FAA Reauthorization Act: Progress and Challenges Implementing Various Provisions of the 2012 Act
Released: 2014-02-05T00:00:00


Highlights: section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The U.S. air transportation system is the busiest and among the safest in the world. Even so, maintaining and improving the extraordinary level of connectivity and mobility the system affords us, and the safety record that has been achieved to date requires continued attention and effort. In the 2012 Act, Congress directed FAA to take various actions to improve the safety and efficiency of the current NAS while transitioning to NextGen. In addition, given the potential and opportunities afforded by new UAS technologies, the 2012 Act included several provisions with respect to FAA safely integrating UAS into the NAS.

Based on work GAO has conducted for this Committee since the passage of the 2012 Act, this testimony discusses FAA's challenges and progress in

1) implementing NextGen,

2) improving aviation safety, and

3) integrating UAS into the national airspace system.

This statement is drawn from several GAO reports completed since the 2012 Act, as well as additional reports from prior to the 2012 Act on these topics. To update information in those reports, GAO conducted interviews with officials from FAA and industry, and reviewed agency documents.

section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (the 2012 Act) contained several provisions related to implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)—a complex, long-term initiative to incrementally modernize and transform the national airspace system (NAS). GAO's recent work on NextGen has highlighted three key implementation issues:

Improving NextGen Leadership: Complex transformations, such as NextGen, require substantial leadership commitment over a sustained period, and leaders must both be empowered to make critical decisions and be held accountable for results. The 2012 Act created a Chief NextGen Officer that FAA appointed in June 2013, and FAA has recently filled other key NextGen leadership positions. With these positions filled, FAA should be in a better position to resolve its NextGen leadership challenges.

Demonstrating Near-Term Benefits: The 2012 Act included a number of provisions aimed at accelerating the creation of performance-based navigation (PBN) procedures, such as following precise routes that use the Global Positioning System, which can save airlines and other aircraft operators money through reduced fuel burn and flight time. FAA must continue to deliver PBN capabilities and begin to demonstrate a return on operator's investments. As of January 2014, FAA has implemented PBN procedures at two of the five airports selected for early deployment.

Balancing the Needs of the Current Air–Traffic Control System and NextGen: While the 2012 Act contained a number of provisions aimed at accelerating NextGen implementation, GAO found that FAA's budget planning does not fully account for the impact on the agency's operating costs of the NextGen systems that will be deployed in future years, along with the need for continued operation and maintenance of existing systems and facilities. Cost estimates for maintaining existing systems and facilities coupled with implementing NextGen exceed anticipated funding levels. GAO recommended improvements to FAA's budget–planning and infrastructure-condition data, which FAA is working to implement.

Safety in the aviation industry is achieved in part through adherence to various certification standards. The 2012 Act required FAA to work with industry to assess the certification process. GAO's work has found that while FAA has made progress developing its plan to implement these recommendations, FAA continues to lack performance measures to track its progress.

For unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), FAA has implemented 7 of the 17 requirements established in the 2012 Act, representing progress since GAO's last update in January 2013. However, FAA continues to experience challenges implementing the provisions in the 2012 Act and integrating UAS into the NAS. For example, although FAA has had efforts under way since 2008 supporting a rulemaking on small UAS, it is unlikely that FAA will meet the August 2014 final rule deadline required by the 2012 Act since it has not yet issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. In addition, while FAA created the UAS Integration Office in 2013 to lead UAS integration, as of January 2014, the program lacks an operations budget.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on progress made by the  Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in implementing key provisions of  the FAA Modernization and Reform Act (the 2012 Act). The U.S. air  transportation system is the busiest and among the safest in the world,  with key aviation stakeholders—FAA, the airlines and other aircraft  operators, airports, aircraft manufacturers, and others—working together  to achieve these results. Nevertheless, FAA must not become  complacent because of the extraordinary level of connectivity and mobility  the system affords us, or the safety record that has been achieved to  date. Thus, in the 2012 Act, the Congress directed FAA to take various  actions to improve the safety and efficiency of the current air traffic control  (ATC) system while transitioning to the Next Generation Air  Transportation System (NextGen). In addition, given the potential  opportunities afforded by new unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), the  2012 Act included several provisions with respect to FAA safely  integrating UAS into the national airspace system (NAS). Ongoing  improvements to safety, implementation of NextGen, and integration of  UAS continue to be paramount as Congress considers FAA’s progress to  date, and begins to consider the next reauthorization bill.

My statement today is based on work on these issues we have completed  for the Subcommittee since passage of the 2012 Act, including (1)  implementing NextGen, (2) improving aviation safety, particularly with  respect to implementing provisions of the 2012 Act related to FAA’s  certification processes, and (3) integrating UAS into the NAS. The 2012  Act also directed us to complete eight studies on a variety of aviation  topics. Appendix II lists seven of those mandated studies that have been  completed and contains information on our key findings.

This statement is drawn from several reports that we completed since  passage of the 2012 Act, as well as additional reports from prior to the  Act on these topics. We have updated this information through a review of  FAA documents and interviews with FAA officials, as well as interviews  with relevant advisory groups. In addition to the information on the seven  completed studies mandated in the 2012 Act listed in appendix II, a list of  other related GAO products is included in appendix I of this statement,  along with footnoted references to these products throughout the  statement. We reviewed and analyzed documents and interviewed  relevant government, academic, and private-sector entities to address  these objectives. The reports and testimonies cited in this statement  contain more detailed explanations of the methods used to conduct our  work. The work upon which this testimony is based on was conducted in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: FAA Faces Several Challenges Implementing NextGen
paragraphs: More than 10 years ago, Congress directed FAA to conceptualize and  plan NextGen; FAA is now implementing key NextGen systems and  capabilities. NextGen was envisioned as a major redesign of the air  transportation system to increase efficiency, enhance safety, and reduce  flight delays that would entail precision satellite navigation and  surveillance; digital, networked communications; an integrated weather  system; and more. Figure 1 provides examples of changes and benefits  that are expected to come from NextGen.

The transition to NextGen—which encompasses multiple programs,  procedures, and systems at different levels of maturity—is a complex,  incremental, multi-year process. Since 2006, we have monitored FAA’s  development of NextGen and identified a number of key challenges  facing the agency’s implementation efforts. The 2012 Act included several  provisions that address some of the issues that we have identified in our  work, including incentivizing aircraft operators to equip with NextGen  technologies, developing performance measures, and involving  stakeholders in NextGen development.progress in implementing NextGen has highlighted ongoing challenges in   Our recent work on FAA’s  three areas: improving leadership, demonstrating near-term benefits, and  balancing the needs of the current system while implementing NextGen  systems.
subsections: section_title: Improving NextGen Leadership
paragraphs: Our work has found that complex organizational transformations, such as  NextGen, involving technology, systems, and retraining key personnel  require substantial leadership commitment over a sustained period, and  that leaders must be empowered to make critical decisions and held  accountable for results. Transitions, inconsistent leadership, and unclear  roles and responsibilities can weaken the effectiveness of the internal and  external collaboration required for successful implementation. Both the  magnitude of the multi-year transition, as well as the numerous efforts  under way throughout the different offices and divisions in FAA to  effectuate that transition, will require FAA’s leaders to manage all aspects  of NextGen in a strategic, timely, and coordinated fashion.

FAA has struggled to have the leadership in place to manage and  oversee NextGen implementation, but more recently, has begun to fill  key positions. In June 2013, FAA appointed a new Deputy Administrator  and designated a Chief NextGen Officer, in response to Section 204 of  the 2012 Act. In addition, in September 2013, FAA appointed a new  Assistant Administrator for NextGen—a position that had previously been  vacant. Designating one leader—such as the Deputy Administrator’s  responsibility over NextGen—can be beneficial because it centralizes  accountability and can speed decision-making. With these positions now  filled, FAA should be in a better position to resolve its NextGen leadership  challenges. However, as I have stated in other work, a number of offices  oversee certain aspects of NextGen, not all of which report to the  Assistant Administrator, and implementation will require successful  collaboration between these offices. As these positions have only recently  been filled, it is not yet clear how effective the changes resulting from the  2012 Act will be in achieving that collaboration.

Another key development in NextGen management envisioned by  Section 208 of the 2012 Act redesignated the Director of the Joint  Planning and Development Office (JPDO) as an Associate Administrator  reporting directly to the FAA Administrator and defined that  administrator’s responsibility for coordination and planning with FAA’s  partner agencies. This change has not been fully implemented by FAA.  However, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, Congress  eliminated direct funding of JPDO, and subsumed JPDO in FAA’s  operations budget. At this point, it remains unclear whether a JPDO  Director position will continue and, if not, how the roles and  responsibilities of that office, particularly with respect to long-term  planning and coordination of research and development efforts across  partner agencies, will be redistributed within FAA. We will continue to  monitor these issues in two studies requested by this committee—one  examining the organizational and leadership structure of the NextGen  effort, and one looking more in-depth at actions FAA has taken to  streamline its organization. We have begun both of these examinations.

section_title: Demonstrating Near-Term Benefits
paragraphs: To convince operators to make investments in NextGen equipment, FAA  must continue to deliver systems, procedures, and capabilities that  demonstrate near-term benefits and a return on an operator’s  investments. In particular, a large percentage of the current U.S. air  carrier fleet is equipped to fly more precise performance-based navigation  (PBN) procedures, such as following precise routes that use the Global  Positioning System or glide descent paths, which can save airlines and  other aircraft operators money through reduced fuel burn and flight time.

However, aircraft operators have expressed concerns that FAA has been  slow to produce new procedures for various reasons, and has not  produced the most useful or beneficial PBN routes and procedures.

The 2012 Act included a number of provisions aimed at accelerating the  creation of PBN procedures. For example, Section 213 of the 2012 Act  directed FAA to develop plans to identify beneficial PBN procedures and  to prioritize their implementation at key airports. We reported in April of  2013 that FAA had made progress in focusing its PBN efforts at seven  priority metroplexes with airport operations that have a large effect on the  overall efficiency of the NAS. More recently, FAA reports that it is  considering recommendations from the NextGen Advisory Committee  (NAC) regarding revalidation of the criteria used to prioritize these  metroplexes, and that recent efforts have been diverted to metroplexes  where the deployment of the new En Route Automation Management  (ERAM) system is complete, in order not to interfere with ERAM  deployment at those locations where it is ongoing.

Our work also found that FAA does not have a system for tracking the  use of existing PBN procedures. As a result, FAA is unable to assure that  investment in these routes is worthwhile or that they justify the cost to  develop and maintain them. Further, in the absence of data on the use of  existing PBN routes, airlines and other stakeholders remain unconvinced  that the investments needed for the full implementation of NextGen will be  justified. Such data could help the agency demonstrate the value of PBN  technologies and any resulting benefits, as well as allow the agency to  identify routes that need to be revised to increase their use. We made  recommendations to FAA to develop a system to track the use of PBN  procedures and a process to proactively identify new PBN procedures  based on NextGen goals and targets. We will continue to monitor FAA’s  progress in implementing these recommendations.

The 2012 Act also included two other key provisions to accelerate the  creation of PBN procedures. The first was a categorical exclusion from  environmental review for PBN procedures that if implemented could  demonstrate measurable reductions in fuel consumption, carbon dioxide  emissions, and noise, on a per-flight basis, as compared to aircraft  operations that follow existing procedures. However, our April 2013  report found that, according to FAA, potential noise impacts are  measured cumulatively for all flights and that FAA has not yet identified  an approach for per-flight assessments. FAA officials stated that no  currently available methodology resolves the technical problems involved  in making such a determination, so the agency has not applied this new  categorical exclusion. Second, the 2012 Act called for the agency to  establish a program for qualified third parties to develop, test, and  maintain flight procedures. FAA has made some progress in this area  by awarding a $2.8-million contract to GE’s Naverus and a partner to  develop two PBN procedures each at five mid-sized airports. The  contractors are to design, evaluate, and maintain these procedures and  be responsible for providing environmental data and analysis to FAA to  support categorical exclusions and for drafting any required National  Environmental Policy Act reviews, for review and approval by FAA. As of  January 2014, PBN procedures had been implemented at two of the five  selected airports.

section_title: Balancing the Needs of the Current and NextGen Systems
paragraphs: NextGen represents a transition from existing ATC systems and facilities  to new systems, potentially necessitating changes to or consolidation of  existing facilities. We have reported over the years that various  investment and policy decisions, including what existing ATC systems  and facilities will remain in the NAS during the transition and for how long,  have yet to be made. For the systems and facilities that remain, FAA will  have to monitor and maintain their performance and condition while the  agency implements the NextGen transition. Decisions about the number  of existing systems and facilities that will remain in operation during the  transition have implications for FAA’s capital and operations budgets  going forward. If aging systems and associated facilities are not retired,  FAA will miss potential opportunities to reduce its overall maintenance  costs at a time when resources needed to maintain both systems and  facilities may become scarcer.

The 2012 Act contained a number of provisions aimed at accelerating the  implementation of NextGen systems. However, we found in August  2013 that FAA’s budget planning does not fully account for the potential  impact of NextGen systems that will be deployed and the need for  continued operations and maintenance of existing systems and  facilities. In the 2012 Act, Congress also expressed concern regarding  the condition of FAA facilities and mandated that we study their condition.  In our September 2013 report, we noted that FAA estimates its staffed  facilities like towers and Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON)  facilities have about $260 million in deferred maintenance; unstaffed  facilities, such as shelters and communication towers that house and  support NAS equipment, had an estimated $446 million in deferred  maintenance in 2012. These, and other cost estimates for maintaining  existing systems and facilities, along with implementing NextGen exceed  anticipated funding levels. However, we concluded that FAA’s imprecise  facility-condition data do not facilitate agency-wide priority assessments,  which, in turn, could hinder the agency’s ability to target its limited  resources on those projects in greatest need of repair and that are most  critical to the NAS. In addition, section 804 of the 2012 Act directed FAA  to complete a study on the consolidation and realignment of FAA services  and facilities to support the transition to NextGen. However, FAA has yet  to identify which facilities would be consolidated or realigned, and  according to FAA officials, the study will continue through 2014.

In our August 2013 report we recommended improvements to FAA’s  budget-planning and infrastructure-condition data, improvements that  FAA is currently considering. Improved budget planning and accurate and  reliable data on infrastructure condition could help Congress better  understand the funding requirements of existing systems and facilities  and facilitate FAA’s efforts to support the agency’s mission of continuing  to safely operate the NAS along with the longer-term goal of transitioning  to NextGen. We will continue to monitor FAA’s progress in implementing  these recommendations.

section_title: FAA Is Continuously Working to Improve Safety and Has Made Progress in Improving Its Certification Processes
paragraphs: The U.S. air transportation system remains one of the safest in the world.  As part of FAA’s efforts to maintain and improve the safety of the system,  FAA issues certificates and approvals for new air operators, new aircraft,  and aircraft parts and equipment, and grants approvals for changes to air  operations and aircraft based on FAA’s interpretation of federal standards  (see fig. 2). These certificates and approvals indicate that such things as  new aircraft, the design and production of aircraft parts and equipment,  and new air operators are safe for use in the NAS. However, our previous  work has highlighted FAA’s inconsistent regulatory interpretation of  certification standards. In 2010, we found that variation in FAA’s  interpretation of standards for certification and approval decisions was a  long-standing issue and made recommendations to improve those  processes. Subsequently, the 2012 Act required FAA to work with  industry to assess the certification process, including reviewing our  previous work and developing recommendations to address the concerns  that we and others have raised.

As required by Section 312 of the 2012 Act, FAA, in consultation with  representatives of the aviation industry, made recommendations to the  director of FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service regarding streamlining and  reengineering the certification process. These recommendations, which  we found to be relevant, clear, and actionable, called for FAA to:  1.  improve the effectiveness of its delegation programs,  2.  update certification procedures to reflect a systems approach to  3.  review operational safety and rulemaking processes, and  4.  implement efficiency reforms, among others.

In July 2013, FAA released its plan to implement these recommendations.  The plan included 14 initiatives and programs that FAA either had under  way or intended to start to improve efficiency and reduce costs related to  certifications. We found these initiatives were generally relevant to the  recommendations and were clear and measurable. However, we found  that FAA’s plans do not contain some of the elements essential to a  performance measurement process. For example, FAA has developed  milestones for each initiative and deployed a tracking system to monitor  the implementation of all certification-related initiatives, but it has not yet  developed performance measures to track the success of most of the  initiatives and programs. According to an FAA official, the agency has  started discussions with industry stakeholders to identify key goals related  to performance measurement. Because industries’ goals and FAA’s goals  may be different with respect to the certification process, developing  meaningful performance measures is a complex task that the agency  plans to continue in 2014. The Committee recently asked us to examine  in more detail FAA’s progress and any challenges experienced in  implementing the recommendations and making improvements to its  certification processes, and will be tracking FAA’s efforts going forward.

Also resulting from issues found in our 2010 report on certification,  section 313 of the Act directed FAA to establish an advisory panel to  address inconsistencies in the interpretation of regulations by the  certification offices. Consistent with issues raised in our 2010 report, this  committee identified three root causes of inconsistent interpretation of  regulations: (1) unclear regulatory requirements; (2) inadequate and  nonstandard FAA and industry training in developing regulations, applying  standards, and resolving disputes; and (3) a culture that includes a  general reluctance by both industry and FAA to work issues of  inconsistent regulatory application through to a final resolution and a “fear  of retribution.” To address these root causes, the committee made six  recommendations, including developing a master source of guidance and  developing instructions for FAA staff with policy development  responsibility. We found that the advisory committee took a reasonable  approach in identifying the root causes and that its recommendations  were relevant, actionable, and clear. The committee also considered the  feasibility of the recommendations by identifying modifications to existing  efforts and programs and prioritizing the recommendations.

FAA reported in January 2014 that it was still determining the feasibility of  implementing these recommendations. The agency told us that it  expected to publish an action plan to address the recommendations and  metrics to measure implementation by late June 2014, more than six  months after FAA’s initial target. We note that while measuring  implementation may be useful, FAA is not intending to measure  outcomes, a measurement that could help in understanding if an action is  having the intended effect.

section_title: While Progress Has Been Made, Safely Integrating UAS into the NAS Will Continue to Present Challenges for FAA
paragraphs: UAS are aircraft and associated equipment that do not carry a pilot  aboard, but instead operate on pre-programmed routes or are manually  controlled by pilot-operated ground stations. Although current non- military, domestic uses of UAS are limited to activities such as law  enforcement, forensic photography, border security, and scientific data  collection, UAS have a wide range of other potential commercial uses— including vehicular traffic monitoring, crop dusting, and pipeline  inspections—and the market for UAS use is expected to grow. Concerned  with the pace of integrating UAS into the NAS, Congress established  specific requirements and set deadlines for FAA in the 2012 Act.

FAA has several efforts under way to satisfy the 2012 Act’s requirements,  most of which must be achieved by December 2015. In January 2013 we  reported that of the seven deadlines that had passed, FAA had completed  two items. However, since that time, FAA has satisfied a number of  additional milestones (see app. III for an update of all the 2012 Act’s  requirements with respect to UAS). Of particular note:  JPDO and FAA released a UAS Comprehensive Plan and a UAS  Roadmap, respectively, in November 2013 to outline the nation’s UAS  goals and objectives and the tasks necessary to achieve UAS  integration.   In late December 2013, FAA selected the six locations for its UAS test  site program.

FAA established permanent Arctic areas where small UAS can  operate for research and commercial purposes and the first flight took  place in the fall of 2013.

While progress has been made implementing some of the key milestones  established in the 2012 Act, integrating UAS into the NAS continues to  challenge FAA leading to uncertainty about when UAS integration will be  achieved. For example, while FAA announced the six locations for its  UAS test site program, FAA has not yet defined what operational, safety,  and performance data it needs from the test sites and how that data will  be collected and analyzed. We previously reported that use of these data  would be important in developing safety, reliability, and performance  standards, which are needed to guide and validate the supporting  research and development efforts. FAA and industry stakeholders have  stated that data and other information generated by the test sites will be  important in helping FAA answer key research questions related to UAS  operations and developing regulations and operational procedures for  future commercial and civil use of UAS. Finally, to increase collaboration  and provide stable organizational leadership, and focus on UAS  integration efforts, FAA created the UAS Integration Office in 2013. While  the office did not have an operations budget, as of January 2014, the  office has 33 full time employees, and FAA is still finalizing agreements  and other arrangements related to the reorganization, and it remains  unclear what resources the office will have available to fulfill its role.

Moving forward, FAA has a number of important milestones it must meet  to ensure UAS integration into the NAS. A key next step, according to  FAA officials and industry stakeholders, will be to adopt a final rule for  small UAS operations. Although FAA has had efforts under way since  2008 supporting a rulemaking on small UAS, it is unlikely that FAA will  meet the August 2014 final rule deadline required by the 2012 Act. For  example, FAA has not yet issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for  small UAS, and recently estimated that one will not be released until  November 2014. Further, FAA must develop standards—and determine  what data are necessary to inform that process—to facilitate safe UAS  integration into the NAS. More broadly, to achieve UAS integration, FAA  faces the challenge of ensure that all of the various efforts supporting  these integration issues within its own agency, as well as across federal  agencies and other entities, align and converge in a timely fashion. We  have begun additional work on UAS that will be looking specifically at  collaboration between federal agencies responsible for UAS integration  into the NAS and the research and development priorities in the area of  research and development to support UAS integration.

In closing, FAA has made some progress in implementing various parts of  the 2012 Act, and is seeking to address some of the key challenges it  faces. Going forward, we will continue to monitor FAA’s progress,  highlight the key challenges that remain, and the steps FAA and industry  can take to find a way forward on the issues covered in this statement as  well as other issues facing the industry. For example as previously  mentioned, we have work underway to examine organizational and  leadership issues with NextGen, and to examine, in greater detail, FAA’s  certification processes and progress made with respect to UAS. In  addition, for this Committee we will be examining issues related to  funding airport development, including passenger facility charges, airport  improvement program grants, and the potential for greater private sector  investment through public-private partnerships.

Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

section_title: Appendix I: Related GAO Reports and Testimonies
paragraphs: NextGen Air Transportation System: FAA Has Made Some Progress in  Midterm Implementation, but Ongoing Challenges Limit Expected  Benefits. GAO-13-264. Washington. D.C.: April 8, 2013.

Next Generation Air Transportation System: FAA Faces Implementation  Challenges. GAO-12-1011T. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2012.

Air Traffic Control Modernization: Management Challenges Associated  with Program Costs and Schedules Could Hinder NextGen  Implementation. GAO-12-223. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2012.

Next Generation Air Transportation System: FAA Has Made Some  Progress in Implementation, but Delays Threaten to Impact Costs and  Benefits. GAO-12-141T. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2011.

Integration of Current Implementation Efforts with Long-term Planning for  the Next Generation Air Transportation System. GAO-11-132R.  Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2010.

NextGen Air Transportation System: FAA’s Metrics Can Be Used to  Report on Status of Individual Programs, but Not of Overall NextGen  Implementation or Outcomes. GAO-10-629. Washington, D.C.: July 27,  2010.
subsections: section_title: Aviation Safety and Certification
paragraphs: Aviation Safety, Status of Recommendations to Improve FAA’s  Certification and Approval Processes. GAO-14-142T. Washington, D.C.:  Oct. 30, 2013.

Aviation Safety: FAA Efforts Have Improved Safety, but Challenges  Remain in Key Areas. GAO-13-442T. Washington, D.C.: April 16. 2013.

Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Enhance Safety Risk  Management. GAO-12-898. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2012.

Aviation Safety: Certification and Approval Processes Are Generally  Viewed as Working Well, but Better Evaluative Information Needed to  Improve Efficiency. GAO-11-14. Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2010.

section_title: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
paragraphs: Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Continued Coordination, Operational Data,  and Performance Standards Needed to Guide Research and  Development. GAO-13-346T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2013.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Measuring Progress and Addressing  Potential Privacy Concerns Would Facilitate Integration into the National  Airspace System. GAO-12-981. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2012.

section_title: Appendix II: Key Findings from Seven GAO Reports That Were Mandated by the FAA Modernization and Reform Act
paragraphs: A “mishandled baggage” report is a report filed with a carrier by or on behalf of a  passenger who claims loss, delay, damage, or pilferage of baggage. A mishandled- baggage report may represent one or more mishandled bags. handling processes; however, data limitations impeded further  analysis. We described DOT’s options for and the impact of  implementing minimum compensation standards for delayed  baggage, which included (1) keeping current regulations, which,  among other things, require compensation for reasonable expenses  that result because of delay in the delivery of baggage; (2)  reimbursing passengers for the checked baggage fee if the bag is  delayed; and (3) implementing compensation standards based on the  length of delay.

Air Traffic Collegiate Training Initiative (CTI). We found that the cost- effectiveness of the CTI schools depends on a number of cost  elements that are currently unknown, including the upfront cost of  developing new curriculums and how FAA implements training  through the CTI schools, among other factors. In addition, we were not able to determine the potential effect of the alternative air–traffic– controller–training approach through CTI schools on controller  trainees; the concept would need further development before  comparisons can be made about performance outcomes for such  trainees under the current approach through the FAA Academy and  the alternative approach through the CTI schools.

FAA facility condition. While FAA has mechanisms to identify and  mitigate safety deficiencies at FAA facilities and has taken actions to  strengthen its capital planning process to help ensure its facilities are  in good condition, our analysis of FAA’s statistical model for  estimating the condition of uninspected terminal facilities found the  model to be imprecise; it uses one variable—age of the facility—to  estimate the facility’s condition. Furthermore, inaccuracies in FAA’s real–estate management database undermine its usefulness as a  management tool to manage its real estate portfolio. We  recommended that FAA take action to improve the precision of the  methods it uses to estimate the conditions of uninspected terminal  facilities and implement a plan to improve its database for tracking its  inventory of real property assets, consistent with sound data– collection practices.

National Mediation Board. We found that the National Mediation  Board, which facilitates labor relations and oversees union elections in  two key transportation sectors—railroads and airlines—through  mediation and arbitration of labor disputes and overseeing union  elections, has adapted to challenges presented by large union  elections resulting from airline mergers and has implemented  improvements such as online voting. However, the board lacks some  controls in key management areas that could risk its resources and its  success such as having a formal mechanism for tracking resolution of  findings and recommendations. We made a number of  recommendations to improve the board’s planning and make the most  effective use of its limited resources and also noted that Congress  should consider authorizing an appropriate federal agency’s Office of  Inspector General to provide additional oversight.

Airport-intercity passenger rail connectivity. Most major U.S. airports  have some degree of physical proximity to intercity passenger rail  stations; however, air-rail connectivity remains limited due to a variety   We found that connectivity between these two modes may  of factors. provide a range of mobility, economic, and environmental benefits,  and while strategies exist to improve connectivity, the costs and trade- offs of enhancing connectivity could be substantial.

GAO, Intermodal Transportation: A Variety of Factors Influence Airport-Intercity  Passenger Rail Connectivity, GAO-13-691 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2013).

section_title: Appendix III: Status of Requirements for UAS Integration under the 2012 Act as of January 2014
paragraphs: Appendix III: Status of Requirements for UAS  Integration under the 2012 Act as of January  2014 Deadline  05/14/2012   Enter into agreements with appropriate government agencies to simplify the  FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 requirement   process for issuing Certificates of waiver or authorizations (COAs) or waivers for  public UAS.

Status of action   In process–memorandum of  agreement (MOA) with the  Department of Defense (DOD)  signed September of 2013; MOA  with Department of Justice (DOJ)  signed March 2013; MOA with  National Aeronautics and Space  Administration (NASA) in final  coordination; MOA with Department  of Interior (DOI) and National  Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration (NOAA) are still in  draft.

08/12/2012   Establish a program to integrate UAS into the national airspace at six test  ranges. This program is to terminate 5 years after date of enactment.   08/12/2012  Develop an Arctic UAS operation plan and initiate a process to work with relevant  federal agencies and national and international communities to designate  permanent areas in the Arctic where small unmanned aircraft may operate 24  hours per day for research and commercial purposes.  08/12/2012   Determine whether certain UAS can fly safely in the national airspace before the  completion of the Act’s requirements for a comprehensive plan and rulemaking to  safely accelerate the integration of civil UAS into the national airspace or the  Act’s requirement for issuance of guidance regarding the operation of public UAS  including operating a UAS with a COA or waiver.

11/10/2012  Expedite the issuance of a COA for public safety entities  11/10/2012   Develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate integration of civil UAS into  Issue guidance regarding operation of civil UAS to expedite COA process;  provide a collaborative process with public agencies to allow an incremental  expansion of access into the national airspace as technology matures and the  necessary safety analysis and data become available and until standards are  completed and technology issues are resolved; facilitate capability of public  entities to develop and use test ranges; provide guidance on public entities’  responsibility for operation.

02/12/2013  Make operational at least one project at a test range.  02/14/2013   Approve and make publically available a 5-year roadmap for the introduction of  civil UAS into national airspace, to be updated annually.   02/14/2013   Submit to Congress a copy of the comprehensive plan.   08/14/2014   Publish in the Federal Register the Final Rule on small UAS.   08/14/2014   Publish in the Federal Register a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to implement  recommendations of the comprehensive plan.   08/14/2014   Publish in the Federal Register an update to the Administration’s policy  statement on UAS in Docket No. FAA-2006-25714.   09/30/2015   Achieve safe integration of civil UAS into the national airspace.

Status of action   None to date   of the comprehensive plan.   12/31/2015   Develop and implement operational and certification requirements for public UAS  02/14/2017  Report to Congress on the test ranges.

section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: For further information on this testimony, please contact Gerald L.  Dillingham, Ph.D., at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. In  addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and  Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals  making key contributions to this testimony include Andrew Von Ah,  Assistant Director; Mike Armes, Martha Chow; Geoff Hamilton; Dave  Hooper; Daniel Hoy; Eric Hudson; Bert Japikse; Heather Krause, Sara  Ann Moessbauer; Faye Morrison; Nalylee Padilla; Melissa Swearingen;  and Jessica Wintfeld.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.


Question-summary annotations: questions: question: What do complex transformations require?
answer: Improving NextGen Leadership: Complex transformations, such as NextGen, require substantial leadership commitment over a sustained period, and leaders must both be empowered to make critical decisions and be held accountable for results.
child_questions: question: How has the 2012 Act addressed this need?
answer: The 2012 Act created a Chief NextGen Officer that FAA appointed in June 2013, and FAA has recently filled other key NextGen leadership positions.
child_questions: question: How will these changes benefit FAA?
answer: With these positions filled, FAA should be in a better position to resolve its NextGen leadership challenges.

questions: question: How does the 2012 Act aim to accelerate the creation of performance-based navigation procedures?
answer: Demonstrating Near-Term Benefits: The 2012 Act included a number of provisions aimed at accelerating the creation of performance-based navigation (PBN) procedures, such as following precise routes that use the Global Positioning System, which can save airlines and other aircraft operators money through reduced fuel burn and flight time.

question: What must the FAA do?
answer: FAA must continue to deliver PBN capabilities and begin to demonstrate a return on operator's investments.
child_questions: question: What is the status of the FAA's efforts to accomplish this task?
answer: As of January 2014, FAA has implemented PBN procedures at two of the five airports selected for early deployment.

questions: question: What problem did GAO find with FAA's budget planning?
answer: Balancing the Needs of the Current Air–Traffic Control System and NextGen: While the 2012 Act contained a number of provisions aimed at accelerating NextGen implementation, GAO found that FAA's budget planning does not fully account for the impact on the agency's operating costs of the NextGen systems that will be deployed in future years, along with the need for continued operation and maintenance of existing systems and facilities.
child_questions: question: What is the relationship between cost estimates and the anticipated funding levels?
answer: Cost estimates for maintaining existing systems and facilities coupled with implementing NextGen exceed anticipated funding levels.
child_questions: question: How did the GAO respond to these issues?
answer: GAO recommended improvements to FAA's budget–planning and infrastructure-condition data, which FAA is working to implement.

questions: question: As of 2013, how has the FAA progressed in relation to meeting the requirements set in the 2012 Act?
answer: For unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), FAA has implemented 7 of the 17 requirements established in the 2012 Act, representing progress since GAO's last update in January 2013.
child_questions: question: What challenges has the FAA faced in implementing these provisions?
answer: However, FAA continues to experience challenges implementing the provisions in the 2012 Act and integrating UAS into the NAS.

question: Why is it unlikely that the FAA will meet the August 2014 deadline to implement UAS?
answer: For example, although FAA has had efforts under way since 2008 supporting a rulemaking on small UAS, it is unlikely that FAA will meet the August 2014 final rule deadline required by the 2012 Act since it has not yet issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.

question: What issue still stands with the UAS Integration Office?
answer: In addition, while FAA created the UAS Integration Office in 2013 to lead UAS integration, as of January 2014, the program lacks an operations budget.

questions: question: How does the U.S. air transportation system rank worldwide?
answer: The U.S. air transportation system is the busiest and among the safest in the world.
child_questions: question: As such, what does maintenance and improvement of the U.S. air transportation system require ?
answer: Even so, maintaining and improving the extraordinary level of connectivity and mobility the system affords us, and the safety record that has been achieved to date requires continued attention and effort.

question: What did Congress direct the FAA to do in the 2012 Act?
answer: In the 2012 Act, Congress directed FAA to take various actions to improve the safety and efficiency of the current NAS while transitioning to NextGen.
child_questions: question: What other provisions are included within the 2012 Act?
answer: In addition, given the potential and opportunities afforded by new UAS technologies, the 2012 Act included several provisions with respect to FAA safely integrating UAS into the NAS.