Personnel Security Clearances: Additional Guidance and Oversight Needed at DHS and DOD to Ensure Consistent Application of Revocation Process
Released: 2014-09-08T00:00:00


Highlights: section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Personnel security clearances allow people access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. In light of recent events, having a high-quality process to determine whether an individual's eligibility to access classified information should be revoked has become increasingly important. DOD and DHS grant the most clearances in the executive branch, and the Director of National Intelligence is responsible for, among other things, oversight of clearance eligibility determinations.

GAO was asked to evaluate revocation processes at DHS and DOD. GAO evaluated the extent to which the agencies (1) track data on these processes; (2) consistently implement government-wide requirements and exercise oversight over these processes; and (3) determine outcomes for employees whose clearances were revoked. During this review, GAO identified possible inaccuracies in DOD's data on eligible personnel with access to classified information and is also reporting on that issue. GAO analyzed agency revocation data, reviewed executive orders, agency guidance, and documents, and interviewed officials from ODNI, DHS, DOD, and their components.

section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) both have systems that track varying levels of detail related to revocations of employees' security clearances. DHS's and DOD's data systems could provide data on the number of and reasons for revocations, but they could not provide some data, such as the number of individuals who received a proposal to revoke their eligibility for access to classified information, which means that the total number of employees affected by the revocation process is unknown.

Inconsistent implementation of the requirements in the governing executive orders by DHS, DOD, and some of their components, and limited oversight over the revocation process, have resulted in some employees experiencing different protections and processes than other employees. Specifically, DHS and DOD have implemented the requirements for the revocation process contained in Executive Orders 12968 and 10865 in different ways for different groups of personnel. Although certain differences are permitted or required by the executive orders, GAO found that implementation by some components could potentially be inconsistent with the executive orders in two areas. As a result, some employees may not be provided with certain information upon which a revocation appeal determination is based, and may not be told that they have a right to counsel. These inconsistencies in implementation may be in part because neither DHS nor DOD have evaluated the quality of their processes or developed performance measures to measure quality department-wide. Similarly, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has only exercised limited oversight by reviewing policies and procedures within some agencies. ODNI has not established any metrics to measure the quality of the process government-wide and has not reviewed revocation processes across the federal government to determine the extent to which policies and procedures should be uniform.

DHS and DOD employees whose clearances were revoked may not have consistent employment outcomes, such as reassignment or termination, because these outcomes are determined by several factors, such as the agency's mission and needs and the manager's discretion. Further, most components could not readily ascertain employment outcomes of individuals with revoked clearances, because these data are not readily available, and communication between personnel security and human capital offices at the departments varies.

GAO's comparison of the total number of DOD employees eligible to access classified information to the total number of DOD employees in fiscal year 2013 suggests that DOD's clearance eligibility totals may be inaccurate. Specifically, GAO found that the number of eligible employees exceeded the total number of employees in five DOD components. DOD officials said this discrepancy could be because DOD's eligibility database is not consistently updated when an employee separates. As a result, the total number of government employees eligible to access classified information that ODNI reports to Congress likely overstates the number of eligible DOD employees. Inaccurate eligibility data hampers DOD's ability to reduce its number of clearance holders to minimize risk and reduce costs to the government.

section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DHS, DOD, and the DNI take several actions to improve data quality and oversight related to the personnel security revocation process. DHS, DOD, and ODNI generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Personnel security clearances allow government and contractor  employees to gain access to classified information that, through  unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave  damage to U.S. national security. Events—such as the May 2010  disclosure of classified documents to Wikileaks, the June 2013 disclosure  of classified documents by a former National Security Agency contractor,  and the September 2013 shooting at the Washington Navy Yard— illustrate the danger that can be posed from insider threats, which involve  individuals with authorized access to government resources and  information. While much attention has been paid to the processes for  granting a personnel security clearance, equally important are the  processes governing whether individuals who have personnel security  clearances should retain their access to classified information. If an  individual’s circumstances change in a manner that raises security  concerns regarding whether he or she should continue to be entrusted  with access to classified information, then processes exist to take away,  or revoke, an individual’s eligibility to access classified information, and  for that individual to appeal that decision.

After the September 16, 2013, shooting at the Washington Navy Yard,  several reviews were initiated and conducted to assess the security  clearance process and facilitate progress in evaluating and improving the  quality of that process. For example, in February 2014, the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB) issued a report that assessed risks  inherent in the current security, suitability, and credentialing processes  and identified recommended solutions to safeguard personnel and protect  sensitive information. In November 2013, the Department of Defense  (DOD) issued reports from two reviews addressing gaps or deficiencies in  DOD programs, policies, and procedures regarding security at DOD  installations and the granting and reviewing of security clearances for  DOD employees and contractor personnel. In these reports, both OMB  and DOD made recommendations related to improving access to  information and reducing the number of clearance holders, among other  recommendations.

Further, although the report recommendations have not yet been  implemented, all three reports recommended continuous evaluation of  employees and contractors who are eligible for access to classified  information, which involves automated data checks from sources such as  credit checks, social media, and personnel records to provide near-real- time notification of relevant information to help identify potential risks to  national security. Implementation of continuous evaluation could prompt  further investigation of events and incidents that could lead to an increase in the number of revocations that are proposed by government agencies.

In addition, the consistent application of revocation processes across  different federal agencies has become increasingly important due to the  requirement for clearance reciprocity, where executive-branch agencies  are required to accept a background investigation or personnel security  clearance determination completed by any authorized investigative or  adjudicative agency, subject to certain exceptions.

For purposes of this report, references to revocation of an employee’s security clearance  means revocation of an employee’s eligibility to access classified information. data, we reviewed the revocation data and supporting documentation and  discussed their reliability with agency officials. We found DHS’s and  DOD’s data on the number of revocations and the reasons for the  revocations to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

To evaluate the extent to which DHS and DOD have consistently  implemented government-wide requirements in their revocation  processes and exercise oversight, along with the DNI, over the process,  we identified key agency and employee rights and responsibilities in  Executive Orders 12968 and 10865 and determined whether the  agencies were providing employees notice of these rights. We also  reviewed applicable federal laws and agency regulations and policies for  revoking an employee’s or contractor’s eligibility for access to classified  information, and interviewed personnel security and human capital office  officials. We reviewed revocation processes for federal civilian and  military personnel within DHS and DOD, excluding the known intelligence  community, and for contractor personnel that follow DOD guidance and  processes. We also met with DHS, DOD, and Office of the Director of  National Intelligence (ODNI) officials to discuss the oversight provided  over personnel security revocation processes, their suggestions for  building quality into the revocation process, and whether any metrics or  reporting requirements exist related to revocations.

To evaluate how DHS and DOD determine the employment outcomes of  personnel whose clearances have been revoked, we obtained and  analyzed DHS and DOD human capital guidance—specifically their  guidance for misconduct, discipline, and adverse actions—and met with  human capital office officials to discuss the resulting employment  outcomes, such as reassignment or termination, for their military and  federal civilian employees. For this objective on managing employment  outcomes, within DHS we focused on selected DHS components that had  the highest number of security clearance revocations from fiscal years  2011 through 2013: the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement, and U.S. Secret Service. Within DOD, we reviewed the  headquarters-level elements of the Departments of the Army, the Navy,  and the Air Force; the Marine Corps; and Washington Headquarters  Services, which provides human capital support for several nonservice  DOD agencies and activities.

During the course of our review, we identified an issue with the accuracy  of DOD’s data on the total number of persons eligible for access to  classified information. To examine the accuracy of DOD’s eligibility data,  we compared the total number of DOD employees eligible for access to  classified information reported by DOD’s personnel security management  system to the total number of DOD employees in each component. We  did not find DOD’s data on the total number of current military, federal  civilian employees, and contractors who are eligible for access to  classified information to be reliable, and our report provides further  information on this issue. A more detailed discussion of our scope and  methodology is provided in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 to September 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Roles and Responsibilities of Organizations Involved in Revocation of Personnel Security Clearances at DHS and DOD
paragraphs: Multiple agencies and organizations within DHS and DOD have key roles  and responsibilities for different steps of the personnel security clearance  revocation process. In 2008, Executive Order 13467 designated the DNI  as the Security Executive Agent. As such, the DNI is responsible for  developing policies and procedures to help ensure the effective, efficient,  and timely completion of background investigations and adjudications  relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information  and eligibility to hold a sensitive position.

Within DHS, the Office of the Chief Security Officer develops,  implements, and oversees the department’s security policies, programs,  and standards, among other things. The DHS Chief of Personnel  Security Division, under the direction of the Chief Security Officer, is  responsible for issuing department-wide policy for the Personnel  Suitability and Security Program, maintaining a departmental database for  tracking personnel security cases, and determining employees’ eligibility  for access to classified information. DHS component Chief Security  Officers implement personnel security and suitability programs within their  respective component.

section_title: Guidance Governing Revocation of Personnel Security Clearances at DHS and DOD
paragraphs: Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information (Aug. 2, 1995, as amended).

section_title: Personnel Security Clearance Revocation Process
paragraphs: DHS and DOD can revoke an employee’s eligibility for access to  classified information based on 13 adjudicative guidelines. While the  personnel security clearance revocation process varies by agency and  type of employee, the general process for DHS and DOD military and  federal civilian personnel, and for government contractors, is summarized  in figure 2. According to DHS officials, the revocation process will end if  the employee chooses to resign before a decision has been made; if a  DOD military or civilian employee has initiated an appeal of a revocation  decision, the appeal will be decided even if an employee has separated.

The process begins with adverse information that can come from a  variety of sources, including but not limited to individual self-reporting,  federal or contract investigators who are conducting an investigation,  Inspector General channels, hotlines, civilian law enforcement agencies,  and reporting by persons such as security officers. According to DHS and  DOD officials, the steps and time frames associated with investigating  and verifying the credibility of the adverse information can vary  considerably according to the nature and source of the adverse  information. Some of these steps may include notifying the employee that  adverse information was reported against him or her, allowing the  employee an opportunity to provide a response, obtaining information  from other government agencies, and conducting an updated background  investigation to obtain court records, criminal records, and financial  checks.

The February 2014 OMB report found that clear and consistent  requirements do not exist across government for employees or  contractors to report information that could affect their continued fitness,  suitability, or eligibility for federal employment and that there was not  consistent guidance in place to direct contractors or contract managers to   The  report noteworthy or derogatory information regarding employees.report recommended acceleration of the implementation of a continuous  evaluation program that would notify security officials of noteworthy  events or incidents in near-real time. If incident reporting increases as a  result of these recommendations, it raises the potential that such  incidents could lead to an increase in the number of revocation cases in  the future. As part of an ongoing review on the quality of the personnel  security background investigation process, we are examining the  implementation status of the recommendations in this OMB report.

section_title: DHS and DOD Data Systems Do Not Track Complete Revocation Information
paragraphs: DHS’s and DOD’s data systems track varying levels of detail related to  personnel security clearance revocations. DHS’s and DOD’s data  systems could provide data on the number of and reasons for  revocations, but they could not provide some data, such as the number of  individuals who received a proposal to revoke their eligibility for access to  classified information, which means that the total number of employees  affected by the revocation process is unknown.
subsections: section_title: DHS Revoked Clearances of Fewer than 1 Percent of Employees Eligible to Access Classified Information, but It Is Believed That Many Employees Resign before Final Determination Is Made
paragraphs: DHS data show that about 125,000 DHS civilian and military employees  were eligible to access classified information as of March 2014, and that  DHS revoked access to classified information for 113 employees, or less  than 1 percent, in fiscal year 2013. An official from the DHS Office of  General Counsel explained that many employees resign before the final  determination is made to revoke their security clearance. Importantly, the  total population affected by the revocation process is unknown because  the number of individuals who received a proposal to revoke their  eligibility for access to classified information is unknown, as discussed  below. Table 1 shows the number of DHS employees eligible to access  classified information as of March 2014, and the number of personnel  security clearance revocations for each DHS component in fiscal year  2013, with the U.S. Coast Guard having the largest number of  revocations. Coast Guard officials stated that the increase in the number  of revocations for Coast Guard military personnel in fiscal year 2013  could be explained in part because that was the first year the Coast  Guard enforced the use of position sensitivity codes. They said that, as  a result, some administratively withdrawn clearances were counted as  revoked, which artificially inflated the revocation number.

Table 2 provides additional information on the number of personnel  security clearance revocations for each DHS component in fiscal years  2011 through 2013.

DHS data show that personal conduct, financial considerations, and  criminal conduct were the most common reasons personnel security  clearances were revoked in fiscal year 2013. Figure 3 provides details  about the issues underlying personnel security clearance revocations for  each DHS component in fiscal year 2013.

DHS employees whose access to classified information was revoked can  first appeal the adverse decision with an initial appeal to a second-level  deciding authority, and then appeal this decision with a final appeal to a  three-person Security Appeals Board. DHS data show that, in fiscal year  2013, 24 employees appealed a revocation decision to the DHS Security  Appeals Board. Of those 24 employees, 1 had his or her security  clearance reinstated.

section_title: DOD Revoked Clearances of More than 16,000 Employees and 2,500 Contractors from Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013
paragraphs: DOD data show that DOD revoked eligibility for access to classified  information for more than 16,000 military and civilian employees from  fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and for almost 2,500 contractors  government-wide during this same period. Because of potential  inaccuracies in DOD eligibility data, which are discussed below, we were  unable to determine the percentage of DOD clearance holders whose  clearances were revoked. However, as we found with DHS, the total  population affected by the revocation process is unknown because the  number of individuals who received a proposal to revoke their eligibility for  access to classified information is unknown, as discussed in the next  subsection in this report. Table 3 shows the number of personnel security  clearance revocations in fiscal years 2009 through 2013 for each DOD  component, with Army military personnel having the largest number of  revocations, and for contractors government-wide working in the industrial  security program.

The most common reasons for revoking a personnel security clearance  for DOD civilian and military personnel in fiscal year 2013 were criminal  conduct, drug involvement, and personal conduct. The most common  reasons for revocation of security clearances for contractor personnel in  fiscal year 2013 were financial considerations, personal conduct, and  criminal conduct. Figure 4 provides details about the issues underlying  personnel security clearance revocations for each DOD component and  for contractors in fiscal year 2013.

section_title: DHS’s and DOD’s Systems Do Not Capture All Revocation-Related Data, Including the Total Population Affected by the Revocation Process
paragraphs: Although DHS’s and DOD’s data systems could provide data on the  number of and reasons for revocations, neither department is currently  required to track or report security clearance revocations data or any  related metrics outside of the DHS and DOD elements of the intelligence  community. As a result, neither system could provide data on how many  individuals separated before a revocation decision was made, appeals,  and time to complete a revocation case. Notably, neither the DHS nor the  DOD system was able to provide data about the total number of  individuals who received a proposal to revoke their security clearance,  which would likely exceed the total number of revocations. Therefore, we  are unable to comment on the total number of employees who might be  affected by the revocation process. In order for organizations to measure  performance, it is important that they have sufficiently complete, accurate,  and consistent data to document performance and support decision  making, while balancing the cost and effort involved in gathering and  analyzing data. DHS’s system for managing and standardizing  personnel security data, the Integrated Security Management System  (ISMS), has not typically been used to track additional information about  security clearance revocations, such as (1) the number of employees who  received a proposal to revoke their clearance, (2) the number of  employees who separated from the department before a revocation  decision was made, (3) the number of employees that filed an initial  appeal of a revocation decision, and (4) the length of time to complete a  revocation case.

First, DHS officials could not provide us with data on the number of  individuals who had received a proposal to revoke their clearance. They  said that this information could be recorded in ISMS, but that this  capability may not be used by all of the components. Second, DHS  officials said that ISMS does not track cases where an individual  separated from the department before a decision was made regarding a  proposal to revoke a personnel security clearance. For example, DHS  officials said that if an employee was issued a proposal to revoke his or  her clearance and he or she resigned and never responded to the  proposal, then the security clearance was never revoked and the case  would not be counted as a revocation. Once an initial decision is made to  revoke a clearance, the decision is entered into ISMS and that decision  will become final even if the employee does not respond, so those cases  would be counted. Third, DHS data on the number of employees that filed  an initial appeal of a revocation decision were not available. Officials from  the Office of the Chief Security Officer told us that ISMS has a module  that could provide this information, but because use of this module is not  required, only a few DHS components use it. Finally, while officials at  DHS components stated that the entire revocation process can take over  a year to complete, DHS data on the average amount of time it takes to  complete a revocation case were not available. Officials from the Office of  the Chief Security Officer said that while ISMS can identify this  information in individual records, it cannot track this type of data as a  whole across the DHS components, because each appeal level would be  saved as a different module entry. They said they try to complete a  revocation case as quickly as possible. However, in some cases,  employees request extensions of time in order to obtain representation or  to obtain documents to refute or explain the revocation decision, which  lengthens the process time. Until DHS considers whether tracking  additional revocation and appeals information would be beneficial, and  modifies its system to provide such information as is deemed beneficial,  the department will continue to lack visibility over certain aspects of the  security clearance revocation and appeal process, which may hinder its  ability to effectively oversee these processes.

Similarly, DOD’s Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) system,  which is designated as DOD’s system of record for personnel security  management to record and document personnel security actions, captures varying levels of detail related to security clearance revocations.   also  We found certain JPAS data fields partially completed or incomplete,  such as fields showing whether an employee received a proposal to  revoke his or her clearance, whether the employee chose to appeal the  revocation decision in writing or in person, the time taken at different  stages of the employee’s revocation appeal, and the number of  employees who separated from the department before a revocation  decision was made. For example, although more than 16,000 military and  federal civilian employees had their personnel security clearances  revoked from fiscal years 2009 through 2013, JPAS data reflected that  fewer than 3,000 individuals had received a statement of reasons, which  is DOD’s initial proposal to revoke a personnel security clearance,  because the JPAS field to record this information had not been filled.

The JPAS system of record notice, dated May 3, 2011, states that the  categories of records in JPAS include records documenting the personnel  security adjudicative and management process. However, officials from  the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), DOD’s JPAS administrator,  and the DOD CAF stated that DOD users instead generally used  component-specific case-management systems to keep track of  adjudication information. DMDC officials explained that the final  eligibility determination, and not all the other adjudication data, from the  different case-management systems was uploaded to JPAS. Officials  from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, which  is responsible for overseeing DOD’s personnel security program, stated  that their oversight efforts have been hindered by the lack of available  data in JPAS, and that they do not have access to the component-specific  case-management systems. DMDC officials stated that JPAS and the  different case-management systems are going to be replaced, by 2016  and the end of fiscal year 2014, respectively. ODNI officials stated that it  would be important for DOD to improve the data in JPAS before the new  systems are implemented.

DOD is already aware that data in JPAS are not being updated as  frequently as needed. For example, the November 2013 DOD report in  response to the Navy Yard shooting found that DOD does not have  policies addressing roles, responsibilities, and standards for security  managers to ensure the upkeep of data in JPAS. The report  recommended that the department establish, reinforce, and enforce roles  and responsibilities for updates to JPAS. Similarly, in April 2014, the DOD  Inspector General issued a report assessing the personnel security  clearance processes for contractors in four defense intelligence agencies.  This report found a lack of effective recordkeeping that occurred because  the appropriate investigative and personnel security databases, including  JPAS, were not being reliably populated with investigative and security  information. The report recommended that the Under Secretary of  Defense for Intelligence direct the defense intelligence agencies to review  the procedures used to ensure that JPAS and other systems are being  properly populated. The report also found that DOD did not have any  overarching policy documents governing JPAS operation, and  recommended that DOD develop and issue an overarching policy for  JPAS.improve the data in JPAS. Until DOD takes steps to ensure that  information is recorded and updated in its systems, the department will  continue to lack visibility over the security clearance revocation and  appeal process, which may hinder its ability to effectively oversee these  processes.

section_title: Inconsistent Implementation of Revocation Requirements across DHS and DOD Is Due in Part to Limited Oversight of the Security Clearance Revocation Process
paragraphs: Inconsistent implementation of the requirements in the governing  executive orders by DHS, DOD, and some of their components, and  limited oversight over the revocation process, have resulted in employees  in some agency components and workforces experiencing different  protections and processes than employees in other agency components  and workforces. DHS and DOD have implemented the requirements in  Executive Orders 12968 and 10865 in different ways for different groups  of personnel, but these differences are required or permitted by the  executive orders. However, some components’ implementation of the  clearance revocation process could potentially be inconsistent with the  executive orders in two areas: having an opportunity to be provided with  certain information upon which a revocation appeal determination is  based, and communicating the right to counsel. Although DHS and DOD  have performed some oversight over the revocation process at the  component level, they have not evaluated the quality of the process or  developed performance measures to measure quality department-wide.  Finally, while ODNI has exercised oversight of security clearance  revocations by reviewing policies and procedures within some agencies,  ODNI has not established any metrics to measure the quality of the  process government-wide and has not reviewed revocation processes  across the federal government to determine the extent to which policies  and procedures should be uniform.
subsections: section_title: DHS and DOD Have Implemented Executive Order Requirements in Different Ways
paragraphs: DHS and DOD have implemented some requirements in the governing  executive orders in different ways for different groups of personnel, but  these differences are required or permitted by the executive orders. The  areas of inconsistency include implementation of the personal  appearance requirement, cross-examination of witnesses, and  administration of the appeal boards within DOD.
subsections: section_title: DHS and DOD Implementation of Personal Appearance Requirement Provides Different Protection for Contractors than Military and Civilian Personnel
paragraphs: The right to a personal appearance during the personnel security  clearance revocation process has been implemented differently across  the two departments in a manner that provides different protections for  contractors than for military and civilian personnel in two areas: the timing  of the personal appearance and the information provided to the employee  about the rationale supporting the revocation decision and the effect of  the personal appearance. Executive Order 12968 provides that  employees shall be provided an opportunity to appear personally at some  point in the process before an adjudicative or other authority; it does not  specify when during the process this personal appearance should occur.  Executive Order 10865 provides that a contractor shall be provided an  opportunity to appear personally after he or she has provided a written  reply to the proposal to revoke eligibility to access classified information.  Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals officials explained that the  personal appearance is a significant opportunity to refute, explain,  extenuate or mitigate critical facts, and stated that the later timing of this  significant procedural protection for military and civilian personnel can  adversely affect the individual’s continued employment while the appeal  process is completed.

The timing of the personal appearance for contractors is earlier in the  revocation process than for DHS employees and DOD military and civilian  employees. Contractors who receive a proposal to revoke their clearance  may choose to respond to the proposal by requesting a personal  appearance before an administrative judge. The administrative judge, in  turn, issues a written decision to revoke or sustain the clearance after the  employee has had his or her hearing. The contractor can appeal this  decision to an appeal board. Thus, contractors have their personal  appearance before the revocation decision is made. In contrast, military  and civilian personnel within DHS and DOD who receive a notice that  their clearance may be revoked can only submit written documentation  prior to a revocation decision. Adjudicators issue a written decision to  revoke or sustain the clearance before any personal appearance by, and  without any in-person discussion with, the employee. The employee can  appeal this written decision and request a personal appearance during  the appeal process.

Furthermore, DHS military and civilian employees, and contractor  employees government-wide, have a better opportunity than DOD military  and civilian employees to understand the rationale for the revocation  decision and the effect their personal appearance may have had on the  revocation decision. DHS military and civilian employees receive a written  decision letter to revoke or sustain the clearance from the individual who  presided over the personal appearance. Similarly, contractors  government-wide are also provided a copy of the administrative judge’s  written decision. However, for DOD military and civilian employees, the  administrative judge who presided over the personal appearance during  the appeal makes a written recommendation rather than a decision. This  recommendation is sent directly to one of DOD’s Personnel Security  Appeals Boards (PSAB), based on the agency to which the employee is  assigned, and the recommendation generally is not shared with the DOD  military or civilian employee. The DOD PSABs consider the administrative  judge’s recommendation and other evidence when they reach and issue a  final written decision regarding the security clearance to the employee,  but they are not required to follow the judge’s recommendation. The  employee is provided a final written decision from one of the three military  department PSABs, which cannot be appealed, but the employee  generally is not privy to the administrative judge’s recommendation. An  exception is the Washington Headquarters Services appeal board which,  in its written decision, typically provides the employee with a copy of the  administrative judge’s recommendation and the hearing transcript. Army  PSAB officials explained that providing the judge’s recommendation to  the employee could be misleading because the individual might assume  that was the final decision, and would be disappointed if the PSAB  reached a different decision.

The level of detail contained in the written decisions received by  employees after the personal appearance also varied, with contractors  having more information about the rationale for the decision than military  and federal civilian personnel in the military departments. When we  reviewed Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals administrative judge  decisions that are provided to contractors, we found that they contained  detailed findings of fact, discussions of applicable law and policy, and  analysis, which provides an employee an in-depth understanding of the  rationale for the judge’s decision. In reviewing versions of the PSAB  decisions that are provided to military and civilian employees, however,  we found that the Army and Air Force PSAB decisions were in a short  memorandum format that state that case records have been reviewed  and the board either sustains the revocation decision or reinstates  eligibility for access to classified information. We found that only the Navy  PSAB decisions provided a more detailed explanation of the rationale for  the revocation of a security clearance. DOD guidance states that the  PSAB’s written decision will provide the reasons that the PSAB either  sustained or overturned the original determination of the adjudication  facility, and that the PSAB’s final written determination shall state its  rationale.

According to Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals officials, DOD’s  process for its military and civilian workers provides less transparency,  quality, and accountability compared to contractor personnel. Specifically,  these officials stated that DOD’s process for military and civilian  employees makes it difficult to determine by reviewing the decision how  or why component PSAB cases are decided the way they are. The  officials also stated that they would like more transparency with regard to  whether the component PSABs agreed or not with the administrative  judge’s recommendation, and stated that as of summer 2013, they are  now able to track this information.

section_title: DHS and DOD Employees Experience Different Rights to Cross-examine Witnesses during the Revocation Process
paragraphs: DHS and DOD employees are provided different rights to present and  cross-examine witnesses during personal appearances, as the  departments have implemented the executive orders differently, resulting  in contractors, DOD employees, and some DHS employees receiving  greater opportunities to cross-examine witnesses than other DHS  employees. Executive Order 10865 explicitly provides contractors the  opportunity to cross-examine persons who have made oral or written  statements adverse to the employee, subject to certain exceptions. In  contrast, Executive Order 12968, which covers military and civilian  employees and contractors, is silent on the opportunity to do so. DOD  military and civilian employees are permitted to cross-examine witnesses  according to a memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence issued in November 2007. Officials from the Defense Office  of Hearings and Appeals and the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Intelligence stated that this was done as a matter of  fundamental fairness, to give military and civilian employees an  opportunity that had been provided to contractors for years.

DHS Instruction Handbook 121-01-007, The Department of Homeland Security  Personnel Suitability and Security Program (June 2009). witnesses during the personal appearance, while employees at other  DHS components, such as U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, have been allowed to  cross-examine witnesses during the personal appearance. U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials stated that employees  were allowed to call and question witnesses during the personal  appearance on a case-by-case basis. DHS officials from the Office of the  Chief Security Officer told us that all employees should be treated the  same across DHS’s components. They said that they would clarify the  wording in the instruction, a draft of which has been under revision for  more than a year; however, the officials had not decided whether they  would revise the instruction to allow or prohibit the testimony or cross- examination of witnesses, and they could not tell us when the revised  instruction would be finalized. Until the processes are consistent for all  employees, and such processes are finalized in an instruction, employees  within DHS may continue to have different rights concerning cross- examination of witnesses during the revocation process, depending on  which component they work for.

section_title: DOD and the Military Departments Disagree on Legal Authority, Risks, and Benefits of Consolidating Multiple Appeals Boards
paragraphs: Each of DOD’s three military departments—of the Army, the Navy, and  the Air Force—has a PSAB that reviews cases and makes final eligibility  determinations for access to classified information for that department’s  military and civilian employees. A fourth appeals board is administered  by DOD’s Washington Headquarters Services, which reviews civilian  employee cases for all other DOD agencies. A fifth appeals board is  administered by the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals, which  reviews cases for all contractors in the industrial security program,  including DOD and DHS. We have previously reported that overlap  occurs when programs have similar goals, devise similar strategies and  activities to achieve those goals, or target similar users, and duplication  occurs when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same  activities or provide the same services to the same beneficiaries.

While  overlap in efforts may be appropriate in some instances, especially if  agencies can leverage each others’ efforts, in other instances overlap  may be unintended, may be unnecessary, or may represent an inefficient  use of U.S. government resources. DOD’s multiple different PSABs could  constitute inefficient overlap because more than one component within  DOD provides the same service.

In 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed a series of initiatives designed  to reduce duplication, overhead, and excess and instill a culture of  savings and cost accountability across the department. As part of this  initiative, in March 2011, the Secretary approved a recommendation to  colocate and consolidate the overlapping security clearance appeal  boards with the Defense Legal Services Agency, similar to the  colocation and consolidation of the service adjudication activities that  were previously directed by the base realignment and closure process  and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Secretary directed a  completion date of September 30, 2011, for this recommendation.  However, this recommendation had not been implemented at the time of  our review. A Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals official explained  that this direction had not been cancelled, but it had not been  implemented because of opposition from the military departments.  Officials from the Navy PSAB stated that the direction had not been  implemented because the PSABs had not received any instructions or  guidance to implement this direction from the Defense Legal Services  Agency. Similarly, the Army PSAB attributed the lack of action to a focus  on completing the consolidation of DOD’s adjudication facilities as well as  the absence of policy direction from the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence.

An official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence explained that there has been an impasse since 2011 over a  legal question regarding whether the PSAB consolidation directed by the  Secretary of Defense is consistent with Executive Order 12968.  Specifically, Army and Air Force PSAB officials stated that PSAB  consolidation is not consistent with Executive Order 12968, explaining  that the review proceedings outlined in the executive order provide an  employee with revoked access to classified information the opportunity for  a final appeal in writing to an agency head–appointed high-level panel.  Army and Air Force PSAB officials stated that “agency head” refers to the  Secretary of the Military Departments, not the Secretary of Defense. Air  Force PSAB officials stated that the Secretary of Defense direction for  PSAB consolidation would require modifying section 5.2 of Executive  Order 12968, and that removing PSABs from the services would neither  enhance due process nor national security. Air Force PSAB officials also  explained that the procedures used to review the DOD efficiency  proposals did not include the opportunity for the service Secretaries to  review and comment, and thus the memo directing consolidation of the  PSABs was signed before military department equities in maintaining  their department PSABs were captured for consideration.

However, an official from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals  explained that the term “agency head” as used in the executive order  includes the Secretary of Defense. Further, an official from the Office of  the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence explained that by law, the  Secretary of Defense has authority, direction, and control over the  Department of Defense, to include the Secretaries of the military  departments, and the Secretary of Defense’s efficiency decisions are  decisions as the head of DOD and apply to all subordinate components of  the department, including the Secretaries of the military departments.  This official stated that the interpretation of the language in the executive  order was ultimately a legal question. DOD guidance provides that the  DOD General Counsel shall provide advice and guidance as to the legal  sufficiency of procedures and standards involved in implementing the  DOD personnel security program.

In addition to the disagreement about the legal authority to consolidate  the PSABs, there is disagreement within the department about the risks  and benefits of implementing the Secretary of Defense direction to  consolidate the PSABs. Officials from the Army, the Navy, and the Air  Force PSABs explained that consolidating PSABs would limit the military  department Secretary’s ability to consider circumstances and risk in light  of that specific service’s special or sensitive programs, missions, or  needs. Washington Headquarters Services officials stated that separate  PSABs were more likely to be sensitive to their component’s special  programs, missions, and needs than a central DOD PSAB. Air Force  PSAB officials stated that, from their past experience, the DOD  Consolidated Adjudications Facility’s (CAF) statement of reasons for  revoking access to classified information is often narrowly focused and  fails to weigh all issues appropriately, and that in personal hearings the  Defense Office of Hearings Appeals administrative judges sometimes fail  to challenge statements made by employees that immediately raise flags  with PSAB members based on their background and experience. They  stated that with the DOD CAF making initial DOD-wide risk assessments  for the military departments, the final revocation appeals should be  decided by the individual departments.

In contrast, officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence and the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals agree that  DOD PSAB consolidation is in keeping with the principles of reciprocity  where risk is managed DOD-wide, not on a component basis. They stated  that with the DOD CAF, the components have already lost their ability to  manage risk with respect to favorable adjudications because the CAF is  making those decisions for the component when personnel security  clearances are initially granted. Officials from the Defense Office of  Hearings and Appeals stated that the requirement that agencies grant  clearance reciprocity has removed the role that service-specific  programs may play in clearance determinations that were completed by  another agency. Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Intelligence explained that consolidation would bring  standardization and consistency of quality, objectivity, and experience to  the process for personnel security appeals, and would result in legal  expertise being part of every appeal process, which would help ensure  that national security needs and procedural fairness are appropriately  balanced. Further, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals officials  stated that contractors have the benefit of independent fact-finding and an  independent written decision by officials who do not work for the  component, which provides an important check against unfairness and  the taint of undue influence. These officials stated that having decision  makers outside of the component’s chain of command helps to reduce  the opportunity for the perception or reality that those in the individual’s  component or chain of command can influence the outcome of the  process.

Officials from the DOD CAF cautioned that DOD needs to study the  implications of moving to a consolidated appeal board to make an  informed decision on any process modifications, efficiencies, and  resource implications prior to executing the direction to consolidate the  appeal boards. Army officials also suggested that establishment of a  working group to review the efficiencies, feasibility, way ahead, and  timelines would be beneficial in formulating a course of action in  implementing the direction to consolidate the PSABs. Until DOD General  Counsel resolves the disagreement within the department about the legal  authority to consolidate the PSABs, and collaborates with the PSABs and  the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to address any other  obstacles to consolidation, the department will continue to face delays  implementing the Secretary of Defense’s direction.

section_title: Implementation of Some Revocation Processes by Components Is Potentially Not Consistent with Executive Orders or Agency Policy
paragraphs: Our review of DHS and DOD department- and component-level guidance,  as well as the components’ communication letters to employees  undergoing a revocation proceeding, found that both departments  generally provided information to employees about their rights under the  two executive orders. However, some components’ implementation of the  clearance revocation process could potentially be inconsistent with the  executive orders or agency policy in two areas: having an opportunity to  be provided any additional information upon which a revocation appeal  determination is based, and communicating the right to counsel.
subsections: section_title: Navy and Army Policies Could Result in PSABs Collecting New Information without Sharing It with the Employee or Providing the Employee with an Opportunity to Respond
paragraphs: Navy and Army policies could allow the Navy and Army PSABs to collect  and consider new information related to the revocation decision without  informing the employee or giving the employee the opportunity to review  or respond to the new information. For example, Navy Manual M-5510.30  strongly encourages the employee’s command to submit additional  information directly to the Navy PSAB after military and civilian personnel  have made their personal appearance in front of the administrative  judge.an appeal of a revocation decision might be denied, to be introduced  without the individual’s awareness. Executive Order 12968, however,  states that employees who are determined not to meet the standards for  access to classified information shall be provided with a reasonable  opportunity to reply in writing to and request a review of the  determination, and to request any documents, records, and reports upon  which a revocation is based, to the extent that the documents would be  provided under the Freedom of Information Act or Privacy Act.

DOD Regulation 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program (January 1987, incorporating  administrative change Feb. 23, 1996).

Similarly, Army Regulation 380-67 could allow the Army PSAB to collect  information without informing the employee or giving the employee the  opportunity to respond to the new information. The Army regulation  regarding appeal of a revocation decision requires the employee to  respond to the decision through his or her immediate commanding  officer. The Army regulation further requires that the commanding officer  must recommend for or against reinstatement of the security clearance,  and provide a rationale addressing the issues in the decision. As written,  the Army regulation is silent on whether the comments will be provided to  the individual to review and respond to the information contained in it.  Army PSAB officials said that the PSAB is not responsible for providing  employees with this information.

Further, Army PSAB officials noted that in cases where a security  clearance was revoked because of financial considerations, the Army  PSAB would request additional documentation concerning any actions  that the employee has taken to resolve delinquent debts, but stated that  the Army PSAB will obtain credit reports directly from the credit reporting  bureaus and compare them to the documents in the appeal package.  Army PSAB officials explained that the credit report is accessed solely to  verify the existence or resolution of disqualifying financial information that  formed the basis of an unfavorable determination by the DOD CAF, so it  is not routinely provided to the employees, but they said that it would be  provided upon request. This raises concerns about whether the employee  has an opportunity to review or respond to information in the credit  reports obtained directly by the PSAB, because credit reports may not  always be accurate. Until the Army regulation is revised to specify that all  information provided to the Army PSAB by the command or obtained by  the Army PSAB itself must also be shared with the individual, along with  an opportunity to respond to this information, the Army PSAB could  potentially deny employees some of the protections provided in the  executive order.

section_title: U.S. Coast Guard Did Not Communicate Right to Counsel to Its Military Personnel
paragraphs: DOD security clearance revocation prehearing memorandums provided to  employees inform all types of employees—military personnel, DOD  civilians, and contractors—of their right to obtain legal representation, and  allow for discussion of any relevant issues. In contrast, at the time of our  review, one DHS component—the Coast Guard—was not notifying its  military personnel of their right to be represented by counsel or other  representative at their own expense, but rather was erroneously informing  military personnel that they had no right to counsel. While Executive  Order 12968 and DHS Instruction Handbook 121-01-007 specify that  employees shall be informed of their right to be represented by counsel or  other representative at their own expense, letters the Coast Guard sent  its military personnel appealing to the second-level deciding authority  stated “you may not have an attorney or anyone else with you during this  administrative process.” The existing Coast Guard Instruction states that  if the final decision results in a revocation, the employee will be advised of  his or her rights, but does not specify what these rights are.

During our review, the Coast Guard Security Center Director  acknowledged this disparity and stated the letters would be changed to  provide the required notification to military personnel that they have a  right to be represented by counsel or other representative at their own  expense during the personal appearance before the second-level  deciding authority. We subsequently reviewed a revised letter, and it had  been modified to inform military personnel of their right to be represented  by counsel. In addition, the Director said he would advocate for modifying  the Coast Guard instruction to formalize this change. Currently, this Coast  Guard instruction is undergoing revision, and the updated version is  expected to be published in the fall of 2014. According to a Coast Guard  official, the revised instruction will address this issue, but we have not  reviewed the revision to determine whether this change was included.

In addition, although the Coast Guard’s communication letters inform  Coast Guard civilian employees of their right to be represented by  counsel or other representative at their own expense during the personal  appearance, they impose some stipulations. The Coast Guard letters,  unlike those sent by other DHS components, state that only the  employee’s account of the issues can be heard during the meeting, the  employee’s counsel or representative cannot instruct the employee during  the meeting, and the employee is limited to only 30 minutes to appear in  person and present any relevant information. The Coast Guard Security  Center Director said these stipulations are imposed because the intent is  to avoid allowing the administrative review from becoming a protracted  and adversarial legal proceeding where objections are injected or cross- examinations are sought. To his knowledge, the “30 minutes” has never  been enforced and is now under review for removal from the Coast Guard  instruction. However, until the Coast Guard instruction and related  communication letters are revised to clearly and consistently  communicate rights provided by the executive orders, military and civilian  employees within the Coast Guard are at risk of not being treated  similarly to one another or to employees in other DHS components.

section_title: DHS and DOD Have Performed Some Oversight over Revocation Process at Component Level but Have Not Evaluated Quality of Revocation Process at Department Level
paragraphs: DHS has taken recent steps in response to recommendations made in a  December 2013 DHS Office of Inspector General report, and individual  DHS and DOD components perform some oversight over aspects of the  revocation process. But neither department has performed an  overarching, department-wide evaluation of the quality of the revocation  process or has developed performance measures and collects data to  measure the quality of the process.

DHS has taken some recent steps to improve the quality of the revocation  process. Specifically, the DHS Office of Inspector General report found  that appointments to the DHS Security Appeals Board and the  composition of the board had not been made in accordance with DHS  policy. For example, it found that one member served on the Security  Appeals Board when an employee in his chain of command was the  appellant, even though DHS guidance provides that board members  cannot have a current supervisory relationship with the employee whose  appeal is being heard. The Inspector General report recommended that  the Director of the U.S. Secret Service ensure that the Uniformed Division  Assistant Chief, or other officials in the agency’s chain of command, do  not rule on appeals by Uniformed Division employees. In March 2014, the  Secret Service issued a new directive describing the composition of the  board and how a board member would be replaced if a case involved an  employee in his or her chain of command.

Further, some DHS component officials told us that their component  provides oversight during the revocation process. For example, officials  from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services said that revocation data  are reviewed throughout the process, at the initial stage of determining  whether the action is warranted and by management at the initial stage  and each subsequent stage, and by legal counsel prior to approval and  signature of the revocation letter. Similarly, at DHS Headquarters, U.S.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Federal Emergency  Management Agency, officials stated that revocation determinations  undergo multiple stages of review, including by the adjudicator’s first-line  supervisor, the Personnel Security Division Director, and an attorney.  Other components, such as Transportation Security Administration and  DHS Headquarters, perform reviews after the process has been  completed to determine whether policies and procedures were  consistently followed prior to reaching the final case determination. In  addition, DHS Headquarters officials said that they review all DHS  component case files before the cases are sent to the Security Appeals  Board.

Within DOD, although the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is  responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the  implementation of DOD policy, programs, and guidance for personnel  security, the extent of oversight over the clearance revocation process  and the use of related metrics varies across the department. Officials  explained that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence conducts annual quality reviews of DOD security clearance  adjudicative determinations, but explained that their oversight efforts have  been hindered by the lack of available data in JPAS, as we previously  discussed. They explained that they do not have access to the agency- specific case-management systems, and that they have sent out manual  data requests in the past, but have experienced difficulties in receiving  responses to these requests that all have a consistent interpretation of  the data. Furthermore, officials from the four PSABs we met with stated  they collect appeal data—such as number of cases reviewed, favorable  decisions, unfavorable issues, and number of days to process an  appeal—and that they generated and submitted internal reports with this  information to their respective leadership, but these appeal board officials  did not elaborate how the information provided to their superiors was  used to perform oversight.

section_title: ODNI Has Exercised Some Oversight over Security Clearance Revocations, but Has Not Reviewed the Extent That Clearance Revocation Process Should Be Uniform across the Federal Government
paragraphs: ODNI has exercised some oversight of security clearance revocations by  reviewing policies and procedures within some agencies; however, it has  not established any metrics to measure the quality of the process  government-wide and has not reviewed security clearance revocation  processes across the federal government to determine the extent to  which policies and procedures should be uniform. In addition to DHS and  DOD, ODNI also has oversight responsibility for the security clearance  process government-wide. In June 2008, Executive Order 13467  designated the DNI as the Security Executive Agent to, among other  things, direct the oversight of determinations of eligibility for access to  classified information or to hold a sensitive position, and assigned the DNI  responsibility for developing uniform and consistent policies and  procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of  investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for  access to classified information or to hold a sensitive position. Executive  Order 13467 also provides the DNI the authority to issue guidelines and  instructions to the heads of agencies to ensure appropriate uniformity,  centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, and timeliness in processes  relating to determinations by agencies of eligibility for access to classified  information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position. This executive order  further states that agency heads shall assist in carrying out any function  under the order, which includes implementing any policies or procedures  developed pursuant to the order.

Executive Order 13467 designated the Director of OPM as the Suitability Executive  Agent, responsible for developing and implementing uniform and consistent policies and  procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of investigations and  adjudications relating to determinations of suitability for government employment.  Executive Order 13467, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government  Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified  National Security Information (June 30, 2008). was added to address an agency’s process to deny or revoke a  clearance.

Despite these efforts at the component level, neither DHS, DOD, nor  ODNI have evaluated the quality of the revocation process across the  specific departments or government-wide. DHS and DOD do not perform  overarching, department-wide oversight over the revocation process, and  neither department has developed metrics or collected data to measure  the quality of the revocation process. Furthermore, ODNI officials  acknowledged that metrics have not been established to measure the  quality of the security clearance revocation process. In November 2013,  we testified that executive-branch agencies do not consistently assess  quality throughout the personnel security clearance process, in part  because they have not fully developed and implemented metrics to  measure quality in key aspects of the personnel security clearance  process. Having assessment tools and performance metrics in place is  a critical initial step toward instituting a program to monitor and  independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of corrective  measures. Our work has also found that agency managers need  performance information as a basis for decision making to improve  programs and results, identify problems in existing programs and develop  corrective actions, and identify priorities and make resource decisions.

ODNI officials stated that they currently report some limited metrics on  revocations for the intelligence community as part of their reporting in  response to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.

They said that they would like to establish and make more robust metrics  for reciprocity, quality, and out-of-scope periodic reinvestigations, and  from there it would be a natural progression to look at developing some  metrics for revocations and denials, and other areas. However, they  stated that due to constrained resources and other priorities they were  uncertain whether they could make a business case to allocate the  resources. The absence of data on the number of persons who receive a  proposal to revoke their eligibility to access classified information, as  discussed above, combined with the likelihood that the shift to increase  continuous evaluation may result in increased instances of revocation  proposals, make it increasingly important for agencies to have  performance measures and data to ensure a high-quality revocation  process. Without performance measures and data to assess the quality of  the personnel security clearance revocation process, individual  departments, such as DHS and DOD, and ODNI lack information to  identify and resolve potential problems in the process, and make informed  decisions about potential changes to the program.

Furthermore, the security clearance revocation process implementation  differences we identified at DHS and DOD continue in part because ODNI  has not reviewed security clearance revocation processes across the  federal government to determine the extent to which policies and  procedures should be uniform. Specifically, ODNI has not assessed  whether the existing security clearance framework, with its parallel  processes for contractors and government employees, or a single  process applicable to all types of employees would best facilitate the  effective, efficient, consistent, and timely completion of security clearance  revocation proceedings. When asked about the different processes, ODNI  officials stated that the executive orders provide broad guidelines that  give agencies the flexibility to implement a review and appeal process  that best fits the agency’s needs, and there is no single solution that all  agencies must follow. Additionally, Executive Orders 12968 and 10865 do  not require a uniform government-wide process, and in fact establish two  parallel processes, one for contractors and one for government  employees.perspective, standardization of the security clearance revocation process  makes sense, but said that ODNI has not had a reason or purpose to  perform an extensive review of the revocation processes. The ODNI  officials stated that they had not heard complaints regarding fairness  while conducting their reviews, and had only heard anecdotal concerns  that the process took too long. Furthermore, ODNI has not established  any policies and procedures to facilitate government-wide consistency in  security clearance revocation proceedings. ODNI officials stated that   The ODNI officials explained that from an efficiencies  publishing guidance for the appeal process might be worth pursuing, but  would have to be prioritized in light of competing priorities and limited  resources. Given the inconsistencies we have identified in the revocation  processes at DHS and DOD discussed previously, combined with the  requirement of clearance reciprocity and the recommendations to  implement continuous evaluation, the DNI’s new role as Security  Executive Agent places ODNI in a unique position to examine whether  any changes to the existing structure with its parallel revocation  processes might be warranted. Until ODNI reviews the effectiveness and  efficiency of all aspects of the security clearance revocation process, and  DHS and DOD take specific actions, it is difficult to determine whether the  existing structures, with different processes for military and civilian  personnel and for contractors, are the most appropriate approach to meet  national security needs.

section_title: Employment Outcomes after Clearance Revocation Are Determined Based on Several Factors, and Identification of these Outcomes Is Hindered by Lack of Data
paragraphs: DHS and DOD employees whose eligibility to access classified  information has been revoked may not have consistent employment  outcomes, such as reassignment or termination, because these outcomes  are generally dependent on several factors, including the agency’s  mission and needs and the manager’s discretion. Communication  between personnel security and human capital offices at DHS and DOD  varies, because human capital and personnel security processes are  intentionally managed separately, and most components could not readily  ascertain the employment outcomes of individuals whose clearances had  been revoked.
subsections: section_title: Employment Outcomes for DHS and DOD Employees with Revoked Clearances Generally Is at Discretion of Employee’s Supervisor or Commander
paragraphs: Employment outcomes, such as reassignment or termination, for DHS  and DOD civilian and military employees whose personnel security  clearance has been revoked are generally dependent on a number of  factors, including the agency’s mission and needs. Key to the decision is  the judgment of the employee’s supervisor or commander, and also  whether there is a job available that the employee is qualified to perform  and the supervisor or commander considers it appropriate or possible to  reassign the employee. DHS officials elaborated that if an individual’s  clearance was revoked, then he or she is no longer qualified to perform  the job he or she was hired for, and so, depending on the policies at the  component where the employee works, the agency may have no  obligation to reassign the individual to another position or find another  position for the employee. DOD officials stated that in many places within  the department, all positions are sensitive, so there may be no positions  to which an employee could be reassigned. DHS officials stated that in  such agencies where all positions require a clearance, holding a  clearance is usually a condition of employment.

Components within DHS and DOD varied as to whether they reassign an  employee after a security clearance revocation. Officials from five DHS  components—U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement, and Transportation Security Administration—stated that  management at their component could decide whether to reassign a  civilian employee to a position with duties not requiring access to  classified information. For two DHS components, U.S. Secret Service and  DHS Headquarters, reassignment is generally not an option because all  or almost all positions in these components require a security clearance.  A DHS Headquarters general counsel official stated that DHS has no  official policy regarding reassignment, so that it can preserve its  administrative options. However, for DHS military personnel, Coast Guard  officials said their component has guidance stating that in cases where a  clearance is terminated for cause and the employee is not recommended  for separation from the Coast Guard, the employee will be reassigned to  a position that does not require a security clearance.

For most DOD civilian and military personnel, officials said that  supervisors or commanders have discretionary authority to determine  how to treat employees whose security clearance has been revoked. For  DOD civilian employees, Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Washington  Headquarters Services officials stated that supervisors have discretion to  reassign employees, while Navy officials said that civilian employees will  undergo a removal action after all appeals are completed if access to  classified information is revoked. Additionally, while DOD department- level and Air Force guidance does not require separation of officers  whose clearances have been revoked, with DOD guidance stating that  officers may be separated from military service, Army and Navy  guidance requires the discharge of an officer who receives a final  revocation of a security clearance. However, two Army regulations  concerning officers appear to contradict each other. While one Army  regulation states that revocation of an officer’s security clearance requires  that the officer be discharged, and further states that this requirement  cannot be waived, a different Army regulation regarding reassignment of  officers provides guidance for the reassignment of officers whose security  clearance has been revoked.

For enlisted military personnel whose security clearance has been  revoked, officials from the military services stated that the Army and the  Marine Corps reassign military personnel to the extent that an alternative  position is available, and the Air Force may reassign military personnel,  while the Navy will generally only reassign military personnel until a final  revocation decision is made by the PSAB. Army officials noted, however, that a clearance revocation should affect a soldier’s ability to  reenlist, because as of 2005 all soldiers enlisting in the Army are subject  to an investigation for eligibility to access classified information at the  secret level, regardless of the access requirements of their position. Navy  officials said that since 2011, all Navy positions require secret clearance  eligibility as a condition of employment, regardless of whether the position  requires access to classified information. As a result, a sailor who has lost  his or her security clearance generally will be separated from the Navy.

Given the component’s policies and procedures regarding reassignment,  officials from four DHS components—U.S. Citizenship and Immigration  Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and  Customs Enforcement, and Transportation Security Administration—told  us that it would be possible for similarly situated employees under  investigation for the same infraction to be treated differently if their  clearances were revoked. When asked how the quality of the process  could be improved once a final revocation decision has been made,  Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials suggested that the  agency could identify a single human capital deciding official to review all  employment outcomes, to ensure consistency of employment status  decisions across the agency. The officials explained that knowing and  tracking the employment outcomes of individuals who lost their  clearances would benefit the agency, because disparate treatment would  not be an appropriate outcome. For DHS Headquarters and the Secret  Service, which do not reassign personnel whose clearances have been  revoked, all employees will be treated similarly because employees who  lose their clearances will be terminated. Given the varying policies and  procedures at DOD components, similarly situated civilian and military  personnel whose security clearances have been revoked may be treated  differently.

section_title: Communication Varies between Personnel Security and Human Capital Offices
paragraphs: Communication between personnel security and human capital offices at  DHS and DOD varies, but lack of communication between these offices  could result in adverse employment actions being taken prematurely or in  inappropriate use of personnel security or human capital processes.  According to DHS and DOD officials, the personnel security revocation  processes and human capital disciplinary or adverse action processes  are intended to be separate and distinct processes, to help ensure  independence and protect national security. DHS and DOD officials  stated that an adverse disciplinary personnel action could be taken based  on the same underlying offense that led to the revocation proceeding, and  if that were to occur, the misconduct and personnel security processes  can run in parallel or they can run consecutively. However, after a final  decision is made to revoke a personnel security clearance, DHS and  DOD personnel security officials said that their role in the process is over,  and that it is a human capital decision as to what next happens to the  individual. A DHS Headquarters general counsel official further stated that  any personnel actions that result due to the revocation of a personnel  security clearance are based exclusively on the fact that the individual is  no longer qualified for his or her position, not on the reasons underlying  the revocation action.

Good human capital policies and practices, to include appropriate  practices for evaluating, counseling, and disciplining personnel, are  critical factors that affect the quality of internal controls. Moreover, to run  and control operations and achieve goals, agencies must have relevant,  reliable, and timely communications relating to internal as well as external  events; effective communications should occur in a broad sense, with  information flowing down, across, and up the organization. Personnel  security offices at some DHS and DOD components said they worked  very closely with human capital officials throughout the personnel security  clearance revocation process, while at other components there was very  little interaction between the offices. For example, Secret Service officials  said that they have excellent communication between the personnel  security and the human capital offices, and that personnel from both  offices meet at every step of the process. Similarly, Coast Guard officials  stated that their human capital and personnel security offices work closely  with each other throughout the revocation process with respect to civilian  employees.

In contrast, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials stated that  they are unaware of any specific DHS human capital policies and  procedures that align or support the security process. These officials also  stated that better coordination and communication between human  capital and personnel security offices is needed during the revocation  process, and that increased coordination and communication could  improve the quality of the process. Similarly, DHS Headquarters  employee relations officials said that their office is not involved or  informed by the personnel security office throughout the security  revocation and appeal process, which includes the initial decision to  revoke an employee’s security clearance through the three levels of  appeal. They explained that their office gets involved after the decision to  revoke the employee’s security clearance is final, and the human capital  office communicates with the personnel security office when a personnel  action is necessary. They explained that this communication is not to  share the details of the underlying offense, but to notify the human capital  office or supervisor of the status of the investigation. An official from the  DHS Office of General Counsel stated that the office is involved  throughout the revocation process to provide legal sufficiency reviews of  clearance determinations and to advise management during any  clearance-related personnel action.

Within DOD, Army human capital officials stated that the appropriate  offices are not informed of the revocation of the security clearance due to  weaknesses in information sharing with other Army offices. They  explained that there is no standard time frame or process for the civilian  personnel office to be notified about a civilian employee’s clearance  revocation, but the office is typically notified when the supervisor seeks  advice regarding what action to take now that the employee’s clearance  has been revoked. In contrast, Navy human capital officials stated that  the nature of the adverse information may trigger employee misconduct  actions as well as actions to revoke a security clearance, thus making  communication among the commanding officer, security manager, and  the serving human resource office essential. They said that, generally, the  security officer and the human resource office interact at all stages of the  incident. Similarly, Marine Corps headquarters officials stated that its  human resources office works with the local command and includes its  local security manager into the process from the very beginning of the  revocation process. Air Force officials stated the local human capital  office is normally informed by the organization when the employee’s  security clearance is revoked. Washington Headquarters Services human  capital officials stated that their personnel security office and occasionally  the local component security manager notifies their human capital office  when an employee’s security clearance has been revoked.

A lack of communication between the human capital and personnel  security offices could result in adverse employment actions being taken  prematurely or in the inappropriate use of personnel security processes in  lieu of human capital processes. For example, DOD officials stated that  one issue that can arise is that human capital officials could fire an  individual before all of the appeals associated with a revocation action are  completed. If the termination was based upon a separate adverse action  proceeding, that action would be appropriate; however, if the action was  based on the clearance revocation, then, under DOD regulation, subject  to certain exceptions, termination should not take place until after the  revocation decision is final, after all appeals have been completed.  Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals and other DOD officials stated  that some components are inappropriately terminating employees due to  loss of a security clearance before the personnel security clearance  appeal process is completed. In addition, ODNI officials explained that  some agencies could use the personnel security process to handle  personnel disciplinary issues, which is not appropriate. For example,  Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals Officials said that retaliation  against whistleblowers is perceived, fairly or not, as a continuing problem  in the personnel security clearance arena. Ordinarily, most federal civilian  employees have a right to appeal serious adverse employment  actions taken against them to the Merit Systems Protections Board.  However, in the security clearance context, federal case law has limited  the scope of the board’s review of adverse actions. Specifically, the board  may review appeals of adverse employment actions resulting from a  denial or revocation of a security clearance or a determination that an  employee is not eligible to hold a sensitive position for specific procedural  issues,clearance denial or revocation, or a finding that an employee is not  eligible to hold a sensitive position. DOD officials said that the personnel  security and human capital processes are designed and intended to be   but the board cannot review the substance of a security  separate in part to protect the employee from someone trying to exercise  undue influence over the disciplinary process, as well as to protect  national security. ODNI officials stated that there are legal restrictions on  the type of information that can be shared between the human capital and  personnel security offices, but said that further review of what information  should be shared between the two offices could be beneficial. Until DHS  and DOD develop guidance specifying what information can and should  be communicated between human capital and personnel security officials,  and at what decision points during the revocation process that information  should be communicated, DHS and DOD will be hampered in their ability  to combat the perception that the personnel security process is being  used to circumvent procedural protections ordinarily provided to federal  employees subject to adverse employment actions, and that individuals  are not being treated in a fair and consistent manner.

section_title: DHS and DOD Do Not Readily Know Employment Outcomes of Individuals with Revoked Clearances Because Data Are Not Readily Available
paragraphs: DOD and most DHS components cannot readily ascertain the  employment outcomes of individuals whose clearances had been  revoked, because these data are not readily available. Within DOD,  officials representing all DOD civilian and military personnel—in the Army,  the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and Washington Headquarters  Services—stated that they do not track and would not be able to report  the human capital outcomes of employees with revoked security  clearances. For example, Army officials explained that there is a  resignation code in their human capital database, but that code covers all  resignations for any reason, and there may or may not be a remark on the  agency’s personnel action form (known as an SF-50) that would relate the  resignation to a security clearance issue. Moreover, Army officials  explained that if an individual were removed as a result of a security  clearance revocation, the removal code could be attributed to failing to  meet any one of several conditions of employment, if maintaining  eligibility for a security clearance was one of the requirements listed in an  individual’s position description. An official from the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness explained that the  separation codes applied for military personnel are similarly broad in  nature, and would include separations for reasons other than revocation  of a security clearance.

Officials in some DHS components said they could manually gather  information about employment outcomes from clearance revocations, but  they explained that doing this would be labor-intensive because their  human capital system would need to be cross-referenced against the  personnel security system. For example, U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement officials commented that there is no DHS or Immigration and  Customs Enforcement policy that requires the collection of data and  reporting of outcomes for employees with revoked security clearances,  but stated that they could determine the employment outcomes on a  piecemeal basis by making a data query for each employee record.  However, Coast Guard officials said that they maintain a spreadsheet of  all disciplinary and adverse actions taken against its civilian employees.  Similarly, Transportation Security Administration personal security  officials also stated that their component can identify the outcomes of  employees with revoked security clearances with help from human capital  officials.

section_title: Data ODNI Provides to Congress on Total Employees Eligible for Access to Classified Information May Include Inaccurate DOD Data
paragraphs: The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the  President to submit an annual report to Congress on, among other things,  the total number of personnel security clearances across the government,  categorized by government employees and contractors who held or were  approved for a security clearance. In response to this requirement,  ODNI has prepared and submitted a report each year, with the most  recent report being issued for fiscal year 2013. However, we found that  the DOD data that are included in this report to Congress likely overstate  the total number of DOD employees eligible to access classified  information, in part because JPAS does not have up-to-date information  about the current population of DOD employees. Without accurate data,  DOD’s ability to reduce the total population of clearance holders and  minimize risk and reduce costs to the government will be hampered. To  measure performance, it is important that organizations have sufficiently  complete, accurate, and consistent data to document performance and  support decision making. Further, one of the five internal control  standards that define the minimum level of quality acceptable for internal  control in the federal government states that information should be  recorded within a time frame that enables management to carry out  responsibilities, and that operational information is needed in part to  determine whether the agency is complying with applicable laws and  regulations.

The number of employees eligible to access classified information was obtained from  JPAS, and includes all employees who had an active or valid confidential, secret, top  secret, or sensitive compartmented information eligibility at the end of fiscal year 2013,  and who did not have a separation date recorded in JPAS prior to the end of the fiscal  year.

Washington Headquarters Services provides human capital support and manages the personnel  security process for several DOD components and agencies.

When we asked DMDC officials for their opinions on why the number of  employees eligible to access classified information was greater than the  total number of employees for some of the DOD components, they  provided some possible explanations for the discrepancy. For example,  DMDC officials explained that the database includes individuals who have  newly enlisted into the military services but who may not have begun their  enlistment period yet, and this would not be included in the employee  totals. However, we reviewed data reported by the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness for fiscal years 2010 through 2012,  and found that the total number of all personnel who joined each year (not  just those who joined with a delayed entry date) each year ranged from  about 43,000 to 44,000 for the Air Force and around 40,000 to 42,000 for  the Marine Corps, which is too few to explain the discrepancy of almost  200,000 for Air Force military personnel and 125,000 for Marine Corps  military personnel.

Furthermore, DOD officials said that the information in JPAS may not  reflect changes in personnel status such as separations due to  retirements, employee job transfers, and deaths. DMDC officials  explained that JPAS receives data from the components’ personnel  centers, and DMDC is dependent on the components to send separation  information. As a result, the number of DOD clearance holders included in  the report to Congress likely overstates the total number of DOD  employees eligible to access classified information because it may  include people whose clearance eligibility has not yet expired, but who  have separated from the department, since JPAS was not updated to  reflect that separation information. ODNI officials stated that because  DOD has the largest number of eligible persons in the federal  government, any overstatement of DOD’s data will have a greater effect  on the reported totals than for other agencies.

DMDC officials stated that since management of JPAS transitioned to  DMDC in June 2010, DOD has conducted an extensive study on the  quality of JPAS data. Specifically, they stated that DMDC has conducted  more than 127 data-quality initiatives affecting 165 million records. These  initiatives include examining records where the access level did not match  the eligibility level (such as where a person has top-secret access but  only secret eligibility) and identifying duplicate records. In addition, a  DMDC official said that the team working on the migration from JPAS to  the new system has identified data-quality issues that they are working to  resolve.

Until DOD takes steps to review and analyze the discrepancies in the  total number of employees and the number of employees eligible to  access classified information, and address any problems identified, DOD  will be unable to rely on the information provided by JPAS to get an  accurate understanding of the total number of DOD employees eligible to  access classified information. The lack of visibility over this total will  impede the department’s ability to implement recommendations to  improve the security clearance process. For example, the February 2014  OMB report on the security, suitability, and credentialing processes  recommended that federal agencies reduce the total population of  clearance holders to minimize risk and reduce costs. However, until  DOD has an accurate baseline of the number of clearance holders in the  department, DOD will be unable to determine the extent that it can or has  reduced the number of clearance holders in accordance with this  recommendation. Furthermore, having inaccurate data about the number  of clearance holders within DOD will hinder the department’s ability to  provide oversight and accurate, complete information about security  clearance eligibility to Congress as required by statute, to other offices  within the department, and to interagency stakeholders.

section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: In an environment where reciprocity of personnel security clearances is  required among federal agencies, the consistent and transparent  application of the processes governing whether individuals should retain  their access to classified information has become increasingly important,  so that all agencies can have reasonable assurance that only trustworthy  individuals obtain and keep security clearances. Moreover, with the  proposed implementation of continuous evaluation, the workload of  agencies’ security offices could significantly increase, making it critical for  agencies to have a high-quality clearance revocation process in place. In  the absence of requirements to track or report security clearance eligibility  data and related metrics, DHS and DOD do not have key revocation data,  such as the number of proposed revocations, to help oversee the  revocation process or determine their workload for planning purposes.

Although both DHS and DOD are generally meeting their responsibilities  and providing information to employees about most of their rights under  the two executive orders governing the revocation process, until Army,  Navy, and Coast Guard guidance is updated, some employees could  potentially be denied some of the protections provided in the executive  orders. Additionally, given the different interpretations of the executive  order and other obstacles to implementation of the Secretary of Defense’s  direction to consolidate DOD’s PSABs, in the absence of a resolution of  these issues by the DOD General Counsel, DOD will be unable to  implement the Secretary of Defense’s direction to eliminate the overlap in  this function.

Further, DHS, DOD, and some of their components have implemented  the requirements from the executive orders in different ways. Without  consistent processes for all employees, regardless of which component  they work for, employees within DHS may experience different  opportunities to cross-examine witnesses during the revocation process.  In addition, without performance measures to assess the quality of the  personnel security clearance revocation process, the ODNI, DHS, and  DOD lack information to identify and resolve potential problems in the  process, and make informed decisions about potential changes to the  program. Further, until the DNI, as the Security Executive Agent, reviews  the efficiency and effectiveness of the existing revocation processes, it is  unknown whether having different processes, for military and civilian  personnel and for contractors, and having inconsistencies among DHS  and DOD, is the most appropriate approach to meet national security  needs. Finally, without specific guidance from DHS and DOD on what  information should be shared between personnel security and human  capital offices, and when that information should be shared, DHS and  DOD cannot ensure that individuals are treated in a fair and consistent  manner. Similarly situated individuals who lose their security clearance  may lose their employment or remain employed and be reassigned,  based on their supervisor’s discretion.

Moreover, without accurate data about the number of current DOD  military and federal civilian employees eligible to access classified  information, DOD is not well positioned to provide the information  Congress has requested. DOD also will be hindered in implementing  recommendations to reduce the total population of clearance holders in  order to minimize risk and reduce cost.

section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security,  and the Director of National Intelligence take the following 13 actions.

To help ensure that the respective DHS and DOD data systems contain  sufficiently complete and accurate information to facilitate effective  oversight of the personnel security clearance revocation and appeal  process, we recommend that  the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Chief Security Officer to  assess the benefits and associated costs of tracking additional  revocation and appeals information, and take any steps necessary to  modify the Integrated Security Management System (ISMS) to track  such information as is deemed beneficial; and the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence to take steps to ensure that data are recorded and  updated in the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) and the  department’s new systems, so that the relevant fields are filled.

To help ensure that all employees within DHS receive the same  protections during their personal appearance, we recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Chief Security Officer to revise  and finalize the DHS instruction regarding the personnel security program  to clarify whether or not employees are allowed to cross-examine  witnesses during personal appearances.

To help ensure independence and the efficient use of resources, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the DOD General  Counsel to take the following two actions:  first, resolve the disagreement about the legal authority to consolidate  the PSABs and, in collaboration with the PSABs and the Under  Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, address any other obstacles to  consolidating DOD’s PSABs; and   second, if the General Counsel determines that there are no legal  impediments and that other obstacles to consolidation can be  addressed, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Defense Legal Services Agency to take steps to implement the  Secretary of Defense’s direction to consolidate DOD’s PSABs.

To help ensure that all employees within DOD receive the same rights  during the revocation process, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise Secretary of the Navy  Manual M-5510.30 to specify that any information collected by the  Navy PSAB from the employee’s command will be shared with the  employee, who will also be given the opportunity to respond to any  such information provided; and direct the Secretary of the Army to revise Army Regulation 380-67 to  specify that any information collected by the Army PSAB from the  employee’s command or by the Army PSAB itself will be shared with  the employee, who will also be given the opportunity to respond to  any such information provided.

To help ensure that all employees are treated fairly and receive the  protections established in the executive order, we recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commandant, U.S. Coast  Guard, to revise the Coast Guard instruction for military personnel to  specify that military personnel may be represented by counsel or other  representatives at their own expense.

To facilitate department-wide review and assessment of the quality of the  personnel security clearance revocation process, we recommend that the  DNI, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland  Security, develop performance measures to better enable them to identify  and resolve problems, and direct the collection of related revocation and  appeals information.

To help ensure that similarly situated individuals are treated consistently,  and to facilitate oversight and help ensure the quality of the security  clearance revocation process, we recommend that the DNI review  whether the existing security clearance revocation process is the most  efficient and effective approach. In this review, the DNI should consider  whether there should be a single personnel security clearance revocation  process used across all executive-branch agencies and workforces, with  consideration of areas such as the timing of the personal appearance in  the revocation process, and the ability to cross-examine witnesses.

Further, to the extent that a single process or changes to the existing  parallel processes are warranted, the DNI should consider whether there  is a need to establish any policies and procedures to facilitate a more  consistent process, and recommend as needed any revisions to existing  executive orders or other executive-branch guidance.

To facilitate coordination between personnel security and human capital  offices regarding how a security clearance revocation should affect an  employee’s employment status, and to help ensure that individuals are  treated in a fair and consistent manner, we recommend that  the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for  Management to review and revise policy regarding coordination  between the personnel security and human capital offices to clarify  what information can and should be communicated between human  capital and personnel security officials at specified decision points in  the revocation process, and when that information should be  communicated; and the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the Under Secretary of  Defense for Intelligence, to review and revise policy regarding  coordination between the personnel security and human capital  offices to clarify what information can and should be communicated  between human capital and personnel security officials at specified  decision points in the revocation process, and when that information  should be communicated.

To help ensure that the DNI report to Congress contains accurate data  about the number of current DOD military and federal civilian employees  eligible to access classified information, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  Readiness to review and analyze the discrepancies in the total number of  employees and the number of employees eligible to access classified  information, and take immediate steps to address the problems.

section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOD, and ODNI for review and  comment. Written comments from DHS, DOD, and ODNI are reprinted in  their entirety in appendices II, III, and IV respectively. All three agencies  generally concurred with our recommendations and provided additional  technical comments, which we incorporated in the report where  appropriate.

In its written comments, DHS concurred with our four recommendations  directed to it, and stated it has already taken steps to implement two of  our recommendations.

First, regarding our recommendation to assess the benefits and  associated costs of tracking additional revocation and appeals  information, DHS concurred, stating that the Office of the Chief  Security Officer has established an estimated completion date of  December 2014 to conduct a review to consider what additional data  would be valuable for collection.

Second, with respect to our recommendation to revise and finalize the  DHS instruction regarding cross-examination of witnesses, DHS  concurred, commenting that the Office of the Chief Security Officer  has revised its personnel security instruction with unambiguous  language on cross-examination of witnesses, and intends to issue the  revised instruction by the end of the year.

Third, for our recommendation to revise the Coast Guard instruction to  specify that military personnel may be represented by counsel, DHS  concurred, stating that the Coast Guard, pending the update of the  Commandant Instruction on Personnel Security, issued an interim  memorandum in May 2014 advising that individuals may have counsel  or other representatives present at the second-level review at their  own expense. DHS also stated that it believes the Coast Guard’s  actions to implement our recommendation regarding the revision of its  instruction to specify that military personnel may be represented by  counsel fulfill the intent of the recommendation, and requested that  this recommendation be closed as implemented. While we are  encouraged by the actions the Coast Guard has already taken, we  continue to believe that it is important that the change be formalized in  the updated Commandant instruction before we close out our  recommendation. Moreover, the revision made by the Coast Guard in  its interim memorandum appears to extend the right to counsel only to  the personal appearance, and does not make clear how employees  will be informed of their right to counsel, but under Executive Order  12968 the right to counsel is not limited to one specific stage of the  revocation process, and the order requires that employees be  informed of this right.

Finally, regarding our recommendation to review and revise policy  regarding coordination between the personnel security and human  capital offices, DHS concurred, commenting that the DHS Office of  the Chief Human Capital Officer concurs with the concept of  facilitating coordination between the personnel security and human  capital offices, and will assess the process to determine appropriate  communication points and provide appropriate guidance. DHS  established an estimated completion date of March 2015 for this  action. Further, in its technical comments, DHS noted that this  recommendation would be more appropriately directed to the DHS  Under Secretary for Management, who oversees both the Office of  the Chief Human Capital Officer and the Office of the Chief Security  Officer. As a result, we have modified the recipient of this  recommendation as suggested.

In its written comments, DOD fully concurred with all but one of our seven  recommendations directed to it, and partially concurred with one of our  recommendations.

First, with respect to our recommendation to ensure data are recorded  and updated in JPAS and DOD’s new systems, DOD concurred,  stating that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence will incorporate monitoring of data fields pertaining to the  personnel security clearance revocation and appeal process into its  quarterly oversight of DOD Personnel Security Program metrics.

Regarding our two recommendations to revise Navy and Army  guidance, respectively, about sharing information collected by the  respective PSABs with the employee, DOD concurred with both  recommendations. DOD commented that the Navy plans to issue  interim guidance by October 1, 2014, and issue the final revised Navy  Manual by October 1, 2015. DOD further stated that the Army  Regulation is under revision and will specify that the PSAB will  provide any documents it obtains to the subject and allow a period of  time for response.

With respect to our recommendation to review and revise policy  regarding coordination between the personnel security and human  capital offices, DOD concurred, stating that the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, with support from  the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, will  identify the way forward to review and revise policy and procedures  regarding coordination between the personnel security and human  capital offices as appropriate.

Finally, regarding our recommendation to review and analyze the  discrepancies in the total number of employees and the number of  employees eligible to access classified information, DOD concurred,  commenting that within 30 days of the release of the final report, the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will convene  a meeting of action officers and analysts to identify strategies for  reviewing, analyzing, and resolving the discrepancies in the total  number of employees and the number of employees eligible to access  classified information.

DOD partially concurred with our draft recommendation for the DOD  General Counsel to resolve the disagreement about the legal authority to  consolidate the PSABs and address any other obstacles to consolidation,  and to implement the Secretary of Defense’s direction to consolidate  DOD’s PSABs if there are no legal or other impediments to consolidation.  DOD agreed with us to review legal or other impediments to  consolidation, and stated that the DOD Office of General Counsel will  address any unresolved disagreements about legal authority for  consolidation of PSABs. DOD further commented that the DOD Office of  General Counsel will work closely with the Office of the Under Secretary  of Defense for Intelligence to address other issues concerning  consolidation of PSABs. However, DOD commented that some DOD  components disagreed with PSAB consolidation. Specifically, DOD stated  that of the eleven components that provided responses to the draft report,  eight concurred or had no issues or comments, while the remaining three  components noted that the PSABs should remain at the component level  and not be consolidated. One of these three components also  commented that the perceived efficiencies from consolidation described  in our report should be validated and that all models for consolidation  should be evaluated before a decision is made that would consolidate the  PSABs. DOD’s comments reflect internal disagreement, which  corroborates our finding that there is disagreement within DOD on the  legal authority, risks, and benefits of consolidating the department’s  multiple appeals boards. As we also note in our report, the Secretary of  Defense has already directed this consolidation. However, in light of  statements from some DOD officials that DOD needs to study the  implications of moving to a consolidated appeal board to make an  informed decision, we clarified our recommendation to clearly separate  the two actions to be taken by the DOD General Counsel: first to resolve  the disagreement about the legal authority for consolidation and address  other obstacles, and second to take steps to implement the consolidation  if there are no legal impediments and the other obstacles to consolidation  can be addressed. We believe this language addresses the need for DOD  to fully consider and resolve the components’ concerns about  consolidation.

In its written comments, ODNI concurred with our two recommendations  directed to it, for ODNI to develop performance measures and direct the  collection of related revocation and appeals information, and to review  whether the existing security clearance revocation process is the most  efficient and effective approach. ODNI stated it established the Security  Executive Agent National Assessment Program in April 2014 to conduct  oversight of personnel security processes across the Executive Branch.  ODNI said that this program includes gathering and analyzing data to  establish standard processes as appropriate and developing performance  measures against those standards. ODNI further commented that DHS  and DOD have implemented revocation processes in different ways,  which warrant additional ODNI oversight of agency revocation policies.  DOD also concurred with our recommendation directed to ODNI  regarding development of performance measures and collection of  related revocation and appeals information, stating that the Office of the  Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence would ensure that ODNI  receives a copy and is made aware of this recommendation.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense, and the  DNI. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last   page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix V.

section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: This report assesses the policies and practices that the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Defense (DOD) use when  revoking personnel security clearances. The scope of our work focused  on the revocation of personnel security clearances for federal civilian  employees and military personnel within DHS and DOD, as well as  federal government contractors. Known intelligence community military  and civilian personnel and contractors were excluded from our scope,  because they follow different processes and guidance than other DOD  personnel. Table 5 provides a complete list of the agencies we contacted  for our review.

To examine the extent to which DHS and DOD track data to oversee their  revocation processes, and what these data show, we analyzed relevant  executive orders and DHS and DOD personnel security clearance  revocation policies to identify the extent to which they are required to  maintain or report data and documentation on their security clearance  revocation and appeals processes. We compared those requirements to  leading practices, and assessed the extent that the policy requirements  comply with these leading practices.obtained DHS and DOD personnel security clearance revocation and  appeal data.

In addition, we requested and  Revocation data for DHS was provided by DHS’s Office of the Chief  Security Officer using its system for managing and standardizing  personnel security processes and data, the Integrated Security  Management System (ISMS). Personnel security records maintained in  ISMS include suitability and security clearance investigations, which  contain information related to background checks, investigations, and  access determinations. The reported DHS security clearance revocation  and appeals data include DHS military personnel and federal civilian  employees within DHS Headquarters and the DHS operational  components. DHS revocation cases for its contractor employees are  processed by DOD and were not included in the DHS data. Although we  requested data from fiscal years 2009 through 2013, DHS officials from  Office of the Chief Security Officer could only provide revocation data for  fiscal years 2011through 2013, because not all of the DHS operational  components had been using ISMS to manage personnel and  administrative security case records until recently. DHS Headquarters  migrated data from its legacy system into and began using ISMS in May  2008; Federal Emergency Management Agency migrated to ISMS in May  2009; U.S. Customs and Border Protection migrated in October 2009;  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement migrated in December 2009;  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services migrated in December 2009;  U.S. Coast Guard migrated in July 2011; Transportation Security  Administration migrated in December 2012; and U.S. Secret Service  migrated in May 2013.

To provide the revocation data we requested regarding the number of  revocations and the reasons for the revocation under the adjudicative  guidelines, DHS queried ISMS and then validated those results with each  of its operational components. The components made changes to the  ISMS data when they determined that the data entered into ISMS did not  track with what they had tracked elsewhere. DHS officials said that the  differences were likely based on data entry and system use issues. The  total number of revocation cases and the total number of revocation  cases that went to the Security Appeals Board represents DHS military  and civilian employees’ revocation cases that were closed in that  particular fiscal year. We found that the total number of cases where a  revocation proceeding was initiated could be higher because ISMS does  not track cases where a person separated from the agency before a final  decision was made on a proposal to revoke a personnel security  clearance. In addition, the total number of military and civilian employees  eligible to access classified information represents a current snapshot in  time as ISMS does not track historical security clearance numbers. To  corroborate the accuracy of the ISMS total number of DHS employees  eligible to access classified information at each component, we compared  this information to the total number of employees at six DHS components  (U.S. Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration, Federal  Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S.  Customs and Border Protection). We found that in all six components, the  total number of employees was greater than the number of employees  eligible to access classified information, as not all DHS employees need  eligibility for access.

Furthermore, while we requested DHS data on the number of employees  that filed an initial appeal and the average amount of time it takes to  complete a revocation case, these data were not available. Officials from  the Office of the Chief Security Officer told us that ISMS has a module,  called the Appeals Case, that could provide information about the number  of initial appeals, but because use of this module is not required, only a  few DHS components use it. Furthermore, officials from the Office of the  Chief Security Officer told us that ISMS cannot track case timeliness data  as a whole across the DHS components, because each appeal level  would be saved as a different appeals case module entry, but the officials  explained that they could determine this information for a particular case  by looking at the individual ISMS records. We analyzed the DHS  revocation data and supporting documentation, and discussed its  reliability with DHS officials, and found the data to be sufficiently reliable  to report on the number of employees whose personnel security  clearance was revoked in DHS, and the reasons for the revocations.

Revocation data for DOD military and federal civilian personnel and for  industry or contractor personnel government-wide was provided by the  Defense Manpower Data Center from DOD’s Joint Personnel  Adjudication System (JPAS), which is DOD’s system of record for  personnel security management to record and document personnel  security actions. DOD security clearance revocation and appeals data  include military personnel and federal civilian employees within the  military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) and the  defense agencies (referred to as Washington Headquarters Services).  Data for government-wide contractors (also referred as industry  personnel) is collectively grouped as one entity because Defense  Manpower Data Center officials informed us that data on contractor  personnel do not indicate the agency with which an individual’s contract is  associated. We met with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary  of Defense for Intelligence and the Defense Manpower Data Center (the  administrator of JPAS) to discuss the approach for our data request and  to get their feedback. We requested JPAS data extracts showing the total  number of persons eligible to access classified information, the number of  security clearance revocations, the reasons for a revocation decision, the  number of appeals, the number of favorable and unfavorable appeal  decisions, the type of appeal selected by the individual (personal  appearance or in writing), and the time values at different intervals of the  revocation and appeal process. We requested that all of these data be  broken out by each DOD component for DOD military personnel, DOD  federal civilian employees, and government-wide contractor employees  for fiscal years 2009 through 2013.

Furthermore, while we requested DOD data on the number of employees  that filed an appeal, appeal outcomes, and the average amount of time it  takes to complete a revocation case, these data were not available.  Although there are fields in JPAS where this information can be recorded,  we found that these fields were not consistently being used in JPAS.

Defense Manpower Data Center officials initially provided mock-ups of  the data request that excluded these data fields or left them blank. When  we asked about this, Defense Manpower Data Center officials stated that  it is their agency’s practice not to provide information from data fields with  less than 50 percent fill rates. We asked that Defense Manpower Data  Center to provide all the requested data along with an additional  worksheet to show the data fill rate percentage, so we could report on the  extent that these data fields had not been used.

To corroborate the accuracy of the JPAS revocation data for DOD military  and civilian employees, we asked DOD officials from the DOD  Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) to provide us with the number  of revocations processed by their adjudicators for the military  departments’ military and civilian employees for fiscal years 2009 through  2013. We compared the JPAS data received from Defense Manpower  Data Center with the data provided by the DOD CAF and we found that  the data did not match. We determined that the discrepancy with the DOD  CAF data was likely caused by a difference in the periods and  populations included in the counts.

To corroborate the accuracy of the JPAS revocation data for contractor  personnel, and data regarding the personal appearance for DOD military  and civilian employees, we asked DOD officials from Defense Office of  Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) to provide information on the number of  contractor hearings and appeals performed, and their outcomes, for fiscal  years 2009 through 2013 and the number of personal appearances for  DOD military and civilian employees and their outcomes for fiscal years  2009 through 2013. We compared the JPAS data received from the  Defense Manpower Data Center with the data provided by DOHA and we  found that the data did not match. We determined that the discrepancy  with the contractor data from DOHA was a result of the inclusion of  clearance denials, which the DOHA database was unable to separate  from clearance revocations. Security clearance denials were not part of  the scope of this review. We analyzed the DOD revocation data and  supporting documentation, and discussed their reliability with DOD  officials, and found the data to be sufficiently reliable to report on the  number of military personnel and federal civilian employees and  contractors whose personnel security clearances were revoked in DOD,  and the reasons for the revocations.

To examine the extent to which DHS and DOD consistently implemented  government-wide requirements in their revocation processes, we  obtained and reviewed the policies and procedures DHS, DOD, and their  components use when revoking an employee’s access to classified  information, interviewed DHS and DOD officials about whether these  processes are being uniformly applied within each department and across  the departments, and discussed the officials’ suggestions for improving  the revocation process. In addition, we reviewed Executive Orders 12968  and 10865, which establish the overall process for revoking an  employee’s security clearance, to identify agency and employee rights  and responsibilities during the clearance revocation process. We then  analyzed DHS and DOD template or redacted sample communication  letters sent to employees during the revocation and appeal process by  each component within DHS and DOD to determine whether they provide  employees notice of their security clearance revocation rights and  responsibilities under Executive Orders 12968 and 10865. Two analysts  independently reviewed and assessed the DHS and DOD communication  letters to determine whether they contain the 14 key rights and  responsibilities for military, civilian, and contractor employees provided by  Executive Order 12968 and the three additional rights for contractor  employees provided by Executive Order 10865. For DHS military and  civilian employees, we reviewed the Notice of Determination, the Notice  of Review, and the Security Appeals Board decision letter. For DOD  military and civilian employees, we reviewed the Statement of Reasons,  the Letter of Revocation, and the PSAB decision letter. For contractor  employees government-wide, we reviewed a Statement of Reasons, the  administrative judge’s decision letter, and the DOHA Appeal Board  decision letter. The analysts then compared their results to identify any  disagreements and reached agreement on all items through discussion.  We reviewed processes for civilian and military personnel within DHS and  DOD, excluding the intelligence community, and for industry or contractor  personnel that are part of the 23 executive-branch agencies that follow  the DOD guidance and process.

Additionally, we interviewed officials from DHS, DOD, and their respective  components to discuss (1) how they are following their policies, (2) how  employee rights and responsibilities factor into the security clearance  revocations process, and (3) how and under what circumstances they  communicate with employees who are subject to the security clearance  revocation process. When we identified discrepancies in following policies  or communicating with employees, we contacted appropriate DHS and  DOD officials to determine the reasons for such discrepancies and their  potential effect. We also met with DHS, DOD, and ODNI officials to  discuss the oversight they provide over executive-branch agencies’  personnel security revocation processes, their suggestions for building  quality into the revocation process, and whether there are currently any  metrics or reporting requirements related to personnel security clearance  revocations.

To examine the extent to which DHS’s and DOD’s respective human  capital and personnel security clearance revocation policies enable the  departments to determine the employment status of their federal civilian  and military employees subject to revocation in a consistent manner, we  analyzed department-level and component level DHS and DOD human  capital guidance—specifically their respective guidance for misconduct,  discipline, and adverse actions, such as a table of penalties—and  personnel security guidance. We assessed the extent that this guidance  could be used to systematically determine what actions the agencies  should take regarding the employment status of individuals subject to the  clearance revocation and appeals processes, and what employment  actions, such as reassignment or separation, are typically taken if an  employee’s personnel security clearance is revoked. In addition, we  assessed the extent to which the different sources of guidance are linked  or are cross-referenced, and assessed what communication is required to  take place between an agency’s personnel security office and human  capital office during the course of a clearance revocation proceeding. We  also interviewed human capital officials at DHS, DOD, and their  components to obtain their perspectives on the extent that DHS and  DOD’s human capital practices regarding the employment status of  individuals subject to revocation are linked to and aligned with personnel  security policies related to security clearance revocation, and the extent  that there is communication between an agency’s personnel security  office and a human capital office during the course of a clearance  revocation proceeding.

In addition, we analyzed DHS’s, DOD’s, and the components’ guidance to  determine whether the departments required tracking of any data  regarding the employment outcomes of individuals whose personnel  security clearances were revoked. We also discussed with DHS and DOD  officials what data regarding employment outcomes were available at the  department and component level. For this objective, within DHS, we  focused on the three DHS components that had the largest number of  personnel security clearance revocations from fiscal years 2011 through  2013, which were the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration and Customs  Enforcement, and U.S. Secret Service. Within DOD, our review included  the headquarters-level elements of the Departments of the Army, the  Navy, and the Air Force; the Marine Corps, and the Washington  Headquarters Services. Contractor personnel were not included in the  scope of this objective, as the human capital policies applicable to  contractors would be those of their private-sector employers.

To assess whether DOD’s personnel security management system  accurately reports the total number of DOD employees eligible for access  to classified information, we compared the total number of DOD  employees eligible for access to classified information reported by DOD’s  personnel security management system to the total number of DOD  employees in each component. To corroborate the accuracy of the JPAS  total number of military and federal civilian employees eligible to access  classified information, we compared this information with total military  personnel end strength and civilian personnel full-time equivalents from  the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller’s National Defense Budget  Estimates (Green Book). We assumed that the total number of military  and civilian employees in each component should be higher than the total  number of military and civilian employees who were eligible to access  classified information, because not all DOD employees should be  required to have clearance eligibility. However, we found that the total  number of military and civilian employees eligible to access classified  information in fiscal year 2013 as reported by JPAS was higher than the  total number of military and civilian employees listed in the fiscal 2013  military personnel end strength and civilian personnel full-time equivalent  data found in the DOD Green Book. We met with officials from Defense  Manpower Data Center to discuss the discrepancies. Regarding the  disparity in the revocation data, the Defense Manpower Data Center  officials stated that they could not speak for the accuracy of the data  derived from the Green Book, since full-time equivalents would  undercount the total number of individuals employed, due to issues such  as two part-time individuals occupying one full-time position. As a result,  they believed that it would not be appropriate to compare these data  against the total number of persons eligible to access classified  information. DMDC officials subsequently agreed to provide us with  counts for the total numbers of DOD active-duty and reserve military  personnel and federal civilian employees for fiscal year 2013.

To determine the total number of DOD active-duty military personnel who  were employed at any time in each active component during fiscal year  2013, data were taken from the Automated Extract of Active Duty Military  Personnel Records. DMDC calculated the total number of active-duty  military personnel by adding the totals from all 12 monthly files for fiscal  year 2013 that were counted and reported as part of official active  component strength. After combining the 12 files, duplicate personnel  were dropped based on Social Security number and service. This  methodology could potentially double-count individuals if someone  transferred from one active service to another active service (e.g., if an  individual transferred from active duty in the Army to active duty in the  Navy).

To determine the total number of DOD reserve personnel who were  employed at any time in each component during fiscal year 2013, data for  reserve personnel were taken from the Reserve Components Common  Personnel Data System. Reserve personnel data includes all Reserve  categories in the Reserve and National Guard (Ready Reserve, Standby  Reserve, and Retired Reserve). DMDC calculated the total number of  reserve personnel by adding the totals of all members of the reserve  components from all 12 monthly files for fiscal year 2013. combining the 12 files, duplicate personnel were dropped based on Social  Security number and service.

This count excludes reserve personnel who were counted within the active end strengths  of the components, which is usually those who serve on active duty for more than 180  days. permanent and non-full-time permanent employees.12 files, duplicate personnel were dropped based on Social Security  number and service. This methodology could potentially double-count  individuals if someone transferred from one agency to another agency  (e.g., if an individual transferred from an Army civilian position to a Navy  civilian position).

Using these total employee counts, we still found that the number of DOD  employees who were eligible to access classified information in five  components exceeded the actual number of DOD employees in those  components. Regarding the disparity in the revocation data, Defense  Manpower Data Center officials stated that JPAS completeness and  accuracy of the data is dependent on the users entering the data. They  further stated that information in JPAS may not reflect the loss of  personnel—due to changes such as retirements, employee job transfer,  and deaths—in the different agencies in DOD, because the department’s  personnel centers can only send in separation dates for their personnel  for a limited period and the personnel centers may not enter or correct an  employee’s status during this period. As a result, we did not find the JPAS  data on the number of current military personnel and federal civilian  employees and contractors who are eligible to access classified  information to be reliable.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 to September 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

section_title: Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

section_title: Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact

section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Margaret A. Best (Assistant  Director), Renee S. Brown, Grace Coleman, Sara Cradic, Randy DeLeon,  Cynthia Grant, Mary Jo LaCasse, Amie Lesser, David E. Moser, Kelly  Rubin, and Michael Willems made major contributions to this report.

section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: Personnel Security Clearances: Actions Needed to Ensure Quality of  Background Investigations and Resulting Decisions. GAO-14-138T.  Washington, D.C.: February 11, 2014.

Personnel Security Clearances: Actions Needed to Help Ensure Correct  Designations of National Security Positions. GAO-14-139T. Washington,  D.C.: November 20, 2013.

Personnel Security Clearances: Opportunities Exist to Improve Quality  Throughout the Process. GAO-14-186T. Washington, D.C.: November  13, 2013.

Personnel Security Clearances: Full Development and Implementation of  Metrics Needed to Measure Quality of Process. GAO-14-157T.  Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2013.

Personnel Security Clearances: Further Actions Needed to Improve the  Process and Realize Efficiencies. GAO-13-728T. Washington, D.C.: June  20, 2013.

Managing for Results: Agencies Should More Fully Develop Priority Goals  under the GPRA Modernization Act. GAO-13-174. Washington, D.C.:  April 19, 2013.

Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for  Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800. Washington,  D.C.: July 12, 2012.

Personnel Security Clearances: Continuing Leadership and Attention Can  Enhance Momentum Gained from Reform Effort. GAO-12-815T.  Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2012.  2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and  Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue.  GAO-12-342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

Background Investigations: Office of Personnel Management Needs to  Improve Transparency of Its Pricing and Seek Cost Savings.  GAO-12-197. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington,  D.C.: February 17, 2011.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February  16, 2011.

Personnel Security Clearances: Overall Progress Has Been Made to  Reform the Governmentwide Security Clearance Process. GAO-11-232T.  Washington, D.C.: December 1, 2010.

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve  Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum.  GAO-11-65. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2010.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s  Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues. GAO-11-185T.  Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2010.

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and  Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide  Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. GAO-10-117T.  Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce  Delays but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain  Reform Efforts. GAO-09-684T. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is  Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process.  GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting,  Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed  to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington,  D.C.: May 19, 2009.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January  2009.

Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint  Reform Efforts to Improve the Government wide Clearance Eligibility  Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance  Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.

Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s  Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement.  GAO-08-551T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008.

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform  Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.:  February 27, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts  to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. GAO-08-470T.  Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable  More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.:  February 13, 2008.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation  Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17,  2007.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January  2007.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to  Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington,  D.C.: September 28, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of  Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.:  May 17, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments  Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2006.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain.  GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles  Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk  Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January  2005.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to  Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for  Industry Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.


Question-summary annotations: questions: question: Why might the DOD's clearance eligibility totals be inaccurate?
answer: GAO's comparison of the total number of DOD employees eligible to access classified information to the total number of DOD employees in fiscal year 2013 suggests that DOD's clearance eligibility totals may be inaccurate.
child_questions: question: What data supports this conclusion?
answer: Specifically, GAO found that the number of eligible employees exceeded the total number of employees in five DOD components.
child_questions: question: Why are these counts inconsistent?
answer: DOD officials said this discrepancy could be because DOD's eligibility database is not consistently updated when an employee separates.

question: How do these DOD inconsistencies affect ODNI figures?
answer: As a result, the total number of government employees eligible to access classified information that ODNI reports to Congress likely overstates the number of eligible DOD employees.
child_questions: question: What are the negative impacts of the overstated clearances?
answer: Inaccurate eligibility data hampers DOD's ability to reduce its number of clearance holders to minimize risk and reduce costs to the government.

questions: question: What issues surround clearance and US security?
answer: Personnel security clearances allow people access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security.
child_questions: question: Why are these issues more important currently?
answer: In light of recent events, having a high-quality process to determine whether an individual's eligibility to access classified information should be revoked has become increasingly important.

question: What clearances do the DOD and DHS grant?
answer: DOD and DHS grant the most clearances in the executive branch, and the Director of National Intelligence is responsible for, among other things, oversight of clearance eligibility determinations.

questions: question: What was the GAO asked to review?
answer: GAO was asked to evaluate revocation processes at DHS and DOD.
child_questions: question: What parts of the revocation processes did the GAO evaluate?
answer: GAO evaluated the extent to which the agencies (1) track data on these processes; (2) consistently implement government-wide requirements and exercise oversight over these processes; and (3) determine outcomes for employees whose clearances were revoked.

question: What inaccuracies did the GAO find?
answer: During this review, GAO identified possible inaccuracies in DOD's data on eligible personnel with access to classified information and is also reporting on that issue.

question: What information did the GAO review for this report?
answer: GAO analyzed agency revocation data, reviewed executive orders, agency guidance, and documents, and interviewed officials from ODNI, DHS, DOD, and their components.