Publication: Magyar Közlöny
Issue: MK-2007-70 (Year: 2007, Number: 70)
Era: 2004-2010
Section: Melléklet a 2007. évi XLVI. törvényhez
Paragraph Index: 3896

d) loss of power that increases CMN to unacceptable limits. 11.2.4 The highest order of protection is required against the risk of undetected failures in the monitoring and associated control system. This would be achieved by careful design to reduce the probability of such occurrences to a low level and by carrying out periodic checks on the monitor system performance at intervals which are determined by the design analysis. Such an analysis can be used to calculate the level of integrity of the system in any one landing. The following formula can be applied to certain types of MLS and provides an example of the determination of system integrity, I, from a calculation of the probability of transmission of undetected erroneous radiation, P. I = 1 – P T P M M D D Where: I = integrity; P = the probability of a concurrent failure in transmitter and monitor systems resulting in undetected erroneous radiation; M1 = transmitter mean time between failure (MTBF) M2 = MTBF of the monitoring and associated control system; D = ratio of the rate of failure in the transmitter resulting in the radiation of an erroneous signal to the rate of all transmitter failures; D = ratio of the rate of failure in the monitoring and associated control system resulting in inability to detect an erroneous signal to the rate of all monitoring and associated control system failures; and T = period of time (in hours) between checks on the monitoring and associated control system. ATT G-31 23/11/06 2007/70/II. szám Annex 10 — Aeronautical Communications Volume I This example formula would be applicable to a non-redundant monitor design in which a single value of T applies to all elements of the monitoring and associated control system. 11.2.5 With regard to integrity, since the probability of occurrence of an unsafe failure within the monitoring or control equipment is extremely remote, to establish the required integrity level with a high degree of confidence would necessitate an evaluation period many times that needed to establish the equipment MTBF. Such a protracted period is unacceptable and therefore the required integrity level can only be predicted by rigorous design analysis of the equipment. However, a degree of confidence in the analysis can be achieved by demonstration of independence between the transmitter and monitor functions. The predicted performances of the transmitter and monitor can then be evaluated independently, resulting in more feasible evaluation periods. 11.2.6 The MTBF and continuity of service of equipment is governed by basic construction characteristics and by the operating environment. The basic construction characteristics include the failure rate of the components of the equipment and the physical relationship of the components. Failure rate (1/MTBF) and continuity of service are not always directly related because not all equipment failures will necessarily result in an outage, e.g. an event such as a failure of a transmitter resulting in the immediate transfer to a standby transmitter. The manufacturer is expected to provide the details of the design to allow the MTBF and the continuity of service to be calculated. Equipment design has to employ the most suitable engineering techniques, materials, and components, and rigorous inspection should be applied during manufacture. It is essential to ensure that equipment is operated within the environmental conditions specified by the manufacturer. 11.2.7 The design continuity of service is expected to exceed that given in 12.4 by as large a margin as is feasible. The reasons for that are as follows:

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