Federal Courthouses: Recommended Construction Projects Should Be Evaluated under New Capital- Planning Process
Released: 2013-04-17T00:00:00


Highlights: section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Rising costs and fiscal challenges have slowed the multibillion-dollar courthouse construction program of the judiciary and the General Services Administration (GSA). In 2006, the judiciary developed AMP to address increasing costs and incorporate best practices and has evaluated about 67 percent of its courthouses under the new system. As requested, GAO assessed changes introduced with AMP. GAO examined: (1) the extent to which the AMP process aligns with leading practices and provides information needed for informed decision making and (2) the extent to which courthouse projects recommended for funding in fiscal years 2014 to 2018 were assessed under the AMP process. GAO compared the judiciary's capitalplanning practices with leading practices, analyzed courthouseplanning documents, and interviewed officials from the judiciary and GSA. GAO visited three courthouses selected because they were highly ranked by the judiciary for replacement, although observations from these site visits cannot be generalized.

section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Asset Management Planning (AMP) process represents progress by the federal judiciary (judiciary) in better aligning its capital-planning process with leading capitalplanning practices, but its 5-year plan for fiscal years 2014 to 2018--the document the judiciary uses to request courthouse construction projects--lacks transparency and key information on how projects qualify for new construction, alternatives the judiciary considered, and their cost. For example, the plan lists costs for the next phase of the 12 recommended courthouse projects, which have several phases, but does not list previous funding or ongoing annual costs for the projects. As a result, the plan lists about $1 billion in costs for the 12 projects, but the projects would actually cost the federal government an estimated $3.2 billion over the next 20 years. Congress has appropriated a small share of the money needed for the projects, and most will need design changes before construction can begin. As a result, there is a risk that congressional funding decisions could be made without complete and accurate information. However, with this information, decision makers could weigh current-year budget decisions within the context of projects' expected future costs, spur discussion and debate about actions to address them, and put the judiciary's requests in context with other federal spending.

Ten of the 12 recommended projects were not evaluated under the AMP process. Judiciary officials said that they did not want to delay the current projects or force them to undergo a second capital-planning process after they had already been approved. Two courthouse projects from a previous 5-year plan that were assessed under AMP were removed from the list and are now ranked behind more than 100 other courthouse construction projects. Furthermore, 10 of the 12 recommended construction projects do not qualify for a new courthouse under the AMP criterion, which requires that new courthouses need two or more additional courtrooms. These conditions call into question the extent to which the projects remaining on the 5-year plan represent the judiciary's most urgent projects and whether proceeding with these projects represents the most fiscally responsible proposal. While 10 additional AMP evaluations would involve some additional costs, not conducting those evaluations could involve spending $3.2 billion over the next 20 years on courthouses that may not be the most urgent projects.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Since the early 1990’s, the federal judiciary (judiciary) and the General  Services Administration (GSA) have undertaken a multibillion-dollar  federal courthouse construction program. To date this program has  resulted in the completion of 78 new courthouses or annexes and 16  projects in various stages of development. However, rising costs and  other budget priorities have slowed the construction program. In addition,  we found in 2010 that recent federal courthouses had been constructed  larger than necessary because of poor planning, oversight, and inefficient  courtroom use. Specifically, 33 federal courthouses completed from  2000 to 2010 included 3.56 million square feet of extra space that cost an  estimated $835 million to construct and $51 million annually to operate  and maintain. We recommended that GSA should: (1) ensure that  courthouses are within their authorized size or notify congressional  committees; and that the judiciary should: (2) retain caseload projections  to improve the accuracy of its 10-year judge planning and (3) establish  and use courtroom-sharing policies based on scheduling and use data.  GSA and the judiciary agreed with the recommendations, but expressed  concerns with GAO’s methodology and key findings. GAO believes these  to be sound, as explained in the report. Our recommendations have not  yet been implemented.

In light of this program history and the federal government’s current fiscal  challenges, you asked us to review the judiciary’s current plans for new  courthouse construction. We examined (1) the extent to which the  judiciary’s capital-planning process aligns with leading practices and  provides information needed for informed decision making and (2) the  extent to which courthouse projects recommended for funding in fiscal  years 2014 to 2018 were assessed under the judiciary’s current capital- planning process.

To determine the extent to which the judiciary’s capital-planning process  aligns with leading practices and provides the information needed for  informed decision making, we interviewed judiciary and GSA officials  about and analyzed documentation on the judiciary’s capital-planning  process. We then compared judiciary’s capital-planning practices with  leading capital-planning practices from the Office of Management and  Budget’s (OMB) Capital Programming Guide and GAO’s Executive  Guide.construction projects and information about other federal buildings  occupied by the judiciary. We reviewed GSA data on costs of construction  and tenant improvements at two courthouse projects, one completed in  2010 and one completed in 2011. We reviewed GSA’s and the judiciary’s  estimated construction costs for proposed courthouse projects. We  assessed the judiciary and GSA data for completeness and determined  that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

We reviewed documentation on the status of courthouse  To determine the extent to which the current courthouse projects  recommended for funding in fiscal years 2014 to 2018 were assessed  under the judiciary’s current capital-planning process, we reviewed the  judiciary’s documents outlining the projects recommended for funding for  fiscal years 2008 through 2018. We also examined judiciary documents  regarding strategic planning, capital-planning, existing courthouse  evaluations, ratings of existing courthouse deficiencies, numbers of  existing and projected judgeships, and policies on courtroom-sharing by  judges. We reviewed congressional authorizations and funding  appropriations for courthouse projects and GSA information on federal  buildings, existing and planned federal courthouses, courthouse design,  and federal historic properties. We interviewed judiciary and GSA officials  in Washington, D.C., and visited federal courthouses in Anniston,  Alabama, and Macon and Savannah, Georgia. We selected these sites  because the courthouses were highly ranked by the judiciary for  replacement. While our site-visit observations cannot be generalized to all  federal courthouses, they provide insights into the physical conditions at  some historic courthouses.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2012 to April 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains additional  information on our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The U.S. district courts are the trial courts of the federal court system.  There are 94 federal judicial districts—at least one for each state, the  District of Columbia, and four U.S. territories—organized into 12 regional  circuits. Each circuit has a court of appeals whose jurisdiction includes  appeals from the district and bankruptcy courts located within the circuit,  as well as appeals from decisions of federal administrative agencies.The Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC) within the  judicial branch carries out a wide range of services for the federal  judiciary, including capital-planning. The Judicial Conference of the  United States (Judicial Conference) supervises the Director of the  AOUSC and is the principal policy-making body for the federal judiciary  and recommends national policies and legislation on all aspects of federal  judicial administration.

Federal courthouses can house a variety of appellate, district, senior  district, magistrate, or bankruptcy judges as well as other court and non- court-related tenants. Prior to 2008, the judiciary did not require judges to  share courtrooms, except in situations where the courthouse was out of  space. courtroom-sharing (1) between senior district judges and (2) between  magistrate judges. In 2011, the Judicial Conference adopted a courtroom- sharing policy for bankruptcy judges. These policies apply to new  courthouse projects and existing courthouses when there is a new space  need that cannot otherwise be accommodated. (See app. II for more  information on judiciary’s courtroom-sharing policies.) The judiciary has  also been studying the feasibility of an appropriate sharing policy for  district judges in courthouses with more than 10 district judges, but has  not yet finalized a policy and could not tell us when or if it expected to do  so. Our 2010 report examined judiciary data on courtroom usage and  found that there are additional opportunities for significant cost savings  through courtroom-sharing, particularly for district judges.

Appellate judges, however, have always shared courtrooms because they sit in panels of  three or more. operational deficiencies in the existing courthouse, and (4) the current  number of judges who do not have a permanent courtroom and chambers  in the existing courthouse, plus the projected number of judges over the  10-year planning period who will not have a courtroom and chambers.  From fiscal years 2005 to 2006, as a cost containment initiative, the  judiciary imposed a moratorium on new courthouse construction while it  reevaluated its capital-planning process.

In 2008, the judiciary began using a new capital-planning process, called  the Asset Management Planning (AMP) process, to assess, identify, and  rank its space needs. According to judiciary officials, the AMP process  addresses concerns about growing costs and incorporates best practices  related to capital-planning. The AMP process includes several steps  beginning with the completion of a district-wide Long Range Facilities  Plan (LFRP). Collectively, the AMP process: documents courthouse space conditions and district space needs develops housing strategies that can include construction of a new  based, in part, on the judiciary’s AMP process rules and building  standards as specified in the U.S. Courts Design Guide;  identifies space needs on a building-specific and citywide basis; and   courthouse or annex and renovation projects.

The AMP process results in an urgency score for construction or  renovation based primarily on the current and future need for courtrooms  and chambers and the condition assessment of the existing building (see  app. III). The AMP process establishes criteria for qualifying for new  courthouse construction, such as requiring that an existing courthouse  have a chamber for each judge and needing two or more additional  courtrooms. Judiciary officials told us that unlike the previous capital- planning process, a new courthouse could no longer be justified as part of  the AMP process based solely on security or operational deficiencies.  The judiciary has chosen to improve security within existing courthouse  rather than replace them with new courthouses. After the Judicial  Conference identifies courthouse projects, GSA conducts feasibility  studies to assess alternatives for meeting the judiciary’s space needs and  recommends a preferred alternative. The judiciary adopts the GSA  recommended alternative, which may differ from the alternative  recommended in the AMP process. For example, a project may not  qualify for new courthouse construction under the AMP process, but GSA  may determine through its feasibility study that new construction is the  most cost-efficient, viable solution. See figure 1 for the judiciary’s current  process for selecting and approving new courthouse construction  projects.

Part of the judiciary’s capital-planning—both the previous and current  processes—has been to periodically communicate its facility decisions for  construction projects via a document known as the Five Year Courthouse  Project Plan (5-year plan). The 5-year plan is a one-page document that  lists proposed projects by fiscal year and the estimated costs for various  project phases (site acquisition, design, or construction) as approved by  the Judicial Conference. The judiciary uses the plan to communicate its  most urgent projects to Congress and other decision makers. Previously,  we found that judiciary’s 5-year plans did not reflect the most urgently  needed projects and lacked key information about the projects selected— such as a justification for the project’s priority level.

GSA reviews its courthouse studies with the judiciary and forwards  approved projects for new courthouses to the Office of Management and  Budget (OMB) for review. If approved by OMB, GSA then submits  requests to congressional authorizing committees for new courthouse  projects in the form of detailed descriptions, or prospectuses, authorizing acquisition of a building site, building design, and  construction. Following congressional authorization and the appropriation  of funds for the projects, GSA manages the site, design, and construction  phases. After occupancy, GSA charges federal tenants, such as the  judiciary, rent for the space they occupy and for their respective share of  common areas, including mechanical spaces. In fiscal year 2012, the  judiciary’s rent payments to GSA totaled over $1 billion for approximately  42.4 million square feet of space in 779 buildings that include 446 federal  courthouses.

Before Congress makes an appropriation for a proposed project, GSA submits detailed  project descriptions called prospectuses to the Senate Committee on Environment and  Public Works and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, for  authorization by these committees when the proposed construction, alteration, or  acquisition of a building to be used as a public building exceeds a specified dollar  threshold. For purposes of this report, we refer to these committees as “authorizing  committees” when discussing the submission of the prospectuses and providing additional  information relating to prospectuses to these committees. Furthermore, for purposes of  this report, we refer to approval of these projects by these committees as “congressional  authorization.” See 40 U.S.C. § 3307. evaluating all of the courthouses until October 2015 and would take  another 18 to 24 months to complete the LRFPs, dependent upon the  availability of funding.

section_title: AMP Process Partially Aligns with Several Leading Practices but Does Not Provide Needed Information to Decision Makers
subsections: section_title: AMP Process Partially Aligns with Several Leading Practices in Capital Planning
paragraphs: The AMP process, which the judiciary has applied to about 67 percent of  its courthouses, represents progress by the judiciary in aligning its capital- planning process with leading capital-planning practices, but the  document the judiciary uses to request courthouse construction projects  lacks transparency and key information. We have previously reported that  prudent capital-planning can help agencies maximize limited resources  and keep capital acquisitions on budget, on schedule, and aligned with  mission needs and goals. Figure 2 summarizes leading capital-planning  practices and our assessment of the extent to which the AMP process  aligns with those practices. For our analysis of judiciary’s planning  practices, we focused on the judiciary’s implementation of the concepts  that underlie the planning phase of OMB and GAO guidance, including  linking capital-planning to an agency’s strategic goals and objectives and  developing a long-term capital investment plan.

Several aspects of the AMP process partially align with leading capital- planning practices, but none fully align and the 5-year plan only aligns to  a limited extent—which we discuss further in this report. Here are some  examples to illustrate partial alignment:

Strategic Linkage. The judiciary’s strategic plan links to its  management of capital assets, but the AMP process does not link to  the strategic plan. For example, the AMP process documents we  reviewed did not explain how the process helps achieve the goals and  objectives in the judiciary’s current strategic plan, which are  organized around seven issues: providing justice; the effective and  efficient management of public resources; the judiciary workforce of  the future; harnessing technology’s potential; enhancing access to the  judicial process; the judiciary’s relationships with the other branches  of government; and enhancing public understanding, trust, and  confidence. However, after our review, a judiciary official told us that  the Long Range Facility Plans (LRFP) currently under development  would include a reference to the strategic plan.

Needs Assessment and Gap Identification. The AMP process has  improved judiciary’s needs assessment and gap analysis by  establishing a comprehensive, nationwide 328-factor study for every  courthouse, whereas the previous process was not as comprehensive  and only assessed courthouses when requested by a local judicial  district. The AMP process evaluates the degree to which existing  facilities support court operations by applying space functionality  standards, security, and building condition factors. However, cost  estimates supporting the judiciary’s needs are incomplete, as  discussed later in this report.

Alternatives Evaluation. The AMP process establishes a review and  approval framework criteria for justifying new construction, whereas  none existed in the previous process. The AMP process evaluates  some alternatives, such as renovating existing courthouses to meet  needs, but it is unclear if the judiciary considered other options, such  as courtroom-sharing in the existing courthouse. Assessing a wide- range of alternatives would help the judiciary ensure that it evaluated  other, less costly, approaches to bridging the performance gap before  recommending new construction.

Review and Approval Framework with Established Criteria for  Selecting Capital Investments. The AMP process includes a review  and approval framework with criteria, such as courthouses needing  two or more courtrooms to qualify for a new courthouse project.  However, courtroom deficits are not apparent in most projects  reported in the 5-year plan.

Long-Term Capital Investment Plan. Judiciary officials with whom  we spoke agreed that the 5-year plan is not a long-term capital  investment plan, but it is what the judiciary uses to document its  request for new courthouse construction to decision makers. The one- page 5-year plan document does not reflect the depth of the AMP  process, describe all other projects that the judiciary considered, or  indicate how the projects chosen will help fulfill the judiciary’s mission,  goals, and objectives.

Two courthouse projects illustrate how the AMP process has changed the  way the judiciary evaluates its need for new courthouses. Specifically, two  projects listed on a previous 5-year plan (covering fiscal years 2012  through 2016) were re-evaluated under AMP—San Jose, California, and  Greenbelt, Maryland. Both had ranked among the top 15 most urgent  projects nationwide under the previous capital-planning process, and as  such, the judiciary prioritized them for new construction in 2010. However,  after the judiciary evaluated the San Jose and Greenbelt projects under  the AMP process, their nationwide rankings fell to 117 and 139,  respectively. Judiciary officials explained that this drop was largely  because of the completion of additional AMP assessments, coupled with  the reduced space needs because of courtroom-sharing. Following the  change in rankings, GSA and the judiciary determined that judiciary’s  needs could alternatively be addressed through repair and alteration  projects that reconfigure existing space. The judiciary added that its  decision saved taxpayer money. As a result, at the request of the  judiciary, the Judicial Conference of the United States removed the two  projects from the 5-year plan.

section_title: Current 5-Year Plan Lacks Transparency, and $1- Billion Cost Estimate Is Not Comprehensive
paragraphs: The judiciary’s current 5-year plan—the end product of the judiciary’s  capital-planning process—does not align with leading practices for a long- term capital investment plan in a number of ways. The plan does not  provide decision makers with detailed information about proposed  construction projects or how they were selected. The one-page document  lists each project by city name, year, and dollar estimate for the next  phase of the project’s development as shown in figure 3. The one-page  plan also provides the project’s urgency score from the judiciary’s capital- planning process. However, the document does not specify whether the  scores were developed under the old process or the AMP process. Unlike  a long-term capital investment plan—usually the end product under  leading capital-planning practices—the 5-year plan lacks complete cost  and funding information, linkage to the judiciary’s strategic plan, and  information on why projects were selected. Specifically, while  courthouses provide facilities for the judiciary to accomplish goals set out  in its strategic plan, such as enhancing access to the judicial process, the  5-year plan contains no mention of the strategic plan. In addition, the 5- year plan does not include a discussion of the AMP process and criteria;  a schedule of when the AMP process will be completed; and details on  the alternatives considered during the process, such as whether the  judiciary’s courtroom-sharing policy was applied prior to requesting a new  courthouse project.

The 5-year plan is not transparent and does not provide key funding  information, such as total estimated project costs. Specifically, it lists  about $1.1 billion in estimated costs, which are the funds needed for that  specific 5-year period. However, these costs only include part of the  project phases. The estimated cost of all project phases—site acquisition,  building design, and construction—comes to $1.6 billion in 2013 dollars.  In addition, while no longer included in the 5-year plan, the judiciary  estimated that it would need to pay GSA $87 million annually in rent, or  $1.6 billion over the next 20 years, to occupy these courthouses if  constructed. Table 1 describes our analysis of judiciary’s data for the  estimated cost of all phases and projected rent costs that total almost  $3.2 billion. However, even though the $3.2-billion estimate provides a  more complete presentation of the project costs, that estimate could  change based on GSA’s redesign of projects because of changes in the  judiciary’s needs. In addition, the $3.2-billion estimate does not include  life-cycle costs, such as furniture and GSA disposal of existing facilities,  which would also have to be included for the cost estimate to be  comprehensive. GAO and OMB have established that estimates of  life-cycle costs are necessary for accurate capital-planning.

In addition, the 5-year plan does not provide the amount of funding  already provided for all of the projects. Since fiscal year 1995, Congress  has appropriated about $177 million of the estimated $1.6 billion needed  for 10 of these projects’ phases, mostly for site acquisitions and designs.  None of the projects has begun construction, and only the Mobile project  has received any construction funding (see fig. 4).

We found that the 5-year plan does not align with the leading practice of  considering the risks involved in acquiring new courthouses. Specifically,  the plan does not inform stakeholders that 11 of the 12 projects require  further design before construction can begin. According to GSA officials,  the agency has not received funding for the design of two projects  (Chattanooga and Des Moines). Of the remaining 10 projects that have  design funding, 1 is in the design process and 9 are on hold. According to  GSA officials, some of the projects on hold must be re-designed to  accommodate policy and other requirements relating to, for example,  changes such as courtroom-sharing and energy management.example, the design of the Savannah courthouse project was completed  in 1998 and now needs extensive re-design to accommodate changes  mandated by policy shifts, including improved security and a reduction in  the number of courtrooms needed. GSA officials said that only the design  of the Nashville project—though oversized by one floor—is likely to  remain largely intact because it would be more cost-effective to rent the  additional space to other tenants than to completely re-design the project.

In February 2012, judiciary submitted its 5-year plan to Congress and  other decision makers. As a result, there is a risk that funding decisions  could be made without complete and accurate information. Congress  would benefit from having information based upon a long-term capital  investment plan for several reasons. Specifically, transparency about  future priorities could allow decision makers to weigh current-year budget  decisions within the context of projects’ expected future costs. In the case  of the judiciary, which has identified a number of future courthouse  projects estimated to cost several billion dollars, full transparency  regarding these future priorities may spur discussion and debate about  actions Congress can take to address them. Additionally, transparency  regarding future capital costs would put the judiciary’s priorities in context  with federal spending. There is widespread agreement that the federal  government faces formidable near- and long-term fiscal challenges. GAO  has long stated that more transparent information and better incentives  for budget decisions, involving both existing and proposed programs,  could facilitate consideration of competing demands and help put U.S.  finances on a more sustainable footing.

section_title: Most Courthouse Projects Were Not Evaluated under AMP Process and Do Not Meet AMP Criterion for New Construction
subsections: section_title: Judiciary Has Not Evaluated Most 5-Year Plan Projects under the AMP Process
paragraphs: The judiciary has not applied the AMP process to 10 of the 12  construction projects on the current 5-year plan dated September 2012.  These 10 projects were evaluated under the judiciary’s prior capital- planning process and approved based on their urgency levels as  determined under that process. Judiciary officials said that they did not  want to delay the projects or force them to undergo a second capital- planning process review because the judiciary had already approved the  projects. Only 2 projects on the current 5-year plan (2014 to 2018) were  assessed under the AMP process—Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Des  Moines, Iowa. Judiciary officials said these projects were added to the 5- year plan in September 2010 because they had the highest priority  rankings of the projects that had undergone an AMP review at that time.  Judiciary officials explained that these projects also had GSA feasibility  studies that recommended new construction. However, the Chattanooga  and Des Moines projects have not retained their top rankings as the  judiciary has continued to apply the AMP process to additional  courthouses. Specifically, judiciary documents show that more than a  dozen other projects not included on the 5-year plan now rank above the  Chattanooga and Des Moines projects, six of which recommend new  construction. For example, we visited the federal courthouse in Macon,  Georgia, which now ranks higher than either the Chattanooga or Des  Moines projects. The Macon courthouse suffers from numerous  operational and security issues typical of historic courthouses, but it is not  included on the 5-year plan. As we previously noted, the judiciary also  applied the AMP process to 2 other projects that were included on an  older 5-year plan (2012 to 2016)—San Jose and Greenbelt—and  subsequently removed them after the projects received substantially  lower priority rankings, as shown in appendix IV.

The change in the rankings of the 4 projects calls into question the extent  to which the projects remaining on the 5-year plan represent the  judiciary’s most urgent projects and whether proceeding with these  projects while hundreds of AMP reviews remain to be done represents  the most fiscally responsible path. We recognize that conducting AMP  reviews of the 10 projects on the 5-year plan would involve additional  costs; however, not conducting AMP reviews on these projects could  involve spending billions of dollars over the next 20 years on courthouses  that may not be the most urgent projects. While the AMP process only  partially aligns with leading practices in capital-planning, it is a significant  improvement over the capital-planning process the judiciary used to  choose 10 of the 12 projects on the 5-year plan. Assessing the 10  projects with the AMP process could help ensure that projects on the 5- year plan do, in fact, represent the judiciary’s most urgent projects.

section_title: Most Projects Do Not Qualify for a New Courthouse under the AMP Courtroom Criterion
paragraphs: found that 5 of the projects on the list currently need additional  courtrooms, and of those, only the Charlotte and Greenville projects  would qualify under the AMP criterion because both need three additional  courtrooms (see table 2). We did not assess if the shortage of courtrooms  alone is the most appropriate criterion for requesting new construction  from GSA, but the establishment of a clear criterion adds an element of  transparency that was lacking in the judiciary’s previous capital-planning  process.

We visited two courthouses on the current 5-year plan that were selected  as new construction projects under the prior capital-planning process— Savannah and Anniston built in 1899 and 1906, respectively. These  historic courthouses qualified for new construction under the previous  process because of space needs and security and operational  deficiencies because of their age, condition and building configuration.  According to judiciary and GSA officials, neither courthouse meets Design  Guide standards for (1) the secure circulation of prisoners, the public, and  courthouse staff and (2) the adjacency of courtrooms and judge’s  chambers. However, neither of these courthouses would qualify for new  construction under the AMP criterion as both have a sufficient number of  existing courtrooms for all the judges. Specifically, the Savannah and  Anniston courthouses each have enough courtrooms for all assigned  judges to have exclusive access to their own courtroom. Savannah  currently houses one district judge, one senior district judge, one  magistrate judge, and one bankruptcy judge. Figure 5 shows two  courtrooms in the Anniston courthouse that currently house one senior  district judge and one bankruptcy judge.

As discussed, the judiciary’s courtroom-sharing policies for senior district,  magistrate, and bankruptcy judges allow it to reduce the scope of its  courthouse projects and contributed to the cancelation of other  courthouse projects. The judiciary has also been studying a courtroom- sharing policy for district judges but has not yet finalized a policy and  could not provide a date when and if it planned to do so. Our 2010 report  based on judiciary data on courtroom scheduling and use showed that  judges of all kinds, including district judges, could share courtrooms  without delaying any scheduled events and recommended that the  judiciary expand courtroom-sharing to more fully reflect the actual  scheduling and use of district courtrooms. Specifically, judiciary data  showed that three district judges could share two courtrooms or a district  judge and a senior district judge could share one courtroom. If district  judges shared courtrooms in this way, the judiciary would have a  sufficient number of courtrooms in all of the 12 proposed projects in the 5- year plan, based on the AMP criterion.

In responding to our recommendation, the judiciary stated that our 2010  report oversimplified the complex task of courtroom-sharing by assuming  that judicial proceedings were more certain and predicable than they are.  We addressed the uncertainty of courtroom scheduling by (1) accounting  for unused scheduled time as if the courtroom were actually used and (2)  providing additional unscheduled time in courtrooms. Since potential  courtroom-sharing among district judges could reduce the need for  additional courtroom space and the AMP criterion for qualifying for new  courthouse construction, it is important for the judiciary to finalize its  position and policy on courtroom-sharing, as we previously  recommended.

section_title: Conclusion
paragraphs: With the development and implementation of the AMP process, the  judiciary’s capital-planning efforts partially align with several leading  practices. The AMP process has the potential to provide a wealth of  information on the judiciary’s existing facilities and assess and rank the  need for new construction based on measurable criteria. However, the 5- year plan submitted for approval of several billion-dollars worth of  projects—a one-page list of projects with limited and incomplete  information—does not support the judiciary’s request for courthouse  construction projects. For example, the AMP process introduces a  criterion for when new construction is warranted—when two or more  courtrooms are needed—but the 5-year plan does not show how this  criterion applies to the recommended projects. Furthermore, the 5-year  plan has underestimated total costs of these projects by about $2 billion  because it does not include all project phases and because the judiciary  no longer includes its rent costs on the 5-year plan. Additionally,  construction has not begun on any of the 12 courthouse projects on the 5- year plan and most need to be redesigned to meet current standards.  Given the fiscal environment, the judiciary and the Congress would  benefit from more detailed information about courthouse projects and  their estimated costs than judiciary currently provides. Such information  would enable judiciary and Congress to better evaluate the full range of  real property priorities over the next few years and, should fiscal  constraints so dictate, identify which should take precedence over the  others. In short, greater transparency would allow for more informed  decision making among competing priorities.

Current fiscal challenges also require that the federal government focus  on essential projects. While the judiciary has made significant strides in  improving its capital-planning process, most of the 12 projects listed on  the 5-year plan are products of its former process. It is possible that some  of the 12 projects do not reflect the most urgent capital investment needs  of the judiciary under its current criteria. Two projects on a previous 5- year plan that were assessed under the AMP process were removed from  the list and now rank well down on the judiciary’s list of priorities, but the  judiciary has not applied the AMP process to 10 courthouses on the  current 5-year plan dated September 2012. Furthermore, 10 of the 12  projects on the current 5-year plan do not require a sufficient number of  courtrooms to qualify for new construction under the AMP courtroom  criterion. In addition, there is no evidence that the judiciary considered  how it could meet the need for courtrooms without new construction if  district judges shared courtrooms. Although there would be some  incremental costs involved with an additional 10 AMP reviews, those  costs appear justified given the billions involved in moving forward with  the construction of those 10 courthouses. Similar to the 2-year  moratorium the judiciary placed on courthouse construction while it  developed the AMP process, it is not too late to apply the AMP process to  the 5-year plan projects and possibly save taxpayers from funding  construction of projects that might not represent the judiciary’s highest  priorities under current criteria. It is critical that the judiciary accurately  determine its most urgent projects because of the taxpayer cost and the  years of work involved in designing and constructing new courthouses.

section_title: Recommendations
paragraphs: To further improve the judiciary’s capital-planning process, enhance  transparency of that process, and allow for more informed decision  making related to the federal judiciary’s real property priorities, we  recommend that the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S.  Courts, on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States, take the  following two actions:  1.  Better align the AMP process with leading practices for capital- planning. This should include linking the AMP process to the  judiciary’s strategic plan and developing and sharing with decision  makers a long-term capital investment plan. In the meantime, future 5- year plans should provide comprehensive information on new  courthouse projects, including:  a)  a summary of why each project qualifies for new construction and  is more urgent than other projects, including information about  how the AMP process and other judiciary criteria for new  courthouse construction were applied to the project;  b)  complete cost estimates of each project; and  c)  the alternatives to a new project that were considered, including  courtroom-sharing, and why alternatives were deemed insufficient.  2.  Impose a moratorium on projects on the current 5-year plan until AMP  evaluations are completed for them and then request feasibility  studies for courthouse projects with the highest urgency scores that  qualify for new construction under the AMP process.

section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided copies of a draft of this report to GSA and AOUSC for  review and comment. GSA and AOUSC provided technical comments  that we incorporated as appropriate. Additionally, AOUSC provided  written comments in which it agreed with our recommendation to link the  AMP process to the judiciary’s strategic plan. However, AOUSC raised a  number of concerns that the subpoints related to our first  recommendation on improving capital planning would duplicate other  judiciary or GSA documents. Furthermore, AOUSC disagreed with our  recommendation to place a moratorium on the projects in the 5-year plan  until it could perform AMP evaluations of those projects because it would  take years and not change the result. We continue to believe that our  recommendation is sound because the projects included on the 5-year  plan were evaluated under the judiciary’s previous capital planning  process and evidence suggested they no longer represent the judiciary’s  highest priorities. Specifically, two projects on a previous 5-year plan that  were assessed under the AMP process were removed from the list and  now rank well down the judiciary’s list of priorities. In addition, 10 of the  12 projects on the current 5-year plan do not qualify for new construction  under the AMP process. In response to AOUSC’s comments, we made  some technical clarifications where noted, none of which materially  affected our findings, conclusions, or recommendations. AOUSC’s  complete comments are contained in appendix V, along with our  response to specific issues raised.

In commenting on a draft of our report, AOUSC said it would take steps to  address our first recommendation to link the AMP process to the  judiciary’s strategic plan, but cited concerns about our presentation of  information, accuracy of data, and the subpoints of the first  recommendation. Specifically, AOUSC disputed our characterization of  the judiciary’s role in the capital-planning process for new courthouses  and the information provided to Congress to justify new courthouses.  According to AOUSC, Congress receives extensive, detailed information  on new courthouse projects from GSA, and our recommendation for the  judiciary to provide more comprehensive information on courthouse  projects in 5-year plans would duplicate the GSA’s work. AOUSC also  disputed our presentation of the AMP process, stating that GAO did not  consider all documents when making our conclusions. AOUSC disagreed  with our recommendation for a moratorium on all projects currently on the  5-year plan because completing AMP evaluations for those projects  would unnecessarily delay the projects and exacerbate existing security  and structural issues with the existing courthouses. In AOUSC’s view,  AMP evaluations for these courthouses would take years and not alter the  justification for new construction projects. AOUSC further disputed the  data we used to support our conclusions about the projects on the 5-year  plan and our explanation of the data’s source. AOUSC also questioned  our characterization of the judiciary’s actions in response to  recommendations in a prior GAO report.

We believe our findings, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are  well supported. GAO adheres to generally accepted government auditing  standards, which ensure the accuracy and relevance of the facts within  this report. These standards include a layered approach to fact validation  that includes supervisory review of all work papers, independent  verification of the facts within the report, and the judiciary’s review of the  facts prior to our release of the draft report for agency comment. To the  extent that the judiciary is questioning any facts, the judiciary had multiple  opportunities provide supporting documentation to substantiate its view.  We believe that our description of the roles and responsibilities of the  judiciary and the GSA in the capital-planning process for new  courthouses is correct and appropriate. In reaching our conclusions about  the information provided to Congress, we relied on documents we  received from the judiciary and GSA. We continue to believe that by  implementing our recommendation about providing additional information  to Congress, the judiciary would improve the completeness and  transparency of the information that Congress needs to justify and  authorize funding of new courthouse projects. We will review AOUSC’s  steps, once finalized, to address our recommendation that the AMP  process be linked to the judiciary’s strategic plan. We continue to believe  that any steps that AOUSC takes should be aligned with leading  practices, including presentation of total project cost estimates and  alternatives considered, such as greater courtroom sharing in existing  courthouses.

With regard to our recommended moratorium on projects on the current  5-year plan, we note that the AMP process represents progress by the  judiciary in better aligning its capital-planning process with leading  practices. Consequently, we believe that it would be worthwhile to use  this improved process to ensure that all courthouse construction  proposals remain the judiciary’s top priorities and qualify for new  construction under the AMP process. The San Jose and Greenbelt  projects were approved as among the highest priorities for new  construction under the old process but, after being evaluated under the  AMP process, now rank far lower on the judiciary’s list of priorities—117th  and 139th, respectively. We also noted that regardless of whether a  project is on the 5-year plan, GSA is responsible for ensuring that  courthouses are adequately maintained. We relied on data provided by  the judiciary and the GSA to support our analysis of whether the projects  on the 5-year plan would qualify under the AMP process, and stand by  our conclusions. We used the most current and complete data provided  by the judiciary to evaluate the cost of these projects. We will review  information provided by the judiciary and determine whether to close the  recommendation from our 2010 report at the appropriate time. In  response to AOUSC’s comments, we clarified the report and added detail  to our methodology in appendix I as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the  appropriate congressional committees, Director of the Administrative  Office of the U.S. Courts, the Administrator of GSA and other interested  parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s  website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions on this report, please contact me  at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. Contact information and key contributors to the report  are listed in appendix VI.

section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: This report addresses the following objectives:

To what extent does the judiciary’s capital-planning process align with  leading practices and provide the information needed for informed  decision making?

To what extent were the courthouse projects recommended for  funding in fiscal years 2014 to 2018 assessed under the judiciary’s  current capital-planning process?

To evaluate the judiciary’s capital-planning process, we collected  information on leading capital-planning practices from the Office of  Management and Budget’s (OMB) Capital Programming Guide and  GAO’s Executive Guide and compared this information with the AMP  process contained in the judiciary’s Long Range Facility Plans, Facility  Benefit Assessments, Citywide Benefit Assessments, Urgency  Evaluations, 5-year plans and Strategic Plan. We did not review the  appropriateness of criteria used by judiciary in its AMP process. We  reviewed documentation on the status of courthouse construction projects  and information about other federal buildings occupied by the judiciary.  We reviewed GSA data on actual costs of construction and tenant  improvements at two courthouse projects (Las Cruces, NM and Ft.  Pierce, FL) one completed in 2010 and one completed in 2011; and GSA  and judiciary estimated costs of construction for the courthouse projects  on the most recent 5-year plan, covering fiscal years 2014 to 2018. To  determine if life-cycle cost estimates were provided in the 5-year plan, we  assessed the judiciary data against GAO’s Cost Estimating and  Assessment Guide. To determine the current dollar value of the  judiciary’s estimate of courthouse projects’ rents, we calculated the  present value of the estimated project cost based upon averages of  monthly indexes from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor  Statistics, and rent based upon 20 year OMB published discount rate for  analyses. In addition, we interviewed judiciary officials on the AMP  process and its alignment with leading capital-planning practices. To  analyze judiciary’s capital-planning process, we reviewed our previous  reports on capital-planning across the federal government, including the  efforts by the judiciary and the Department of Veterans Affairscommunicate its urgent housing needs to Congress.

To assess recent courthouse projects recommended for funding under  the judiciary’s current capital-planning process, we reviewed the  judiciary’s documents detailing the projects recommended for funding for  fiscal years 2009 through 2018, called 5-year plans, and other documents  on: congressional authorizations and funding appropriations for  courthouse projects; judiciary information on courts and courthouses; and  GSA information on federal buildings, existing and planned federal  courthouses, courthouse design, and federal historic property. We  interviewed judiciary and GSA officials in Washington, D.C., and federal  courthouses we selected in Anniston, AL; Macon, GA; and Savannah,  GA. To observe existing courthouses, we selected Anniston and  Savannah because they were evaluated under judiciary’s old capital- planning process and are on the most recent 5-year plan, covering fiscal  years 2014 to 2018. We selected Macon because it was highly ranked  under the judiciary’s new capital-planning process and is in close  proximity to Anniston and Savannah. While our observations cannot be  generalized to all federal courthouses, they provide keen insights into  physical conditions at old historic courthouses. We reviewed  documentation provided by the judiciary on strategic planning, capital- planning, existing courthouse evaluations, the rating and ranking of  existing courthouse deficiencies, existing and future judgeships, and  courtroom-sharing by judges. To determine the extent that courthouse  projects on the 5-year plan reflect future judges needed and courtroom- sharing, we compared the judiciary’s planned occupancy information to  the judiciary’s own guidance, our previous work on judiciary’s courtroom- sharing, and a recently proposed bill from the 112th Congress that would  have required GSA to design courthouses with more courtroom-sharing.

We determined the number of courtrooms in the existing courthouses and  compared them to the number of courtrooms needed in the new  courthouses using the judiciary’s courtroom-sharing policy. We also  applied judiciary’s courtroom-sharing policy for new courthouses to  existing courthouses. We reviewed documentation provided by GSA on  the status of courthouse construction; the status of courthouse projects  on the two most recent 5-year plans; and federal buildings and  courthouses occupied by the judiciary. We reviewed the judiciary’s and  GSA’s data for completeness and determined that the data were  sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2012 to April 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

section_title: Appendix II: Judiciary’s Courtroom-Sharing Policy for New Construction
subsections: section_title: Senior District Judges
paragraphs: In court facilities with one or two Bankruptcy Judges, one courtroom will be provided for each  Bankruptcy Judge. In court facilities with three or more bankruptcy judges, one courtroom will be  provided for every two bankruptcy judges, rounding down when there is an odd number of judges. In  addition, one courtroom will be provided for emergency matters, such as Chapter 11 first-day  hearings.

section_title: Appendix III: Judiciary’s Asset-Management Planning Process Urgency-Evaluation Matrix for New Construction Projects
paragraphs: Categories (weight)  Description  Current additional  courtrooms needed  (15%)

Courtrooms needed today. Data separated by judge type and weights assigned (district  judges 100%, senior district judges 75%, magistrate judges 50% or bankruptcy judges  50%). Courtroom-sharing per Judicial Conference policy.

Future additional  courtrooms needed  (5%)

Courtrooms needed within 15 years. Data separated by judge type and weights assigned  (district judges 100%, senior district judges 75%, magistrate judges 50% or bankruptcy  judges 50%). Courtroom-sharing per Judicial Conference policy.

Current additional  chambers needed  (22.5%)

Chambers needed today. Data separated by judge type and weights assigned (district  judges 100%, senior district judges 75%, magistrate judges 50% or bankruptcy judges  50%). Courtroom-sharing per Judicial Conference policy.

Future additional  chambers needed  (7.5%)

Chambers needed within 15 years. Data separated by judge type and weights assigned  (district judges 100%, senior district judges 75%, magistrate judges 50% or bankruptcy  judges 50%). Courtroom-sharing per Judicial Conference policy.

Citywide benefit  assessment result  (40%)

In cities where courtrooms and chambers are located in multiple facilities, a citywide  benefit assessment is produced. This incorporates the individual Facility Benefit  Assessment for each facility; the type, a mix of facility ownership; and fragmentation of  the court operations on a citywide basis. In cities with a single courthouse, the Facility  Benefit Assessment is the same as the citywide assessment and covers 328 items in four  main categories: building conditions (30%); space functionality (30%); security (25%);  and space standards (15%).

Civil filings historic  (3%)

Average annual change in the number of civil filings (1997-2011).

Civil filings projected  (1%)

Projected average annual change in the number of civil filings (2012-2026).

Criminal defendants  historic (4.5%)

Average annual change in the number of number of criminal defendants (1997-2011).

Criminal defendants  projected (1.5%)

Projected average annual change in the number of criminal defendants (2012-2026).

section_title: Appendix IV: Judiciary’s New Courthouse Projects for Fiscal Years 2012 to 2016 and Fiscal Years 2014 to 2018
subsections: section_title: New asset-management planning process
paragraphs: Fiscal year  2014 – 2018 5-   X  90.4    See note    See note    The higher the “score,” the greater the space need urgency.

More than one building assessed.

section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Federal Judiciary
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  AOUSC stated that we failed to understand the purpose of the 5-year plan,  indicating that it is not a long-term capital investment plan. The draft report  that we provided to AOUSC for comment indicates that the 5-year plan is not  a long-term capital investment plan. However, the 5-year plan represents the  only document that communicates the judiciary’s recommendations related to  new courthouse projects to Congress and other stakeholders. Since it is  important for stakeholders to understand the context for new courthouse  projects, we continue to believe that the judiciary should improve the  completeness and transparency of the information the judiciary uses to justify  these projects.  2.  AOUSC stated that funding for the projects totaled $188.29 million, but did  not provide any supporting information for this amount. We used General  Services Administration (GSA) data to determine the amount of funding  appropriated for the projects on the 5-year plan, which we state to be $177  million in our report.  3.  AOUSC stated that GSA already provides sufficient information to Congress  on the judiciary’s behalf for courthouse projects. While GSA provides  information to congressional committees when seeking authorization for new  courthouse projects, by that time, the judiciary has already recommended the  projects for new construction. The 5-year plan represents the only document  that communicates the judiciary’s recommendations for new construction,  and it is incomplete and lacks transparency. For example, the 5-year plan  underestimates the total costs of these projects by about $2 billion because it  does not include all project phases and because the judiciary no longer  includes its rent costs on the 5-year plan.  4.  AOUSC was critical of our conclusion that the AMP process does not link to  the judiciary’s strategic plan. According to AOUSC, the template for future  Long-Range Facilities Plans will clearly illustrate how the AMP process  supports and links to the judiciary’s strategic plan. We continue to welcome  improvements to the judiciary’s approach to strategic planning for courthouse  construction. We will assess these changes when they are implemented, as  part of our recommendation follow-up process.  5.  AOUSC noted that, with respect to our recommendation, imposing a  moratorium and reviewing the projects on the 5-year plan under the AMP  process would create a delay of up to 6 years and that 10 of the 12 projects  have been on the 5-year plan since 1999 or earlier. AOUSC states in its  response that the previous capital-planning process was “stringent,” and as a  result should be respected for its policy and budgetary implications. We have  previously found deficiencies in the judiciary’s previous capital planning  process, including that the judiciary tends to overstate the number of judges  that will be located in a courthouse after 10 years. Our draft report noted that  the AMP process represents progress by the judiciary in better aligning its  capital-planning process with leading practices. When the judiciary applied  the AMP process to two projects on a previous 5-year plan—San Jose,  California, and Greenbelt, Maryland—neither project ranked among the  judiciary’s revised priorities for new construction, indeed, they ranked 117th  and 139th, respectively. In addition, only two projects in the current 5-year  plan qualify for new construction under the judiciary’s AMP process. Shifting  courthouse priorities demonstrate a process that is not yet finalized. Given  the federal government’s current budgetary condition, the judiciary should  assure the Congress through its planning process that the courthouses  prioritized for construction funding truly represent its most urgent needs.  Otherwise, the government stands to potentially spend billions of dollars on  courthouse construction that does not meet the judiciary’s most urgent needs.  Assessing all courthouses under the AMP process, given the problems of the  previous process, would help assure the judiciary and the Congress that the  highest priority courthouses are selected and that the government is  effectively spending construction funds.  6.  AOUSC stated that the declining conditions in existing courthouses on the 5- year plan place judges, staff, and the public in harm’s way. Our work over a  number of years has shown that many federal buildings face deteriorated  conditions, a reason that federal property was included on GAO’s High Risk  List. The courts are not alone in this regard. Our draft report noted that GSA  is responsible for ensuring that courthouses are adequately maintained. As a  result, GSA addresses building maintenance issues regardless of the status  of the courthouse construction program. In addition, we note that the criteria  the judiciary uses to select new courthouse construction projects are its own.  The AMP process established that space shortages, not facility condition, are  the only criteria for requesting new courthouse construction.   7.  AOUSC noted the security concerns at existing courthouses we visited that  we did not independently evaluate. For additional context, we added to the  report references to the judiciary’s approach to improve security within  existing courthouses rather than replace them with new courthouses. The  judiciary’s AMP process criteria are consistent with this approach, as facility  security deficiencies under the AMP process are no longer a justification for  new courthouse construction.  8.  AOUSC attached a letter from Chief Judge Lisa Godbey Wood of the  Southern District of Georgia, which we have printed in this report on pages 47  to 54. We address Judge Wood’s comments separately (see comments 21- 27).   9.  AOUSC stated table 2 included incorrect information and provided revisions  to the table. We stand by the information provided in our report, which was  provided by the GSA and the judiciary and was reviewed consistent with our  internal controls under generally accepted government auditing standards.  The AOUSC’s most recent numbers relate only to one courthouse in each  city, but our numbers represent all the judiciary’s courtrooms in each city for  which we used judiciary and GSA data. We revised our final report to clarify  that the number of courtrooms in table 2 were for cities, some of which have  more than one existing courthouse. For example, in Chattanooga,  Tennessee, the AOUSC revised our number of courtrooms from six to four  possibly because there are only four courtrooms in the Joel W. Solomon  Federal Building and United States Courthouse from which the judiciary is  seeking to relocate district and magistrate judge’s chambers and courtrooms.  However, there are six courtrooms in Chattanooga because the bankruptcy  judges’ chambers and courtrooms are located in a leased former post  office/customs house.  10. AOUSC stated that the criteria of needing two or more courtrooms in order to  recommend constructing a new courthouse pertains to the housing strategy  recommendations contained in a district’s Long Range Facilities Plan, and  that the next step is the completion of a GSA feasibility study. However,  AOUSC is describing the new AMP process. The fact remains that most  projects on the current 5-year plan were selected based on their evaluation  under the judiciary’s previous capital-planning process, which did not include  the courtroom shortage criteria. As a result, those courthouses slated for new  construction under the old process and those selected under the new process  are not comparable and do not represent the judiciary’s highest priorities.     11. AOUSC noted that when projects on the 5-year plan have a shortfall of one  courtroom as opposed to two, the GSA feasibility study concluded that new  courthouse construction was recommended. Our draft report observed that  although a project may not qualify for new courthouse construction under the  AMP process, GSA may determine through a feasibility study that new  construction is the most cost-efficient, viable solution despite the fact the  courthouse in question did not rise to the top in the selection process.    12. According to AOUSC, two projects were removed from the 5-year plan  because their space needs had changed and not because their rankings  dropped. Our draft report correctly stated that reduced space needs  contributed to the removal of these projects from the 5-year plan.   13. AOUSC questioned if we reviewed any of the Long Range Facility Plans  produced as part of the AMP process and the previous capital planning  process. We reviewed these judiciary documents and have revised the  description of our methodology discussed in appendix I to include the names  of the documents related to the judiciary’s capital-planning process that we  reviewed while developing this report. Specifically, we added the Long Range  Facility Plans, Facility Benefit Assessments, Citywide Benefit Assessments,  Urgency Evaluations, and the 5-year plan.  14. AOUSC stated that our assessment that the AMP process partially aligns with  the leading capital practice related to “needs assessment and gap  identification” was a gross error. According to AOUSC, it is not the judiciary’s  role to generate cost estimates, and they believe that our partially aligns  assessment is too low. While GSA is responsible for estimating the costs of  courthouse projects, we continue to believe that the judiciary’s capital- planning process partially—not fully—aligns with this leading practice. GAO  and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance has established that  estimates of life-cycle costs are necessary for accurate capital planning. The  judiciary’s 5-year plan lists GSA estimated costs, but they are incomplete.  Specifically, the cost estimates do not include all project phases—site  acquisition, building design, and construction. In addition, the judiciary no  longer includes the estimated cost of rent in its 5-year plan even though they  have estimated costs for all project phases and rent. We believe this  omission denies stakeholders and congressional decision makers complete  information on judiciary construction-program costs. In addition, our draft  report notes that these estimates are not life-cycle costs, which would also  have to be included for the cost estimate to be comprehensive.   15. AOUSC disagreed with our assessment that the AMP process partially aligns  with the leading capital practices related to “alternatives evaluation” because  the judiciary does evaluate options with an emphasis on the least costly  option. AOUSC also indicated that we did not consider Long Range Facility  Plans in making this determination. We did consider Long Range Facility  Plans, and continue to believe that the judiciary’s capital-planning process  partially aligns with this leading practice. GAO and OMB guidance  established that leading organizations carefully consider a wide range of  alternatives. Our draft report noted that the AMP process evaluates some  alternatives, such as renovating existing courthouses to meet needs, but the  judiciary provided no evidence that it considered other viable options, such as  courtroom sharing in existing courthouses, even though courtroom sharing is  required in new courthouses.   16. AOUSC disagreed with our assessment that the AMP process partially aligns  with the leading capital practices related to establishing a “review and  approval framework with established criteria for selecting capital investments”  because our draft report indicated that the judiciary has established such a  framework. We continue to believe that the judiciary’s capital-planning  process partially aligns with this leading practice because while we were able  to discern that there are review and approval criteria in the AMP process, we  found no evidence that the judiciary’s current 5-year plan applies those  criteria. Specifically, the judiciary established the criterion that courthouses  need to have a shortage of two or more courtrooms to qualify for a new  courthouse construction project. However, 10 of the 12 projects  recommended for new construction on the 5-year plan do not qualify under  this criterion.   17. AOUSC stated that we used incorrect and inflated estimates for project costs.

We sought to provide total project cost estimates for each project on the 5- year plan. Our draft report uses estimates that the judiciary provided for total  project costs and rent, which we adjusted for inflation to the current fiscal  year. In response to our statement of facts, AOUSC provided a revised table  (reprinted on p. 51 of this report). However, the data in the table that AOUSC  provided were incomplete and they did not include supporting documentation.  Consequently, we continue to use the most current, complete estimates of  the total project costs and rent available.   18. AOUSC stated that the estimates of total project costs were provided to them  by GSA. We added GSA to the source of table 1.  19. AOUSC stated that the judiciary has implemented changes to address  recommendations from our 2010 report (GAO-10-417). GAO has a process  for following up and closing previous recommendations. We have not yet  assessed the extent to which the judiciary’s actions have fulfilled the  recommendations from our 2010 report. We will, however, consider this and  all other information from the judiciary when we determine whether to close  the recommendations from our 2010 report. We plan to examine this  recommendation in the summer of 2013.  20. According to AOUSC, the projects on the 5-year plan are fully justified under  its previous “stringent” process that preceded the AMP process. However, as  we have previously noted, the former process had shortcomings and in our  opinion does not represent a process that the Congress should rely upon for  making capital budget decisions. The new AMP process will, when complete,  likely provide Congress with greater assurance that the judiciary’s  construction priorities represent the highest priority needs. We addressed the  difference in funding for the projects on the current 5-year plan in comment 2.  21. Judge Wood stated that the number of judges in Savannah may change. For  each project, we used data provided by AOUSC. However, in our 2010 report  (GAO-10-417), we found that the judiciary often overestimated the number of  future judges it would have in planning for new courthouses.   22. According to Judge Wood, it is inappropriate to subject the Savannah  courthouse to the AMP process when over $6 million has already been spent  on design services. We found, and the AOUSC agreed, in comments to our  draft report, that the Savannah courthouse has four courtrooms and four  judges. Consequently, it does not qualify for new construction under the AMP  criterion. In addition, according to GSA, the original courthouse design from  1998, to which Judge Wood refers, is old and outdated. As a result, if the  project moves forward, the government would need to spend additional  money to redesign a new courthouse for Savannah.   23. Judge Wood noted the poor condition of the existing Savannah courthouse  and the need for a repair and alterations project to address deferred  maintenance issues. We toured this courthouse and noted many of the same  deficiencies. Our draft report noted that regardless of whether a project is on  the 5-year plan, GSA is responsible for ensuring that courthouses are  adequately maintained. In addition, as the current plan for the Savannah  project is to continue to use the existing courthouse and build an annex,  deferred maintenance in the existing courthouse would still need to be  addressed if the plan moved forward.  24. Judge Wood noted that the existing Savannah Courthouse was built in 1899  and has several deficiencies to Design Guide standards. Our draft report  noted that some existing courtrooms may not meet Design Guide standards  for size. However, as we also note, according to AMP guidance, a disparity  between space in an existing facility and the Design Guide standards is not  justification for facility alteration and expansion.  25. Judge Wood noted several security concerns in the existing Savannah  Courthouse. See comment 7.  26. Judge Wood noted that the Savannah Courthouse project preceded the AMP  process and the courthouse needs an additional courtroom and judge’s  chamber. We address the judiciary’s previous capital planning process and  judge and courtroom counts in Savannah in comments 20 and 21,  respectively.  27. Judge Wood attached photos documenting some of the building condition  problems at the Savannah Courthouse, and those are reprinted on pages 49  and 50. See comment 23.  28. AOUSC provided changes to the courtroom numbers in table 2 from our draft  report. As we explained in comment 9, we changed the table to make clear  that the courtroom count refers to the number of courtrooms citywide, not just  in one courthouse.

section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact

section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Keith Cunningham, Assistant  Director; George Depaoli; Colin Fallon; Geoffrey Hamilton; James  Leonard; Faye Morrison; and Sara Ann Moessbauer made key  contributions to this report.


Question-summary annotations: questions: question: Why is the AMP 5-year plan lacking?
answer: The Asset Management Planning (AMP) process represents progress by the federal judiciary (judiciary) in better aligning its capital-planning process with leading capitalplanning practices, but its 5-year plan for fiscal years 2014 to 2018--the document the judiciary uses to request courthouse construction projects--lacks transparency and key information on how projects qualify for new construction, alternatives the judiciary considered, and their cost.
child_questions: question: How is the 5-year plan lacking with respect to courthouse projects?
answer: For example, the plan lists costs for the next phase of the 12 recommended courthouse projects, which have several phases, but does not list previous funding or ongoing annual costs for the projects.
child_questions: question: Why is this lack a problem?
answer: As a result, the plan lists about $1 billion in costs for the 12 projects, but the projects would actually cost the federal government an estimated $3.2 billion over the next 20 years.

question: How has Congress responded to the 5-year plan?
answer: Congress has appropriated a small share of the money needed for the projects, and most will need design changes before construction can begin.
child_questions: question: Why is it a problem that most projects will need design changes?
answer: As a result, there is a risk that congressional funding decisions could be made without complete and accurate information.

question: How will complete information be more useful to Congress?
answer: However, with this information, decision makers could weigh current-year budget decisions within the context of projects' expected future costs, spur discussion and debate about actions to address them, and put the judiciary's requests in context with other federal spending.

questions: question: Why were most recommended projects not evaluated under the AMP process?
answer: Ten of the 12 recommended projects were not evaluated under the AMP process. Judiciary officials said that they did not want to delay the current projects or force them to undergo a second capital-planning process after they had already been approved.
child_questions: question: How were courthouse project priorities reorganized?
answer: Two courthouse projects from a previous 5-year plan that were assessed under AMP were removed from the list and are now ranked behind more than 100 other courthouse construction projects.

question: Why do most of the recommended projects not qualify for a new courthouse?
answer: Furthermore, 10 of the 12 recommended construction projects do not qualify for a new courthouse under the AMP criterion, which requires that new courthouses need two or more additional courtrooms.
child_questions: question: What do these projects reveal about the AMP's 5-year plan as a whole?
answer: These conditions call into question the extent to which the projects remaining on the 5-year plan represent the judiciary's most urgent projects and whether proceeding with these projects represents the most fiscally responsible proposal.

question: Why is it important that AMP conduct these remaining evaluations?
answer: While 10 additional AMP evaluations would involve some additional costs, not conducting those evaluations could involve spending $3.2 billion over the next 20 years on courthouses that may not be the most urgent projects.

questions: question: Why has the courthouse construction program been slowed?
answer: Rising costs and fiscal challenges have slowed the multibillion-dollar courthouse construction program of the judiciary and the General Services Administration (GSA).

question: Why was AMP created?
answer: In 2006, the judiciary developed AMP to address increasing costs and incorporate best practices and has evaluated about 67 percent of its courthouses under the new system.

question: Why was this report written?
answer: As requested, GAO assessed changes introduced with AMP.
child_questions: question: What topics are examined in this report?
answer: GAO examined: (1) the extent to which the AMP process aligns with leading practices and provides information needed for informed decision making and (2) the extent to which courthouse projects recommended for funding in fiscal years 2014 to 2018 were assessed under the AMP process.

question: How did GAO conduct research for this report?
answer: GAO compared the judiciary's capitalplanning practices with leading practices, analyzed courthouseplanning documents, and interviewed officials from the judiciary and GSA. GAO visited three courthouses selected because they were highly ranked by the judiciary for replacement, although observations from these site visits cannot be generalized.