Wildland Fire Management: Improvements Needed in Information, Collaboration, and Planning to Enhance Federal Fire Aviation Program Success
Released: 2013-08-20T00:00:00


Highlights: section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: The Forest Service and Interior contract for aircraft to perform various firefighting functions, including airtankers that drop retardant. The Forest Service contracts for large airtankers and certain other aircraft, while Interior contracts for smaller airtankers and water scoopers. However, a decrease in the number of large airtankers, from 44 in 2002 to 8 in early 2013--due to aging planes and several fatal crashes--has led to concerns about the agencies' ability to provide aerial firefighting support.

GAO was asked to review agency efforts to ensure the adequacy of the firefighting aircraft fleet. This report examines (1) Forest Service and Interior efforts to identify the number and type of firefighting aircraft they need and (2) the Forest Service's approach to modernizing the large airtanker fleet and the challenges it faces in doing so. GAO reviewed agency studies and strategies, assessing the extent to which they included key elements important for understanding fire aviation needs; reviewed large airtanker planning and acquisition documents; and interviewed agency officials and representatives of the fire aviation community selected to represent state agencies, aircraft vendors, and others.

section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and the Department of the Interior have undertaken nine major efforts since 1995 to identify the number and type of firefighting aircraft they need, but those efforts--consisting of major studies and strategy documents--have been hampered by limited information and collaboration. Specifically, the studies and strategy documents did not incorporate information on the performance and effectiveness of firefighting aircraft, primarily because neither agency collected such data. While government reports have long called for the Forest Service and Interior to collect aircraft performance information, neither agency did so until 2012 when the Forest Service began a data collection effort. However, the Forest Service has collected limited data on large airtankers and no other aircraft, and Interior has not initiated a data collection effort. In addition, although firefighting aircraft are often shared by federal agencies and can be deployed to support firefighting operations on federal and nonfederal lands, the agencies have not consistently collaborated with one another and other stakeholders to identify the firefighting aircraft they need. Many agency officials and stakeholders GAO contacted noted concerns about limited collaboration, and many cited shortcomings with the formal mechanism for collaboration--the National Interagency Aviation Committee. The committee has implemented some leading practices for collaboration such as defining and articulating a common purpose, but it has not taken additional steps to monitor and evaluate its collaborative activities, another leading practice. Collectively, additional information on aircraft performance and effectiveness and collaboration across agencies and with stakeholders could enhance agency estimates of their firefighting aircraft needs to more accurately represent national needs for such aircraft, and as a result, better position the agencies to develop strategic planning documents that represent those needs.

The Forest Service plans to modernize the large airtanker fleet by obtaining large airtankers from various sources over the near, medium, and long term, but each component of this approach faces challenges that make the continued availability of such aircraft to meet national fire suppression needs uncertain. In the near term, the agency plans to rely on a mix of contracted "legacy" airtankers as well as supplemental aircraft available through additional contracts and agreements with other governments and the military. However, agency concerns exist regarding the availability, capability, and costs of these resources. In the medium term, the Forest Service has awarded contracts for "next-generation" large airtankers that are faster and more up-to-date than most "legacy" aircraft, but it is uncertain when all of these aircraft will begin supporting fire suppression activities. Specifically, bid protests delayed contract issuance, and most of the aircraft receiving awards have not been fully tested and approved. In the long term, the Forest Service's plan includes purchasing certain large airtankers and obtaining others through intergovernmental transfer at no initial cost if they are declared surplus by the military--a shift from its long-standing practice of contracting for rather than owning aircraft. However, the Forest Service was unable to justify its previous plans for purchasing large airtankers to the Office of Management and Budget, and concerns exist regarding the retardant capacity and operating cost of the other airtankers it would obtain through intergovernmental transfer.

section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends, among other things, that the Forest Service and Interior expand efforts to collect information on the performance and effectiveness of firefighting aircraft and enhance collaboration across agencies and the fire aviation community. The agencies generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Over the last 5 decades, aircraft have played an important role in wildland  fire suppression activities throughout the country by conducting aerial  surveillance, delivering supplies and firefighters, and dropping retardant  to slow fire growth or water to suppress fires. Federal, state, and local  governments rely on firefighting aircraft—including fixed-wing airtankers,  helicopters, and other aircraft—to help protect communities and natural  resources from wildland fire, and experts project that, as fire seasons  become longer and more severe, the need for firefighting aircraft will  continue to grow. The federal government plays a central role in wildland  fire response, including the use of firefighting aircraft, for which it largely  relies on private vendors that own and operate the aircraft under contract  to the government.

Among firefighting aircraft, large airtankers—those able to carry at least  1,800 gallons of fire retardant—are key resources for the federal  government because they have the ability to fly to remote areas and  quickly assist in containing small fires before they become larger, costlier,  and more dangerous. However, the number of large airtankers available  under federal contract decreased substantially in the last decade, from 44   The decrease of large airtankers in the federal  in 2002 to 8 in early 2013.fleet is, in part, the result of aircraft being retired due to their age—the  average large airtanker is more than 50 years old—as well as agencies’  concerns about the airtankers’ safety and capability to perform a  demanding fire aviation mission, which involves maneuvering aircraft at  low speeds and altitude and enduring significant structural wing stress.  Safety issues arose from two fatal crashes in 2002, both of which were  caused by structural failures—specifically, wings separating from the  aircraft during flight. These safety-related concerns led the government in  2011 to terminate contracts for eight large airtankers, which represented  more than 40 percent of the federally-contracted large airtanker fleet at  the time. Three additional crashes in 2012, two of which resulted in  fatalities, further increased public concerns regarding the federal  government’s ability to provide continued aerial support for wildland  firefighting activities.

Aircraft availability is also limited by the market characteristics for each  type of aircraft. In particular, large airtankers are less available than other  aircraft such as single-engine airtankers, helicopters, and surveillance  aircraft. Large airtankers have historically consisted of larger aircraft— typically surplus from the military—that were not designed to drop liquids  and have undergone retrofitting to perform that mission. (See fig. 1 for  examples of single-engine and large airtankers). According to the federal  government’s 2009 wildland fire aviation strategy, the availability of  single-engine airtankers and helicopters is sufficient to meet national fire  demands over the next 15 to 20 years, and the availability of aerial  surveillance and smokejumper aircraft is adequate, but the Forest  Service’s recent large airtanker strategy notes that the economic difficulty  for new vendors to enter the market or existing vendors to upgrade their  fleets demonstrates the uncertainty regarding the continued availability of  large airtankers.

The Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service and the Department of  the Interior’s land management bureaus have a responsibility to respond  to wildland fires on federal lands. States and other entities—including  tribal and local fire departments—have primary responsibility for  responding to wildland fires on tribal, state, local, and private lands.  Fighting wildland fires—which can burn across federal, state, and local  jurisdictions—can require significant investments of personnel, aircraft,  equipment, and supplies and can result in substantial fire suppression  expenditures, with firefighting aircraft contributing to these costs. From  2007 through 2012, these agencies reported that more than $2.4 billion  was spent on federally-contracted firefighting aircraft, fuel, and retardant.

In light of questions about the availability of needed aerial support for  firefighting—in particular the decrease in large airtanker availability—you  asked us to review federal agencies’ efforts to ensure the adequacy of the  federal firefighting aircraft fleet. This report examines (1) Forest Service  and Interior efforts to identify the number and type of firefighting aircraft  they need, and (2) the Forest Service’s approach to modernizing the large  airtanker fleet and the challenges it faces in doing so.

To examine Forest Service and Interior efforts to identify their firefighting  aircraft needs, we identified and reviewed agency studies and strategy  documents and interviewed agency officials responsible for managing fire  aviation programs. We focused on those efforts conducted since 1995,  when the Forest Service and Interior jointly conducted the first major  study of their large airtanker needs. For each effort, we reviewed the  methodologies used and identified the extent to which they included  analysis of key elements, which we identified as important for  understanding firefighting aircraft needs based on our reviews of multiple  academic and agency studies and interviews with numerous stakeholders  throughout the fire aviation community. The key elements we identified  are: aircraft types, basing options, acquisition models, aircraft capabilities,  suppression methods, and aircraft performance and effectiveness. We  also interviewed agency officials about each effort to determine the extent  of federal interagency collaboration involved. We compared the agencies’  practices with GAO-identified leading practices for interagency  collaboration. To examine the Forest Service’s approach to modernizing  the large airtanker fleet and any challenges it faces in doing so, we  reviewed agency documents related to large airtanker acquisition,  management, and operations as well as planning and acquisition  documents, such as the 2009 Interagency Aviation Strategy, the Forest  Service’s 2012 Large Airtanker Modernization Strategy, and Forest  Service airtanker contract solicitations, which lay out the agency’s  approach to obtaining large airtankers. For both objectives, we  interviewed members of the fire aviation stakeholder community,  including officials involved in the management and operations of aerial  firefighting from the Forest Service, Interior and its four land management  bureaus, the Department of Defense (DOD), and six state agencies that  we selected based on input from federal agencies and the National  Association of State Foresters; representatives from eight of the nine  vendors we identified that own and operate large airtankers and that have  responded to the most recent Forest Service contract solicitations; and  two national trade organizations, which we identified based on  conversations with agency officials and vendor representatives. We also  conducted site visits to the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise,  Idaho; the facilities of the only two private vendors with active Forest  Service “legacy” large airtanker contracts, located in Minden, Nevada and  Missoula, Montana; and the headquarters of California’s fire aviation  program—part of the California Department of Forestry and Fire  Protection (CAL FIRE) in Sacramento. The results of our interviews and  site visits are not generalizable. Appendix I provides a more detailed  description of our objectives, scope, and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to August 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: For decades, the federal government has relied on firefighting aircraft to  assist in wildland fire suppression activities. These aircraft perform  various firefighting activities, including gathering intelligence by detecting  fires and conducting assessments of ongoing fires; delivering supplies  such as water, food, and ground-based firefighting equipment;  transporting firefighters; providing coordination and direction to aerial and  ground-based firefighters; and delivering retardant or water to extinguish  or slow the growth of fires. The federal government uses different types of  firefighting aircraft, including large airtankers, very large airtankers,  single-engine airtankers, amphibious fixed-wing water scoopers,  helicopters, and fixed-wing surveillance and smokejumper aircraft to  perform these aerial fire suppression activities. Table 1 describes these  firefighting aircraft and their functions. In general, multiple types of aircraft  operate simultaneously to suppress fires. For example, airtankers that  drop retardant or water often work in tandem with surveillance aircraft— lead planes—that coordinate the firefighting operation and guide the  airtankers in dropping the retardant or water in the correct location. The  2013 Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations defines  several types of federal firefighting aircraft—including large and very large  airtankers, large and medium helicopters, and surveillance and  smokejumper aircraft—as national resources that can be deployed  anywhere in the country and support fire suppression operations in any  jurisdiction, including federal lands and nonfederal lands in accordance  with relevant intergovernmental agreements.

In most instances, firefighting aircraft that drop retardant or water do not  extinguish wildland fires but instead slow the spread of fires or reduce  their intensity as firefighters on the ground work to contain or suppress  fires. Firefighting aircraft that deliver retardant or water support ground- based firefighters by performing two main functions: (1) dropping  retardant around wildland fires to slow fire growth to provide ground- based firefighters additional time to build or reinforce fireline and (2)  reducing the intensity of fires by dropping water directly on them. In  general, airtankers deliver retardant around fires to slow their spread,  water scoopers drop water directly on fires to reduce their intensity, and  helicopters can perform either function. Currently, all large and very large  airtankers in the federal fleet are aircraft initially designed for other  purposes—such as maritime patrol or civilian passenger transport—that  have been retrofitted for the aerial fire suppression mission through the  incorporation of retardant delivery systems—tanks affixed to aircraft that  hold and release retardant. Conversely, single-engine airtankers and  water scoopers are built to drop retardant and water, respectively, to fight  wildland fires. Traditionally, airtankers have used retardant delivery  systems that rely on gravity to evacuate retardant via doors that open in  the bottom of the aircraft. However, some systems have been developed  that use compressed air to force retardant out of the aircraft through  nozzles rather than doors.

Fire suppression activities can generally be categorized as initial attack,  extended attack, or large fire support. Initial attack activities include those  conducted during the first “operational period” after the fire is reported,  generally within 24 hours.  When fires are not controlled through initial attack, extended attack activities occur that generally involve the use of  additional firefighting resources; when such fires grow large and complex,  these activities may be referred to as large fire support. Federal and state  wildland fire responders rely on a tiered interagency dispatch process for  requesting and coordinating the use of firefighting resources, including  aircraft, to respond to wildland fires. For example, when a wildland fire is  reported, a local dispatch center identifies and dispatches, if available, fire  response resources such as firefighters, aircraft, and equipment to  perform initial attack activities. If sufficient resources are not available,  local dispatch centers can request additional resources from the  appropriate geographic area coordination center. In the event that  sufficient resources are not available within a geographic area, its  geographic area coordination center can request additional resources  from the National Interagency Coordination Center, which serves as the  focal point for coordinating the mobilization of resources for wildland fire  and other incidents throughout the United States.

A number of interagency organizations develop interagency firefighting  standards, including those pertaining to the development and use of  firefighting aircraft, and coordinate federal firefighting efforts. To  coordinate the overall firefighting efforts of the Forest Service and other  federal land management agencies, the interagency National Wildfire  Coordinating Group was established in 1974. This interagency group  develops and maintains standards, guidelines, and training and  certification requirements for interagency wildland fire operations. Within  this group, the National Interagency Aviation Committee is an interagency  body of federal and state aviation operations managers responsible for  providing common policy and direction for aviation resources involved in  wildland firefighting.

This committee was established to serve as a body  of aviation experts, assisting the National Wildfire Coordinating Group  with recognizing opportunities to enhance safety, effectiveness, and  efficiency in aviation-related operations, procedures, programs, and  coordination. In turn, the National Interagency Aviation Committee  chartered the Interagency Airtanker Board to review and approve  retardant and water delivery systems based on established performance  criteria. The approval process—which includes an assessment of system  design, testing of the systems’ performance, and a physical inspection of  the aircraft with system installed—ensures that the systems meet basic  standards for delivery of retardant or water. Interagency Airtanker Board  approval serves as a guide to participating federal and state agencies for  identifying acceptable aircraft and retardant or water delivery systems that  may compete for agency contracts.

The federal firefighting aircraft fleet includes some aircraft that are  government owned, but most are obtained through contracts with private  industry vendors. For example, the federal government owns some  surveillance and smokejumper aircraft and contracts for the remainder,  along with helicopters and aircraft that deliver retardant or water, from  private industry vendors that own, operate, and maintain them. Currently,  the Forest Service issues contracts for large and very large airtankers, as  well as large and medium helicopters, and Interior issues contracts for  single-engine airtankers and water scoopers. The agencies use two  types of contracts for obtaining firefighting aircraft from vendors:  exclusive-use and call-when-needed. Exclusive-use contracts require a  vendor to provide an aircraft for service on any day covered by the  “mandatory availability period” stipulated in the contract. The agencies  pay vendors a daily rate regardless of whether the aircraft is used and  also pay a fee for each hour flown if the aircraft is used. Conversely, call- when-needed contracts do not guarantee vendors any fee unless the  aircraft is called upon to provide aerial fire support. This type of contract  allows the government the flexibility to pay for firefighting aircraft only  when they are used. However, the daily availability and flight hour rates  for call-when-needed contracts are generally higher than those for  exclusive-use contracts. In contrast to large airtankers, other types of  firefighting aircraft are generally more available for federal contracting.  For example, the agencies plan to have over 100 helicopters available in  2013 for fire suppression activities through exclusive-use contracts with  hundreds more available through call-when-needed contracts. See  appendix II for the number and types of aircraft in the federal firefighting  aircraft fleet in 2013 and their associated cost rates.

The Forest Service and Interior have also established agreements with  other governments (i.e., cooperator governments), as well as the military,  to augment the national firefighting aircraft fleet during periods of heavy  fire activity. The United States and Canada have established a mutual aid  agreement whereby the National Interagency Coordination Center and  the Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre can request firefighting  resources, including aircraft, from each other during periods of heavy fire  activity. Similarly, some U.S. states and Canadian provinces have  established regional intergovernmental agreements to facilitate the  sharing of firefighting resources: the Northwest Fire Protection  Agreement, the Great Lakes Forest Fire Compact, and the  Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Compact. Through these  agreements, firefighting resources, including aircraft, can be dispatched  from their contracted agency, state, or province to assist on fires on other  lands covered by the agreement. The Forest Service can also obtain  aerial firefighting support through the Modular Airborne Firefighting  System (MAFFS) program under an agreement with DOD. Under this  program, DOD provides Lockheed Martin C-130 Hercules aircraft as  additional capacity for aerial firefighting when requested by the Forest  Service. Each of the aircraft is equipped with a MAFFS unit—a portable,  pressurized retardant delivery system that can be inserted into military C- 130 aircraft to convert them into large airtankers when needed. The  Forest Service owns the MAFFS units (eight in total) and provides the  retardant, and DOD provides the C-130 aircraft, pilots, and maintenance  and support personnel to fly the missions. A new generation of MAFFS  units became operational in February 2009, and the fleet has since  transitioned to use this system exclusively.

section_title: Agencies’ Efforts to Identify Firefighting Aircraft Needs Have Been Hampered by Limited Information and Collaboration
paragraphs: Since 1995, the Forest Service and Interior have cumulatively produced  nine major studies and strategy documents related to their firefighting  aviation needs, but the agencies’ efforts to identify the number and type  of firefighting aircraft needed have been hampered by limited information  and collaboration. In particular, these efforts did not include information  on the performance and effectiveness of firefighting aircraft and involved  limited collaboration between agencies and with stakeholders in the fire  aviation community.
subsections: section_title: Agency Efforts to Identify Firefighting Aircraft Needs Did Not Include Information on Performance and Effectiveness of Firefighting Aircraft
paragraphs: Forest Service and Interior efforts to identify the number and type of  firefighting aircraft they need have largely consisted of developing major  studies and strategy documents—nine since 1995. Based on reviews of  academic and government studies and interviews with officials and  representatives from across the fire aviation community, we identified the  following key elements as important for understanding firefighting aircraft  needs:

Aircraft types – aircraft manufacturer, model, and size classification;

Basing options – potential locations for aircraft bases;

Acquisition models – options for obtaining aircraft, including  purchasing aircraft or using vendor-owned aircraft;

Aircraft capabilities – required capabilities of aircraft, such as  retardant capacity and speed;

Suppression methods – how to use aircraft to suppress fire, including  initial attack and extended attack; and

Aircraft performance and effectiveness – the results of using aircraft to  support fire suppression activities.

While the Forest Service and Interior studies and strategy documents  contained various key elements, none included information on  performance and effectiveness of aircraft in helping to suppress wildland  fires because agencies have not collected such information. Figure 2  identifies which key elements were included in each of the major studies  and strategy documents we analyzed. (See app. III for additional  information on each of these efforts.)

The agencies generally used cost- and efficiency-based metrics in these  efforts, such as the potential cost of damage from wildland fires or the  frequency with which requests for firefighting aircraft are unmet, to identify  their firefighting aircraft needs. For example, the three-part National Study  of Airtankers to Support Initial Attack and Large Fire Suppression,  conducted from 1995 to 2005, estimated the number of large airtankers  needed by comparing the cost of using large airtankers to help suppress  wildland fires with the projected cost of the damage that could result from  not suppressing the fires. In addition, the Forest Service’s 2013  Firefighting Aircraft Study focused on efficiency and identified the number  of large airtankers needed by analyzing the annual number of requests  for these aircraft that the Forest Service was unable to meet. However,  agency efforts to identify their firefighting aircraft needs have not included  information on the performance and effectiveness of using aircraft to  suppress wildfires primarily because neither the Forest Service nor  Interior has collected data on these aspects of firefighting aircraft.  Specifically, the agencies have not established data collection  mechanisms to track the specific tactical uses of firefighting aircraft—for  example, where retardant or water is dropped in relation to a fire as well  as the objective of a drop, such as protecting a structure or preventing a  fire from moving in a specific direction—or measure their performance  and effectiveness in those uses. Moreover, a 2012 study by the Forest  Service’s Rocky Mountain Research Station found that the Forest Service  did not collect information about the locations where airtankers drop  retardant or the actual performance and effectiveness of these aircraft.

In May 2012, we reported on the importance of performance information  in another context and found that such information can inform key  management decisions, such as allocating resources, or it can help  determine progress in meeting the goals of programs or operations.

General agreement exists among wildland firefighters that, based on their  experience, using aircraft can be beneficial to suppressing fires, but little  empirical data exist to measure the performance and effectiveness of  such aircraft use. For example, a 2007 study cited anecdotal evidence  that firefighting aircraft saved homes, and a 2012 study that surveyed fire  management officials found that these officials believed aircraft were  effective in reducing the amount of time required to contain wildfires,  particularly in the most difficult fire suppression conditions. such views are not based on empirical data on aircraft performance and  effectiveness, and other studies—including the Forest Service’s 2013  Firefighting Aircraft Study—found that no accurate information on the  effectiveness of aerial fire suppression exists and noted that the factors  contributing to the success of wildfire suppression efforts are poorly  understood.difficult to assess the relative value of delivering retardant or water  through helicopters, large airtankers, and single-engine airtankers and  called for analytic tools focusing on this area to be developed. In addition,  the 1998 National Study of Tactical Aerial Resource Management  identified the need for better information on the intended use of  surveillance aircraft—such as support for initial attack or large fire  suppression activities—to determine the specific types of aircraft that will  meet federal needs for aerial surveillance during firefighting.

See M. Plucinski, J. Gould, G. McCarthy, and J. Hollis, “The Effectiveness and  Efficiency of Aerial Firefighting in Australia, Part 1,” Bushfire Cooperative Research  Centre, Technical Report A0701 (June 2007), and M. Plucinski, J. McCarthy, J. Hollis, and  J. Gould, “The Effect of Aerial Suppression on the Containment Time of Australian  Wildfires Estimated by Fire Management Personnel,” International Journal of Wildland Fire  21 (December 2011): 219-229.

This limited availability of information on the performance and  effectiveness of firefighting aircraft is an area of long-standing concern;  since the 1960s, multiple reviews of federal fire aviation programs have  called for the Forest Service and Interior to collect information on the  performance of firefighting aircraft but neither agency has taken action  until recently. Specifically, in May 2012, the Forest Service recognized  the need for an approach to evaluate the effective and efficient use of  firefighting aircraft and began a project on aerial firefighting use and  effectiveness to develop technology, evaluation criteria, and performance  measures to quantify and assess the effective use of large airtankers,  helicopters, and water scoopers in delivering retardant, water, and fire- suppressing chemicals. According to Forest Service documents, the  agency plans to collect information including whether an aircraft was used  for initial attack or extended attack; the aircraft’s objective, such as  building a line of retardant, directly suppressing fire, or protecting a  specific structure; whether the fire is in grass, shrub, or timber; general  weather conditions; and characteristics of the actual drop of retardant,  such as the time, aircraft speed, retardant amount, and outcome. The  agency collected some of this information during 2012, but it has not  developed incremental goals for assessing progress or timelines for  completing the project.

The Forest Service faces several challenges in carrying out its project on  aerial firefighting use and effectiveness. For example, during 2012, the  agency collected information on the performance and effectiveness of  one type of aircraft—large airtankers—from about 25 fires but needs  information on several hundred fires to perform useful analysis on large  airtanker performance, according to Forest Service officials managing the  data collection effort. These officials said that it will likely take several  years for the agency to collect the information needed to analyze and  understand the effectiveness of the three types of firefighting aircraft— large airtankers, helicopters, and water scoopers—included in the project.  Forest Service officials also told us that aerial firefighters have been  reluctant to collect information on the results of using firefighting aircraft  for several reasons, including safety concerns regarding adding to the  workload of aerial firefighters while they are flying over fires, firefighters’  concerns that Forest Service will use the information to criticize their  performance, a firefighting culture that values experience and history over  data and scientific analysis, and the challenges in finding time to  complete data collection while fighting wildfires. Interior officials said that  the department is assisting the Forest Service in this data collection  project but does not currently have plans to collect performance  information on the firefighting aircraft it manages.

Large airtankers have been the focus of the Forest Service’s current data  collection effort as well as the agencies’ prior studies and strategy  documents, but few efforts have focused on other types of firefighting  aircraft. Specifically, eight of the agencies’ nine studies and strategy  documents attempted to identify the appropriate number of large  airtankers for the federal fleet. However, only three of the efforts—the  1998 National Study of Tactical Aerial Resource Management, the 2009  Interagency Aviation Strategy, and the 2012 Air Attack Against Wildfires:  Understanding U.S. Forest Service Requirements for Large Aircraft— identified the number of other types of aircraft needed, despite the fact  that each type of firefighting aircraft provides unique capabilities to  support fire suppression operations. For example, water scoopers can  deliver large quantities of water when a fire ignites near a water source,  smokejumper aircraft can quickly transport firefighters and supplies to  fires in remote areas, and helicopters have the versatility to transport  firefighters, supplies, or small quantities of water or retardant. As a result,  performance and effectiveness information on all types of firefighting  aircraft helps agencies identify the number and type of firefighting aircraft  they need, including assessing any potential new firefighting aircraft  platforms or technologies that vendors may propose; understand the  strengths and limitations of each type of aircraft in different situations; and  understand how firefighting aircraft could help achieve their wildfire  suppression goals. Obtaining information about aircraft performance and  effectiveness could better inform agency estimates of firefighting aircraft  needs to include in their strategies for obtaining aircraft, thus helping  agencies better ensure the adequacy of the federal firefighting aircraft  fleet.

In contrast to U.S. federal agencies, some foreign and U.S. state  governments that operate aerial firefighting programs have employed  various methods to collect and use performance and effectiveness  information on their firefighting aircraft. For example, in Canada, the  British Columbia Forest Service requires aerial firefighters to complete an  airtanker data report immediately after each airtanker flight. Officials then  compile information gathered through these reports with information from  their dispatch system to evaluate airtanker performance using a set of key  performance indicators, such as the amount of time from the initial report  of a fire to the time that an airtanker request is entered into the dispatch  system, the distance between available airtankers and the actual fire, and  the change in the size of the fire from the time an aircraft arrives at the  fire to the time the fire is contained. According to British Columbia Forest  Service officials, the performance information and indicators have been  integral to improving British Columbia’s aerial firefighting program. For  example, officials found that available aircraft were often over 100 miles  from the wildfires where they dropped retardant. Based on this analysis,  the province made significant changes to its methods for pre-positioning  firefighting aircraft and as a result, available aircraft are generally within  60 miles of a wildfire. In addition, the Minnesota Department of Natural  Resources requires officials to complete debriefing reports after each use  of firefighting aircraft. The report includes information on the specific  aircraft that were sent to the fire and gathers the firefighters’ views on  whether areas such as dispatch information, aircraft briefings, target  descriptions, and communications were adequate or need improvement.  According to Minnesota Department of Natural Resources officials,  information from these reports may help determine the best methods for  suppressing fires when a specific set of aircraft is available.

section_title: Agencies Have Not Consistently Collaborated with One Another or with Other Stakeholders to Identify Firefighting Aircraft Needs
paragraphs: In efforts to identify the number and type of firefighting aircraft they need,  agencies have engaged in limited collaboration with one another or with  other stakeholders in the fire aviation community. For example, the Forest  Service developed its 2012 Large Airtanker Modernization Strategy  without obtaining input from representatives of state fire aviation  programs or the large airtanker industry and did not coordinate with  Interior until after the development of an initial draft. According to several  agency officials we spoke with, the Forest Service did not invite Interior  officials to provide their input on the strategy until after the agency sent  the draft version to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for  review and approval. Similarly, regarding Interior, senior Interior officials  told us that Interior generally does not involve other agencies or  stakeholders in developing annual estimates of the number of each type  of aircraft to obtain through contracts. Rather, Interior develops these  estimates by asking relevant Interior bureaus to provide the number of  each type of aircraft it needs, compiling these estimates, and adjusting  them based on available funding.

The importance of collaboration with stakeholders and agencies has been  noted in several government reports. For example, the interagency  2009 Quadrennial Fire Review identified the need to engage agency  leaders, partners, and industry in a strategic dialogue about the demands  for firefighting resources, such as aircraft, and noted the importance of   Additionally, a  innovative and efficient ways to meet those demands.2009 Department of Agriculture Inspector General’s report recommended  that the Forest Service collaborate with stakeholders in the fire aviation  community to develop goals and performance measures for the agency’s  aviation strategic plan. Regarding collaboration with stakeholders, in  April 2013, we reported that when agencies carry out activities in a  fragmented and uncoordinated way, the resulting patchwork of programs  can waste scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program customers, and  limit the overall effectiveness of the federal effort. In addition, we  reported in October 2011 that successful organizations involve  stakeholders in developing their mission, goals, and strategies to help  ensure that they target the highest priorities. In that report, we also  stated that stakeholders can influence success or failure of agencies’  programs.

Many Forest Service and Interior officials, as well as other stakeholders,  we spoke with expressed concerns about limited collaboration, and many  cited shortcomings with the formal mechanism for interagency  collaboration—the National Interagency Aviation Committee, which  includes representatives from the Forest Service, Interior and its bureaus,  and the National Association of State Foresters. Some stakeholders told  us the committee has not always considered the needs of all agencies  involved in firefighting efforts. For example, in 2008 committee members  collaboratively developed a national firefighting aviation strategy, the  Interagency Aviation Strategy. A year later, however, the Forest Service  developed an appendix to the strategy that outlined the Forest Service’s  plans for replacing its large airtanker fleet, and the committee published  an amended strategy—including that appendix—without providing  member agencies the opportunity to review or contribute to it, according  to agency officials. As a result, the large airtanker appendix does not  reflect the opinions of all committee members, and consequently does not  reflect the needs of the fire aviation community stakeholders that will  require the use of large airtankers. In addition, Forest Service and Interior  officials told us that agency staff who serve on the committee are  generally firefighting operations staff and do not represent senior agency  management. As a result, the collaboration that occurs through the  committee is often limited to day-to-day operations activities rather than  broader strategic efforts.

The committee has implemented some leading practices that we  previously reported can help enhance and sustain collaboration.  Specifically, the committee’s members have defined and articulated a  common purpose and have agreed on agency roles and responsibilities.  For example, the committee’s charter identifies its purpose as serving as  a body of aviation experts focused on identifying opportunities to enhance  safety, effectiveness, and efficiency in aviation related operations,  procedures, programs, and coordination. In addition, the committee’s  2009 Interagency Aviation Strategy defines the general aerial firefighting  roles and responsibilities of federal and state agencies as well as aircraft  contracting responsibilities of the Forest Service and Interior. However,  we previously found that agencies often face a range of barriers, including  concerns about controlling jurisdiction over missions and resources, when  they attempt to collaborate with other agencies. Interior officials told us  that the division of firefighting aircraft contracting responsibilities among  the Forest Service and Interior—under which Forest Service issues  contracts for large and very large airtankers and large and medium  helicopters, while Interior issues contracts for single-engine airtankers  and water scoopers—may not foster a culture of collaboration since each  agency is focused on its own aircraft of responsibility. Although the  committee has implemented some leading practices for collaboration, it  has not taken additional steps to reinforce agency accountability for  collaboration, such as developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and  report the results of collaborative efforts. We have reported that by  creating the means to monitor, evaluate, and report the results of their  collaborative efforts, federal agencies can better identify areas for  improvement, although the specific ways in which this practice is  implemented may differ based on the specific collaboration challenges  agencies face. For example, mechanisms for monitoring the results of  collaborative efforts may range from occasional meetings among agency  officials to more formal periodic reviews where officials from each agency  report on progress toward achieving the goals of interagency  collaborative efforts. As we reported in August 2012, absent effective  collaboration, interagency efforts could result in limited information being  communicated and opportunities for incorporating stakeholder input being  missed.

Senior management in both the Forest Service and Interior told us they  have begun discussions regarding how to improve their interagency  collaboration. However, they said that these discussions have focused on  obtaining firefighting aircraft for the 2013 fire season and have not yet  addressed collaboration on strategic planning issues. Further, both Forest  Service and Interior officials told us the Interagency Aviation Strategy is  outdated and should be updated to more accurately reflect current  firefighting aircraft needs. Engaging in effective collaboration to  incorporate input from all fire aviation community stakeholders could  better position the agencies in developing strategic planning documents— including any updates to the Interagency Aviation Strategy—that  represent the national need for firefighting aircraft.

section_title: The Forest Service’s Approach to Modernizing the Large Airtanker Fleet Faces Challenges, Resulting in Uncertainty over Continued Large Airtanker Availability
paragraphs: The Forest Service plans to modernize the large airtanker fleet by  obtaining large airtankers from various sources over the near, medium,  and long terms, but each component of this approach faces challenges  that make the continued availability of such aircraft to meet national fire  suppression needs uncertain. The components of the agency’s approach  include: (1) in the near term, continuing to contract with private vendors  for “legacy” large airtankers—generally aging aircraft with limited future  service life spans—on exclusive-use contracts and very large airtankers  on call-when-needed contracts, as well as relying on agreements with  cooperator governments and the military; (2) in the medium term,  contracting with vendors for airtankers that are more modern and capable  than those generally in use currently; and (3) in the long term, acquiring  new federally-owned aircraft with expected service life spans of up to 30  years. Additionally, some federal and state agencies are considering  alternative plans to obtaining aerial fire suppression support to reduce  reliance on large airtankers.
subsections: section_title: The Forest Service’s Near-term Approach Includes Using “Legacy” and Supplemental Airtankers but Concerns Exists Regarding Aircraft Availability, Performance, or Cost
paragraphs: For the near-term, the Forest Service plans to primarily rely on exclusive- use “legacy” contracts to obtain large airtankers. However, during periods  of heavy fire activity, the agency plans to obtain supplemental airtankers  through call-when-needed contracts for very large airtankers, agreements  with cooperator governments, and military aircraft equipped with MAFFS.  However, agency officials and vendor representatives told us about  limitations and challenges—including availability, performance, and  cost—regarding these resources.

Over the next 5 years—including the 2013 fire season—the Forest  Service plans to rely on aircraft obtained through its “legacy” exclusive- use contracts, which has been the agency’s traditional acquisition model  for obtaining large airtankers. The agency in 2013 announced contract  awards for nine aircraft: seven P-2V Neptunes—Korean War-era piston- engine maritime patrol aircraft—and two British Aerospace BAe-146s— converted versions of modern commercial jets. However, the availability  of the P-2V Neptunes in the short term is uncertain, and the Interagency  Airtanker Board has documented concerns regarding performance of the  retardant delivery systems on these BAe-146s.

Lockheed P-2V Neptune. The age of the seven P-2V Neptunes—they  average more than 50 years old—makes their availability throughout  the entire 5-year contract period uncertain. Specifically, vendors told  us they might need to retire some aircraft prior to the end of the  current contract period because of the cost of maintaining the aging  aircraft. In particular, they told us that the limited availability of  replacement parts—and the difficulty of manufacturing new ones if no  others exist—coupled with the requirements of increased  maintenance and inspection standards make the P-2V Neptune  difficult to operate in a cost-effective manner. Further, physical  stresses on the aircraft could cause cracking of critical components  during fire missions. For example, representatives from Neptune  Aviation Services told us that the vendor retired one of its P-2V  Neptunes after the 2012 fire season due to structural problems  discovered during routine maintenance. They also said that the  vendor probably could continue to operate approximately five P-2V  Neptunes for the next 10 years but that the current heavy use of their  fleet could shorten this timeframe. Ultimately, Neptune Aviation  Services plans to retire its P-2V Neptune fleet and transition to  operating modern aircraft exclusively.

Neptune Aviation Services’ British Aerospace BAe-146s. Concerns  regarding the performance of the retardant delivery system on  Neptune Aviation Services’ BAe-146s have been documented during  agency evaluations of the aircraft and were voiced by several agency  officials we interviewed. During initial assessment of the system in  2011, the Interagency Airtanker Board determined that the retardant  delivery system did not meet established performance criteria and  identified problems regarding the system’s design and performance.However, in September 2012, the board approved, on an interim  basis, the use of the retardant delivery system through the 2012 fire  season so that information on its operational effectiveness could be  collected and design deficiencies addressed. During the 2012 fire  season, the BAe-146s collectively made approximately 300 retardant  drops, which the board considered sufficient to collect data needed to  assess their operational effectiveness.

In December 2012, the Interagency Airtanker Board declined to  extend the interim approval of Neptune Aviation Services’ BAe-146  system, citing the problematic retardant delivery system design and  deficient performance during the 2012 fire season. In February 2013,  however, the National Interagency Aviation Committee determined  that the need for aircraft to deliver retardant for the 2013 fire season  was sufficiently important to override the board’s decision. As a result,  the board, at the direction of the committee, granted an extension of  its interim approval of the retardant delivery system through  December 15, 2013. Representatives of Neptune Aviation Services  acknowledged that the system has limitations, but they stated that the  company is developing a revised retardant delivery system and plans  to retrofit all of its BAe-146 aircraft with the updated design by the  beginning of the 2014 fire season. However, the Interagency Airtanker  Board has noted that the deficiencies may persist due to the inherent  design of the system, and fire management officials from the Forest  Service, Interior, and several states that are familiar with this aircraft  told us they have reservations about the retardant delivery system’s  performance.

The Forest Service announced call-when-needed contracts for two very  large airtankers—converted versions of Boeing 747 and McDonnell  Douglas DC-10 commercial jets—to provide extended attack and large  fire support beginning in 2013 with durations of up to 3 years. However,  some agency officials cited concerns about the aircrafts’ role, suitability  for operating over rugged terrain, limited compatibility with current  airtanker base infrastructure, and high costs (see fig. 3 for an example of  a very large airtanker).

The Forest Service previously contracted for very large airtankers, but  according to Forest Service and Interior officials, firefighters were initially  reluctant to request the very large airtankers for several reasons. For  example, because of the size of these aircraft, some federal officials were  uncertain whether they could safely operate in rugged terrain. Some  officials also told us that firefighters did not request very large airtankers  because they were uncertain how best to use this new tool. For example,  the Forest Service identifies the primary mission of large airtankers as  initial attack, whereas the solicitation for the very large airtanker call- when-needed contract stated that they will be used to provide support for  extended attack on large fires—leading to uncertainty about the best  tactics for employing them. Despite early reluctance to use very large  airtankers, officials noted increased reliance on these aircraft;  nevertheless, some agency officials continue to disagree about the most  effective role—initial attack or large fire support—for these aircraft as well  as whether or not they are suited to operating above rugged terrain.  Additionally, very large airtankers can operate out of a limited number of  established airtanker bases because their weight and size are too great  for some existing base infrastructure such as runways or aircraft parking  areas. Specifically, about half of the large airtanker bases nationwide—35  of 67—are currently or potentially capable of supporting DC-10  operations, according to a Forest Service official;with bases is even more limited in that it can operate from approximately  12 locations, not all of which are airtanker bases. However, some agency  officials told us that the speed of these aircraft can compensate for their  limited compatibility with existing airtanker bases and associated  increased distances that the aircraft might need to fly to respond to fires.  Some officials also noted concerns about the high costs of using the  aircraft. (See app. II for the current contract rates of firefighting aircraft.)   the 747’s compatibility  The Forest Service plans to request large airtankers from two cooperator  governments—Canada and the State of Alaska—during periods of high  fire activity but these aircraft may not always be available. Under an  agreement originally established in 1982, the Forest Service plans to rely  on five Convair CV-580 large airtankers—converted commercial aircraft  with retardant capacities of 2,100 gallons—provided by Canadian  provinces as additional resources when additional large airtankers are  needed. Additionally, Forest Service officials told us that, under a  separate agreement, the agency can also request use of three CV-580s  contracted by the State of Alaska. However, the use of these airtankers to  supplement the federal large airtanker fleet is contingent upon the  cooperator governments making them available. For example, such  airtankers might already be committed to suppressing fires, which could  prevent them from being released to assist other governments.

Modular Airborne Firefighting  System (MAFFS)

As it has periodically done since the program’s inception in the early  1970s, the Forest Service plans to rely on the military to provide surge  aerial firefighting capacity through the deployment of up to eight MAFFS- equipped C-130 aircraft (see fig. 4 for an example of a MAFFS-equipped  C-130). However, a number of officials from the Forest Service, Interior,  and state fire agencies stated that MAFFS performance can be  inadequate in some circumstances. For example, while a Forest Service  official noted that the MAFFS system has been approved by the  Interagency Airtanker Board, some federal and state fire aviation officials  told us that the retardant line dispersed by the MAFFS system is  generally narrower than firefighters prefer, which can either allow a fire to  jump across the retardant line or necessitate an additional drop to widen  the line, if another aircraft is available. Additionally, some officials said the  system is unable to penetrate dense forest canopies, thereby preventing  the retardant from being effective when used in heavy timber. However,  some federal and state officials told us that MAFFS can be used  effectively on rangeland where grasses are the predominant fuel type.

Further, some fire officials expressed concern regarding the limited  experience that MAFFS crews may have in the fire aviation mission  because they are not full-time aerial firefighters. A DOD accident  investigation report conducted in response to a 2012 fatal crash of a  MAFFS-equipped C-130H found that the limited total firefighting  experience of the crew—in particular, the number of drops accomplished  prior to the accident—was a contributing factor to the accident. report also stated that the crew’s training did not include essential  components—including training on local terrain conditions and congested  airtanker base operations—necessary to conduct MAFFS operations in  the region where the crash occurred. A Forest Service official involved in  managing MAFFS training told us that the agency has updated the  training to better incorporate such components.

United States Air Force Accident Investigation Board Report C-130H3, T/N 93-1458  (Oct. 27, 2012).

section_title: The Forest Service’s Medium-term Approach Includes Contracting for Newer Aircraft, but Implementation Has Been Delayed
paragraphs: For nearly 2 years, the Forest Service has attempted to award “next- generation” contracts with durations of 5 to 10 years to modernize the  fleet with faster and more up-to-date large airtankers. However, these  efforts have been delayed by bid protests, and it is uncertain when some  vendors will complete federal approval and certification processes for  their aircraft, which are necessary prior to use as airtankers on federal  contracts. As a result, it is uncertain when the “next-generation” large  airtankers will be available to support fire suppression activities.  Additionally, private vendors that are developing the “next-generation”  large airtankers told us that concerns regarding the consistency of the  Forest Service’s approach to fleet modernization have increased the  difficulty of making business decisions and could affect the number of  aircraft they will be able to provide to the government.

section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Recognizing the importance of aircraft to help fight wildland fires, the  Forest Service and Interior have undertaken efforts to identify the number  and type of firefighting aircraft they need over the years but have met with  limited success. None of the agencies’ studies and strategy documents  contained information on aircraft performance and effectiveness in  supporting firefighting operations, which limits the agencies’  understanding of the strengths and limitations of each type of firefighting  aircraft and their abilities to identify the number and type of aircraft they  need. The Forest Service has started to collect some aircraft performance  information, but it is limited and focused on large airtankers. Interior has  no current plans to collect performance information on the aircraft it  manages. Agencies have also engaged in limited collaboration with each  other and with other stakeholders in the fire aviation community— including the private aircraft vendors on whom the Forest Service has  traditionally relied to provide large airtankers. Incorporating input from all  fire aviation community stakeholders in their strategic planning  documents could better position the Forest Service and Interior in  developing estimates of aircraft needs to include in their strategies that  represent the national need for firefighting aircraft. This concern is  illustrated by the variety of federal and state agencies taking steps to  compensate for the decline in large airtankers, which highlights the  number of parties affected by firefighting aircraft decisions and reinforces  the need for collaboration. Overall, better knowledge about aircraft  effectiveness—and more complete input from all involved parties—could  inform Forest Service and Interior decisions and help them ensure the  adequacy of the nation’s firefighting aircraft fleet. The challenges faced by  the Forest Service in each phase of its large airtanker approach, which  includes the potential acquisition of aircraft the federal government would  own and operate for decades, underscore the need for a complete and  collective understanding of the nation’s firefighting aircraft needs.

section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help the agencies enhance their abilities to identify their firefighting  aircraft needs and better ensure they obtain aircraft that meet those  needs, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior  direct the Chief of the Forest Service and the Deputy Assistant Secretary  for Public Safety, Resource Protection, and Emergency Services,  respectively, to take the following three actions:

Expand efforts to collect information on aircraft performance and  effectiveness to include all types of firefighting aircraft in the federal  fleet;

Enhance collaboration between the agencies and with stakeholders in  the fire aviation community to help ensure that agency efforts to  identify the number and type of firefighting aircraft they need reflect  the input of all stakeholders in the fire aviation community; and

Subsequent to the completion of the first two recommendations,  update the agencies’ strategy documents for providing a national  firefighting aircraft fleet to include analysis based on information on  aircraft performance and effectiveness and to reflect input from  stakeholders throughout the fire aviation community.

section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and the Interior  with a draft of this report for their review and comment.

The Forest Service (responding on behalf of the Department of  Agriculture) and Interior generally agreed with our findings and  recommendations, and their written comments are reproduced in  appendixes IV and V respectively. The Forest Service and Interior also  provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. The  Department of Defense did not provide comments.

While the Forest Service generally agreed with our findings and  recommendations and stated that it is committed to improving its  collaboration efforts, it also reiterated its interest in obtaining C-27Js to  augment its aerial firefighting capabilities, citing the benefit of low initial  investment for aircraft that could potentially function in multiple roles. As  stated in our report, we acknowledge the Forest Service’s incentive to  obtain the C-27Js free of acquisition cost and their potential use in  multiple roles. We also note, however, that the agency may face  challenges regarding the retardant capacity and operating costs  associated with the airtankers.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Agriculture,  Defense, and the Interior; the Chief of the Forest Service; the Directors of  the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and  Wildlife Service, and National Park Service; appropriate congressional  committees; and other interested parties. In addition,   the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please  contact me at (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix VI.

section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report examines (1) Forest Service and Department of the Interior  efforts undertaken to identify the number and type of firefighting aircraft  they need and (2) the Forest Service’s approach to modernizing the large  airtanker fleet and the challenges it faces in doing so.

To examine Forest Service and Interior efforts to identify their firefighting  aircraft needs, we reviewed major agency studies and strategy  documents and interviewed agency officials responsible for managing fire  aviation programs. We focused on those efforts conducted since 1995,  when the Forest Service and Interior jointly conducted the first major  study of their large airtanker needs. We reviewed the purpose,  methodology, and results of each of these studies and strategy  documents. We also reviewed seven academic and government studies  on aerial firefighting and conducted interviews with agency officials, as  well as officials representing stakeholders in the fire aviation community,  including military, state, and international firefighting organizations, and  companies that own and operate firefighting aircraft, to identify key  elements that are important for understanding firefighting aircraft needs.  (Information on the stakeholders included in our review is discussed in  more detail later in this appendix.) Through these document reviews and  interviews, and in consultation with internal GAO stakeholders including  methodological specialists and staff knowledgeable about aviation  contracting, we identified the following key elements: aircraft types,  basing options, acquisition models, aircraft capabilities, suppression  methods, and aircraft performance and effectiveness. We then reviewed  the agency efforts to determine the extent to which each effort included  analysis of these key elements.

We also interviewed agency officials about the extent of collaboration  involved in agency efforts to identify the number and type of firefighting  aircraft they need. In light of the information collected, we reviewed our  prior work on interagency collaboration and key practices that can help  enhance and sustain collaborative efforts, and compared the practices of  the formal body for coordination among aerial firefighting agencies—the  National Interagency Aviation Committee—with key collaboration  practices to determine the extent to which the committee’s practices were  consistent with key practices we previously identified. The key practices  we evaluated were: defining and articulating a common outcome;  establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies to achieve the  outcome; identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources;  agreeing upon agency roles and responsibilities; establishing compatible  policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency  boundaries; developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report the  results of collaborative efforts; and reinforcing agency accountability for  collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports. GAO has also  identified reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts  through agency performance management systems as a best practice for  coordination, but we did not consider this practice in our assessment  because performance management systems fell outside the scope of this  review.

To examine the Forest Service’s approach to modernizing the large  airtanker fleet and the challenges it faces in doing so, we reviewed  agency documents related to large airtanker acquisition, management,  and operations and interviewed agency officials to identify the agency’s  approach to obtaining these aircraft. We reviewed agency planning and  acquisition documents, such as the National Interagency Aviation  Committee’s 2009 Interagency Aviation Strategy, the Forest Service’s  2012 Large Airtanker Modernization Strategy, and Forest Service  airtanker contract solicitations, which lay out the Forest Service’s  approach to obtaining large airtankers in the short, medium, and long  terms. that represents firefighting aircraft vendors and one that represents  pilots—which we identified based on conversations with agency officials  and vendor representatives. We also conducted site visits to the National  Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho; the facilities of the only two  private vendors with current Forest Service “legacy” large airtanker  contracts, located in Minden, Nevada, and Missoula, Montana; the  manufacturing facility of a company that produces single-engine  airtankers in Olney, Texas; and the headquarters of California’s fire  aviation program —part of the California Department of Forestry and Fire  Protection (CAL FIRE) in Sacramento—which manages more airtankers  than the Forest Service. The results of our interviews and site visits are  not generalizable.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to August 2013  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

section_title: Appendix II: 2013 Forest Service and Interior Firefighting Aircraft Availability and Rates
paragraphs: The Forest Service and Interior contract for, and to a lesser extent own, a  variety of aircraft used to help suppress wildland fires. Table 2 provides  information, as reported by Forest Service and Interior contracting  officials, on the federal firefighting aircraft fleet for the 2013 fire season,  including aircraft type, number available, and cost rates.

section_title: Appendix III: Summary of Agency Efforts Since 1995 to Identify Number and Type of Firefighting Aircraft They Need
paragraphs: Since 1995, the Forest Service and Interior have conducted or contracted  for nine major studies and strategy documents that identify firefighting  aircraft needs. Table 3 provides information on major efforts conducted  by, or on behalf of, the Forest Service and Interior to identify the number  and type of firefighting aircraft they need.

section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Agriculture

section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of the Interior

section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact

section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the individual named above, Steve Gaty, Assistant Director;  Kristin Hughes; Richard P. Johnson; and Matthew Tabbert made  significant contributions to this report. Cheryl Arvidson, Steven Putansu,  and Kiki Theodoropoulos provided technical assistance.


Question-summary annotations: questions: question: What efforts did the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and the Department of Interior have undertaken to identify information regarding firefighting aircraft?
answer: The Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and the Department of the Interior have undertaken nine major efforts since 1995 to identify the number and type of firefighting aircraft they need, but those efforts--consisting of major studies and strategy documents--have been hampered by limited information and collaboration.
child_questions: question: Why didn't the documents incorporate information on the performance of these aircrafts?
answer: Specifically, the studies and strategy documents did not incorporate information on the performance and effectiveness of firefighting aircraft, primarily because neither agency collected such data.

question: Why didn't the study have enough data?
answer: While government reports have long called for the Forest Service and Interior to collect aircraft performance information, neither agency did so until 2012 when the Forest Service began a data collection effort. However, the Forest Service has collected limited data on large airtankers and no other aircraft, and Interior has not initiated a data collection effort.
child_questions: question: What is the reason that caused this data shortage?
answer: In addition, although firefighting aircraft are often shared by federal agencies and can be deployed to support firefighting operations on federal and nonfederal lands, the agencies have not consistently collaborated with one another and other stakeholders to identify the firefighting aircraft they need.

question: How has the committee tried to help with the situation?
answer: The committee has implemented some leading practices for collaboration such as defining and articulating a common purpose, but it has not taken additional steps to monitor and evaluate its collaborative activities, another leading practice.

question: Why is collaboration between the agencies and stakeholders necessary?
answer: Collectively, additional information on aircraft performance and effectiveness and collaboration across agencies and with stakeholders could enhance agency estimates of their firefighting aircraft needs to more accurately represent national needs for such aircraft, and as a result, better position the agencies to develop strategic planning documents that represent those needs.

questions: question: What does the Forest Service plan to do?
answer: The Forest Service plans to modernize the large airtanker fleet by obtaining large airtankers from various sources over the near, medium, and long term, but each component of this approach faces challenges that make the continued availability of such aircraft to meet national fire suppression needs uncertain.
child_questions: question: What does the agency plan to rely on in the near term?
answer: In the near term, the agency plans to rely on a mix of contracted "legacy" airtankers as well as supplemental aircraft available through additional contracts and agreements with other governments and the military.

question: What does the agency plan to do in the medium term?
answer: In the medium term, the Forest Service has awarded contracts for "next-generation" large airtankers that are faster and more up-to-date than most "legacy" aircraft, but it is uncertain when all of these aircraft will begin supporting fire suppression activities.

question: What does the agency plan to do in the long term?
answer: In the long term, the Forest Service's plan includes purchasing certain large airtankers and obtaining others through intergovernmental transfer at no initial cost if they are declared surplus by the military--a shift from its long-standing practice of contracting for rather than owning aircraft.

question: What were some concerns that the agency have?
answer: However, the Forest Service was unable to justify its previous plans for purchasing large airtankers to the Office of Management and Budget, and concerns exist regarding the retardant capacity and operating cost of the other airtankers it would obtain through intergovernmental transfer.

questions: question: What does the  Forest Service and Interior do?
answer: The Forest Service and Interior contract for aircraft to perform various firefighting functions, including airtankers that drop retardant.

question: How do their jobs differ?
answer: The Forest Service contracts for large airtankers and certain other aircraft, while Interior contracts for smaller airtankers and water scoopers.

question: How did a decrease in the number of large airtankers affect the agencies' ability to provide support?
answer: However, a decrease in the number of large airtankers, from 44 in 2002 to 8 in early 2013--due to aging planes and several fatal crashes--has led to concerns about the agencies' ability to provide aerial firefighting support.

questions: question: What was GAO asked to review?
answer: GAO was asked to review agency efforts to ensure the adequacy of the firefighting aircraft fleet.

question: What does this report examine?
answer: This report examines (1) Forest Service and Interior efforts to identify the number and type of firefighting aircraft they need and (2) the Forest Service's approach to modernizing the large airtanker fleet and the challenges it faces in doing so.
child_questions: question: What did GAO review?
answer: GAO reviewed agency studies and strategies, assessing the extent to which they included key elements important for understanding fire aviation needs; reviewed large airtanker planning and acquisition documents; and interviewed agency officials and representatives of the fire aviation community selected to represent state agencies, aircraft vendors, and others.