Defense Headquarters: DOD Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach for Managing Resources Devoted to the Functional Combatant Commands
Released: 2014-06-26T00:00:00


Highlights: section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: DOD operates three functional combatant commands, which provide special operations, strategic forces, and transportation. GAO was mandated to review personnel and resources of these commands in light of plans announced by DOD to reduce headquarters. This report (1) identifies the trends in resources devoted to the functional combatant commands and their service component commands and (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD's reductions to headquarters could result in cost savings.

GAO analyzed data for fiscal years 2001 through 2013 on authorized positions and costs to support headquarters operations for the functional combatant commands and their service component commands. GAO also obtained documentation such as guidance and budget documents and interviewed officials regarding the commands' approach for implementing reductions to headquarters.

section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: GAO analysis of the resources devoted to the Department of Defense's (DOD) functional combatant commands shows substantial increases in authorized positions and costs to support headquarters operations. Specifically, the number of authorized positions across the commands grew from 5,731 in fiscal year 2004 to 10,515 in fiscal year 2013. According to DOD officials, recent and emerging missions have driven up demands at all three functional combatant commands and driven the growth in authorized personnel. In addition, costs to support headquarters operations also increased substantially at the functional combatant commands. Data, in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars, show that the combined costs to support headquarters operations for the commands increased from about $296 million in fiscal year 2001 to more than $1.236 billion in fiscal year 2013. Authorized positions and costs to support headquarters operations at the service component commands supporting the functional combatant commands also increased. Specifically, authorized positions grew from about 6,675 in fiscal year 2002 to about 7,815 in fiscal year 2013, and costs to support headquarters operations increased from about $614 million in fiscal year 2008 to about $657 million in fiscal year 2013.

DOD's directed reductions to headquarters do not include all resources at the commands, which may affect DOD's ability to achieve significant savings in headquarters operations. In 2013, DOD directed reductions to management headquarters resources in an effort to streamline the department's management. However, GAO found that the department did not have a clear or accurate accounting of the resources being devoted to management headquarters to use as a starting point to track reductions. Officials noted that DOD relied on data self-reported by the commands, and GAO found that these data were potentially inconsistent and did not include the totality of headquarters resources. Specifically, GAO found that less than a quarter of the positions at the functional combatant commands are considered to be management headquarters even though many positions appear to be performing management headquarters functions such as planning, budgeting, and developing policies. As such, more than three quarters of the headquarters positions at the functional combatant commands are potentially excluded from DOD's directed reductions. However, the department does not have any plans to reevaluate the baseline on which the reductions are based, in part because it does not have an alternative source for complete and reliable data. GAO has also concluded that restructuring efforts must be focused on clear goals and consolidation initiatives grounded in accurate and reliable data. Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 requires that DOD develop and submit a plan for streamlining management headquarters by June 2014. Unless DOD reevaluates its decision to focus reductions to management headquarters and establishes a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point on which to base reductions, the department will be unable to track and reliably report its headquarters reductions and ultimately may not realize significant savings.

section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DOD (1) reevaluate the decision to focus reductions on management headquarters to ensure meaningful savings, (2) set a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point as a baseline for the reductions, and (3) track reductions against the baselines in order to provide reliable accounting of savings and reporting to Congress. DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation, questioning, in part, the recommendation's scope, and concurred with the second and third recommendations. GAO continues to believe the first recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: To support its worldwide military missions and meet evolving national  security challenges, the Department of Defense (DOD) operates three  functional combatant commands: U.S. Special Operations Command  (SOCOM), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and U.S.  Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). Each have thousands of  headquarters personnel who assist in carrying out the commands’  worldwide responsibilities and providing unique capabilities in support to  DOD’s six geographic combatant commands and four military services.  Specifically, SOCOM provides special operations forces to defend the  United States and its interests, while STRATCOM is responsible for  conducting global operations to deter and detect strategic attacks against  the United States and its allies, with missions including space, cyber,  missile defense, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  Finally, TRANSCOM is responsible for providing air, land, and sea  transportation for DOD during times of peace and war, with a primary  focus on wartime readiness. Generally, the combatant commanders have  the authority to organize the structure of these commands to carry out   and do so with the support of  assigned missions and responsibilities,subordinate unified commands and service component commands, each  of which also has its own staff.

Like the rest of the federal government, DOD is operating in a constrained  budget environment and facing difficult decisions about how to allocate its  resources to meet mission requirements. the administration released defense strategic guidance to direct defense  priorities and spending over the coming decade. The guidance states  that DOD must continue to reduce the cost of doing business, which  includes reducing the rate of growth in personnel costs and finding further  efficiencies in overhead and headquarters, in its business practices, and  in other support activities. One approach the department has pursued in  recent years to find cost savings is to reduce the footprint of headquarters  staff, such as the combatant commands and their subordinate unified  commands and respective service component commands. This approach  includes establishing personnel baselines, identifying personnel  reductions to achieve efficiencies, instituting caps on authorized civilian  personnel, and limiting service support contract expenditures. Further, in  July 2013, the Secretary of Defense directed a 20 percent cut in  management headquarters spending throughout DOD, to include  spending on government civilian personnel, facilities, and information  technology. The cuts, which apply to all headquarters staff at the  combatant commands and service component commands, are designed  to streamline DOD’s management through efficiencies and elimination of  lower-priority activities.

Among other constraints, the Budget Control Act of 2011 established requirements for  automatic budget sequestration, setting caps on the levels of DOD spending from 2013 to  2021. See Pub. L. No. 112-25, § 365 (Aug. 2, 2011).

We have issued several reports in the past few years on defense  headquarters and on the department’s ability to determine the right  number of personnel needed to perform headquarters functions. For  example, in May 2013 we found that authorized military and civilian  positions at the geographic combatant commands—excluding U.S.  Central Command—had increased by about 50 percent from fiscal year  2001 through fiscal year 2012. We also found that DOD’s process for  sizing its combatant commands had several weaknesses, including the  absence of a comprehensive, periodic review of the existing size and  structure of these commands and inconsistent use of personnel- management systems to identify and track assigned personnel. DOD  concurred with our recommendation that it improve its visibility over its  headquarters personnel, but did not concur with our recommendation that  it conduct comprehensive and periodic reviews of the combatant  commands’ existing size, as we discuss later in this report. We are  following up with DOD about its actions in response to our  recommendations. In addition, in March 2012, we found that DOD did not  have complete and reliable headquarters information available for use in  making efficiency assessments and decisions. We recommended that the  Secretary of Defense revise DOD Instruction 5100.73, Major DOD  Headquarters Activities, to include all headquarters organizations;  specify how contractors performing headquarters functions will be  identified and included in headquarters reporting; clarify how components  are to compile the information needed for headquarters reporting  requirements; and establish time frames for implementing actions to  improve tracking and reporting of headquarters resources. These  headquarters organizations include the functional combatant commands  and their service component commands. DOD generally concurred with  the findings and recommendations in that report.recommendations, DOD officials stated that several efforts have been  made to consolidate or eliminate commands, and centralize  administrative and command support services, functions, or programs.  DOD has also begun efforts to assess what headquarters organizations  are not currently included in its guiding instruction on headquarters, but it  has not completed its update of the instruction to include these  organizations.

A House Armed Services Committee report accompanying a bill for the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated us to  review the personnel and resources of the functional combatant  commands. the functional combatant commands and their service component  commands for fiscal years 2001 through 2013, and (2) evaluates the  extent to which DOD’s directed reductions to headquarters, like the  functional combatant commands and supporting service component  commands, could result in cost savings for the department.

See H. Rep. No. 113-102 (June 7, 2013) accompanying H.R. 1960, a bill for the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014. and headquarters support for the commands. Unless otherwise noted,  we reported all costs in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars. Since  historical data were unavailable in some cases, we limited our analysis of  trends to authorized military and civilian positions at the combatant  commands from fiscal years 2004 through 2013 and authorized military  and civilian positions at the service component commands from fiscal  years 2002 through 2013. We also obtained data on actual assigned  personnel for fiscal year 2013. Using available data, we provided an  analysis of trends in costs to support headquarters operations at the  combatant commands for fiscal years 2001 through 2013, but since  historical data were unavailable in some cases for the service component  commands, we limited our analysis of trends to fiscal years 2008 through  2013. We also obtained and analyzed available data on contractors  assigned to the commands, but based on the availability of data, we were  not able to identify trends in contractors assigned to the individual  commands. We assessed the reliability of the data given these and other  limitations by interviewing DOD officials, incorporating data-reliability  questions into our data-collection instruments, and comparing the multiple  data sets received from DOD components against each other to ensure  that there was consistency in the data that the commands provided. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

To determine the extent to which DOD’s directed reductions to  headquarters, like the functional combatant commands and supporting  service component commands, will result in cost savings for the  department, we obtained and reviewed guidance and documentation on  DOD’s planned headquarters reductions, such as the department-issued  memorandum outlining the reductions and various DOD budget-related  data and documents. We then examined whether this information  addressed some key questions we previously had developed for an  agency to consider when evaluating proposals to consolidate  management functions.reviewing our reports on specific consolidation initiatives that have been  undertaken, complementing this with information gathered through a  review of the relevant literature on public-sector consolidations. In  addition, we reviewed selected consolidation initiatives at the federal  agency level and interviewed a number of individuals selected for their  expertise in public management and government reform. For the current  report, we obtained data on the total authorized positions at the functional  combatant commands for fiscal year 2013 as well as the number of  positions deemed by the commands to be performing headquarters  functions and included in DOD’s planned headquarters reductions. We  assessed the reliability of the data given these and other limitations by  interviewing DOD officials, incorporating data-reliability questions into our  data-collection instruments, and comparing the multiple data sets  received from DOD components against each other to ensure that there  was consistency in the data that the commands provided. We determined  the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also interviewed  officials at the functional combatant commands, some of their respective  subordinate unified commands, and the service component commands to  discuss specific headquarters positions and organizations that could be  affected by DOD’s planned reductions to the commands and their  components.

We developed these key questions by  We conducted this performance audit from May 2013 to June 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further details on our scope  and methodology may be found in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Combatant Command Responsibilities
paragraphs: DOD’s Unified Command Plan sets forth basic guidance to all combatant  commanders and establishes the missions, responsibilities, and areas of  geographic responsibility among all the combatant commands. There  are currently nine combatant commands—six geographic and three  functional. The six geographic combatant commands have responsibilities  for accomplishing military operations in defined areas of operation and  have a distinct regional military focus. The three functional combatant  commands operate worldwide across geographic boundaries and provide  unique capabilities to the geographic combatant commands and the  military services. In addition, each combatant command is supported by  multiple service component commands that help provide and coordinate  service-specific forces, such as units, detachments, organizations, and  installations, to help fulfill the combatant commands’ current and future  operational requirements. Figure 1 is a map of the headquarters locations  of the functional combatant commands, to include their subordinate  unified commands and their respective service component commands.

section_title: Combatant Command Structure
paragraphs: Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense,  the combatant commanders organize the structure of their commands as  they deem necessary to carry out assigned missions. The commands’  structure may include a principal staff officer; personal staff to the  commander; a special staff group for technical, administrative, or tactical  advice; and other staff groups that are responsible for managing  personnel, ensuring the availability of intelligence, directing operations,  coordinating logistics, preparing long-range or future plans, and  integrating communications systems. The commands may also have  liaisons or representatives from other DOD agencies and U.S.  government organizations integrated into their staffs to help enhance the  commands’ effectiveness in accomplishing their missions. While the  commands generally conform to these organizational principles, there  may be variations in a command’s structure based on its unique mission  areas and responsibilities.

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. permanent authorized positions for military, civilian, and other personnel  responsible for managing the day-to-day operations of the command.

section_title: Military Service Supporting Responsibilities
paragraphs: Title 10 of the U.S. Code assigns the Secretaries of the military  departments responsibility for a variety of tasks specific to their respective  forces, to include organizing, equipping, and training tasks. In addition to  these service-specific tasks, Title 10 of the U.S. Code also assigns the  Secretaries of the military departments responsibility for assisting the  combatant commands, to include responsibility for assigning all forces  under their jurisdiction to the combatant commands to perform missions  assigned to those commands and responsibility for carrying out functions  to fulfill current and future operational requirements of the combatant  commands.

In addition to service-specific tasks, DOD Directive 5100.03, Support of  the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands,  states that the military departments—as combatant command support  agents—are responsible for programming, budgeting, and funding the  administrative and logistical support of the headquarters of the combatant  commands and subordinate unified commands. On an annual basis, each  of the three military departments assess needs and develop a request for  funding as part of their respective operation and maintenance budget  justification to meet this requirement to support the combatant commands  and subordinate unified commands. The directive assigns each military  department responsibility for specific combatant commands and  subordinate unified commands. As the combatant command support  agent for the three functional combatant commands, the Air Force is  responsible for allocating funding to combatant commands’ mission   As  areas, including the costs for civilian salaries, awards, and travel.such, the operating costs of these commands are generally subsumed  within the Air Force’s budget and funded through operation and  maintenance appropriations. Table 1 provides a listing of the functional  combatant commands, their subordinate unified commands, and the  military departments that support them.

section_title: Other Combatant Command Funding
paragraphs: Some of the functional combatant commands also receive funding  through appropriations other than operation and maintenance.  Specifically, Title 10 of the U.S. Code gives the Commander, Special  Operations Command, the authority to prepare and submit to the  Secretary of Defense program recommendations and budget proposals  for special operations forces and for other forces assigned to SOCOM  through a separate major force program category. In addition, funding  for TRANSCOM’s costs to support headquarters operations comes  primarily from the Air Force’s Transportation Working Capital Fund, which  is part of the Air Force Working Capital Fund. Unlike the other  combatant commands, TRANSCOM is operated in a fee-for-service  manner and charges its customers for transportation services.  TRANSCOM and its service component commands bill the customers for  services rendered, customers transfer funds into the Transportation  Working Capital Fund to pay the bill, and TRANSCOM and its service  component commands receive payment from the Transportation Working  Capital Fund. Officials noted that one component of these transportation  costs is overhead, to include pay for civilian personnel, material and  supplies, equipment, travel, and facility operations.

section_title: Resources Devoted to the Functional Combatant Commands Have Grown Considerably over the Last Decade
subsections: section_title: Authorized Military and Civilian Positions Have Grown at the Functional Combatant Commands
paragraphs: Our analysis shows that the functional combatant commands’ number of  authorized positions has substantially increased since fiscal year 2004  primarily due to added missions and responsibilities. Taken together,  the authorized number of military and civilian positions for the three  functional combatant commands almost doubled from 5,731 in fiscal year  2004 to 10,515 in fiscal year 2013.

All three functional combatant commands’ number of authorized positions  grew. SOCOM’s authorized military and civilian positions more than  doubled from 1,885 in fiscal year 2004 to 4,093 in fiscal year 2013.  According to SOCOM officials, an increase in authorized positions at the  Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center and  the Joint Special Operations Command contributed to the growth at the  command. TRANSCOM’s number of authorized military and civilian  positions more than doubled from 863 in fiscal year 2004 to 1,956 in fiscal  year 2013. According to TRANSCOM officials, the realignment of the  Defense Courier Service from Air Mobility Command to TRANSCOM and  the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command from the Joint Staff to  TRANSCOM were the primary contributors to the increase in authorized  positions at the command. STRATCOM’s authorized military and civilian  positions increased by 50 percent from 2,983 in fiscal year 2004 to 4,466  in fiscal year 2013. During this period, the creation of new organizations  at STRATCOM to fill additional mission requirements, including Joint  Functional Component Commands (Integrated Missile Defense;  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Global Strike; and  Space), two Centers (U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating  Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Joint Warfare Analysis Center),  and a subordinate unified command (United States Cyber Command),  were the primary contributors to the increase in authorized positions at  the command. Figure 2 shows the number of authorized military and  civilian positions at the functional combatant commands.

As with our findings in our May 2013 report on the geographic combatant  commands, we found that, over time, the functional combatant  commands have become more reliant on civilian personnel to meet their  mission needs.civilian positions at the functional combatant commands almost tripled— from about 1,900 in fiscal year 2004 to about 5,200 in fiscal year 2013.  According to DOD officials, the increase in authorized civilian positions is  the result of attempts to rebalance workload and become a cost-efficient  workforce, namely by converting positions filled by military personnel or  in-sourcing services performed by contractors to civilian positions, and  adding civilians in specific functional areas, such as intelligence and   Specifically, we found that the number of authorized  cyber, to support warfighter needs.authorized civilian positions at the functional combatant commands  increased from about one-third of authorized positions in 2001 to about  half in 2013. However, the functional combatant commands also  increased the number of military personnel to support the headquarters.  This is reflected in our analysis, which shows that from fiscal years 2004  through 2013 the number of authorized military positions also increased,  by about 40 percent, from 3,850 to more than 5,300. Figure 3 shows  changes in the functional combatant commands’ number of authorized  military and civilian positions from fiscal years 2004 through 2013.

section_title: Authorized Military and Civilian Positions Have Grown at the Service Component Commands
paragraphs: Our analysis of data provided by the service component commands of the  functional combatant commands showed that the service component  command positions also increased, although not as much as in the  functional combatant commands that they support. Specifically, total  authorized military and civilian positions for the service component  commands increased from about 6,675 in fiscal year 2002 to about 7,815  in fiscal year 2013. Changes in the authorized military and civilian  positions at STRATCOM’s and SOCOM’s service component commands,  as well as the establishment of new commands, drove the overall  increase in total authorized positions, while the service component  commands supporting TRANSCOM reduced their total authorized  positions over the period. Among the military services, the Air Force’s  service component commands saw the greatest increase in authorized  positions, accounting for more than two thirds of the total increase in  authorized military and civilian positions. This increase is primarily  attributable to the establishment of Air Force Global Strike Command—a  service component command to STRATCOM—which was activated in  fiscal year 2009 to develop and provide combat-ready forces for nuclear  deterrence and global strike operations, and is responsible for the  nation’s intercontinental ballistic missile wings. The creation of Air Force  Global Strike Command added over 330 additional military positions in  fiscal year 2010. Figure 4 shows the increase in authorized positions at  the service component commands that we reviewed.

We found that the service component commands’ authorized military and  civilian mix has changed slightly since fiscal year 2002. In fiscal year  2002 the mix was 55 percent civilian and 45 percent military, and in fiscal year 2013 the mix was about 60 percent civilian and 40 percent military.

section_title: Trends in Contractor Full-Time Equivalents Not Identifiable Due to Data Variations across the Commands
paragraphs: The availability of data on contractor full-time equivalents varied across  the combatant commands, and thus trends in full-time equivalents were   DOD officials stated the department generally tracks  not identifiable.and reports expenditures for contract services, and that the combatant  commands were not required to maintain historical data on the number of  contractor personnel. As a result, we found that the combatant  commands had taken varied steps to collect data on contractor full-time  equivalents. We also found that the data on the number of personnel  performing contract services at the service component commands varied  or were unavailable, and thus trends could not be identified. We found  that some service component commands do not maintain data on the  number of personnel performing contract services, and others used  different methods to track these personnel, for instance counting the  number of contractors on hand or the number of identification badges  issued.

In recent years, Congress has enacted legislation to help improve DOD’s  ability to manage its acquisition of services; to make more strategic  decisions about the right workforce mix of military, civilian, and contractor  personnel; and to better align resource needs through the budget process  to achieve that mix. For example, Section 2330a of Title 10 of the U.S.  Code requires DOD to annually compile and review an inventory of  activities performed by contractors pursuant to contracts for services.  Moreover, our work over the past decade on DOD’s contracting activities  has noted the need for DOD to obtain better data on its contracted  services and personnel to enable it to make more-informed management  decisions, ensure department-wide goals and objectives are achieved,  and have the resources to achieve desired outcomes. In response to  our past work, DOD has outlined its approach to document contractor full- time equivalents and collect personnel data from contractors in DOD’s  inventory of contract services. However, DOD does not expect to fully  collect contractor personnel data until fiscal year 2016.

Secretary of Defense, Combatant Command (COCOM) Civilian and Contractor  Manpower Management. for these services in the fiscal year 2010 President’s Budget Request.  Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014  extends these limits into fiscal year 2014.

section_title: Costs to Support Headquarters Operations Have Grown for Combatant and Service Component Commands
paragraphs: Total costs to support headquarters operations at the three functional  combatant commands we reviewed increased substantially from fiscal  years 2001 to 2013. Our analysis of data provided by the commands  shows that the costs to support headquarters operations—including costs  for civilian pay, contract services, travel, and equipment —increased  more than fourfold in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars, from about $296  million in fiscal year 2001 to more than $1.236 billion in fiscal year 2013.  A primary driver for the growth in costs has been the increase in  SOCOM’s costs to support headquarters operations, which increased  more than sixfold, from about $75 million in fiscal year 2001 to almost  $467 million in fiscal year 2013. Costs increased across SOCOM  headquarters and subordinate organizations, to include the Special  Operations Research, Development and Acquisition Center, the theater  special operations commands, and the Joint Special Operations   Also, STRATCOM’s costs to support headquarters  Command.operations almost quadrupled, from about $164 million in fiscal year 2001  to almost $624 million in fiscal year 2013. This increase in STRATCOM’s  costs was largely driven by the costs to establish and operate several  new subordinate organizations—Joint Functional Component Commands  and U.S. Cyber Command—which reflect new missions and  responsibilities assigned to STRATCOM over time. TRANSCOM’s costs  to support headquarters operations more than doubled, from about $56  million in fiscal year 2001 to $145 million in fiscal year 2013. Growth in  civilian pay and purchased services and equipment drove the increases in  TRANSCOM’s costs to support headquarters operations. In addition, the  transfer of the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command from the Joint Staff  in fiscal year 2012 added tens of millions of dollars to TRANSCOM’s  headquarters support costs. Figure 5 shows the overall change in the  costs to support headquarters operations at the three functional  combatant commands that we reviewed for fiscal years 2001 and 2013.

Total costs in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars to support headquarters  operations increased slightly at the service component commands we  reviewed, from about $614 million in fiscal year 2008 to about $657  million in fiscal year 2013.component commands saw the greatest increase in costs to support  headquarters operations, primarily due to the establishment of Air Force  Global Strike Command, which first reported costs in fiscal year 2010. Air  Force costs were also driven by growth in costs for civilian pay associated  with Air Force Space Command. In addition, SOCOM’s service  component commands also experienced cost increases from fiscal years  2008 through 2013, primarily due to increases in costs for civilian pay.  Conversely, TRANSCOM’s service component commands reduced their  costs to support headquarters operations over the time period. Figure 6  shows the changes in the costs to support headquarters operations at the  service component commands that we reviewed for fiscal years 2008 and  2013.

section_title: DOD’s Headquarters Reductions Do Not Include All Command Resources, Thus Affecting DOD’s Ability to Achieve Significant Cost Savings
paragraphs: In 2013, the Secretary of Defense set a target for reducing management  headquarters budgets by 20 percent, but we found that DOD did not have  an accurate accounting of the budgets and personnel associated with  management headquarters to use as a starting point for reductions. Our  work also found that management headquarters include about a quarter  of the personnel at the commands—of the 10,500 authorized positions at  the functional combatant commands, about 2,500 are considered to be  management headquarters. As a result, about three-quarters of the  authorized positions at the commands in our review are not included in  the potential reductions. Moreover, without a clear and consistently  applied starting point for reductions, it will be difficult for DOD to reliably  track savings to management headquarters in the future.
subsections: section_title: DOD’s Planned Reductions to Headquarters Budgets Are Based on Self- Reported and Potentially Inconsistent Data
paragraphs: DOD relied on self-reported and potentially inconsistent data when  implementing the Secretary of Defense’s planned headquarters  reductions. In July 2013, the Deputy Secretary of Defense announced in  a memorandum that the Secretary of Defense had directed reductions to  DOD headquarters, to include the functional combatant commands, in an  effort to streamline DOD’s management and eliminate lower-priority  activities. The memorandum directed a 20 percent reduction to DOD  components’ total management headquarters budgets for fiscal years  2014 through 2019, including costs for civilian personnel, contract  services, facilities, information technology, and other costs that support  headquarters functions. As outlined in budget documents, the targeted  savings goal of 20 percent of headquarters operating budgets is to be  realized by fiscal year 2019, with incremental savings each year  beginning fiscal year 2015. DOD budget documents project the  reductions will yield a total savings of about $5.3 billion over the period,  with most savings coming in 2019.

DOD began efforts to initiate reductions to headquarters during the  development of the fiscal year 2015 President’s Budget. According to  DOD officials, the department used the end of the 5-year defense plan  within the fiscal year 2014 President’s Budget, or fiscal year 2018, as a  point to base the targeted savings goal of 20 percent of headquarters  budgets through fiscal year 2019, with costs adjusted for inflation.  Officials told us that the parameters for these savings were established so  the department could achieve already-planned savings from prior  efficiencies. DOD officials noted that the Secretary of Defense provided  general guidance as to what should be considered management  headquarters for the commands to use when identifying their total  headquarters budgets and directed commands to include only operation  and maintenance funding. Because the department does not have  complete and reliable information on the resources being devoted to  management headquarters, officials noted that each individual  component was asked to identify and self-report its management  headquarters operating budget from which reductions would be based.  DOD officials further noted that after the individual components  determined what they considered their management headquarters  budgets to be, officials from DOD’s Office of Cost Assessment and  Program Evaluation reviewed the documentation to ensure it was  reflective of the intent of the reductions.

DOD focused its reductions on management headquarters, or major DOD  headquarters activities, because, according to officials, doing so would  ensure that the department saved as much money as possible for the  warfighting elements. However, by relying on DOD components to self- report their total management headquarters budgets, DOD cannot ensure  these self-reported budgets were captured consistently or reflect total  headquarters costs among the commands. DOD officials reported that  each of the combatant commands developed different approaches for  identifying the population of resources on which to base reductions.  Ultimately, officials determined that reductions would be based only on  operation and maintenance funds.

We also found that the underlying data are often tracked in an  inconsistent manner. During the course of our review, we found that the  functional combatant commands and service component commands had  different ways of capturing total costs to support headquarters operations.  All of the commands included costs for categories like civilian  compensation, and travel and transportation expenses. However, some  commands included categories such as software for command-specific  systems as well as command-specific equipment. Based on discussions  with DOD officials, it is unclear whether the commands were consistent in  their approaches for identifying and self-reporting the information they  provided.

section_title: Some Costs and Authorized Positions Are Not Included in DOD’s Planned Headquarters Reductions
paragraphs: Our analysis shows that not all costs and authorized positions are  included in DOD’s planned headquarters reductions and that all of the  functional combatant commands exclude most of their authorized staffs  from management headquarters totals. While the trends we described  earlier in this report include the entire commands, we gathered  information directly from the commands to determine how much of their  organizations they considered management headquarters. We found that  less than a quarter of their personnel are designated as management  headquarters. This designation is critical because the Deputy Secretary of  Defense’s July 2013 memorandum directed a 20 percent reduction to  DOD components’ total management headquarters budgets for fiscal  years 2014 through 2019, including costs for civilian personnel, contract  services, facilities, information technology, and other costs that support  headquarters functions. In addition, the memorandum noted that  organizations should strive for a goal of 20 percent reductions in  authorized government civilian staff at the headquarters as well as a goal  of 20 percent reductions in military personnel billets on management  headquarters staffs.

On the basis of our analysis of data on authorized positions at the  functional combatant commands and their service component commands,  we found that the commands designate less than a quarter of the total  authorized positions as part of their management headquarters functions.  Specifically, about 2,500 of about 10,500 total authorized positions are  accounted for in the functional commands’ management headquarters  position totals. As a result, a 20 percent reduction to management  headquarters could result in a relatively small cut to the total number of  positions at the three functional combatant commands. Specifically, as  figure 7 shows, a 20 percent reduction to management headquarters  positions means that, combined, the functional combatant commands  would have to eliminate about 500 positions, or less than 5 percent of the  overall authorized positions at the commands.

Compared to the functional combatant commands, the service  component commands have a larger percentage of authorized positions  included in their management headquarters totals. Based on our analysis  of data on authorized positions at the service component commands,  about 6,000 of about 7,800 total authorized positions are accounted for in  the management headquarters position totals (77 percent). As such, a 20  percent reduction to management headquarters positions means that,  combined, the service component commands would have to eliminate  about 1,200 positions, or about 15 percent of the overall authorized  positions at the commands. This reduction is larger than the 5 percent  reduction that would be required at the functional combatant commands if  the reductions are based on management headquarters totals, as DOD  calculated them.

We further analyzed data provided by the individual functional combatant  commands to determine what they included in their management  headquarters totals. The proportion of personnel considered to be in  management headquarters positions at the three functional combatant  commands ranged from 20 to 28 percent of their overall personnel based  on their 2013 authorized positions. DOD officials explained that the  positions that are not accounted for in management headquarters  positions perform more operationally focused tasks and functions. For  example, STRATCOM officials stated that positions within the command’s  Joint Functional Component Commands for Global Strike; Intelligence,  Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Integrated Missile Defense; and  Space are not included in the command’s management headquarters  totals because the positions within these components and the missions  they perform are operational in nature. Similarly, TRANSCOM officials  told us that because the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command is a  deployable operational command component, all authorized positions  within this component are excluded from the command’s management  headquarters totals. Moreover, officials at each of the functional  combatant commands told us that some authorized positions within their  headquarters—such as those within the intelligence and operations  directorates—are not considered management headquarters positions  because these positions perform operational tasks and functions.

Examples of the positions within the individual commands that are  included in management headquarters and those that are not are as  follows:

About 20 percent of SOCOM’s reported total authorized positions, or  about 800 of 4,100 authorized positions, are included in the  command’s management headquarters position totals. According to  officials, positions not included in management headquarters  functions include 267 authorized positions in the Special Operations  Research, Development, and Acquisition Center; the entirety of the  Joint Special Operations Command headquarters; and certain  positions within command directorates such as intelligence and  operations. For example, only 1 of the 473 authorized military and  civilian positions in the intelligence directorate is included in the  command’s management headquarters position totals.

About 28 percent of STRATCOM’s reported total authorized positions,  or about 1,200 of 4,500 total positions, are included in the command’s  management headquarters position totals. According to officials,  positions not counted as part of the command’s management  headquarters totals include 1,544 authorized positions in the  command’s Joint Functional Component Commands; 918 authorized  positions at U.S. Cyber Command; and 64 authorized positions in the  command’s J9 Mission Assessment and Analysis Directorate.

About 24 percent of TRANSCOM’s reported total authorized positions,  or about 500 of 2,000 positions, are included in the command’s  management headquarters position totals. According to officials,  positions that are excluded from this total include about 260  authorized positions that are part of the Defense Courier Service,  among others.

Figure 8 shows the number of authorized positions within the functional  combatant commands in fiscal year 2013 included in management  headquarters totals and the number not included.

While the functional combatant commands have components and  associated positions that are more operational in nature, we found that  each of these operational components have personnel that perform  management headquarters functions, such as conducting planning,  budgeting, and developing policies. For example, STRATCOM officials  noted that the Joint Functional Component Commands have resource- management personnel that manage the component commands’ funding,  which is a headquarters function, as defined in DOD Instruction 5100.73,  Major DOD Headquarters Activities. However, STRATCOM excludes  these personnel from its management headquarters totals because,  according to STRATCOM officials, the headquarters directorates at these  component commands are relatively small and personnel rely heavily on  STRATCOM for support in these functional areas. Moreover, a majority of  the positions in SOCOM’s research, development, and acquisition center,  which manages and supports the development, acquisition, and fielding  of critical items for special operations forces, are not included in the  command’s management headquarters totals even though these  personnel perform headquarters-specific functions as defined in DOD  Instruction 5100.73, Major DOD Headquarters Activities.

section_title: Absent a Clear Starting Point, Savings Will Be Difficult to Track
paragraphs: DOD’s reduction initiatives targeted management headquarters, and the  department reported a savings estimate from these reductions in its fiscal  year 2015 budget submission, but because the department did not have a  reliable way to determine the resources being devoted to such  headquarters as a starting point, actual savings will be difficult to track.  Specifically, DOD officials acknowledged the limitations of management  headquarters data, stating that they did not have an operationally clear  definition and good data about what constituted management  headquarters, and agreed that this made it difficult to establish a starting  point for reductions. However, the department does not have any plans to  reevaluate the baseline on which the reductions are based, in part  because it does not have an alternative source for complete and reliable  data. Moreover, DOD reported in its fiscal year 2015 budget submission  that reductions to management headquarters staffs will result in a savings  of $5.3 billion through fiscal year 2019 in comparison to DOD’s overall  expected $2.7 trillion budget over those fiscal years. The department  based this total on incremental savings from reductions being realized  each year from fiscal years 2015 through 2019. However, this represents  a savings of about 2/10 of 1 percent. If DOD’s headquarters reductions do  not have a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point on which  to target savings—and reductions are only focused on what the  commands have self-reported as management headquarters activities— then the department may not be able to track its savings to management  headquarters or assure that reductions are achieved as intended.

Accounting for management headquarters is a long-standing challenge  for DOD that has created problems before in tracking savings. In October  1997, in the wake of the mid-1990s military drawdown, we found that total  personnel and costs of defense headquarters were significantly higher  than were being reported. At the time, we found that about three-fourths  of subordinate organizations excluded from the management  headquarters accounting were actually performing management or  management support functions and that such accounting masked the true  size of DOD’s headquarters organizations. In March 2012, we  concluded that DOD’s data on its headquarters personnel lacked  completeness and reliability necessary for use in making efficiency  assessments and decisions. We recommended that the Secretary of  Defense revise DOD Instruction 5100.73, Major DOD Headquarters  Activities, to include all headquarters organizations; specify how  contractors performing headquarters functions will be identified and  included in headquarters reporting; clarify how components are to  compile the information needed for headquarters-reporting requirements;  and establish time frames for implementing actions to improve tracking  and reporting of headquarters resources. DOD generally concurred with  the findings and recommendations in that report and is taking steps to  address the recommendations. For example, DOD has begun the  process of updating DOD Instruction 5100.73, Major DOD Headquarters  Activities, to include all major DOD headquarters activity organizations.  However, the department has not yet taken actions to fully address our  recommendations. In April 2003, we testified on the importance of  periodically reexamining whether current programs and activities remain  relevant, appropriate, and effective in an agency’s ability to deliver on its  mission and noted that restructuring efforts must be focused on clear  goals. Moreover, key questions that agencies should consider when  evaluating organizational consolidation note that the key to any  consolidation initiative is the identification of and agreement on specific  goals, with the goals of the consolidation being evaluated against a  realistic assessment of how the consolidation can achieve them. We  further noted that any consolidation initiatives must be grounded in  accurate and reliable data.

Moreover, unless these issues are addressed, the department may be  unable to convince external stakeholders, such as Congress, that its  actions will address overhead in a meaningful way. Section 904 of the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 requires that  DOD develop and submit a plan for streamlining management  headquarters, to include the combatant commands, by June 2014.plan is to include a description of the planned changes or reductions in  staffing and services and the estimated cumulative savings to be  achieved from fiscal years 2015 through 2024. According to officials,  DOD has not yet decided how it plans to track its management  headquarters reductions and report to Congress to satisfy this statutory  requirement. Without establishing a starting point for reductions that  includes all headquarters personnel and resources within these  commands, it is unclear how the department will provide reliable  information to Congress. Moreover, since the universe of resources that  DOD has identified for headquarters reductions is relatively small  compared to the overall size of the functional combatant commands,  unless the department reevaluates its decision to base reductions on  management headquarters, it may not ultimately realize significant  savings.

section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: As it faces a potentially extended period of fiscal constraints, DOD has  concluded that reducing the resources it devotes to headquarters is a  reasonable area to achieve cost savings. However, by focusing the  reductions on management headquarters budgets and personnel—which  tend to be inconsistently defined and often represent a small portion of  the overall headquarters—in the way it has, the department is, in effect,  shielding much of the resources it directs to headquarters organizations  like those of the functional combatant commands. Unless the department  reevaluates its decision to focus reductions on management  headquarters and sets a clearly defined and consistently applied starting  point from which to base budgetary and staff reductions at headquarters  organizations and track them, DOD is likely to face difficulties ensuring  that its actions result in significant overhead savings. As the department  continues to identify efficiencies in its operations and potential reductions  in overhead, accurately identifying the universe of resources that DOD  dedicates to headquarters and using that as a starting point for reductions  would help DOD ensure it achieves savings. Finally, managing  headquarters resources is a long-standing challenge at DOD. We have  previously recommended that DOD improve the accounting of  management headquarters functions and develop a process to  periodically revalidate the size and structure of the combatant commands.

We believe that these recommendations apply to the functional  combatant commands in this review, and are still valid, and thus are  making no new recommendations on these issues.

section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: In order to improve the management of DOD’s headquarters-reduction  efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following  three actions:  1.  Reevaluate the decision to focus reductions on management  headquarters to ensure the department’s efforts ultimately result in  meaningful savings.  2.  Set a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point as a  baseline for the reductions.  3.  Track reductions against the baselines in order to provide reliable  accounting of savings and reporting to Congress.

section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In  written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with  the first recommendation and concurred with the second and third  recommendations. DOD’s comments are summarized below and  reprinted in their entirety in appendix VIII.

DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation that the Secretary  of Defense reevaluate the decision to focus reductions on management  headquarters to ensure the department’s efforts ultimately result in  meaningful savings. DOD stated that this department-wide  recommendation would garner greater savings. However, DOD officials  raised concerns that the recommendation seemed to be outside the  scope of the review, which focused on the functional combatant  commands, and with our distinction between management headquarters  and below-the-line organizations and the functions that personnel in these  positions perform. We agree that the recommendation has implications  beyond the functional combatant commands. While our review was  focused on the functional combatant commands, the issue we identified is  not limited to these commands. The findings related to the three  functional combatant commands illustrate a fundamental challenge facing  the department in its efforts to reduce headquarters overhead. As  discussed in this report, we have previously reported on problems with  the way that DOD accounts for management headquarters across the  department. As part of this review, we found that DOD did not have an  accurate accounting of the budgets and personnel associated with  management headquarters to use as a starting point for reductions. Given  the longstanding issues with accounting for management headquarters,  we believe the recommendation that the Secretary reevaluate the  decision to focus the department’s reduction efforts on management  headquarters is appropriate.

The department also stated in its letter that while the Secretary of  Defense’s reductions were focused on management headquarters, the  military services were allowed to reduce below-the-line organizations— those not designated as management headquarters—which includes  elements of the combatant commands. According to DOD, these  reductions will range from 3 percent up to 15 percent depending on the  military service. We recognize that the military services plan to implement  reductions that may result in savings at some non-management  headquarters organizations across the department. However, the  department’s response did not delineate how these reductions were  determined, how they were applied by the military services, or how much  the actions would ultimately save the department. Further, in discussions,  DOD officials raised concerns about our distinction between management  headquarters and below-the-line organizations and the functions that  personnel in these positions perform. As noted in the report, we  understand the distinctions as defined in guidance between management  headquarters and below-the-line organizations, or those not considered to  be part of an organization’s management headquarters. However, our  analysis focused on the extent to which the functional combatant  commands reported that personnel were performing management  functions, and we noted that this data was self-reported and potentially  inconsistent. The intent of the recommendation was to focus on positions  not included in the commands’ assessment of management headquarters  positions, but in response to DOD’s concern, we modified the  recommendation to clarify that the goal of ensuring cost savings was  related to the assessment of personnel performing management functions  versus the definition of people included in management headquarters  totals.

In its comments, the department also questioned the use of Joint Table of  Distribution data from DOD’s Electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel  System versus the Future Years Defense Program data in DOD’s  Defense Resources Data Warehouse for this study. We attempted to use  the data warehouse as part of our prior work examining the resources  devoted to the geographic combatant commands in May 2013; however,  after querying the database, Joint Staff officials explained that the data it  yielded were unreliable. Therefore, the officials suggested that we obtain  the authorized position and costs to support headquarters operations data  directly from the combatant commands and service component  commands. DOD noted in its comments that the data trends may be  skewed since the Joint Table of Distribution presents a point-in-time look  at on-hand personnel. For this review, we focused on authorized positions  as documented on the combatant command’s Joint Tables of Distribution  rather than focusing on personnel on hand because data on authorized  positions provided the most accurate and repeatable data to identify  trends. Moreover, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction  1001.01A, Joint Manpower and Personnel Program, notes that Joint  Tables of Distribution are documented in the Joint Staff’s Electronic Joint  Manpower and Personnel System which is DOD’s system of record to  document the unified combatant commands’ organizational structure and  track the manpower and personnel required to meet the combatant  commands’ assigned missions. The instruction also states that manpower  authorizations on the Joint Table of Distribution should be compared with  the Future Years Defense Program and any disconnects must be  resolved. Finally, in January 2012, the Vice Director of the Joint Staff  issued a memo identifying its Electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel  System as the authoritative data source for DOD and for congressional  inquiries of joint personnel, stating that the system must accurately reflect  the manpower and personnel allocated to joint organizations, such as the  combatant commands, to provide senior leaders with the necessary data  to support decision making in a fiscally constrained environment.  Therefore, we maintain that the use of authorized military and civilian  positions from the combatant command’s Joint Tables of Distribution, as  documented in DOD’s Electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System,  was appropriate for our review of the resources devoted to the functional  combatant commands.

DOD concurred with the second and third recommendations that the  Secretary of Defense: set a clearly defined and consistently applied  starting point as a baseline for the reductions, and track reductions  against the baselines in order to provide reliable accounting of savings  and reporting to Congress. In its response, DOD recommended the use  of the Future Years Defense Program data to set the baseline going  forward and stated that it was enhancing data elements within DOD’s  Resource Data Warehouse to better identify management headquarters  resources to facilitate tracking and reporting across the department. We  agree that enhancements to the data elements will increase DOD’s  capability to track and report management headquarters resources  across the department and, thus, the Future Years Defense Program data  could be used to set baselines and track future reductions. These  enhancements, if implemented, would address the intent of the  recommendations.

DOD also provided what it considered significant points of fact. However,  we considered these were technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.

We are sending a copy of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, and the Secretaries of the military departments. In addition, this  report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix IX.

section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: We conducted this work in response to a mandate from the House Armed  Services Committee to review the personnel and resources of the  functional combatant commands. This report (1) identifies any trends in  resources devoted to the functional combatant commands and their  service component commands for fiscal years 2001 through 2013 to meet  their assigned missions and responsibilities, and (2) evaluates the extent  to which the Department of Defense’s (DOD) directed reductions to  headquarters, like the functional combatant commands and supporting  service component commands, could result in cost savings for the  department.

To conduct this work and address our objectives, we identified sources of  information within DOD that would provide data on the resources devoted  to the functional combatant commands—U.S. Special Operations  Command (SOCOM), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and U.S.  Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)—to include their subordinate  unified commands and their corresponding service components  commands.

To identify trends in the resources devoted to DOD’s functional  combatant commands, including their subordinate unified commands and  their service component commands, we obtained and analyzed data on  available authorized military and civilian positions, and operation and  maintenance obligations, from each of the commands and their  corresponding service component commands from fiscal years 2001  through 2013. We focused our review on authorized positions, as these  reflect the approved, funded manpower requirements at each of the  functional combatant commands. To provide insight into the number of  personnel assigned to each command, we obtained data on actual  assigned personnel for fiscal year 2013. We also obtained and analyzed  available data on contractors assigned to the commands, but based on  the availability of data, we were not able to identify trends in contractors  assigned to the individual commands. Our review also focused on  operation and maintenance obligations—because these obligations  reflect the primary costs to support headquarters operations of the  combatant commands, their subordinate unified commands and other  activities, and corresponding service component commands—including  the costs for civilian personnel, contract services, travel, and equipment,  among others. We included funds provided to TRANSCOM through the  Transportation Working Capital Fund and to SOCOM through the  command’s special operations–specific appropriations that provides  funding for necessary special operations forces’ unique capabilities and  items since these funds most appropriately reflect the primary mission  and headquarters support for the commands. Our review excluded  obligations of operation and maintenance funding for DOD’s overseas  contingency operations not part of DOD’s base budget. Unless otherwise  noted, we reported all costs in this report in constant fiscal year 2013  dollars. Since historical data were unavailable in some cases, we limited  our review of the combatant commands authorized positions to fiscal  years 2004 through 2013, and authorized military and civilian positions at  the service component commands to fiscal years 2002 through 2013.  Using available data, we provided an analysis of trends in operation and  maintenance obligations at the combatant commands for fiscal years  2001 through 2013, but since historical data were unavailable in some  cases for the service component commands, we limited our analysis of  trends to fiscal years 2008 through 2013. We obtained data on actual  assigned personnel for fiscal year 2013. To assess the reliability of the  data, we interviewed DOD officials and analyzed relevant manpower and  financial-management documentation to ensure that the authorized  positions and data on operation and maintenance obligations that the  commands provided were tied to mission and headquarters support. We  also incorporated data-reliability questions into our data-collection  instruments and compared the multiple data sets received from DOD  components against each other to ensure that there was consistency in  the data that the commands provided. We determined the data were  sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

To determine the extent to which DOD’s directed reductions to  headquarters, like the functional combatant commands and supporting  service component commands, will result in cost savings for the  department, we obtained and reviewed guidance and documentation on  DOD’s and the services’ planned headquarters reductions, such as the  department-issued memorandum outlining the reductions and various  DOD budget-related data and documents. We then examined whether  this information addressed some key questions we had developed for an  agency to consider when evaluating proposals to consolidate  management functions. We developed these key questions by reviewing  our reports on specific consolidation initiatives that have been  undertaken, complementing this with information gathered through a  review of the relevant literature on public-sector consolidations produced  by academic institutions, professional associations, think tanks, news  outlets, and various other organizations. In addition, as illustrative  examples for this prior work, we reviewed selected consolidation  initiatives at the federal agency level and interviewed a number of  individuals selected for their expertise in public management and  government reform. We obtained data on the total authorized positions  at the functional combatant commands for fiscal year 2013 as well as the  number of positions deemed by the command to be performing  headquarters functions and included in DOD’s planned reductions. To  assess the reliability of the data, we interviewed DOD officials, analyzed  relevant manpower documentation, incorporated data-reliability questions  into our data-collection instruments, and compared the multiple data sets  received from DOD components against each other to ensure that there  was consistency in the data that the commands provided. We determined  the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also interviewed  officials at the functional combatant commands, some of their respective  subordinate unified commands, and the service component commands to  discuss specific headquarters positions and organizations that will be  affected by DOD’s planned reductions in the commands and their service  components.

We interviewed officials or, where appropriate, obtained documentation  from the organizations listed below:

Manpower and Personnel Directorate

Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate  Department of the Air Force

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and Personnel

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and  Comptroller, Army Budget Office

U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps  Unified Combatant Commands and Subordinate Unified Commands

Marine Corps Forces U.S. Strategic Command

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Forces  Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile  Defense

Air Force Global Strike Command

Air Force Space Command

U.S. Special Operations Command

U.S. Army Special Operations Command

Air Force Special Operations Command

Naval Special Warfare Command

U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command

Special Operations Command Central

Surface Deployment and Distribution Command  We conducted this performance audit from May 2013 to June 2014 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

section_title: Appendix II: Headquarters Locations of the Functional Combatant Commands, Their Subordinate Unified Commands, and Their Service Component Commands
paragraphs: This appendix contains information in noninteractive format presented in  figure 1.

section_title: Appendix III: Resources at U.S. Special Operations Command and Its Service Component Commands (Part 1 of 6)
paragraphs: U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND  (SOCOM)

Mission: Provides special operations forces to defend the United States and its interests, and synchronizes planning of and  operations against global terrorist networks.

Headquarters: MacDill Air Force Base, Florida  Responsibility: Daily planning for and execution of SOCOM’s mission is performed by the command headquarters, three  subordinate unified commands—Joint Special Operations Command, Special Operations Command–North, and Special Operations  Command–Joint Capabilities—and two direct reporting units—Special Operations Joint Task Force and a Regional Special  Operations Forces Coordination Center. SOCOM is also supported by four service component commands, which are the U.S. Army  Special Operations Command; the Naval Special Warfare Command; the Air Force Special Operations Command; and the Marine  Corps Special Operations Command.

Interactivity instructions:       Click on the combatant command name to see more information.

See appendix VII for the noninteractive, printer-friendly version.
subsections: section_title: SOCOM’s Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2013

section_title: SOCOM’s Number of Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2013
paragraphs: 5% Theater Special  Operations Command (23)

15% Joint Special  Operations  Command (71)

80% SOCOM  Headquarters  (373)

section_title: SOCOM’s Service Component Commands’ Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2013

section_title: SOCOM’s Service Component Commands’ Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Year 2013
paragraphs: 34% Air Force  Special  Operations  Command (710)

12% Air Force  Special  Operations  Command (29.4)

7% Marine Corps  Special Operations  Command (16.2) 14% Naval Special  Warfare  Command (33.2)

67% Army Special  Operations  Command (159.7)

14% Marine Corps Special  Operations Command (304)

section_title: Fiscal Year 2013 Authorized Military and Civilian Positions by Directorate, Subordinate Command, and Component Command U.S. Special Operations Command Headquarters Directorates
subsections: section_title: Subordinate Unified Command Total Direct Reporting Units

section_title: U.S. Special Operations Command Grand Total

section_title: Fiscal Year 2013 Authorized Military and Civilian Positions by Directorate, Subordinate Command, and Component Command Service Component Commands
subsections: section_title: Service Component Command Grand Total

section_title: Appendix IV: Resources at U.S. Strategic Command and Its Service Component Commands (Part 1 of 6)
paragraphs: U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND (STRATCOM)

Mission: STRATCOM conducts global operations in coordination with other combatant commands, military services, and  appropriate U.S. government agencies to deter and detect strategic attacks against the United States and its allies.

Headquarters: Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska Responsibility: Daily planning and execution for STRATCOM’s mission is performed by one subunified command—U.S. Cyber  Command—and seven component commands—Joint Functional Component Command-Global Strike; Joint Functional Component  Command-Space; Joint Functional Component Command-Integrated Missile Defense; Joint Functional Component  Command-Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; the STRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction,  the Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination, and the Joint Warfare Analysis Center. STRATCOM is also supported by four  service component commands, including Air Force Global Strike Command, Air Force Space Command, Army Space and Missile  Defense Command / U.S. Army Forces Strategic Command, and Marine Corps Forces U.S. Strategic Command.

Interactivity instructions:       Click on the combatant command name to see more information.

See appendix VII for the noninteractive, printer-friendly version.
subsections: section_title: STRATCOM’s Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2013

section_title: STRATCOM’s Number of Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2013
paragraphs: 29% Cyber  Command  (180.9)

44% STRATCOM  Headquarters (275.0)

24% Component  Commands (167.5)

section_title: STRATCOM’s Service Component Commands’ Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2013

section_title: STRATCOM’s Service Component Commands’ Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Year 2013
paragraphs: 28% Air Force  Global Strike  Command  (991)

22% Army Forces  Strategic  Command  (28.5)

1% Marine  Corps  Forces,  Strategic  Command  (0.45)

31% Air Force  Global Strike  Command  (40.6)

38% Air Force  Space  Command  (1,363)

47% Air Force Space  Command (60.1)

section_title: Fiscal Year 2013 Authorized Military and Civilian Positions by Directorate, Subordinate Command, and Component Command U.S. Strategic Command Headquarters Directorates
subsections: section_title: Headquarters Directorates Total Subunified Command

section_title: U.S. Strategic Command Grand Total

section_title: Fiscal Year 2013 Authorized Military and Civilian Positions by Directorate, Subordinate Command, and Component Command Service Component Commands
subsections: section_title: Service Component Command Grand Total

section_title: Appendix V: Resources at U.S. Transportation Command and Its Service Component Commands (Part 1 of 4)
paragraphs: U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND  (TRANSCOM)

Mission: TRANSCOM provides air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense (DOD) in time of peace and war,  with a primary focus on wartime readiness.

Headquarters: Scott Air Force Base, Illinois Responsibility: TRANSCOM provides air, land, and sea transportation for DOD and is the manager of the DOD Transportation  System, which relies on military and commercial resources to support DOD’s transportation needs. The command, among other  responsibilities, provides commercial air, land, and sea transportation; terminal management; aerial refueling to support the global  deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of U.S. forces; and is responsible for movement of DOD medical patients.   TRANSCOM has one subordinate command—the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command. TRANSCOM works with three component  commands to accomplish its joint mission: Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, and Surface Deployment and  Distribution Command.

Interactivity instructions:       Click on the combatant command name to see more information.

See appendix VII for the noninteractive, printer-friendly version.
subsections: section_title: TRANSCOM’s Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2013

section_title: TRANSCOM’s Number of Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2013
paragraphs: 27% Joint  Enabling  Capabilities  Command  (38.9)

73% TRANSCOM  Headquarters (106.3)

section_title: TRANSCOM’s Service Component Commands’ Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2013

section_title: TRANSCOM’s Service Component Commands’ Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Year 2013
paragraphs: 54% Air Mobility  Command (1,145)

36% Surface  Deployment  and  Distribution  Command (104.7)

39% Air Mobility  Command (112.0)

25% Military  Sealift  Command (72.1)

section_title: Fiscal Year 2013 Authorized Military and Civilian Positions by Directorate, Subordinate Command, and Component Command U.S. Transportation Command Headquarters Directorates
subsections: section_title: U.S. Transportation Command Grand Total Service Component Commands

section_title: Service Component Commands Grand Total

section_title: Appendix VII: Functional Combatant Command Organizational Structure Descriptions
paragraphs: This appendix contains information in noninteractive format presented in  the organizational charts in appendixes III, IV, and V.

section_title: Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Defense

section_title: Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact

section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  include Richard K. Geiger (Assistant Director), Tracy Barnes, Robert B.  Brown, Tobin J. McMurdie, Carol D. Petersen, Michael Silver, Amie  Steele, Erik Wilkins-McKee, and Kristy Williams.


Question-summary annotations: questions: question: Why did DOD initiate reductions to headquarters resources?
answer: In 2013, DOD directed reductions to management headquarters resources in an effort to streamline the department's management.
child_questions: question: What might negatively affect DOD's ability to cut costs in their headquarters operations?
answer: DOD's directed reductions to headquarters do not include all resources at the commands, which may affect DOD's ability to achieve significant savings in headquarters operations.

question: What was the outcome of GAO's report regarding these cost-saving measures?
answer: However, GAO found that the department did not have a clear or accurate accounting of the resources being devoted to management headquarters to use as a starting point to track reductions.
child_questions: question: In what ways did GAO find that DOD's data led to inaccurate conclusions?
answer: Officials noted that DOD relied on data self-reported by the commands, and GAO found that these data were potentially inconsistent and did not include the totality of headquarters resources. Specifically, GAO found that less than a quarter of the positions at the functional combatant commands are considered to be management headquarters even though many positions appear to be performing management headquarters functions such as planning, budgeting, and developing policies. As such, more than three quarters of the headquarters positions at the functional combatant commands are potentially excluded from DOD's directed reductions.
child_questions: question: What is DOD's response to this assessment of their faulty data measures?
answer: However, the department does not have any plans to reevaluate the baseline on which the reductions are based, in part because it does not have an alternative source for complete and reliable data.
child_questions: question: As such, what is GAO's recommendation regarding data collection?
answer: GAO has also concluded that restructuring efforts must be focused on clear goals and consolidation initiatives grounded in accurate and reliable data.
child_questions: question: What are the risks if DOD does not establish better data practices?
answer: Unless DOD reevaluates its decision to focus reductions to management headquarters and establishes a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point on which to base reductions, the department will be unable to track and reliably report its headquarters reductions and ultimately may not realize significant savings.

question: What are the federal requirements for DOD's streamlining process?
answer: Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 requires that DOD develop and submit a plan for streamlining management headquarters by June 2014.

questions: question: What is the nature of DOD's functional combatant commands?
answer: DOD operates three functional combatant commands, which provide special operations, strategic forces, and transportation.
child_questions: question: Why was GAO asked to review these commands?
answer: GAO was mandated to review personnel and resources of these commands in light of plans announced by DOD to reduce headquarters.
child_questions: question: What does GAO's report contain?
answer: This report (1) identifies the trends in resources devoted to the functional combatant commands and their service component commands and (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD's reductions to headquarters could result in cost savings.

questions: question: What are GAO's three recommendations to DOD regarding data collection practices?
answer: GAO recommends that DOD (1) reevaluate the decision to focus reductions on management headquarters to ensure meaningful savings, (2) set a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point as a baseline for the reductions, and (3) track reductions against the baselines in order to provide reliable accounting of savings and reporting to Congress.
child_questions: question: What was DOD's response to these recommendations?
answer: DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation, questioning, in part, the recommendation's scope, and concurred with the second and third recommendations.
child_questions: question: What is GAO's position regarding DOD's response to the first recommendation?
answer: GAO continues to believe the first recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report.