Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen CBP Efforts to Mitigate Risk of Employee Corruption and Misconduct
Released: 2013-01-03T00:00:00


Highlights: section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: CBP—a component within the Department of Homeland Security— is responsible for securing U.S. borders and facilitating legal travel and trade. Drug-trafficking and other transnational criminal organizations are seeking to target CBP employees with bribes to facilitate the illicit transport of drugs, aliens, and other contraband across the southwest U.S. border, in particular. CBP IA is responsible for promoting the integrity of CBP’s workforce, programs, and operations; and CBP components implement integrity initiatives. GAO was asked to review CBP’s efforts to ensure the integrity of its workforce. This report examines (1) data on arrests of and allegations against CBP employees for corruption or misconduct, (2) CBP’s implementation of integrity-related controls, and (3) CBP’s strategy for its integrity programs. GAO analyzed arrest and allegation data since fiscal year 2005 and 2006, respectively, reviewed integrity-related policies and procedures, and interviewed CBP officials in headquarters and at four locations along the southwest border selected for geographic location, among other factors.

section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data indicate that arrests of CBP employees for corruption-related activities since fiscal years 2005 account for less than 1 percent of CBP’s entire workforce per fiscal year. The majority of arrests of CBP employees were related to misconduct. There were 2,170 reported incidents of arrests for acts of misconduct such as domestic violence or driving under the influence from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012, and a total of 144 current or former CBP employees were arrested or indicted for corruption-related activities, such as the smuggling of aliens and drugs, of whom 125 have been convicted as of October 2012. Further, the majority of allegations against CBP employees since fiscal year 2006 occurred at locations along the southwest border. CBP officials have stated that they are concerned about the negative impact that these cases have on agencywide integrity.

CBP employs screening tools to mitigate the risk of employee corruption and misconduct for both applicants (e.g., background investigations and polygraph examinations) and incumbent CBP officers and Border Patrol agents (e.g., random drug tests and periodic reinvestigations). However, CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs (IA) does not have a mechanism to maintain and track data on which of its screening tools (e.g., background investigation or polygraph examination) provided the information used to determine which applicants were not suitable for hire. Maintaining and tracking such data is consistent with internal control standards and could better position CBP IA to gauge the relative effectiveness of its screening tools. CBP IA is also considering requiring periodic polygraphs for incumbent officers and agents; however, it has not yet fully assessed the feasibility of expanding the program. For example, CBP has not yet fully assessed the costs of implementing polygraph examinations on incumbent officers and agents, including costs for additional supervisors and adjudicators, or factors such as the trade-offs associated with testing incumbent officers and agents at various frequencies. A feasibility assessment of program expansion could better position CBP to determine whether and how to best achieve its goal of strengthening integrity-related controls for officers and agents. Further, CBP IA has not consistently conducted monthly quality assurance reviews of its adjudications since 2008, as required by internal policies, to help ensure that adjudicators are following procedures in evaluating the results of the preemployment and periodic background investigations. CBP IA officials stated that they have performed some of the required checks since 2008, but they could not provide data on how many checks were conducted. Without these quality assurance checks, it is difficult for CBP IA to determine the extent to which deficiencies, if any, exist in the adjudication process.

CBP does not have an integrity strategy, as called for in its Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. During the course of our review, CBP IA began drafting a strategy, but CBP IA’s Assistant Commissioner stated the agency has not set target timelines for completing and implementing this strategy. Moreover, he stated that there has been significant cultural resistance among some CBP components in acknowledging CBP IA’s authority for overseeing all integrity-related activities. Setting target timelines is consistent with program management standards and could help CBP monitor progress made toward the development and implementation of an agencywide strategy.

section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that CBP, among other things, track and maintain data on sources of information used to determine which applicants are unsuitable for hire, assess the feasibility of expanding the polygraph program to incumbent officers and agents, consistently conduct quality assurance reviews, and set timelines for completing and implementing a comprehensive integrity strategy. DHS concurred and reported taking steps to address the recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Drug-trafficking and other transnational criminal organizations have  increasingly sought to target U.S. law enforcement personnel with bribes  and other inducements to facilitate their illicit transport of drugs, aliens,  and other contraband across the U.S. southwest border. U.S. Customs  and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS), is responsible for securing U.S. borders and facilitating  legal travel and trade. Specifically, officers from CBP’s Office of Field  Operations (OFO) are responsible for securing the border at U.S. ports  of entry, while CBP’s U.S. Border Patrol agents (BPA) are responsible for  securing the national border between the ports of entry. CBP’s Office of  Internal Affairs (IA) is responsible for promoting the integrity of CBP’s  workforce, programs, and operations. For the purposes of our report,  integrity issues include acts of corruption such as accepting cash bribes  and other gratuities in return for allowing contraband or inadmissible  aliens into the country, as well as other criminal activities or misconduct  such as drug or alcohol abuse.

DHS officials have testified that CBP’s increased hiring of officers and  agents since fiscal year 2006 has amplified the incentives and  opportunities for attempted corruption of the CBP workforce through  bribery, infiltration, or other means. the number of CBP officers (CBPOs) and BPAs along the southwest  border increased from 15,792 to 24,057. Moreover, DHS officials have  stated that drug-trafficking organizations are attempting to infiltrate the  CBP workforce through conspired hiring operations and aggressive  targeting of incumbent CBPOs and BPAs. In fiscal year 2012, CBP  allocated approximately $166 million for integrity programs.

From fiscal years 2006 through 2011,  You asked us to review CBP’s efforts to ensure the integrity of its  workforce, and particularly for CBPOs and BPAs stationed along the  southwest U.S. border. This report examines (1) data on arrests of and  allegations against CBP employees accused of corruption or misconduct- related activities, (2) CBP’s implementation of integrity-related controls to  prevent and detect employee corruption and misconduct, and (3) CBP’s  strategy for implementing its integrity programs.

See Statement of Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,  before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs,  Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Washington, D.C.:  June 9, 2011, and Statement of Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General,  Department of Homeland Security, before the Subcommittee on Government  Organization, Efficiency, and Financial Management, Committee on Oversight and  Government Report, House of Representatives. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 1, 2012.  Statement of James F. Tomsheck, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs, U.S.  Customs and Border Protection, before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local and  Sector Preparedness and Integration, Committee on Homeland Security and  Governmental Affairs, Senate. Washington, D.C.:Mar. 11, 2010. allegations of corruption and misconduct made against CBP employees  from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. For both arrest and allegation data,  these are the time periods for which the most complete and reliable data  were available. In particular, we analyzed variations in both sets of data  across CBP components and geographic regions. To assess the reliability  of these data, we (1) performed electronic data testing and looked for  obvious errors in accuracy and completeness, and (2) interviewed agency  officials knowledgeable about these data to determine the processes in  place to ensure their accuracy. In addition, we interviewed CBP officials  to gain their perspectives on these data. We determined that the data  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Pub. L. No. 111-376, § 3, 124 Stat. 4104, 4104-05 (2011).

Personnel Security Division (PSD), including interviewing PSD officials  who are responsible for deciding whether an applicant or incumbent  officer or agent is suitable for hire or continued employment. We  compared CBP’s integrity-related controls, as applicable, with standards  in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and  standard practices from the Project Management Institute. Furthermore,  we conducted visits to four locations along the southwest U.S. border to  observe the implementation of various integrity-related controls and  obtain perspectives from CBP officials at these locations on the  implementation of integrity-related controls. We selected these locations  on the basis of a variety of factors, including the colocation of CBP IA with  OFO offices and U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) sectors along the southwest  border and the number of allegations against or arrests of CBP  employees for corruption or misconduct. Because we selected a  nonprobability sample of locations to visit, the information we obtained  from these visits cannot be generalized to all field locations. However,  observations obtained from these visits provided us with a greater  understanding of CBP’s integrity-related initiatives.

To evaluate CBP’s integrity strategy, including how the agency  incorporates lessons learned from prior misconduct and corruption cases,  we reviewed CBP strategic planning documents and other policy  statements on integrity initiatives. In particular, we analyzed these  documents against the requirements set forth in CBP’s Fiscal Year 2009- 2014 Strategic Plan. In addition, we analyzed all available  postcorruption analyses reports, which identify deficiencies that may have  enabled CBP employees to engage in corruption-related activities,  against OFO and USBP program requirements. We interviewed CBP  officials in Washington, D.C., as well as during our site visits, regarding  CBP’s integrity strategy and the extent to which CBP is using lessons  learned from prior corruption and misconduct cases to guide changes in  policies and procedures, as appropriate.

We conducted this performance audit from December 2011 to December  2012, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I presents more  details about our scope and methodology.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: CBP is the largest uniformed law enforcement agency in the United  States, with approximately 21,400 BPAs patrolling between the nation’s  ports of entry and more than 20,000 CBPOs stationed at air, land, and  seaports nationwide at the end of fiscal year 2011.southwest border, there are about 5,500 CBPOs and 18,000 BPAs as of  the end of fiscal year 2011. CBPOs, based within OFO, are responsible  for processing immigration documentation of passengers and pedestrians  and inspecting vehicles and cargo at U.S. ports of entry. BPAs are based  within the USBP and are responsible for enforcing immigration laws  across the territory in between the ports of entry and at checkpoints  located inside the U.S. border. Together, CBPOs and BPAs are   On the U.S.  responsible for detecting and preventing the illegal entry of persons and  contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, across  the border.
subsections: section_title: Hiring Process for CBPOs and BPAs
paragraphs: U.S. citizens interested in becoming CBPOs or BPAs must successfully  complete all steps of the CBP hiring process, which includes an online  application, a cognitive exam, fingerprint collection, financial disclosure, a  structured interview, fitness tests, medical examinations, a polygraph  examination, a background investigation, and a drug test. CBP IA’s PSD  manages the personnel security program by initiating and adjudicating  preemployment investigations for CBP applicants, which aim to ensure  that the candidates are reliable, trustworthy, and loyal to the United  States, and therefore suitable for employment. In addition, CBP IA’s  Credibility Assessment Division (CAD) is responsible for administering the  polygraph examinations, interviewing applicants, and collecting any  admissions that an applicant may reveal including past criminal behavior  or misconduct. Human Resource Management is responsible for making  the hiring decisions based on the final suitability determination from CBP  IA (this includes PSD’s overall assessment of the polygraph examination  and background investigation), as well as the applicant’s successful  completion of the other steps in the hiring process.

The number of CBP employees increased from 43,545 in fiscal year 2006  to 60,591 as of August 2012. During this time period, both OFO and  USBP experienced a hiring surge and received increased appropriations  to fund additional hiring of CBPOs and BPAs. The majority of the newly  hired CBPOs and BPAs were assigned to the southwest border. In  particular, during this time period, their total numbers along the southwest  border increased from 15,792 to 24,057. As of fiscal year 2011, 57  percent of the CBPOs and BPA were stationed along the southwest  border. Figure 1 provides additional details.

Allegations against CBP employees for misconduct, corruption, or other  issues can be reported through various mechanisms. CBP IA, in  partnership with the Office of Professional Responsibility—an office within  DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement—accepts allegations  through the Joint Intake Center (JIC). JIC is CBP’s central clearinghouse  for receiving, processing, and tracking all allegations of misconduct  involving personnel and contractors employed by CBP. Staffed jointly by  CBP IA and the Office of Professional Responsibility, JIC is responsible  for receiving, documenting, and routing misconduct allegations to the  appropriate investigative entity for review to determine whether the  allegation can be substantiated. CBP employees or the general public  may report allegations to JIC’s hotline by e-mail or telephone, to local  CBP IA field offices, the DHS Office of Inspector General, or the other law  enforcement agencies. Anonymous allegations are also received,  documented, and subjected to further inquiry.

section_title: The Majority of Arrests against CBP Employees Are Related to Misconduct; Majority of Allegations Occurred at Locations along the Southwest Border
paragraphs: According to CBP’s data, incidents of arrests of CBP employees from  fiscal years 2005 through 2012 represent less than 1 percent of the entire  CBP workforce per fiscal year. During this time period, 144 current or  former CBP employees were arrested or indicted for corruption—the  majority of which were stationed along the southwest border. In addition,  there were 2,170 reported incidents of arrests for misconduct.Allegations against CBPOs and BPAs as a percentage of total on-board  personnel remained relatively constant from fiscal years 2006 through  2011 and ranged from serious offenses such as facilitating drug  smuggling across the border to administrative delinquencies such as  losing an official badge. The majority of allegations made against OFO  and USBP employees during this time period were against officers and  agents stationed on the southwest U.S. border.
subsections: section_title: The Majority of Arrests of CBP Employees since Fiscal Year 2005 Are Related to Alleged Misconduct Activities
paragraphs: CBP data indicate that from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012, the  majority of arrests since fiscal year 2005 are related to alleged  misconduct activities. A total of 144 current or former CBP employees  were arrested or indicted for corruption. In addition, there were 2,170  reported incidents of arrests for misconduct. In both cases, each  represents less than 1 percent of the entire CBP workforce per fiscal  year. Specifically, in fiscal year 2005, out of 42,409 CBP employees, 27  were arrested or indicted for corruption. In addition, during this time  period, there were 190 reported incidents of arrests for misconduct. As of  August 2012, when CBP’s workforce increased to 60,591, 11 CBP  employees were arrested or indicted for corruption, and there were 336  reported incidents of arrests for misconduct. CBP IA defines delinquent  activity as either corruption or misconduct. Corruption involves the misuse  or abuse of the employee’s position, whereas misconduct may not  necessarily involve delinquent behavior that is related to the execution of  official duties. CBP further categorizes the delinquent behavior into the  following categories: (1) non-mission-compromising misconduct, (2)  mission-related misconduct, (3) corruption, and (4) mission-compromising  corruption. The first category is the only one that is unrelated to the  execution of the CBP employee’s official duties or authority, and the  majority of the incidents of arrests for misconduct (2,153 out of 2,170)  since fiscal year 2005 fall in this category. Examples include domestic  violence and driving under the influence while off duty. Table 1 provides  CBP IA’s definitions of the two types of delinquent activity and examples  of each category.

About 65  southwest border. Our review of documentation on these cases indicates  that 103 of the 144 cases were for mission-compromising corruption  activities, which are the most severe offenses, such as drug or alien  smuggling, bribery, and allowing illegal cargo into the United States.  Forty-one of the 144 CBP employees arrested or indicted were charged  with other corruption-related activities. According to CBP IA, this category  is less severe than mission-compromising corruption and includes  offenses such as the theft of government property and querying personal  associates in a government database for purposes other than official  business. Table 2 provides a breakdown of these arrests by fiscal year.

Table 3 outlines the number of incidents of arrests of CBP employees for  misconduct for fiscal years 2005 through 2012.

Although the total number of corruption convictions (125) is less than 1  percent when compared with CBP’s workforce population by fiscal year,  CBP officials stated that they are concerned about the negative impact  employee corruption cases have on agencywide integrity. For example,  the Acting Commissioner of CBP testified that no act of corruption within  the agency can or will be tolerated and that acts of corruption  compromise CBP’s ability to achieve its mission to secure America’s  borders against all threats while facilitating and expediting legal travel and  trade. In particular, there have been a number of cases in which  individuals, known as infiltrators, pursued employment at CBP solely to  engage in mission-compromising activity. For example, in 2007, a CBPO  in El Paso, Texas, was arrested at her duty station at the Paso Del Norte  Bridge for conspiracy to import marijuana into the United States from  June 2003 to July 2007, and was later convicted and sentenced to 20  years in prison. OFO reported that she may have sought employment  with CBP to facilitate drug smuggling. CBP officials view this case as an  example of the potential impact of corruption—if the officer had  succeeded in facilitating the importation of 5,000 pounds of marijuana per  month, this would amount to a total of 240,000 pounds over 4 years with  a retail value of $288 million dollars. In another case, a former BPA  previously stationed in Comstock, Texas, was arrested in 2008 for  conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, more than 1,000  kilograms of marijuana. The agent was convicted in 2009 and sentenced  to 15 years in prison and ordered to pay a $10,000 fine. CBP is also  concerned about employees who may not be infiltrators, but began  engaging in corruption-related activities after joining the agency. For  example, CBP IA officials stated that some employees may have  experienced personal hardships after being hired, such as financial  challenges, which made them vulnerable to accepting bribes to engage in  corrupt activity. In addition, some employees arrested for corruption had  no prior disciplinary actions at the time of their arrests.

section_title: Allegations against CBPOs and BPAs as a Percentage of Total Onboard Personnel Remained Relatively Constant from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011
paragraphs: According to our analysis of CBP data, from fiscal years 2006 through  2011, a total of 32,290 allegations were made against CBP employees;  90 percent (29,204) were made against CBPOs and BPAs. CBP IA  categorizes allegations of misconduct or corruption by varying levels of  severity. For example, allegations may range from serious offenses such  as facilitating drug smuggling across the border to administrative  delinquencies such as losing a badge. CBP allegations of corruption or  misconduct are sorted into differing classes depending on the severity of  the allegation and whether there is potential for federal prosecution. As  table 4 indicates, class 1 allegations comprise the more severe  allegations that could lead to federal prosecution, such as drug smuggling  or bribery, with classes 2, 3, and 4 representing decreasing levels of  severity.

Information for management may include notifications such as reporting a  lost badge or an arrest of an employee’s family member. CBP  management will take this information into consideration but may  determine that the action does not warrant referring the case for further  disciplinary action.

Table 5 depicts the number of allegations against CBPOs and BPAs from  fiscal years 2006 through 2011. Allegations made against OFO and BP  employees as a percentage of the total OFO and USBP workforce  remained constant from 12 percent to 14 percent over fiscal years 2006  to 2011.

Similar to the arrest data, of the total number of allegations made against  OFO and USBP employees from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011— 29,204 total allegations—the majority of these allegations were made  against officers and agents stationed on the southwest U.S. border.  Specifically, there were approximately 19,905 total allegations against  CBPOs and BPAs stationed on the southwest border—about 68 percent  of total allegations. Approximately 57 percent of all CBPOs and BPAs are  stationed along the southwest border. By comparison, during this time  period, there were 9,299 allegations made against officers and agents  across the rest of CBP’s ports of entry and sectors. According to a senior  CBP IA official who is responsible for tracking and maintaining CBP  allegations data, it is possible that the southwest border region received  more allegations, in part, because CBP assigned more employees to the  region, many of whom were new, relatively less experienced agents from  the hiring increases from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, or were  employees on detail to the southwest border region. During this same  period, the number of officers and agents and BPAs along the southwest  border increased from 15,792 to 24,057. In addition, in each fiscal year  from 2006 through 2011, more allegations were made against USBP  employees than OFO employees along the southwest border— allegations against BPAs were about 32 percent higher, on average, than  those against CBPOs.

section_title: CBP Has Implemented Integrity-Related Controls, but Could Better Assess Screening Tools for Applicants and Incumbent Employees
paragraphs: CBP employs integrity-related controls to mitigate the risk of corruption  and misconduct for both applicants and incumbent officers and agents,  such as polygraph examinations and random drug testing, respectively.  However, CBP does not maintain or track data on which screening tools  provided the information that contributed to applicants being deemed  unsuitable for hire, making it difficult for CBP to assess the relative  effectiveness of these screening tools. In addition, an assessment of the  feasibility of expanding the polygraph program to incumbent officers and  agents, and consistent implementation of its quality assurance review  program for background investigations and periodic reinvestigations,  could strengthen CBP’s integrity-related controls. OFO and USBP have  also implemented controls to help detect and prevent corruption and  misconduct; however, additional actions could help improve the  effectiveness of OFO’s integrity officers.
subsections: section_title: CBP Employs Controls to Mitigate the Risk of Hiring Potentially Corrupt Officers and Agents, but Does Not Track Data That Can Help Determine the Relative Effectiveness of Screening Tools
paragraphs: CBP has two key controls to screen applicants for CBPO and BPA  positions during the hiring process—background investigations and  polygraph examinations. Background investigations involve, among other  things, a personal interview; a 10-year background check; and an  examination of an applicant’s criminal, credit, and financial history,  according to Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations.  Polygraph examinations consist of a preinterview, the examination, and a  postexamination interview. The Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010  requires that, as of January 2013, all CBPO and BPA applicants receive  polygraph examinations before they are hired. CBP IA officials stated  that the agency met the mandated polygraph requirement in October  2012—90 days before the deadline.

PSD considers multiple factors, or a combination thereof, to determine  whether an applicant is suitable for employment. PSD officials stated that  suitability determinations are based on three adjudication phases: (1)  after PSD verifies that each applicant’s forms are complete and conducts  preliminary law enforcement database and credit checks, (2) after CAD  reports the technical results of the polygraph examinations to PSD, and  (3) after the completion of the background investigation. PSD is responsible for adjudicating the final polygraph examination results, as  well as reviewing any other information that may be used in determining  whether or not applicants are suitable for employment. If, after the final  adjudication, there is no derogatory information affecting an applicant’s  suitability, PSD forwards the final favorable adjudication decision to  Human Resources Management, which completes the remainder of the  required steps in the hiring process.

Regarding polygraph examinations, CAD has maintained data on the  number of polygraph examinations that it administers and the technical  results of those examinations since January 2008. CAD officials stated  that an applicant technically fails the polygraph examination by receiving  a “significant response” on the test or using countermeasures to deceive  the test, which is an indicator of deception and results in PSD making a  determination that an applicant is unsuitable for hire. Alternatively, an  applicant can technically pass the polygraph examination, but admit to  past criminal behavior (e.g., admitting to frequent and recent illegal  narcotics usage) that would likely render the applicant unsuitable for CBP  employment when PSD adjudicates a complete record of CAD’s  polygraph examination and associated interviews. Table 6 provides our  analysis of CAD’s data on the 11,149 polygraph examinations  administered since 2008, and the technical results of those examinations.

In addition to the technical examination results, CAD maintains  documentation on admissions that applicants reveal during the polygraph  examination process. Applicants have admitted to a range of criminal  activity from plans to gain employment with the agency in order to further  illicit activities, such as drug smuggling to excessive illegal drug use. For  example, one applicant admitted that his brother-in-law, a known Mexican  drug smuggler, asked him to use employment with CBP to facilitate  cocaine smuggling. Another applicant admitted to using marijuana 9,000  times, including the night before the polygraph examination; cocaine 30 to  40 times; hallucinogenic mushrooms 15 times; and ecstasy about 50  times. CBP IA officials stated that admissions such as these highlight the  importance of the polygraph examination to help identify these types of  behaviors in applicants before they are hired for CBP employment. CBP  IA officials stated that the polygraph examination is the key investigative  tool in the agency’s integrity program because it can help identify whether  applicants have misled background investigators regarding previous  criminal histories or misconduct issues.

PSD is responsible for maintaining data on its final suitability  determinations—whether or not it determines that applicants are suitable  for hire. However, CBP IA does not have a mechanism to track and  maintain data on which of its screening tools (e.g., background  information or polygraph examination) provided the information that PSD  used to determine that applicants were not suitable for hire, making it  difficult for CBP IA to assess the relative effectiveness of its various  screening tools. For example, if 100 applicants technically pass a  polygraph examination, but 60 of these applicants are ultimately found  unsuitable for hire, CBP IA does not have data to indicate if the applicants  were found unsuitable based on admissions during the polygraph  examination, derogatory information collected by background  investigators, a combination of this information, or on the basis of other  screening tools. PSD officials stated that they do not have the data  needed to assess the effectiveness of screening tools because of  limitations in PSD’s information management system, the Integrated  Security Management System (ISMS), which is not designed to collect  data on the source of the information (e.g., background information,  polygraph examination) and the results used to determine whether an  applicant is deemed suitable for hire. CBP IA’s Assistant Commissioner  and other senior staff stated that maintaining these data on an ongoing  basis would be useful in managing CBP IA’s programs.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  program managers need operational data to determine whether they are  meeting their goals for accountability for effective and efficient use of  resources. Moreover, the standards state that pertinent information  should be identified, captured, and distributed in a form and time frame  that permits managers to perform their duties efficiently. The standards  also require that all transactions be clearly documented in a manner that  is complete and accurate in order to be useful for managers and others  involved in evaluating operations. which screening tools provide information that contributes to PSD  determining that an applicant is not suitable for hire could better position  CBP IA to gauge the effectiveness of each tool and the extent to which  the tools are meeting their intended goals for screening applicants for  hire.

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

section_title: CBP Has Tools for Screening Incumbent Officers and Agents
paragraphs: CBP has two key controls for incumbent employees—random drug  testing and periodic reinvestigations—to ensure the continued integrity of  the CBPOs and BPAs. CBP is required to conduct random drug tests on  an annual basis for at least 10 percent of the employees in designated  positions, including CBPOs and BPAs, to help ensure employees who  hold positions in the area of law enforcement or public trust refrain from  the use of illegal drugs while on or off duty. According to CBP data for  fiscal years 2009 through 2011, more than 99 percent of the 15,565  random drug tests conducted on CBP employees were negative. CBP  officials stated that actions against those with positive results ranged from  voluntary resignation to removal. In September 2012, Human Resource  Management officials told us that DHS was in the process of reviewing  drug-free workplace programs across the department and that CBP was  coordinating with DHS’s drug-free workforce program. Changes under  consideration for DHS’s program include eliminating the 2-hour advance  notice that employees currently receive before they are required to  provide a urinalysis sample, which human resource officials stated could  help reduce the possibility of CBP employees potentially engaging in  efforts to dilute the results of the tests.

In addition, CBP policy states that all CBPOs and BPAs are subject to a  reinvestigation every 5 years to ensure continued suitability for  employment. control for monitoring incumbent officers and agents, particularly for those  employees who were hired in the past without a polygraph examination.

CBP policies allows for reinvestigations to be initiated outside of the standard 5-year  cycle. As of July 2012, CBP has not conducted any periodic reinvestigations outside of the  normal cycle, according to CBP IA officials.

CBP IA officials stated that they conducted few periodic reinvestigations  during fiscal years 2006 to 2010 because resources were focused on  meeting mandated hiring goals. Thus, CBP IA accumulated a backlog of  15,197 periodic reinvestigations as of 2010. To help address this backlog,  the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010 required CBP to initiate all  outstanding periodic reinvestigations within 180 days of the enactment of  the law, or July 3, 2011. As of September 2012, CBP IA had initiated  100 percent, and had completed 99 percent (15,027 of 15,197) of the  outstanding reinvestigations from the backlog. According to CBP IA  officials, 13,968 of the reinvestigations that were completed as of  September 2012 have been adjudicated favorably, and CBP officials  stated that they had referred three additional cases to the Office of Labor  and Employee Relations for possible disciplinary action. CBP IA data  indicate, however, that about 62 percent of the favorably adjudicated  reinvestigations initially identified some type of issue, such as criminal or  dishonest conduct or illegal drug use, which required further review during  the adjudication process. According to CBP IA officials, PSD adjudicators  mitigated these issues and determined that they did not warrant any  referrals to labor and employee relations officials for disciplinary actions.

section_title: CBP Has Not Assessed the Feasibility of Expanding Its Polygraph Program to Incumbent Officers and Agents
paragraphs: CBP IA officials stated that they are considering implementing a polygraph  requirement for incumbent employees; however, CBP has not yet  assessed the feasibility of expanding the program beyond applicants. In  May 2012, CBP’s Acting Deputy Commissioner testified that the agency is  considering whether and how to subject incumbent officers and agents to  polygraph examinations. CBP IA officials and supervisory CBPOs and  BPAs that we interviewed at all four of the locations we visited expressed  concerns about the suitability of the officers and agents hired during the  surges because most of these officers and agents did not take a polygraph  examination. CBP IA’s Assistant Commissioner also stated that he  supports a periodic polygraph requirement for incumbent officers because  of the breadth and volume of derogatory information that applicants have  provided during the polygraph examinations. The Assistant Commissioner  and other senior CBP officials stated that they have begun to consider  various factors related to expanding polygraph examinations to incumbent  officers and agents in CBP. However, CBP has not yet fully assessed the  costs and benefits of implementing polygraph examinations on incumbent  officers and agents, as well as other factors that may affect the agency’s  efforts to expand the program. For example:

Costs. In September 2012, CBP IA officials told us that they had not  fully examined the costs associated with different options for  expanding the polygraph examination requirement to incumbent  employees. To test 5 percent of current eligible law enforcement  employees (about 45,000 officer and agents), for example, equates to  2,250 polygraph examinations annually, according to CBP IA. Testing  20 percent of eligible employees each year, by comparison, equates  to 9,000 polygraph examinations annually. CBP IA preliminarily  identified some costs based on the average cost per polygraph  examination (about $800); however, it has not completed analyses of  other costs associated with testing incumbent employees, including  those associated with mission support specialists, adjudicators, and  supervisors who would need to be hired and trained to conduct the  examinations. In October 2012, CBP IA officials stated that there  would be further costs associated with training polygraph examiners— approximately $250,000 per examiner. CBP has not determined the  full costs associated with expanding polygraph examinations to  incumbent employees to help assess the feasibility of various options  for expansion.

Authority and ability to polygraph incumbents. According to OPM  requirements, to conduct polygraph examinations on current  employees, CBP would need to request and obtain approval from  OPM. As of September 2012, CBP had not yet sought approval from  OPM to conduct polygraph examinations on incumbent employees  because CBP’s senior leadership had not completed internal  discussions about how and when to seek this approval. In addition,  CBP officials identified other factors that the agency has not yet  assessed, which could affect the feasibility of conducting polygraph  examinations on incumbent employees. These factors include the  need to assess how the agency will use the results of incumbent  employees’ polygraphs and whether these options are subject to  negotiation with the labor unions that represent CBPOs and BPAs.  For example, according to CBP officials, it might be necessary to  negotiate with the unions as to what disciplinary action could be taken  based on the possible outcomes of the examination, including the test  results themselves and any admissions of illegal activity or  misconduct made by the employee during the examination.

Frequency or number of polygraph examinations to be  conducted. According to the CBP IA Assistant Commissioner, the  agency has identified possible options for how frequently to implement  polygraph examinations for incumbent employees or for what  population to conduct the examinations. For example, possible  options include conducting polygraph examinations on a random  sample of incumbent employees each year (e.g., 5 percent or 20  percent of eligible employees each year), or conducting the  examinations based on reasonable suspicion of finding derogatory  information. CBP IA officials stated that testing incumbent employees  on a random basis could have a deterrent effect by causing some  employees to cease their corrupt behavior, and dissuading other  employees from becoming involved in corrupt behavior. Although CBP  has identified possible options for how frequently to implement  polygraph examinations for incumbent employees or for what  population to conduct the examinations, CBP officials stated that they  have not assessed the feasibility of implementing these options,  particularly in light of their relative costs and benefits.

Standard practices for project management call for the feasibility of  programs to be considered early on. Moreover, standard practices for  project management state that specific desired outcomes or results should  be conceptualized, defined, and documented as part of a road map.

CBP has not fully assessed the feasibility of expanding the polygraph  program to incumbent officers and agents, in accordance with standard  practices for project management, including assessing all of the  associated costs and benefits, options for how the agency will use the  results of the examinations, and the trade-offs associated with testing  incumbent officers and agents at various frequencies. In October 2012,  the CBP IA Assistant Commissioner stated that the agency has begun to  discuss options with senior agency officials for expanding its polygraph  program. He and other senior CBP IA officials acknowledged that his  office had not yet fully assessed the various factors that might affect the  feasibility of expanding the polygraph program and agreed that such an  assessment would be useful in discussions with CBP senior  management. Assessing the feasibility of expanding periodic polygraphs  early on in its planning efforts, consistent with standard practices, could  help CBP determine how to best achieve its goal of strengthening  integrity-related controls over incumbent CBPOs and BPAs.

section_title: CBP IA Could Benefit from Implementing Its Quality Assurance Program for Initial Background and Periodic Reinvestigations
paragraphs: A senior PSD official stated that PSD has not implemented a quality  assurance program at the level desired because it has prioritized its  resources in recent years to address hiring goals and the mandated  requirements to clear the backlog of reinvestigations. PSD established a  quality assurance program in 2008 to help ensure that proper policies and  procedures are followed during the course of the preemployment  background investigations and incumbent employee reinvestigations. As  part of this program, PSD is to (1) review, on a monthly basis, no more  than 5 percent of all completed investigations to ensure the quality and  timeliness of the investigations and to identify any deficiencies in the  investigation process, and (2) report the findings or deficiencies in a  standardized checklist so that corrective action can be taken, if  necessary. As of September 2012, PSD officials stated that they have not  consistently completed the monthly checks, as required by the quality  assurance program, because they have prioritized their resources to  screen applicants to meet CBP’s hiring goals. PSD officials stated that  they have performed some of the required checks since 2008. However,  PSD officials could not provide data on how many checks were  conducted or when the checks were conducted because they did not  retain the results of the checks on the required checklists. In addition,  CBP IA officials stated that they had performed 16 quality reviews on an  ad hoc basis outside of the monthly checks from fiscal years 2008  through 2010. CBP IA documented the results of these ad hoc checks,  which did not identify significant deficiencies according to officials.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides  guidance on the importance of evaluating the effectiveness of controls  and ensuring that the findings of audits and other reviews are promptly  resolved and evaluated within established time frames so that all actions  that correct or otherwise resolve the matters have been brought to  management’s attention. The standards also state that all transactions  and other significant events need to be clearly documented, and the  documentation should be readily available for examination. Senior CBP  IA officials stated that a quality assurance program is an integral part of  their overall applicant screening efforts, and they stated that it is critical  for CBP IA to identify and leverage resources to ensure that the quality  assurance program is fully implemented on a consistent basis. Without a  quality review program that is implemented and documented on a  consistent basis, it is difficult to determine the extent to which  deficiencies, if any, exist in the investigation and adjudication process and  whether individuals that are unsuitable for employment are attempting to  find employment with CBP. As a result, it is difficult for CBP to provide  reasonable assurance that cases have been investigated and adjudicated  properly and that corruption risk to the agency is mitigated accordingly.

section_title: OFO and USBP Have Developed Integrity- Related Controls; OFO Could Benefit from Clarifying the Roles and Responsibilities of Its Integrity Officers
paragraphs: In addition to CBP’s screening tools for applicants and incumbent  employees, OFO and USBP have developed controls to help mitigate the  risk of potential CBPO and BPA corruption and misconduct (see table  7). For example, OFO has been able to use upgraded technology at  ports of entry to help prevent and detect possible officer misconduct and  to monitor officers’ activities while on duty. USBP established a policy that  limits the use of portable electronic devices while on duty to mitigate the  risks of agents potentially organizing illegal border crossings.

Senior USBP officials stated that its agents operate in an environment  that does not lend itself to the types of technological controls, such as  Red Flag, that OFO has implemented at the ports of entry, which are  more confined and predictable environments than Border Patrol  environments. For example, BPAs are required to patrol miles of terrain  that may be inaccessible to radio coverage by supervisors at the sector  offices. CBPOs operate in more controlled space at U.S. ports of entry as  opposed to the open terrain across USBP sectors. Nevertheless, USBP  officials stated that they are working with AMSCO and CBP IA to identify  innovative ways that technology might be used to assist USBP in  mitigating the risk of corruption along the border.

In addition, in 2009, OFO established the integrity officer position to  provide an additional control within the individual field offices. As of  August 2012, there were 19 integrity officers across OFO’s 20 field  offices; there were 5 officers across the 4 field offices on the southwest  border. Integrity officers monitor integrity-related controls, including the  Red Flag system and video surveillance cameras. Integrity officers also  perform data analyses and provide operational support to criminal and  administrative investigations against OFO employees. However, CBP IA  officials stated that OFO has not consistently coordinated the integrity  officer program with CBP IA, which is the designated lead for all integrity- related matters within CBP. According to a CBP directive, entities within  CBP, such as OFO, that are engaged in integrity-related activities must  coordinate with CBP IA to ensure organizational awareness and prevent  investigative conflicts. CBP IA officials stated that although they are  aware of the Integrity Officer program, they expressed concerns that the  roles and responsibilities of these officers may not be clearly articulated  and thus could result in potential problems, such as jeopardizing ongoing  investigations.

See Statement of David Aguilar, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border  Protection, before the Subcommittee on Government Organization, Efficiency, and  Financial Management, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of  Representatives. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 1, 2012. responsibilities, including the definition of assisting with operational  inquiries. For example, in our meetings with 4 of the integrity officers  along the southwest border, we found that 3 defined their role to include  active participation in investigations of allegations of misconduct and  corruption against OFO employees. At one location we visited, the  integrity officer stated that he had created an online social media profile  under an assumed name to connect with CBP employees at his port of  entry, one of whom was under investigation—an activity that the OFO  Program Manager, senior OFO officials, and CBP IA officials  acknowledged was beyond the scope of the intended role of the integrity  officer position. Further, one integrity officer indicated that his role  includes a right to “fully investigate” CBP employees, while another  interpreted his role to be limited to conducting data analysis.

CBP IA officials stated that integrity officers are not authorized to conduct  investigations nor are they trained to do so. Differences in integrity  officers’ activities across field locations could be justified given the  variances at each port of entry. CBP IA officials expressed concerns,  however, that the integrity officers may be overstepping their roles by  inserting themselves into ongoing investigations, which could potentially  disrupt or jeopardize ongoing investigations because they could  unknowingly compromise the independence of an investigation or  interview. OFO’s Acting Assistant Commissioner and the integrity officer  program manager acknowledged that it would be useful to further clarify  integrity officers’ duties to avoid any conflicts with ongoing investigations  and ensure that the officers were approaching their duties more  consistently. Clear roles and responsibilities for integrity officers  developed in consultation with key stakeholders such as CBP IA, and a  mechanism that monitors the implementation of those roles and  responsibilities, could help OFO ensure that the program is operating  effectively and, in particular, in coordination with the appropriate  stakeholders like CBP IA.

section_title: An Agencywide Strategy and Lessons Learned Analyses Could Help Guide CBP Integrity-Related Efforts
paragraphs: CBP has not developed a comprehensive integrity strategy to encompass  all CBP components’ initiatives. Further, CBP has not completed some  postcorruption analyses on employees convicted of corruption since  October 2004, missing opportunities to gain lessons learned to enhance  policies, procedures, and controls.
subsections: section_title: CBP Is Developing an Integrity Strategy, but Does Not Have Target Timelines for Its Completion and Implementation
paragraphs: CBP has not completed an integrity strategy that encompasses the  activities of CBP components that have integrity initiatives under way,  including CBP IA, OFO, and USBP, as called for in the CBP Fiscal Year  2009-2014 Strategic Plan. Specifically, CBP’s Strategic Plan states that  it will deploy a comprehensive integrity strategy that integrates  prevention, detection, and investigation. Further, a 2008 CBP directive  states that CBP IA is responsible for developing and implementing CBP’s  comprehensive integrity strategy to prevent, detect, and investigate all  threats to the integrity of CBP. We have previously reported that  developing effective strategies can help ensure successful  implementation of agencywide undertakings where multiple entities are  involved, such as CBP integrity-related efforts. Elements of an effective  strategy include, among others, (1) identifying the purpose, scope, and  particular problems and threats the strategy is directed toward; (2)  establishing goals, subordinate objectives and activities, priorities,  timelines, and performance measures; (3) defining costs, benefits, and  resource and investment needs; and (4) delineating roles and  responsibilities.

CBP convened the IPCC in 2011 as a forum to discuss integrity-related issues and  ideas and to share best practices among the members. IPCC is responsible for facilitating  integrity-related operations of individual offices within CBP as a deliberative body. In  particular, IPCC was tasked with making recommendations to address the results of an  integrity study conducted by the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute. The  IPCC is composed of representatives from CBP IA, OFO, USBP, Human Resources  Management, and Labor and Employee Relations, among others. See Homeland Security  Studies and Analysis Institute, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Workforce Integrity  Study. Dec. 15, 2011. committees in selected sectors, including along the southwest border, to  establish training and guidance to help BPAs and reinforce concepts such  as professional behavior and ethical decision making. OFO established  an Integrity Committee to review misconduct and corruption data related  to OFO employees, identify potential trends, and develop integrity  initiatives to address any concerns. Although CBP IA has a strategic  implementation plan for its activities and officials told us that these  integrity coordination committees have been useful as forums for sharing  information about the components’ respective integrity-related initiatives,  CBP has not yet developed and deployed an agencywide integrity  strategy.

During the course of our review, CBP IA began drafting an integrity  strategy for approval by the components and CBP’s senior management,  in accordance with CBP’s Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. CBP IA  officials stated that a comprehensive strategy is important because it  would help guide CBP integrity efforts and can, in turn, lead to specific  objectives and activities, better allocation and management of resources,  and clarification of roles and responsibilities. A 2011 workforce integrity  study commissioned by CBP recommended that CBP develop a  comprehensive integrity strategy and concluded that without such a  strategy, there is potential for inconsistent efforts, conflicting roles and  responsibilities, and unintended redundancies. However, CBP IA’s  Assistant Commissioner stated that, as of September 2012, his office had  not developed timelines for completing and implementing the agencywide  integrity strategy and has not been able to finalize the draft, in  accordance with the Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. He indicated  that that there has been significant cultural resistance among some CBP  component entities in acknowledging CBP IA’s authority and  responsibility for overseeing the implementation of all CBP integrity- related activities. Program management standards state that successful  execution of any program includes developing plans that include a  timeline for program deliverables. Without target timelines, it will be  difficult for CBP to monitor progress made toward the development and  implementation of an agencywide strategy. Further, it is too soon for us to  determine if the final strategy will meet the key elements of an effective  strategy that encompasses CBP-wide integrity stakeholders’ goals,  milestones, performance measures, resource needs, and roles and  responsibilities. A strategy that includes these elements could help better  position CBP to provide oversight and coordination of integrity initiatives  occurring across the agency.

section_title: CBP Has Not Yet Completed Analyses of Prior Cases of Corruption
paragraphs: CBP has not completed some analyses of some cases in which CBPOs  and BPAs were convicted of corruption-related charges. Such analyses  could provide CBP with information to better identify corruption or  misconduct risks to the workforce or modify existing policies, procedures,  and controls to better detect or prevent possible corrupt activities on the  part of CBPOs and BPAs. In 2007, OFO directed relevant managers to  complete postcorruption analysis reports for each employee convicted for  corruption. In 2011, USBP began requiring that these reports be  completed after the conviction of any USBP employee for corruption. The  reports are to include information such as how the employee committed  the corrupt activity, and provide, among other things, recommendations  on how USBP and OFO could improve policies, procedures, and controls  to prevent or detect similar corruption in the future. For example,  according to an OFO Director, several reports stated that the use of  personal cell phones helped facilitate and coordinate drug smuggling  efforts. As a result of these analyses, OFO implemented a restriction on  the use of personal cell phones while on duty.

As of October 2012, OFO has completed about 66 percent of the total  postcorruption analysis reports on OFO employees convicted since  October 2004 (47 of 71 total convictions). OFO’s Incident Management  Division Director stated that OFO had not completed the remaining  reports because some convictions occurred prior to the 2007 OFO  directive or because the convictions had not been published on CBP IA’s  internal website—a point that informs OFO when it has 30 days to  complete the report. USBP has completed about 4 percent of  postcorruption anlaysis reports on USBP employees convicted since  October 2004 (2 of 45 total convictions). USBP was instructed to  complete postcorruption analysis reports in August 2011, and USBP  officials stated that the agency does not have plans to complete analyses  for convictions before August 2011 because CBP IA is reviewing these  cases as part of a study to analyze behavioral traits among corrupt  employees. However, CBP IA’s study does not substitute for  postcorruption analysis reports because for this study, CBP IA  researchers are exploring the convicted employees’ thinking and behavior  to gain insights into the motives behind the betrayal of trust, how the  activity originated, and how they carried out the illegal activity. The  postcorruption reports, however, may go beyond this type of analysis and  also may aim to identify deficiencies in port or sector processes that may  have fostered or permitted corruption and to produce recommendations  specific to enhancing USBP policies, procedures, or controls. A USBP  Deputy Chief acknowledged that completing the remaining reports could  be beneficial to understanding any trends or patterns of behavior among  BPAs convicted of corruption. In some cases, OFO and USBP officials  stated that it may be difficult to complete postcorruption analysis reports  for older convictions, as witnesses and other information on the  corruption-related activities may no longer be available.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides  guidance on the importance of identifying and analyzing risks, and using  that information to make decisions. These standards address various  aspects of internal control that should be continuous, built-in components  of organizational operations. One internal control standard, risk  assessment, calls for identifying and analyzing risks that agencies face  from internal and external sources and deciding what actions should be  taken to manage these risks. The standards indicate that conditions  governing risk continually change and periodic updates are required to  ensure that risk information, such as vulnerabilities in the program,  remains current and relevant. Information collected through periodic  reviews, as well as daily operations, can inform the analysis and  assessment of risk. Complete and timely information from postcorruption  analysis reports of all convictions could assist USBP and OFO  management in obtaining and sharing lessons learned to enhance  integrity-related policies, procedures, and controls throughout CBP.

section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Data indicate that the overwhelming majority of CBP employees adhere  to the agency’s integrity standards; however, a small minority have been  convicted of engaging in corruption due, in part, to the increasing  pressure from drug-trafficking and other transnational criminal  organizations that are targeting CBPOs and BPAs, particularly along the  southwest U.S. border. The Acting Commissioner of CBP testified that no  act of corruption within the agency can or will be tolerated and that acts of  corruption compromise CBP’s ability to achieve its mission to secure  America’s borders against all threats while facilitating and expediting legal  travel and trade. Strategic and continuous monitoring of operational  vulnerabilities is important given the shifting tactics of drug-trafficking  organizations seeking to infiltrate the agency. Therefore, CBP has taken  steps to mitigate the risk of misconduct and corruption among incoming  CBPOs and BPAs by implementing controls during the preemployment  screening process. However, tracking and maintaining data on the results  of its screening tools for applicants, a feasibility assessment for potential  expansion of polygraph requirements, and a robust quality assurance  program for background investigations and periodic reinvestigations that  ensures reviews are consistently conducted and documented could better  position CBP to mitigate risk of employee corruption. In addition, clear  roles and responsibilities for OFO’s integrity officers developed in  coordination with appropriate stakeholders such as CBP IA could help  CBP ensure that the program is operating effectively. Moreover,  establishing a target time frame for completing a comprehensive integrity  strategy could help CBP ensure sufficient progress toward its  development and implementation. In addition, completed, postcorruption  analysis reports of former CBP employees who have been arrested for  corruption could better position CBP to implement any lessons learned  from these cases.

section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To enhance CBP’s efforts to mitigate the risk of corruption and  misconduct among CBPOs and BPAs, we recommend that the CBP  commissioner take the following seven actions: develop a mechanism to maintain and track data on the sources of  information (e.g., background investigation or polygraph examination  admissions) that PSD uses to determine what applicants are not  suitable for hire to help CBP IA assess the effectiveness of its  applicant screening tools; assess the feasibility of expanding the polygraph program to  incumbent CBPOs and BPAs, including the associated costs and  benefits, options for how the agency will use the results of the  examinations, and the trade-offs associated with testing incumbent  officers and agents at various frequencies;  conduct quality assurance reviews of CBP IA’s adjudications of  background investigations and periodic reinvestigations, as required  in PSD’s quality assurance program; establish a process to fully document, as required, any deficiencies  identified through PSD’s quality assurance reviews; develop detailed guidance within OFO on the roles and  responsibilities for integrity officers, in consultation with appropriate  stakeholders such as CBP IA;  set target timelines for completing and implementing a comprehensive  integrity strategy; and,  complete OFO and USBP postcorruption analysis reports for all  CBPOs and BPAs who have been convicted of corruption-related  activities, to the extent that information is available.

section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment.  DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix  II. DHS concurred with all seven recommendations and described actions  under way or plans to address them.  DHS also discussed concerns it  had with periodically polygraphing incumbent law enforcement officers.

With regard to our first recommendation, DHS concurred and indicated  that by March 31, 2013, CBP expects to collect data on the impact of the  polygraph examination regarding the outcome of CBP applicant suitability  adjudications and undertake steps to ensure data reliability across  various CBP personnel security databases.

With regard to the second recommendation, while DHS concurred, it  reported possible adverse impacts associated with periodically  polygraphing incumbent law enforcement officers.  Specifically, DHS  noted that doing so could adversely affect CBP resources without  additional resources to implement the requirement. While we understand  DHS’s concerns, we did not recommend that CBP expand its polygraph  program to incumbent employees; rather, we recommended that CBP  assess the feasibility of expanding polygraph examinations to incumbent  CBPOs and BPAs.  Thus, concerns such as these could be considered in  conducting its feasibility assessment.  As we reported, assessing the  feasibility of expanding periodic polygraphs early on in its planning efforts  could help CBP determine how to best achieve its goal of strengthening  integrity-related controls over incumbent CBPOs and BPAs. In addition,  DHS noted that expanding the polygraph program to incumbent  employees would be contingent on approval from OPM and may  encounter resistance from unions representing CBP’s employees who  may view it as a potential change to the conditions of their employment.  As noted in the report, these are important factors CBP could consider in  assessing the feasibility of expanding the polygraph program.

With regard to the other five recommendations, DHS concurred and  indicated that CBP will work to strengthen its current quality assurance  processes and develop a process to document deficiencies identified  through quality reviews; develop detailed guidance on the duties, roles,  and responsibilities of integrity officers; complete a comprehensive  integrity strategy; and develop postcorruption analysis reports for any  convictions that do not currently have such reports.  DHS estimates that it  will complete these steps by July 31, 2013. The actions that DHS has  planned or under way should help address the intent of the  recommendations. DHS also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents  earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its  issue date. If you or your staff have any questions about this report,  please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are  listed in appendix III.

section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: To examine data on arrests of and allegations against U.S. Customs and  Border Protection (CBP) employees accused of corruption or misconduct  issues, we analyzed data on 144 CBP employees arrested or indicted  from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012 for corruption activities. We  also analyzed data on allegations of corruption and misconduct against  CBP employees from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. For both arrest and  allegation data, these are the time periods for which the most complete  data were available. In particular, we analyzed variations in both sets of  data across CBP components and geographic region. To assess the  reliability of these data, we (1) performed electronic data testing and  looked for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness, and (2)  interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about these data to determine  the processes in place to ensure their accuracy. We determined that the  data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. In addition,  we interviewed officials from CBP Office of Internal Affairs (IA), Office of  Field Operations (OFO), United States Border Patrol (USBP), and CBP’s  Human Resource Management, and Labor and Employee Relations, to  gain their perspectives on these data on CBP employee corruption and  misconduct.

To evaluate CBP’s implementation of integrity-related controls to prevent  and detect employee misconduct and corruption, we analyzed relevant  laws such as the Anti-Corruption Border Act of 2010, which requires, by  January 2013, that all CBP officer (CBPO) and U.S. Border Patrol Agent  (BPA) applicants receive polygraph examinations before they are hired.

We also reviewed documentation on CBP’s preemployment screening  practices and their results—including background investigations and  polygraph examinations—and relevant data and documentation on the  random drug testing program and the periodic reinvestigation process for  incumbent CBPOs and BPAs. In particular, we evaluated CBP IA data on  the technical results of polygraph examinations from January 2008  through August 2012. To assess the reliability of the technical results of  the polygraph data, we (1) performed electronic data testing and looked  for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness, and (2) interviewed  agency officials knowledgeable about these data to determine the  processes in place to ensure their accuracy. We determined that these  data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. In addition,  we examined CBP IA’s quality assurance program for its Personnel  Security Division (PSD), including interviewing PSD officials who are  responsible for deciding whether an applicant or incumbent officer or  agent is suitable for hire or continued employment. We also analyzed  Human Resource Management’s random drug testing data for fiscal  years 2009 through 2011, the time period for which the most complete  data were available, and examined the results of those mandated periodic  reinvestigations that CBP IA had completed as of September 2012. To  assess the reliability of these data, we conducted tests for accuracy and  interviewed officials responsible for managing the drug testing and  reinvestigation programs and found that the data were sufficiently reliable  for the purposes of our report.

We compared CBP’s integrity-related controls, as applicable, against  recommended controls in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government and standard practices from the Project Management  Institute. Furthermore, we conducted site visits to four locations along  the southwest U.S. border to observe the implementation of various  integrity-related controls and obtain perspectives from CBP IA, OFO, and  USBP officials at these locations on the implementation of integrity- related controls. We conducted these visits in El Paso, Texas; Laredo,  Texas; San Diego, California; and, Tucson, Arizona. We selected these  locations on the basis of a variety of factors, including the colocation of  CBP IA with OFO offices and USBP sectors along the southwest border  and the number of allegations against or arrests of CBP employees for  corruption or misconduct. Because we selected a nonprobability sample  of sites, the information we obtained from these interviews and visits  cannot be generalized to all OFO, USBP, and CBP IA field locations.

However, observations obtained from these visits provided us with a  greater understanding of CBP’s integrity-related initiatives.

To evaluate CBP’s integrity strategy, including how the agency  incorporates lessons learned from prior misconduct and corruption cases,  we reviewed documentation on integrity initiatives from CBP IA, OFO,  and USBP, as well as from the Integrity Integrated Planning and  Coordination Committee (IPCC), which CBP convened in 2011 as a  forum to discuss integrity-related issues and ideas and to share standard  practices among the members. In particular, we analyzed these  documents against the requirements set forth in the CBP Fiscal Year  2009-2014 Strategic Plan. In addition, we analyzed all available  postcorruption analyses reports, which identify deficiencies that may have  enabled CBP employees to engage in corruption-related activities,  against OFO and USBP program requirements. We interviewed officials  in Washington, D.C., from the Office of Policy and Planning, CBP IA,  USBP, OFO, and IPCC, as well as officials during our site visits,  regarding CBP’s integrity strategy and the extent to which CBP is using  lessons learned from prior corruption and misconduct cases to guide  changes in policies and procedures, as appropriate.

We conducted this performance audit from December 2011 to December  2012, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

section_title: Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact

section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet, Assistant  Director; David Alexander; Nanette J. Barton; Frances Cook; Wendy Dye;  David Greyer; Jackson Hufnagle; Wendy Johnson; Otis S. Martin; and  Linda Miller made significant contributions to the work.


Question-summary annotations: questions: question: What is the status of arrests of CBP officials?
answer: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data indicate that arrests of CBP employees for corruption-related activities since fiscal years 2005 account for less than 1 percent of CBP’s entire workforce per fiscal year. The majority of arrests of CBP employees were related to misconduct.
child_questions: question: By what margin is the relationship between misconduct and corruption?
answer: There were 2,170 reported incidents of arrests for acts of misconduct such as domestic violence or driving under the influence from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012, and a total of 144 current or former CBP employees were arrested or indicted for corruption-related activities, such as the smuggling of aliens and drugs, of whom 125 have been convicted as of October 2012.

question: What is the geographical center of CBP misconduct?
answer: Further, the majority of allegations against CBP employees since fiscal year 2006 occurred at locations along the southwest border.

question: What is the official reaction to these arrests?
answer: CBP officials have stated that they are concerned about the negative impact that these cases have on agencywide integrity.

questions: question: What resources does the CBP employ to combat corruption and misconduct?
answer: BP employs screening tools to mitigate the risk of employee corruption and misconduct for both applicants (e.g., background investigations and polygraph examinations) and incumbent CBP officers and Border Patrol agents (e.g., random drug tests and periodic reinvestigations).
child_questions: question: Why are these tools ineffective?
answer: However, CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs (IA) does not have a mechanism to maintain and track data on which of its screening tools (e.g., background investigation or polygraph examination) provided the information used to determine which applicants were not suitable for hire. Maintaining and tracking such data is consistent with internal control standards and could better position CBP IA to gauge the relative effectiveness of its screening tools.

question: What other potential options is CBP considering to aid in their testing?
answer: CBP IA is also considering requiring periodic polygraphs for incumbent officers and agents; however, it has not yet fully assessed the feasibility of expanding the program. For example, CBP has not yet fully assessed the costs of implementing polygraph examinations on incumbent officers and agents, including costs for additional supervisors and adjudicators, or factors such as the trade-offs associated with testing incumbent officers and agents at various frequencies. A feasibility assessment of program expansion could better position CBP to determine whether and how to best achieve its goal of strengthening integrity-related controls for officers and agents.

question: How could CBP IA improve its quality assurance?
answer: Further, CBP IA has not consistently conducted monthly quality assurance reviews of its adjudications since 2008, as required by internal policies, to help ensure that adjudicators are following procedures in evaluating the results of the preemployment and periodic background investigations. CBP IA officials stated that they have performed some of the required checks since 2008, but they could not provide data on how many checks were conducted. Without these quality assurance checks, it is difficult for CBP IA to determine the extent to which deficiencies, if any, exist in the adjudication process.

questions: question: To what extent does CBP employ an integrity strategy?
answer: CBP does not have an integrity strategy, as called for in its Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan.
child_questions: question: What is the current state of the strategy?
answer: During the course of our review, CBP IA began drafting a strategy, but CBP IA’s Assistant Commissioner stated the agency has not set target timelines for completing and implementing this strategy.
child_questions: question: What may have caused this stagnation?
answer: Moreover, he stated that there has been significant cultural resistance among some CBP components in acknowledging CBP IA’s authority for overseeing all integrity-related activities.

question: Why is it important that this strategy becomes completed and active?
answer: Setting target timelines is consistent with program management standards and could help CBP monitor progress made toward the development and implementation of an agencywide strategy.

questions: question: What is CBP's importance?
answer: CBP—a component within the Department of Homeland Security— is responsible for securing U.S. borders and facilitating legal travel and trade.
child_questions: question: What vulnerability does the CBP have because of that importance?
answer: Drug-trafficking and other transnational criminal organizations are seeking to target CBP employees with bribes to facilitate the illicit transport of drugs, aliens, and other contraband across the southwest U.S. border, in particular.

question: What organizations monitor CBP?
answer: CBP IA is responsible for promoting the integrity of CBP’s workforce, programs, and operations; and CBP components implement integrity initiatives. GAO was asked to review CBP’s efforts to ensure the integrity of its workforce.
child_questions: question: What are the contents of GAO's report?
answer: This report examines (1) data on arrests of and allegations against CBP employees for corruption or misconduct, (2) CBP’s implementation of integrity-related controls, and (3) CBP’s strategy for its integrity programs. GAO analyzed arrest and allegation data since fiscal year 2005 and 2006, respectively, reviewed integrity-related policies and procedures, and interviewed CBP officials in headquarters and at four locations along the southwest border selected for geographic location, among other factors.