Publication: Magyar Közlöny
Issue: MK-2009-104 (Year: 2009, Number: 104)
Era: 2004-2010
Section: 
Paragraph Index: 2821

c) random RNAV routings. 2.1.4 The navigational performance required of such RNAV equipment envisages a level of navigational accuracy for en-route purposes having a navigation performance equal to or better than a track-keeping accuracy of ±11.1 km (6 NM) for 99.5 per cent of the flight time of all aircraft using RNAV equipment. Navigational performance of this type is expected to be consistent with a track-keeping accuracy of ±7.4 km (4 NM) for 95 per cent of flight time of all aircraft using RNAV equipment. This level is similar to that currently achieved by aircraft without RNAV capability operating on existing routes defined by VOR or VOR/DME, where the VORs are less than 93 km (50 NM) apart. 2.2 Protected airspace for RNAV ATS routes based on RNP 4 2.2.1 The minimum protected airspace provided for RNAV ATS routes should be 11.1 km (6 NM) either side of the intended track, within which RNAV-equipped aircraft can be expected to remain for 99.5 per cent of the flight time. Before applying the values stemming from this concept, account should be taken of any practical experience gained in the airspace under consideration as well as the possibility of achieving improvements in the overall navigation performance of aircraft. In this context, when lateral deviations are being controlled with the aid of radar monitoring, the size of the protected airspace required may be reduced in accordance with the following: 2.2.2 Radar monitoring studies indicate that any potential reduction of the protected airspace is closely related to traffic characteristics, information available to the controller, and sector workload. Finally, it is worth considering that the analysis of RNAV accuracy performed in terms of containment measurements by some European States has shown that flights with RNAV capability were within 5 NM of the route centre line for 99.5 per cent of the time (EUR Doc 001, RNAV/4 refers). If the appropriate ATS authority considers that more protection is required, e.g. because of proximity of prohibited, Percentage containment 99.5 km ±7.4 ±7.4 ±8.3 ±9.3 ±10.2 ±11.1 NM ±4.0 ±4.0 ±4.5 ±5.0 ±5.5 ±6.0 22/11/07 No. 45 Annex 11 — Air Traffic Services Attachment B 1/11/01 ATT B-2 28/11/02 No. 41 restricted or danger areas, climb and descent paths of military aircraft, etc., additional buffers should be provided. 2.2.3 Where there is an angular difference of more than 25 degrees between route segments, additional protected airspace, as indicated in Attachment A, 3.5 to 3.12 and Section 7, should be provided. Note.— Different levels of navigation accuracy may be required by States for operations of RNAV-equipped aircraft. These requirements are not covered by this guidance material and may necessitate changes to protected airspace criteria. 2.3 Spacing between parallel RNAV routes based on RNP 4 When utilizing protected airspace as described in 2.2, route centre lines may be spaced such that the protected airspaces encompassing the 99.5 per cent containment values do not overlap. When implementing a spacing encompassing less than the 99.5 per cent containment values, radar monitoring is required. 3. Spacing between parallel tracks or between parallel RNAV route centre lines based on RNP type 3.1 It should be noted that, where indicated, the spacings depicted below are based on safety assessments performed specifically for a particular network of tracks or routes. As such, the assessments evaluated traffic characteristics which might be unique to the network being assessed. For example, some of these characteristics are traffic density, the frequency of aircraft passing with minimum separation, communication and surveillance facilities, etc. Additional information on performing safety assessments is contained in the Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for the Determination of Separation Minima (Doc 9689). 3.2 When determining the spacing between parallel tracks or ATS routes (hereinafter referred to as a “system”), the safety assessment, involving an examination of items such as those listed in 3.1 above, should be performed against a minimum acceptable safety level. 3.2.1 Where “fatal accidents per flight hour” is considered to be an appropriate metric, a target level of safety (TLS) of 5 × 10–9 fatal accidents per flight hour per dimension should be applied for determining the acceptability of future en-route systems that will be implemented after the year 2000. Until then, a TLS of 2 × 10–8 fatal accidents per flight hour per dimension may be applied for this purpose. 3.2.2 However, where “fatal accidents per flight hour” is not considered to be an appropriate metric, justifiable alternative metrics and methods of assessment providing an acceptable level of safety may be established by States and, as appropriate, be implemented by regional agreements. 3.3 If, at the time a system is established or upon a subsequent system safety assessment, it is determined that the system does not meet the appropriate level of safety for the method of assessment being used, a reassessment should be considered. This assessment should be undertaken in accordance with Doc 9689 to determine if a level of safety equivalent to or better than the minimum acceptable level can be met. 3.4 Examples of spacings for systems in specific areas or regions based on RNP type are provided below. Where these spacings are based on the characteristics of a specific area or region (reference system), other States or regions will need to evaluate their own systems for comparability with the reference system. 3.4.1 For procedural environments:

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