NASA Major Projects: Portfolio Is at Risk for Continued Cost Growth and Schedule Delays
Released: 2018-06-14T00:00:00


Highlights: section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: GAO designated NASA's acquisition management as a high-risk area in 1990 after a history of persistent cost growth and schedule slippage in many of NASA's major projects. In more recent years, GAO found that NASA had taken some steps to improve its management, and, in May 2017, GAO found that projects were continuing a generally positive trend of limiting cost and schedule growth. But at the same time, GAO noted that many of these projects, including some of the most expensive ones, were approaching the phase in their life cycles when cost and schedule growth is most likely.

This statement summarizes GAO's 2018 findings from its 10th annual snapshot of how well NASA is planning and executing its major acquisition projects, and describes (1) the cost and schedule performance of NASA's portfolio of major projects and (2) the extent to which NASA faces risks for further cost increases and schedule delays. To conduct its review for the 2018 report, GAO-18-280SP , GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and other data for NASA's 26 major projects, each with a life-cycle cost of over $250 million; reviewed monthly project status reports; and interviewed NASA officials.

section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The cost and schedule performance of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) portfolio of major projects has deteriorated, but the extent of cost performance deterioration is unknown. NASA expects cost growth for the Orion crew capsule—one of the largest projects in the portfolio—but does not have a current cost estimate. In addition, the average launch delay for the portfolio was 12 months, the highest delay GAO has reported in its 10 years of assessing major NASA projects (see figure below).

The deterioration in portfolio performance was the result of 9 of the 17 projects in development experiencing cost or schedule growth.

Four projects encountered technical issues that were compounded by risky program management decisions. For example, the Space Launch System and Exploration Ground Systems programs are large-scale, technically complex human spaceflight programs, and NASA managed them to aggressive schedules and with insufficient levels of cost and schedule reserves. This made it more difficult for the programs to operate within their committed baseline cost and schedule estimates.

Two projects ran into technical challenges that resulted in delays in the integration and test phase. For example, in December 2017, GAO found that the James Webb Space Telescope project encountered delays primarily due to the integration of the various spacecraft elements taking longer than expected, as well as the need to resolve technical issues during testing. GAO has previously found that integration and testing is when projects are most at risk of incurring cost and schedule growth.

Three projects experienced cost growth or schedule delays due to factors outside of the projects' control, such as delays related to their launch vehicles.

NASA continues to face increased risk of cost and schedule growth in future years due to new, large and complex projects that will enter the portfolio and expensive projects remaining in the portfolio longer than expected.

section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement. GAO has made recommendations in prior reports to strengthen NASA's acquisition management of its major projects. NASA generally agreed with these recommendations, but has not fully addressed some of them. GAO continues to believe they should be fully addressed.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Thank you for inviting me to discuss the cost and schedule performance  of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) portfolio  of major acquisition projects. NASA’s major projects are the key enablers  for the agency to achieve its vision and its mission. They include NASA’s  Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle  (Orion), which are the centerpieces of NASA’s human exploration plans;  Mars 2020 and Europa Clipper, which will further our understanding of the  habitability of other planets; and the Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation  Satellite-2 (ICESat-2), which will provide better data on changes in the  Earth. In its fiscal year 2019 budget request, NASA requested $19.9  billion, which included about $4.5 billion for its deep space exploration  programs and research and about $6 billion for science programs and  research. As these projects are complex and specialized, and often push  the state of the art in space technology, NASA manages a portfolio that  will always have inherent technical, design, and integration risks.

We have been assessing the cost and schedule performance of NASA’s  major projects—those that have a life-cycle cost over $250 million— annually for 10 years. Over this time, we have seen NASA make progress  in reducing acquisition risks, such as by improving cost and schedule  estimating tools, and establishing design metrics and tracking projects  against the metrics. But our most recent assessment in May 2018 found  that the cost and schedule performance of the portfolio deteriorated after  several years of following a generally positive trend of limiting cost and  schedule growth.

My statement today is based primarily upon our May 2018 report.  Specifically, I will discuss (1) the cost and schedule performance of  NASA’s portfolio of major projects and (2) the extent to which NASA faces  risks for continued cost increases and schedule delays. To conduct this  work, we collected cost and schedule information from NASA’s major  projects using a data collection instrument, analyzed projects’ monthly  status reports, interviewed NASA project and headquarters officials, and  reviewed project documentation. At the time of our review, there were 26  major projects in total, but the information available depended on where a  project was in its life cycle. For the 17 projects that were in the  implementation phase, we compared current cost and schedule estimates  to their original cost and schedule baselines. We reviewed historical data  on cost and schedule performance for major projects from our prior  reports and compared them to the performance of NASA’s current  portfolio of major projects. More detailed information on our objectives,  scope, and methodology for that work can be found in our May 2018  report. In addition, we requested and received an update from NASA in  early June 2018 on whether the agency had completed a new life-cycle  cost estimate for the Orion program. We also updated the actual launch  date for the Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment Follow-On  (GRACE-FO) project and updated information on the launch date for the  Ionospheric Connection Explorer (ICON) project.

We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance  with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards  require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate  evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions  based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained  provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on  our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: NASA Acquisition Life Cycle for Space Flight Projects
paragraphs: The life cycle for NASA space flight projects consists of two phases— formulation, which takes a project from concept to preliminary design, and  implementation, which includes building, launching, and operating the  system, among other activities. NASA further divides formulation and  implementation into phases, phase A through phase F. Major projects  must get approval from senior NASA officials at key decision points  before they can enter each new phase. Formulation culminates in a  review at key decision point C, known as project confirmation, where cost  and schedule baselines are established and documented in a decision  memorandum. Figure 1 depicts NASA’s life cycle for space flight projects.

At the time of our review in May 2018, NASA had a portfolio of 26 major  projects (see table 1). See appendix I for a brief description of each  project.

section_title: NASA Acquisition Management as a High- Risk Area
paragraphs: NASA acquisition management is an area that we monitor on our high- risk list. Our high-risk series is a biennial report that keeps focused  attention on government operations with greater vulnerabilities to fraud,  waste, abuse, and mismanagement or that are in need of transformation  to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. In 1990, we  first designated the area as high risk because there was little emphasis  on end results, product performance, and cost control; the acquisition  process itself was cumbersome and time-consuming; and NASA found  itself procuring expensive hardware that did not work properly. For  example, in April 1990, NASA deployed the $1.5 billion Hubble Space  Telescope and soon after, the agency discovered that the primary mirror  had been manufactured in the wrong shape, severely degrading some of  the telescope’s scientific capabilities.

Subsequently, we and other organizations, including the National  Academy of Sciences and NASA’s Office of the Inspector General, found  that NASA’s cost estimates were overly optimistic. Our reviews also  found that NASA continued to experience significant cost and schedule  growth due, in part, to not having a disciplined cost estimating process.

In 1992, we reviewed the cost and schedule performance of 29 NASA  programs and found that 25 of those programs experienced cost  growth that ranged from 14 to 426 percent above their initial  estimates. Further, the median estimate change for all programs was  an increase of 77 percent. General reasons that NASA provided for  the cost growth included insufficient definition studies, program and  funding instability, overly optimistic assumptions by program officials,  and unrealistic contractor estimates. The more specific reasons for  the cost growth we found included program redesigns, technical  complexities, budget constraints, and incomplete cost estimates.

In 2004, we reviewed the cost and schedule performance of 27 NASA  programs and found that 17 of the programs experienced cost  growth. Cost growth for 10 of the 17 programs was over 25 percent.

We found that considerable change in NASA’s program cost  estimates—both increases and decreases—indicated that NASA  lacked a clear understanding of how much its programs cost and how  long they will take to achieve their objectives. Further, we found that  NASA’s basic cost-estimating processes—an important tool for  managing programs—lacked the discipline needed to ensure that  program estimates are reasonable.

In more recent years we have found that NASA’s leadership was focused  on improving acquisition outcomes and had taken some steps to improve  its management.

In 2006, NASA established a management review process to enable  NASA’s senior management to more effectively monitor a project’s  performance, including cost, schedule, and cross-cutting technical  and nontechnical issues.

In 2009, NASA began requiring that NASA major programs and  projects develop a joint cost and schedule confidence level (JCL) prior  to project confirmation in order to ensure that cost and schedule  estimates were realistic and projects thoroughly planned for  anticipated risks. The JCL is a point-in-time estimate that, among  other things, includes all cost and schedule elements, incorporates  and quantifies known risks, assesses the impacts of cost and  schedule to date, and addresses available annual resources. NASA  policy generally requires that projects be baselined and budgeted at  the 70 percent confidence level.

In 2012, the agency established metrics to more consistently measure  a project’s design progress and, in 2014, we found that most major  projects in the portfolio were tracking and reporting those metrics. In  addition, experts with whom we met confirmed that NASA’s metrics  are valid measures to assess design maturity in space systems.

Since 2015, we have observed a positive trend of higher numbers of  projects maturing technologies prior to preliminary design review.  Demonstrating that technologies will work as intended in a relevant  environment serves as a fundamental element of a sound business  case, and projects falling short of this standard often experience  subsequent technical problems. Our best practices work has shown  that maturing technologies prior to preliminary design review can  minimize risks for projects entering development, which lowers the  risk of subsequent cost growth and schedule delays.

We believe that many of these steps NASA has taken contributed to the  largely positive trend of cost and schedule performance for NASA’s  portfolio of major projects between 2013 and 2017. In our May 2017  assessment of major projects, we found that out of 16 projects in  development, 5 experienced cost growth and 4 experienced schedule  delays over their development cost and schedule baselines. Both of  these measures were at or near the lowest levels we have reported since  we began our annual assessments in 2009.

However, we also found in our February 2017 high risk update that NASA  needed to do more with respect to anticipating and mitigating risks— especially with regard to large programs, estimating and forecasting costs  for its largest projects, and implementing management tools. We  highlighted several actions that would be critical to improving NASA’s  acquisition outcomes, including the following:

Ensuring that NASA conducted adequate and ongoing assessments  of risks for larger programs because the impacts of any potential  miscalculations will be felt across NASA’s portfolio.

Ensuring that NASA understood long-term human exploration  program costs. While the three major human exploration programs— Orion, SLS, and the Exploration Ground Systems (EGS)—have been  baselined, none of the three programs has a baseline that covers  activities beyond the second planned flight. Long-term estimates,  which could be revised as potential mission paths are narrowed and  selected, would provide decision makers with a more informed  understanding of costs and schedules associated with potential  agency development paths.

Ensuring that program offices regularly and consistently updated their  JCL across the portfolio. As a project reaches the later stages of  development, especially integration and testing, its risk posture may  change. An updated project JCL would provide both project and  agency management with data on relevant risks that can guide project  decisions.

Ensuring that NASA continued its efforts to build capacity in areas  such as cost and schedule estimating and measuring contractor  performance.

Further, in our 2016 and 2017 assessments of major projects, we found  that while the cost and schedule performance of NASA’s portfolio was  improving, a number of large, complex projects were in or would soon be  entering the integration and test phase—the phase in development that  often reveals unforeseen challenges that can lead to cost and schedule  growth. In May 2017, projects in this phase included all three human  spaceflight programs and the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST).  Subsequently, we found that these programs experienced delays during  this phase of development. For example, in December 2017, NASA  announced a 13- to 19-month delay for the first integrated mission of  Orion, SLS, and EGS. This mission is referred to as Exploration Mission 1  (EM-1) and will not have crew. In addition, in December 2017, we found  that the JWST project continued to make progress towards launch, but  the program was encountering technical challenges that required both  time and money to fix and may lead to additional delays. Subsequently,  the JWST project delayed its launch readiness date by at least 19 months  from October 2018 to May 2020.

section_title: Portfolio Cost and Schedule Deteriorated but Extent of Cost Growth Is Unknown
paragraphs: The cost and schedule performance of NASA’s portfolio of major projects  deteriorated between May 2017 and May 2018, but the extent of cost  growth is unknown. NASA lacks a current cost estimate for its Orion crew  capsule—one of the largest programs in the portfolio—but expects the  program will exceed its cost baseline when NASA updates the program’s  life-cycle cost estimate. Because the Orion program accounts for about  22 percent of all development costs, even a small percentage of cost  growth for the Orion program could significantly affect portfolio cost  performance. The known negative cost and schedule performance is  largely driven by the cost and schedule growth of four projects—SLS,  EGS, Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment (SGSS) and Mars  2020—that experienced technical problems compounded by  programmatic challenges. Together, these projects experienced $638  million in cost growth and 59 months in aggregate schedule delays. Two  projects—JWST and ICESat-2—experienced schedule delays due to  technical challenges identified during integration and test. Another 3  projects—NASA Indian Space Research Organisation Synthetic Aperture  Radar (NISAR), ICON, and GRACE-FO—experienced cost growth or  delays largely due to factors outside of the projects’ control, such as  launch vehicle delays.
subsections: section_title: Portfolio Average Launch Delays Increased, but NASA Lacks a Current Orion Program Cost Estimate to Determine Extent of Cost Growth
paragraphs: The average launch delay increased from 7 months in our May 2017  report to 12 months in our May 2018 report—the highest schedule delay  we have reported to date. We were not able to determine the extent of  portfolio cost growth this year because NASA does not have a current  cost estimate for the Orion program—one of the largest programs in its  portfolio—and officials expect the cost to increase. As of June 2017, the  Orion program’s development cost was about $6.6 billion; based on that  estimate, it accounts for 22 percent of the portfolio’s estimated $30.1  billion of development costs. As a result, a small percentage of cost  growth for the Orion program could significantly affect cost performance.  Even without including Orion cost growth, the overall development cost  growth for the portfolio of 17 development projects increased to 18.8  percent, up from 15.6 percent in 2017 (see figure 2).

Senior-level NASA officials told us they expect that the Human  Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate and the Orion program  will complete an updated life-cycle cost estimate in June 2018. This would  be approximately 10 months after the program raised to senior-level  officials’ attention that the program expects cost growth over its cost  baseline during an August 2017 briefing concerning potential cost  increases related to the launch delay for EM-1. In early June 2018,  NASA officials said that they had not yet completed the updated life-cycle  cost estimate.

In our May 2018 report, we found that 7 of 17 NASA major projects had  stayed within cost and schedule estimates since our 2017 annual  assessment of major projects, but 9 projects experienced cost growth or  schedule delays and cost growth is expected for the Orion program.  Table 2 provides data on the cost and schedule performance between our  May 2017 and 2018 reports for the 17 major projects in development that  have cost and schedule baselines.

The deteriorating cost and schedule performance of the portfolio in 2018  is the result of  four projects—SLS, EGS, SGSS, and Mars 2020—addressing  technical challenges that were compounded by risky programmatic  decisions;  two projects—JWST and ICESat-2—experiencing delays due to  technical challenges identified during integration and test; and  three projects—NISAR, ICON, and GRACE-FO—experiencing cost  growth or delays largely due to factors outside of the projects’ control.

We elaborate on these three scenarios below.

Technical challenges compounded by risky programmatic  decisions. Together, SLS, EGS, SGSS, and Mars 2020 experienced  $638 million in cost growth and 59 months in aggregate schedule delays  due to technical problems that were compounded by programmatic  challenges since our May 2017 report. The SLS and EGS programs  experienced cost growth and schedule delays associated with EM-1, their  first combined mission along with the Orion program. We have found for  several years that the human spaceflight programs—Orion, SLS, and  EGS—are making progress maturing designs and building hardware, but  also are experiencing some significant engineering and manufacturing  challenges. For example, the SLS program ran into numerous challenges  completing the welding of its core stage element in 2017. The program  stopped welding on the core stage for months to identify and resolve low  weld strength in the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks due to low  weld strength measurements found in the liquid oxygen tanks caused by  a program and contractor decision to change the weld tool configuration  during fabrication. The EGS program also experienced technical  challenges, including with the design and installation of the ground  support equipment and the 10 umbilicals that connect SLS and Orion to  the Mobile Launcher—which supports the assembly, testing, and  servicing of SLS and provides the platform on which SLS and Orion will  launch.

Finally, although the Orion program has not yet reported cost growth, it  also experienced technical challenges. These challenges included  software and hardware delays, and at least 14 months of delays with the  European Service Module—which provides air, water, power, and  propulsion to Orion during in-space flight—since the element’s critical  design review in June 2016. In April 2017, we found that, according to  program officials, the delays with the service module were largely due to  NASA, the European Space Agency, and the European Space Agency  contractor underestimating the time and effort necessary to address  design issues for the first production service module and the availability of  parts from suppliers and subcontractors. NASA expects the Orion  program to experience cost growth over its cost baseline to the second  combined mission, Exploration Mission 2 (EM-2). However, the extent of  the growth is unknown because, as noted above, NASA is currently  revising the program’s life-cycle cost estimate.

Technical challenges such as these are not unusual for large-scale  programs, especially human exploration programs that are inherently  complex and difficult. However, we have found that NASA has made  programmatic decisions—including establishing low cost and schedule  reserves, managing to aggressive schedules, and not following best  practices for earned value management or creating reliable cost and  schedule baselines—that have compounded the technical challenges  (see table 3). As a result, the three human spaceflight programs have  been at risk of cost and schedule growth since NASA approved their  baselines.

In December 2017, NASA announced the new internal launch readiness  date for EM-1 is now December 2019, and has allocated 6 months of  schedule reserve available to extend the date to June 2020 for possible  manufacturing and production schedule risks. This represents a delay of  13-19 months for EM-1. It is too soon to know if NASA has addressed the  programmatic challenges identified above. We will continue to follow up  through future reviews.

Similarly, the SGSS project experienced new cost growth of $59.5 million  and delayed its completion by 21 months. Project officials attributed the  cost growth and delays to the contractor’s incomplete understanding of its  requirements, which led to poor contractor plans and late design  changes. But project management has been a challenge as well. The  project has historically struggled to manage contractor performance and  has faced both contractor and project staffing shortfalls, as we found in  our prior reports starting in 2013. For example, NASA managers noted  concerns with contractor plans and staffing estimates in 2013 during  project confirmation. In March 2015, we found that the project was being  rebaselined due to the contractor’s poor cost and schedule performance  and in order to conform with limitations that NASA placed on the funding  available to the contractor in fiscal years 2014 and 2015. The contractor  was also operating with a limited number of staff at that time. In May  2017, we found that the project continued to experience contractor  performance problems and had experienced cost growth and schedule  delays over the 2015 rebaseline even as the project decreased its scope.  In addition, the project experienced staff shortfalls in key areas, such as  systems engineering and business management.

The Mars 2020 project experienced $12.9 million in development cost  growth, but no schedule delays. The cost growth was primarily due to  technical challenges on a technology demonstration instrument and  higher than anticipated integration costs for an entry, descent, and  landing instrument. Both instruments are funded by the Human  Exploration and Operations and Space Technology Mission Directorates.  NASA officials attributed the cost growth of the technology demonstration  instrument—which is designed to convert carbon dioxide to oxygen—to the complexity of the technology development for the effort. At the  project’s preliminary design review in February 2016, a critical technology  for the technology demonstration instrument did not meet the  recommended level of maturity, which we have found can increase risk  for systems entering product development. The project had matured the  technology to this recommended level by its critical design review in  February 2017. However, as a result of the focus on maturing this  particular technology, other components of the instrument fell behind the  planned schedule. Project costs for Mars 2020 also increased for an  entry, descent, and landing instrument, due, in part, to cost increases for  integration and to add additional staff to the instrument team to maintain  schedule.

Finally, the Radiation Budget Instrument project would have likely  exceeded its cost baseline if NASA had not decided to cancel the project  in January 2018. According to NASA’s cancellation memorandum, the  project was canceled because of continued cost growth, technical issues,  and poor contractor performance. In 2017, we found that the project was  working to an aggressive schedule, and the prime contractor continued to  experience cost overruns even after NASA added a deputy project  manager and increased site visits and meetings with the contractor.  Subsequently, the project—which was developing an instrument to be  hosted on a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration satellite— determined that it would not be able to meet its delivery date for  integration with the satellite without requiring additional funding in excess  of the project’s cost baseline if other technical issues arose. In its  cancellation memorandum, NASA stated continuing to fund the project  from within the Earth Science Division budget would slow other important  activities.

Technical challenges identified during integration and test. The  JWST and ICESat-2 projects experienced technical challenges during  integration and test that delayed their schedules. Both projects were  previously rebaselined before entering system-level integration and  testing, and the current schedule delays are beyond the new schedules  that NASA set for the projects in 2011 for JWST and in 2014 for ICESat- 2.

The JWST project delayed its launch readiness date by at least 19  months from October 2018 to May 2020. NASA announced two  delays for the project since our portfolio-wide review in May 2017.  First, as we found in February 2018, the project delayed its launch  readiness date by up to 8 months primarily due to the integration of  the various spacecraft elements taking longer than expected.  Specifically, execution of spacecraft integration and test tasks, due to  complexity of work and cautious handling given the sensitivity of flight  hardware, was slower than planned. In addition, before the delay, the  project used all of its schedule reserves to its prior launch readiness  date. This was the result of various contractor workmanship errors,  particularly with respect to the spacecraft propulsion systems, as well  as the resolution of various technical issues, including a test anomaly  on the telescope and sunshield hardware challenges. Second, in  March 2018, NASA announced that it had delayed the project’s  launch readiness date by an additional 11 months to approximately  May 2020 and planned to establish an external independent review  board to analyze the project’s organizational and technical issues to  inform a more specific launch time frame.

The announcement also stated that after a new launch date is  established, NASA would provide a new cost estimate that may  exceed the $8 billion congressional cost cap that was established in  2011. NASA plans to finalize the project’s cost and schedule estimate  by the end of June 2018. Because the additional delays were  announced while a draft of our May 2018 report was with NASA for  comment, we plan to follow up on the reasons for the additional  delays and the results of the analysis in a future review.

In our prior assessments of JWST, we have made recommendations  with regard to improving cost and schedule estimating, updating risk  assessments, and strengthening management oversight. NASA has  generally agreed and taken steps to implement a number of our  recommendations. For example, in December 2015, we  recommended that the JWST project require contractors to identify,  explain, and document anomalies in contractor-delivered monthly  earned value management reports. NASA concurred with this  recommendation and, in February 2016, directed the contractors to  implement the actions stated in the recommendation. However, NASA  did not implement some recommendations, which if implemented,  may have provided insight into the challenges it now faces. For  example, in December 2012, we recommended the JWST project  update its JCL. Although NASA concurred with this  recommendation, it did not take steps to implement it. An updated  JCL may have portended the current schedule delays, which could  have been proactively addressed by the project.

The ICESat-2 project delayed its launch readiness date by 4 months  from June to October 2018 due to technical issues with its only  instrument, the Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System. A key  part in the instrument’s lasers failed during instrument environmental  testing, which delayed the project’s system integration review—the  start of system-level integration and test. The manufacturer  determined the primary cause of the anomaly was a flaw in the design  of the mount that ensures a component of the optical module remains  in a specific, precise position. The spare flight laser encountered the  same problem during earlier testing, which indicated a systemic  problem. The project redesigned and repaired the lasers and is  proceeding through integration and test.

External factors. External factors—including responding to requests for  additional data collection and delays due to launch-vehicle related  issues—contributed to cost increases or schedule delays for the NISAR,  ICON, and GRACE-FO projects.

The NISAR project experienced cost growth as the result of an  increase in the scope of data collection in response to additional data  needs being identified by an interagency working group. The  additional data include soil moisture and natural hazard data that  would be of value for other federal agencies and the science  community. NASA officials said the additional funding for development  would be used to upgrade the ground stations so that they can  receive the additional data at a higher downlink data rate and volume.

The ICON project missed its committed launch readiness date  because of an accident involving its launch vehicle. In January 2017,  two of the Pegasus launch vehicle’s three stages were involved in a  transport accident. The stages were subsequently returned to the  launch vehicle contractor facility for inspection and testing, and no  damage was found. The project had been on track to launch early.  Subsequently, in September 2017, an anomaly found in testing of the  launch vehicle bolt cutter assemblies resulted in additional delays.  NASA had planned to launch ICON in mid-June 2018, but recently  announced a delay after off-nominal data was observed from the  rocket during transit to the launch site. NASA announced a new  launch date would be determined at a later date.

The GRACE-FO project delayed its launch readiness date from  February to May 2018 due to issues with its planned launch vehicle  and launch site. The launch vehicle is the responsibility of NASA’s  partner on the project—German Research Centre for Geosciences  (GFZ). GRACE-FO had planned to launch at a Russian launch site. In  February 2016, GFZ reported that it was notified by the Russian  Federal Space Agency that the Dnepr launch vehicle was no longer  available for GRACE-FO. GFZ, in June 2016, arranged to launch the  two GRACE-FO spacecraft, along with commercial satellites, on a  SpaceX Falcon 9. On May 22, 2018, GRACE-FO launched from  Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.

In addition, the Commercial Crew Program also experienced delays,  which are not included above because the program does not have a  schedule baseline. Since the award of the current Commercial Crew  contracts in September 2014, the program, Boeing, SpaceX, and multiple  independent review bodies have all identified the contractors’ delivery  schedules as aggressive. In February 2017, we found that Boeing and  SpaceX had determined that neither could meet their original 2017 dates  for NASA to certify their systems for human spaceflight. In January  2018, we found that both contractors had notified NASA that final  certification dates have slipped again and are now in the first quarter of  calendar year 2019. The Commercial Crew Program’s schedule  analysis indicates that certification may be further delayed to December  2019 for SpaceX and February 2020 for Boeing.

section_title: NASA Is Likely to Encounter Additional Cost Growth and Schedule Delays
paragraphs: The composition of the portfolio in the coming years is expected to  include large and complex projects, putting NASA at risk of continued  cost increases and schedule delays. Specifically, NASA plans to have  complex projects enter the development portfolio in the next few years as  it holds confirmation reviews and set cost and schedule baselines. This  includes the Europa Clipper project and potentially the Wide-Field  Infrared Survey Telescope (WFIRST) project. In February 2018, the  President’s 2019 Budget Request proposed canceling the WFIRST  project due to the project’s significant costs and higher priorities in the  agency. However, the project may continue if funding is received.  Together, preliminary estimates indicate that these two projects could  cost as much as $7.8 billion. In addition, NASA expects to begin other  large, complex projects like the Lunar Orbital Platform-Gateway— currently being discussed as a space station or outpost in lunar orbit— and a Europa Lander project in the coming years. A December 2017  space policy directive also instructed NASA to return astronauts to the  moon for long-term exploration and to pursue human exploration of Mars  and the broader solar system.

To its credit, NASA recently took steps to put a process in place to control  the costs of two projects while in formulation, which may prove useful if  properly executed.

The Europa Clipper project implemented a process whereby cost  growth threats would be offset by descoping instruments in whole or  in part. For example, if an instrument exceeds its development cost by  20 percent, the project would propose a descope option to NASA that  brings instrument cost below that threshold. NASA had not descoped  any instruments as of our May 2018 report.

The WFIRST project is responding to findings from an independent  review that was conducted to ensure the mission’s scope and  required resources are well understood and executable. The review  found that the mission scope is understood, but not aligned with the  resources provided and concluded that the mission is not executable  without adjustments and/or additional resources. For example, the  study team found that NASA’s current forecasted funding profile for  the WFIRST project would require the project to slow down activities  starting in fiscal year 2020, which would result in an increase in  development cost and schedule. NASA agreed with the study team’s  results and directed the project to reduce the cost and complexity of  the design in order to maintain costs within the $3.2 billion preliminary  cost target.

But even with these efforts, NASA’s cost and schedule performance may  be further tested in upcoming years as some expensive, complex projects  linger in the portfolio longer than expected.

As previously discussed, the Orion program expects cost growth and  faces other schedule and technical risks as it moves through the  integration and test phase for EM-1 into at least 2019 and then  through 2023 for EM-2. As of August 2017, NASA officials expected  that new hardware and addressing development challenges would be  the factors contributing to increased cost for the program. For  example, there was a cost impact when the program moved from a  single-piece, or monolithic, heatshield design to one that employs  blocks in order to improve its structural strength. Program officials  said they are also assessing schedule delays for EM-2, and noted that  the EM-2 launch date depends on the outcome of the EM-1 launch  date.

The SLS and EGS programs continue to face cost, schedule, and  technical risks as they move through the integration and test phase  into at least 2019. For example, SLS will have to complete a “green  run” test which requires multiple first-time efforts. Specifically, the test  is the culmination of the development effort and includes the core  stage integration with its four main engines, fully fueling with  cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen, and then firing all four engines for  about 500 seconds. NASA currently has no schedule reserve to its  target December 2019 launch readiness date for two key areas in the  core stage schedule. First, there is no reserve between the end of  core stage production and the delivery of the core stage to the test  facility. Second, there is no reserve between the end of the testing  and delivery to Kennedy Space Center for final integration and testing  prior to launch.

As previously discussed, the JWST project is at risk of exceeding its  congressional cost cap, and faces schedule risks as it completes its  remaining integration and test work. These activities have taken  considerably longer than planned due to a variety of challenges,  including reach and access limitations on the flight hardware.  Additionally, the project faces significant work ahead. For example,  the project must complete integration of spacecraft element hardware  and conduct deployment and environmental tests of the integrated  sunshield and spacecraft. Further, it must integrate the telescope  element with the spacecraft element to form the JWST observatory,  and complete another set of challenging environmental tests on the  full integrated observatory. At the same time, the project will need to  mitigate dozens of remaining hardware and software risks to  acceptable levels and address the project’s many potential single  point failures to the extent possible.

The SGSS project expects to experience additional cost growth  through the final acceptance review because the full scope of the  effort has not been included in the cost. NASA only approved its new  cost estimate through the initial operational readiness review,  currently planned for September 2019. A project official said NASA  headquarters asked the project to determine if there are ways to  reduce the cost between the operational readiness review and the  final acceptance review. NASA plans to conduct an independent  review of the project in mid-2018 to inform a decision on whether to  continue the project past the operational readiness review. If NASA  decides to continue the project past this review, additional cost growth  is expected for SGSS when NASA revisits project costs through future  budget cycles.

In closing, NASA continues to make improvements to the acquisition  management of its portfolio of major projects. However, the deterioration  of the cost and schedule performance of NASA’s portfolio this year and  the likelihood of additional cost growth and schedule delays demonstrate  the need for NASA to continue to take actions to further reduce  acquisition risk as we and others have recommended. Continuing to  improve cost and schedule estimating tools and practices—such as by  providing projects with sufficient cost and schedule reserves to address  risks and unforeseen technical challenges and ensuring that program  offices regularly and consistently update their JCLs across the portfolio— could help to better position NASA for improved outcomes. We look  forward to continuing to work with NASA and this subcommittee in  addressing these issues.

Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Bera, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

section_title: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please  contact Cristina T. Chaplain, Director, Contracting and National Security  Acquisitions at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions  to this statement include Molly Traci, Assistant Director; Laura Greifner;  Erin Kennedy; Miranda Riemer; Roxanna T. Sun; and Alyssa Weir.

section_title: Appendix I: Descriptions of National Aeronautics and Space Administration Major Projects Reviewed in GAO’s 2018 Assessment
paragraphs: Appendix I: Descriptions of National   Aeronautics and Space Administration Major  Projects Reviewed in GAO’s 2018 Assessment Project description  The Commercial Crew Program facilitates and oversees the development of safe, reliable,  and cost-effective crew transportation systems by commercial companies to carry NASA  astronauts to and from the International Space Station. The program is a multi-phase effort  that started in 2010. During the current phase, the program is working with two contractors— Boeing and SpaceX—that will design, develop, test, and operate the crew transportation  systems. Once NASA determines the systems meet its standards for human spaceflight—a  process called certification—the companies will fly up to six crewed missions to the space  station.

The DART project plans to travel to the near-Earth asteroid Didymos, a binary system, and  impact the smaller of the two bodies. NASA will assess the deflection result of the impact for  potential future use on other potentially hazardous near-Earth objects. The project responds  to near-Earth object guidance by the Office of Science and Technology Policy to better  understand our impact mitigation posture, and to recommendations by the National Research  Council Committee to conduct a test of a kinetic impactor. The DART mission is part of the  Asteroid Impact and Deflection Assessment, which is an international collaboration with the  European Space Agency.

The Europa Clipper mission aims to investigate whether the Jupiter moon could harbor  conditions suitable for life. The project plans to launch a spacecraft in the 2020s, place it in  orbit around Jupiter, and conduct a series of investigatory flybys of Europa. The mission’s  planned objectives include characterizing Europa’s ice shell and any subsurface water,  analyzing the composition and chemistry of its surface and ionosphere, understanding the  formation of its surface features, and surveying sites for a potential landed mission.

The EGS program is modernizing and upgrading infrastructure at the Kennedy Space Center  and developing software needed to integrate, process, and launch the Space Launch System  (SLS) and Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion). The EGS program consists of several  major construction and facilities projects including the Mobile Launcher, Crawler Transporter,  Vehicle Assembly Building, and launch pad, all of which need to be complete before the first  uncrewed exploration mission using the SLS and Orion vehicles.

The GRACE-FO mission will continue and expand upon the 2002 GRACE mission, which  ended science operations in October 2017. The system, which consists of two spacecraft  working together to obtain scientific measurements, will provide high-resolution models of  Earth’s gravity field and insight into water movement on and beneath the Earth’s surface for  up to 5 years. These models will provide rates of ground water depletion and polar ice melt  and enable improved planning for droughts and floods. GRACE-FO is a collaborative effort  with the German Research Centre for Geosciences.

The ICESat-2 mission is a follow-on mission to ICESat that will measure changes in polar  ice-sheet mass and elevation. The measurements will provide researchers a better  understanding of the mechanisms that drive polar ice changes and their effect on global sea  level. ICESat-2’s upgraded laser instrument will allow the satellite to make more frequent  measurements and provide better elevation estimates over certain types of terrain than  ICESat.

InSight is a Mars lander with two primary objectives. It is intended to further understanding of  the formation and evolution of terrestrial planets by determining Mars’s size, its composition,  and the physical state of the core; the thickness of the crust; and the composition and  structure of the mantle, as well as the thermal state of the interior. It will also determine the  present level of tectonic activity and the meteorite impact rate on Mars. InSight is based on  the Phoenix lander design. Phoenix successfully landed on Mars in 2008.

Project description  The ICON observatory will orbit Earth to explore its ionosphere—the boundary region  between Earth and space where ionized plasma and neutral gas collide and react. Its four  instruments will make direct measurements and use remote sensing to further researchers’  understanding of Earth’s upper atmosphere, the Earth-Sun connection, and the ways in  which Earth weather drives space weather.

JWST is a large, infrared-optimized space telescope designed to help understand the origin  and destiny of the universe, the creation and evolution of the first stars and galaxies, and the  formation of stars and planetary systems. It will also help further the search for Earth-like  planets. JWST will have a large primary mirror composed of 18 smaller mirrors and a  sunshield the size of a tennis court. Both the mirror and sunshield are folded for launch and  open once JWST is in space. JWST will reside in an orbit about 1 million miles from the  Earth.

Landsat 9 is the next satellite in the Landsat series Program, which provides a continuous  space-based record of land surface observations to study, predict, and understand the  consequences of land surface dynamics, such as deforestation. The program is a  collaborative, joint mission between NASA and the U.S. Geological Survey. The Landsat data  archive constitutes the longest continuous moderate-resolution record of the global land  surface as viewed from space and is used by many fields, such as agriculture, mapping,  forestry, and geology.

LCRD is a technology demonstration mission with the goal of advancing optical  communication technology for use in deep space and near-Earth systems. LCRD will  demonstrate bidirectional laser communications between a satellite and ground stations,  develop operational procedures, and transfer the technology to industry for future use on  commercial and government satellites. NASA anticipates using the technology as a next  generation Earth relay as well as to support near-Earth and deep space science, such as the  International Space Station and human spaceflight missions. The project is a mission partner  and will be a payload on a U.S. Air Force Space Test Program satellite.

Low Boom Flight Demonstrator (LBFD)  LBFD is a flight demonstration project planned to demonstrate that noise from supersonic  flight—sonic boom—can be reduced to acceptable levels, allowing for eventual commercial  use of overland supersonic flight paths. Plans include multiple flights beyond fiscal year 2022  to gather community responses to the flights and to create a database to support  development of international noise rules for supersonic flight.

Lucy will be the first mission to investigate the Trojans, which are a population of never- explored asteroids orbiting in tandem with Jupiter. The project aims to understand the  formation and evolution of planetary systems by conducting flybys of these remnants of giant  planet formation. The Lucy spacecraft will first encounter a main belt asteroid—located  between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter—and then will travel to the outer solar system where  the spacecraft will encounter six Trojans over an 11-year mission. The mission’s planned  measurements include asteroid surface color and composition, interior composition, and  surface geology.

Mars 2020 is part of the Mars Exploration Program, which seeks to further understand  whether Mars was, is, or can be a habitable planet. Its rover and science instruments will  explore Mars and conduct geological assessments, search for signs of ancient life, determine  potential environmental habitability, and prepare soil and rock samples for potential future  return to Earth. The rover will include a technology demonstration instrument designed to  convert carbon dioxide into oxygen. Mars 2020 is based heavily on the Mars Science  Laboratory, or Curiosity, which landed on Mars in 2012 and remains in operation.

Project description  NISAR is a joint project between NASA and Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) that  will study the solid Earth, ice masses, and ecosystems. It aims to address questions related  to global environmental change, Earth’s carbon cycle, and natural hazards, such as  earthquakes and volcanoes. The project will include the first dual frequency synthetic  aperture radar instrument, which will use advanced radar imaging to construct large-scale  data sets of the Earth’s movements. NISAR represents the first major aerospace science  partnership between NASA and ISRO.

Orion is being developed to transport and support astronauts beyond low-Earth orbit,  including traveling to Mars or an asteroid. The Orion program is continuing to advance  development of the human safety features, designs, and systems started under the  Constellation program, which was canceled in 2010. Orion is planned to launch atop NASA’s  Space Launch System. The current design of Orion consists of a crew module, service  module, and launch abort system.

PSP will be the first NASA mission to visit a star. Using the gravity of Venus, the spacecraft  will orbit the Sun 24 times and gather information to increase knowledge about the solar  wind, including its origin, acceleration, and how it is heated. PSP instruments will observe the  generation and flow of solar winds from very close range and sample and take  measurements of the Sun’s outer atmosphere, where solar particles are energized. To  achieve its mission, parts of the spacecraft must be able to withstand temperatures  exceeding 2,500 degrees Fahrenheit and endure blasts of extreme radiation. The project was  formerly named Solar Probe Plus, or SPP, and was renamed in May 2017.

PACE is a polar-orbiting mission that will use advanced global remote sensing instruments to  improve scientists’ understanding of ocean biology, biogeochemistry, ecology, aerosols, and  cloud properties. PACE will extend climate-related observations begun under earlier NASA  missions, which will enable researchers to study long-term trends on Earth’s oceans and  atmosphere, and ocean-atmosphere interactions. PACE will also enable assessments of air  and coastal water quality, such as the locations of harmful algae blooms.

Psyche will be the first mission to visit a metal asteroid and aims to understand a previously  unexplored component of the early building blocks of planets: iron cores. The project plans to  orbit the Psyche asteroid to determine if it is a planetary core, characterize its topography,  assess the elemental composition, and determine the relative ages of its surface regions.

RBI is a scanning radiometer that NASA planned to launch on the National Oceanic and  Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Joint Polar Satellite System 2. RBI’s planned mission  was to support global climate monitoring by continuing measurements of the Earth’s reflected  sunlight and emitted thermal radiation made by NASA and NOAA satellites over the past 30  years. This data was intended to represent one of two key sets of measurements needed to  determine whether the Earth is warming or cooling.

The Restore-L project will demonstrate the capability to refuel on-orbit satellites for eventual  use by commercial entities. Specifically, Restore-L plans to autonomously rendezvous with,  inspect, capture, refuel, adjust the orbit of, safely release, and depart from the U.S.  Geological Survey’s Landsat 7 satellite.  Landsat 7 can extend operations if successfully  refueled, but it is planned for retirement if the technology demonstration is unsuccessful.

SLS is intended to be NASA’s first human-rated heavy-lift launch vehicle since the Saturn V  was developed for the Apollo program. SLS is planned to launch NASA’s Orion spacecraft  and other systems on missions between the Earth and Moon and to enable deep space  missions, including Mars. NASA is designing SLS to provide an initial lift capacity of 70 metric  tons to low-Earth orbit, and be evolvable to 130 metric tons, enabling deep space missions.  The 70-metric-ton capability will include a core stage, powered by four RS-25 engines, and  two five-segment boosters. The 130-metric-ton capability will use a new upper stage and  evolved boosters.

Project description  The SGSS project plans to develop and deliver a new ground system for one Space Network  site. The Space Network provides essential communications and tracking services to NASA  and non-NASA missions. Existing systems, based on 1980s technology, are increasingly  obsolete and unsustainable. The new ground system will include updated systems, software,  and equipment that will allow the Space Network to continue to provide critical  communications services for the next several decades. The Space Network is managed by  the Space Communication and Navigation program.

The SWOT mission will use its wide-swath radar altimetry technology to take repeated high- resolution measurements of the world’s oceans and freshwater bodies to develop a global  survey. This survey will make it possible to estimate water discharge into rivers more  accurately, and help improve flood prediction. It will also provide global measurements of  ocean surface topography and variations in ocean currents, which will help improve weather  and climate predictions. SWOT is a joint project between NASA and the French Space  Agency—the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales.

TESS will use four identical, wide field-of-view cameras to conduct the first extensive survey  of the sky from space for transiting exoplanets—or planets in other solar systems. The  mission’s goal is to discover these exoplanets during transit, the time when the planet’s orbit  carries it in front of its star as viewed from Earth. The project plans to discover rocky and  potentially habitable Earth-sized and super-Earth planets orbiting nearby bright stars for  further evaluation through ground- and space-based observations by other missions, such as  JWST.

WFIRST is an observatory designed to perform wide-field imaging and survey of the near- infrared sky to answer questions about the structure and evolution of the universe, and  expand our knowledge of planets beyond our solar system. The project will use a telescope  that was originally built and qualified by another federal agency. The project plans to launch  WFIRST in the mid-2020s to an orbit about 1 million miles from the Earth. The project is also  planning a guest observer program, in which the project may provide observation time to  academic and other institutions.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Fast facts: This testimony highlights our 10th annual Quick Look report on the status of NASA's major projects. Many of them experienced significant cost and schedule growth in the past year.

NASA is likely to keep seeing cost and schedule growth because complex new projects are starting up, and other expensive projects are taking longer to launch than expected.

The full extent of cost growth was unknown because NASA didn't have a cost estimate for the Orion crew vehicle, one of its most expensive projects.

The average launch delay was 12 months in this review—the most we've ever reported.

Question-summary annotations: questions: question: How has NASA's performance in terms of projects in recent years changed?
answer: The cost and schedule performance of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) portfolio of major projects has deteriorated, but the extent of cost performance deterioration is unknown.

question: How have the costs of NASA's programs changed in recent years?
answer: The cost and schedule performance of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) portfolio of major projects has deteriorated, but the extent of cost performance deterioration is unknown.
child_questions: question: What is an example of this discrepancy?
answer: NASA expects cost growth for the Orion crew capsule—one of the largest projects in the portfolio—but does not have a current cost estimate.

question: How have these recent tendencies affected NASA's timely output of projects?
answer: In addition, the average launch delay for the portfolio was 12 months, the highest delay GAO has reported in its 10 years of assessing major NASA projects (see figure below).

questions: question: How have NASA's projects been affected by the cost growth and schedule delay tendencies?
answer: Four projects encountered technical issues that were compounded by risky program management decisions.

question: How has NASA failed to manage these projects in an effective way?
answer: For example, the Space Launch System and Exploration Ground Systems programs are large-scale, technically complex human spaceflight programs, and NASA managed them to aggressive schedules and with insufficient levels of cost and schedule reserves.
child_questions: question: What were the setbacks of this mismanaged project?
answer: This made it more difficult for the programs to operate within their committed baseline cost and schedule estimates.

questions: question: What kinds of delays occurred due to NASA's mismanagement of projects?
answer: Two projects ran into technical challenges that resulted in delays in the integration and test phase.
child_questions: question: How did these technical difficulties cause delays?
answer: For example, in December 2017, GAO found that the James Webb Space Telescope project encountered delays primarily due to the integration of the various spacecraft elements taking longer than expected, as well as the need to resolve technical issues during testing.

question: How has GAO evaluated NASA's schedule in regards to these widespread delays?
answer: GAO has previously found that integration and testing is when projects are most at risk of incurring cost and schedule growth.

question: What times in the project schedule are most likely to incur higher costs and delays?
answer: GAO has previously found that integration and testing is when projects are most at risk of incurring cost and schedule growth.

questions: question: How did GAO attempt to respond to NASA's increase in costs and schedules?
answer: GAO designated NASA's acquisition management as a high-risk area in 1990 after a history of persistent cost growth and schedule slippage in many of NASA's major projects.

question: How has NASA performed recently in response to GAO's designation?
answer: In more recent years, GAO found that NASA had taken some steps to improve its management, and, in May 2017, GAO found that projects were continuing a generally positive trend of limiting cost and schedule growth.
child_questions: question: What has GAO found despite NASA's seemingly positive progress?
answer: But at the same time, GAO noted that many of these projects, including some of the most expensive ones, were approaching the phase in their life cycles when cost and schedule growth is most likely.