Publication: Magyar Közlöny
Issue: MK-2007-70 (Year: 2007, Number: 70)
Era: 2004-2010
Section: Melléklet a 2007. évi XLVI. törvényhez
Paragraph Index: 3731

b) for delays more than 350 nanoseconds the error contribution will be reduced considerably. A typical value will be plus or minus 7 nanoseconds (1 m). 7.3.7.3 The airborne DME antenna should be located so as to preclude antenna gain reductions in the forward direction with the aircraft in the landing configuration. Any such antenna gain reductions could enhance the multipath error component when the aircraft is on approach and landing phases when highest DME accuracies are required. 7.3.8 ME/P power budget 7.3.8.1 Tables C-7 and C-8 are an example of CTOL air-to-ground and ground-to-air power budgets. The permitted peak ERP value is based on a pulse shape which meets the spectral constraints in Chapter 3, 3.5.4.1.3 e). 23/11/06 ATT C-80 2007/70/II. szám Attac ment C Annex 10 — Aeronautical Communications Table C-7. CTOL ground-to-air power budget Power budget items 41 km (22 NM) 13 km (7 NM) Ref. datum Roll-out Peak effective radiated power, dBm Ground multipath loss, dB –5 –3 –4 –17 Antenna pattern loss, dB –4 –2 –5 –5 Path loss, dB –125 –115 –107 –103 Monitor loss, dB –1 –1 –1 –1 Polarization and rain loss, dB –1 –1 Received signal at aircraft, dBm –81 –67 –62 –71 Power density at aircraft, dBW/m2 –89 –75 –70 –79 Aircraft antenna gain, dB Aircraft cable loss, dB –4 –4 –4 –4 Received signal at interrogator, dBm –85 –71 –66 –75 Receiver noise video, dBm (Noise factor (NF) = 9 dB) IF BW: 3.5 MHz IF BW: 0.8 MHz –109 –103 –103 –103 Signal-to-noise ratio (video), dB Table C-8. CTOL air-to-ground power budget Power budget items 41 km (22 NM) 13 km (7 NM) Ref. datum Roll-out Interrogator transmitter power, dBm Aircraft antenna gain, dB Aircraft cable loss, dB –4 –4 –4 –4 Peak effective radiated power, dBm Ground multipath loss, dB –5 –3 –4 –17 Path loss, dB –125 –115 –107 –103 Polarization and rain loss, dB –1 –1 Received signal at transponder antenna, dBm –78 –66 –58 –67 Ground antenna gain, dB Pattern loss, dB –4 –2 –5 –5 Cable loss, dB –3 –3 –3 –3 Received signal at transponder, dBm –77 –63 –58 –67 Receiver noise video, dBm (Noise factor (NF) = 9 dB) IF BW: 3.5 MHz IF BW: 0.8 MHz –112 –106 –106 –106 Signal-to-noise ratio (video), dB ATT C-81 23/11/06 2007/70/II. szám Annex 10 — Aeronautical Communications Volume I 7.3.8.2 In the power budget calculations, it is assumed that the aircraft antenna is not shielded by the aircraft structure including the landing gear when extended. 7.3.8.3 The video power signal-to-noise ratio is related to the IF power signal-to-noise ratio in the following manner: IF noise bandwidth S/N (video) = S/N (IF) + 10 log video noise bandwidth Note 1.— The distances are measured from the transponder antenna. Note 2.— Frequency dependent parameters were calculated for 1 0 M z. 7.3.9 ME/P monitor time delay measurement The required time delay measurement can be accomplished by measuring the output of a PFE filter and making a control decision within 1 second. However, since the transponder PFE is a slowly varying error component, an equivalent measurement is to average the unfiltered time delay samples for 1 second. 8. Material concerning power supply switch-over times 8.1 Power supply switch-over times for ground-based radio aids used in the vicinity of aerodromes The power supply switch-over times for radio navigation aids and ground elements of communications systems are dependent on the type of runway and aircraft operations to be supported. Table C-9 indicates representative switch-over times which may be met by power supply systems currently available. Table C-9. Power supply switch-over times for ground-based radio aids used at aerodromes Type of runway Aids requiring power Maximum switch-over times (seconds) Instrument approach SRE VOR NDB D/F facility Precision approach, Category I ILS localizer ILS glide path ILS middle marker ILS outer marker PAR Precision approach, Category II ILS localizer ILS glide path ILS inner marker ILS middle marker ILS outer marker Precision approach, Category III (same as Category II) ___________________ 23/11/06 ATT C-82 2007/70/II. szám ATTACHMENT D. INFORMATION AND MATERIAL FOR GUIDANCE IN THE APPLICATION OF THE GNSS STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES 1. Definitions Bi binar . Bi-binary is known as “Manchester Encoding”. It issometimes referred to as “Differential Manchester Encoding”. Using this system, it is the transition of the edge that determines the bit. C ip. A single digital bit of the output of a pseudo-random bit sequence. Gold code. A class of unique codes used by GPS, which exhibit bounded cross-correlation and off-peak auto-correlation values. Selective availabilit (SA). A set of techniques for denying the full accuracy and selecting the level of positioning, velocity and time accuracy of GPS available to users of the standardpositioning service signal. Note.— GPS SA was discontinued at midnight on 1 May 2000. 2. General Standards and Recommended Practices for GNSS contain provisions for the elements identified in Chapter 3, 3.7.2.2. Note.— Except where specifically annotated, GBAS guidance material applies to GRAS. 3. Navigation system performance requirements 3.1 Introduction 3.1.1 Navigation system performance requirements are defined in the Manual on Required Navigation Performance (RNP) (Doc 9613) for a single aircraft and for the total system which includes the signal-in-space, the airborne equipment and the ability of the aircraft to fly the desired trajectory. These total system requirements were used as a starting point to derive GNSS signal-in-space performance requirements. In the case of GNSS, degraded configurations which may affect multiple aircraft are to be considered. Therefore, certain signal-in-space performance requirements are more stringent to take into account multiple aircraft use of the system. 3.1.2 Two types of approach and landing operations with vertical guidance (APV), APV-I and APV-II, use vertical guidance relative to a glide path, but the facility or navigation system may not satisfy all of the requirements associated with precision approach. These operations combine the lateral performance equal to that of an ILS Category I localizer with different levels of vertical guidance. Both APV-I and APV-II provide access benefits relative to a non-precision approach, ANNEX 10 — VOLUME I ATT D-1 23/11/06 2007/70/II. szám Annex 10 — Aeronautical Communications Volume I and the service that is provided depends on the operational requirements and the SBAS infrastructure. APV-I and APV-II exceed the requirements (lateral and vertical) for current RNAV approaches using barometric altimetry, and the relevant onboard equipment will therefore be suitable for the conduct of barometric VNAV APV and RNAV non-precision approaches. 3.2 Accuracy 3.2.1 GNSS position error is the difference between the estimated position and the actual position. For an estimated position at a specific location, the probability should be at least 95 per cent that the position error is within the accuracy requirement. 3.2.2 Stationary, ground-based systems such as VOR and ILS have relatively repeatable error characteristics, so that performance can be measured for a short period of time (e.g. during flight inspection) and it is assumed that the system accuracy does not change after the test. However, GNSS errors change over time. The orbiting of satellites and the error characteristics of GNSS result in position errors that can change over a period of hours. In addition, the accuracy itself (the error bound with 95 per cent probability) changes due to different satellite geometries. Since it is not possible to continually measure system accuracy, the implementation of GNSS demands increased reliance on analysis and characterization of errors. Assessment based on measurements within a sliding time window is not suitable for GNSS. 3.2.3 The error for many GNSS architectures changes slowly over time, due to filtering in the augmentation systems and in the user receiver. This results in a small number of independent samples in periods of several minutes. This issue is very important for precision approach applications, because it implies that there is a 5 per cent probability that the position error can exceed the required accuracy for an entire approach. However, due to the changing accuracy described in 3.2.2, this probability is usually much lower. 3.2.4 The 95 per cent accuracy requirement is defined to ensure pilot acceptance, since it represents the errors that will typically be experienced. The GNSS accuracy requirement is to be met for the worst-case geometry under which the system is declared to be available. Statistical or probabilistic credit is not taken for the underlying probability of particular ranging signal geometry. 3.2.5 Therefore, GNSS accuracy is specified as a probability for each and every sample, rather than as a percentage of samples in a particular measurement interval. For a large set of independent samples, at least 95 per cent of the samples should be within the accuracy requirements in Chapter 3, Table 3.7.2.4-1. Data is scaled to the worst-case geometry in order to eliminate the variability in system accuracy that is caused by the geometry of the orbiting satellites. 3.2.6 An example of how this concept can be applied is the use of GPS to support performance required for nonprecision approach operations. Assume that the system is intended to support non-precision approaches when the horizontal dilution of precision (HDOP) is less than or equal to 6. To demonstrate this performance, samples should be taken over a long period of time (e.g. 24 hours). The measured position error g for each sample i is denoted gi. This error is scaled to the worst-case geometry as 6 u gi/HDOP. Ninety-five per cent of the scaled errors must be less than 220 m for the system to comply with the non-precision accuracy requirement under worst-case geometry conditions. The total number of samples collected must be sufficient for the result to be statistically representative, taking into account the decorrelation time of the errors. 3.2.7 A range of vertical accuracy values is specified for Category I precision approach operations which bounds the different values that may support an equivalent operation to ILS. A number of values have been derived by different groups, using different interpretations of the ILS standards. The lowest value from these derivations was adopted as a conservative value for GNSS; this is the minimum value given for the range. Because this value is conservative, and because GNSS error characteristics are different from ILS, it may be possible to achieve Category I operations using larger values of accuracy and alert limits within the range. The larger values would result in increased availability for the operation. The maximum value in the range has been proposed as a suitable value, subject to validation. 23/11/06 ATT D-2 2007/70/II. szám Attac ment Annex 10 — Aeronautical Communications ATT D-3 23/11/06 3.2.8 Specific alert limits have been defined for each augmentation system. For GBAS, technical provision has been made to broadcast the alert limit to aircraft. GBAS standards require the alert limit of 10 m. For SBAS, technical provisions have been made to standardize the alert limit through an updateable database (see Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Global Positioning System/ ide Area Augmentation System (GPS/ AAS) Airborne Equipment (RTCA/DO- 229C)). 3.2.9 The GPS SPS position error (Chapter 3, 3.7.3.1.1.1) accounts for the contribution of the space and control segment to position errors (satellite clock and ephemeris errors) only; it does not include the contributions of ionospheric and tropospheric delay model errors, errors due to multipath effects, and receiver measurement noise errors (Attachment D, 4.1.2). These errors are addressed in the receiver standards. The user positioning error at the output of ABAS-capable equipment is mainly driven by the GNSS receiver used. 3.2.9.1 For Basic GNSS receivers, the receiver qualification standards require demonstration of user positioning accuracy in the presence of interference and a model of selective availability (SA) to be less than 100 m (95 per cent of time) horizontally and 156 m (95 per cent of time) vertically. The receiver standards do not require that a Basic GNSS receiver applies the ionospheric correction described in Appendix B, 3.1.2.4. Note.— The term Basic GNSS receiver designates the GNSS avionics that at least meet the requirements for a GPS receiver as outlined in Annex 10, Volume I and the specifications of RTCA/ O-20 as amended by nited States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) TSO-C129A, or E ROCAE E -72A (or equivalent). 3.2.9.2 Since the discontinuation of SA, the representative user positioning accuracy of GPS has been conservatively estimated to be as shown in Table D-0. The numbers provided assume that the worst two satellites of a nominal 24 GPS satellite constellation are out of service. In addition, a 7 m (1 ı) ionospheric delay model error, a 0.25 m (1 ı) residual tropospheric delay error, and a 0.80 m (1 ı) receiver noise error are assumed. After discontinuation of SA (Attachment D, 1.), the dominant pseudo-range error for users of the GPS Standard Positioning Service is the ionospheric error that remains after application of the ionospheric corrections. This error is also highly variable and depends on conditions such as user geomagnetic latitude, level of solar activity (i.e. point of the solar cycle that applies), level of ionospheric activity (i.e. whether there is a magnetic storm, or not), elevation angle of the pseudo-range measurement, season of the year, and time of day. The ionospheric delay model error assumption reflected in Table D-0 is generally conservative; however, conditions can be found under which the assumed 7 m (1 ı) error during solar maximum would be inadequate. Table D-0. GPS user positioning accuracy GPS user positioning accuracy 95% of time, global average Horizontal position error 33 m (108 ft) Vertical position error 73 m (240 ft) 3.2.10 SBAS and GBAS receivers will be more accurate, and their accuracy will be characterized in real time by the receiver using standard error models, as described in Chapter 3, 3.5, for SBAS and Chapter 3, 3.6, for GBAS. Note 1.— The term SBAS receiver designates the GNSS avionics that at least meet the requirements for an SBAS receiver as outlined in Annex 10, Volume I and the specifications of RTCA/ O-229C, as amended by nited States FAA TSO-C145A/TSO-C146A (or equivalent). Note 2.— The term GBAS receiver designates the GNSS avionics that at least meet the requirements for a GBAS receiver as outlined in Annex 10, Volume I and the specifications of RTCA/ O-253A, as amended by nited States FAA TSO-C161 and TSO-C162 (or equivalent). 2007/70/II. szám Annex 10 — Aeronautical Communications Volume I 23/11/06 ATT D-4 3.3 Integrity and time-to-alert 3.3.1 Integrity is a measure of the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the information supplied by the total system. Integrity includes the ability of a system to provide timely and valid warnings to the user (alerts) when the system must not be used for the intended operation (or phase of flight). 3.3.2 To ensure that the position error is acceptable, an alert limit is defined that represents the largest position error allowable for a safe operation. The position error cannot exceed this alert limit without annunciation. This is analogous to ILS in that the system can degrade so that the error is larger than the 95th percentile but within the monitor limit. 3.3.3 The integrity requirement of the navigation system for a single aircraft to support en-route, terminal, initial approach, non-precision approach and departure is assumed to be 1 – 1 × 10–5 per hour. 3.3.4 For satellite-based navigation systems, the signal-in-space in the en-route environment simultaneously serves a large number of aircraft over a large area, and the impact of a system integrity failure on the air traffic management system will be greater than with traditional navigation aids. The performance requirements in Chapter 3, Table 3.7.2.4-1, are therefore more demanding. 3.3.5 For precision approach operations, integrity requirements for GNSS signal-in-space requirements of Chapter 3, Table 3.7.2.4-1, were selected to be consistent with ILS requirements. 3.4 Continuity of service 3.4.1 Continuity of service of a system is the capability of the system to perform its function without unscheduled interruptions during the intended operation. 3.4.2 En-route 3.4.2.1 For en-route operations, continuity of service relates to the capability of the navigation system to provide a navigation output with the specified accuracy and integrity throughout the intended operation, assuming that it was available at the start of the operation. The occurrence of navigation system alerts, either due to rare fault-free performance or to failures, constitute continuity failures. Since the durations of these operations are variable, the continuity requirement is specified as a probability on a per-hour basis. 3.4.2.2 The navigation system continuity requirement for a single aircraft is 1 – 1 × 10–4 per hour. However, for satellitebased systems, the signal-in-space may serve a large number of aircraft over a large area. The continuity requirements in Chapter 3, Table 3.7.2.4-1, represent reliability requirements for the GNSS signal-in-space, i.e. they derive mean time between outage (MTBO) requirements for the GNSS elements. 3.4.2.3 A range of values is given in Chapter 3, Table 3.7.2.4-1, for the signal-in-space continuity requirement for en-route operations. The lower value is the minimum continuity for which a system is considered to be practical. It is appropriate for areas with low traffic density and airspace complexity. In such areas, the impact of a navigation system failure is limited to a small number of aircraft, and there is, therefore, no need to increase the continuity requirement significantly beyond the single aircraft requirement (1 – 1 u 10–4 per hour). The highest value given (i.e. 1 – 1 u 10–8 per hour) is suitable for areas with high traffic density and airspace complexity, where a failure will affect a large number of aircraft. This value is appropriate for navigation systems where there is a high degree of reliance on the system for navigation and possibly for dependent surveillance. The value is sufficiently high for the scenario based on a low probability of a system failure during thelifeof the system. Intermediate values of continuity (e.g. 1 – 1 u 10–6 per hour) are considered to be appropriate for areas of high traffic density and complexity where there is a high degree of reliance on the navigation system but in which mitigation for navigation system failures is possible. Such mitigation may be 2007/70/II. szám Attac ment Annex 10 — Aeronautical Communications through the use of alternative navigation means or the use of ATC surveillance and intervention to maintain separation standards. The values of continuity performance are determined by airspace needs to support navigation where GNSS has either replaced the existing navigation aid infrastructure or where no infrastructure previously existed. 3.4.3 Approach and landing 3.4.3.1 For approach and landing operations, continuity of service relates to the capability of the navigation system to provide a navigation output with the specified accuracy and integrity during the approach, assuming that it was available at the start of the operation. The occurrence of navigation system alerts, either due to rare fault-free performance or to failures, constitute continuity failures. In this case, the continuity requirement is stated as a probability for a short exposure time. 3.4.3.2 The continuity requirements for approach and landing operations represent only the allocation of the requirement between the aircraft receiver and the non-aircraft elements of the system. In this case, no increase in the requirement is considered necessary to deal with multiple aircraft use of the system. The continuity value is normally related only to the risk associated with a missed approach and each aircraft can be considered to be independent. However, in some cases, it may be necessary to increase the continuity values since a system failure has to be correlated between both runways (e.g.the use of a common system for approaches to closely-spaced parallel runways). 3.5 Availability 3.5.1 The availability of GNSS is characterized by the portion of time the system is to be used for navigation during which reliable navigation information is presented to the crew, autopilot, or other system managing the flight of the aircraft. 3.5.2 When establishing the availability requirements for GNSS, the desired level of service to be supported should be considered. If the satellite navigation service is intended to replace an existing en-route navigation aid infrastructure, the availability of the GNSS should be commensurate with the availability provided by the existing infrastructure. An assessment of the operational impact of a degradation in service should be conducted. 3.5.3 Where GNSS availability is low, it is still possible to use the satellite navigation service by restricting the navigation operating times to those periods when it is predicted to be available. This is possible in the case of GNSS since unavailability due to insufficient satellite geometry is repeatable. Under such restrictions, there remains only a continuity risk associated with the failure of necessary system components between the time the prediction is made and the time the operation is conducted. 3.5.4 En-route 3.5.4.1 Specific availability requirements for an area or operation should be based upon:

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