Publication: Magyar Közlöny
Issue: MK-2007-70 (Year: 2007, Number: 70)
Era: 2004-2010
Section: Melléklet a 2007. évi XLVI. törvényhez
Paragraph Index: 2172

p) content of the security training programme (13.4). 6. Validation of the standard of operations Standard 4.2.1.5 requires that the validity of an AOC shall depend upon the operator maintaining the original certification standards (4.2.1.4) under the supervision of the State of the Operator. This supervision requires that a system of continued surveillance be established to ensure the required standards of operations are maintained (4.2.1.7). A good starting point in the development of such a system is to require annual or semi-annual inspections, observations and tests to validate the required certification approval and acceptance actions. 7. Amendment of air operator certificates The certification of an operator is an ongoing process. Few operators will be satisfied over time with the initial authorizations issued with their AOC. Evolving market opportunities will cause an operator to change aircraft models and seek approval for new operational areas requiring other additional capabilities. Additional technical evaluations should be required by the State before issuing the formal written instruments approving any changes to the original AOC and other authorizations. Where possible, each request should be “bridged”, using the original authorization as the foundation to determine the extent of the State’s impending evaluation before issuing the formal instrument. 2007/70/II. szám ANNEX 6 — PART I ATT G-1 1/11/01 ATTACHMENT G. MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST (MEL) Supplementary to Chapter 6, 6.1.2 1. If deviations from the requirements of States in the certification of aircraft were not permitted an aircraft could not be flown unless all systems and equipment were operable. Experience has proved that some unserviceability can be accepted in the short term when the remaining operative systems and equipment provide for continued safe operations. 2. The State should indicate through approval of a minimum equipment list those systems and items of equipment that may be inoperative for certain flight conditions with the intent that no flight can be conducted with inoperative systems and equipment other than those specified. 3. A minimum equipment list, approved by the State of the Operator, is therefore necessary for each aircraft, based on the master minimum equipment list established for the aircraft type by the organization responsible for the type design in conjunction with the State of Design. 4. The State of the Operator should require the operator to prepare a minimum equipment list designed to allow the operation of an aircraft with certain systems or equipment inoperative provided an acceptable level of safety is maintained. 5. The minimum equipment list is not intended to provide for operation of the aircraft for an indefinite period with inoperative systems or equipment. The basic purpose of the minimum equipment list is to permit the safe operation of an aircraft with inoperative systems or equipment within the framework of a controlled and sound programme of repairs and parts replacement. 6. Operators are to ensure that no flight is commenced with multiple minimum equipment list items inoperative without determining that any interrelationship between inoperative systems or components will not result in an unacceptable degradation in the level of safety and/or undue increase in the flight crew workload. 7. The exposure to additional failures during continued operation with inoperative systems or equipment must also be considered in determining that an acceptable level of safety is being maintained. The minimum equipment list may not deviate from requirements of the flight manual limitations section, emergency procedures or other airworthiness requirements of the State of Registry or of the State of the Operator unless the appropriate airworthiness authority or the flight manual provides otherwise. 8. Systems or equipment accepted as inoperative for a flight should be placarded where appropriate and all such items should be noted in the aircraft technical log to inform the flight crew and maintenance personnel of the inoperative system or equipment. 9. For a particular system or item of equipment to be accepted as inoperative, it may be necessary to establish a maintenance procedure, for completion prior to flight, to deactivate or isolate the system or equipment. It may similarly be necessary to prepare an appropriate flight crew operating procedure. 10. The responsibilities of the pilot-in-command in accepting an aeroplane for operation with deficiencies in accordance with a minimum equipment list are specified in Chapter 4, 4.3.1. 27/11/03 No. 28 2007/70/II. szám ANNEX 6 — PART I ATT H-1 1/11/01 27/11/03 No. 28 ATTACHMENT H. FLIGHT SAFETY DOCUMENTS SYSTEM Supplementary to Chapter 3, 3.3 1. Introduction 1.1 The following material provides guidance on the organization and development of an operator’s flight safety documents system. It should be understood that the development of a flight safety documents system is a complete process, and changes to each document comprising the system may affect the entire system. Guidelines applicable to the development of operational documents have been produced by government and industry sources and are available to operators. Nevertheless, it may be difficult for operators to make the best use of these guidelines, since they are distributed across a number of publications. 1.2 Furthermore, guidelines applicable to operational documents development tend to focus on a single aspect of documents design, for example, formatting and typography. Guidelines rarely cover the entire process of operational documents development. It is important for operational documents to be consistent with each other, and consistent with regulations, manufacturer requirements and Human Factors principles. It is also necessary to ensure consistency across departments as well as consistency in application. Hence the emphasis on an integrated approach, based on the notion of the operational documents as a complete system. 1.3 The guidelines in this Attachment address the major aspects of an operator’s flight safety documents system development process, with the aim of ensuring compliance with Chapter 3, 3.3. The guidelines are based not only upon scientific research, but also upon current best industry practices, with an emphasis on a high degree of operational relevance. 2. Organization 2.1 A flight safety documents system should be organized according to criteria which ensure easy access to information required for flight and ground operations contained in the various operational documents comprising the system and which facilitate management of the distribution and revision of operational documents. 2.2 Information contained in a flight safety documents system should be grouped according to the importance and use of the information, as follows:

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