Combating Terrorism: State Should Evaluate Its Countering Violent Extremism Program and Set Time Frames for Addressing Evaluation Recommendations
Released: 2015-07-22T00:00:00


Highlights: section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a global threat, and combating them remains a top priority for the U.S. government. State leads and coordinates U.S. efforts to counter terrorism abroad. State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism was elevated to bureau status in 2012 with the aim of enhancing State's ability to counter violent extremism, build partner counterterrorism capacity, and improve coordination. GAO was asked to review the effects of this change and the new bureau's efforts.

This report examines (1) how the bureau's staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the extent to which the bureau's coordination with U.S. government entities on selected programs is in line with key collaboration practices. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed State and other U.S. government agency information and interviewed U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C.

section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of State's (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism has had an annual increase in authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) positions since fiscal year 2011 and has recently undertaken efforts to reduce a persistent staffing gap. The bureau's authorized FTEs increased from 66 in fiscal year 2011 to 96 in fiscal year 2015, and over the same period, FTE vacancies ranged from 17 to 23 percent. The vacancies included both staff and management positions. Bureau officials said they postponed filling some positions until the Coordinator for Counterterrorism had sufficient time to assess the bureau's needs and priorities. A senior Bureau of Counterterrorism official testified before Congress in June 2015 that the bureau was making progress and that it had 11 vacancies. However, we have not been able to verify that 4 of the reportedly filled positions have been filled because State did not provide sufficient documentation.

While the bureau has undertaken efforts to assess its progress, it has not yet evaluated its priority Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program and has not established time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. Specifically, the bureau established indicators and targets for its foreign assistance–related goals and reported results achieved toward each indicator. The bureau has also completed four evaluations covering three of its six programs that resulted in 60 recommendations. The bureau reported having implemented about half of the recommendations (28 of 60) as of June 2015 but has not established time frames for addressing the remaining recommendations. Without specific time frames, it will be difficult for the bureau to ensure timely implementation of programmatic improvements. In addition, despite identifying its CVE program as a priority and acknowledging the benefit of evaluating it, the bureau has postponed evaluating it each fiscal year since 2012.

The bureau's coordination on two programs GAO reviewed, CVE and Counterterrorism Finance, generally reflects key practices for effective collaboration. For example, GAO identified efforts to define outcomes and accountability, bridge organizational cultures, and establish written guidance and agreements—all key practices of effective collaboration.

section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Secretary of State take steps to (1) ensure that CVE program efforts abroad are evaluated and (2) establish time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. State concurred with both of GAO's recommendations. State indicated that it was currently assessing which programs would benefit from a third-party evaluation and that it would commit to setting a timetable for reviewing each recommendation by a third-party evaluator.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a global threat, and  countering terrorism both at home and abroad remains a top national  security priority for the U.S. government. In 2010, the first Quadrennial  Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), conducted by the  Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID), addressed these global threats by recommending  that State’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (CT Office) be   According to the  elevated to a Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT Bureau).2010 QDDR report, the elevation of the CT Office to a bureau would  enhance State’s ability to, among other things, counter violent extremism,  build foreign partner capacity, and engage in counterterrorism diplomacy.  In addition, the QDDR report stated that the bureau’s new status would  enable more effective coordination with other U.S. government agencies.  Following the QDDR, State elevated the CT Office to the CT Bureau in  January 2012.

You asked us to review the effects of this change and the CT Bureau’s  efforts. In this report, we examine (1) how the CT Bureau’s staffing  resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to which the bureau  has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the extent to which the  bureau’s coordination with U.S. government entities on selected  programs is in line with key collaboration practices.

To examine how the CT Bureau’s staffing resources have changed since  2011, we reviewed and analyzed State data from fiscal years 2011 to  2015. We also interviewed State officials from the CT Bureau; Office of  Inspector General; Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources; and the  Bureaus of Human Resources, Comptroller and Global Financial  Services, Budgeting and Planning, and Administration about staffing and  budgeting resources. To assess the reliability of the staffing data, we  compared information provided by State with staffing information in  State’s Congressional Budget Justifications and interviewed State officials  regarding the processes they use to collect and verify the staffing data.  On the basis of the checks we performed, we determined that these data  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To examine the  extent to which the CT Bureau has assessed its performance since 2011,  we reviewed bureau strategic plans, performance reports, program  evaluation reports, and action plans for evaluation recommendations, as  well as State policy and guidance documents outlining performance  reporting and evaluation requirements for bureaus. We compared the  bureau’s performance reporting and program evaluation efforts against  State requirements. We also interviewed CT Bureau officials responsible  for strategic planning and program monitoring and evaluation and  interviewed or obtained written responses from State officials responsible  for overseeing implementation of State’s performance reporting and  evaluation policies. To examine the extent to which the CT Bureau’s  coordination with U.S. government entities on selected programs is in line  with key collaboration practices, we reviewed agency documents and  interviewed officials from various State regional and functional bureaus;  from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and the  Treasury; and from USAID, the National Counterterrorism Center, and the  United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. We focused on the  CT Bureau’s Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Counterterrorism  Finance (CTF) programs because these programs involve coordination  with large numbers of agencies and also represent strategic priorities for  the CT Bureau. We compared the CT Bureau’s coordination efforts  against key collaboration practices to evaluate the extent and nature of  collaboration between the CT Bureau and other bureaus within State and  other U.S. government agencies. See appendix I for a complete  description of our scope and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2014 to July 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Role and Evolution of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
paragraphs: As shown in figure 1, the CT Office has evolved over the last two  decades. In December 2010, the QDDR recommended the creation of the  CT Bureau to supersede the CT Office.numerous other offices, was attached to State’s Office of the Secretary,  which provided management and administrative support to the CT Office.  The CT Office relied on the Secretary of State’s Office of the Executive  Secretariat for functions such as budgeting and human resources.  According to a report by State’s Office of Inspector General in 2012, the   The CT Office, along with  CT Office’s needs for management support services, such as human  resources, could not be met in a timely and efficient fashion because the  Office of the Executive Secretariat had other responsibilities in addition to  providing administrative support to the CT Office.

According to State, one reason for elevating the CT Office to a bureau  was that the office’s responsibilities for counterterrorism strategy, policy,  operations, and programs had grown far beyond the original coordinating  mission. The QDDR stated that the new CT Bureau, when established,  would build on and expand the CT Office’s activities in three areas; it  would (1) play a key role in State’s efforts to counter violent extremism,  (2) strengthen State’s ability to assist foreign partners as they build their  own counterterrorism capabilities, and (3) engage in multilateral and  bilateral diplomacy to advance U.S. counterterrorism goals. In addition,  the QDDR mentioned that the bureau status would allow for more  effective coordination with other agencies, including the Departments of  Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice, and with the Intelligence  Community. Figure 2 shows the organizational structure of the CT Office  in 2011.

As the new CT Bureau began organizing itself, State’s Office of Inspector  General (OIG) conducted an inspection of the CT Bureau in early 2012.  The OIG recognized that the inspection took place as the bureau was  implementing internal reorganization and reported that this process  entailed creating an executive office, adding new staff to develop  capabilities, and shifting staff around, among other things. In its report,  the OIG stated that the CT Bureau’s intended goals included improving  communications and coordination through measures such as integrating  policy and program staff and creating more efficient and transparent flows  of information, including through a new tasking and tracking system. The  OIG made 13 formal recommendations addressing issues such as  staffing, training, and reorganization; 10 of the recommendations had  been closed as implemented as of June 2015, according to an OIG  official.

section_title: Role and Evolution of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism
paragraphs: Since transitioning to a bureau in January 2012, the CT Bureau updated  its mission statement to focus on partnerships and building the capacity of  partner nations to counter terrorism. The current mission of the CT  Bureau is  to promote U.S. national security by taking a leading role in  developing coordinated strategies and approaches to defeat  terrorism abroad and securing the counterterrorism cooperation of  international partners.

The CT Bureau identified five principal areas of responsibility: (1) U.S.  counterterrorism strategy and operations, (2) countering violent  extremism, (3) homeland security coordination, (4) capacity building, and  (5) counterterrorism diplomacy. According to CT Bureau officials, these  responsibilities are reflected in the types of programming that the bureau  carries out.
subsections: section_title: CT Bureau Programs and Activities
paragraphs: Like its predecessor office, the CT Bureau manages a range of programs,  initiatives, and activities to combat terrorism around the world. According  to the CT Bureau, it manages and oversees six key programs:

Antiterrorism Assistance: implemented by the Department of  State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, helps partner nations build  capacity across a wide spectrum of counterterrorism law enforcement  skills, offering training, equipment, mentoring, and technical  assistance.

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): seeks to deny terrorism new  recruits by reducing sympathy and support for violent extremism. The  program supports targeted counter-recruitment interventions for at- risk communities in priority countries and aims to build resilience  against violent extremist narratives. It also builds the capacity of  partner nations and civil society organizations to counter violent  extremism.

Counterterrorism Engagement: builds the capacity of multilateral  organizations and regional bodies, including the Global  Counterterrorism Forum, to promote counterterrorism cooperation and  best practices.

Counterterrorism Finance (CTF): assists partner nations to build  and strengthen effective legal frameworks and regulatory regimes,  establish active and capable Financial Intelligence Units, strengthen  the investigative skills of law enforcement entities, and bolster  prosecutorial and judicial development.

Regional Strategic Initiative: fosters regional cooperation and  deepens partnerships to address top-priority terrorism challenges.

Terrorist Interdiction Program: provides partner nations with  biometrics technology and training to identify, disrupt, and deter  terrorist travel at airports and other major ports of entry.

In addition, the CT Bureau manages or is responsible for other  counterterrorism-related efforts, which are described in appendix II.

section_title: CT Bureau Organizational Structure
paragraphs: In the transition from CT Office to CT Bureau in 2012, some  organizational changes occurred, such as a reduction from five to four  Deputy Coordinators. The creation of the bureau elevated the role of  strategic planning and metrics, and established a new policy and  guidance unit to ensure that all CT programs and activities, to include  counterterrorism programs implemented with foreign partners, conform to  law and policy and reflect the counterterrorism priorities of the Secretary  of State and the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

Additional changes to the CT Bureau’s organizational structure occurred  starting in 2014, following the confirmation of an ambassador as the  Coordinator of the bureau.Coordinator initiated a strategic review of the CT Bureau’s programs and  what they were accomplishing to help form a clear picture of priorities,  threats, and where the bureau’s efforts and funding should be directed.  The strategic review led to several key changes in the bureau’s structure,  and the CT Bureau’s overall programmatic focus shifted to a regional or  geographic approach. The function of program monitoring, oversight, and  evaluation was elevated, and a separate Office of Programs was created  to monitor the day-to-day activities of counterterrorism programming at  the program management level. Figure 3 depicts the new organizational  chart of the CT Bureau as of June 2015.

section_title: CT Bureau Funding Allocations
paragraphs: The CT Bureau is allocated funding for (1) foreign assistance  programming that the bureau oversees as well as (2) the operations of  the bureau. The foreign assistance allocations to the CT Bureau fund  counterterrorism-related programs that the bureau oversees. As shown in  figure 4, from fiscal years 2011 through 2014, the CT Bureau was  allocated a cumulative total of $539.1 million for six counterterrorism- related programs: (1) Antiterrorism Assistance, (2) Countering Violent  Extremism, (3) Counterterrorism Engagement, (4) Counterterrorism  Finance, (5) Regional Strategic Initiative, and (6) Terrorist Interdiction  Program. The CT Bureau requested $104.4 million in allocations for fiscal  year 2015 for these programs. State officials were unable to provide  actual allocations for fiscal year 2015 because they were working to  finalize them, as of June 2015. For funding allocations by program, fiscal  year, and funding account, see appendix IV.

When the CT Bureau became operational, in early 2012, its operations  were no longer part of the executive management of the Office of the  Secretary of State. The CT Bureau and the Office of the Secretary of  State worked with State’s Bureau of Budgeting and Planning to determine  the size of the budget that was needed to support the new CT Bureau,  according to CT Bureau officials. The bureau’s allocated resources  include funding for the operations of the bureau. The CT Bureau receives  funds from two sources to fund its core operations: the Diplomatic and  Consular Programs and the Worldwide Security Programs accounts.  Figure 5 shows the bureau’s total allocations for its overall management  and operations since fiscal year 2012. These allocations increased from  $11.7 million in fiscal year 2012 to $14.7 million in fiscal year 2013, as the  bureau was being established. The allocations then decreased to $13.1  million in fiscal year 2014. Appendix V provides information on the CT  Bureau’s total obligations for its overall operations since fiscal year 2012.

section_title: CT Bureau’s Authorized Staffing Has Increased since Fiscal Year 2011, and Recent Efforts Have Been Made to Reduce Long- standing Staffing Gaps
paragraphs: The CT Bureau’s number of authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) staff  positions has grown annually since fiscal year 2011, and the bureau has  recently undertaken efforts to reduce a persistent staffing gap. The  bureau’s number of authorized FTEs grew from 66 in fiscal year 2011 to  96 in fiscal year 2015, which is an increase of more than 45 percent.  Figure 6 shows the number of authorized FTEs within the bureau for  fiscal years 2011 to 2015, along with the number of FTE positions that  were filled. While the bureau’s current authorized level of FTEs for fiscal  year 2015 is 96 positions, it had 22 vacancies as of October 31, 2014.  The percentage of vacancies in the bureau has ranged from 17 percent to  23 percent in fiscal years 2011 to 2015. According to the CT Bureau,  these vacancies have included both staff-level and management  positions. For example, recent vacancies have included a management  position in the Office of Homeland Security and program analyst positions  in the Office of Programs. Since the staffing snapshot reflected in figure 6,  the bureau has reported it has made efforts to fill vacancies. The Principal  Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism testified before Congress on  June 2, 2015 that the CT Bureau had reduced its FTE vacancies to 11  positions. However, we have been unable to verify that 4 of the  reportedly filled positions have been filled because State has not provided  sufficient documentation.

In addition to the authorized FTEs, the CT Bureau also has non-FTE  positions, which include contractors; interns; fellows; detailees; and  “When Actually Employed,” the designation applied to retired State  employees rehired under temporary part-time appointments. For fiscal  years 2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively, the CT Bureau had 92, 78, and  69 such positions, in addition to its authorized FTEs, according to the CT  Bureau.

According to State, to meet the personnel requirements associated with  standing up the CT Bureau, the bureau received an authorized increase   According of 31 positions covering fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2014. to the CT Bureau, about 7 of these positions were initially filled within the  first 6 months after the bureau was established. Filling many of the  remaining positions was postponed until the current Coordinator for  Counterterrorism had time to assess the bureau’s needs and priorities,  according to the CT Bureau. CT Bureau officials stated that since fiscal  year 2012, the authorized positions have been reallocated each year and  moved around within the CT Bureau based on the bureau’s needs. When  the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, following the strategic review,  deemed that more staff might be needed in newly created units, some of  the authorized positions were used for that purpose. For example, 1  position was used to fill a management-level position in the CT Bureau’s  Office of Strategy, Plans, and Initiatives and another to fill a senior-level  position in the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Unit, according to CT Bureau  officials. For additional information regarding the CT Bureau’s workforce  planning efforts, see appendix VI.

section_title: While CT Bureau Has Assessed Its Performance, It Has Not Evaluated Its Priority Countering Violent Extremism Program or Established Time Frames for Addressing Evaluation Recommendations
paragraphs: The CT Bureau utilized various means to assess its performance,  including performance assessments and program evaluations.  Specifically, in fiscal years 2012 and 2013, the CT Bureau established  indicators and targets for its foreign assistance–related goals identified in  the bureau’s first multiyear strategic plan. The bureau also reported  results achieved toward each established indicator. In addition, since  being elevated to a bureau in fiscal year 2012, the CT Bureau has  completed four evaluations of counterterrorism-related programs it  oversees, but none have focused on CVE programming—a priority for the  bureau. The completed evaluations resulted in 60 recommendations, and  the CT Bureau reported having implemented about half of the  recommendations as of June 2015. A standard practice in program  management is to complete actions in response to recommendations  from evaluations within established time frames. However, the CT Bureau  has not established time frames for addressing the remaining  recommendations. Without specific time frames for completing actions in  response to recommendations from evaluations, it will be difficult for the  bureau to ensure that needed programmatic improvements are made in a  timely manner or to hold its implementing partners accountable for doing  so.
subsections: section_title: CT Bureau Assessed Progress toward Achieving Its Foreign Assistance– Related Goals
paragraphs: The CT Bureau assessed its progress toward achieving its foreign  assistance–related goals in fiscal years 2012 and 2013, as required by  State policy. That policy requires bureaus to respond to an annual  department-wide data call for foreign assistance–related performance  information. Specifically, bureaus must identify indicators and targets for  their foreign assistance–related goals, as defined in their multiyear  strategic plans, and report results achieved toward each indicator for the  prior fiscal year.foreign assistance–related goals in its first multiyear strategic plan and   As shown in figure 7, the CT Bureau identified four  established quantitative indicators and corresponding targets for each of  those goals. It also reported results achieved for each indicator.  According to these results, the CT Bureau generally met or exceeded its  targets or the baseline when no target existed.

section_title: CT Bureau Has Completed Four Program Evaluations since Fiscal Year 2012 but Has Not Evaluated Its Priority CVE Program
paragraphs: Since being elevated to a bureau in fiscal year 2012, the CT Bureau has  completed four evaluations of counterterrorism-related programs it funds  and oversees. The number of completed program evaluations meets the  number of evaluations required by State’s February 2012 evaluation  policy.during fiscal years 2013 and 2014 and focused primarily on evaluating  programs providing training courses to law enforcement officials of  partner nations, such as the Antiterrorism Assistance program in Morocco  and Bangladesh.

section_title: CT Bureau Has Not Established Time Frames for Addressing Recommendations from Program Evaluations
paragraphs: Standard practices in program management include, among other things,  establishing specific time frames for addressing recommendations from  program evaluations. For example, internal control standards for the  federal government state that management should (1) promptly assess  the findings and recommendations from evaluations, (2) determine and  complete actions in response to the findings and recommendations from  evaluations within established time frames, and (3) record actions taken  on recommendations in a timely and accurate manner. State’s January  2015 evaluation guidance, which provides specific criteria and guidelines  for evaluating State programs, also recognizes the need for bureaus to  track and address recommendations from evaluations.

The four program evaluations the CT Bureau completed during fiscal  years 2013 and 2014 resulted in 60 recommendations. In response to  questions during the course of our review, CT Bureau officials developed  action plans to describe the status of efforts to address the 60  recommendations. On the basis of our review of these action plans, the CT Bureau reported having implemented about half of the  recommendations (28 of 60) as of June 2015. The bureau had put on  hold or decided not to implement 4 recommendations. The remaining 28  recommendations were still being considered or were in the process of  being implemented, or the bureau had made a commitment to implement  them. CT Bureau officials said that program officers are assigned  responsibility for following up on recommendations that affect their  portfolio but that the bureau does not have any policy or other guidance  outlining the timing for addressing recommendations from evaluations.  Further, according to bureau officials, the bureau does not have a system  for assigning time frames for the implementation of recommendations.  While the action plans are a positive first step to help the bureau monitor  and track its progress in implementing recommendations, they do not  address the need for the bureau to establish time frames for addressing  recommendations from evaluations. Without specific time frames for  completing actions in response to recommendations from evaluations, it  will be difficult for the bureau to ensure that needed programmatic  improvements are made in a timely manner or to hold its implementing  partners accountable for doing so.

section_title: CT Bureau’s Collaboration on Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism Finance Programs Was Generally in Line with Key Collaboration Practices
paragraphs: We found that activities between the CT Bureau and other bureaus within  State as well as with other U.S. government agencies on counterterrorism  programs, specifically the CVE and CTF programs, were generally in line  with six of the seven key practices that GAO has identified for interagency  collaboration in the areas of (1) outcomes and accountability, (2) bridging  organizational cultures, (3) leadership, (4) clarity of roles and  responsibilities, (5) resources, and (6) written guidance and   We did not review one additional key collaboration  agreements.practice, which covers participants, because doing so would have  required taking a comprehensive look across all the State bureaus and  other U.S. government agencies to ensure that all the relevant  participants in counterterrorism efforts were included and would have  required an evaluation of their relevant resources, skills, and abilities to  contribute, which was outside the scope of this review.

Outcomes and accountability.

GAO-12-1022. Having defined outcomes and mechanisms to track progress can help  shape a collaborative vision and goals. defined intended outcomes generally as collaborating on policy and  programming decisions, sharing information, and ensuring that there  is no duplication of existing or planned initiatives. When working with  other U.S. government agencies, the CT Bureau generally has laid  out the intended outcomes of coordination efforts in interagency  agreements. We found that within State, the goals of coordination  may be articulated by the CT Bureau through specific requests across  regional or functional bureaus or messages defining and assigning  specific tasks. For example, some State officials in regional bureaus  mentioned that the CT Bureau has asked for input on CVE  programming, specifically on reviewing CVE grant proposals from  posts and nongovernmental organizations for respective regions to  ensure that the programming was feasible and did not conflict with  other initiatives. Further, some State officials said that the CT Bureau  reached out to them to request their expertise on identifying regional  stakeholders that could provide input for the State portion of the  February 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent  Extremism.

With regard to coordination on CTF, we found that the interagency  Terrorist Financing Working Group previously had provided a  mechanism for the CT Bureau and other U.S. government agencies to  hold regular meetings to discuss and reach consensus on CTF  programming outcomes and goals. According to agency officials,  interagency coordination on CTF programs occurred in the past  mostly through the Terrorist Financing Working Group, which  developed an annual list of priority countries based on an analysis by  participating agencies, including various intelligence agencies. The  working group was co-chaired by the former CTF unit within the CT  Bureau and provided a mechanism for agency stakeholders to share  information on CTF activities and find ways to avoid potential conflict  between any initiatives. According to officials at other agencies, the  Terrorist Financing Working Group has not met recently, and the CT  Bureau is in the process of developing new interagency collaboration  mechanisms for CTF programming, after the CTF unit within the  bureau was disbanded during the recent reorganization of the bureau.  Department of the Treasury officials stated that in the interim there is  sufficient coordination between the bureau and stakeholders on CTF  programming; however, they stated that if the Terrorist Financing  Working Group remains on hiatus for some time, and no replacement  mechanism for regular formal collaboration is initiated, stakeholders’  awareness of what other agencies are doing to counter terrorism  financing could be hindered.

We identified accountability mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and  report on results or outcomes of counterterrorism programming,  especially when there is an interagency agreement between the CT  Bureau and other U.S. government agencies on programming such as  CVE. For example, an interagency agreement between the CT  Bureau and United States Institute of Peace stipulates that reporting  on the outcome of the programming is to include quarterly  performance reports, interim reports, and final reports no later than 60  days after the termination of the agreement. In addition, some agency  officials said that there are monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in  place when implementing CT Bureau–funded programming. For  example, Department of the Treasury officials stated that they are  responsible for providing after-action reports to the CT Bureau on their  program efforts related to activities with foreign governments aimed at  strengthening anti-money laundering and combating the financing of  terrorism regimes for CT Bureau-funded programming.

Bridging organizational cultures.

We found that while terminology  may differ when discussing CVE, within State, some regional and  functional bureau officials we spoke with stated that they use a  common definition for CVE and apply the CVE strategy and policy that  the CT Bureau has developed for CVE programming. Similarly, some  officials in other U.S. government agencies we spoke with said they  agree on common terms and outcomes of counterterrorism  programming as ideas are discussed between the CT Bureau and the  implementing agency, if the bureau funds a program or grant. For  example, USAID officials said that while their agency’s definition of  CVE differs from the CT Bureau’s, they have implemented programs  on the ground in the Maghreb and the Sahel region on CVE capacity  building using an agreed-upon common CVE definition.

We also found that collaborating agencies reported frequent  communication related to CVE programs. Specifically, we found that  frequency of communication between the CT Bureau and other State  bureaus as well as other U.S. government agencies varied depending  on the project or activity and ranged from daily to monthly interactions.  For example, on one of the CT Bureau–funded CVE projects  implemented by the United States Institute of Peace, the  implementing program specialist estimated that he has been in touch  with his counterpart at State once every 2 days on average over the  life of the program, which focuses on developing training for an  international institution for CVE-related training in the United Arab  Emirates.

Leadership.

For CVE and to some extent CTF, we found that  officials at State and at other U.S. government agencies were  generally aware of the agency or individual with leadership  responsibility for the particular counterterrorism program. In addition,  at the time of our review, officials said that they receive relevant and  timely information on CVE-related programming from the bureau.  Officials in State’s regional bureaus stated that they are generally  aware of when the CT Bureau would have the lead on  counterterrorism issues versus the regional bureaus. For example,  some of these officials said that if a given issue involved policy and  cross-cutting counterterrorism areas, the CT Bureau would take the  lead on meetings and assigning tasks, whereas if the issue was more  regional in nature, the regional bureaus would take the lead with  support from the CT Bureau.

We found that while the leadership for the CTF program was generally  clear in the past, at the time of our review there was some uncertainty  among officials as to whom they should be working with on CTF  programming, because of the recent reorganization of the CT Bureau.  For example, some U.S. government officials said that there had been  a dedicated CTF unit within the bureau that dealt with CTF  programming and also coordinated the interagency Terrorist  Financing Working Group. However, with the elimination of the stand- alone CTF unit within the CT Bureau, it was not as clear to these  officials who was the point of contact for CTF issues. At the time of  our review, a few U.S. government agency officials said that it would  be beneficial if the CT Bureau shared new contact information  resulting from the recent reorganization; however, in the interim, the  officials would still reach out to the point of contact that had been  previously established for CTF issues.

Clarity of roles and responsibilities.

We found that there was  general clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the participants  collaborating on CVE and CTF counterterrorism programs with the CT  Bureau. For example, several State officials said that for questions  related to programs, such as CVE, they knew who their point of  contact in the CT Bureau was and also what that person’s portfolio  encompassed. We also found that the roles and responsibilities of  participants are generally clarified in writing in cases where there is an  interagency agreement between the bureau and implementing U.S.  government agency partners on a particular program. For example,  such agreements outline the roles and responsibilities of the  requesting agency and the servicing agency.

When referring to assessing the performance of counterterrorism  programming, officials from both within State and other U.S.  government agencies said that they were clear on whose  responsibility it was to monitor and evaluate CVE and CTF  programming activities. State and other agency officials understood  that the CT Bureau would be responsible for ensuring evaluations of  counterterrorism programs are conducted; however, the monitoring  and reporting of the outcomes of CT Bureau–funded programs would  be the responsibility of the implementing U.S. government agency  partner of that program, or the recipient of the funding.

Resources.

According to information provided by the CT Bureau, it  had provided funding for CVE or CTF programming activities to most  of the agencies with which we spoke. The program funding for these  activities came from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and  Related Programs and Economic Support Fund funding accounts.  According to information from the CT Bureau, from fiscal year 2011 to  fiscal year 2014, it obligated over $11 million to agencies we spoke  with for CVE programming and over $43 million to agencies we spoke  with for CTF programming using interagency agreements or transfers.

We found that, in cases where the CT Bureau funded U.S.  government agencies on CVE or CTF programming, the funding  mechanism was clear and laid out in the interagency agreements.

Some agency officials told us that these agreements provide the  vehicle whereby funding can be obligated from the CT Bureau to their  agencies using a standard process. For example, Department of  Homeland Security officials said that they have worked with the CT  Bureau when receiving funding for cross-border financial training to be  carried out in various countries and that the funding mechanism was  clear. USAID officials stated that while USAID does not have  interagency agreements with the CT Bureau, funding from the bureau  for the CVE programs and activities that USAID administers comes  through standard interagency transfers.

Written guidance and agreements.

We found that many of the  U.S. government agencies we spoke with had formal interagency  agreements with the CT Bureau on CVE- and CTF-related  programming or activities. The interagency agreements described,  among other things, the service to be provided, roles and  responsibilities of each party, method and frequency of performance  reporting, and accounting information for funding of the service  provided. The interagency agreements we reviewed covered a  multiyear agreement period. For example, the CT Bureau has an  agreement with the Department of Justice Office of Overseas  Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training on funding a  Resident Legal Advisor in Panama who works with the host country  government to enhance the capacity of criminal justice actors and  institutions to handle financial crimes involving money laundering and  terrorist finance. The interagency agreement in place covers funding  for the period of 2014 through 2019. According to CT Bureau officials,  as the scope or activities of the CT Bureau–funded programming  changes, the interagency agreements can be modified. In addition,  the CT Bureau and the Department of Justice have an interagency  agreement on development of community police training in  Bangladesh.

We found that many of the State bureaus we spoke with that  coordinate with the CT Bureau on CVE and CTF programs did not  have any written agreements, such as memorandums of  understanding or written guidance laying out the terms of the  collaboration. However, several State officials indicated that  formalized agreements were not necessary, as the collaboration  between bureaus within State is routine and the CT Bureau has been  effective in sharing information pertaining to the CVE programs.

section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Given the critical importance of preventing terrorist attacks on the United  States and its interests around the world, State elevated the Office of the  Coordinator for Counterterrorism to the Bureau of Counterterrorism in  fiscal year 2012 to lead the department’s effort to counter terrorism  abroad and to secure the United States against terrorist threats and  violent extremism. The CT Bureau recently has undertaken steps to  address long-standing staffing gaps and it has placed a priority on efforts  to counter violent extremism, among other things, since being elevated to  a bureau in fiscal year 2012. Although the bureau has completed some  program evaluations, it has yet to evaluate its past or current CVE efforts,  an action that could help it make more informed decisions about  programmatic efforts to counter violent extremism abroad. Also, while the  CT Bureau has completed four program evaluations, resulting in 60  recommendations to improve its programs, it has implemented only about  half of those recommendations and has not established time frames for  addressing the remaining recommendations. Without specific time frames  for completing actions in response to evaluation recommendations, it will  be difficult for the bureau to ensure the timely implementation of  programmatic improvements that would benefit both the country-specific  efforts evaluated as well as the broader global program.

section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: Given that countering violent extremism is a priority for the U.S.  government in general and State’s CT Bureau, we recommend that the  Secretary of State take steps to ensure that CVE program efforts abroad  are evaluated.

To improve State’s CT Bureau’s program management efforts, we  recommend that the Secretary of State take steps to ensure the CT  Bureau establishes specific time frames for addressing recommendations  from program evaluations.

section_title: Agency Comments
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State, Defense,  Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury, and to USAID, the United  States Institute of Peace, and the Office of the Director of National  Intelligence for their review and comment. We received written comments  from State, which are reprinted in appendix VII. State and Treasury  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.  State concurred with our recommendation to conduct an evaluation of its  overseas Countering Violent Extremism program efforts. Specifically,  State indicated that it was currently assessing which programs would  most benefit from third-party evaluation during the upcoming fiscal year  and expected CVE to be included in its final determination. State also  concurred with our recommendation to establish specific time frames for  addressing recommendations from its program evaluations. State  indicated that it will commit to setting a timetable for reviewing each  recommendation by a third-party evaluator and implementing those  actions that are deemed both implementable and worthwhile.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and  the Treasury, the Attorney General of the United States, the USAID  Administrator, the Director of National Intelligence, and the President,  United States Institute of Peace. In addition, the report is available at no  charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the  last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VIII.

section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: In addition to presenting information on the evolution of the Department of  State’s (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT Bureau) and changes in  funding, the objectives of this review were to examine (1) how the CT  Bureau’s staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to  which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the  extent to which the bureau’s coordination with U.S. government entities  on selected programs is in line with key collaboration practices.

To determine the extent to which the CT Bureau’s staffing resources have  changed since 2011, we reviewed staffing allocation data from fiscal  years 2011 to 2015. We received data on the total authorized full-time  equivalent (FTE) positions, total established positions, and the total on- board positions for those fiscal years. State’s Office of the Executive  Secretariat provided the FTE staffing data for fiscal years 2011 and 2012,  and the CT Bureau, specifically the Executive Office, provided the FTE  and other staffing data for fiscal years 2013 to 2015. To assess the  reliability of the staffing data, we compared and corroborated information  provided by State with staffing information in the Congressional Budget  Justifications for the fiscal years as well as spoke to State officials  regarding the processes they use to collect and verify the staffing data.  On the basis of the checks we performed, we determined these data to  be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To determine how  the CT Bureau’s mission, organizational structure, and funding resources  may have changed since 2011, we reviewed and analyzed State and CT  Bureau documents pertaining to the mission, organization of the bureau,  staffing, funding, and foreign assistance program allocations. We also  interviewed State officials from the CT Bureau; Office of Inspector  General; Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources; and the Bureaus  of Human Resources, Comptroller and Global Financial Services,  Budgeting and Planning, and Administration. Specifically, for the mission  statement, we reviewed the CT Bureau’s mission statement from 2011  and also from 2015, both reflected in bureau documents and on the  bureau’s website, to ascertain what changes, if any, there have been to  the bureau’s mission. We discussed with CT Bureau officials any changes  to the bureau’s mission over time. To determine changes in the CT  Bureau’s organizational structure, we reviewed the organizational chart of  the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (CT Office) from 2011  as well as organizational charts of the CT Bureau covering 2012 through  2015. We also spoke to officials representing every directorate and most  offices that had been established within the CT Bureau to understand  their roles and responsibilities and any impact that the bureau’s strategic  review and reorganization has had on their portfolios. To depict changes  in resources, we reviewed data on the CT Bureau’s operations allocations  and obligations from 2011 to 2015 as well as foreign assistance  allocations that the bureau has received over the same time period. The  allocations and obligations for the bureau’s operations were provided by  the CT Bureau, while the allocations for the foreign assistance programs  were provided by State’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources.  We depicted the allocated funding information based on the funding  accounts as well as the foreign assistance programs they cover. To  assess the reliability of the funding and allocations data, we spoke to  State officials regarding the processes they use to collect and verify the  data. On the basis of the checks we performed, we determined these  data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

To examine the extent to which the CT Bureau has assessed its  performance since 2011, we reviewed bureau strategic plans,  performance reports, program evaluation reports, and action plans for  evaluation recommendations, as well as State policy and guidance  documents outlining performance reporting and evaluation requirements  for bureaus. Specifically, to examine the CT Bureau’s performance  reporting efforts, we reviewed the bureau’s multiyear strategic plans and  performance reports to determine whether the bureau had established  performance measures for its foreign assistance–related goals and used  established performance measures to assess the bureau’s progress  toward achieving its goals, as required by State policy. While we reviewed documentation on the CT Bureau’s performance measures, and  discussed the CT Bureau’s performance reporting efforts with cognizant  State officials, we did not fully assess the reliability of these measures  because our goal was to determine whether the bureau had established  performance measures rather than describe the bureau’s actual  performance. We are publishing the performance results the CT Bureau  reported to provide context and additional support for our finding that the  bureau has assessed its performance. To examine the CT Bureau’s  program evaluation efforts, we reviewed evaluation reports and compared  the number of evaluations the bureau completed against the number of  evaluations required by State’s February 2012 evaluation policy. We also  compared the bureau’s efforts to track and address recommendations  from evaluations against internal control standards for the federal  government and State’s January 2015 evaluation guidance, which  provides specific criteria and guidelines for evaluating State programs. In  addition, we interviewed or obtained written responses from officials from  State’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources and Bureau of  Budget and Planning to clarify State’s performance reporting and  evaluation requirements for bureaus and whether the CT Bureau had met  the requirements. We also interviewed CT Bureau officials responsible for  strategic planning and program monitoring and evaluation to obtain  additional or clarifying information related to past or currently planned  bureau efforts on performance reporting and evaluations.

To examine the extent to which the CT Bureau’s coordination within State  and other U.S. government entities on selected programs is in line with  key collaboration practices and collaboration features, we reviewed  agency documents and interviewed officials from various State regional  and functional bureaus and other U.S. government agencies. Specifically,  we spoke with officials representing regional bureaus—African Affairs,  East Asian and Pacific Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs, Near  Eastern Affairs, South and Central Asian Affairs, and Western  Hemisphere Affairs—and officials representing functional bureaus or  offices—Center for Strategic Communications; Conflict and Stabilization  Operations; Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Economic and  Business Affairs; Educational and Cultural Affairs; International Narcotics  and Law Enforcement Affairs; and International Organization Affairs. We  also spoke with officials from the Departments of Defense, Homeland  Security, Justice, and the Treasury; United States Agency for  International Development; the National Counterterrorism Center; and the  United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. We focused on  coordination on the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and  Counterterrorism Finance (CTF) programs because these programs  involve coordination with large numbers of agencies and State entities  and also represent strategic priorities for the CT Bureau. We used GAO’s  leading practices for implementing interagency collaborative mechanisms  to better understand the extent and nature of collaboration between the  CT Bureau and other bureaus within State and other U.S. government  agencies on CT Bureau programs and compared CT Bureau’s  coordination efforts against these key collaboration practices. We  devised a standard set of questions that incorporated questions provided  in GAO’s collaboration practices to ask State regional and functional  bureaus and U.S. government agencies. We focused on six of the key  collaboration practices: outcomes and accountability, bridging  organizational cultures, leadership, clarity of roles and responsibilities,  resources, and written guidance and agreements. We analyzed the  information provided by State and agency officials against these practices  to determine whether the collaboration between these entities and the CT  Bureau on CVE and CTF were generally consistent with these practices.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2014 to July 2015 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

section_title: Appendix II: Ancillary Efforts Managed by the Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism
paragraphs: In addition to its key programs and activities, the Bureau of  Counterterrorism manages or is responsible for a number of other  counterterrorism-related efforts, including the following:  Issuing Country Reports on Terrorism, which are annual, mandated  reports to Congress that provide, among other things, an assessment  of each country in which acts of international terror of major  significance occurred and an assessment of each country whose  territory is being used as a sanctuary for terrorist or terrorist  organizations.

Co-chairing the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), which  enhances the counterterrorism technology and equipment capabilities  of U.S. government agencies and elements involved in  counterterrorism and antiterrorism activities. The TSWG implements  five bilateral research and development agreements with international  partners. The cooperative programs with Israel, Canada, the United  Kingdom, Australia, and Singapore allow the United States to  leverage foreign experience, expertise, resources, and infrastructure  to address commonly-held technical priorities for combating terrorism.

Leading the Counterterrorism Preparedness Program, a series of  international exercises designed to strengthen the U.S. and partner  nations’ capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover  from terrorist attacks, especially those involving weapons of mass  destruction.

Leading the Foreign Emergency Support Team, which is the U.S.  government’s only interagency, on-call team poised to support  embassies in responding to terrorist incidents worldwide.

Preparing public designations of foreign terrorist organizations,  designations that have legal consequences.

section_title: Appendix III: Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism Description of Its Directorates and Offices
paragraphs: The Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT  Bureau) is led by a Coordinator for Counterterrorism and is currently  organized with four directorates and numerous offices and units that  cover counterterrorism policy, strategy, planning, programming, and  operations. According to the CT Bureau, the bureau’s final structure is  pending until it has been approved by State’s management and  incorporated into the department’s Foreign Affairs Manual. Pending  incorporation into the Foreign Affairs Manual, the CT Bureau provided the  following description of its directorates and offices.
subsections: section_title: Directorates
subsections: section_title: Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism
paragraphs: The Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism serves as the  senior deputy and advisor to the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and  has the authority to act on the Coordinator’s behalf in his or her absence.  The Principal Deputy Coordinator is responsible for overall management  of the bureau and, in consultation with the Coordinator, plans and  supervises the substantive work of the bureau, including public affairs  outreach strategies. The Principal Deputy Coordinator represents the  bureau in department and interagency groups as well as supervises  subordinate offices, as directed by the Coordinator.

section_title: Regional and Multilateral Affairs
paragraphs: The directorate is led by a Deputy Coordinator and is made up of two  offices with a regional focus and one focused on multilateral affairs,  according to the CT Bureau. The two regional offices—Office of Africa,  Europe, and the Americas, and Office of South and Central Asia and the  Near East—are engaged in day-to-day policy tasks and interactions that  are managed by interagency working groups. This includes writing policy  papers, providing policy guidance, and participating in interagency and  within-State meetings to work on counterterrorism-related issues. The  offices work very closely with State regional bureaus, focusing on  terrorism-related issues, such as designation of terrorist groups or  updates on terrorist threats or activities in a region or country.

The Office of Multilateral Affairs handles multilateral engagements of the  CT Bureau and works with multiple partners including the United Nations.  The office tracks the work of the multilateral organizations, sets the  agenda on U.S. counterterrorism issues at multilateral meetings, and  develops multilateral counterterrorism programs to cover capacity- building goals as well as other counterterrorism strategic priorities of the  CT Bureau and the rest of the U.S. government. One example of  multilateral engagement is through the Global Counterterrorism Forum,  which is an informal, multilateral counterterrorism platform that focuses on  identifying critical civilian counterterrorism needs, mobilizing the  necessary expertise and resources to address such needs, and generally  enhancing global cooperation.

section_title: Homeland Security
paragraphs: The directorate is led by a Deputy Coordinator and covers three offices— Office of Homeland Security, Office of Terrorist Screening and  Interdiction, and Office of Terrorist Designations and Sanctions, according  to the CT Bureau. The Office of Homeland Security leads State’s efforts  to deliver and implement core cross-cutting homeland security policies  and programs that intersect with U.S. foreign policy development on  counterterrorism issues and coordinates with other State bureaus and  U.S. government agencies on homeland security issues such as border  security, transportation security, and critical infrastructure protection. The  Office of Terrorist Screening and Interdiction leads State’s policy  development, interagency coordination, international engagement, and  negotiations for the exchange of biographic terrorism screening  information. It also coordinates programs to constrain terrorist mobility  globally by helping countries at risk of terrorist activity or transit to  enhance their border security capabilities. The Office of Terrorist  Designations and Sanctions identifies and designates targets for listing as  Foreign Terrorist Organizations and leads the mandated review of State’s  designations under Foreign Terrorist Organization authorities. It also  leads State’s coordination of policy on countering terrorism finance  worldwide.

section_title: Operations
paragraphs: The directorate is led by a Deputy Coordinator and covers one office, the  Office of Operations, and three units—the Technical Programs Unit, the  Policy Unit, and the Coordination Unit, according to the CT Bureau. The  directorate coordinates State’s interagency efforts to plan and conduct  sensitive counterterrorism operations worldwide. It also coordinates  interagency and military counterterrorism activities and leads the Foreign  Emergency Support Team, which is the U.S. government’s interagency  team poised to respond quickly to terrorist incidents worldwide.

section_title: Offices and Units
subsections: section_title: Office of the Executive Director
paragraphs: The Office of the Executive Director provides executive management and  direction for the CT Bureau in areas related to budget and finance, human  resources, information technology, and communications. The office keeps  track of CT Bureau reporting requirements such as quarterly reports and  congressional notifications in order to execute the foreign assistance  budget. The office also liaises with other government agencies on  counterterrorism programmatic and management issues such as budget  and financial management, training, and continuity of operations.

section_title: Office of Strategy, Plans, and Initiatives
paragraphs: The Office of Strategy, Plans, and Initiatives identifies, sets, coordinates,  monitors, and adjusts CT Bureau counterterrorism priorities at the  strategic level. The priorities are based on the current threat environment,  partnership priorities, and monitoring priorities. The office also manages  the bureau’s congressional affairs portfolio and provides broad guidance  on counterterrorism policy and strategy to program implementers in State  and other government agencies.

section_title: Office of Programs
paragraphs: The Office of Programs covers counterterrorism programming and  implementation from a regional perspective focused on Countering  Violent Extremism, Counterterrorism Finance, Antiterrorism Assistance,  and Regional Strategic Initiative–funded programs and other  counterterrorism-related programs. The office monitors the day-to-day  activities at the program management level and makes sure that program  implementers follow implementation agreements. The office also leads  the monitoring and evaluation of programs to ensure that the programs  follow statements of work with indicators.

section_title: Public Affairs Unit
paragraphs: The Public Affairs Unit covers several functions, among other things, that  involve writing press guidance, speeches, public remarks, and  congressional testimony for senior CT Bureau personnel. The unit  reviews and clears reports from other offices within the CT Bureau and  also clears press releases and guidance related to counterterrorism  issues. The unit also promotes the CT Bureau’s mission and events via  social media. The unit is also involved in the tasking, coordinating, and  drafting of State’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism.

section_title: Foreign Terrorist Fighters Unit
paragraphs: The Foreign Terrorist Fighters Unit, led by an ambassador-level Senior  Advisor, leads State’s and interagency efforts in engaging with foreign  partners to prevent and interdict foreign extremist travel to Syria and Iraq.  The unit coordinates bureau and interagency strategy and initiatives on  the foreign fighter issue to advise principals on the latest developments  surrounding this problem set. The unit screens cables, intelligence  reports, and academic research, and briefs the Senior Advisor and other  principals as necessary. The unit also meets with foreign partners to  exchange information, coordinate actions, and assist in the development  of press guidance on these issues.

section_title: Countering Violent Extremism Unit
paragraphs: The Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Unit was created to elevate and  advance the CT Bureau’s policy work on countering and preventing  violent extremism. To accomplish this goal, the CVE policy unit helps  formulate and develops department, interagency, diplomatic, and  multilateral efforts and initiatives to identify and address the drivers of  violent extremism. The unit also engages with and supports other CVE- specific and relevant elements within State and with other agencies.

section_title: Appendix IV: Allocations of Funds to the Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism for Six Counterterrorism- Related Programs, Fiscal Years 2011 to 2015
paragraphs: Foreign assistance allocations to the Department of State’s Bureau of  Counterterrorism (CT Bureau) fund counterterrorism-related programs  that the bureau oversees. These allocations increased from fiscal years  2011 to 2012 as the CT Bureau transitioned from an office to a bureau.  These allocations decreased thereafter from $154 million in fiscal year  2012 to $110 million in fiscal year 2014, as shown in figure 8. The  majority of these allocations are from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism,  Demining, and Related Programs account, which funds all six  counterterrorism-related programs listed in the figure. These programs  support a variety of activities including antiterrorism training and  equipment, building foreign partner capacity to counter violent extremism,  counterterrorism engagement with foreign partners, and anti-money  laundering and counterterrorism finance training. Allocations from the  Economic Support Fund support those Countering Violent Extremism and  Counterterrorism Engagement program activities that do not involve law  enforcement entities. For fiscal year 2015, the CT Bureau requested  $104.4 million in allocations to fund the six programs.

section_title: Appendix V: Funds Obligated for the Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism Operations Budget, Fiscal Years 2012 to 2014
paragraphs: The Bureau of Counterterrorism receives funds from two sources to  support its core operations: the Diplomatic and Consular Programs and  the Worldwide Security Programs accounts. The base operations of the  bureau cover all travel, the majority of contracts, supplies, staffing costs,  telephone, information technology, and printing and equipment. Figure 9  shows the bureau’s total obligations for its overall operations since fiscal  year 2012. These obligations increased from fiscal year 2012 to 2013 as  the bureau was being established. The base operations obligations then  decreased from about $7.7 million in fiscal year 2013 to about $4.8 million  in fiscal year 2014.

The Bureau of Counterterrorism’s overall budget is made up of the  following components: (1) Base Operations covers all travel, the majority  of contracts, supplies, staffing costs, telephone, information technology,  and printing and equipment for the bureau; (2) Regional Security Initiative  covers the travel for the bureau’s six field coordinators based at U.S.  embassies as well as two to four regional conferences per year that bring  together personnel from the embassies from various regions to discuss  counterterrorism policy and strategy for that region; (3) Foreign  Emergency Support Team supports the Operations Directorate’s  activities, including its travel, equipment, and post support costs; (4)  Technical Support Working Group supports the Operations Directorate’s  activities, including its travel and contribution to the Department of  Defense; and (5) the Worldwide Security Program account covers the  costs of the contracts related to staff and other direct costs supporting the  Counterterrorism Preparedness Program.

section_title: Appendix VI: Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism Workforce Planning Efforts
paragraphs: According to the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of  Counterterrorism (CT Bureau), it has used a number of ways to assess its  resource and workforce planning needs. CT Bureau officials reported that  it uses State’s Domestic Staffing Model to establish human resource  demand for its workforce and to also make staffing decisions across the  bureau. According to the Office of Resource Management and Analysis in  State’s Bureau of Human Resources, bureau managers can use the data  in the model to make various decisions on current levels of work and the  personnel resources performing the work. For example, the baseline  could provide insight into the level of effort being expended on each  function and managers could assess whether their practices are  consistent with bureau priorities. The Domestic Staffing Model contains  grade and skill level information for personnel performing functions in  each bureau, which allows the model to predict what type of personnel  resources would be required to support the expected workload increases.  Moreover, this in turn could provide valuable information for recruitment,  succession planning, and training purposes. However, the most recent  data collection for the Domestic Staffing Model was conducted in spring  2011, when the CT Bureau was the Office of the Coordinator for  Counterterrorism and thus the model does not reflect the current CT  Bureau’s organizational structure. According to State officials, the  information for the CT Bureau will be updated in the Domestic Staffing  Model by the end of 2015.

CT Bureau officials also reported that the bureau looks at its resource  needs during the annual planning and budgeting process that entails CT  Bureau directors analyzing or assessing the workload of the staff in their  respective areas and providing detailed justification for each full-time  equivalent staff position requested. All requests and justifications for  additional full-time equivalent staff positions are vetted with the Principal  Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism and if approved, presented to  the Coordinator for Counterterrorism for approval as part of the overall  bureau budget request, according to the CT Bureau. Once updated, the  Domestic Staffing Model, along with the annual planning and budgeting  process, would be a reasonable approach at looking at workforce  planning and consistent with best practices.

Best practices for effective strategic workforce planning should, among  other things, address the following key principles: determine the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to  achieve current and future programmatic results; develop strategies that are tailored to address gaps in number,  deployment, and alignment of human capital approaches for enabling  and sustaining the contributions of all critical skills and competencies;  and monitor and evaluate the progress toward its human capital goals.

section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State

section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact

section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Jason Bair (Assistant Director),  Andrea Riba Miller (Analyst-in-Charge), Esther Toledo, Ashley Alley,  David Dayton, Martin de Alteriis, and Laurani Singh made key  contributions to this report. Tina Cheng, Steven Lozano, and Sarah Veale  provided technical assistance.


Question-summary annotations: questions: question: How has the number of FTE positions at the Bureau of Counterterrorism changed since FY2011?
answer: The Department of State's (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism has had an annual increase in authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) positions since fiscal year 2011 and has recently undertaken efforts to reduce a persistent staffing gap.
child_questions: question: How did the number of authorized FTEs change between FY2011 and FY2015?
answer: The bureau's authorized FTEs increased from 66 in fiscal year 2011 to 96 in fiscal year 2015, and over the same period, FTE vacancies ranged from 17 to 23 percent.
child_questions: question: How were these vacancies distributed?
answer: The vacancies included both staff and management positions.

question: Why were some vacancies left unaddressed?
answer: Bureau officials said they postponed filling some positions until the Coordinator for Counterterrorism had sufficient time to assess the bureau's needs and priorities.

question: What progress has been made in addressing vacancies?
answer: A senior Bureau of Counterterrorism official testified before Congress in June 2015 that the bureau was making progress and that it had 11 vacancies. However, we have not been able to verify that 4 of the reportedly filled positions have been filled because State did not provide sufficient documentation.

questions: question: What gaps exist in the bureau's self-assessment efforts?
answer: While the bureau has undertaken efforts to assess its progress, it has not yet evaluated its priority Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program and has not established time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. Specifically, the bureau established indicators and targets for its foreign assistance–related goals and reported results achieved toward each indicator.
child_questions: question: What evaluations has the bureau completed?
answer: Specifically, the bureau established indicators and targets for its foreign assistance–related goals and reported results achieved toward each indicator. The bureau has also completed four evaluations covering three of its six programs that resulted in 60 recommendations. The bureau reported having implemented about half of the recommendations (28 of 60) as of June 2015 but has not established time frames for addressing the remaining recommendations.
child_questions: question: Why is the lack of time frames a negative factor for the bureau?
answer: Without specific time frames, it will be difficult for the bureau to ensure timely implementation of programmatic improvements.

question: What flaws exist in the bureau's evaluation selection?
answer: In addition, despite identifying its CVE program as a priority and acknowledging the benefit of evaluating it, the bureau has postponed evaluating it each fiscal year since 2012.

questions: question: How important are counterterrorism efforts for the U.S. government?
answer: Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a global threat, and combating them remains a top priority for the U.S. government.
child_questions: question: What agency leads counterterrorism efforts?
answer: State leads and coordinates U.S. efforts to counter terrorism abroad.
child_questions: question: How has State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism changed to better counter terrorism?
answer: State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism was elevated to bureau status in 2012 with the aim of enhancing State's ability to counter violent extremism, build partner counterterrorism capacity, and improve coordination.

question: What was GAO asked to review?
answer: GAO was asked to review the effects of this change and the new bureau's efforts.

questions: question: What did GAO recommend?
answer: GAO recommends that the Secretary of State take steps to (1) ensure that CVE program efforts abroad are evaluated and (2) establish time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations.
child_questions: question: To what extent did State concur with these recommendations?
answer: State concurred with both of GAO's recommendations.

question: What actions does State plan to take?
answer: State indicated that it was currently assessing which programs would benefit from a third-party evaluation and that it would commit to setting a timetable for reviewing each recommendation by a third-party evaluator.