ICBM Modernization: Approaches to Basing Options and Interoperable Warhead Designs Need Better Planning and Synchronization
Released: 2013-09-20T00:00:00


Highlights: section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: U.S. nuclear weapons--both the bombs and warheads and their delivery systems--are aging beyond their intended service lives. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review recommended that the Nuclear Weapons Council study options for extending the life of ICBM warheads, including the potential for developing a warhead that is interoperable on both Air Force and Navy missiles. In 2013 DOD will initiate a study to identify a replacement for the Minuteman III missile. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DOD has assessed the capability requirements, potential basing options, and costs for the follow-on to the Minuteman III ICBM; and (2) DOD and DOE have explored the feasibility of incorporating an interoperable warhead concept into the long-term nuclear weapons stockpile plan. GAO analyzed DOD and NNSA policies, plans, guidance, and other documents; and interviewed officials responsible for planning the Minuteman III follow-on and the warhead life-extension program.

section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Defense (DOD) has identified capability requirements and potential basing options for the Minuteman III follow-on intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and the Department of Energy (DOE) has begun a parallel study of options to extend the life of its warhead, but neither department plans to estimate the total system costs for the new missile and its warhead. GAO's work on cost estimating has found that a reliable cost estimate is critical to any program by providing the basis for informed decision making. The Nuclear Weapons Council--the joint activity of DOD and DOE for nuclear weapons programs--is responsible for coordinating budget matters related to nuclear weapons programs between the departments, and is engaging in an effort to broadly synchronize nuclear weapons life-extension programs with delivery-system modernization efforts, but has not asked either department to provide estimates of the total system cost. In the absence of such a request, neither department is developing total cost estimates. Further, DOD's plan to study ICBM follow-on options does not include the council as a stakeholder to synchronize the missile and warhead efforts to help ensure that the study considers an enterprise-wide perspective. Without timely cost estimates and updates on the status of the ICBM follow-on study, the council may be unable to provide guidance and direction on the study, or consider its implications and potential effects on other nuclear weapons modernization efforts.

DOD and DOE have prepared a long-term plan that incorporates interoperable warheads into the stockpile, and although they have begun studying the feasibility of designing such a warhead, the Navy has had limited participation thus far. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review recommended the Nuclear Weapons Council study the development of an interoperable warhead that could be deployed on both Air Force and Navy ballistic missiles, and the council has requested the Air Force, Navy, and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to commit resources to the study. Although the Air Force and NNSA have been examining warhead concepts, the Navy has not fully engaged in the effort because (1) other, ongoing modernization programs are higher Navy priorities, and (2) it has concerns about changing the design of the warhead. The Navy's further participation is uncertain because it has not identified the resources needed to continue with the program once the study is completed, if the interoperable warhead is adopted. Consequently, the Navy will be poorly positioned to perform the more-detailed analyses needed to validate the approved design, potentially resulting in program delays. The Nuclear Weapons Council guidelines governing nuclear weapons refurbishments, and the corresponding DOD instruction, do not require the Air Force and Navy to align their programs and resources before beginning joint-service warhead studies. For example, DOD's instruction states that the military departments are to develop procedures for certain joint DOD-DOE activities, but it is unclear about aligning their programs and resources with each other. If the guidance and DOD instruction are not updated, the services may not be prepared to participate in future joint-service studies.

section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO is making seven recommendations to provide complete cost estimates to the Nuclear Weapons Council and improve synchronization between DOD and DOE; to identify long-term Navy funding to support the interoperable warhead life-extension program; and to issue or revise existing DOD and Nuclear Weapons Council guidance. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all of GAO's recommendations, and DOE concurred with the three recommendations requiring joint action between the two departments.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report affirmed that the fundamental  role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack against the  United States, its allies, and partners. U.S. strategic nuclear forces— intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic  missiles (SLBM), and nuclear-capable long-range bombers—continue to  underwrite deterrence, albeit at substantially reduced levels from the Cold  War. These delivery systems and the bombs and warheads they carry are  aging, and some types of delivery systems are being deployed long  beyond their intended service lives. For example, the Minuteman III ICBM  was first deployed in 1970; following successive modernization efforts, it  is expected to stay in service through 2030 as a highly responsive, alert  nuclear force. The current administration has pledged that the U.S.  nuclear deterrent will be safe, secure, and effective for as long as nuclear  weapons exist, even as it has committed to consider additional arms  reductions. To this end, the Department of Defense (DOD) informed  Congress in May 2012 that it intended to invest at least $118.5 billion to  sustain and modernize nuclear delivery systems between fiscal year 2013   while the National Nuclear Security Administration  and fiscal year 2022,(NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy  (DOE), informed Congress in February 2011 that it had identified about  $90 billion in nuclear weapons stockpile and infrastructure costs over  roughly the same period.

In 2013, the Air Force plans to initiate a study, called the Ground Based  Strategic Deterrent analysis of alternatives (hereafter “Minuteman III  follow-on study”), to identify the best approach to upgrade or replace the  Minuteman III. This study is being prepared under DOD’s standard  requirements and acquisition process, which generally begins when a  military service or other sponsor identifies capability requirements and  critical gaps, which may then be documented in an initial capabilities   The Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved the Air  document.Force’s initial capabilities document in August 2012, and since that time  the Air Force has drafted a plan for conducting the Minuteman III follow- on study (hereafter “draft study plan”). As of April 2013, the Air Force  expects that the study will begin later this fiscal year.

Even as the Air Force started planning for the Minuteman III follow-on  study, in June 2012 the Nuclear Weapons Council requested that the Air  Force, Navy, and NNSA study the feasibility and costs of options to  extend the service life of the W78 ICBM warhead (hereafter “warhead  feasibility study”). The council directed this study to recommend options for developing a warhead that not only would replace the W78 ICBM   warhead, but also could replace the W88 SLBM warhead. The resulting  W78/88-1 warhead would be the first of three “interoperable warheads”— warheads designed with common (or “interoperable”) nuclear explosive  packages and similar (or “adaptable”) nonnuclear components, such that  they are compatible with both Air Force and Navy ballistic missile  systems—that the Nuclear Weapons Council envisions introducing to the  stockpile over the next 25 years. This approach to warhead  modernization marks a departure from prior ballistic missile warhead life- extension programs, which did not consider such options.

The W78/88-1 life-extension program is being conducted under the  Nuclear Weapons Council’s Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X  Process, which is used to manage nuclear weapons refurbishments,  including not only alterations to replace aging nuclear weapons  components, but also full-scope life-extension programs. DOD  procedures are further codified in a DOD instruction, DOD Procedures for  Joint DOD-DOE Nuclear Weapons Life-Cycle Activities. A joint DOD  and DOE Project Officers Group provides day-to-day oversight and  management of the warhead feasibility study. The Air Force chairs the  Project Officers Group and the Navy serves as cochair. The Nuclear  Weapons Council directed that the Project Officers Group complete the  warhead feasibility study, identify potential costs for the warhead life- extension program, and recommend potential designs for council  approval by December 31, 2014.

DOD and NNSA are beginning the effort to replace the Minuteman III and  W78 warhead at a time of fiscal uncertainty. DOD plans to significantly  reduce the rate of growth in defense spending over the next 5 years in  response to the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the subsequent  sequester. Since NNSA last reported its estimated nuclear weapons  stockpile and infrastructure costs to Congress in February 2011, the  agency had reprioritized nuclear modernization programs in response to  fiscal uncertainties, including delaying key infrastructure projects and  nuclear weapons life extensions. As the Minuteman III follow-on study  and warhead feasibility study take shape, fiscal conditions affecting both  DOD and DOE may create incentives for both departments to work more  closely together to minimize risk, maximize value, and avoid a  competition over scarce resources.

Section 1047 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2012 requires GAO to conduct a study of DOD’s strategic nuclear  weapons capabilities, force structure, employment policy, and targeting  requirements. This is the second unclassified report prepared in  response to the requirement in the Act. This report addresses the extent  to which: (1) DOD has assessed the capability requirements, potential  basing options, and costs for the follow-on to the Minuteman III ICBM;  and (2) DOD and DOE have explored the feasibility of incorporating an   interoperable warhead concept into the long-term nuclear weapons  stockpile plan. In June 2013 we reported to you on the results of our work  in a classified report.  This is the unclassified version of that report. To  prepare this unclassified version, we removed references to funding;  stockpile quantities and locations; capabilities; and specific classified  assessments.

To evaluate our objectives, we analyzed DOD, DOE, and Nuclear  Weapons Council policies and guidance on the requirements  development process and the planning and implementation of nuclear  weapons delivery system modernization and stockpile life-extension  programs. We obtained, reviewed, and analyzed key Air Force  documents, such as the Initial Capabilities Document for Ground Based  Strategic Deterrent, and the Air Force’s draft plan for preparing the  Minuteman III follow-on study. Using best practices we identified in our  prior work, we assessed the Air Force’s proposed methodology for  estimating the costs for options that the Air Force will consider in the  Minuteman III follow-on study. We also reviewed DOD and NNSA reports,  Project Officers Group and subgroup charters, and Air Force and NNSA  budget documentation. We analyzed documents from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, NNSA, and  the Nuclear Weapons Council. We also interviewed DOD and NNSA  officials responsible for developing and coordinating requirements for the  follow-on to the Minuteman III ICBM and for the W78/88-1 life-extension  program, and other officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense,  including from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Nuclear Matters and the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office;  the Air Force, including Global Strike Command and Nuclear Weapons  Center; the Navy, including Strategic Systems Programs; U.S. Strategic  Command; and NNSA, including the manager for the W78/88-1 life- extension program and managers for the ICBM and SLBM weapons  systems.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to June 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain   sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Our scope and methodology  are described in more detail in appendix I.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: The Air Force presently deploys 450 Minuteman III ICBMs in fixed, land- based launch facilities (or “silos”), located on three bases that encompass  vast regions of the United States. Three missile wings—the 90th Missile  Wing, 91st Missile Wing, and 341st Missile Wing, which fall under the  command of Air Force Global Strike Command—operate the ICBM force.  Each ICBM carries up to three W78 warheads, or a single W87 warhead.  In fiscal year 2007, the Air Force began deploying W87 warheads, while  reducing the number of deployed W78 warheads. To support U.S.  Strategic Command’s operational requirements, the Air Force maintains  nearly all of the ICBMs on alert at any given time.

DOD has not finalized the force structure and warhead requirements for  the Minuteman III under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New  START).  DOD last reported on its plans to implement the treaty in May  2012, when it informed Congress that the Air Force would deploy up to  420 Minuteman III ICBMs by 2018,Based on the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the Air Force plans  to retain the ability to redeploy additional warheads on the Minuteman III  in case technical problems occur with other strategic delivery systems or  warheads. In April 2013, DOD informed Congress that the decision on  how to meet the New START limits will be finalized before the beginning  of fiscal year 2015.   each carrying only a single warhead.

Like the Air Force, the Navy also maintains and operates nuclear-armed  ballistic missiles. Nuclear-armed Trident II SLBMs are deployed on 14  Ohio-class fleet ballistic missile submarines, 12 of which are operational  at any given time, while 2 are in overhaul. Each submarine currently  carries 24 SLBMs, and each SLBM carries either multiple W76-0/1  warheads or W88 warheads. NNSA is refurbishing the W76 warhead,  and plans to upgrade key nonnuclear components of the W88 warhead  beginning in fiscal year 2019. Unlike the Air Force, not all of the Navy’s  ballistic missile force structure is on alert at any given time.

Since 1994, the United States has retained a stockpile of nondeployed  weapons, called the hedge, in order to mitigate risks posed by unforeseen  technical problems with deployed weapons, or posed by changes in the  international security environment. As of September 2012, the Air Force  maintained both W78 warheads and W87 warheads in the hedge, and the  Navy maintained W76-0/1 warheads in the hedge. All of the Navy’s W88  warheads are either operationally deployed or retained as spares to be  used when deployed weapons are withdrawn for maintenance.

Air Force and Navy warheads were designed with unique aeroshells,  which differ in size, weight, and payload capacities. The W78 warhead is  encased in the Air Force Mk12A aeroshell, and the W87 warhead is  encased in the Mk21 aeroshell. The W88 warhead is encased in the  Navy’s Mk5 aeroshell, which, while smaller than the Mk21, is comparable  to the Mk21 in volume and payload capacity.

A number of DOD and DOE organizations oversee the nuclear weapons  enterprise, which includes the military forces, military and civilian  organizations, nuclear weapons design laboratories, and nuclear  weapons production plants that support DOD’s nuclear deterrence  mission:

DOD and DOE, specifically NNSA, share responsibility under the  Phase 6.X process for nuclear weapons refurbishments and life- extension programs. In addition to the W78/88-1 life-extension  program, NNSA is producing W76-1 warheads for the Navy, and  plans to begin producing B61-12 gravity bombs for the Air Force in  fiscal year 2019. NNSA also plans to initiate a life-extension program  for a cruise missile warhead, with production beginning in 2024.

The Air Force and Navy develop strategic delivery systems such as  ICBMs and SLBMs, and provide personnel, training, and equipment  for nuclear operations. In addition to the effort to replace the  Minuteman III ICBM, the Air Force plans to replace the nuclear-armed  air-launched cruise missile and develop a new, nuclear-  capable bomber. The Navy is acquiring a replacement for the Ohio- class submarine, and plans to replace the Trident II SLBM in the  2040s.

Air Force Global Strike Command provides operational ICBM forces  and is responsible for preparing the Minuteman III follow-on study,  and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center oversees Minuteman III  sustainment activities. The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center also  chairs the W78/88-1 Project Officers Group.

Navy Strategic Systems Programs is the Navy’s technical authority for  nuclear weapons systems and strategic forces; engages in activities  for Navy SLBMs and warhead requirements and modernization; and  chairs the project officers groups for Navy warheads. Strategic  Systems Programs cochairs the W78/88-1 Project Officers Group with  the Air Force.

The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, following guidance and  direction provided by the President, Secretary of Defense, and  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, develops an operational plan  and identifies targets for nuclear forces.

NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs plans and coordinates NNSA  activities to maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile. A national  complex of three nuclear weapons design laboratories, four  production plants, and the Nevada National Security Site carry out the  Office of Defense Programs’ mission. NNSA plans to modernize its  plutonium and uranium processing capabilities at Los Alamos, New  Mexico, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee, respectively. Lawrence  Livermore National Laboratory, in California, Los Alamos National  Laboratory, in New Mexico, and Sandia National Laboratories, in New  Mexico and California, are involved in the warhead feasibility study.

The Nuclear Weapons Council is the joint DOD and DOE activity  responsible for matters related to executive-level management of the  nuclear weapons stockpile. Established by statute in 1986, the council  facilitates cooperation and coordination between the two departments to  evaluate, maintain, and ensure the safety, security, and control of the  nuclear weapons stockpile. Among its responsibilities, the Nuclear  Weapons Council prepares the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile  Memorandum on behalf of the Secretaries of Defense and Energy,  which is transmitted to the President and, if approved, serves as the basis  for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. In November 2012, to  synchronize NNSA nuclear weapons life-extension programs, DOD  platform modernization programs, and NNSA plans for recapitalizing key  nuclear weapons production infrastructure, the Nuclear Weapons Council  adopted a long-term baseline plan for the nuclear weapons enterprise.  The council’s baseline plan featured the development of interoperable  warheads, beginning with the W78/88-1 life-extension program.

section_title: DOD Has Identified Potential Minuteman III Follow-on Options but DOD and NNSA Are Not Preparing Complete Cost Estimates or Effectively Involving the Nuclear Weapons Council
paragraphs: DOD has identified capability requirements and potential basing options  for the Minuteman III follow-on ICBM; however, neither the Air Force nor  NNSA are required to estimate the total system costs for both the missile  and warhead for the Nuclear Weapons Council to review; moreover, the  Air Force does not identify the council as a stakeholder to synchronize the  Minuteman III follow-on study with the W78/88-1 life-extension program.  The potential options under consideration in the Minuteman III follow-on  study include maintaining the existing Minuteman III, upgrading the  Minuteman III, and developing a new missile on mobile launchers.  Although the Nuclear Weapons Council is responsible for coordinating  budget matters pertaining to nuclear weapons programs between DOD  and DOE, and is engaging in an effort to broadly synchronize warhead  life-extension programs with delivery system modernization efforts, it has  not requested that either the Air Force or NNSA estimate the total system  costs of the missile and warhead. Moreover, neither the Air Force nor  NNSA are required to prepare cost estimates that identify the total system  costs for both the Minuteman III follow-on system and the W78/88-1  warhead for the Nuclear Weapons Council’s review. Furthermore, the Air  Force has not identified the council as a stakeholder to provide guidance  on synchronizing the Minuteman III follow-on study with the W78/88-1 life- extension program, even though it is responsible for coordinating the  programming of nuclear weapons programs between DOD and NNSA,  such as a nuclear weapon life-extension program. Without timely and  relevant information on the projected costs and findings of the Minuteman  III follow-on study, the Nuclear Weapons Council may be unable to  provide guidance to the Air Force on the study, or consider the study’s  implications and potential effects on other nuclear weapons  modernization efforts as it revises its baseline plan.
subsections: section_title: DOD Has Identified Capability Requirements and Alternative Basing Options to Be Analyzed in the Minuteman III Follow- on Study
paragraphs: DOD has identified capability requirements and alternative basing options  to be analyzed in the Minuteman III follow-on study, consistent with the  2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report. With this review, DOD was  directed to study potential alternatives for the Minuteman III, with the  objective of defining a cost-effective approach that supports continued  reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons while maintaining stable deterrence.  To prepare the initial capabilities document, the Air Force examined a  range of potential scenarios involving nuclear combat between 2025 and  2075, and concluded that ICBMs provide a stabilizing influence through  dispersed basing, alert posture, and high day-to-day readiness. However,  the initial capabilities document also found that while the Minuteman III  currently provides a robust deterrent, it is an aging weapon system that  requires enhancement, recapitalization, replacement, or development of a  new capability. The Air Force’s list of ICBM capability requirements is  presented in table 1.

The Air Force plans to formally assess different alternatives to replace,  recapitalize, upgrade, or evolve the existing Minuteman III ICBM during  the follow-on study. In preparation for the study, the Air Force has  developed a list of potential basing options, which it used to categorize  the alternatives to be assessed in the follow-on study. As of March 2013,  according to the Air Force Global Strike Command and Air Force Nuclear  Weapons Center, the Air Force has identified five potential approaches  for replacing the Minuteman III, as summarized in table 2. However, Air  Force officials added that these basing options could change before the  Minuteman III follow-on study begins later this year.

The Air Force recognizes that there are benefits and risks for each of the  basing options. For example, the New Fixed, Mobile, and Tunnel  approaches might enhance the system’s survivability, according to Air  Force Nuclear Weapons Center documentation and officials from the  Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, the Air Force recognizes  that there are risks to each approach, noting for example that introducing  new technologies to legacy systems could create technical risk for either  the Baseline or Current Fixed approaches.

Air Force officials expect that there will be a wide range of costs  associated with each basing option. Air Force officials noted that they do  not plan on ruling out options prior to the start of the Minuteman III follow- on study because of cost, but added that cost will likely play a  considerable role during the study. For example, in 2005 during the Land  Based Strategic Deterrent analysis of alternatives, the Air Force  reviewed several basing options including mobile and rail variants. During  that study, officials requested the Air Force to narrow its scope to finish  the study more quickly, according to U.S. Strategic Command and Air  Force Global Strike Command officials. The Air Force official added that  the mobile and rail variants were quickly eliminated based on their  estimated costs in order to meet this direction. As of March 2013, the Air  Force plans on assessing mobile and underground rail options during the  current study with a different set of assumptions than were used in the  previous study, primarily the ability of options to maintain a resilient  deterrent effect at lower force levels, according to Air Force Global Strike  Command. Final direction on study options will occur when the analysis  formally begins.

section_title: The Air Force and NNSA Are Not Developing Complete System Cost Estimates for the Nuclear Weapons Council
paragraphs: The Nuclear Weapons Council is synchronizing DOD programs to  modernize delivery systems with NNSA warhead life-extension programs,  but neither the Air Force nor NNSA are preparing cost estimates that  identify the total system costs for both the Minuteman III follow-on system  and the W78/88-1 warhead. GAO’s work on cost estimating has found  that a reliable cost estimate is critical to the success of any program  because it provides the basis for informed decision making. Furthermore,  it is important to provide such information early to effectively inform  decision making in the acquisition process. The Nuclear Weapons  Council needs such information to effectively synchronize DOD and  NNSA budgeting plans for nuclear weapons modernization.

Although the Nuclear Weapons Council should have estimates for the full  system cost for the Minuteman III follow-on system, neither the Air Force  nor NNSA are estimating such costs. Our review of the Air Force’s draft  plan for estimating Minuteman III follow-on costs indicates that, if the plan  is followed, the cost estimates will likely be well documented, accurate,  and credible in terms of estimating costs for the missile system itself.  However, from a system-wide perspective, the Air Force’s draft   methodology is not comprehensive, because the Air Force is not including  the costs for the W78/88-1 warhead in its estimate. DOD officials told us  that the Air Force is not responsible for estimating the costs for the  W78/88-1 life-extension program as it prepares the Minuteman III follow- on study. According to senior officials from the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, Air Force, and NNSA, NNSA is responsible for planning,  programming, and budgeting for the costs for the W78/88-1 warhead,  regardless of whether or how the Air Force replaces the Minuteman III  ICBM.

Further, NNSA believes it is premature to prepare cost estimates for the  W78/88-1 warhead life extension because, according to NNSA officials,  doing so requires making assumptions about the warhead’s design and  mode of deployment. The federal program manager and other NNSA  officials stated that reliable estimates for the warhead’s development and  production costs could not be prepared until additional information was  known about the specific nuclear explosive package design, enhanced  safety features, and the Air Force’s basing of the Minuteman III follow-on  system. NNSA officials told us that preliminary cost estimates for the  W78/88-1 life-extension program, prepared in October 2012, for the  Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan, total about  $12 billion in fiscal year 2012 dollars, but they noted that this estimate is  uncertain and likely to change as both the Minuteman III follow-on study  and the warhead feasibility study make progress over the next 2 years.  NNSA officials expect to prepare long-term cost estimates for this and  other warhead life-extension programs as NNSA develops its agency- wide stockpile management plan, but these estimates do not include cost  estimates for DOD’s delivery system modernization efforts, and are not  being prepared in conjunction with the Minuteman III follow-on study. The  Nuclear Weapons Council directed the Project Officers Group—the group  that exercises day-to-day management of the warhead feasibility study— to provide it with a semiannual program review on the study, and stated  that nuclear enterprise life-cycle costs will be a key metric in selecting a  design for the warhead. However, the Project Officers Group is not  required to provide a final cost estimate to the council until December  2014.

Given the lack of synchronization between DOD’s and DOE’s cost  estimate preparation, it is critical that the Nuclear Weapons Council  understand the full potential system costs for replacing the Minuteman III  and developing the W78/88-1 warhead. Without this understanding, the  council will not have the key information it needs to synchronize planning  and programming of nuclear weapons activities across DOD and DOE.  Moreover, it is not clear which department will bear responsibility for the  total system costs. For example, in 2010 DOD transferred $5.7 billion of  budget authority to NNSA for nuclear weapons and naval reactor program  activities from 2011 to 2015, including $784 million for the warhead life- extension program. DOD later augmented this $5.7 billion with an  additional $2.2 billion to be allocated annually from fiscal year 2012 to  fiscal year 2016. However, neither the Air Force nor NNSA are preparing  total system costs estimates for the missile and warhead, or formally  providing such estimates to the council.

section_title: The Air Force’s Draft Plan Does Not Effectively Involve the Nuclear Weapons Council
paragraphs: The Nuclear Weapons Council is responsible for coordinating  programming and budget matters pertaining to nuclear weapons  programs between DOD and DOE, but the Air Force’s draft plan does not  identify the council as a formal stakeholder to synchronize the two  studies. According to Air Force and NNSA officials, they are establishing  procedures to synchronize the Minuteman III follow-on study with NNSA’s  warhead feasibility study. Air Force officials noted that the Minuteman III  follow-on study group is working with the W78/88-1 Project Officers  Group to identify potential integration challenges. NNSA officials told us  that the group will help both the Air Force and NNSA to anticipate key  requirements for designing the communications interface between the  new missile and its warhead. Air Force and NNSA officials added that  these integration challenges are expected to be addressed in the future.

Although the Air Force and NNSA are establishing relationships to ensure  requirements are synchronized, the Air Force has not identified the  Nuclear Weapons Council as a stakeholder in the Minuteman III follow-on  study. An Air Force handbook on performing operations analysis indicates  that organizations that are heavily invested in the outcome of an analysis  should be given consideration as stakeholders. According to a senior  official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Minuteman III follow- on study’s ongoing status, potential recommendations, cost estimates,  and program schedule for the new missile are important factors for the  Nuclear Weapons Council to consider as it synchronizes the nuclear  modernization efforts across DOD and DOE.

Rather than identifying the Nuclear Weapons Council as a key  stakeholder, the Air Force’s November 2012 draft plan designates senior  DOD and NNSA representatives as members of a specially created study  advisory group, which is the only body authorized to change the study  guidance, and thus the scope and direction of the Air Force’s analysis.  Each of the Nuclear Weapons Council’s member offices is to be  represented on the study advisory group and will receive periodic updates  on the Minuteman III follow-on study’s progress and findings, according to  the Air Force’s draft study plan. Some Air Force and U.S. Strategic  Command officials told us that this process may be sufficient to obtain the  council’s perspective.

In contrast, several other officials from across DOD and DOE stated that  the Nuclear Weapons Council should be formally identified as a key  stakeholder in the draft study plan to help ensure that the Air Force  considers an enterprise-wide perspective as it conducts the study. For  example, officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and some  Air Force officials stated that the study advisory group members may not  approach their responsibilities from an operational or DOD-wide policy  perspective. Additionally, a senior official from the Office of the Secretary  of Defense highlighted the need for the Nuclear Weapons Council to be  cognizant of how NNSA’s life-extension program activities support the Air  Force’s schedule for developing and fielding the Minuteman III follow-on  system. Air Force Global Strike Command and other Office of the  Secretary of Defense officials told us that it would be beneficial for the  Nuclear Weapons Council to review the conduct and findings of the  Minuteman III follow-on study to ensure the program is managed from an  enterprise-wide perspective. NNSA officials added that including the  Nuclear Weapons Council as a stakeholder would improve NNSA’s  understanding of the Air Force’s priorities for the Minuteman III follow-on  system relative to other Air Force modernization priorities. A senior official  from the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center stated that including the  Nuclear Weapons Council as a stakeholder could bring focus and high- level attention to the council’s planning effort.

Without timely and relevant information on the progress and findings of  the Minuteman III follow-on study, the Nuclear Weapons Council may not  be able to provide guidance on synchronizing the Minuteman III follow-on  program with the W78/88-1 life-extension program, or consider the  study’s implications and potential effects on other nuclear weapons  modernization efforts. The Nuclear Weapons Council expects to update  and revise its baseline plan for the nuclear weapons enterprise in 2013  based on information obtained from ongoing weapons modernization   programs and analyses. Such revisions could include adjusting the  schedule of key weapons modernization programs, including the   W78/88-1 life-extension program. In preparing the long-term baseline   plan that it adopted in November 2012, the Nuclear Weapons Council  recommended adjusting initial operational dates for multiple nuclear  weapons systems and warhead life-extension programs. Absent accurate  and reliable information on nuclear weapons programs such as the  Minuteman III follow-on program, the Nuclear Weapons Council may be  poorly positioned to consider such changes in the future.

section_title: DOD and DOE’s Long- Term Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Incorporates Interoperable Warheads, but the Navy’s Participation in the Warhead Feasibility Study Has Been Limited
paragraphs: DOD and DOE, through the Nuclear Weapons Council, have prepared a  long-term, baseline plan for the nuclear weapons enterprise that  incorporates interoperable warheads, and the Air Force and NNSA have  begun examining the feasibility of designing such a warhead, but the  modernization of existing weapons is a higher Navy priority and has  limited the Navy’s participation in the warhead feasibility study. The  2010 Nuclear Posture Review recommended that the Nuclear Weapons  Council study options for extending the life of the W78 ICBM warhead,  including the possibility of using the resulting warhead also on Navy  SLBMs, and in June 2012 the Nuclear Weapons Council requested the  Air Force, Navy, and NNSA to commit resources to the W78/88-1 life- extension program study. Although the Air Force and NNSA have been  examining interoperable warhead concepts at the council’s direction, the  Navy had not included funds in its fiscal year 2013 budget submission for  the effort because the ongoing W76-1 life-extension program and other  modernization efforts were higher priorities, and because the Navy had  concerns about introducing changes to the design of Navy warheads. The  Navy’s fiscal year 2014 budget submission did include funds for the  study; however, according to the Air Force, the Navy’s limited  participation to date has delayed the Project Officer Group’s review of key  requirements. Moreover, unless the Navy identifies the resources needed  to implement the later stages of the life-extension program, should the  Nuclear Weapons Council approve the W78/88-1 interoperable design,  the Navy may not be in a position to test and certify the resulting design  or take other steps needed to prepare it for deployment. Lastly, if the  guidance governing life-extension programs is not updated, the services  may not be prepared to align their programs and resources in support of  joint interoperable warhead studies.
subsections: section_title: The Nuclear Weapons Council’s Baseline Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Incorporates Interoperable Warheads
paragraphs: The Nuclear Weapons Council’s baseline plan for the nuclear weapons  enterprise, adopted in November 2012, establishes a long-term vision for  the stockpile that is built around the development of interoperable ballistic  missile warheads. The first interoperable warhead, as shown in figure 1,  would be produced beginning with the W78/88-1 life-extension program in  2025; a second interoperable ballistic missile warhead would be produced  beginning in 2031; and a third type beginning in 2037, according to the  Nuclear Weapons Council’s baseline plan.

A key reason for developing the interoperable W78/88-1 warhead is that it  would provide U.S. Strategic Command flexibility to adjust its nuclear war  plan, should deployed warheads develop safety, security, or effectiveness  problems due to age or unforeseen technical failure, according to DOD  and NNSA. For example, as of September 30, 2012, SLBM W76-0/1  warheads accounted for a significant percentage of the deployed U.S.  nuclear force. Should these weapons become unreliable, the Navy would  not have replacements available because all of the W88 warheads in the  stockpile are already factored into the nuclear war plan. Rather, DOD  would have to deploy additional ICBM warheads and weapons carried by  heavy bombers, which could create operational risks because ICBM  warheads and bomber weapons have different operational  characteristics—such as range, accuracy, yield, fuzing options, and  responsiveness—than do SLBM warheads.warheads to the stockpile, DOD would have additional flexibility to ensure  target coverage in the war plan if the W76-0/1 warheads were  unexpectedly withdrawn from operations, because the Navy would have  another type of SLBM warhead available to replace it.

section_title: The Air Force and NNSA Have Begun Examining the Feasibility of the W78/88-1 Warhead with Limited Navy Participation
paragraphs: Even before the Nuclear Weapons Council adopted its nuclear weapons  enterprise baseline plan, the Air Force and NNSA completed a concept  study and initiated a feasibility study for the W78/88-1 life-extension  program with limited Navy participation.W76-1 and other nuclear weapons modernization efforts are higher  priorities than the W78/88-1 life-extension program and therefore Navy  Strategic Systems Programs’ participation in the warhead feasibility study  was unfunded. Moreover, the Navy understands the Nuclear Weapons  Council’s requirement to enhance safety features, but has concerns that  doing so would introduce uncertainty into the weapon’s design.

In September 2010, the Air Force and NNSA began a concept study to  evaluate weapon design concepts that could be used in both the W78  and W88 life-extension programs. This effort focused on identifying  options compatible with the Air Force’s Mk12A aeroshell, which encases  the W78 warhead, and the Navy’s Mk5 aeroshell, which encases the W88  warhead. Separately, in January 2012, NNSA sponsored an internal    study by the nuclear weapons laboratories to develop additional  concepts.were potentially compatible with both Air Force and Navy ballistic missile  systems.

Together, the two studies identified a dozen designs that  Subsequently, the W78/88-1 Project Officers Group, the joint DOD-DOE  body responsible for leading the feasibility study, has made progress in  the study. By March 2013, the Nuclear Weapons Council had selected  the Mk21 aeroshell, rather than the Mk12A aeroshell, for the Air Force  version of the design. Group is expected to recommend using a single type of primary, which is  a key component for the design. Moreover, the Project Officers Group  has agreed to limit the number of potential interoperable warhead design  options that it would recommend to the Nuclear Weapons Council at the  conclusion of the study.

Because the Mk21 aeroshell is larger than the Mk12A, the feasibility study will have a  broader range of options to consider for enhancing the safety and security of the design.  The Navy version of the design would continue to be compatible with the Mk5 aeroshell,  which is smaller than the Mk21. which is to be installed on the warhead over a 5-year period beginning  in fiscal year 2019. By contrast, the W78/88-1 life-extension program  is a longer-term effort than these programs and, from the Navy’s  perspective, does not require the Navy’s attention until the mid-2020s  and after these more pressing needs are met. Therefore the Navy did  not program funds for the warhead feasibility study in its fiscal year  2013 budget submission.

The Navy has concerns about changing the warhead design. In its  June 2012 approval of the start of the feasibility study, the Nuclear  Weapons Council directed that the Project Officers Group investigate  design options for an interoperable nuclear explosive package that  included insensitive high explosive.because the interoperable warhead is expected to involve a new  design, it would require extensive flight testing and certification.  Recognizing the Navy’s concerns in November 2012, the Nuclear  Weapons Council broadened the scope of the warhead feasibility  study to also include options based on the existing W88 design, which  does not use insensitive high explosive.

section_title: The Navy Has Identified Resources for the Warhead Feasibility Study, but Its Long-Term Support for the Program Remains Uncertain
paragraphs: The Navy has identified the required resources to support the study, but  has not identified the long-term resource requirements needed to  participate in later phases of the life-extension program, thereby making  its commitment uncertain. In November 2012, the Navy offered to provide  $43 million for the warhead feasibility study, but, according to Navy and  Strategic Systems Programs officials, as of March 2013 the Navy had  been unable to obligate any funds during fiscal year 2013 due to budget uncertainty and restrictions for operating under a continuing resolution.However, the fiscal year 2014 budget submission included $14 million for  fiscal year 2014 and $7 million for fiscal year 2015 for the Navy’s  participation in the study.

In the longer term, the Navy has not identified the resources needed to  support the life-extension program, should the Nuclear Weapons Council  approve of an interoperable design once the warhead feasibility study is  completed. In preparing for the life-extension program’s initial concept  study, which the Air Force began in September 2010, the Office of the  Secretary of Defense convened a Joint Requirements Working Group that  identified several critical factors that should occur even before the start of  the feasibility study. Among these factors, the Joint Requirements Working Group recommended that the services and NNSA align their  programs and identify and commit resources to the program early in the  Phase 6.X process. The Air Force has established a program for the life- extension effort, and in January 2013 the Air Force Nuclear Weapons  Center estimated the costs for fiscal year 2016 through fiscal year 2018 to  be about $5.5 million per year, once the warhead feasibility study is  complete. The Air Force lead project officer stated that these projected  costs do not include additional funding needed for weapons system  integration with the ICBM, adding that annual integration costs could grow  to $20 million to $30 million by 2025, when the warhead is first being  produced. By contrast, the Navy has not yet identified potential resource  requirements beyond the feasibility study, and did not include such costs  in its fiscal year 2014 budget submission.

The Navy’s participation in the later phases of the W78/88-1 life-extension  program remains uncertain because it has not identified the long-term  resources that would be needed if the interoperable warhead is adopted.  For example, DOD has not issued an implementing document for the  2010 Nuclear Posture Review that would require the Navy to identify such  resources, even though the Nuclear Posture Review Report  recommended studying options for developing an interoperable warhead  during the W78 life-extension program, according to officials from the  Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Navy. An official from the  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy told us that the Navy would be  directed to commit resources for the feasibility study through DOD’s  budgeting process, but the Navy has not been directed to identify the  long-term costs associated with the effort.

Unless the Navy identifies the resources needed to support the later  stages of the W78/88-1 life-extension program, should the Nuclear  Weapons Council approve this step, then the Navy will be poorly  positioned to perform more-detailed analysis, certification, and testing  needed to validate the approved design, resulting in program delays. The  costs of testing and certifying an interoperable warhead would likely be  considerable, according to Navy officials, given the expectation that the  warhead’s design would be different than previously deployed warheads.  During the phase of the 6.X process that comes after the feasibility and  design definition and cost study phases, NNSA, in coordination with DOD,  conducts tests, experiments, and analyses in order to validate the design  options. At the end of this phase, the weapon’s design needs to be  demonstrated to be feasible in terms of safety, use control, performance,  reliability, and producibility. According to the NNSA federal program  manager for SLBM warheads, significant differences exist between Air  Force and Navy requirements, such that the Navy’s participation during  this phase would be needed in order to validate an interoperable  warhead’s design. Absent the Navy’s identification of long-term funds,  Navy officials acknowledged that the interoperable warhead’s deployment  on Navy systems could be delayed.

section_title: Guidelines for Refurbishing Warheads Do Not Require Program and Resource Alignment for Joint Warhead Studies
paragraphs: The guidance that governs warhead refurbishments, including life- extension programs, does not require the services to align their programs  and resources in support of joint-service concept and feasibility studies  conducted under the Phase 6.X process. This is because neither the  Nuclear Weapons Council’s Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X  Process, nor DOD’s implementing instruction 5030.55, DOD Procedures  for Joint DOD-DOE Nuclear Weapons Life-Cycle Activities, have been  updated to reflect the need for the Air Force and Navy to align their  programs and resources early in the life-extension process, as the Joint  Requirements Working Group recommended in 2010. For example, both  the Procedural Guideline and DOD Instruction 5030.55 currently  demonstrate coordination and conferral between DOD and DOE with  respect to nuclear weapons activities. Additionally, DOD’s instruction  currently states that the military departments are to develop procedures  for certain joint DOD-DOE activities. However, the Procedural Guideline  and the instruction are unclear about the services’ aligning their programs  and resources with each other for supporting joint-service nuclear  weapons concept and feasibility studies.

Both DOD and DOE have requirements to review and, as needed, update  their respective guidance regularly. For example under the DOD  Directives Program, DOD issuances—including directives, instructions,  and other key publications—must be reviewed to determine whether they  are necessary, current, and consistent with DOD policy, existing law, and  statutory authority prior to the 5th year anniversary of their publication  date. The Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X Process was issued  in 2000, and is now being updated, but the completion date of this task is  uncertain. If the Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X Process and the  corresponding DOD instruction are not updated to reflect the need for the  services to align their programs and identify resources to support joint- service nuclear weapons concept and feasibility studies, or unless other  guidance is issued to this effect, then the individual services may not be  prepared to fund future studies examining the feasibility of interoperable  warheads.

section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD and NNSA are embarking on a long-term modernization of strategic  delivery systems and the nuclear stockpile, which increasingly requires  accurate information and close collaboration. The Nuclear Weapons  Council has special roles and responsibilities related to synchronizing  DOD and DOE efforts to modernize the nuclear weapons enterprise, and  has adopted a long-term baseline plan for doing so. To this end, the  council needs current and up-to-date cost estimates and other information  from the Air Force and NNSA about a centerpiece of the 2010 Nuclear  Posture Review Report—the long-term sustainment of the ICBM, together  with interoperable warheads. Moreover, without considering which  department will bear responsibility for the full cost of both the Minuteman  III follow-on and the W78/88-1 warhead, both the Air Force and the  council may be significantly underestimating the funds needed from DOD  for the system’s modernization. The conduct of the Minuteman III follow- on study may have implications for other nuclear weapon systems  developments as the council revises its baseline plan. Therefore without  Nuclear Weapons Council stakeholder involvement, the council’s ability to  synchronize its long-term plan will be limited.

At this time, the Navy has higher nuclear weapons modernization  priorities and, coupled with long-standing concerns about introducing  design changes to nuclear weapons, the Navy has been reluctant to fund  its participation in the W78/88-1 feasibility study, contributing to the  study’s delay. However, unless the Navy identifies the long-term  resources needed for the W78/88-1 life-extension program, it may be  poorly positioned to undertake the more-detailed analyses needed to  validate the interoperable warhead on Navy systems, resulting in further  program delays and potentially costly modifications. Moreover, the  Nuclear Weapons Council will lack the information that it needs to  determine whether the interoperable warhead concept is an effective  approach, both for the W78/88-1 life-extension program, and over the  long term as a cornerstone for stockpile modernization. Further, unless  the Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X Process and DOD Instruction  5030.55 are revised to ensure that the services align their programs and  resources to jointly support future warhead concept and feasibility  studies, or other such guidance is issued, the Nuclear Weapons Council’s  long-term vision for stockpile management, including the introduction of  interoperable warheads, may be unattainable. Finally, unless the Navy  identifies the long-term resource requirements for the warhead life- extension program, should the Nuclear Weapons Council approve an  interoperable warhead design, then the Navy may be unable to fund the  effort needed to test and certify the new design.

section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To assist DOD and DOE in synchronizing plans for modernizing the  nuclear weapons enterprise and for assessing the feasibility of the  interoperable warhead concept, we recommend the Secretary of Defense  take the seven actions listed below, including three recommendations that  are jointly addressed to the Secretary of Energy.

To enhance the Nuclear Weapons Council’s ability to consider the  development of the Minuteman III follow-on system and the W78/88-1  warhead as it synchronizes DOD and DOE modernization programs, we  recommend the following four actions:

The Secretaries of Defense and Energy direct the Secretary of the Air  Force and NNSA Administrator to prepare cost estimates that include the total system costs for  Minuteman III follow-on system alternatives and the costs  associated with the W78/88-1 warhead, and provide periodic updates on the estimated total system cost to the  Nuclear Weapons Council in conjunction with the Project Officers  Group’s semiannual program review.

The Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to  update the draft study plan for the Minuteman III follow-on study by  including the Nuclear Weapons Council as a stakeholder to  synchronize the Minuteman III follow-on study with the W78/88-1  life-extension program, and providing periodic updates and a final report on the Minuteman III  follow-on study to the Nuclear Weapons Council in conjunction  with the Minuteman III follow-on study’s periodic updates to its  study advisory group.

To ensure that DOD and NNSA are able to consider the possibilities of  potentially designing and developing an interoperable warhead as  directed by the Nuclear Weapons Council during the W78/88-1 life- extension program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Navy to identify the long-term resources needed to  implement the W78/88-1 life-extension program once the warhead  feasibility study is completed, should the Nuclear Weapons Council  approve of an interoperable warhead design.

To ensure that the services are able to support the consideration of  interoperable warhead concepts during future life-extension programs, we  recommend the following two actions:  the Secretaries of Defense and Energy direct the Nuclear Weapons  Council to revise the Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X Process  to require the services to align their programs and resources before  beginning concept or feasibility studies jointly with another service;  and the Secretary of Defense issue or revise existing guidance to require  the services to align their programs and resources before beginning  concept or feasibility studies jointly with another service.

section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided DOD and DOE with copies of our draft classified report for  their review and comment. In response, we received written comments  from both departments, which are reprinted in appendixes II and III,  respectively. DOD concurred with all seven recommendations, and DOE  concurred with the three recommendations requiring joint action between  the departments. DOD and DOE also provided technical comments,  which we have incorporated as appropriate.

DOD and DOE concurred with our two recommendations that the  Secretaries of Defense and Energy direct the Secretary of the Air Force  and NNSA Administrator to (1) prepare cost estimates that include the  total system costs for the Minuteman III follow-on system alternatives and  the costs associated with the W78/88-1 warhead, and (2) provide periodic  updates on the estimated total system cost to the Nuclear Weapons  Council in conjunction with the W78/88-1 Project Officers Group’s  semiannual program review. In its response, DOD stated that the Air  Force will outline the total life-cycle costs for the Minuteman III follow-on  system as part of the Minuteman III follow-on study. DOD further stated  that decisions about the Minuteman III follow-on and the W78/88-1  warhead will be informed by estimates of costs, schedule, and  performance for the complete system, adding that total ownership costs  would be agreed upon by DOD and NNSA. DOD also stated that it and  NNSA would track progress via the Nuclear Weapons Council with  semiannual updates from the Project Officers Group and through other  acquisition reviews. In its response, DOE indicated that NNSA will  prepare cost estimates that are suitable for discriminating among the  options under consideration during the course of the warhead feasibility  study, adding that a more-detailed cost estimate would be developed  following the warhead feasibility study. DOE further indicated that  although it could not speak for DOD, NNSA would work within the Nuclear  Weapons Council and Project Officers Group structure—which includes  the Air Force—to make parallel presentations of cost estimates for the  Minuteman III follow-on system and the W78/88-1 warhead, as we   recommended. Additionally, DOE indicated that NNSA and DOD could  brief the council on estimated warhead costs and Minuteman III follow-on  system costs, in conjunction with the Project Officers Group’s semiannual  program reviews.  Our recommendations intend that the Nuclear  Weapons Council receive total cost estimates periodically throughout the  course of the Minuteman III follow-on study and the warhead feasibility  study. If DOD’s and DOE’s proposed actions provide such periodic  updates to the Nuclear Weapons Council  and the presentations present  a total system cost estimate in sufficient detail to affect the council’s  decision-making, then the intent of our recommendations will have been  met.

DOD also concurred with our two recommendations that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to update the draft study  plan for the Minuteman III follow-on study by (1) including the Nuclear  Weapons Council as a stakeholder to synchronize the Minuteman III  follow-on study with the W78/88-1 life-extension program, and (2)  providing periodic updates and a final report on the Minuteman III follow- on study to the Nuclear Weapons Council. In its response, DOD stated  that the draft study plan includes the members of the Nuclear Weapons  Council as stakeholders, adding that the council members are part of the  study’s senior advisory group, which would receive periodic updates from  the Air Force study group. DOD stated further that it would provide  additional briefings during the Minuteman III follow-on study to the council  as requested. Our recommendation seeks to involve the Nuclear  Weapons Council as a body in the Minuteman III follow-on study, so that  the council is better informed about the course of the study, and can take  actions to synchronize the development of a follow-on ICBM with other  long-term nuclear weapons recapitalization plans. If DOD’s actions  provide the council with the information it needs for this purpose, then the  intent of our recommendation will have been met.

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Secretary of the Navy to identify the long-term resources  needed to implement the W78/88-1 life-extension program once the  warhead feasibility study is completed, should the Nuclear Weapons  Council approve of an interoperable warhead design. In its response,  DOD stated that it supports Navy direction to identify the long-term  resources needed to implement the W78/88-1 life-extension program  once the warhead feasibility study is completed and the council approves  a design. However, DOD did not provide information in its comments as  to how it would implement this recommendation.

DOD and DOE concurred with our recommendation that the Secretaries  of Defense and Energy direct the Nuclear Weapons Council to revise the  Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X Process to require the services to  align their programs and resources before beginning concept or feasibility  studies jointly with another service.  DOD stated that a revision to the  Phase 6.X process is currently underway and will serve to align service  programs and resources to support future warhead interoperability.  In its  response, DOE stated that NNSA will coordinate with DOD on the  appropriate revisions.  DOD also concurred with our recommendation that  the Secretary of Defense issue or revise existing guidance to require the  services to align their programs and resources before beginning concept  or feasibility studies jointly with another service. In concurring with these  recommendations, DOD stated further that the revision to the Phase 6.X  process will acknowledge the requirement in existing departmental  guidance that programs be fully resourced before major acquisition  decisions. DOD added that the Nuclear Weapons Council and DOD’s  annual program review process will also provide forums to ensure  technical, schedule, and resource alignment between the services and  subsequently with NNSA.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees and to the Secretary of Defense; Secretary of the Air Force;  Secretary of the Navy; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Commander, U.S.  Strategic Command; Secretary of Energy; and Administrator, National  Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). This report is also available at  no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please  contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made  contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: For this review, we addressed the extent to which (1) the Department of  Defense (DOD) has assessed the capability requirements, potential  basing options, and costs for the follow-on to the Minuteman III  intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM); and (2) DOD and the National  Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) have explored the feasibility of  incorporating an interoperable warhead concept into the long-term  nuclear weapons stockpile plan. For our review of these two objectives,  we obtained and analyzed DOD, NNSA, and Nuclear Weapons Council  policies and guidance on the requirements development process and the  planning and implementation of nuclear weapons delivery system  modernization and stockpile life-extension programs. This documentation  included: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01H, Joint  Capabilities Integration and Development System, dated January 10,  2012; DOD Instruction 5030.55, DOD Procedures for Joint DOD-DOE  Nuclear Weapons Life-Cycle Activities, dated June 25, 2001; and the  Nuclear Weapons Council’s Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X  Process, dated April 2000. For criteria used in both objectives, we  reviewed the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, particularly its  analysis and recommendations for modernizing the Minuteman III ICBM  and for studying the feasibility of developing interoperable warheads to be  used on ICBMs and Navy submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).

To help us understand ICBM operational requirements, we traveled to Air  Force Global Strike Command, Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, and  to U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, to obtain  briefings on ICBM operational requirements, readiness, maintenance,  sustainment, and modernization, and to discuss these subjects with  officials from each organization. We also reviewed Air Force instructions  on ICBM readiness, operations, and maintenance. We obtained and  reviewed key reports to Congress, including the May 2010, February  2011, and April 2012 reports to Congress from the Office of the Secretary  of Defense that describe the administration’s 10-year plan and cost  estimates for modernizing nuclear weapons and their associated delivery  systems. We also obtained and reviewed key Air Force documentation  that provided additional details of the Air Force’s plan to sustain the  Minuteman III to 2030, and discussed this plan with Air Force Global  Strike Command officials. We obtained and reviewed the 2011  Requirements and Planning Document, and a November 2012 update to  that document that details DOD’s requirements for deployed and  nondeployed ICBM and SLBM warheads. We also obtained and reviewed  the Nuclear Weapons Council’s Report on Stockpile Assessments for  Fiscal Year 2011 in order to obtain a complete perspective on the safety,  security, and effectiveness of the W78 and W88 warheads. We also   obtained and reviewed NNSA’s Fiscal Year 2011 Stockpile Stewardship  and Management Plan and the Technical Basis for Stockpile  Transformation Planning–FY 2010 in order to put the proposal for  developing interoperable warheads into context. We also interviewed  DOD and NNSA officials responsible for developing and coordinating  requirements for the follow-on to the Minuteman III ICBM and for the  W78/88-1 life-extension program, and other officials from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, including from the office of the Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters and the Cost Assessment and  Program Evaluation office; the Air Force, including Global Strike  Command and Nuclear Weapons Center; the Navy, including Strategic  Systems Programs; U.S. Strategic Command; and NNSA, including the  NNSA manager for the W78/88-1 life-extension program and NNSA  managers for the ICBM and SLBM weapons systems.

To determine the extent to which DOD has assessed the capability  requirements and potential basing options for the follow-on to the  Minuteman III ICBM, we analyzed the Air Force’s initial capabilities  document for the Minuteman III follow-on system, which identified  minimum capability requirements for the future system and gaps in the  current operating system. For an operational perspective, we met with  officials from the Air Force Global Strike Command, Air Force Nuclear  Weapons Center, Air Force A10, and U.S. Strategic Command to discuss  such requirements and the Air Force’s ability to maintain requirements at  high levels of operational alert. To identify alternative basing options for  the Minuteman III follow-on system, we reviewed previous basing reports  such as the Land Based Strategic Deterrent analysis of alternatives, and  Air Force documentation highlighting proposed alternative basing options  prepared by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center and the Air Force  Global Strike Command, which is leading the Minuteman III follow-on  study. We discussed this documentation with officials from the Joint Staff,  Air Force A10, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Nuclear Matters, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, and Air Force  Global Strike Command.

After identifying capability requirements and alternative basing options,  we reviewed the Air Force’s draft plan for studying Minuteman III follow- on options, which was prepared by Air Force Global Strike Command.  After reviewing the Air Force’s draft study plan, we met with Air Force  Global Strike Command and Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center officials  to discuss, among other elements, how they planned to establish cost  estimates for each of the alternative basing options, and the Air Force’s  plan for oversight for the planned study. Using our prior work for  developing sound cost estimates found in GAO Cost Estimating and  Assessment Guide as criteria, we identified potential challenges to  building comprehensive and credible cost estimates. Additionally, we  reviewed statues and guidance related to the Nuclear Weapons Council,  DOD, and Air Force processes for analyzing weapon system  requirements, and used these documents as criteria to analyze the  Nuclear Weapons Council’s role in the Minuteman III follow-on study. We  discussed and confirmed our approach with officials from the Office of the  Secretary of Defense’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office,  Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters,  Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic and  Tactical Systems, Air Force Global Strike Command, Air Force Nuclear  Weapons Center, and Air Force A10.

To determine the extent to which DOD and NNSA have explored the  feasibility of incorporating an interoperable warhead concept into the  long-term nuclear weapons stockpile plan, we examined both the long- term plan and effort to date to implement the W78/88-1 life-extension  program. We analyzed the Nuclear Weapons Council’s preliminary  baseline plan for the nuclear weapons stockpile for the next 25 years,  including options that the council considered in adopting the baseline  plan. We obtained and reviewed key briefings from U.S. Strategic  Command, and interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, U.S. Strategic Command, NNSA, Air Force Nuclear Weapons  Center, and Navy Strategic Systems Programs. We discussed possible  uncertainties and risks about the baseline plan with officials from the  Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters;  U.S. Strategic Command; Air Force; and Navy. Turning to our analysis of  the W78/88-1 life-extension program, we used criteria drawn from the  2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report and from the U.S. Strategic  Command’s 2010 Joint Requirements Study for a Common Life  Extension Program for the Mk12A/W78-1 and Mk5/W88-1, and the  Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X Process, to evaluate the extent to  which the Air Force and Navy have aligned their programs and resources  to support this effort. To perform this analysis, we  reviewed documentation for the W78/88-1 life-extension program,  including memorandums from the Air Force, Navy, NNSA, and  Nuclear Weapons Council; identified and reviewed key Air Force and NNSA briefings that  identified potential design options for the W78/88-1 life-extension  program; reviewed DOD, NNSA, and W78/88-1 Project Officer Group and  subgroup charters, as well as Air Force, Navy, and NNSA budget  documents; reviewed the Navy’s perspective on stockpile modernization by  interviewing senior officials from Navy Strategic Systems Programs,  Navy N514, and NNSA’s federal program manager for Navy  warheads; interviewed the Air Force lead project officer and NNSA federal  program manager for the W78/88-1 life-extension program, at Kirtland  Air Force Base, New Mexico; interviewed NNSA officials involved in the management of the W78  and W88 warheads; and met with DOD officials, including officials from the Office of the Deputy  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters; Joint Staff J8; and  U.S. Strategic Command.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to June 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

section_title: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

section_title: Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy

section_title: Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact

section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report  included Penney Harwell Caramia, Assistant Director; David M. Adams;  Colin Chambers; Grace Coleman; Julie Corwin; Robert Scott Fletcher;  Jason Lee; Kevin L. O’Neill; Michael Shaughnessy; and Amie Steele.


Question-summary annotations: questions: question: To what extent has the financial cost of refurbishment been considered?
answer: The Department of Defense (DOD) has identified capability requirements and potential basing options for the Minuteman III follow-on intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and the Department of Energy (DOE) has begun a parallel study of options to extend the life of its warhead, but neither department plans to estimate the total system costs for the new missile and its warhead.
child_questions: question: How important is a cost analysis to the program?
answer: GAO's work on cost estimating has found that a reliable cost estimate is critical to any program by providing the basis for informed decision making.

question: How has the Nuclear Weapons Council attempted to create a cost estimate?
answer: The Nuclear Weapons Council--the joint activity of DOD and DOE for nuclear weapons programs--is responsible for coordinating budget matters related to nuclear weapons programs between the departments, and is engaging in an effort to broadly synchronize nuclear weapons life-extension programs with delivery-system modernization efforts, but has not asked either department to provide estimates of the total system cost.
child_questions: question: Why is neither department developing total cost estimates?
answer: In the absence of such a request, neither department is developing total cost estimates.

question: To what extent has the Council been involved in the study?
answer: Further, DOD's plan to study ICBM follow-on options does not include the council as a stakeholder to synchronize the missile and warhead efforts to help ensure that the study considers an enterprise-wide perspective.
child_questions: question: How may this lack of coordination negatively affect the study?
answer: Without timely cost estimates and updates on the status of the ICBM follow-on study, the council may be unable to provide guidance and direction on the study, or consider its implications and potential effects on other nuclear weapons modernization efforts.

questions: question: To what extent has the possibility of interoperable warheads been examined?
answer: DOD and DOE have prepared a long-term plan that incorporates interoperable warheads into the stockpile, and although they have begun studying the feasibility of designing such a warhead, the Navy has had limited participation thus far.
child_questions: question: To what extent does the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review recommend expanding this examination?
answer: The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review recommended the Nuclear Weapons Council study the development of an interoperable warhead that could be deployed on both Air Force and Navy ballistic missiles, and the council has requested the Air Force, Navy, and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to commit resources to the study.

question: Why has the Navy been inactive in this review?
answer: Although the Air Force and NNSA have been examining warhead concepts, the Navy has not fully engaged in the effort because (1) other, ongoing modernization programs are higher Navy priorities, and (2) it has concerns about changing the design of the warhead.
child_questions: question: To what extent is the Navy likely to participate in future rounds of the review?
answer: The Navy's further participation is uncertain because it has not identified the resources needed to continue with the program once the study is completed, if the interoperable warhead is adopted.
child_questions: question: What will the Navy be poorly positioned to do as a result of not identifying necessary resources needed to continue the program?
answer: Consequently, the Navy will be poorly positioned to perform the more-detailed analyses needed to validate the approved design, potentially resulting in program delays.

question: What imperative (if any) does the Navy have to join the reviews?
answer: The Nuclear Weapons Council guidelines governing nuclear weapons refurbishments, and the corresponding DOD instruction, do not require the Air Force and Navy to align their programs and resources before beginning joint-service warhead studies. For example, DOD's instruction states that the military departments are to develop procedures for certain joint DOD-DOE activities, but it is unclear about aligning their programs and resources with each other.
child_questions: question: Why might the lack of joint-service cooperation cause issues in the future?
answer: If the guidance and DOD instruction are not updated, the services may not be prepared to participate in future joint-service studies.

questions: question: To what extent are US nuclear weapons still within their intended service lives?
answer: U.S. nuclear weapons--both the bombs and warheads and their delivery systems--are aging beyond their intended service lives.
child_questions: question: How did the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review plan on mitigating the aging issue?
answer: The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review recommended that the Nuclear Weapons Council study options for extending the life of ICBM warheads, including the potential for developing a warhead that is interoperable on both Air Force and Navy missiles.

question: What will happen in order to begin the process of replacing the Minuteman III missile?
answer: In 2013 DOD will initiate a study to identify a replacement for the Minuteman III missile.

question: To what extent did GAO analyze plans and policies in regards to the life-extension program?
answer: GAO analyzed DOD and NNSA policies, plans, guidance, and other documents; and interviewed officials responsible for planning the Minuteman III follow-on and the warhead life-extension program.