Force Structure: F-22 Organization and Utilization Changes Could Improve Aircraft Availability and Pilot Training
Released: 2018-07-19T00:00:00


Highlights: section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The F-22 was designed and fielded as the Air Force's premier air-to-air fighter. The small fleet of 186 F-22s is central to the Air Force's ability to accomplish its air superiority mission in high threat areas. While the Air Force has focused on other missions over the last 15 years of conflict, it is now trying to refocus on overcoming advanced threats, even as it continues to support ongoing operations. Though the recent introduction of the F-35 gives the Air Force another advanced fighter, the F-35 is primarily designed for the air-to-ground missions and so is intended to complement but not replace the F-22.

Senate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review a variety of issues related to Air Force F-22 fighter squadrons. This report examines the extent to which the Air Force's (1) organization of its F-22 fleet maximizes availability of aircraft and (2) utilization of its F-22 fleet affects pilot air superiority training. GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, analyzed maintenance data and training information for the F-22, evaluated the use of F-22s during deployments, and interviewed agency officials. This is a public version of a classified report issued in April 2018. Information DOD deemed classified or sensitive has been omitted.

section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Air Force's organization of its small F-22 fleet has not maximized the availability of these 186 aircraft. Availability is constrained by maintenance challenges and unit organization. For example, stealth is a central feature of the F-22 and, according to Air Force officials, maintaining the stealth coating on the outside of the aircraft is time consuming and significantly reduces the time F-22s are available for missions. Maintenance availability challenges are exacerbated by the Air Force's decision to organize the F-22 fleet into small units—18 or 21 primary mission aircraft per squadron and one or two squadrons per wing. Traditional fighter wings have three squadrons per wing with 24 aircraft in each squadron, which creates maintenance efficiencies because people, equipment, and parts can be shared, according to Air Force officials. Moreover, the Air Force organized F-22 squadrons to operate from a single location. However, it generally deploys only a part of a squadron, and the remaining part struggles to keep aircraft available for missions at home. Larger, traditional Air Force squadrons and deployable units provide a better balance of equipment and personnel, according to service officials. The Air Force has not reassessed the structure of its F-22 fleet since 2010. Without conducting a comprehensive assessment to identify and assess F-22 organization, the Air Force may be foregoing opportunities to improve the availability of its small yet critical F-22 fleet, and support combatant commander air superiority needs in high threat environments.

The Air Force's utilization of its F-22 fleet has limited pilot opportunities to train for air superiority missions in high threat environments. To complete the annual training requirements for air superiority missions, F-22 pilots must train almost the entire year. However, F-22 pilots are not meeting their minimum yearly training requirements for the air superiority missions, according to Air Force training reports and service officials. Moreover, the utilization of F-22s for exercises and operational missions that do not require the F-22's unique capabilities interrupt pilot training and lead to reduced proficiency. For example, F-22 units are often directed to participate in partnership building exercises. However, during these exercises, F-22 pilots may be restricted from flying the F-22 the way they would fly it in combat—due to security concerns about exposing the F-22's unique capabilities. These restrictions limit the value of the exercises and can result in pilots developing bad habits, according to Air Force officials. The Air Force also uses F-22s to support alert missions—a mission that requires certain bases to have jets ready at all times to respond to threats from civil or military aviation. The alert mission does not require the advanced capabilities of the F-22, but there are no other operational Air Force fighter squadrons currently based at the F-22 locations in Alaska and Hawaii, so the alert mission falls to the F-22 units. Pilots and aircraft assigned to the alert mission cannot be used for any other purposes, including training. This limits opportunities for pilots to enhance air superiority skills. Without examining and implementing options to improve F-22 pilot training opportunities, the Air Force may be foregoing opportunities to improve its capability to address the high-end air superiority challenges it expects to face.

section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that the Air Force reassess its F-22 organizational structure to determine alternative approaches to organizing F-22 squadrons, and identify ways to increase F-22 pilot training opportunities for high-end air superiority missions. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Widely regarded as the best air superiority fighter aircraft in the world, the  F-22 is an integral part of the U.S. military’s ability to defeat high-end  adversaries. Potential adversaries around the world are pursuing  technologies and strategies that are reducing the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) relative advantage in a number of areas, according to  the department, including air superiority—a primary mission for the Air  Force. Air superiority is established when the air and missile threat is  reduced to a degree that other operations can occur without significant  interference. As such, the Air Force considers it a precondition for  success of combat operations, and therefore a mission it must address  first. However, fourth generation fighters are increasingly unable to  operate in highly contested environments where advanced air defense  systems render them ineffective, according to the Air Force.  A linchpin  in the Air Force’s ability to establish air superiority in highly contested  environments is its small fleet of F-22s. With a unique combination of  advanced stealth and maneuvering capabilities, the F-22 is designed to  achieve air superiority against the most advanced air and surface threats.  The Air Force currently uses a variety of fourth generation fighters, and  plans to use F-35s for the air superiority mission since F-22 units  constitute only 6 of the Air Force’s 55 combat coded fighter squadrons.

Over the past 15 years, U.S. air superiority has largely gone  unchallenged, so it has not been a main focus during ongoing operations.  Instead, the focus has been on attacking ground targets in support of  ground operations. With little slowdown in the pace of operations, the Air  Force finds itself in a position where it must balance ongoing operational  demands with the growing need to be prepared for current and future  threats to air superiority.

To meet its assigned air superiority responsibility, the Air Force needs to  provide the combatant commanders with, at a minimum: 1) mission- capable aircraft, and 2) pilots who are trained to fly those aircraft in the  expected threat environments. The Senate Armed Services Committee  report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2017 questioned whether the Air Force’s fleet of F-22s is  optimized to deter, and if necessary, quickly defeat increasingly capable  potential adversaries. The Senate report also included a provision for us  to review a variety of issues related to Air Force F-22 fighter squadrons.  This report evaluates the extent to which the Air Force’s (1) organization  of its F-22 fleet maximizes aircraft availability, and (2) utilization of the F- 22 fleet affects pilot air superiority training.

To address our objectives, we analyzed aircraft inventory data and  maintenance data from the Integrated Maintenance Data System from  2012 through 2016. We used that date range so that we could observe  any trends and because the force structure has been relatively stable  since 2012. We performed data reliability procedures on the information  by taking steps including comparing that information against related  documentation and testimonial evidence, performing logic checks, and  interviewing knowledgeable officials on controls over the reporting  systems. We determined that the reliability of these data were sufficient  for the purposes of describing general trends and making proximate  comparisons. We also analyzed pilot training information, including yearly  memorandums produced by the F-22 operational squadrons for years  2012 through 2016. We also conducted on-site interviews with Air Force  officials from Air Force Headquarters; Air Combat Command; Air National  Guard; Air Force Reserve Command; the four locations with operational  F-22 squadrons; the training unit; and the operational test and evaluation  unit. We discussed how unit organization affects aircraft availability and  the units’ abilities to maintain their aircraft in both the short and long term,  as well as how F-22 utilization affects pilot training for the air superiority  mission. We also discussed issues regarding the need for aircraft that  play the role of adversaries for F-22 training purposes, known as  adversary air. To examine how operational utilization of the F-22 affects  the fleet’s ability to support air superiority, we reviewed mission  assignments and deployment information for F-22 squadrons. We also  interviewed officials from U.S. Central Command, U.S. European  Command, U.S. Northern Command/North American Aerospace Defense  Command, and U.S. Pacific Command, regarding F-22 requirements and  utilization. Finally, we reviewed DOD and Air Force guidance as well as  reports and other documentation relevant to our review, such as Air  Superiority 2030 Flight Plan and various briefings.

This report is a public version of a classified report that we issued on April  27, 2018. The classified report included an appendix describing current  and projected operational requirements for the F-22. DOD deemed the  information in the appendix to be classified, which must be protected from  loss, compromise, or inadvertent disclosure. Consequently, this public  version excludes that appendix. Further, this public report omits certain information that DOD deemed to be sensitive related to (1) the inventory  of F-22, F-35, F-15C, F-15E, F-16, and A-10 primary mission aircraft  (aircraft authorized to perform combat), (2) maintenance data on aircraft  availability and cannibalization rates, (3) maintenance challenges related  to the F-22’s low observable coating, (4) F-22 squadron organization into  deployable units and related issues, (5) F-22 annual training sortie  standards, (6) effects on pilot training of F-22 operational deployments,  and (7) F-22 spare engine shortfalls. Although the information provided in  this report is more limited, it addresses the same objectives and uses the  same methodology as the classified report.

The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted  from July 2016 to April 2018 in accordance with generally accepted  government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan  and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide  a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit  objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  worked with DOD from April 2018 to July 2018 to prepare this unclassified  version of the report for public release. This public version was also  prepared in accordance with these standards.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: DOD guidance states that the Air Force and other services are  responsible for providing trained and ready forces to fulfill the current and  future operational requirements of the combatant commands. The Air  Force is specifically responsible for gaining and maintaining air  superiority. The Air Force Strategic Master Plan states that the Air Force  must focus clearly on the capabilities that will allow freedom of maneuver  and decisive action in highly contested spaces, including high-end air  capabilities. Fifth generation fighter capabilities and ready and trained  Airmen who are properly equipped for their missions are central  components of the Air Force’s ability to provide air superiority in  contested environments.

The F-22 is the Air Force’s fifth generation, air superiority fighter that  incorporates a stealthy and highly maneuverable airframe, advanced  integrated avionics, and engines capable of sustained supersonic flight.  The F-22 is optimized for air-to-air combat, able to carry up to eight air-to- air missiles, and equipped with a 20-millimeter cannon. After development  began, the Air Force also added air-to-ground capabilities to the F-22. Air  Force officials emphasized the synergistic benefits of the F-22 to the joint  force. Specifically, the F-22’s individual capabilities, like its stealth and  sensors, help it to coordinate and improve the performance of other  aircraft during operations, including fourth generation fighters. The Air  Force views the F-22 and the F-35—its other fifth generation fighter—as  complementary platforms with some overlapping capabilities. For  example, the F-22 is focused on, and more capable in, air-to-air missions  and the F-35 is focused on, and more capable in, air-to-ground missions.  The Air Force announced in its fiscal year 2018 budget request that it now  intends to retain the F-22 until 2060. It has also begun an effort to define  and develop the next generation of air superiority capabilities that it plans  to field in 2030 and beyond. Figure 1 shows a picture of an F-22.

The F-22 and the F-15C are the two operational fighters in the Air Force’s  Air Superiority Core Function. The Air Force assigns two primary (air-to- air focused) missions and one secondary (air-to-ground focused) mission  to the F-22. These missions are described in table 1. The Air Force  requires its pilots to be proficient in their primary missions and familiar  with their secondary missions.

The size of the current F-22 fleet is smaller than the Air Force originally  planned. The Air Force F-22 acquisition program began in 1991 with an  intended development period of 12 years and a planned quantity of 648  aircraft. The Air Force had intended to station 40 percent of the  operational fleet outside of the United States. However, schedule delays,  cost increases, and changes to threats, missions, and requirements led  DOD to reduce the number of F-22s it eventually purchased. The Air  Force identified a requirement for 381 F-22s in 2002, but ended aircraft  production in 2012 with approximately half of that number. As of May  2018, the Air Force had a total of 186 F-22s, as shown in figure 2. The  total aircraft inventory includes primary mission aircraft in each  community—those authorized to perform combat—as well as aircraft that  are designated for other purposes.

The operational portion of the F-22 fleet is organized into 6 operational  squadrons at four locations. According to Air Force officials, the small  number of F-22s provides a less than ideal fifth generation fighter  capacity until F-35 numbers grow. However, in a June 2017 report to  Congress, the Air Force stated that it would not make economic or  operational sense to reopen the F-22 production line, and reported that it  would cost approximately $50 billion to procure an additional 194 F-22s.  The Air Force is continuing to fund programs to modernize the F-22 and  make reliability improvements.

Figure 3 shows the basing locations of the F-22 fleet, and the numbers of  aircraft at each base.

section_title: F-22 Unit Size and Organizational Structure Constrain Aircraft Availability and Have Not Been Reviewed by the Air Force since 2010
paragraphs: The size and structure of F-22 units diminishes the Air Force’s ability to  maximize the number of F-22s available for operations and have not been  reviewed since 2010. The F-22 has sustainment issues due to the fleet’s  maintenance and supply challenges. These challenges have affected  aircraft availability rates, which have remained below Air Force standards.  The small size of F-22 squadrons and wings has contributed to low  aircraft availability rates. Further, the Air Force practice of deploying a  small portion of a squadron makes it difficult for F-22 squadrons, as  currently organized, to make aircraft available for their missions at home  station. The Air Force would also face difficulties generating aircraft to  support DOD’s concepts for using distributed operations in high threat  environments with its current F-22 squadron organization. Although in  2016 it assessed its future air superiority capability needs, the Air Force  has not comprehensively assessed whether the current F-22  organizational structure is optimized to support combatant commander  needs.
subsections: section_title: Sustainment Issues Limit F-22 Aircraft Availability
paragraphs: The F-22 has sustainment issues due to the fleet’s maintenance and  supply challenges that have affected aircraft availability rates. In fiscal  year 2016, this resulted in the fleet having an average of 80 F-22s  available for operations, as shown in figure 4. According to the Air  Force, from fiscal year 2012 through 2016, the F-22 fleet availability rate  was below the Air Force’s annual F-22 availability standard by 4 to 19  percent.

First, the F-22 has some unique maintenance challenges, which have  affected aircraft availability rates. The maintenance demands of the F- 22’s Low Observable (LO) coating, a critical component of its stealth  characteristic, reduces aircraft availability. Without the LO maintenance  issues, availability would have been significantly closer to meeting the  annual availability standard, according to the Air Force officials. Fourth  generation fighters do not have to contend with this maintenance issue.  The F-22’s LO coating is actually a series of coatings that require diligent  and time-consuming application and curing, which results in extended  periods of time when the aircraft are not available, according to Air Force  officials. The F-22’s LO coating is also beginning to reach the end of its  service live, requiring maintenance actions that further reduce aircraft  availability. The Air Force has begun to address these maintenance  issues by using a more durable coating and standing up additional repair  facilities.

Second, the F-22 faces a number of supply challenges that have  contributed to reduced and unpredictable aircraft availability. Officials  from all four operational locations expressed concerns over low supply  levels and difficulties with obtaining needed parts. The F-22 fleet’s small  size and resulting low demand for parts contributes to this problem.  Obtaining missing parts can be a time-consuming and costly process  because some original manufacturers no longer make the parts or are  completely out of business, according to Air Force officials. When this is  the case, the Air Force may need to find the original aircraft and parts  design plans, and obtain a new contractor to produce a small number of  parts. Officials at one operational location said a simple wiring harness  required a 30-week lead time.

Appendix I contains additional information on F-22 maintenance and  supply issues.

section_title: Small F-22 Squadrons and Wings Exacerbate Aircraft Availability Challenges
paragraphs: With 18 to 21 primary mission aircraft per F-22 squadron, and 1 or 2 F-22  squadrons per wing, the Air Force has been unable to gain the  maintenance and supply efficiencies associated with its larger traditional  squadrons and wings, and this has contributed to low aircraft availability  rates. According to service officials, the Air Force has traditionally  structured its fighter wings to have 3 squadrons with 24 primary mission  aircraft per squadron to optimize maintenance efficiency and combat  power. The Air Force is planning to organize its active duty F-35 fleet into  traditional sized squadrons with 2 or 3 squadrons per wing. A RAND  study also concluded that larger squadrons and multiple squadrons per  wing create efficiencies. Larger squadrons and wings create efficiencies  because people, equipment, and parts can be shared, according to Air  Force officials. Having a multi-squadron wing is also beneficial when one  squadron deploys a portion of its aircraft, pilots, and maintenance  personnel and leaves another portion of the squadron at the squadron’s  home station. In these cases, collocated squadron(s) can help backfill  shortfalls for the portion of the squadron that remained at home station.

The Air Force recognizes that smaller F-22 operational squadrons and  wings face sustainment challenges due to their size. Facing cuts in the  total number of aircraft purchased, the Air Force decided in 2006 to  organize its F-22s into 7 operational squadrons, each with 18 primary  mission aircraft. However, in 2010, the Air Force found that this plan was  unsustainable because operational squadrons were not able to produce  adequate sorties. The Air Force then decided to eliminate 1 squadron and  used some of the aircraft from that squadron to increase the number of  primary mission aircraft to 21 in its 5 remaining active duty squadrons.  The Air Force left its one F-22 National Guard squadron with only 18  primary mission aircraft. The Air Force’s intent with this restructuring was  to increase fleet sustainability while retaining enough squadrons for force  projection needs.

F-22 aircraft availability metrics have fluctuated, but have generally been  better for operational locations with more aircraft per squadron and more  squadrons per wing. For example, table 2 shows that the operational  locations in Alaska and Virginia—locations with 2 operational  squadrons—have higher aircraft availability rates than the locations with  only 1 operational squadron. Although Air Force maintenance data shows  that the Florida operational squadron had a lower availability rate than the  locations with 2 operational squadrons in fiscal years 2014, 2015, and  2016, Air Force officials noted that this squadron should be able to  leverage the maintenance benefits of having the F-22 training squadron  on base. However, a major maintenance backlog for the training  squadron currently limits that benefit, according to the officials.

The F-22 units in Alaska and Virginia are also generally able to produce  more sorties per month. Further, F-22 squadron officials in Hawaii stated  that increasing their squadron—the smallest in the fleet—by 4 additional  aircraft would allow the squadron to generate 32 percent more sorties. Air  Force officials cautioned that there are many factors that influence  maintenance metrics for the F-22, including the age of the aircraft, climate  and leadership. However, they agreed that larger squadrons and wings  increase maintenance performance.

section_title: Partial Unit Deployments Hinder the F-22 Squadrons’ Abilities to Maximize the Aircraft Available for Operations
paragraphs: Further, the Air Force practice of deploying a small portion of a squadron  forward makes it difficult for F-22 squadrons as currently organized to  make aircraft available for their missions at home station, according to  officials from all four operational locations. The Air Force organizes its F- 22 squadrons and other fighter squadrons based on a model where a  squadron deploys to a single forward location, according to Air Force  officials. In order to facilitate deployments, the Air Force has for  approximately the last two decades organized squadrons into smaller  deployable pieces called Unit Type Codes (UTCs). However, the UTCs  are not the same size. For example, one of the F-22’s UTCs is designed  to have only 6 of a squadron’s 21 aircraft but contains almost 50 percent  of the squadron’s equipment, approximately 40 percent of the squadron’s  maintenance personnel and 60 percent of its operational personnel.  This organizational approach therefore creates a disproportionate split  among UTCs in terms of equipment and personnel, making it more  difficult for the underserved portions of the squadron to maintain  readiness or generate sorties.

Furthermore, different UTCs will not only have unequal amounts of  equipment and personnel, but will also tend to unevenly apportion their  best aircraft, more experienced personnel, and critical parts, according to  Air Force officials. The officials noted that during “split operations,” the  portion of the squadron remaining at home struggles to keep aircraft  available for missions. According to Air Force officials, traditional fighter  squadrons have larger UTCs, which provides a better balance in  equipment and personnel that lessens the strain of split operations.

section_title: Organizing for New Operational Concepts Poses Additional Aircraft Availability Challenges
paragraphs: With its current F-22 squadron organization, the Air Force would also face  difficulties generating aircraft to support DOD’s concepts for using  distributed operations in high threat environments. According to DOD,  potential adversaries are increasingly capable of challenging U.S. access  to operational areas by, for example, developing cruise and ballistic  missiles that are able to reach U.S. forward air bases. In its Air Superiority  2030 Flight Plan, the Air Force states that the ability to deploy and  operate forces in non-permissive environments is essential to air  superiority. One approach for doing this is to use distributed bases.  Instead of operating from well-developed and vulnerable forward air  bases, squadrons would break up into smaller units and operate  independently from multiple locations, moving around so as to complicate  enemy targeting. The Air Force is drafting an adaptive basing concept  and implementation plan to help guide its efforts in this area.

Sustaining and maintaining multiple independent deployable units so that  they have operational aircraft available for the combatant commander is  not possible with the current F-22 squadron structure and would require  significant investment, according to Air Force officials. F-22 squadrons  have made a number of short exercise deployments, with small numbers  of aircraft to provide forward presence and examine the units’ abilities to  conduct distributed operations. These deployments showed that rapidly  deploying small numbers of F-22s for short durations is possible. The  deployments also identified a number of challenges the Air Force needs  to address if it implements a distributed operations concept, including  maintenance, logistics, spare parts, and tanker support challenges,  according to after-action reports and service officials. Furthermore,  according to the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, distributed  operations requires a dynamic logistics system that is more responsive,  agile, and flexible than DOD is used to employing. Air Force officials told  us that the Air Force is early in the process of examining the implications  of distributed operations and has not determined the extent to which F-22  squadron organization should be adjusted to support distributed  operations.

section_title: The Air Force Has Not Comprehensively Assessed F-22 Organizational Structure since 2010
paragraphs: While the Air Force reviews F-22 operations and sustainment needs as  part of the annual programming and budgeting process within DOD, the  Air Force has not comprehensively assessed whether the current F-22  organizational structure is the optimal structure to support combatant  commander needs since 2010, according to Air Force officials. As  previously discussed, the Air Force found in 2010 that operational  squadrons were not able to produce adequate sorties and so eliminated 1  squadron and used some of the aircraft from that squadron to increase  the number of primary mission aircraft in its 5 remaining active duty  squadrons  DOD’s Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, states that risk  management is the process to identify, assess, and control hazards  arising from operational factors and make decisions that balance risk and  cost with mission benefits. It assists organizations and individuals in  making informed decisions to reduce or offset risk, thereby increasing  operational effectiveness and the probability of mission success.  Furthermore, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  states that management should periodically evaluate the organizational  structure so that it meets the entity’s objectives and has adapted to any  new objectives for the entity. Furthermore, management should  periodically review policies, procedures, and related control activities for  continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving the entity’s objectives  or addressing related risks.

However, the Air Force has not conducted a comprehensive assessment  of the F-22 organizational structure since 2010, according to Air Force  officials. As previously discussed, while the larger squadrons and wings  created after the 2010 restructuring have generally had higher availability  rates than smaller ones, fleet aircraft availability rates remain below the  Air Force standard for what is needed. Further, the F-22’s role has also  evolved since 2010. For example, F-22s have begun participating in  combat operations in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, potential adversaries  are increasingly able to challenge U.S. air superiority, according to the Air  Force. In 2016, the Air Force examined its future air superiority capability  needs in its Air Superiority 2030 Flight Plan, but that review did not  include an assessment of organizational structure, according to officials  involved with the review. Such an assessment could consider a number  of alternatives, such as consolidating the F-22 fleet into larger squadrons  and/or wings to improve aircraft availability or revising the design of the  deployable units in squadrons to better support current deployment  practices and future operational concepts, as well as any risks associated  with those alternatives. Without conducting a comprehensive assessment  of the F-22 organizational structure that identifies and assesses  alternative approaches to organizing F-22 squadrons, the Air Force may  be forgoing opportunities to improve the availability of its small yet critical  F-22 fleet to support current and future combatant commander high-end  air superiority needs.

section_title: Air Force Utilization of F-22s Reduces Pilot High-End Air Superiority Training Opportunities
paragraphs: The Air Force’s utilization of its F-22 fleet has limited its pilots’  opportunities to train for their high-end air superiority missions, and  contributed to F-22 pilots not meeting their training requirements. F-22  pilots need extensive training in order to be prepared to execute their  high-end air superiority missions. However, Air Force utilization of F-22  units for exercises, the low supply of adversary air training capabilities,  and the use of F-22s to meet combatant commander needs, including the  alert mission, affects the ability of pilots to meet those requirements.
subsections: section_title: F-22 Pilots Are Not Meeting Minimum Training Requirements Necessary for Their Air Superiority Missions
paragraphs: F-22 pilots are not meeting their minimum yearly training requirements for  the air superiority missions, according to Air Force training reports and  service officials. F-22 pilots need extensive training for F-22 units to  fulfill their air superiority role. Air Force guidance notes that a key to  maintaining air superiority is trained and ready Airmen that must possess  a well-honed combat edge so that they are ready to prevail even against  the most advanced opponents. The Air Force strategy also notes that  the training of Airmen must be relevant and responsive if they are to  maintain superior agility in the future. Through its Ready Aircrew  Program, the Air Force establishes annual continuation training  requirements for F-22 pilots. These requirements focus on the training  needed to accomplish the core missions of F-22 units. They define the  minimum required mix of annual sorties, simulator missions, and training  events aircrews must accomplish to sustain combat mission readiness.  Air Force officials emphasized that the requirements outlined in the  Ready Aircrew Program are minimums and noted that some pilots may  need additional sorties to achieve proficiency.

In 2016, GAO reported that combat fighter squadrons were unable to  meet annual training requirements across the full range of core  missions. Further, an Air Force analysis conducted in 2016 determined  that, based on current aircraft availability rates, pilots in an F-22 squadron  with 21 primary mission aircraft need 270 days of home station training  each year to meet their minimum annual continuation training  requirements. However, F-22 pilots are generally not meeting those  minimums, according to the officials, and F-22 operational squadrons  have reported numerous shortfalls. For example, one squadron identified  training shortfalls in its primary missions for four consecutive years in its  annual training reports. Another squadron identified training shortfalls in  one of its primary missions, offensive counter-air, in three of the last four  annual training reports.

section_title: F-22 Pilots Benefit from Exercises, but Exercise Quality and Quantity Can Detract from Training Needs
paragraphs: Although participation in exercises is an important component of F-22  pilot training, multiple exercises can interrupt pilot training cycles and  restrictions in some exercises can detract from F-22 pilot training for the  high threat environment. Exercises provide pilots an opportunity to train in  a more realistic setting. At the same time, frequent participation in  exercises can take time away from the home station training that is  required to maintain combat mission readiness for high-end air superiority  missions. Although high demand for exercise participation is causing  stress across the Air Force, the problem is particularly acute for F-22  pilots, according to a 2016 Air Force analysis. While F-22 pilots require  270 days at home each year, they are getting only 191 days on average,  according to the analysis. Pilots from other fighter aircraft, such as the F- 16 and F-15E, are also experiencing home station training shortfalls, but  not as great as those faced by F-22 pilots, according to the analysis.

Furthermore, F-22 units are often directed to participate in exercises as  part of Air Force efforts to build relationships with partners. However, due  to security concerns regarding exposing the F-22’s unique capabilities, F- 22 pilots may be restricted from flying the aircraft the way they would in  combat, according to Air Force officials. As a result, the value of the  training is reduced and these types of exercises can result in the F-22  pilots developing bad habits that must be corrected in future training,  according to Air Force officials.

The Air Force recognizes that exercise demands on F-22 units and other  fighter units make it difficult for pilots to complete their required training.  Based on its analysis, the Air Force is planning to increase the time pilots  have available to conduct home station training, including by establishing  a goal of no more than 1 day on travel for every 5 days at home station.  As a result, the Air Force will be reducing total exercise participation and  thereby increasing the number of days F-22 pilots are at home station in  fiscal year 2018 by 8 days. However, the Air Force projects that F-22  pilots in fiscal year 2018 will still fall 71 days short of the 270 days they  need to meet their yearly training requirement, based on current aircraft  availability rates. Without exploring further reductions in exercise events  that do not contribute to high-end air superiority training, at current aircraft  availability rates F-22 pilots may not be fully prepared to effectively  support combatant commander needs against the most advanced threats.

section_title: Adversary Air Demands for F-22s Detract from the Ability of Pilots to Meet Training Requirements
paragraphs: F-22 pilot training requires flying against aircraft playing the role of  adversaries, but high demand and low supply of adversary air resources  have resulted in training shortfalls. Due to the F-22’s unique air superiority  role and high-end capabilities, the Air Force expects F-22 pilots to face  and defeat numerically superior adversaries. This results in an annual  demand of between 145 and 171 adversary air sorties for every  operational F-22 pilot. The adversary air demand for fourth generation  fighters is much lower. For example, continuation training for the Air  Force’s other air superiority fighter—the F-15C—results in an annual  demand of between 45 and 73 adversary air sorties. To support F-22  training requirements, the Air Force has provided two of the four  operational locations (Virginia and Florida) with a squadron of T-38s to  provide dedicated adversary air support for use in training. In Alaska, an  adversary air squadron is located at a nearby base that is able to provide  some support for F-22 training, according to officials. The F-22s in Hawaii  have no adversary air support on base or nearby. Figure 5 shows F-22  operational locations and their adversary air support.

All F-22 operational locations report that insufficient adversary air caused  pilots to have shortfalls in their training. For example, the operational F-22  squadron in Florida, which shares an adversary air squadron with a  collocated F-22 training unit, reported that F-22 pilot training deficiencies  in fiscal year 2016 were caused in part by limited adversary air support.  Specifically, adversary air shortfalls negatively impacted the training of 83  percent of the squadron’s pilots for the offensive counter-air mission and  54 percent of the pilots for the defensive counter-air mission. Operational  squadrons at other locations reported similar negative effects on training  caused in part by the limited adversary air.

Moreover, the limited supply of dedicated adversary aircraft means that  often F-22 pilots must fly their aircraft in an adversary aircraft role to  support the training of the squadron’s other F-22 pilots. For example,  according to a 2017 Air Force memo, 55 percent of all sorties generated  by F-22s based in Hawaii were dedicated to adversary air. The F-22  squadron in Hawaii reported that this practice negatively affected the  combat readiness of all of the squadron’s pilots. The Air Force  categorizes adversary air sorties as useful only for maintaining basic  flying proficiency. Officials from the Virginia unit explained that F-22 pilots  flying adversary air do not fly like they would during combat missions and  so these sorties are wasteful, having no or negative training value. An  official representing the Hawaii unit indicated that the high percentage of  sorties dedicated to adversary air leads to wasteful training and declines  in readiness against potential threats. Air Force officials expect  competing demands for limited adversary air to grow as the Air Force  stands up more F-35 squadrons.

The Air Force recognizes and is attempting to mitigate adversary air  shortfalls. For example, the Air Force has hired contractors to address  Air Force adversary air shortfalls at exercises, as we previously  reported. In addition, the Air Force has outlined a plan to provide  additional adversary air support for its fighter units, including contract  adversary air support for the F-22 training squadron in Florida and the  operational squadrons at two of the four operational locations (Virginia  and Hawaii) in the 2019 timeframe. However, the Air Force must first  complete additional analysis and finalize funding before additional  adversary support is provided to these locations, according to an August  2017 Air Force briefing on the plan. Until the Air Force explores  additional alternatives for increasing external adversary air training  support at all of the operational locations, F-22 pilots will likely continue to  face training shortfalls and use limited sorties on flying adversary air  themselves. Furthermore, this may result in the F-22 squadrons not being  fully prepared to execute the high-end air superiority missions.

section_title: Current Operations Reduce F-22 Pilot High- End Air Superiority Training Opportunities
paragraphs: The Air Force is providing F-22s in support of current combatant  commander needs, including alert missions and operational deployments,  but the alert mission and these operational deployments take time away  from air superiority training. Although these missions are important, they  take no or limited advantage of the unique capabilities provided by the F- 22, as figure 6 illustrates. Classified details regarding the current and  projected operational requirements for the F-22 are included in the  classified version of this report.

DOD has an established risk-informed process to distribute the service’s  operational forces to the combatant commanders. Air Force officials told  us that combatant commanders can request a general fighter capability or  a very specific capability that only an F-22 can provide. Air Force officials  also said the Air Force does not set aside F-22 units for only the most  advanced threat missions, and it does not set aside any other fighter units for unique missions. The Air Force provides F-22 units to the combatant  commands when those units address the combatant commander’s  capability requirement and are available, according to service officials.
subsections: section_title: Use of F-22s for Alert Missions Diminishes Pilots’ Ability to Train for High-End Air Superiority Missions
paragraphs: F-22 support for ongoing air sovereignty alert missions further reduces F- 22 pilots’ abilities to train for the high-end air superiority mission. The alert  mission supports homeland defense, DOD’s top priority. This mission  requires certain air bases have fully fueled, fully armed jets ready at all  times to respond to threats from civil or military aviation. Two F-22  operational locations have full time alert mission responsibilities (Alaska  and Hawaii) and one location (Virginia) performs alert missions on an as- needed basis. According to Air Force officials, the alert mission does not  require the high-end capabilities provided by the F-22 and currently F- 15C and F-16 squadrons are filling alert mission requirements in other  parts of the United States. F-35s could also conduct this mission if they  were assigned it, according to Air Force officials. The Air Force plans to  start fielding 2 F-35 squadrons in Alaska beginning in 2020. However,  there are currently no plans to use F-35s for the alert mission, according  to U.S. Northern Command. With no other operational Air Force fighter  squadrons currently based in Hawaii and Alaska, the alert mission falls to  the F-22 units.

Dedicating F-22s to the alert mission reduces the ability of F-22 pilots to  train for their primary missions. Operational squadrons in Alaska and  Hawaii have F-22 pilots sitting alert in order to address the 24-hour per  day alert commitment. During this time they are not able to train for their  high-end air superiority missions. Further, the squadrons must dedicate a  number of mission-capable aircraft to this mission, which is more  challenging for squadrons with a smaller number of aircraft. Squadron  officials from one location estimated that they could generate hundreds of  additional training sorties on an annual basis if they could use the aircraft  that are currently dedicated to the alert mission.

section_title: Operational Deployments Diminish F-22 Pilots’ Ability to Train for High-End Air Superiority Missions
paragraphs: The Air Force also deploys F-22s outside of the United States to address  combatant commander requirements and these deployments also reduce  the time available for F-22 pilots to conduct home station training for their  high-end air superiority missions. Since 2007, the Air Force has deployed  F-22s to a number of combatant commands to address a variety of  needs, including providing assurance to friends and allies and deterring  potential adversaries. F-22s deployed to U.S. Central Command have  also been supporting ongoing operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

F-22 pilots can gain valuable experience from deployments but their  ability to train for the high-end air superiority mission can suffer. For  example, F-22 involvement in current combat operations against ISIS  provides pilots with experience deploying for combat, integrating with  coalition forces, and conducting air-to-ground attack operations,  according to Air Force officials. Although its high-end capabilities provide  some benefits in current operations against ISIS, F-22s have primarily  been used for close air support (CAS) missions in operations against  ISIS, according to Air Force officials. However, CAS is not a primary or  secondary mission for the F-22. As such, F-22 pilot air superiority skills  degrade while on deployment because they are conducting CAS missions  and not able to train for their air superiority missions, according to Air  Force officials.

section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: The F-22’s current availability and pilot training challenges will likely  become more significant as fourth generation fighters become less  survivable and the Air Force’s reliance on its small fleet of F-22s to  execute the air superiority mission grows. Limitations on F-22 availability  are due in part to maintenance challenges inherent to the F-22, including  maintaining its LO coating. It is also due in part to Air Force decisions to  organize the F-22 fleet into small wings and squadrons, resulting in lost  efficiencies that come with larger organizations. Further, F-22 squadrons,  designed to operate from one location, face challenges generating  available aircraft when they are split, as current Air Force practices and  future concepts require. The Air Force also requires well-trained pilots in  order to take full advantage of the F-22’s high-end capabilities. However,  F-22 pilots’ ability to train for its air superiority missions and meet  associated training requirements is constrained by factors including  adversary air limitations and participation in exercises with limited training  value. Operational use of the F-22 for missions that have no or limited  need for the F-22’s unique capabilities, such as the alert mission, further  limit the ability of pilots to prepare for the high-end air superiority  challenges the nation increasingly faces.

One option for addressing these challenges would be to purchase more  F-22s. However, the Air Force’s determination that it does not make  economic or operational sense to restart F-22 production means that the  Air Force has to find other ways to improve its F-22 fleet’s ability to  address high-end air superiority challenges. Air Force efforts to improve  F-22 capabilities and maintainability and wider efforts to address high  exercise demand and adversary air shortfalls are examples of positive  steps the service is taking. The Air Force has also shown a prior  willingness to consolidate its F-22 fleet. Further, the Air Force outlined its  commitment to addressing high-end air superiority challenges in its Air  Superiority 2030 Flight Plan. This effort, along with the planned fielding of  a large number of F-35s provides the Air Force with the opportunity to  more comprehensively review and, if necessary, transform how it should  best organize, posture, train, and utilize its fifth generation assets,  including the F-22. However, unless the Air Force takes steps to assess  and make necessary adjustments to the current organization and use of  its F-22s, F-22 units are likely to continue to experience aircraft  availability and pilot training rates that are below what they could be. As a  result, the Air Force may be incurring increased risks in future operations  in high threat areas.

section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We are making the following two recommendations to the Air Force:  The Secretary of the Air Force should conduct a comprehensive  assessment of the F-22 organizational structure that identifies and  assesses alternative approaches to organizing F-22 squadrons. The  assessment could at a minimum assess the following two alternatives:  consolidating the fleet into larger squadrons and/or wings in order to  improve aircraft availability, and revising the design of the deployable  units in squadrons to better support current deployment practices and  future operational concepts. (Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of the Air Force should identify and assess actions to  increase F-22 pilot training opportunities for the high-end air superiority  missions. This effort could consider alternatives such as: reducing  exercise events that do not contribute to F-22 pilot high-end air superiority  training, increasing external adversary air support so all F-22 pilots can  use their available limited sorties to conduct high-end air superiority  training rather than having a significant portion of the F-22 pilots providing  training support, and finding alternatives to using F-22 units for alert  missions, and other missions that do not require the jet’s unique  capabilities or prepare F-22 pilots for their primary missions.  (Recommendation 2)

section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of the classified version of the report to DOD for  review and comment. That draft contained the same recommendations as  this unclassified version. In written comments (reproduced in appendix II),  DOD concurred with our recommendations and noted planned actions to  address each recommendation. DOD also provided technical comments,  which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Senate Armed Services  Committee and the House Armed Services Committee and the Secretary  of Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Secretary of  the Air Force, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is  available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III.

section_title: Appendix I: F-22 Maintenance and Supply Challenges Limit Aircraft Availability
paragraphs: Maintenance demands of the F-22’s unique Low Observable (LO)  coating, along with supply challenges exacerbated by the fleet’s small  size, limit the number of aircraft available for missions. In part because of  these challenges, the Air Force had an average of 80 F-22s available for  operations during fiscal year 2016.
subsections: section_title: Maintenance of the F-22’s Unique Low Observable Coating Reduces Aircraft Availability
paragraphs: Maintenance demands of the F-22’s unique LO coating, a critical  component that gives the F-22 its stealth characteristics, reduces aircraft  availability. Without the LO maintenance issues, availability would have  been significantly closer to meeting the annual availability standard,  according to Air Force officials. Fourth generation fighters, lacking a full  LO coating, do not have to contend with this maintenance issue. The LO  coating is actually a series of coatings that require diligent and time- consuming application and curing, resulting in extended periods of time  during which aircraft are not available, according to Air Force officials.  Further, the LO coating for each F-22 requires regular and thorough  inspection to ensure that any damaged or degraded areas are identified  and repaired. If damage to the LO coating exceeds a threshold, the F-22  is considered not capable of conducting its mission. An Air Force report  summarizing fiscal year 2016 maintenance issues reported that LO  maintenance was the primary reason F-22s were not considered mission  capable due to maintenance.

Maintaining the integrity of the LO coating complicates other F-22  maintenance actions because the LO coating must be removed and then  restored. According to Air Force officials, removing and replacing a part  on an F-22 and a fourth generation fighter, like an F-15C, could take a  similar amount of time. However, the F-22 would require additional time at  the beginning and end of the maintenance action to gain access to the  part through the LO coating and then restore the integrity of the coating,  significantly increasing the time aircraft would be unavailable due to  maintenance. The Air Force is taking steps to reduce the impact of LO  maintenance by, for example, creating panels that can be removed  without requiring a full recoating procedure and by developing a more  durable coating. Additionally, Air Force officials told us that the LO coating  for its other fifth generation fighter—the F-35—uses different materials  and processes and should be easier to maintain than the F-22’s LO.

The F-22’s LO coating is also beginning to reach the end of its service  life, requiring maintenance actions that further reduce aircraft availability.  According to Air Force officials, the LO coating has an 8-to-10 year life  span, but environmental factors such as high temperatures, humidity, and  salinity can reduce that span by 2 to 3 years. Further, the Air Force does  not house its F-22s in climate-controlled hangars at 3 of the 4 operational  locations (Florida, Hawaii, and Virginia), thus exposing them to these LO- degrading environmental factors. The Air Force has taken action to  address maintenance challenges by using a more durable coating and  standing up additional repair facilities. The Air Force also plans to use  more durable materials to make long-term corrective repairs beginning in  calendar year 2019, but this will constitute a costly long-term effort,  according to the Air Force.

section_title: The F-22’s Small Fleet Size Exacerbates Spare Part Supply Challenges
paragraphs: As a result of the F-22 fleet’s small size and resulting low demand for  parts, the F-22 faces a number of supply challenges that have contributed  to reduced and unpredictable aircraft availability. Officials from all four  operational locations identified low supply levels and difficulty obtaining  needed parts as a concern. Obtaining parts can be a time-consuming and  costly process because some original manufacturers no longer make the  parts or are completely out of business, according to Air Force officials.  When this is the case, the Air Force may need to find the original aircraft  and parts design plans, and obtain a new contractor to produce a small  number of parts. Officials at one operational location said a simple wiring  harness required a 30-week lead time. Air Force maintenance statistics  for fiscal year 2016 show that 14 percent of the F-22 fleet was not mission  capable, and therefore not available, due to supply issues. According to  Air Force officials, the F-22 fleet’s small size and resulting low demand for  parts makes this problem more acute.

F-22 squadrons face an unenviable choice when necessary parts are not  available, according to Air Force officials: they can make the aircraft  unavailable until the spare part arrives and can be installed or they can  take the part from another aircraft that may be broken for a different  reason. The second option, called cannibalization, is an inefficient way to  conduct maintenance because it doubles the work. A good part needs to  be removed from one aircraft and put into another. Once the replacement  part arrives, it needs to be installed on the cannibalized aircraft. There is  also a chance that the cannibalized part could get damaged in the  process or just not work. Further, cannibalization could result in additional  LO repairs on the donor aircraft. An Air Force report summarizing fiscal  year 2016 maintenance issues reported that F-22 cannibalization rates  have grown by 6 percent between fiscal years 2012 and 2016.

The F-22’s small fleet size also exacerbates supply challenges it is facing  with its engines, potentially falling below minimum spare part  requirements for multiple calendar years. Further, an increase in flying  hours in 2014 resulted in engines requiring overhauls sooner than  previously anticipated. It is taking time for the engine maintenance  contractor to build up enough capacity to deal with this increased  demand. The officials said that the F-22’s small fleet size contributed to  this problem because, as was the case with other parts issues, low early  demand meant that many of the vendors that built parts for those engines  no longer build the parts or are not in business. Additionally, it takes time  to find vendors and skilled people to build those parts again. The Air  Force is implementing a mitigation plan that includes increasing  production, overflying the standard engine maintenance interval, and  borrowing engines from aircraft in long-term maintenance. According to  Air Force officials, this kind of engine issue is not unique to the F-22.  They noted that there was a time when B-1s, another small fleet, had a  major engine shortfall that resulted in aircraft parked without engines in  them. An Air Force forecast shows that mitigation efforts will avoid that  problem, barring unanticipated increases in demand or maintenance  problems.

section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact

section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact name above, Michael Ferren, Assistant Director;  Vincent Buquicchio; Nicolaas Cornelisse, Analyst-in-Charge; Patricia  Donahue; Amie Lesser; Tamiya Lunsford; Matthew Jacobs; Travis  Masters; Richard Powelson; Walter Vance; and Nicole Volchko made key  contributions to this report.


Question-summary annotations: questions: question: To what extent has the Air Force optmized its F-22 fleet?
answer: The Air Force's organization of its small F-22 fleet has not maximized the availability of these 186 aircraft.
child_questions: question: Why is availability limited?
answer: Availability is constrained by maintenance challenges and unit organization.

question: What is one example of this constraint?
answer: For example, stealth is a central feature of the F-22 and, according to Air Force officials, maintaining the stealth coating on the outside of the aircraft is time consuming and significantly reduces the time F-22s are available for missions.

question: What else causes maintenance availability challenges?
answer: Maintenance availability challenges are exacerbated by the Air Force's decision to organize the F-22 fleet into small units—18 or 21 primary mission aircraft per squadron and one or two squadrons per wing.

question: Why would larger units be better for maintenance availability?
answer: Traditional fighter wings have three squadrons per wing with 24 aircraft in each squadron, which creates maintenance efficiencies because people, equipment, and parts can be shared, according to Air Force officials. Larger, traditional Air Force squadrons and deployable units provide a better balance of equipment and personnel, according to service officials.

question: What locations have F-22 squadrons operated from?
answer: Moreover, the Air Force organized F-22 squadrons to operate from a single location.
child_questions: question: How does this cause issues?
answer: However, it generally deploys only a part of a squadron, and the remaining part struggles to keep aircraft available for missions at home.

question: How has the Air Force previously assessed the F-22 fleet?
answer: The Air Force has not reassessed the structure of its F-22 fleet since 2010.
child_questions: question: What are the consequences of htis lack of assessment?
answer: Without conducting a comprehensive assessment to identify and assess F-22 organization, the Air Force may be foregoing opportunities to improve the availability of its small yet critical F-22 fleet, and support combatant commander air superiority needs in high threat environments.

questions: question: How has Air Force use of the F-22 fleet shaped training opportunities?
answer: The Air Force's utilization of its F-22 fleet has limited pilot opportunities to train for air superiority missions in high threat environments. To complete the annual training requirements for air superiority missions, F-22 pilots must train almost the entire year.
child_questions: question: What are the problems with such a program?
answer: However, F-22 pilots are not meeting their minimum yearly training requirements for the air superiority missions, according to Air Force training reports and service officials. Moreover, the utilization of F-22s for exercises and operational missions that do not require the F-22's unique capabilities interrupt pilot training and lead to reduced proficiency. These restrictions limit the value of the exercises and can result in pilots developing bad habits, according to Air Force officials.
child_questions: question: What is a specific example of such problems?
answer: For example, F-22 units are often directed to participate in partnership building exercises. However, during these exercises, F-22 pilots may be restricted from flying the F-22 the way they would fly it in combat—due to security concerns about exposing the F-22's unique capabilities.

question: What is another exxample of these problems?
answer: The Air Force also uses F-22s to support alert missions—a mission that requires certain bases to have jets ready at all times to respond to threats from civil or military aviation. The alert mission does not require the advanced capabilities of the F-22, but there are no other operational Air Force fighter squadrons currently based at the F-22 locations in Alaska and Hawaii, so the alert mission falls to the F-22 units. Pilots and aircraft assigned to the alert mission cannot be used for any other purposes, including training. This limits opportunities for pilots to enhance air superiority skills.

question: What are the consequences of Air Force's lack of evaluation?
answer: Without examining and implementing options to improve F-22 pilot training opportunities, the Air Force may be foregoing opportunities to improve its capability to address the high-end air superiority challenges it expects to face.

questions: question: What was the F-22 designed as?
answer: The F-22 was designed and fielded as the Air Force's premier air-to-air fighter.
child_questions: question: What abilities do the F-22s provide to the Air Force?
answer: The small fleet of 186 F-22s is central to the Air Force's ability to accomplish its air superiority mission in high threat areas.

question: How is the Air Force attempting to redirect their focus?
answer: While the Air Force has focused on other missions over the last 15 years of conflict, it is now trying to refocus on overcoming advanced threats, even as it continues to support ongoing operations.

question: How does the introduction of the F-35 impact F-22 use?
answer: Though the recent introduction of the F-35 gives the Air Force another advanced fighter, the F-35 is primarily designed for the air-to-ground missions and so is intended to complement but not replace the F-22.

questions: question: What has the Senate provisioned GAO to review?
answer: Senate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review a variety of issues related to Air Force F-22 fighter squadrons.

question: What does this report cover?
answer: This report examines the extent to which the Air Force's (1) organization of its F-22 fleet maximizes availability of aircraft and (2) utilization of its F-22 fleet affects pilot air superiority training.
child_questions: question: What information did the GAO review for this report?
answer: GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, analyzed maintenance data and training information for the F-22, evaluated the use of F-22s during deployments, and interviewed agency officials.

question: How does this report differ from other versions?
answer: This is a public version of a classified report issued in April 2018. Information DOD deemed classified or sensitive has been omitted.