Publication: Magyar Közlöny
Issue: MK-2007-70 (Year: 2007, Number: 70)
Era: 2004-2010
Section: Melléklet a 2007. évi XLVI. törvényhez
Paragraph Index: 3892

11. Integrity and continuity of service — MLS ground equipment 11.1 Introduction 11.1.1 This material is intended to provide description of the integrity and continuity of service objectives of MLS ground equipment and to provide guidance on engineering design and system characteristics of this equipment. The integrity and continuity of service must of necessity be known from an operational viewpoint in order to decide the operational application which an MLS could support. 11.1.2 It is generally accepted, irrespective of the operational objective, that the average rate of a fatal accident during landing, due to failures or shortcomings in the whole system, comprising the ground equipment, the aircraft and the pilot, should not exceed 1 × 10–7. This criterion is frequently referred to as the global risk factor. 11.1.3 In the case of Category I operations, while minimum standards of accuracy and integrity are required during the early stages of landing, most of the responsibility for assuring that the above objective is not exceeded is vested in the pilot. In Category III operations, the same objective is required but must now be inherent in the whole system. In this context it is of the utmost importance to endeavour to achieve the highest level of integrity and continuity of service of the ground equipment. Integrity is needed to ensure that an aircraft on approach will have a low probability of receiving false guidance; continuity of service is needed to ensure that an aircraft in the final stages of approach will have a low probability of being deprived of a guidance signal. 11.1.4 It is seen that various operational requirements correspond to varied objectives of integrity and continuity of service. Table G-15 identifies and describes four levels of integrity and continuity of service that are applicable for basic rocedures where DME is not a critical element. p 11.2 Achievement and retention of integrity and continuity of service levels 11.2.1 An integrity failure can occur if radiation of a signal which is outside specified tolerances or which is incorrect (in the case of digital data) is either unrecognized bythe monitoring equipment or the control circuits fail to remove the faulty signal. Such a failure might constitute a hazard if it results in a gross error. 23/11/06 ATT G-30 2007/70/II. szám Attac ment G Annex 10 — Aeronautical Communications 11.2.2 Clearly not all integrity failures are hazardous in all phases of the approach. For example, during the critical stages of the approach, undetected failures producing significant path following error (PFE) are of special significance whereas an undetected loss of clearance or identification signals would not necessarily produce a hazardous situation. The criterion in assessing which failure modes are relevant must however include all those deleterious fault conditions which are not unquestionably obvious to the automatic flight system or pilot. 11.2.3 It is especially important that monitors be designed to provide fail-safe operation through compliance with the Standards of Chapter 3, 3.11.5.2.3 and 3.11.5.3.3. This often requires a rigorous design analysis. Monitor failures otherwise may permit the radiation of erroneous signals. Some of the possible conditions which might constitute a hazard in operational performance Categories II and III are:

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