Nuclear Nonproliferation: The Administration's 2018 Plan for Verification and Monitoring Met Most Reporting Requirements but Did Not Include Future Costs and Funding Needs
Released: 2018-09-14T00:00:00


Highlights: section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a national security priority that is challenged by weapons advances from existing nuclear states and other actors possessing or attempting to possess nuclear weapons. To help address these issues, Congress directed the Administration in 2015 and 2017 to develop a plan for verification and monitoring relating to the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons, components of such weapons, and fissile material. GAO reviewed the first plan submitted to Congress in 2015, and an update submitted in 2017. GAO reported in March 2018 that this plan and update generally did not address the congressionally mandated reporting requirements.

In the fiscal year 2018 NDAA, Congress directed the Administration to develop another plan and included a provision for GAO to review the plan. This report assesses whether the Administration's new plan provided details on the reporting requirements included in the NDAA.

To determine whether the plan provided details on the reporting requirements, GAO reviewed the fiscal year 2018 plan and assessed whether the plan included details for each of the elements as required by the NDAA.

section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO found that the 2018 plan provided details on most of the reporting requirements in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018, but did not include information on future costs and funding needs (see table below). In the NDAA, Congress directed the President to produce a plan that would address four reporting requirements: (1) a plan and roadmap on verification, detection and monitoring efforts, including details on costs and funding needs over 10 years, (2) an international engagement plan, (3) a research and development plan, and (4) a description of interagency engagement. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy, developed the plan and submitted it to Congress in April 2018.

According to NNSA officials, NNSA did not include long-term costs and funding needs in the plan because identifying these needs is unrealistic for several reasons, including because agencies have little influence over the spending priorities of other departments outside of the President's budget process. However, NNSA and other agencies already develop plans with long-term funding priorities and cost estimates for other programs. Because the plan does not include any estimates on future costs and funding needs, it limits congressional understanding of the long-term affordability of the nation's verification and monitoring efforts and its ability to make necessary funding and policy decisions. GAO has previously reported that providing estimates of future costs and funding needs can help congressional decisionmakers prioritize projects and identify long-term funding needs. By including in its plan estimates of future costs and funding needed to support the activities in the plan, NNSA could help provide assurance that agencies are allocating appropriate resources to the verification and monitoring effort and that these resources are aligned with future activities and processes.

section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Administrator of NNSA should include in its plan estimates of future costs and funding needed to support the activities in the plan. NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation, but said it planned no further action. GAO maintains that the recommendation is valid.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018,  Congress included a provision directing the President to develop and  submit to Congress a plan for verification and monitoring relating to the  potential proliferation of nuclear weapons, components of such weapons,  and fissile material. This provision came out of issues that were  highlighted in a 2014 report from the Department of Defense’s Defense  Science Board (DSB) on nonproliferation verification and monitoring  technologies. As a result of the DSB report, in the fiscal year 2015 and  fiscal year 2017 NDAAs, Congress directed the Administration to submit  interagency plans for verification and monitoring. The Administrations  submitted a classified plan in October 2015 and a classified update to the  plan in May 2017 in response to these mandates. We assessed the 2015  plan and 2017 update in March 2018 and found that they generally did  not address the reporting requirements.

In the fiscal year 2018 NDAA, Congress indicated that the 2015 plan and  2017 update failed to answer congressional requirements and did not  reflect the high priority of this issue. Further, the NDAA reiterated the  DSB report’s finding that “The nuclear future will not be a linear  extrapolation of the past…and the technologies and processes designed  for current treaty verification and inspections are inadequate to future  monitoring realities.” To address these issues, in the fiscal year 2018  NDAA Congress directed the President to produce a new plan that would  address four reporting requirements: (1) a plan and roadmap on  verification, detection, and monitoring efforts, including details on future  costs and funding needs over 10 years; (2) an international engagement  plan; (3) a research and development (R&D) plan to describe current and  planned efforts; and (4) a description of interagency engagement. On  behalf of the Administration, the National Nuclear Security Administration  (NNSA) prepared, and the Department of Energy submitted, a classified  plan to congressional committees in April 2018.

The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2018 NDAA includes  a provision for GAO to review the plan and provide its assessment to  congressional committees 90 days after submission of the plan. The  objective of this report is to assess whether the Administration’s plan  provided detail on the reporting requirements in the fiscal year 2018  NDAA.

To address this objective, we reviewed the 2018 plan. We assessed the  content of the plan against the reporting requirements and rated the  extent to which it provided detail on those requirements in one of three  ways: (1) addressed the reporting requirement with detail, (2) addressed  the reporting requirement without detail, or (3) did not address the  reporting requirement. In assessing the level of detail, we considered key  factors identified in our previous work on national strategies, federal  planning, and interagency collaboration. For example, we considered  the extent to which the plan provided information regarding specific goals  or objectives; strategies to achieve those goals or objectives and how  they would be implemented; which agency or agencies would implement  the strategies; and other measurable information, such as timelines and  the resources required. We also interviewed officials at NNSA who led the  development of the plan and coordinated with other contributing  interagency partners.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2018 to August 2018 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the  evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objective.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: Countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of  mass destruction (WMD) remains a U.S. national security priority.  According to the 2017 National Security Strategy, terrorist groups  continue to pursue WMD-related materials, which pose a grave danger to  the United States. As also stated in the 2017 National Security Strategy,  Russia’s nuclear arsenal remains the most existential threat to the United  States, China’s nuclear arsenal is growing and diversifying, Iran has the  potential of renewing its nuclear program and North Korea has pursued  nuclear weapons despite international commitments. As the DSB report  noted, U.S. monitoring abilities are increasingly challenged by evolving  risks in 1) the capability of existing nuclear states and 2) the number of  state and nonstate actors possessing or attempting to possess nuclear  weapons. U.S. nonproliferation activities are conducted and coordinated  across multiple government agencies and organizations, as well as the  intelligence community. In addition, these efforts are coordinated with  international entities, national laboratories, industry, and academia.

U.S. nuclear nonproliferation verification and monitoring efforts are guided  by, among other things, U.S. obligations under the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and U.S. support for the  Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty  Organization (CTBTO). The NPT lays out the respective responsibilities  of nuclear-weapon and nonnuclear-weapon states with regard to the  transfer, acquisition, possession, control, and manufacture of nuclear  weapons. All nonnuclear-weapon states are required to have a  comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic  Energy Agency (IAEA) to facilitate IAEA’s safeguards activities. IAEA  safeguards are a set of technical measures and activities by which IAEA  seeks to verify that nuclear material subject to safeguards is not diverted  to nuclear weapons or other proscribed purposes. Under the  Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has yet to enter  into force, parties agree not to carry out any nuclear explosions. The  United States supports the work of the CTBTO to build up a verification  regime in preparation for the treaty’s entry into force.

The Administration’s fiscal year 2018 plan for verification and monitoring  described ongoing interagency efforts to support nuclear proliferation  verification and monitoring and includes information about relevant  national priorities, capability gaps, R&D initiatives, and roles and  responsibilities. The 2018 plan (40 pages) is longer and more detailed  than the 2015 plan (2 pages) or the 2017 update (4 pages). The bulk of  the 2018 plan is contained in two chapters—one chapter broadly  describes U.S. and international efforts and roles and responsibilities, and  the other chapter describes ongoing U.S. R&D efforts.

section_title: The Administration’s 2018 Plan Generally Addressed the Reporting Requirements but Did Not Identify Costs and Funding Needs
paragraphs: We found the Administration’s 2018 plan provided details on each of the  four major reporting requirements called for in the fiscal year 2018 NDAA  with the exception of future costs and funding needs (see table 1).
subsections: section_title: Plan and Roadmap
paragraphs: The first reporting requirement called for a plan and roadmap for  verification, detection, and monitoring with respect to policy, operations,  and research, development, testing, and evaluation, including—  Identifying requirements for verification, detection, and monitoring;  Identifying and integrating roles, responsibilities, and planning for  verification, detection, and monitoring activities; and

The costs and funding requirements over 10 years for these activities.

We found that the 2018 plan provided detail on verification, detection, and  monitoring requirements and roles and responsibilities, but did not  provide details on future costs and funding needed to support the  activities in the plan.

We found that the plan identified requirements for verification, detection,  and monitoring as required. To identify these requirements, the plan  notes that interagency partners first identified a set of verification and  monitoring priorities. From these priorities they identified a number of  technical gaps. The plan then described dozens of examples of R&D  efforts and non-technical activities to address those technical gaps. For  example, for one gap the plan identifies eight current efforts to address  this gap, including continued Department of Energy and NNSA  investment in sensor capabilities that are small, light, and can operate in  low power.

We found that the plan provided details on the requirement to identify and  integrate roles and responsibilities and planning. The plan includes details  of the roles and responsibilities of interagency partners and international  bodies that cooperate in the nonproliferation realm. For example, the plan  describes how the Department of Defense is to support U.S. verification  activities under the CTBT, including the installation, operation, and  maintenance of U.S. International Monitoring Systems.

We found that the plan did not identify costs and funding needs over a 10- year period. NNSA officials stated that they believed providing funding  information over a 10-year period is unrealistic for several reasons. First,  according to NNSA officials, it is not feasible to achieve agreement on  actual or implied budgets outside of the existing President’s budget  process. Second, according to NNSA officials, agencies have little  influence over the funding priorities of other departments outside of  existing budget efforts. Third, according to NNSA officials, long-term  funding estimates are infeasible because the President’s budget only  identifies funding levels five years into the future. However, the 2018  NDAA did not ask for budget information. Instead, the NDAA reporting  requirement called for long-term costs and funding information necessary  to support the verification and monitoring activities in the plan. Finally,  NNSA officials told us that they and officials from other agencies briefed  the appropriate congressional committees prior to the release of the 2018  plan, and discussed the challenges with providing cost and funding data.

According to NNSA officials, they verified with the congressional  committees that providing such information in the plan would be  impractical.

We have previously reported that providing estimates of future costs and  funding needs can help congressional decisionmakers prioritize projects  and identify long-term funding needs. NNSA as well as other agencies  within the federal government already develop plans with long-term  funding priorities and cost estimates. For example, in June 2014, we  reported on 10-year estimates for sustaining and modernizing U.S.  nuclear weapons capabilities. As we found in this and other reports,  even when budgets are preliminary or not yet known, plans that include a  range of potential estimates help Congress prioritize projects and  funding. Because the plan does not include any information on  interagency costs and funding needs, it limits 1) congressional  understanding of the long-term affordability of the nation’s verification and  monitoring efforts and 2) Congress’s ability to make necessary funding  and policy decisions. By including in its plan estimates of future costs and  funding needed to support the activities in the plan, NNSA could help  provide assurance that agencies are allocating appropriate resources to  the verification and monitoring effort.

In addition, including estimates of future costs and funding needs in the  plan can help ensure that interagency partners understand the amount of  resources necessary to support verification and monitoring efforts, and  determine if these resources align with agency activities. We have  previously reported on the importance of identifying resources among  collaborating agencies; we noted that without information on resource  contributions from partners in a collaborative effort, there is less  assurance that agency contributions are appropriate to successfully  sustain the effort. Similarly, providing information on future costs and  funding needs is important to help interagency partners coordinate and  develop long-term strategic plans that align with future interagency  efforts. We have found that for strategic planning to be done well, plans  should demonstrate alignment between activities, core processes, and  resources that support mission outcome. By including in its plan  estimates of future costs and funding needed to support the activities in  the plan, NNSA could help provide assurance that agencies are allocating  appropriate resources for interagency efforts and that these resources are  aligned with future activities and processes.

section_title: International Engagement Plan
paragraphs: The second reporting requirement called for an international engagement  plan for building cooperation and transparency—including bilateral and  multilateral efforts—to improve inspections, detection, and monitoring  activities. We found that the 2018 plan provided detail on this  requirement. The 2018 plan reiterates the nation’s commitment to the  NPT and includes information on IAEA’s safeguards programs and U.S  support for those programs. For example, under the plan, interagency  partners are to continue to encourage countries through diplomatic  outreach to conclude Additional Protocol agreements with IAEA.

section_title: Research and Development Plan
paragraphs: The third reporting requirement called for the plan to describe current and  planned R&D efforts toward improving monitoring, detection, and in-field  inspection and analysis capabilities, including persistent surveillance, remote monitoring, and rapid analysis of large data sets; and measures to  coordinate technical and operational requirements early in the process.  We found that the 2018 plan provided detail on this requirement. The plan  includes detail on a wide range of R&D efforts and non-technical efforts  that agencies are pursuing. For example, the plan reports that the  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is starting a program that  models millions of nodes and billions of connections to support the  detection of WMD proliferation activities. In addition, the plan describes  interagency groups involved in coordinating R&D requirements, such as  the National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee on Nuclear  Defense Research and Development.

section_title: Interagency Engagement
paragraphs: The fourth reporting requirement called for the plan to describe the  engagement of relevant federal departments and agencies; the military  departments; national laboratories; industry; and academia. We found  that the 2018 plan provided detail on this requirement. The plan includes  detail on the roles and responsibilities for interagency partners, as well as  information on interagency organizations and working groups to  coordinate efforts and reduce duplication. For example, the plan  discusses the Department of State’s efforts to lead the interagency policy  process on nonproliferation and manage global U.S. security policy, and  the Department of Defense’s support of U.S. diplomatic efforts, including  agreements with other defense departments, R&D cooperation, and  multinational exercises.

section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: This 2018 plan represents the third effort by Administrations to address  the nation’s nuclear proliferation verification and monitoring efforts. The  2018 plan provides more detail on these efforts than the 2015 plan and  2017 update. However, the plan does not include estimates of future  costs and funding needs as required by the fiscal year 2018 NDAA. Costs  and funding information can help congressional decisionmakers prioritize  projects and identify potential long-term funding needs. Similarly, costs  and funding information helps interagency partners understand what  resources they are expected to contribute in the future and helps to  ensure long-term strategic plans reflect an alignment between resources  and interagency activities. By including in its plan estimates of future  costs and funding needed to support the activities in the plan, NNSA  could help provide assurance that agencies are allocating appropriate  resources to the verification and monitoring effort and interagency  activities, and that these resources are aligned with future activities and  processes.

section_title: Recommendation for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making the following recommendation to NNSA:  The Administrator of NNSA should include in its plan for verification and  monitoring estimates of future costs and funding needed to support the  activities in the plan. (Recommendation 1)

section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided NNSA with a draft of this report for review and comment.  NNSA provided written comments, which are summarized below and  reproduced in appendix I; the agency neither agreed nor disagreed with  our recommendation to include estimates of future costs and funding  needed to support the activities in its plan for nuclear proliferation  verification and monitoring. However, NNSA stated that it planned no  further action with regard to costs and funding data. NNSA also provided  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

NNSA stated that it appreciated our recognition of improvements in the  2018 plan for verification and monitoring over the 2015 plan and the 2017  update. In its written comments, NNSA acknowledged that it did not  include interagency cost and funding requirements in the 2018 plan over  10 years as required in the NDAA. The agency stated that it briefed the  appropriate congressional committees before the release of the plan  about the challenges and feasibility of providing the cost and funding data  and received no objections on the omission of the data from the plan.  NNSA also stated that it informed us of the briefings. We have added  clarification in our report that NNSA officials believed they received  agreement from congressional staff to exclude funding and cost estimates  from its plan.

NNSA stated that the NDAA did not prioritize the relative importance of  the reporting requirements, and that we disproportionately weighted the  one omission in our assessment, effectively overstating the importance of  providing cost and funding information. In addition, NNSA identified  challenges to the feasibility of providing interagency out-year cost and  funding estimates, including the difficulty to quantify the level of R&D and  associated funding required to achieve specific outcomes and that  departments and agencies are unable to commit to aligning 10 year  funding estimates with individual agencies’ timelines and internal  processes for planning, programming, budgeting, and execution.

NNSA’s statement suggests that it views nuclear proliferation verification  and monitoring programs as being unique and different from other federal  programs and that they should therefore be exempt from estimating their  potential long-term resource burden on the federal budget. We disagree.  Developing future cost and funding estimates for programs is central to  effective interagency planning efforts. The efforts described in NNSA’s  2018 nuclear verification and monitoring plan span a diverse range of  activities that are implemented across multiple agencies. The absence of  cost and funding estimates for these efforts in NNSA’s plan raises  questions as to whether there is an effective interagency process to  coordinate these efforts and if the process is taking adequate account of  resource constraints and making realistic assessments of program  resource needs. In addition, information on future cost and funding  estimates of federal programs provides Congress with a better  understanding of the potential long-term funding needs and costs of the  diverse efforts supporting the proliferation verification and monitoring  mission. We believe this big picture view is important given the multiple  congressional committees of jurisdiction—including appropriations,  authorization, and oversight committees—for the efforts identified in  NNSA’s plan.

Regarding the feasibility of providing 10-year cost and funding estimates,  we recognize the difficulty and uncertainty agencies face in estimating  future funding needs. However, we do not believe developing such  estimates is impossible. As we reported, the Department of Defense  (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) prepare an annual plan with  10 year cost and funding estimates for their ongoing nuclear sustainment  and modernization efforts, including R&D efforts.

NNSA also provided general technical comments addressing our findings  on the cost and funding estimates that were not included in the plan,  including comments on NNSA’s authority to obtain 10-year estimates  from other agencies, and on the examples we cited of other interagency  plans that include similar estimates.

NNSA stated that it did not have authority to require other agencies to  submit 10-year budget estimates for their efforts that are included in the  plan. We noted in our report that Congress directed the President to  include this element in the nuclear proliferation verification and monitoring  plan. However, responsibility to prepare and submit the plan was  delegated by the President to DOE.

NNSA commented that the joint DOD-DOE annual nuclear sustainment  and modernization plan is not comparable to the NNSA plan because the  former primarily addresses capital projects and other material products,  while the latter primarily addresses R&D activities. The reporting  requirements for NNSA’s nuclear proliferation verification and monitoring  plan were not limited to R&D efforts, but included cost and funding  estimates for related activities and capabilities, including policy,  operations, testing, and evaluation. NNSA’s comment focuses only on the  difficulty of addressing cost and funding estimates for only one aspect  (R&D) of nuclear proliferation verification and monitoring and ignores the  possibility that estimates for non-R&D efforts may be more feasible and  less difficult to report. Moreover, we have reported that the joint DOD- DOE plan on nuclear modernization includes 10-year DOD and DOE  estimates for R&D, as well as estimates for related modernization efforts,  including infrastructure, nuclear weapon life extension programs, delivery  systems, nuclear command, control, and communications systems, and  other related activities.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Administrator of NNSA, and other interested parties. In  addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made significant contributions to this  report are listed in appendix II.

section_title: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Energy

section_title: Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact

section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, William Hoehn (Assistant  Director), Dave Messman (Analyst-in-Charge), Alisa Carrigan, Antoinette  Capaccio, Ben Licht, Steven Putansu, and Gwen Kirby.

Fast facts: In 2015 and 2017, federal law directed the President to submit a plan to Congress for monitoring the potential spread of nuclear weapons and materials. In earlier reports, we found those plans did not address required areas.

A 2018 law again directed the President to produce a plan, which the National Nuclear Security Administration prepared. Most required subjects were included, such as plans for research and development and international engagement. However, the plan did not include information on its cost over the next 10 years.

We recommended the NNSA provide estimates of the funding needed to support the activities in the plan.

Question-summary annotations: questions: question: What information was lacking in the NDAA's 2018 plan?
answer: GAO found that the 2018 plan provided details on most of the reporting requirements in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018, but did not include information on future costs and funding needs (see table below).
child_questions: question: What four requirements were expected in the President's plan?
answer: In the NDAA, Congress directed the President to produce a plan that would address four reporting requirements: (1) a plan and roadmap on verification, detection and monitoring efforts, including details on costs and funding needs over 10 years, (2) an international engagement plan, (3) a research and development plan, and (4) a description of interagency engagement.

question: What group developed the plan?
answer: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy, developed the plan and submitted it to Congress in April 2018.

questions: question: Why did NNSA officials say they did not include long-term costs and funding needs in the report?
answer: According to NNSA officials, NNSA did not include long-term costs and funding needs in the plan because identifying these needs is unrealistic for several reasons, including because agencies have little influence over the spending priorities of other departments outside of the President's budget process.
child_questions: question: What is the problem with this logic?
answer: However, NNSA and other agencies already develop plans with long-term funding priorities and cost estimates for other programs.

question: How does this missing information limit congressional understanding of the issue?
answer: Because the plan does not include any estimates on future costs and funding needs, it limits congressional understanding of the long-term affordability of the nation's verification and monitoring efforts and its ability to make necessary funding and policy decisions.

question: What is GAO's stance on this issue?
answer: GAO has previously reported that providing estimates of future costs and funding needs can help congressional decisionmakers prioritize projects and identify long-term funding needs.

question: How would NNSA benefit from including cost estimates?
answer: By including in its plan estimates of future costs and funding needed to support the activities in the plan, NNSA could help provide assurance that agencies are allocating appropriate resources to the verification and monitoring effort and that these resources are aligned with future activities and processes.

questions: question: How do existing nuclear states challenge national security priorities?
answer: Countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a national security priority that is challenged by weapons advances from existing nuclear states and other actors possessing or attempting to possess nuclear weapons.
child_questions: question: How did Congress attempt to address this issue?
answer: To help address these issues, Congress directed the Administration in 2015 and 2017 to develop a plan for verification and monitoring relating to the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons, components of such weapons, and fissile material.
child_questions: question: How was GAO involved in this process?
answer: GAO reviewed the first plan submitted to Congress in 2015, and an update submitted in 2017.
child_questions: question: What did GAO find?
answer: GAO reported in March 2018 that this plan and update generally did not address the congressionally mandated reporting requirements.