Warfighter Support: DOD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate Operational Contract Support into Contingency Planning
Released: 2013-02-08T00:00:00


Highlights: section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD has relied extensively on contractors for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade. At the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the number of contractors exceeded the number of military personnel, and a similar situation is occurring in Afghanistan. In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum noting the risk of DOD's level of dependency on contractors and outlined actions to institutionalize changes necessary to influence how the department plans for contracted support in contingency operations. The memorandum also called for leveraging the civilian expeditionary workforce to reduce DOD's reliance on contractors, but this workforce is not yet fully developed. GAO was asked to examine DOD's progress in planning for operational contract support. Our review determined how DOD is integrating operational contract support into its planning through efforts of the (1) OSD, Joint Staff, and military services, and (2) combatant commands and their components. To conduct its work, GAO evaluated DOD operational contract support guidance and documents and met with officials at various DOD offices.

section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the services have taken steps to integrate operational contract support into planning for contingency operations. For example, in April 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, working with the Joint Staff, revised the Guidance for the Employment of the Force to require planning for operational contract support in all phases of military operations. Further, in December 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) revised an instruction and issued corresponding regulations establishing policies and procedures for operational contract support. The Army issued service-specific guidance that describes roles, responsibilities, and requirements to help integrate operational contract support into its planning efforts for contingency operations. However, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not issued similar comprehensive guidance for integrating operational contract support throughout each service. Instead, these services have taken actions such as developing training and other individual efforts to familiarize servicemembers with operational contract support. According to service officials, one reason that they have not issued comprehensive guidance similar to the Army's guidance is because the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not been the lead service for contracting in recent operations. However, these services combined spent over a billion dollars for contracted services in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2011. Without specific, service-wide guidance, the other services' future planning efforts may not reflect the full extent of the use of contract support and the attendant cost and need for oversight.

The combatant commands and their components have begun to incorporate operational contract support into their planning for contingencies, but they have not fully integrated operational contract support in all functional areas. We found that the combatant commands and components are not planning for the potential use of contractors in areas where they may be needed beyond logistics such as communications. Recognizing the problem, DOD, in October 2012, issued guidance that calls on functional planners beyond the logistics area to identify major support functions planned for commercial support sourcing. GAO also found that officials involved with logistics planning at the commands receive training from the Joint Staff and assistance from embedded operational contract support planners to help integrate operational contract support into logistics planning. However, officials involved in planning for other areas--such as intelligence--that have used contractors in past operations, do not receive such training. Further, the embedded operational contract support planners do not focus on areas beyond logistics. Moreover, while the combatant commands have embedded experts to assist with operational contract support planning, the military service components do not have such expertise. Without training for all planners, a broader focus beyond logistics for embedded planners, and expertise offered at the military service components, DOD risks being unprepared to plan and manage deployed contractor personnel and may not be able to provide the necessary oversight during future contingencies.

section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Navy , Marine Corps and Air Force provide guidance on planning for operational contract support; that the Joint Staff provide training for all planners; that the planners broaden their focus to include areas beyond logistics; and that expertise is offered to service components to further integrate operational contract support into plans. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has relied extensively on contractors  for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade. At the height  of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the number of contractors exceeded the  number of military personnel, and a similar situation is occurring in  support of Operation Enduring Freedom. According to DOD, in 2012, the  number of contractors in Afghanistan exceeded 109,000 compared to the  approximately 84,200 military personnel present at that same time.  According to DOD regulations, operational contract support is the ability  to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract  support and management of contractor personnel providing support to the  joint force within a designated operational area. In Afghanistan,  contractors provide traditional logistical support, such as base operating  support (food and housing) and maintaining weapon systems.  Additionally, contractors provide nonlogistical support, such as  intelligence analysts and interpreters who accompany military patrols.  DOD anticipates continued reliance on contractors for future operations.

Our previous work has highlighted long-standing problems regarding the  oversight and management of contractors supporting deployed forces and  the department’s failure to fully integrate operational contract support  within DOD. For example, we and others have identified instances in Iraq  and Afghanistan where DOD’s acquisition and non-acquisition personnel  were in short supply, were not properly trained, or were not fully aware of  their responsibilities. Since 1992, we have designated DOD contract  management as a high-risk area. In our February 2011 report on high- risk areas, we reported that DOD needed to, among other things, fully  integrate operational contract support throughout the department through  education and predeployment training. In June 2010, because of the  department not fully integrating operational contract support, we called for  a cultural change in DOD—one that emphasized an awareness of  operational contract support throughout all entities of the department to  help address the challenges faced in ongoing and future contingency  operations—and last September, we testified that DOD still faced  challenges achieving such a change. We recognize that effecting a  cultural change is a major undertaking for organizations, especially for an  organization as large and multifaceted as DOD. Effecting a cultural  change involves, for example, developing and communicating a vision for  the future, neutralizing impediments to change, identifying stakeholders in  the change process, and promoting continued support from senior  leaders. Additionally, Congress has enacted legislation requiring DOD to  take specific actions to improve its management and oversight of  contractors in contingency operations. For example, in the John Warner  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress  required DOD to develop joint policies for requirements definition,  contingency program management, and contingency contracting during  combat and postconflict operations. A provision in the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 added to this requirement, which  is codified as amended at section 2333 of Title 10, United States Code.

DOD has taken steps toward making fundamental changes in how it  approaches the issue of operational contract support. In January 2011,  the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum in which he expressed  concern about the risks introduced by DOD’s current level of dependency  on contractors, its future total force mix, and the need to better plan for  operational contract support in the future. The Secretary outlined a  number of actions needed to institutionalize the changes necessary to  influence a cultural shift in how the department views, and accounts and  plans for, contracted support in a contingency environment. In addition, in  June 2011, the Director of the Joint Staff issued a memorandum to  implement the direction in the Secretary’s memorandum and assigned  Joint Staff directors to specific tasks regarding the integration of  operational contract support and the civilian expeditionary workforce  throughout DOD. Further, in December 2011, DOD issued DOD  Instruction 3020.41 and corresponding regulations in the Code of Federal  Regulations. The instruction and regulations established policy, assigned  responsibilities, and provided procedures for operational contract support,  including operational contract support program management, contract  support integration, and integration of defense contractor personnel into  contingency operations outside the United States.

In addition to operational contract support, the Secretary of Defense’s  January 2011 memorandum also addresses the need to better leverage  the capabilities of the civilian expeditionary workforce in order to reduce  the risk introduced by DOD’s level of reliance on contractors. Created in  2009, the civilian expeditionary workforce is a DOD program that deploys  civilian employees to support military operations. As of late 2012, it  comprised approximately 395 personnel, which is about 10 percent of the  total number of civilians deployed in support of contingency operations.  DOD established this workforce to create a cadre of civilians who are  trained, cleared, and equipped to respond urgently to expeditionary  requirements. However, according to officials from the civilian  expeditionary workforce program office, the use of these individuals, to  date, has been on an augmentee basis to fulfill individual requirements. In  an effort to utilize the program as originally intended with a ready pool of  qualified and trained civilians to support contingency operations, civilian  expeditionary workforce officials stated that they are currently developing  a DOD instruction that includes defining the critical skill sets for the  civilian expeditionary workforce program. DOD expects to issue the  instruction in late 2013. In the interim, DOD officials stated that they  expect to release a policy memorandum ahead of the instruction that will  address the civilian expeditionary workforce support and deployment  procedures. According to officials from the services and combatant  commands and their components, they are not planning for this workforce  until the capabilities are further defined.

In light of continuing interest in DOD’s integration and management of  contracted support in support of contingency operations, you asked us to  examine DOD’s progress on institutionalizing the planning for operational  contract support throughout the department. Specifically, our objectives  were to determine how DOD is integrating planning for operational  contract support through efforts of: (1) the Office of the Secretary of  Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the military services, and (2) the  combatant commands and their components.

To conduct this review, we collected and analyzed documentation such  as planning guidance and policies related to the integration of operational  contract support into DOD’s planning for contingency operations. We  reviewed plans and other efforts to understand DOD’s implementation of  requirements to integrate operational contract support. We also  interviewed officials from OSD, the Joint Staff, military services, and  combatant commands to obtain a comprehensive understanding of  DOD’s efforts to integrate operational contract support. Specifically, to  determine how OSD and the Joint Staff have taken steps to integrate  operational contract support department-wide, we examined excerpts  from strategic planning guidance and policies regarding operational  contract support and met with officials from OSD and the Joint Staff. We  reviewed DOD guidance on the civilian expeditionary workforce and  interviewed officials from OSD, the Joint Staff, the civilian expeditionary  workforce program office, military services, and combatant commands to  understand the intent and the status of the development of the civilian  expeditionary workforce program. To determine how the military services  have integrated operational contract support into their operations, we  collected and analyzed documentation related to operational contract  support initiatives from each of the services. We also met with officials  from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force to gain an  understanding of how each organization has implemented operational  contract support to support strategic-level guidance and policy. To  determine how combatant commands and their components have  integrated operational contract support into planning, we reviewed  selected operation and contingency plans to validate the integration of  operational contract support considerations in those instances. We also  met with officials from all of the geographic combatant commands (except  U.S. Northern Command) and their components to gain knowledge about  their current processes for planning for contingency operations.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to February  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional  details on our scope and methodology are in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Organizational Responsibilities for Operational Contract Support
paragraphs: The U.S. military routinely uses contracted support in contingency  operations. Military forces will often be significantly augmented with  contracted support because of the continual introduction of high- technology equipment, coupled with force structure and manning  limitations, and the high pace of operations. Accordingly, DOD has  recognized that the planning for and integration of contracted support into  joint operations is important for the successful execution of military  operations. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense’s January 2011  memorandum addresses the need to better plan for operational contract  support at the strategic and operational levels. The following describes  the roles of various DOD offices involved in planning for operational  contract support:

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is  responsible for policy, plans, and program development for the total  force, which includes military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor  personnel.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics has the overall responsibility for the performance of the  department’s acquisition system, including establishing and publishing  policies and procedures governing the operations of the acquisition  system and the administrative oversight of defense contracts.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has specific responsibilities  in the areas of strategic direction as well as in strategic and  contingency planning. The Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (J-4)  provides plans, policy, guidance, and oversight on joint logistics,  including joint contingency operational contract support matters.

The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force (under their respective  Secretaries) are responsible for planning and executing contract  support to their own forces unless directed otherwise by a combatant  commander. The Secretaries of the military departments have been  tasked in the Secretary of Defense’s January 2011 memorandum to  assess how total force data (that is, the mix of military forces,  contractors, and civilians) can inform planning and to assess  opportunities for in-sourcing contracted capabilities that represent a  high risk to the warfighter.

The geographic combatant commands plan and oversee the military  operations for their areas of responsibility. Combatant commanders  are assigned military service components that assist them with further  planning and execution of the missions (see fig. 1).

The Defense Logistics Agency, at the request of the combatant  commands, has two expert planners from its Joint Contingency  Acquisition Support Office placed in the logistics offices at each  combatant command to improve the incorporation of operational  contract support into combatant command plans.

section_title: Contingency Planning
paragraphs: The combatant commands and their components create plans to prepare  for possible missions in their area. This planning begins with broad  strategic guidance provided by the President, the Secretary of Defense,  and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This strategic guidance  includes DOD documents, such as the Guidance for the Employment of  the Force and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which tell combatant  commanders what to plan for within their areas of responsibility. On the  basis of the strategic guidance, combatant command planners write an  operation plan to address particular contingencies. During this stage, a  combatant commander can also task and provide guidance to the  component commands to develop supporting plans for an operation plan.  DOD doctrine suggests that, as a plan is developed, frequent dialogue  between planners and senior DOD leadership is necessary to ensure that  results are sufficient and feasible to meet mission objectives.

An operation plan describes how DOD will respond to a potential  contingency that might require the use of military force. Such plans are  used to deal with a wide range of events, such as terrorism, hostile  foreign nations, and natural disasters. An operation plan consists of a  base plan and annexes. A base plan describes the concept of operations,  major forces, sustainment concept, and anticipated timelines for  completing the mission. Base plans are written following a five-paragraph  structure—Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics,  and Command and Control. Plans will generally include assumptions that  are relevant to the development or successful execution of the plan and  the concept of operation that the commander plans to use to accomplish  the mission, including the forces involved, the phasing of operations, and  the general nature and purpose of operations to be conducted. In addition  to the base plan, operation plans sometimes include annexes that provide  further details on areas such as intelligence (Annex B), operations (Annex  C), logistics (Annex D), personnel (Annex E), communications (Annex K),  and operational contract support (Annex W)—the latter generally includes  information such as contract support, contracting capabilities, and  capacities support estimates. While Annex D includes operational  contract support considerations, we have previously reported that  because DOD has typically relied on contractors in areas beyond  logistics, it is important for DOD to conduct up-front planning for the use  of contractors in all functional areas, not just logistics. In 2010, we  recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff require all  base plans and nonlogistics annexes (e.g., intelligence and  communication) to address the potential need for contractor support  where appropriate.

section_title: OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services Have Taken Steps to Integrate Operational Contract Support, but Most of the Military Services Have Not Issued Comprehensive Guidance
paragraphs: OSD and the Joint Staff have taken steps to integrate operational contract  support into departmental planning, but the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air  Force have not issued comprehensive guidance for integrating  operational contract support throughout each service’s planning efforts.
subsections: section_title: OSD and the Joint Staff Have Taken Actions and Have Other Efforts Underway to Plan for Operational Contract Support
paragraphs: OSD and the Joint Staff have issued several new or revised policies,  undertaken other actions, and are revising other policies regarding  operational contract support. These efforts are described in figure 2.

OSD and the Joint Staff have issued several new or revised policies on  planning for operational contract support. In January 2011, the Secretary  of Defense issued a memorandum to address the risks introduced by  DOD’s level of dependency on contractors, its future total force mix, and  the need to better plan for operational contract support in the future. The  memorandum required, among other things, that the Under Secretary of  Defense for Policy integrate operational contract support considerations  into strategic planning documents and provide policy guidance on  planning for contracted support in force planning scenario development.  Also, the memorandum required that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff collaboratively develop procedures to support operational contract  support planning in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System,  including contractor support estimates and visibility of contractors  accompanying the force. A memorandum issued by the Director of the  Joint Staff in June 2011 further assigned Joint Staff directors to either  lead or support specific tasks to implement the Secretary of Defense’s  direction.

Working with the Joint Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  completed revisions in April 2011 to the Guidance for the Employment of  the Force requiring that the combatant commands, together with their  service components and relevant combat support agencies, plan for the  integration of contracted support and contractor management in all  phases of military operations. Additionally, the Joint Staff completed  revisions in April 2011 to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The  revisions included the requirement that operational contract support  planning must occur at all plan levels and that, at a minimum, plans will  identify anticipated contract support requirements by joint capability area,  phase of operation, and area of need.

In addition to policy revisions, OSD and the Joint Staff have undertaken  additional actions to ensure that planners better integrate operational  contract support into the planning process. For example, at the request of  the combatant commands, the Joint Staff has conducted operational  contract support training that explains changes to the planning  requirements for the integration of operational contract support.  Specifically, the Joint Staff held training seminars for operational contract  support planners at Central Command and Southern Command in  November 2011, at Pacific Command in January 2012, and at Africa and  European Commands in May 2012 to highlight recent changes in  guidance and processes.

In addition, the Functional Capabilities Integration Board, which was  created in 2010, is actively monitoring ongoing operational contract  support–related efforts across DOD and the progress toward timely  completion of the direction in the Secretary’s January 2011  memorandum. Chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Program Support and the Vice Director for Logistics of the Joint Staff, the  Functional Capabilities Integration Board is a senior executive–level body  that includes officials from OSD, the military services, defense agencies,  and the Joint Staff. The board meets quarterly to conduct independent  assessments and analyses of operational contract support capabilities (to  include supporting doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership  and education, personnel, and facilities of the armed forces). It also seeks  to establish and assess ways to improve performance and processes for  assessing operational contract support readiness.

OSD and the Joint Staff are also revising other guidance on operational  contract support and examining the extent to which operational contract  support is integrated in DOD’s planning for operations, as noted in figure  2. For example, the Joint Staff is overseeing an effort to revise a key  doctrine document, Joint Publication 4-10, to incorporate, among other  things, lessons learned from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Joint  Publication 4-10 establishes doctrine for planning, conducting, and  assessing operational contract support integration and contractor  management functions in support of joint operations. The joint doctrine  in the publication applies to the combatant commands and their service  components, subunified commands, joint task forces, the services, and  defense agencies in support of joint operations. According to Joint Staff  officials, they expect to complete revisions to the guidance in November  2013.

Moreover, the Joint Staff recently published, on October 18, 2012, the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.03 on Adaptive  Planning and Execution, Planning Formats and Guidance, which replaces  the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II. This  manual will be used by joint commanders and war planners to monitor,  plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and  sustainment activities associated with joint operations and provide users  with access to joint operations planning policies and procedures.  Specifically, the Adaptive Planning and Execution manual requires that  functional planners identify major support functions planned for  commercial support sourcing. The manual also references Annex W in  the instructions for many of the individual annexes. Also, the Adaptive  Planning and Execution manual, in keeping with the Secretary of  Defense’s memorandum requirements, requires the expansion of the  Annex W, the operational contract support annex, in operation plans to  include appendixes on (1) estimates of contracting capabilities and  capacities support, (2) a contractor management plan, and (3) estimates  of contractor support. As stated in the recently revised Joint Strategic  Capabilities Plan, operational contract support planning is now required in  much greater detail because of the volume of participation and resulting  lessons learned in current operations.

Additionally, the Joint Staff is drafting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff Manual 4300.01, which will include information on integrating  operational contract support in joint logistics planning. Specifically, the  manual will assist logistics planners in developing procedures and  guidance for a logistics planning process that effectively integrates,  synchronizes, prioritizes, and focuses joint logistics capabilities on  achieving a supported commander’s operational objectives and desired  effects for various types of plans, including contingency plans, tasked in  the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or as directed by the combatant  commander. The Joint Staff’s revisions will include setting minimum  requirements for operational contract support by plan level and providing  templates and tools for planners to use to estimate contractor support and  contracting capabilities. DOD officials stated that this manual will be  published following revisions to the Logistics Supplement to the Joint  Strategic Capabilities Plan, expected by the end of 2012.

Finally, OSD has drafted an action plan, in conjunction with the Joint Staff  and military services, that will establish operational contract support  objectives and performance measures in the department’s attempt to fully  institutionalize operational contract support by the end of fiscal year 2016.  Specifically, the draft action plan identifies major actions and the  projected cost to institutionalize operational contract support capabilities  and capacity across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel,  leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy spectrum. It  identifies timelines and lead organizations for specified tasks to help  guide operational contract support planning and programming initiatives  required to resolve urgent capability gaps. DOD officials stated that they  expect the draft of the action plan to be approved by January 2013.

section_title: The Military Services, with the Exception of the Army, Have Not Issued Comprehensive Guidance on Integrating Operational Contract Support
paragraphs: The military services, with the exception of the Army, have not issued  comprehensive guidance to enable the integration of operational contract  support into their planning efforts, thus limiting the institutionalization of  operational contract support at the service level. Joint Publication 4-10,  issued in 2008, notes that each military service, under its respective  military department, is responsible for planning and executing contracting  support to its forces, unless otherwise directed by the combatant  commander. Joint Publication 4-10 also notes that the military services  are responsible for integrating identified contract requirements into  training. Further, the Secretary of Defense’s January 2011  memorandum also directs the military services to take certain actions,  which could improve how they plan for and use operational contract  support.

In large part because of the Army’s leading role in the major  contingencies over the past decade that required it to employ operational  contract support, the Army has issued guidance and created various  organizations for integrating contract support into its planning and for  developing related training. The Secretary of the Army established an  independent panel, known as the Gansler Commission, which issued a  final report in October 2007 that highlighted issues and needs for better  military operations and cited critical deficiencies in the Army’s contracting  and contract management. Since that report’s issuance, the Army has  made it a priority to address highlighted deficiencies in areas such as  guidance and training. In particular, the Army has issued service-specific  guidance for integrating contract support into the service. For example,  the Army issued Army Regulation 715-9 in 2011 that provides guidance  regarding planning and managing operational contract support for the  nonacquisition force, such as operational commanders or contracting  officer’s representatives. It describes responsibilities, policy, and  implementing procedures for operational contract support. Specifically,  the regulation describes, among other things, planning, requirements  definition, and oversight in the context of contracted support. For  example, the regulation notes that, in general, contracted support will be  utilized after full consideration of all sources of support, including  deployable civilians. The Army also developed a manual containing  tactics, techniques, and procedures for operational contract support.  The manual provides “how to” guidance about operational contract  support for Army operational commanders and their nonacquisition officer  staff. In addition, the manual describes the roles of Army officials and  organizations regarding operational contract support and serves as the  primary reference document for execution of operational contract support  planning, integration, and oversight tasks provided in other guidance,  including Army Regulation 715-9. Moreover, the manual contains  checklists that include considerations related to operational contract  support. Furthermore, in direct response to the Gansler Commission  report, the Army created the Army Contracting Command in 2008, which  performs the majority of the contracting work for the Army, including  assisting in operational contract support planning needs, training  development, and execution. Other Army entities, along with DOD’s  Defense Acquisition University, have developed and are implementing  additional operational contract support training initiatives. Key Army  training initiatives include the following:

The Expeditionary Contracting Command, a subordinate to the Army  Contracting Command, provides contracting support to the Army and  other federal organizations at installations outside of the United  States. Additionally, the Expeditionary Contracting Command has  seven contracting support brigades that provide direct support to  Army service component commanders, including providing  predeployment contingency contracting unit training, which includes  training contracting officers’ representatives.

The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and  Technology) Integration Office works with other entities including the  Expeditionary Contracting Command to develop collective and  individual training standards and material for acquisition and  nonacquisition personnel involved with the planning, requirements  definition, contracting, and management of operational contract  support. Also, the integration office oversees the incorporation of  planning of operational contract support for brigade-level training.

The Army Contracting Command, along with other entities, developed  and launched enhanced training of contracting officer’s  representatives through the Defense Acquisition University. This  course assists with deploying more prepared and trained contracting  officer’s representatives into contingencies.

Finally, according to statements of senior Army officials before the  Commission on Wartime Contracting, the Assistant Secretary of the Army  (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) chartered the Operational  Contracting Support and Policy Directorate in December 2009. As  described in an Army briefing, this directorate develops, issues, manages,  and measures the effectiveness of policies regarding operational contract  support. According to the briefing, it provides strategic contract  management and oversight of the U.S. Central Command Joint Theater  Support Contracting Command, an organization that provides theater  contracting support to the combined joint operations area of Afghanistan.  The directorate provides oversight of contingency contracting operations  in Iraq and Afghanistan as the focal point for the Army for contracting in- theater. According to the briefing, among other activities, such as  validation of operational contract support in doctrine, organization,  training, materiel, leadership, and personnel considerations, members of  the directorate also serve on DOD’s Operational Contract Support  Functional Capabilities and Integration Board. In addition, this directorate,  along with the Army’s other efforts, assists the Army in meeting the  operational contract support requirements in both Joint Publication 4-10  and the Secretary of Defense’s January 2011 memorandum.

While the Army has established guidance and taken several steps to  integrate operational contract support within its service, the other services  have not taken similar actions to incorporate operational contract support  into their planning. Joint Publication 4-10 and the Secretary of Defense’s  January 2011 memorandum require the military departments to take  certain steps that could improve how they plan for and use operational  contract support. While the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have  developed some training and other efforts to improve the planning and  use of operational contract support, they have not developed service- specific guidance detailing how operational contract support will be  integrated into each of their services’ planning and execution efforts for  contingency operations. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force officials told  us that they generally do not have a major role in operational contract  support because the Army has been the lead service for contracting in  present conflicts.

Navy officials acknowledged that some sailors need to understand the  role that operational contract support plays in their deployed locations. As  a result, Navy officials have included information about operational  contract support in logistics training, which provides a basic overview of  contract execution. However, as acknowledged by Navy officials, the  Navy has not issued guidance that includes information regarding roles  and responsibilities for ensuring better execution of planning, integration,  and oversight of operational contract support within the service. Marine  Corps officials acknowledged that the Marine Corps has also not issued  service-wide, specific operational contract support guidance, although  they explained that the service’s role in the Afghanistan and Iraq  contingencies showed that operational contract support was important  and that the Marine Corps needed specific, related training. In  Afghanistan, the Marine Corps established two operational contract  support cells, which have managed contract support and management- related activities for the service and provided oversight of operational  contract support training to relevant personnel. In addition, a 2009 Marine  Corps reference publication on contingency contracting contains doctrinal  information for commanders and their staff members to plan for and  obtain contracting support when deployed. While this information is  helpful to commanders and their staff to understand the process for  contingency contracting, the document does not comprehensively  describe how the Marine Corps plans to integrate operational contract  support throughout the service. Further, as part of planning before  deployment, the Marine Corps identified and trained contracting officer’s  representatives prior to their deployment. Additionally, officials told us that  the Marine Corps has begun to include some operational contract support  in training in areas such as on regulations related to contracting. While  the Marine Corps has incorporated some operational contract support in  predeployment planning, the training is limited and, according to Marine  Corps officials, it is at the commanders’ discretion to include it into their  units’ training. According to Marine Corps officials, the Marine Corps has  not provided guidance detailing the roles and responsibilities for  nonacquisition personnel on how operational contract support will be  integrated into the Marine Corps’ planning and execution efforts for  contingency operations. Since training often changes, there is no  permanent enforcement to maintain competencies of operational contract  support, such as contractor oversight, into planning or training within the  Marine Corps, thus limiting full institutionalization of operational contract  support.

Air Force officials acknowledged that the Air Force has not developed  service-wide guidance regarding the integration of operational contract  support within the service. The guidance that officials did identify is  focused on the role of contracting officer’s representatives and actions for  deployed commanders and contingency contracting officers to take during  initial deployment (such as establishing shelter requirements and other  needs of the unit). GAO identified similar acquisition-related implementing  guidance related to basic contingency contracting actions during phases  of an operation as well as implementing guidance regarding review of  operation plans for contractor support integration plans, contractor  management plans, and other contracting considerations. However, these  documents do not comprehensively describe how the Air Force plans to  integrate operational contract support throughout the service. Further, it is  not clear how familiar officials are with these documents, as they were not  mentioned during the course of discussions. The Air Force’s current  training related to operational contract support is limited to the contract  familiarization training provided to the contracting officer’s  representatives, which is typical of training provided to contracting  officer’s representatives in all services. As a result, the integration of  operational contract support throughout the Air Force’s planning is limited  because, as acknowledged by Air Force officials, the Air Force has not  issued comprehensive guidance explaining the roles and responsibilities  for the execution of planning, integration, and oversight of operational  contract support within the service.

Thus, while the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have developed some  training and other individual efforts to familiarize servicemembers with  operational contract support, these services have not issued  comprehensive guidance to assist in fully institutionalizing operational  contract support. DOD and service officials told us that they do not need  to plan for operational contract support in advance because the Army has  been the lead service in recent conflicts. However, according to DOD, the  Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force spent over a billion dollars combined  for contracted services in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2011, and therefore  contracted support has been utilized for which planning should have  occurred. Without specific service-wide guidance to help institutionalize  operational contract support, the other services may not fully understand  their role in operational contract support and may not be prepared to  execute operational contract support in the future—when it is possible  that one of these services, instead of the Army, will play a leading role.  Further, unless the services’ guidance describes how each service plans  to integrate operational contract support into each organization—including  planning for contingency operations and training—the other services’  planning efforts may not reflect the full extent of the use of contract  support and the attendant cost and requirements for oversight.

section_title: Combatant Commands and Components Have Taken Positive Steps, but Face Challenges in Fully Integrating Operational Contract Support into Their Contingency Planning Processes
paragraphs: The combatant commands and their components have begun to  incorporate operational contract support into their planning, but they  have not fully integrated operational contract support into their planning  for contingencies. While the combatant commands and their components  have taken steps to integrate operational contract support into  contingency planning, mostly in the area of logistics, they are not planning  for such support across all areas—such as intelligence and  communications—that are likely to use contractors in future  contingencies. We found that DOD’s efforts to fully integrate operational  contract support at the command and component levels are hindered by  not training all planners about new operational contract support  requirements, a lack of focus of operational contract support planners on  areas beyond logistics, and not providing operational contract support  planning expertise at the commands’ components.
subsections: section_title: The Combatant Commands and Their Components Have Taken Some Positive Steps to Integrate Operational Contract Support in Their Planning Processes
paragraphs: The combatant commands and their components have taken some  positive steps to integrate operational contract support in their planning  processes. According to DOD officials, at the time of this review, there  were 95 plans with 45 approved Annex Ws. In addition, our current review  of selected operation plans at each of the combatant commands found  that officials are now including planning assumptions about operational  contract support within either the base plan or Annex W. For example, in  a draft humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster response plan that  we reviewed, officials at Southern Command had included an Annex W  that integrated assumptions for operational contract support. Similarly,  officials incorporated assumptions for operational contract support in  operation base plans and Annex Ws that we examined at Central  Command, Pacific Command, Africa Command, and European  Command. This integration of operational contract support is an  improvement from February 2010 when we found that only 4 of 89  operation plans had approved Annex Ws.

Also, the Joint Staff has developed training for logistics officials at the  combatant commands and components to better understand how to  integrate operational contract support into their planning processes. The  Joint Staff’s training informs planners of requirements in the Guidance for  the Employment of the Force that the combatant commands, together  with their service components and relevant combat support agencies,  plan for the integration of contracted support into all phases of military  operations. The training also makes officials aware of the new  requirement in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan that states that  geographic combatant commands, together with their service  components and logistics planners, will synchronize and integrate  contracted support into military operations. According to U.S. Central  Command officials, they have already begun to employ the new guidance  shared with them during the training for developing the Annex W.

We also noted several other positive efforts to integrate operational  contract support into planning. For example, the Defense Logistics  Agency, at the request of the combatant commands, has assigned two  expert planners from its Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office to  the logistics offices at each combatant command to improve the  incorporation of operational contract support into combatant command  plans. Also, U.S. Africa Command has developed its own instruction to  help the command integrate operational contract support into its planning  process.

section_title: Combatant Commands and Components Did Not Plan for the Potential Use of Contractors in All Areas Where They Might Be Needed, and Have Recently Been Issued Guidance
paragraphs: While the combatant commands and their components have taken steps  to integrate operational contract support into contingency planning, mostly  in the area of logistics, they are not planning for such support across all  areas—such as intelligence and communications—that are likely to use  contractors in future contingencies. Under regulations and DOD  Instruction 3020.41, when officials anticipate the need for contractor  personnel and equipment to support military operations, military planners  are directed to develop orchestrated, synchronized, detailed, and fully  developed contract support integration plans and contractor management  plans as components of concept plans and operational plans in  accordance with appropriate strategic planning guidance. The  regulations and instruction also state that plans should contain additional  contract support guidance, as appropriate, in applicable annexes and  appendixes within the respective plans. Our previous work has shown  that DOD has typically relied on contractors in areas beyond logistics, and  thus we have emphasized the importance of the up-front planning for their  use across all functional areas.

A Joint Staff official indicated that, in 2011, the Joint Staff added a  requirement to incorporate planning for operational contract support in the  base plan and Annex W of all operation plans; but the official noted that  requirement did not include incorporating operational contract support in  the nonlogistics annexes of plans. In a briefing document on changes and  anticipated changes to strategic and planning guidance, the Joint Staff  suggested that, among other things, planners would be required to  include assumptions for the use of contractor support in paragraph one of  the base plan and provide estimates of contractors in the Annex W.  Although the combatant commands and their components have  integrated operational contract support in the base plans and Annex Ws  we reviewed, they did not, at the time we reviewed their plans, have  more-specific and comprehensive guidance within the key operations  planning system manual for integrating planning for operational contract  support across all functional areas where contractors might be used. As a  result, officials working in areas outside of logistics were not integrating  operational contract support into their respective sections of plans. For  example, nonlogistics officials at Central Command—such as those in the  communications (Annex K) and intelligence (Annex B) divisions—stated  that they do not plan for operational contract support in their respective  annexes although contract support had been utilized in the past in these  areas. Similarly, at Southern Command, we found that operational  contract support was incorporated in Annex D (logistics) and Annex W  (operational contract support), but its Annex Ks (communications) and  Annex Bs (intelligence) did not directly contain considerations for  operational contract support. Moreover, nonlogistics officials at Africa  Command stated that they did not incorporate considerations of  operational contract support in annexes other than Annex W. Some  nonlogistics officials at Central Command further stated that they tend to  assume the logistics planners will address the need to incorporate  operational contract support throughout operation plans, but we found  that this was not occurring. Finally, nonlogistics officials at Pacific  Command stated that they had also used contracted support in past  operations but believed they did not need to plan for operational contract  support until a contingency was under way.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy completed revisions in April  2011 to include broad language in the Guidance for the Employment of  the Force requiring that the combatant commands plan for the integration  of contracted support and contractor management in all phases of military  operations. However, the Joint Staff only recently issued in October 2012  the Adaptive Planning and Execution manual that calls on functional  planners beyond the logistics area alone to identify major support  functions planned for commercial support sourcing. As a result, the effect  of this new manual remains to be determined. Until all functional area  planners begin to integrate operational contract support into their  respective sections of plans, the combatant commands and their  components risk being unprepared to fully plan for the use of contractors  in contingencies. Without plans that adequately consider the use of  contract support in areas beyond logistics, DOD has an increased risk of  being unprepared to manage deployed contractor personnel and services  and to provide necessary oversight during contingencies.

section_title: Joint Staff Training on Operational Contract Support to Commands and Components Is Focused on the Logistics Area
paragraphs: As previously discussed, the Joint Staff J-4 has developed training on the  requirements for planning for operational contract support at the  combatant commands and their components, but, up to this point, this  training has been focused on planners only in the logistics area and not  on planners in all functional areas. Joint Staff J-4 officials stated that they  are developing an operational contract support planning and execution  training course to train all strategic and operational planners on the  specific requirements and complexities of planning for operational  contract support in all functional areas and types of operations. However,  this training has not been fully developed and implemented. According to  regulations and DOD guidance, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  will incorporate, where appropriate, program management and elements  of the operational contract support guidance into joint training. Further,  according to the Secretary of Defense’s January 2011 memorandum, the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall sustain ongoing efforts and  initiate new efforts to institutionalize processes, tools, and doctrine that  facilitate and strengthen planning for operational contract support and, by  extension, joint operational contract support training, exercises, and  execution.

Although the Joint Staff has developed new training for planning for  operational contact support, this training is not focused on training  officials from functional areas other than logistics. According to a Joint  Staff official, while the training was open to all planners, it was focused on  training operational contract support planners on the new operational  contract support requirements and guidance. With the lack of training  across all functional areas, along with the absence, until recently, of  more-specific and comprehensive joint operations planning guidance on  including operational contract support in plans, we found that planning by  the combatant commands and their components included limited  integration of operational contract support in areas where contracted  support has been used, such as communications or intelligence. For  example, some officials involved in intelligence and communications  planning at Central Command acknowledged that, while contracted  support has been used in these areas in recent operations, they have not  initially planned for the capability. In addition, in the operation plans that  we reviewed at the various combatant commands, the potential use of  contracted support was not mentioned in any of the nonlogistics annexes.

In our previous work, we reported weaknesses in DOD’s planning for  using contractors to support future military operations, and that DOD  risked being unprepared to provide the management and oversight of  contractor personnel deployed in contingencies. In this review, we found  in some cases that officials outside of the logistics area were unaware of  the planning requirements for operational contract support that are  outlined in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force. Without  training to incorporate operational contract support into all areas of their  plans, the combatant commands and components risk not fully  understanding the extent to which they will be relying on contractors to  support combat operations outside of the logistics area and may be  unprepared to provide the necessary management and oversight of  deployed contractor personnel. Until DOD takes steps to address these  gaps, it may be limited in its ability to fully institutionalize operational  contract support in planning for current and future contingency operations  at both the combatant command and component levels—where the  planning for specific operations generally occurs.

section_title: Planners Are Aiding the Combatant Commands with Operational Contract Support, but They Are Not Focused on Working with All Planners throughout the Commands
paragraphs: At the request of the combatant commands, the Defense Logistics  Agency has assigned planners from its Joint Contingency Acquisition  Support Office to assist all combatant commands with the integration of  operational contract support into the commands’ planning. However, the  two planners embedded within each combatant command are not  integrated across all functional areas and are not always focused on  working with the planners from all the functional directorates to integrate  operational contract support in all areas of plans.

According to guidance from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  OSD established the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office within  the Defense Logistics Agency in July 2008 as one of several initiatives to  respond to congressional mandates in the John Warner National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. As explained in the guidance,  DOD viewed the act as requiring the department to adopt a preplanned  organizational approach to program management and to provide a  deployable team during contingency operations when requested, to  ensure jointness and cross-service coordination. According to the  guidance, the purpose of the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office  is to help synchronize, integrate, and manage the implementation and  execution of operational contract support among diverse communities in  support of U.S. government objectives during peacetime and contingency  operations. As envisioned by the guidance, the planners of the Joint  Contingency Acquisition Support Office assigned to each combatant  command would enable joint operational contract support planning and  strengthen combatant commands’ planning for contingencies.  Specifically, among other things, the guidance directs the Joint  Contingency Acquisition Support Office, when requested, to provide resources and expertise to the combatant commands to  conduct deliberate operational contract support planning, and  establish and implement program management strategies to address  and resolve operational contract support challenges; assist combatant commands in preparation of plans and orders by  drafting, coordinating, and establishing Annex Ws; and participate in exercises, training, meetings, and conferences to  integrate and advance operational contract support across DOD.

All planners from the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office have  been organizationally placed within the logistics directorate at each of the  combatant commands. According to combatant command officials, these  planners have helped to integrate operational contract support into  combatant command planning through their participation in planning  meetings, communication of new planning requirements for operational  contract support to the combatant command planners, and the  development—and sometimes the writing—of the Annex W for certain  plans. However, because these planners are placed within the logistics  directorates, the planners are not integrated across all functional areas  and are not always focused on working with all planners at the combatant  commands to enable planning for the use of contracted support. Some  planners, such as those at U.S. Southern Command, coordinate with  combatant command planners from the nonlogistics areas and have  helped these planners to become aware of operational contract support  considerations. Other planners, such as those at U.S. Central Command,  focus on integrating operational contract support into the logistics annex  and Annex W sections of plans and are not involved in other areas such  as communications or intelligence, which are areas that also have relied  on contracted support in recent operations.

The Secretary of Defense’s January 2011 memorandum calls for better  planning for contracted support at the strategic and operational levels.  Further, our prior work on DOD’s development of contract support plans  recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff require  personnel to address the potential need for contractor support where  appropriate. In addition, the DOD guidance for combatant commander  employment of the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office calls for  the office, when requested, to embed planners from the Joint  Contingency Acquisition Support Office within the combatant commands  to enable joint operational contract support planning, and to integrate and  synchronize operational contract support efforts across DOD and other  partners. Without full coordination of the planners from the Joint  Contingency Acquisition Support Office with all planners at the combatant  commands to incorporate operational contract support into all areas of  their plans, the combatant commands risk not fully understanding the  extent to which they will be relying on contractors to support combat  operations outside of the logistics area and may be unprepared to provide  the necessary management and oversight of deployed contractor  personnel. Until DOD takes steps to address these gaps, it may be limited  in its ability to fully institutionalize operational contract support in planning  for current and future contingency operations.

section_title: Components Have Not Received Expertise Such as Provided to Combatant Commands to Integrate Operational Contract Support into Their Planning
paragraphs: While the Defense Logistics Agency, at the request of the combatant  commands, has provided planning expertise to aid combatant commands  in integrating operational contract support into planning, the combatant  commands’ components have not been provided such expertise to aid  them in meeting their operational contract support planning requirements.  As a result, the components face difficulties incorporating operational  contract support considerations into their planning efforts. Two planners  are assigned to each combatant command. After a combatant command  plan is developed, it is sent to the combatant command’s components for  those organizations to develop their own plans to support the combatant  command’s requirements, including the requirements for the integration of  operational contract support. For example, a component may be required  to develop its own Annex W to support a combatant command’s Annex W  within a particular plan. This level of planning is essential since  components generally identify and provide the resources necessary to  support the combatant command’s requirements in order to accomplish  the mission of the specific operation.

Without this expertise, component planners are limited in their ability to  integrate operational contract support into their plans to support  combatant command requirements and, in some cases, are unaware of  the overall requirements to integrate operational contract support into  their planning as directed by the combatant commander. For example,  some component officials with whom we met stated they were unfamiliar  with the operational contract support planning requirements found in  DOD’s strategic planning guidance such as the Guidance for the  Employment of the Force. Some component officials also stated that they  were not familiar with how to write an Annex W to support the combatant  command requirements. There was consensus among the component  officials whom we interviewed, as well as several combatant command  officials, that the components would benefit from additional training or  expertise in planning for operational contract support.

The Secretary of Defense’s memorandum regarding DOD’s  implementation of operational contract support requires the Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take various steps to improve operational  contract support planning. In addition, as described by DOD guidance for  the employment of the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office,  combatant commands are responsible for strategic theater planning, and  the joint force commander and component commands are responsible for  operational planning. Further, the DOD guidance states that the Joint  Contingency Acquisition Support Office’s mission is to bring its enabling  capability to support planning activities at the strategic and operational  levels. However, the Joint Staff has not acted to ensure that both the  combatant commands and their components have planning expertise to  address operational contract support in planning for operations. As a  result, the components may not be able to fully integrate operational  contract support into their planning for contingency operations; therefore,  they may be unprepared to manage deployed contractor personnel and  provide the necessary oversight.

section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The Secretary of Defense’s January 2011 memorandum, and several of  the ongoing and recently completed efforts we have noted in this report,  illustrate the department’s recognition of and commitment to integrating  operational contract support throughout all aspects of military planning.  While progress has been made at high levels within the department to  emphasize an awareness of operational contract support, DOD has not  yet fully institutionalized planning for operational contract support  throughout the military services, or at the combatant commands or  components where much of the operational planning occurs for  contingencies. Although the Army has made strides in creating guidance  and training on the importance of planning for operational contract  support because of the challenges it encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan,  the other military services have not taken additional steps to develop and  implement comprehensive guidance within each service to ensure the full  institutionalization of operational contract support. Moreover, at the  combatant commands and components, there is a lack of emphasis on  training for all planners, operational contract support planners are not  working with all planners, and expertise on operational contract support is  not provided for component planners. As a result, these challenges hinder  DOD’s ability to achieve the cultural change that we called for 2 years  ago—a change that emphasizes an awareness of operational contract  support throughout all entities of the department. Without a focus on  recent changes in planning guidance and more training on incorporating  operational contract support in all areas of operation plans—not just in the  logistics area—DOD may face challenges to successfully plan for the use  of contractors in critical areas such as intelligence and communications.

Similarly, without the operational contract support planners assisting the  commands with planning in all areas and without such expertise at the  service component commands, DOD risks being unprepared to manage  deployed contractor personnel and provide the necessary oversight in the  next contingency.

section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To further the integration of operational contract support into all of the  services’ planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force to provide comprehensive  service-wide guidance for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force that  describes how each service should integrate operational contract support  into its respective organization to include planning for contingency  operations.

To further the integration of operational contract support into all areas of  the operation planning process, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to focus its  training about operational contract support, which is currently focused on  the logistics planners, on training all planners at the combatant  commands and components as necessary.

To further enable all planners at the combatant commands to integrate  operational contract support into plans across their functional areas, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff to identify and implement actions by the combatant  commanders needed to ensure that planners from the Joint Contingency  Acquisition Support Office supporting the combatant commands expand  their focus to work with planners throughout all functional areas.

To enable the integration of operational contract support into service  component command–level planning efforts, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to  work with the military services as necessary to improve the level of  expertise in operational contract support for the combatant commands’  components.

section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three of  our recommendations and partially concurred with one. DOD’s comments  are reprinted in appendix II.  DOD also provided technical comments  which we have incorporated where appropriate.

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force to provide  comprehensive service-wide guidance for the Navy, Marine Corps, and  Air Force that describes how each service should integrate operational  contract support into its respective organization to include planning for  contingency operations. DOD stated that the Marine Corps has made  significant progress in integrating operational contract support into its  warfighting capabilities. DOD noted that the Marine Corps uses Marine  Corps Reference Publication 4-11E, “Contingency Contracting,” dated  February 12, 2009, which it described as the service-wide guidance on  contingency contracting support. According to DOD, this publication  contains doctrine for commanders and their staff to plan for and obtain  contracting support when deployed. DOD also noted that the Marine  Corps has integrated operational contract support with respect to its  primary mission, with a focus on support to the Marine Air Ground Task  Force. While our report acknowledges the progress made by the services  to integrate operational contract support into service training, as well as  acknowledging the Marine Corps’ use of Marine Corps Reference  Publication 4-11E, we believe that the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force  should develop comprehensive service-wide guidance to fully  institutionalize operational contract support.

DOD also agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to focus its training about  operational contract support on training all planners at the combatant  commands and components as necessary. DOD stated that the Joint  Staff is working with the services and the geographic combatant  commands to develop an appropriate training plan and gather the  necessary resources to conduct operational contract support training. We  agree that if fully implemented this action could address this  recommendation.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency to identify  and implement actions needed to ensure that planners from the Joint  Contingency Acquisition Support Office expand their focus to work with  planners throughout all functional areas at the combatant commands.  DOD agreed with the thrust of our recommendation—the need for efforts  to broaden the focus of planners from the Joint Contingency Acquisition  Support Office as part of an effort to integrate operational contract  support in combatant command planning.  DOD stated, however, that the  combatant commands—not the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support  Office—are responsible for operational contract support planning across  “all functional areas.” DOD also stated that, when requested, the Joint  Contingency Acquisition Support Office operational contract support  planners support combatant commands in meeting this planning  requirement. DOD noted that the geographic combatant commanders are  responsible for conducting the planning of their respective war plans, not  the Defense Logistics Agency. Consequently, DOD stated that, to enable  all planners at the combatant commands to integrate operational contract  support into plans across their functional areas, the Secretary of Defense  should direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to continue efforts  to develop operational contract support planning capabilities and  encourage the geographic combatant commanders to utilize the Joint  Contingency Acquisition Support Office for planning. We recognize that  the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office supports the combatant  commands in their efforts to incorporate operational contract support  planning within their respective war plans, and that the individual  combatant commanders are ultimately responsible for how they utilize  embedded Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office planners. We  acknowledge that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is in a position  to encourage the combatant commanders to utilize the Joint Contingency  Acquisition Support Office planners.  As such, we agree that the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be an appropriate official to  implement our recommendation, and we have revised our  recommendation accordingly.  However, we continue to believe that the  Defense Logistics Agency, which is responsible for the Joint Contingency  Acquisition Support Office, must ensure that its planners are prepared to  assist the combatant commanders in these efforts, when requested. Full  implementation of the recommendation would therefore likely necessitate  cooperation and coordination by the Defense Logistics Agency, the Joint  Contingency Acquisition Support Office, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs  of Staff, and the geographic combatant commands.

Finally, in concurring with our recommendation that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to work with the  military services as necessary to improve the level of expertise in  operational contract support for the combatant commands’ components,  DOD stated that the Joint Staff is taking action to integrate operational  contract support into the services’ component command-level planning  efforts. DOD also stated that the Joint Staff is developing a Joint  Professional Military Education course that focuses on the planning and  execution of operational contract support. DOD noted that this course is  additive to other courses offered by Defense Acquisition University as  well as courses offered by the U.S. Army Logistics University. According  to DOD, the Joint Staff will continue to work with the other services on  operational contract support issues. We agree that if DOD takes these  actions, these efforts could address our recommendation.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and the Secretary of Defense. The report also is available at  no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) is  integrating planning for operational contract support through efforts of the  Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, and military  services, we collected and analyzed documentation such as planning  guidance and policies related to the integration of operational contract  support into DOD’s planning for contingency operations. Specifically, we  analyzed the implementation of DOD guidance, such as Joint Publication  4-10, the Secretary of Defense’s memorandum on Strategic and  Operational Planning for Operational Contract Support and Workforce  Mix, and related policies and instruction through discussions with officials  from OSD and the Joint Staff to understand the various efforts to address  the integration of operational contract support throughout the department.  We reviewed and analyzed provisions from the Guidance for the  Employment of the Force to understand the new requirements DOD has  in place for planning for operational contract support in all phases of  military operations. We also spoke with officials specifically focused on  integrating operational contract support department-wide, such as officials  from the Operational Contract Support Functional Capabilities Integration  Board to obtain their perspective on the progress the department has  made in integrating operational contract support as well as learning of  related initiatives. We reviewed DOD guidance on the civilian  expeditionary workforce and interviewed officials from OSD, the Joint  Staff, the civilian expeditionary workforce program office, military  services, and combatant commands to understand the intent and the  status of the development of the civilian expeditionary workforce program.  To determine how the military services have integrated operational  contract support into their operations, we collected and analyzed service- specific documentation related to operational contract support initiatives  from each of the services and met with officials from the Army, Navy,  Marine Corps, and Air Force. We also held discussions with officials from  each of the services to gain an understanding of how each organization  has implemented operational contract support. Further, we reviewed  related GAO reports on operational contract support, as well as related  reports issued by other agencies.

To determine the extent to which DOD is integrating planning for  operational contract support in operations planning at the combatant  commands and their components, we reviewed plans, such as operation  and contingency plans, and other efforts, such as specific related  guidance, to understand the commands’ and components’  implementation of requirements to integrate operational contract support.  As mentioned above, we interviewed officials from OSD and the Joint  Staff in order to assess the extent to which DOD has integrated  operational contract support requirements for planning in policies. We  then spoke with officials from all of the geographic combatant commands  (except Northern Command) and their components regarding their  knowledge of the requirements and the extent to which they are planning  for operational contract support. Additionally, we spoke to officials to gain  knowledge about their current processes for planning for contingency  operations. During our meetings with the combatant commands, we  spoke with officials from various directorates, such as strategic plans,  logistics, and intelligence, in order to obtain an understanding of the  extent to which operational contract support is being planned for in the  base plan and the directorates’ respective annexes. During our meetings  we also reviewed sample operation plans and annexes to analyze the  extent to which DOD has integrated operational contract support  considerations in its contingency planning. To determine the level at  which the combatant commands and components are integrating  operational contract support into plans, we requested combatant  command and component officials to provide sample operation plans that  included base plans with operational contract support considerations,  Annex Ws, and other functional area annexes that also contained  operational contract support language. Further, we obtained and  analyzed specific policies the combatant commands and service  component commands had in place governing the planning for  operational contract support in their contingency and operation plans.

Our review focused on DOD’s planning efforts and thus did not include an  examination of how operational contract support is integrated in  professional military education or in the execution of current operations.

We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review:

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness, Washington, D.C.

Civilian Expeditionary Workforce Program Office, Washington,  D.C.

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Washington, D.C.

Force Development, Washington, D.C.

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program  Support), Washington, D.C.

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology

Operational Contract Support Functional Capabilities Integration

U.S. Africa Command, Stuttgart, Germany, and several of its service

U.S. Central Command, Tampa, Florida, and several of its service

U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, and several of its

U.S. Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii, and several of its service

U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida, and several of its service  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  Joint Staff J-4 (Logistics) Directorate, Washington, D.C.

Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology-Integration Office, Hopewell,

G-43, Strategic Operations, Washington, D.C.

Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Navy Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Navy Expeditionary Contracting Command, Little Creek, Virginia

U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Department of the Air Force

U.S. Air Force Headquarters, Acquisition, Washington, D.C.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to February  2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for this  assessment based on our audit objectives.

section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact

section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Alissa Czyz, Assistant Director;  Marilyn Wasleski, Assistant Director; Hia Quach; Michael Shaughnessy;  Yong Song; and Natasha Wilder made key contributions to this report.  Richard Powelson and Amie Steele provided assistance in report  preparation.

section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Operational Contract Support: Sustained DOD Leadership Needed to  Better Prepare for Future Contingencies. GAO-12-1026T. Washington,  D.C.: September 12, 2012.

Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve Data on  Contracting but Need to Standardize Reporting. GAO-12-977R.  Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2012.

Iraq and Afghanistan: State and DOD Should Ensure Interagency  Acquisitions Are Effectively Managed and Comply with Fiscal Law.   GAO-12-750. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2012.

Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions to Address Recommendations  by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.  GAO-12-854R. Washington, D.C.: August 1, 2012.

Defense Acquisition Workforce: Improved Processes, Guidance, and  Planning Needed to Enhance Use of Workforce Funds. GAO-12-747R.  Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2012.

Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight Improvements  Needed in Afghanistan. GAO-12-290. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2012.

Acquisition Workforce: DOD’s Efforts to Rebuild Capacity Have Shown  Some Progress. GAO-12-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2011.

Defense Contract Management Agency: Amid Ongoing Efforts to Rebuild  Capacity, Several Factors Present Challenges in Meeting Its Missions.  GAO-12-83. Washington, D.C.: November 3, 2011.

Defense Acquisition Workforce: Better Identification, Development, and  Oversight Needed for Personnel Involved in Acquiring Services.   GAO-11-892. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2011.

Contingency Contracting: Improved Planning and Management Oversight  Needed to Address Challenges with Closing Contracts. GAO-11-891.  Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2011.

Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility,  Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role.   GAO-11-774. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2011.

Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using  Contractors to Support Future Military Operations. GAO-10-472.  Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.

Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face  Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and  Afghanistan. GAO-10-1. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009.

Contingency Contract Management: DOD Needs to Develop and Finalize  Background Screening and Other Standards for Private Security  Contractors. GAO-09-351. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2009.

Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and  Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO-09-19. Washington,  D.C.: October 1, 2008.

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance  on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight.  GAO-08-572T. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.


Question-summary annotations: questions: question: How have the OSD, Joint Staff, and services tried to improve planning for contingency operations?
answer: The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the services have taken steps to integrate operational contract support into planning for contingency operations.
child_questions: question: What steps have these stakeholders taken to accomplish this?
answer: For example, in April 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, working with the Joint Staff, revised the Guidance for the Employment of the Force to require planning for operational contract support in all phases of military operations.

question: What action has DOD taken?
answer: Further, in December 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) revised an instruction and issued corresponding regulations establishing policies and procedures for operational contract support.

question: How has Army participated in this process?
answer: The Army issued service-specific guidance that describes roles, responsibilities, and requirements to help integrate operational contract support into its planning efforts for contingency operations.

question: Why haven't the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not issued comprehensive guidance ?
answer: However, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not issued similar comprehensive guidance for integrating operational contract support throughout each service. Instead, these services have taken actions such as developing training and other individual efforts to familiarize servicemembers with operational contract support. According to service officials, one reason that they have not issued comprehensive guidance similar to the Army's guidance is because the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not been the lead service for contracting in recent operations. However, these services combined spent over a billion dollars for contracted services in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2011.
child_questions: question: What risk are these organizations assuming by not issuing comprehensive guidance?
answer: Without specific, service-wide guidance, the other services' future planning efforts may not reflect the full extent of the use of contract support and the attendant cost and need for oversight.

questions: question: How fully have the combatant commands incorprated operational contract support into their contingency planning?
answer: The combatant commands and their components have begun to incorporate operational contract support into their planning for contingencies, but they have not fully integrated operational contract support in all functional areas.
child_questions: question: How are they falling short?
answer: We found that the combatant commands and components are not planning for the potential use of contractors in areas where they may be needed beyond logistics such as communications.

question: What did DOD do in response to this problem?
answer: Recognizing the problem, DOD, in October 2012, issued guidance that calls on functional planners beyond the logistics area to identify major support functions planned for commercial support sourcing.

question: To what extent do officials receive training in this realm?
answer: GAO also found that officials involved with logistics planning at the commands receive training from the Joint Staff and assistance from embedded operational contract support planners to help integrate operational contract support into logistics planning. However, officials involved in planning for other areas--such as intelligence--that have used contractors in past operations, do not receive such training. Further, the embedded operational contract support planners do not focus on areas beyond logistics. Moreover, while the combatant commands have embedded experts to assist with operational contract support planning, the military service components do not have such expertise.
child_questions: question: What is the risk of such haphazard training?
answer: Without training for all planners, a broader focus beyond logistics for embedded planners, and expertise offered at the military service components, DOD risks being unprepared to plan and manage deployed contractor personnel and may not be able to provide the necessary oversight during future contingencies.

questions: question: Why is the DOD relationship with contractors important?
answer: DOD has relied extensively on contractors for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade.
child_questions: question: How much did the DOD rely on contractors?
answer: At the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the number of contractors exceeded the number of military personnel, and a similar situation is occurring in Afghanistan.

question: How did the OSD respond to DOD reliance on contractors?
answer: In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum noting the risk of DOD's level of dependency on contractors and outlined actions to institutionalize changes necessary to influence how the department plans for contracted support in contingency operations.
child_questions: question: How did the OSD propose to reduce the reliance on contractors?
answer: The memorandum also called for leveraging the civilian expeditionary workforce to reduce DOD's reliance on contractors, but this workforce is not yet fully developed.

question: What did GAO analyze?
answer: GAO was asked to examine DOD's progress in planning for operational contract support. Our review determined how DOD is integrating operational contract support into its planning through efforts of the (1) OSD, Joint Staff, and military services, and (2) combatant commands and their components.
child_questions: question: How did GAO complete this review?
answer: To conduct its work, GAO evaluated DOD operational contract support guidance and documents and met with officials at various DOD offices.