national security and public safety as well as the prevention of disorder and crime. The Government claimed that the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression had been necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, by referring to Abdullah Öcalan as a “leading figure” and an interlocutor for the State of Turkey, the applicants had conveyed to the public the idea that their client was still active. Moreover, their statements contained expressions referring to the strategy of a terrorist organisation. Noting that the applicants had not been imprisoned or subjected to any other restrictions, the Government contended that the interference in question had therefore not been disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.


183.  The Government maintained that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. First of all, they submitted that the interference complained of had been  <mask>. It had been based on Law 7(I)/1998 and the relevant regulations. The relevant provisions were clear and their effects reasonably foreseeable, especially with the assistance of a lawyer. Secondly, the Government argued that the interference with the applicant’s right pursued legitimate aims and in particular the protection of the rights of others. In this respect, they emphasised the need to safeguard the rights and interests of viewers, including children, who were vulnerable, and to protect them from abusive practices. The Government relied on the reasoning given by the CRTA in its decisions concerning the broadcasts in question. They further highlighted the need to regulate the mass media in view of the significant influence they had on people and society at large. The measures taken by the CRTA had been necessary in securing compliance with the relevant legal provisions and regulations.


82.  The Government further submitted that the interference in question had been  <mask>. They noted in this regard that the applicant’s conviction had been based on section 23(b) of Law no. 2911 and Articles 220 § 6 and 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code. According to the Government, these provisions, and in particular Article 220 § 6 of the Criminal Code, fulfilled the requirement of “foreseeability” for the purposes of Article 11 of the Convention.


32.  The Government accepted that the decision complained of by the applicant constituted an interference with her rights guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. Nevertheless, they argued that the interference was  <mask>, namely by Articles 998-1000 of the Civil Code in force at the time. Furthermore, the interference aimed at the protection of the reputation of a third party, and was thus legitimate.


19.  The Government conceded that Article 152 of the Civil Code, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in its Resolution of 24 February 2005 (see paragraph 13 above), did not authorise an apology as a remedy in a defamation action, except in certain circumstances, for instance under the terms of a friendly-settlement agreement between the parties to a civil litigation. The Government contended, however, that before the above Resolution all other courts could interpret Article 152 differently. The Government considered with reference to that provision that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression had been  <mask> and was aimed at protecting the reputation of other persons. The fine imposed on the applicant was derisory and the obligation to make an apology could not be judged as harsh.


16.  The applicant newspaper agreed that the interference was  <mask> and had pursued a legitimate aim. However, it was not necessary in a democratic society because the impugned article had merely disseminated statements made by a third party and had been part of a debate on an issue of public interest. The impugned statement was a quote from an open letter sent to the President of the country, the Prime Minister, the Council of Europe, the OSCE Mission in Moldova, the Moldovan Centre for Human Rights and the United States Embassy in Chişinău. Beside Mr V.S., the letter referred to at least five other judges and prosecutors involved in the criminal case. Mr V.S. had never asked the newspaper for a retraction of the statement or for a right to retort. The article had been written on the basis of detailed research. The journalist had contacted the author of the open letter and interviewed her. The journalist had also obtained a legal opinion from a lawyer and studied the verbatim record of a debate in Parliament on the criminal proceedings against Ms Duca. Mr V.S. had indeed been dismissed from his position in June 2002 and appointed as a simple prosecutor. The reasons for the demotion had never been made public; however, the investigation conducted by the journalist and the fact of the demotion of Mr V.S. could have reasonably made the journalist believe that the information in the open letter was reliable.


105.  The Government did not deny that the applicant’s conviction constituted an interference with the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. They took the view, however, that this interference was  <mask>, since its legal basis lay in section 23 and sections 29 et seq. of the Act of 29 July 1881, and that it pursued a legitimate aim. On that latter point they argued that it sought to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary, and to ensure the protection of the reputation or rights of others, since the statements had been directed at judges in the exercise of their duties and also undermined the confidence of citizens in the judiciary.


28.  The Government argued that the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression had been compatible with the terms of Article 10. The interference was  <mask>, being based on Article 212 of the Criminal Code, and pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the reputation or rights of others. It was also “necessary in a democratic society”. Furthermore, the reasons advanced by the domestic courts were relevant and sufficient to justify the interference.


77.  The Government did not contest that there had been an interference with the applicant company’s freedom of expression. They submitted, however, that it was  <mask>, namely under the provisions of the Civil Code (see paragraph 47 above). It pursued the legitimate aim of protecting I.’s reputation. Protection of the rights guaranteed by Article 8 as well as protection of public servants from offensive attacks which were calculated to affect them in the performance of their duties were legitimate interests recognised in the Court’s case-law (citing Radio France and Others v. France, no. 53984/00, § 31, ECHR 2004‑II, and Janowski v. Poland [GC], no. 25716/94, § 33, ECHR 1999‑I, respectively).


69.  The applicant company argued that the interference with its freedom of expression – including its right to store information and to enable users to impart their opinions – was not  <mask>. It submitted that there was no legislation or case-law stating that an intermediary was to be considered a publisher of content which it was not aware of. On the contrary, the applicable law expressly prohibited the imposition of liability on service providers for third-party content. In this connection, the applicant company referred to the Directive on electronic commerce, the Estonian Information Society Services Act and the Council of Europe Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet. The Directive provided for limited and notice-based liability with take-down procedures for illegal content. Service providers were exempted from liability where, upon obtaining actual knowledge of illegal activities, they acted expeditiously to remove or disable access to the information concerned. Such removal or disabling of access had to be undertaken in the observance of the principle of freedom of expression and of procedures established for this purpose at national level (Recital 46 of the Preamble to the Directive). The applicant company argued that this law was indisputably formulated with sufficient precision to enable a citizen to regulate his conduct. According to the applicant company, its behaviour had been in full compliance with the applicable law as it had removed the defamatory comments the same day it had been notified by the original plaintiff.


58.  The Government submitted that the complaint under Article 10 was manifestly ill‑founded. They maintained that the restrictions on the applicant’s freedom of expression had been  <mask> (Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code) and had served the aim of maintaining the authority of the judiciary. In the long term it had also served the aim of maintaining public safety and prevention of crimes. They emphasised that the authority of the justice system, its stability and credibility were of essential value in maintaining public order and combating crimes. These restrictions had been necessary within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention in order to maintain the authority and the credibility of the justice system (cf. Skałka v. Poland, no. 43425/98, § 40, 27 May 2003).


36.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant's freedom of expression was  <mask> and pursued a legitimate aim, to which it was proportionate. In particular, they pointed out that the applicant had been acquitted and that there was no evidence that he had paid the damages or court fees imposed (they referred to Stângu v. Romania (dec.), no. 57551/00, 9 November 2004, and Stângu and Scutelnicu v. Romania, no. 53899/00, 31 January 2006). Moreover, the amounts imposed by the court had been moderate.


22.  The Government submitted that under Article 11 of the Convention the right of assembly was not an absolute right and therefore could be subjected to restrictions. In Hungary, the possibility of interfering with that right was laid down in an Act of Parliament. The holding of certain assemblies and meetings on public areas must be notified three days ahead. Under section 11(2) of the Assembly Act, the police were empowered to remove from the venue those who disturbed the assembly. In the course of securing an assembly, a police officer might, upon the well-founded suspicion of an administrative or criminal offence, apprehend the perpetrator; under section 142(2) b) of Act no. LXIX of 1999 on Administrative Offences, disobedience was punishable with a fine. Thus, the applicant’s right to freedom of assembly had been restricted in compliance with the conditions  <mask>.


22.  The Government argued that the interference was justified under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. It was  <mask>, namely by Section 6 of the Media Act and Section 111 of the Criminal Code. It pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the reputation or rights of others, protecting in particular Mr Paarhammer’s reputation and the rights of the Salzburg Roman Catholic population against attacks on their religious beliefs and institutions. It was also necessary in a democratic society for the following reasons: Eight years after the election of the Salzburg archbishop there was no strong public interest in receiving the information at issue. The Government, referring to the case of Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria (judgment of 26 April 1995, Series A no. 313), argued that the margin of appreciation accorded to Contracting States was a wide one and that church-related matters were not part of a general political debate. The domestic courts had correctly found that the applicant company had not submitted facts proving the truth of the allegations at issue. It had failed to comply with the ethics of journalism, had not acted in good faith as it had not verified the origin of that document, nor had it given the person concerned an opportunity to comment. In balancing the conflicting interests, namely the applicant company’s interest in the publication of the statements in question and that of the general public in receiving this information, on the one hand, and Mr Paarhammer’s interest and that of the Catholic population in protecting the reputation of a dignitary of the Church, on the other, the Austrian courts had given priority to the interests of the latter. Since the applicant company was ordered to pay a moderate amount of approximately EUR 2,180, the interference was not disproportionate either.


31.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim as the proceedings against him had ended, due to being time-barred. They therefore considered that there had been no interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. Alternatively, they submitted that the applicant had been prosecuted pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and thus the interference, if any, was  <mask>. They further submitted that the domestic authorities had pursued the legitimate aims of protection of national security, territorial integrity and public safety as well as prevention of crime. As to the necessity of the interference in a democratic society, the Government stated that they were aware of the Court’s case-law in that field. They nevertheless noted that the applicant had been convicted of generating propaganda in favour of the PKK, an organisation which was considered to be a terrorist organisation by a number of international organisations and states, such as the United States of America, the United Nations, the NATO and the European Union.


20.  The applicant maintained that his criminal conviction for the protest of 29 January 2013 had amounted to an interference with his right to freedom of expression. He argued that the interference had not been  <mask> because Article 287 of the Criminal Code had not been applicable to his situation and that it had not been necessary in a democratic society.


48.  The applicant submitted that the decision ordering her to reveal her source was an interference under Article 10 which was not  <mask>. It followed from Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that journalists could not be obliged to do so. The wording contained no exception for situations in which the source was allegedly known, and no domestic case-law supported a different interpretation. The fact that a person had stated that he was the source, or a court’s own assessment of whether this was probable, could not – according to Article 125 – oblige the journalist to confirm or disprove the identity of the source.


36.  The Government did not dispute the fact that there had been an interference. They argued that it was  <mask>, namely by the decree of 27 November 1991 organising the legal profession, and that it pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or the rights of others; in addition, the proceedings against the applicant had been such as to “maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”. Further, the interference had met a pressing social need and had been proportionate to the aims pursued.


22.  The Government agreed that there had been an interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression, but submitted that the interference had been  <mask>, had pursued a legitimate aim and had been necessary in a democratic society. The applicant had defamed V.P., not only in the letter addressed to the Prosecutor's Office, the President of Moldova and the Speaker of Parliament but also by spreading defamatory rumours amongst the villagers. The Government relied on the testimonies of witnesses called in the domestic proceedings by V.P. (see paragraph 11 above).


38.  The applicant contended that the restriction of inmates’ use of the Internet in prison was not  <mask>. The legislation relied on by the Government, namely point 6 of Annex 1 to the Code of the Execution of Sentences (see paragraph 30 above), which explicitly prohibited prisoners from having telephones and other means of communication such as radios, could not be regarded as formulated with sufficient precision to be foreseeable and therefore as meeting the Court’s standards. The fact that none of the legal rules clearly and unambiguously stated that prisoners may not be granted access to the Internet was further supported by the fact that Article 96 of the Code of the Execution of Sentences allowed prisoners to use computers and radios (see paragraph 29 above). The Government themselves stated that the restriction on Internet use by prisoners was only implicit, and was derived systemically from the regime applicable to prisoners per se.


21.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression had been  <mask>, notably Article 152 of the Civil Code. It had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of others, namely Regional Prosecutor B., and was necessary in a democratic society. They referred to the judgment of the District Court, which had established that the applicant had failed to show that his allegations were true. The penalty imposed on the applicant had not been severe.


78.  The applicant company submitted that the NTRC was obliged under the law to inform it of the reasons for denying it a licence. The mere presence of its representative during the presentation of competitive bids and a points-based vote which, moreover, indicated only a total score did not constitute proper provision of a reasoned decision. The NTRC's letters announcing the outcome of the calls for tenders could not be considered as notification of reasons either, since they failed to state the grounds for the relevant decisions but simply announced them. By failing to provide reasons for its decisions explaining the assessment of the competitive bids, the NTRC made it impossible to establish whether the licensing criteria contained in section 50 of the Broadcasting Act were met when it awarded broadcasting licences. This rendered the licensing process arbitrary and not as  <mask>.


31.  The Government agreed that the judgments of the domestic courts had constituted an interference with the applicant company’s freedom of expression. However, they considered that the interference had been  <mask>, being based on the relevant provisions of the Civil Code and the Information Act. It had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of others.


42.  The Government pointed out that the possibility of terminating a contract of employment in the event of attacks on the employer or workers was  <mask> and pursued a legitimate aim: the protection of the reputation of others. The Spanish courts had considered that the applicants had gone beyond the limits inherent in the exercise of their freedom of expression, to the extent of damaging the reputation of the employer and of other workers. The comments had not been published in the media but in the confined environment of a company, and concerned individuals working there, namely the human resources manager and work colleagues, that is to say persons with no public duties. The extent of acceptable criticism when directed against a private individual was narrower than that directed against authorities or public institutions (contrast Dink v. Turkey, nos. 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 and 7124/09, § 133, 14 September 2010). That context had aggravated the damage caused by the newsletter to the reputations of the persons concerned, since all its potential addressees knew the individuals who were criticised or caricatured.


84.  The Government argued that there had been no interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression under Article 10. They claimed in this connection that the petitions that had been the subject matter of the criminal proceedings in the instant case had been submitted as part of a collective action organised by the PKK, a terrorist organisation, as could be seen from their virtually identical wording and the timing of their submission. In these circumstances, the criminal investigation initiated in relation to those petitions had been  <mask> and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of the prevention of disorder. They also argued that even if an interference were to be found on the facts, the applicants had been acquitted at the end of the criminal proceedings and there had therefore been no violation of their right to freedom of expression.


46.  The Government argued that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had been compatible with the terms of Article 10. The interference was  <mask>, being based on Article 212 of the Criminal Code and pursued a legitimate aim, i.e. the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The statement that the mayor had put “extralegal pressure on the prosecution service” was directed against his personal dignity and had debased him.


20.  The applicant submits that his conviction amounted to an interference with his right to be free to exercise his religion together with all those who turned to him for spiritual guidance. He further considers that his conviction was not  <mask>. In this respect he affirms that the Treaty of Peace of Athens remains in force. The Greek Prime-Minister accepted that at the Diplomatic Conference leading to the 1923 Treaty of Peace of Lausanne. Moreover, the Court of Cassation has recently confirmed the continued validity of the Treaty of peace of Athens and legal scholars hold the same view. The Muslims had never accepted the abrogation of Law no. 2345/1920. The applicant lastly contends that his conviction was not necessary in a democratic society. He points out that the Christians and Jews in Greece have the right to elect their religious leaders. Depriving the Muslims of this possibility amounts to discriminatory treatment.


33.  The Government contested this complaint. While they accepted that the above measures constituted an interference with the applicant company's rights under Article 10 § 1 of the Convention, they argued, however, that the interference was  <mask>, pursued the legitimate aim of protecting effectively the reputation or rights of others and was proportionate to the aim pursued. The Government referred in this regard to the domestic courts' findings which they considered relevant and sufficient. The Government in particular pointed out that, while the underlying expert opinion in itself basically was a value judgment, the impugned article did not refer to the matter as a legal dispute but built the expert opinion up to an irrevocable verdict on the Carinthian Governor. Thus, the article did not mention the existence of a counter-expert opinion. Moreover, as regards the distortion of the expert opinion, the applicant company could not prove that it had complied with its obligation to safeguard journalistic diligence as it had relied on a press release prepared by a political party whose views were known to be often contrary to those of the Carinthian Governor without examining the truth behind these statements. The Government finally argued that the interference was also proportionate as the Austrian courts merely ordered the applicant company to black out the impugned passages in the remaining issues of “Der Standard” still to be disseminated and the publication of the judgment.


50.  The Government agreed that there was an interference by a public authority with the exercise of the applicants’ freedom of expression on account of the coercive measures taken against them. In their view the interference was  <mask>. As the seizures mainly served the purpose of obtaining evidence the Freedom of the Press Act was not applicable. The conditions for the search as prescribed by the Coercive Measures Act were met, given that the investigation concerned suspected public defamation which carried a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment. It was true that the records of the coercive measures taken in the homes of Ms Soini and Ms Mikola only referred to “other investigations”. This deficiency – due to the number of different offences of which a large number of persons were suspected – was corrected in the proceedings before the District Court.


46.  The applicant went on to argue that her dismissal had not been  <mask>. The disciplinary proceedings against her had not complied with the Labour Code 1986 – a fact established by the first‑instance court – because she had not been properly asked to give explanations for her conduct and because the persons who had taken part in the proceedings had not been duly constituted disciplinary authorities. The alleged breaches of discipline to which the Government alluded in their observations had not been laid down in any statute or internal rule of the BNR; they had been breaches of non‑existent rules issued by bodies that by law did not exist. As evident from the minutes of its meeting of 5 October 1998, the editorial board had not formally resolved to bar Ms V.N. from taking part in the applicant’s show. However, even if it had done so, its resolution would have amounted to censorship and would have been invalid. The NRTC had found that the BNR’s internal rules had not clearly set out the powers of its collective bodies, and those rules did not identify clearly the roles of the various persons who were to take part in radio shows. There had therefore been no clear legal basis for holding the applicant liable.


13.  The Government contested his argument. They claimed at the outset that he did not have victim status, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, given that the pronouncement of his conviction had been suspended. The Government further submitted that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression had been  <mask>, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the State as a whole and had been necessary in a democratic society. They noted that the article in question glorified the PKK and promoted hatred, hostility and the use of arms, militancy and revenge. They lastly contended that the circumstances of the case were similar to the case of Sürek v. Turkey ((no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, ECHR 1999‑IV) in which the Court found no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.


55.  The Government acknowledged that the impugned court decisions amounted to an interference with the applicant company’s right to freedom of expression. However, the interference was  <mask> and pursued an aim recognised as legitimate by the Court, namely, the protection of the private sphere (News Verlags GmbH & Co.KG v. Austria, no. 31457/96, § 44, ECHR 2000‑I). The question at issue between the parties in the present case was whether the interference had been proportionate, and in particular whether the balancing exercise undertaken by the national courts of the applicant company’s right to freedom of expression against X’s right to respect for his private life was in conformity with the criteria established by the Court’s case-law. In that connection regard had to be had to the role of the person concerned, the purpose of the publication and the severity of the sanction imposed on the press.


104.  The Government submitted that, if the Court were to conclude that there had been an interference with the applicant's right to freedom of peaceful assembly, this interference was  <mask>. The applicant blocked Mashtots Avenue with a group of people and, by doing so, violated public order, which was qualified as minor hooliganism and fell within the ambit of Article 172 of the CAO.


94.  The Government submitted that by organising an unauthorised public event, the applicant had committed an administrative offence. The police had warned her that the public event had been unlawful and had demanded that it be stopped. She had not complied. She had also refused to go to the police station. Her escorting to the police station and her administrative arrest had therefore been justified by the need to stop the administrative offence and to hold her liable. Both the escorting and the arrest had been performed in accordance with the procedure  <mask>. She had been released as soon as all the requisite procedural documents had been drawn up. The length of her arrest had been within the statutory limits: it had lasted for four hours and fifteen minutes, which had subsequently been deducted from her penalty.


85.  The Government did not contest that the impugned judgments constituted an interference with the applicant company’s rights under Article 10 of the Convention and submitted that it had been  <mask>, in particular by the relevant provisions of the Civil Code, that it had followed the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of others and that it had been necessary in a democratic society.


46.  The applicant complained under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention that the allegedly arbitrary denial of Latvian citizenship through naturalisation was a punitive measure imposed on him because he had imparted ideas and exercised his right of assembly in order to criticise the government’s position. He further complained that the aforementioned infringements of his rights, contrary to the requirements of Article 10 § 2 and Article 11 § 2 of the Convention, were not  <mask>, did not pursue a legitimate aim and were disproportionate and not necessary in a democratic society. Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention read as follows.


34.  The Government maintained that the interference was  <mask> and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of others. They referred to case-law in which the Court had presupposed that a public body could also fall within “the protection of the reputation or rights of others”, for example, Romanenko and Others v. Russia, cited above, § 39; Lombardo and Others v. Malta, no. 7333/06, §§ 50 and 54, 24 April 2007; and Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992, Series A no. 239. They further contended that since it was recognised that the reputation of the police may be a legitimate aim, the same should apply to several other public bodies. The conditions at a public hospital constitute an issue of considerable public interest and entail a need for wider limits for public scrutiny, but this is partly for other reasons than for a public body exercising power in the traditional sense. Public interest may therefore be deemed to be interconnected with the relevance of the activities of the hospital to the life and health of individuals. Allegations made on a factually incorrect basis will affect the patient’s confidence in the treatment offered and may weaken the possibilities of the hospital to function in an optimal manner. In addition, it would amount to unfounded arbitrariness in the protection of the health interests of the contracting States if they were to have the possibility of interfering with attacks on the reputation of private hospitals but not of public hospitals.


38.  The applicants submitted that the manner in which the NRTC had applied its criteria for evaluating candidates for broadcasting licences had been arbitrary. Firstly, those candidates had had no direct contact with the NRTC, which had engendered delay and confusion. Secondly, the points system adopted by the NRTC had not been properly operated. It was natural to expect that each candidate would be allotted a certain number of points, that later a ranking would be made, and that the candidate obtaining the highest number of points would be granted a licence. However, the NRTC had eschewed such allotting of points, instead merely informing the candidates that they would or would not be granted a licence. The procedure followed had not been public and transparent. The NRTC had not disclosed the reasons for its decisions and the candidates had not been told why some of them had been approved and others not. Their evaluations had never been made public. These deficiencies had not been addressed or remedied in the ensuing judicial review proceedings, which had deprived judicial review of all practical meaning. For all these reasons, the applicants were of the view that the interference with their freedom of expression had not been  <mask>.


24.  The applicant noted that there was no dispute over whether there had been an interference with her right to freedom of expression. She agreed that the interference had been  <mask>, even if she contended that Chapter 24, section 8, of the Penal Code failed to meet the standards of the Court’s case-law. The applicant also claimed that the interference had not been necessary in a democratic society. There had to be a pressing social need for the interference.


44.  The applicants contested the Government’s view that the interference was  <mask>. They stressed that the impugned article concerned a public trial. The District Court had held at least nine hearings before the impugned article was published. The applicants were surprised that neither the Government nor the Supreme Court had mentioned the principle of the public nature of legal proceedings, given that the case related exclusively to the disclosure of the identity of a defendant in such proceedings. Finnish legislation contained no provision which required the accused person’s consent prior to publication of his or her name or picture. At the relevant time the Constitution Act had not included a separate provision on the protection of privacy. The defendant’s identity in a trial had never before been considered as belonging to a person’s private life within the meaning of Chapter 27, Article 3a, of the Penal Code, and this principle still applied to public legal proceedings. For example, in its decision no. 2005:136 the Supreme Court majority had reached the opposite conclusion with regard to the publication of a convicted person’s name, ruling that “a criminal offence is not the private matter of the individual who committed the offence”. In the applicants’ view, the Government defined the concept of private life too broadly when they claimed that information was part of private life unless specifically found otherwise. This claim contradicted the provisions of the Public Nature of Court Proceedings Act.


36.  The Government averred that the interference with the applicant's freedom of expression was  <mask> and pursued a legitimate aim, to which it was proportionate. In particular, they pointed out that the applicant had been acquitted and that there was no evidence that he had paid the damages or court fees imposed (they referred to Stângu v. Romania (dec.), no. 57551/00, 9 November 2004; and Stângu and Scutelnicu v. Romania, no. 53899/00, 31 January 2006). Moreover, the amounts imposed by the court had been moderate.


115.  The applicant company submitted that the refusal to allocate it any broadcasting frequencies amounted to interference with the exercise of its rights under Article 10 § 1 of the Convention (Meltex Ltd and Movsesyan, cited above, and Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov, cited above). The interference had not been  <mask>, as required by the Convention, on account of the unforeseeability of the transitional legislation passed by the national parliament. The applicant company further pointed out that the Italian courts had applied the legislation in question and had found that compensation should be calculated with effect from 1 December 2004, contrary to what the ECJ had held in its judgment.


50.  The applicant disagrees with the Government’s arguments. He submits that his conviction amounted to an interference with his right to be free to exercise his religion together with all those who turned to him for spiritual guidance. He further considers that his conviction was not  <mask>. In this respect he affirms that the Treaty of Peace of Athens remains in force. The Greek Prime-Minister accepted that at the Diplomatic Conference leading to the 1923 Treaty of Peace of Lausanne. Moreover, the Court of Cassation has recently confirmed the continued validity of the Treaty of peace of Athens and legal scholars hold the same view. The Muslims had never accepted the abrogation of Law no. 2345/1920. The applicant lastly contends that his conviction was not necessary in a democratic society. He points out that the Christians and Jews in Greece have the right to elect their religious leaders. Depriving the Muslims of this possibility amounts to discriminatory treatment.


33.  The Government claimed that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies in respect of the decision of 7 April 2003, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. According to Article 286 of the CAO, the court's decision to impose an administrative penalty was final and not subject to appeal except for the cases  <mask>. Such an exception in respect of cases concerning offences under Article 172 of the CAO was provided by Article 294 of the CAO. This Article prescribed two possibilities to have the court's decision quashed, either by requesting the prosecutor to lodge a protest or by lodging an appeal directly with the chairman of a superior court. Thus, if a party had applied to a prosecutor but the latter refused to lodge a protest, then this party was entitled to appeal to the chairman of a superior court. Moreover, a party was entitled to appeal immediately to the chairman of a superior court without having first applied to a prosecutor. The applicant was informed about this possibility, since the decision of 7 April 2003 stated that “it was subject to review by the Chairman of the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal”. However, he used only the first of these two possibilities and did not apply to the Chairman.


115.  The applicant's conviction for publication of the second article indisputably amounted to an interference with the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. The Court accepts that this interference was  <mask>; in particular, by Articles 214.1 and 283.2.2 of the Criminal Code. For the purposes of the following analysis, the Court will also accept the Government's submission that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining public safety. Accordingly, it remains to be determined whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”.


56.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s judicial-review complaint against the refusal to approve the location of her public event had been examined before the planned date of that event and had been allowed in part. The domestic courts had found, in particular, that the town administration had failed to provide her with a well-reasoned proposal to change the location of the event. Moreover, no writ of execution had been issued. The Government further submitted that the domestic courts had had to assess whether the contested decision had been lawful and well-reasoned, and whether the procedure  <mask> for adopting it had been complied with. However, the courts had no competence to examine the “reasonableness” of any proposal to change the location.


26.  The Government maintained that compulsory military service in Turkey was necessary in order to protect national and public security. They stated that any action taken against this obligation  <mask> would amount to a provocation to disobey the law. In this connection, they noted that the applicant, by distributing the leaflet concerning the conscientious objector O.M.U in a public area, committed the offence of inciting others to evade military service.


45.  The Government said that, on the contrary, the actions of the domestic authorities had not interfered with the first applicant’s rights under Article 10. The searches had been unproductive, as the sole document seized was not one the first applicant had used as a source for his newspaper article. Any interference had, in any event, been  <mask>, namely Article 65 of the Criminal Investigation Code, and pursued the legitimate aim of preventing disorder or crime. It had also been necessary in a democratic society and was proportionate to the aim pursued. The approach followed in Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 27 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II) could not be applied in the instant case. Firstly, the first applicant had not been required to reveal his source on pain of a fine, but had merely been subjected to a search that had resulted in the seizure of a single document. Secondly, the aim pursued by the interference in the instant case was far more important than that of protecting the economic interests of a private undertaking, as in Goodwin. The investigation into an allegation of breach of professional confidence was of direct relevance to the proper functioning of public institutions. The prevention and punishment of that offence thus constituted a “pressing social need” that justified the interference.


19.  The Government conceded that there had been interference with the applicants' rights, but that it was  <mask> and sought to protect the reputation and rights of others. Furthermore, the interference had been necessary and proportionate within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Convention. The article had quoted and commented on excerpts from various Austrian newspapers. In a total of eighteen quotations it had referred to headlines and passages from various other articles reporting statements which had actually been made in connection with Hermann Maier's accident. The impugned statement, attributed to Stefan Eberharter, was the only fictitious statement amongst all those quotations. As the Austrian courts had rightly pointed out, in those circumstances only a highly concentrated reader could have been expected to realise that this passage was pure fiction with comic exaggeration. The offending statement conveyed a negative image of Mr Eberharter's person in a striking and blatant manner. Even considering the satirical nature of this statement, the limits to the guarantees under Article 10 of the Convention had clearly been transgressed as there was no factual basis for the reproach of envy and inappropriate glee. The Government also referred in this regard to the judgment in Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal (no. 37698/97, ECHR 2000‑X) and the decision in Österreichische Schutzgemeinschaft für Nichtraucher and Rockenbauer v. Austria (no. 17200/91, Commission decision of 2 December 1991, unreported). Mr Eberharter's interest in protection against statements which seriously affected his image as a sportsman had outweighed the applicants' interest in embellishing their article, which was of no particular public interest, by means of the impugned statement. Moreover, the interference with the applicants' rights had been proportionate as the fine imposed on the first applicant was a suspended penalty and the amount of compensation the second applicant had been ordered to pay was minor.


98.  The Government noted that the material that had been seized from the applicant had been likely to promote racist and anti-Turkish propaganda and promote ill-will between the two communities on the island. Any limitation of the applicant’s rights had been  <mask> and was justified under the second paragraph of Articles 9 and 10 as being necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order and for the safeguarding of national security and/or territorial integrity.


69.  The Government argued that the interference was  <mask>. Section 38(1) of the 1881 Act was an integral part of the published and accessible legislation. Moreover, case-law had established that the impugned prohibition applied to all documents from criminal case files and had set its scope, which included extracts from such documents (they cited Tourancheau and July, cited above, § 26). Lastly, the domestic courts had examined the relevant publications in the light of Article 10 of the Convention (see paragraph 47 above).


24.  The applicant association argued that the public exhibition of a painting contributed to a debate between the artist, the exhibitor and the public and was therefore protected under Article 10 of the Convention. It accepted that the impugned interference was  <mask>, but maintained that the interference had been neither necessary nor proportionate. It submitted that the Government's submissions as regards the protection of morals were irrelevant as in the present case the domestic courts had based their decisions merely on Mr Meischberger's prevailing personal interests as protected under section 78 of the Copyright Act. Mr Meischberger could not, however, claim any personal interest worth protecting as the painting obviously did not state or suggest that the way in which he was portrayed corresponded to his actual behaviour. The painting presented the artist's personal history in an allegorical way and depicted, among several other well-known persons, the painter himself and some of his friends and benefactors. All these persons were depicted engaging in sexual acts, reflecting the painter's conception of the interrelation between power and sexuality. Mr Meischberger had been one of the figures who had characterised the history of the FPÖ party in the past few years, and he had been portrayed with the other three members as an allegory of that party, which had always strongly criticised the painter's work. Furthermore, Mr Meischberger and, in any event, the actions he considered libellous were not recognisable after the painting had been partly damaged. In the applicant association's view, the fact that he had instituted proceedings only after the painting had been partly damaged demonstrated that rather than protecting his personal interests he was aiming to discredit the painter's work.


35.  The applicant association submitted, in particular, that the issue of the civil injunction was not  <mask>. The legal prerequisites of the provisions referred to by the domestic courts had not been met. It was not true that the dissemination of the film footage interfered with the C. company’s rights. Furthermore, the applicant association’s actions had not been unlawful as the applicant’s right to freedom of expression – which was, in the instant case, enforced by the constitutionally proclaimed right to animal protection – outweighed the C. company’s interests.


27.  The Government argued that were the Court to find that Article 10 was applicable and had been infringed, the interference in question was  <mask>, specifically Chapter 12 of the Land Code, and that it served the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others, including those of the landlord, other tenants and third parties. As to the question whether the measure had been “necessary” within the meaning of Article 10, they claimed that a fair balance had been struck between the landlord's right to property and its interest in maintaining order and good conditions on the property, on the one hand, and the applicants' right to receive information by means of a private satellite dish, on the other. Moreover, the proceedings had been fair at every level, the two instances involved having given extensive and detailed reasons after holding hearings and inspecting the satellite installation in question. Thus, having regard also to the margin of appreciation, the alleged interference had been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and “necessary” in terms of Article 10 § 2.


41.  The Government conceded that there had been an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression, albeit one  <mask> and pursuing the legitimate aim of the protection of the rights of others. In their view, the authorities had acted within their margin of appreciation essentially because by displaying the comments the applicants had exceeded the limits of freedom of expression as guaranteed under the Convention.


26.  The Government asserted that the interference with the applicant's freedom of expression was  <mask>, namely by Article 11 (e) of Law no. 2935 dated 25 October 1983, and that it pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and crime and protecting national security as permitted by Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. They maintained that the measure taken against the newspaper was within the authorities' margin of appreciation and that it was justified given the specific circumstances of the case. They submitted in this connection that vital interests of the State were at stake and that the decision to ban was in response to a pressing social need and was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.


33.  The Government submitted that the measure was  <mask>, namely by Section 20 § 1 of the Media Act. It was foreseeable for the applicant company. This was implicitly conceded by the applicant company as otherwise it would not have requested, on 23 September 1997, that Section 20 § 4 of the Media Act be applied by analogy. Thereby the applicant company acknowledged that this provision was not applicable as such and that only by applying Section 20 § 4 by analogy, Section 20 § 1 –which was in principle applicable – would no longer apply.


40.  The applicant complained that she had been compelled to disclose information that had enabled a journalistic source to be identified, in violation of her right to receive and impart information as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. In her submission, the interference with her freedom of expression was not  <mask>, did not pursue a legitimate aim and was not necessary in a democratic society. The applicant further asked the Court to clarify the duties of the State under this provision in these circumstances. Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows:


26.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim, as the proceedings against him had become time-barred. They therefore argued that there had been no interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. Alternatively, they submitted that the applicant had been prosecuted pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, and thus the interference, if any, had been  <mask>. They further submitted that the domestic authorities had pursued the legitimate aims of protecting public order and national security. The Government lastly submitted that the interference had been necessary in a democratic society, given that the content of the book in question had promoted hatred, hostility, the use of arms, militancy and revenge.


47.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression had been  <mask>. They referred to the Advocacy Act and the Advocate's Code of Professional Conduct. It had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of the judiciary and had been necessary in a democratic society. The penalty imposed on the applicant had not been severe. It had been proportionate to the disciplinary offence committed by the applicant.


48.  The Government conceded that the liability to pay damages amounted to an interference with the exercise of the applicants’ right to freedom of expression. The interference was nonetheless  <mask>, having a basis in Chapter 27, Article 3a, of the then Penal Code and section 10, subsection 1, of the Constitution Act in force at the material time. The grounds relied on by the Finnish courts were consistent with the legitimate aim of protecting X’s private life.


32.  The Government stressed that the applicants were convicted of the crime of agitation against a national or ethnic group, in accordance with Chapter 16 Section 8 of the Penal Code, and that all five justices of the Supreme Court reached the conclusion that this penalty was  <mask> within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.


24.  The Government contested the applicant’s argument. They claimed at the outset that the applicant did not have victim status, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, given that the pronouncement of his conviction had been suspended. They further claimed that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, given that the proceedings against him had ended with the suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment. The Government submitted that should the Court conclude that there had been an interference, that interference had been  <mask> and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining national security, territorial integrity and public safety, as well as preventing disorder and crime. The Government claimed that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression had been necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, as a politician, the applicant had showed his support for a terrorist organisation’s activities by chanting the slogans noted in the first-instance judgment. Taking into account the necessity to fight against terrorism, the Government contended that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had corresponded to a pressing social need and had been proportionate.


33.  The Government were sceptical about the applicants’ argument that the text of the second applicant’s article had made no allusion to Mr V., but had rather criticised the course of the regional election campaign and various violations committed by regional law-enforcement agencies during that campaign. In that connection, the Government contended, firstly, that the applicant had never complained to the Central Electoral Commission of Russia or to any law-enforcement body at any level of jurisdiction about the course or results of elections in the Primorksiy Region, or about any act or omission by law-enforcement agencies during those elections. According to the Government, the applicants had not attempted “to establish, in accordance with a procedure  <mask>, the credibility of their ideas concerning elections in the Primorskiy Region and the role in them of law‑enforcement agencies”. Secondly, the Government stated that the applicants could have expressed their criticism by accompanying the second applicant’s article with a photograph of “inanimate, depersonalised objects”, such as the building of the prosecutor’s office of the Primorskiy Region or the regional electoral commission, a statue of Justice in a one-dollar banknote, or they could have refrained from using any illustrations at all.


16.  The applicants agreed that the interference was  <mask> and had pursued a legitimate aim. However, it was not necessary in a democratic society because the impugned articles had merely disseminated statements made by third parties and had been part of a debate on an issue of distinct public importance, namely the management of public transport and alleged illegalities committed by public officials. The applicants had acted in good faith when publishing the article and verified the statements made by the third parties. They had considered the source to be reliable, since it was a letter addressed to the President of the country, contained many details, and official reports emanating from State transport authorities were attached to it. Of course it had been impossible for them to verify the statement according to which Mr Stepaniuc had telephoned the Minister of Public Transport.


28.  The applicant company complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the restrictions on its right to freedom of expression in its case had not been  <mask> as the Penal Code provision applied had not defined adequately the scope of private life. Nor had the restrictions been necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. B. had not been an innocent bystander but had participated actively in the incident of 4 December 1996. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest, especially since the case had been very newsworthy. Moreover, the information in the articles had in every respect been correct.


50.  The applicant’s deprivation of liberty clearly did not fall under sub‑paragraphs (a), (d), (e) or (f) of paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Convention. Nor could it be said to fall under sub—paragraph (b): there was no evidence of non‑compliance with a lawful order of a court and the applicant’s detention could not have been to secure the fulfilment of an obligation  <mask> because, at the time his arrest, there was no unfulfilled obligation on the applicant (see Vasileva v. Denmark, no. 52792/99, § 36, 25 September 2003).


25.  The applicants complained that their freedom to receive information had been breached because the restrictions imposed on them either had not been  <mask> or had been more far-reaching than necessary in a democratic society. Moreover, they claimed that the consequences – the eviction from their flat and the move to another town – had been disproportionate to the aims pursued. They relied on Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


38.  The Government submitted that the interference complained of by the applicant had been  <mask>, pursued a legitimate aim and had been necessary in a democratic society to achieve that aim. The restrictions imposed on the applicant had been necessary as they had met a pressing social need, namely the protection of the legal profession. This profession played a special role in the system of administration of justice. The decisions of the domestic courts constituted an appropriate reaction to defamatory accusations made by the applicant against advocate J.Z., accusations which had been devoid of any factual foundation and had been made in bad faith.


27.  The Government did not dispute the fact that the applicants' conviction for the offence of handling information protected by the secrecy of a judicial investigation or by a duty of professional confidence constituted interference with their right to freedom of expression. In their opinion, that interference was  <mask>, namely by Articles 226-13 and 321-1 of the Criminal Code, which fulfilled the conditions of accessibility and foreseeability required by the Court (see Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, ECHR 1999‑I). The Government considered, however, that the interference constituted a measure that was necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others and for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Without disputing the fact that the aim of the applicants' work had been to inform the general public about an affair of state that was of interest to public opinion, they considered that it prejudiced the presumption of innocence in respect of G.M. The publication of the book just a few days after the death of François Mitterrand had given it a certain commercial and media impact, thereby increasing the prejudice sustained by G.M. Moreover, the affair had been a very sensitive one and the book had contained precise reproductions of a number of documents from the case file.


31.  The Government were further of the view that the interference with the applicant's rights had been  <mask>, namely the Constitution of 1991, the Persons and Family Act of 1949 and the Political Parties Act of 1990. It had been intended to safeguard a wide range of public interests. All three levels of court had lawfully and justifiably refused to register the association.


21.  The applicant company alleged a violation of its right to freedom of expression. It submitted that the domestic courts' injunctions prohibiting it from distributing the book Le Grand Secret had not been  <mask>, had not pursued a legitimate aim and had not been “necessary in a democratic society”; it further complained that the “exorbitant” award of damages which it had also been ordered to pay had not been proportionate to the aim pursued. It relied on Article 10 of the Convention, which provides:


33.  The Government maintained that the applicants’ dismissal from their posts, following their statement of 24 February 2008, was compatible with Article 10 of the Convention. Their dismissal was  <mask> as it had been based, in particular, on section 40, subsection 1, point (j), of the Diplomatic Service Act which provided that a diplomat should be dismissed from office if he violated any of the restrictions prescribed in section 44 of the Act. One of those restrictions was that a diplomat had no right to use his official capacity and work facilities for the benefit of political parties or non‑governmental organisations, or in order to carry out other political or religious activity. Contrary to what the applicants claimed, at the relevant time the existence of a single element made the provision applicable. This Act was both accessible and foreseeable and the notions used in it were sufficiently clear. The Act had been designed to cover relations within the diplomatic service and it was thus designed for professionals. The applicants had had from 11 to 15 years’ professional experience as members of diplomatic corps. Had they been uncertain about the content of the Act, they could have sought advice from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Taking into consideration the applicants’ positions and professional experience, they had to be aware of the legal framework regulating their service, including the restrictions. They had also been well aware of the political situation in Armenia, the character of their public statement and its possible impact. The applicants could, and must, have foreseen the consequences of their statement, especially as the ambassadors who had issued the original statement had been dismissed from their posts the day before and their dismissal had been widely reported in the media.


29.  The Government submitted that the interference had pursued several of the legitimate aims listed in the second paragraph of Article 10: the protection of public safety,  <mask> or crime, and the protection of the reputation or rights of others, namely those of the victims of the crimes committed by the applicant and of their families. On the latter point, they emphasised that the applicant’s release on licence had caused much emotion not only among the victims’ families but also, more broadly, within the local population, particularly because, on the one hand, on leaving the prison the applicant had given a speech in Basque stating that his joy at being free was not complete because the French State did not recognise the Basque Country, and on the other hand, a few months later he had taken part in a demonstration in support of Basque prisoners, during which he had denounced the injustice of the situation of those political prisoners and stated that they should be released. According to the Government, therefore, the aim had been to prevent any act or comment likely to offend the victims’ families and any further criminal activity. With reference to the judgment in the case of Leroy v. France (no. 36109/03, § 36, 2 October 2008), the Government observed that in the Court’s view, the legitimacy of the aims pursued by the interference should be assessed in the light of the sensitivity of the endeavour to combat terrorism and the need for the authorities to remain vigilant about acts liable to increase the attendant violence.


41.  The Government drew attention to the Constitutional Court’s findings that the restriction at issue, having regard to the historical experience of Hungarian society, had been a response to a “pressing social need” in pursuit of the legitimate aims of the  <mask> and the protection of the rights of others. That court had been satisfied that these aims could not have been achieved by less severe means than those of the criminal law. Moreover, it had found that the restriction had been proportionate to the aims pursued since it had been limited in scope, extending only to some well-defined forms of the public use of such symbols, which entailed identification with, and the intention to propagate, the totalitarian ideologies represented by them. It had been satisfied that the use of such symbols for scientific, artistic, educational or informational purposes was not prohibited.


40.  The Government argued that the exercise of the right of freedom of expression demanded from the user some duties and responsibilities, which could be subject to restrictions and penalties as were prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of – with respect to the present case – public safety, for the  <mask> or crime, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others or for maintaining the authority of the judiciary. The statements made by the applicant were broadly reported by the mass media to whom he gave a press conference.


84.  The Government argued that there had been no interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression under Article 10. They claimed in this connection that the petitions that had been the subject matter of the criminal proceedings in the instant case had been submitted as part of a collective action organised by the PKK, a terrorist organisation, as could be seen from their virtually identical wording and the timing of their submission. In these circumstances, the criminal investigation initiated in relation to those petitions had been prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of the  <mask>. They also argued that even if an interference were to be found on the facts, the applicants had been acquitted at the end of the criminal proceedings and there had therefore been no violation of their right to freedom of expression.


176.  The applicant’s case is troubling, since his intransigence has led to his spending a substantial period of time in prison for what is – in itself – usually a relatively trivial offence (see paragraph 100 above). However, the applicant’s imprisonment is the consequence of his repeated violation of the criminal law in full knowledge of the consequences, through conduct which he knew full well not only goes against the standards of accepted public behaviour in any modern democratic society but also is liable to be alarming and morally and otherwise offensive to other, unwarned members of the public going about their ordinary business. Having regard to the considerations set out above and to the wide margin of appreciation, the Court finds that the reasons for the measures adopted by the police, the prosecuting authorities and the courts, and in particular those adopted in respect of his arrest in 2011, were “relevant and sufficient” and that the measures met a pressing social need in response to repeated anti-social conduct by the applicant. It cannot be said that the repressive measures taken in reaction to the particular, repeated form of expression chosen by the applicant to communicate his opinion on nudity were, even if considered cumulatively, disproportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued, namely the  <mask> and crime. In particular, Article 10 does not go so far as to enable individuals, even those sincerely convinced of the virtue of their own beliefs, to repeatedly impose their antisocial conduct on other, unwilling members of society and then to claim a disproportionate interference with the exercise of their freedom of expression when the State, in the performance of its duty to protect the public from public nuisances, enforces the law in respect of such deliberately repetitive antisocial conduct. Even though, cumulatively, the penalties imposed on the applicant undoubtedly did entail serious consequences for him, the Court cannot find in the circumstances of his case, having regard in particular to his own responsibility for his plight, that the public authorities in Scotland unjustifiably interfered with his exercise of freedom of expression. Accordingly, no violation of Article 10 of the Convention has been established.


25.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had been prescribed by law. They noted that the applicant’s conviction had been based on section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. The Government further contended that the interference in question had pursued the aims of protecting national security, territorial integrity and public safety as well as the  <mask> or crime.


15.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of national security and territorial integrity and the  <mask> and crime. They further submitted that the TKP/ML was a terrorist organisation, and that slogans praising that organisation had been chanted during the public gathering in question. Submitting that section 7 of Law no. 3713 had been amended in 2013, the Government left the issue of the necessity of the interference in a democratic society to the Court’s discretion.


19.  The Government contested his argument. They submitted that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression had been prescribed by law, and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining national security and territorial integrity and  <mask>. The Government further contended that the interference had been necessary in a democratic society. They noted that in the article in question Abdullah Öcalan was referred to as “the ideological and political leader of the Kurdish movement” and the HPG, the PJA and the KONGRA-GEL were described as “facilitators of the military, political and ideological development formed under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan”. According to the Government, the publication of a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan holding a weapon demonstrated that the purpose of the publication of the article was to advocate and propagate terrorism. The Government lastly noted that the PKK was considered to be a terrorist organisation by a number of states and international organisations, such as the United Nations, NATO and the United States of America, and thus represented a serious threat not only to the internal security of Turkey but also to the international public order.


113.  The Government alleged that in view of the temporary and transient nature of the “detention”, there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to her private life or home. In any event, any interference by the authorities had been in accordance with the law and necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, and for the  <mask> or crime. The authorities had not transgressed the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.


47.  The Government submitted that the banning measures provided for by the Law of 1881, as amended, and fleshed out by the subsequent case-law pursued a legitimate aim, namely the  <mask>, and were most frequently used against racist publications or publications inciting people to violence. The applicant association submitted that the provisions in question reflected discriminatory ideas based on the nationality of the authors of a publication and on language.


19.  The Government contested their argument. They claimed at the outset that the applicants did not have victim status, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, given that the pronouncement of their conviction had been suspended. They further submitted that the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression had been prescribed by law, and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining national security and public safety as well as the  <mask> and crime. The Government claimed that the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression had been necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, by referring to Abdullah Öcalan as a “leading figure” and an interlocutor for the State of Turkey, the applicants had conveyed to the public the idea that their client was still active. Moreover, their statements contained expressions referring to the strategy of a terrorist organisation. Noting that the applicants had not been imprisoned or subjected to any other restrictions, the Government contended that the interference in question had therefore not been disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.


42.  The Government further submitted that the civil injunction was necessary to protect the C. company’s personality rights as well as its right to respect for its home and to its freedom of occupation. The interference with these rights was of a particular weight because the film footage had been unlawfully made under false pretences. The injunction was further necessary for the prevention of crime. The applicant association had agitated against the C. company to such a degree that criminal offences had already been committed. There were fears that the further dissemination of the film by the applicant association would lead to the commitment of further crimes. Finally, the civil injunction was necessary for the  <mask>, as the danger existed that the dissemination of the film material by the applicant could lead to demonstrations involving violent acts.


36.  The Government further submitted that the interference complained of had been justified in order to safeguard order and security within the penitentiary, which included preventing criminal offences and thwarting escape attempts. The interference thus pursued the legitimate aims of protecting public safety, the  <mask> or crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as set out in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


29.  The applicant submitted that in any event the impugned article could not have had the effect of inciting people to hatred or violence since the journal in which it was published had been confiscated by the order of Istanbul State Security Court on 2 January 1994 before it could be distributed and sold to the public. The applicant affirmed that with the confiscation order any alleged threat to the  <mask> or crime had already been averted.


88.  The Government concluded that both the general measures taken in relation to the assembly as a whole and the individual measures taken against the applicant personally had been justified under Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. They submitted that the measures in question had complied with domestic law, had been necessary “for the  <mask> or crime” and “for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” and had remained strictly proportionate.


20.  The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. They submitted that the interference with her right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of national security and public order, as well as the  <mask> and crime. The Government further submitted that in her speech the applicant had legitimised the PKK and called for a moment of silence for the terrorists who had died during the conflicts with the Turkish Armed Forces. Besides, following her speech, the crowd had made a “V” sign. The Government took the view that, having regard to the content of her speech and to the fact that the applicant was not a politician, her speech could not be protected as political discourse. They further submitted that the first-instance court had assessed the circumstances of the event as a whole and had had regard to the other speakers’ speeches and the slogans chanted by the crowd when it had convicted the applicant. The Government also contended that the investigation against the applicant had not only been based on her acts during the event of 21 March 2007 but also on the books and documents found in her house. They lastly noted that the applicant had been sentenced to imprisonment of only one year, the minimum possible sentence under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. In sum, the Government considered that the applicant’s conviction had been necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.


33.  The Government submitted that the contested provision had been inserted into the Criminal Code because twentieth-century dictatorships had caused much suffering to the Hungarian people. The display of symbols related to dictatorships created uneasy feelings, fear or indignation in many citizens, and sometimes even violated the rights of the deceased. To wear the symbols of a one-party dictatorship in public was, in the Government’s view, tantamount to the very antithesis of the rule of law, and must be seen as a demonstration against pluralist democracy. In line with the Constitutional Court’s position in the matter, the Government contended that the measure in question pursued the legitimate aims of the  <mask> and the protection of the rights of others.


31.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim as the proceedings against him had ended, due to being time-barred. They therefore considered that there had been no interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. Alternatively, they submitted that the applicant had been prosecuted pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and thus the interference, if any, was prescribed by law. They further submitted that the domestic authorities had pursued the legitimate aims of protection of national security,  <mask> and public safety as well as prevention of crime. As to the necessity of the interference in a democratic society, the Government stated that they were aware of the Court’s case-law in that field. They nevertheless noted that the applicant had been convicted of generating propaganda in favour of the PKK, an organisation which was considered to be a terrorist organisation by a number of international organisations and states, such as the United States of America, the United Nations, the NATO and the European Union.


25.  The Government acknowledged the existence of an interference in the instant case but submitted that it was justified under the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention. The interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression had been based on Article 6 of Law no. 3713 as well as Additional section 2 of Law no. 5680. The interference had been in the interests of national security,  <mask> and the protection of the rights of others owing to the disclosure of the identities of certain public officials.


24.  The Government contested the applicant’s argument. They claimed at the outset that the applicant did not have victim status, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, given that the pronouncement of his conviction had been suspended. They further claimed that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, given that the proceedings against him had ended with the suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment. The Government submitted that should the Court conclude that there had been an interference, that interference had been prescribed by law and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining national security,  <mask> and public safety, as well as preventing disorder and crime. The Government claimed that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression had been necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, as a politician, the applicant had showed his support for a terrorist organisation’s activities by chanting the slogans noted in the first-instance judgment. Taking into account the necessity to fight against terrorism, the Government contended that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had corresponded to a pressing social need and had been proportionate.


98.  The Government noted that the material that had been seized from the applicant had been likely to promote racist and anti-Turkish propaganda and promote ill-will between the two communities on the island. Any limitation of the applicant’s rights had been prescribed by law and was justified under the second paragraph of Articles 9 and 10 as being necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order and for the safeguarding of national security and/or  <mask>.


25.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had been prescribed by law. They noted that the applicant’s conviction had been based on section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. The Government further contended that the interference in question had pursued the aims of protecting national security,  <mask> and public safety as well as the prevention of disorder or crime.


15.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression had had a legal basis and had pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of national security and  <mask> and the prevention of disorder and crime. They further submitted that the TKP/ML was a terrorist organisation, and that slogans praising that organisation had been chanted during the public gathering in question. Submitting that section 7 of Law no. 3713 had been amended in 2013, the Government left the issue of the necessity of the interference in a democratic society to the Court’s discretion.