DOD Joint Bases: Implementation Challenges Demonstrate Need to Reevaluate the Program
Released: 2014-09-19T00:00:00


Highlights: section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: GAO designated DOD support infrastructure as a high-risk area to address efficiency challenges. In 2005, DOD recommended to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission combining 26 installations into 12 joint bases to generate efficiencies and cost savings, initially estimated to be $2.3 billion. In 2009, DOD reduced this estimate to $273 million. GAO was mandated to assess DOD's progress in consolidating common services across joint bases. This report addresses the extent to which officials reported consolidating installation-support functions, and meeting joint basing goals to achieve greater efficiencies and cost savings. GAO conducted a survey of 11 joint bases, and reviewed applicable guidance. GAO did not survey Joint Region Marianas because it was subject to different expectations.

section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: Joint base officials reported varying progress in consolidating installation-support functions, and challenges resulting from consolidation efforts that created inefficiencies and inequities. Overall, the joint bases reported partially consolidating 80 percent of their installation-support functions, but the extent of consolidation varied across the bases and among the various functions. None of the joint bases have reported consolidating all functions. However, all 11 joint bases reported consolidating some portion of eight functions, such as custodial services and installation safety. The least consolidated functions were reported to be military service-specific or mission-specific, such as small-arms range management and port services. Also, joint base officials reported several challenges resulting from consolidation, such as multiple inspections and employees being potentially disadvantaged in competing for promotion opportunities due to military service-specific personnel policies. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and military service officials have not evaluated which functions are still suitable for consolidation or taken policy actions to address any challenges resulting from consolidation. Without an evaluation of the suitability of installation-support functions for consolidation and without actions to address any negative consequences that emerged from consolidation, the Department of Defense (DOD) may continue to experience challenges in its efforts to consolidate these functions.

Note: Not all of the joint bases that GAO surveyed have small-arms range management or port services functions.

Joint base officials reported that consolidation of support functions has resulted in some progress toward achieving the goals of joint basing (achieving efficiencies and cost savings), by reducing redundant positions and finding contracting efficiencies. However, as GAO reported in November 2012, DOD does not have a method to collect cost savings information achieved specifically from joint basing. Thus, GAO recommended that DOD develop a plan for doing so. DOD disagreed and has not yet taken action. GAO continues to believe this recommendation has merit and should be addressed. Also, officials said they are uncertain of the extent to which the goals of joint basing are still appropriate, and to what extent they are required to take actions to pursue them. OSD has not collaborated with the military services to evaluate whether the goals of joint basing remain appropriate and has not provided direction to the joint bases on future priorities. Without a collaborative evaluation of the joint basing program by OSD and military service officials to determine if the goals remain appropriate—and without additional direction to help meet reporting requirements—it will be difficult for DOD to determine the extent to which the joint basing initiative is achieving its intended goals.

section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: Congress should consider directing DOD to evaluate joint basing goals, provide direction on requirements to meet the goals, and determine next steps for joint basing. GAO included this matter because DOD did not concur with GAO's recommendations to conduct such an evaluation and provide direction, in part because DOD stated joint bases have achieved savings. GAO also recommended DOD evaluate which installation-support functions remain suitable for consolidation, with which DOD concurred, and take policy actions to address challenges, with which DOD partially concurred, noting its existing processes to address challenges. GAO continues to believe its findings and recommendations are valid as discussed in this report.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: In the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, the  Department of Defense (DOD) proposed a recommendation to the BRAC  Commission to consolidate 26 service-specific stand-alone installations  into 12 joint bases to take advantage of opportunities for efficiencies. In  DOD’s justification for its recommendation to the BRAC Commission, the  Secretary of Defense noted, among other things, that because the  installations either shared a common boundary or were in proximity to at  least one other installation and performed common support functions,  there was a significant opportunity to reduce duplication of similar support  services, which could produce savings. DOD projected savings in various  areas, such as by paring unnecessary management personnel, achieving  greater efficiencies through economies of scale, and consolidating and  optimizing existing and future service contract requirements. DOD and  the BRAC Commission estimated that the creation of joint bases could  save about $2.3 billion over a 20-year period in net present value terms.

DOD’s joint basing initiative—implemented in two phases, with five joint  bases established in October 2009 and the remaining seven bases  established in October 2010—created 12 joint bases from the 26  previously stand-alone installations that were originally operated by the  Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, combining installation-support  services such as airfield operations, grounds maintenance, and custodial  services. The 2005 BRAC recommendation on joint basing established  which military bases would receive installation-management functions  from one or more other bases in lieu of each base providing the same  services. On the basis of these realignments, the Office of the Secretary  of Defense (OSD) designated the military service responsible for  delivering installation support at each joint base as the lead service, and  in 2008 OSD issued further guidance for joint basing implementation.According to this guidance, the lead service is referred to as the  supporting component and the military services receiving installation  support are referred to as the supported components.

GAO, Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support Standards and  Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of Facility Sustainment Funding Uses,  GAO-09-336 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2009). basing was a relatively new initiative and implementation issues were still  being resolved. We continue to believe that these recommendations are  valid and should be implemented.

For almost two decades, we have designated DOD infrastructure as a  high-risk area, citing that reducing the cost of excess infrastructure  activities was critical to making use of scarce resources and maintaining  high levels of military capabilities. During this time, we reported that DOD  faced challenges in three areas: (1) reducing excess and obsolete  infrastructure, (2) sustaining facilities, and (3) achieving cost savings and  efficiencies in base-support services. After DOD made significant  progress in addressing the issues regarding planning and funding to  sustain facilities, in 2011 we narrowed this high-risk area to focus on the  two remaining issues. DOD has cited its joint basing initiative as the  mechanism through which it could achieve greater economies of scale  and savings by consolidating and eliminating duplicative installation- support services. In GAO’s 2013 high-risk update, we reported that DOD  had made little progress in realizing the anticipated cost savings and  efficiencies from consolidations and from the elimination of duplicate base  support at specific installations.

The House Armed Services Committee, in its 2013 report accompanying  a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014,  mandated that we assess the progress DOD has made in consolidating  common services across the joint bases. This report addresses the extent to which officials have reported (1) consolidating installation- support functions at the joint bases, and (2) meeting the goals of joint  basing to achieve greater efficiencies and cost savings as stated in the  2005 BRAC recommendation.

To determine the extent to which officials have reported consolidating  their installation-support functions, we reviewed DOD’s 2008 Joint Basing  Implementation Guidance to identify DOD’s expectations for  consolidation, and compared these with the results of our web-based  survey of 11 of the 12 joint bases. We also interviewed joint base  officials from a nongeneralizable sample of four joint bases, and reviewed  the joint bases’ memorandums of agreement. To determine why  consolidation had or had not occurred as intended, to identify any factors  that have hindered consolidation, and to identify any challenges that have  resulted from consolidation efforts, we analyzed information obtained  through our survey and interviewed joint base officials. We evaluated  DOD’s efforts to address reported hindrances to consolidation and  challenges that have resulted from consolidation efforts and compared   We did not  those efforts to key federal practices for consolidation.independently assess the extent to which consolidation occurred as  identified by survey respondents and during interviews.

To determine the extent to which officials have reported meeting the  goals of joint basing to achieve greater efficiencies and cost savings as  stated in the 2005 BRAC recommendation, we reviewed documents and  guidance from OSD, the military services, and individual joint bases. We  reviewed survey results and information collected from interviews and  compared them to key federal practices for consolidation of management  functions and to key practices agencies can take to improve efficiency as  identified in our prior work. To understand the role of OSD and military  service headquarters in overseeing joint bases, we interviewed OSD joint  basing officials; members of the Joint Base Working Group that  represents the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps headquarters;  and officials from the Army Installation Management Command, the Air  Force Civil Engineering Command, and Navy Installations Command as  they provide varying levels of funding for and oversight of installation  support for their corresponding military services. To understand the  roles and responsibilities of the regional commands in managing joint  bases, we interviewed regional officials with responsibility for joint bases,  including officials from Army Installation Management Command as well  as four Air Force major commands and two Navy regional commands. To  collect information about specific initiatives undertaken by the joint bases  and about the related outcomes, we drew from our survey and interviews.  See appendix I for a detailed description of our overall scope and  methodology, and appendix II for a copy of the survey questions.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 to September 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Establishment of Joint Bases
paragraphs: DOD consolidated 26 service-specific stand-alone installations into 12  joint bases to take advantage of opportunities for efficiencies.1 for a list of joint bases, their locations, and the identification of which  military service is the supporting component that delivers installation  support.

Figure 1 is an interactive map that depicts the locations of the 11 joint  bases and Joint Region Marianas. The map (see interactive instructions)  also features individual maps of each of the joint bases and joint region.  See appendix V for the printed version of each map.

section_title: Implementation of Joint Basing
paragraphs: In January 2008, OSD issued guidance to implement the joint basing  initiative. The guidance established a comprehensive framework to  consolidate installation-support functions while meeting mission  requirements. It also created a Joint Management Oversight Structure to  establish the lines of authority for handling disputes and directed the  transfer of installation-support authority and real property to the  supporting component. Further, the guidance requires that the military  services at each joint base enter into a memorandum of agreement to  define the relationships between the components; to detail the transfer of  real property and funding to the supporting component; and to require the  establishment of the Joint Base Partnership Council, which is a group  consisting of representation from the major supported component(s) and  the tenants on the base. The council’s role includes helping at the joint  base level to resolve any disputes that arise between the supporting and  supported components. The agreements generally require the Joint  Base Partnership Council to annually review any financial effects from the  agreements, and to triennially review each agreement.

OSD guidance requires that each joint base have a Joint Base  Commander from the supporting component, and a Deputy Joint Base  Commander who is generally from the supported component.

The Joint  Base Commander has the authority and responsibility for effectively using  available resources for planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and  controlling the delivery of installation support as detailed in each joint  base’s memorandum of agreement.

Additionally, OSD guidance required that all civilian authorizations  providing installation support from the supported component will become  part of the supporting component, under the supporting components’  civilian personnel management system. Some joint bases incorporated  military positions from the supported component into the joint base  structure. These positions generally were identified in the agreements for  each joint base and now perform installation-support duties for the Joint  Base Commander.

section_title: Installation-Support Functions
paragraphs: DOD’s 2008 guidance originally identified and defined 47 common  installation-support functions to be aligned under the authority of the Joint  Base Commander, subject to certain exceptions. According to OSD  officials, individual installation-support functions have been reviewed on a  case-by-case basis and removed from the list. We reviewed 42  installation-support functions as part of our survey; see table 2 for a list of  those functions.

section_title: Joint Base Officials Have Reported Varying Levels of Progress in Consolidating Functions, but Cited Limited Opportunities and Challenges from Consolidation Efforts
paragraphs: Joint base officials reported varying levels of progress in consolidating  installation-support functions, several limitations that inhibited  consolidation, and challenges resulting from consolidation efforts that  created inefficiencies and inequities. DOD guidance outlined more than  40 specific, common installation-support functions at joint bases to be  aligned under the authority of the Joint Base Commander, unless the   According to  relevant memorandums of agreement provide otherwise.key federal practices for consolidation, federal agencies need to plan to  monitor and to evaluate their efforts to identify areas for improvement.  Overall, we found that the 11 joint bases had reported partially  consolidating 80 percent of the functions for which the joint base  commander had some responsibility, but the extent of consolidation  varied from one joint base to another and among the various installation- support functions. Our analysis of information gathered from the survey  and interviews showed that the joint bases reported having limited  opportunities to consolidate some functions, such as those unique to a  single military service’s mission (e.g. airfield operations and port services)  and those managed by a military service’s headquarters such as legal- support services. Furthermore, joint base officials reported several  challenges resulting from consolidation, such as multiple military service  inspections and employees being disadvantaged in competing for  promotion opportunities, resulting from service-specific personnel  policies. DOD has not comprehensively evaluated installation-support  functions to determine whether they are all still appropriate for  consolidation. Also, DOD has not taken steps to address any  inefficiencies and inequities arising from consolidation, or assessed any  actions that can be taken to facilitate consolidation and address any  negative effects in these circumstances. Without a comprehensive  evaluation of the suitability of installation-support functions for  consolidation—and without guidance to address any negative  consequences that emerge from consolidation—individual joint bases will  still be expected to merge support functions, which may result in ongoing  inefficiencies and inequities.
subsections: section_title: Joint Base Officials Reported Varying Levels of Progress in Consolidating Installation- Support Functions
paragraphs: Joint base officials whom we surveyed and interviewed reported  variations in the extent to which installation-support functions were  consolidated. None of the 11 joint bases we surveyed or the Joint Region  Marianas reported that they have consolidated all installation support  functions identified in DOD’s 2008 Joint Basing Implementation  Guidance. DOD’s guidance identified and defined more than 40 specific  installation-support functions to be aligned under the authority of the Joint  Base Commander, unless the relevant agreement provides otherwise. In  written comments to our 2012 report on joint basing and during the  course of this review, OSD reaffirmed its expectations that Joint Base  Commanders are to merge their management structures, operating  procedures, financial systems, and staffs to consolidate installation- support functions.

For the 11 joint bases that we surveyed, our analysis indicated that of the  potential 462 installation-support functional areas (42 common functions  at each of the 11 joint bases) to be transferred to the supporting  component, Joint Base Commanders had some responsibility for 438, or  about 95 percent, of those support functions. Our analysis showed that  the joint bases reported that they have at least partially consolidated 350  (about 80 percent) of the 438 installation-support functional areas for  which the joint base commander had some responsibility. About 4 percent  of the installation-support functions that are included in the 80 percent  were consolidated prior to joint basing via agreements between the  military services. According to our analysis, most instances of  consolidation prior to joint basing (16 out of 18) occurred at Joint Base  Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington. Figure 2 illustrates the status of  consolidation based on our analysis of survey responses and other  supporting documentation.

Consolidation varied greatly by location among the 11 joint bases.example, our analysis of survey responses and other supporting  documentation showed that Joint Base Langley-Eustis had reported some  level of consolidation in 52 percent of its functions, whereas three other  joint bases had some consolidation in approximately 90 percent or more  of the functions. Figure 3 illustrates the status of consolidation for each  installation based on our analysis of survey responses and other  supporting documentation.

section_title: Joint Base Officials Reported Limited Opportunities to Consolidate Some Support Functions and Workforces
paragraphs: Joint base officials reported that there were limited opportunities to  consolidate some installation-support functions, and that the workforces  used by the military services to provide support services—as well as  geography—can affect consolidation efforts. The officials stated that they  may not be able to fully consolidate some functions because these  functions are unique to one military service’s mission or the function is  mainly managed by a military service’s headquarters. Also, joint base  officials stated that limited opportunities exist to consolidate workforces  because of the differences in the original types of workforces—military,  civilian, and contractor—that were in place prior to joint basing. As part of  our review, we are reporting our analyses of responses to our survey  questions and examples provided during interviews with joint base and  military service officials. We did not independently assess the extent to  which consolidation occurred as identified by survey respondents and by  officials during interviews.

Our survey and interview data showed the support functions that provided  the least amount of opportunity for consolidation generally are unique to a  single military service’s mission, or are mainly managed by a military  service headquarters, including those that have the need to follow military  service-specific requirements and procedures.

Support functions unique to military service mission. Our analysis of  survey results and other supporting documentation, as illustrated in figure  4, showed that installation-support functions reported to be consolidated  at the fewest joint bases tended to have military service-specific or  mission-specific characteristics. According to officials, these functions  offered limited opportunities to consolidate because they were unique to  the missions of the individual military services. In most instances, these  functions either did not transfer to the supporting component as part of  joint basing because the function was considered to be mission-related  rather than part of installation support or did not have a counterpart in the  other military service. For example:

Port services. We found that one, or 25 percent, of the four joint bases  that have a port and included port services as part of the joint base  commander’s responsibility had reported consolidating this function.  The one base that did consolidate was a location where the Navy was  a supported component and did not have an operational mission. The  three bases that did not consolidate were locations where there was  only one service with the function (so there was not a need to  consolidate).

Small-arms range management. We found that three, or 38 percent,  of the eight joint bases where the joint base commander had  responsibility for small-arms range management had reported  consolidating this function. For all three of the joint bases that had  consolidated this function, this function tended to be installation  support rather than directly tied to a mission requirement. Officials for  the other five joint bases that did not consolidate this function reported  that they had not done so because the Army was exempt at four of  the bases from consolidating this function and there was only one  service with this function at the other base (so there was not a need to  consolidate).

Airfield operations. We found that four, or 44 percent, of the nine joint  bases where the joint base commander had some responsibility for  airfield operations had reported consolidating this function. The Air  Force was the supporting component for three of the joint bases while  the Navy was supporting for the other one. Officials for the other five  joint bases reported that they had not consolidated this function  because the Air Force had variances to consolidating the function at  two of the bases and there was only one service with this function at  the other three bases (so there was not a need to consolidate).

Support functions managed by military service headquarters. Our  analyses of survey results and other supporting documentation found  some functions were limited in the amount of overlapping activities that  could be consolidated because the functions remained largely managed  by a military service headquarters, or officials executing these functions  were required to follow specific military service requirements or  procedures. In our survey, 45 percent of 438 joint base officials reported  that their consolidation efforts had been hindered by military service- specific requirements, practices, or policies. For example:  Information technology system management. Joint base officials  reported that opportunities to merge or consolidate information  technology systems were limited since the military services operate  separate information technology systems with distinct email and  operational requirements, as well as maintain service-specific  databases. According to our analysis, 34 percent of 438 functional  area respondents stated that they had not merged or consolidated  information technology systems. DOD has two department-wide  initiatives underway to standardize some information technology and  services, called the Joint Information Environment and Enterprise  Email service. As DOD implements these initiatives, opportunities  for further consolidation may emerge.

Advisory services. Joint base officials reported that Equal Opportunity  Employment services offered limited opportunities for consolidation  beyond the intake of complaints. According to officials whom we  interviewed, equal opportunity complaints are filed against specific  military department Secretaries, and the formal grievance of any  complaint must follow the procedures of the particular military  department where the individual filing the complaint either works or  serves. For instance, these officials told us that an employee of the  supported component, such as a service member or civilian (a  position that did not transfer to the supporting component as part of  the installation-support workforce), would submit a complaint through  the local equal opportunity office, which is part of the supporting  component. However, these officials also indicated that the grievance  would then transfer back to the supported component since it must  follow that service’s procedures. Therefore, in the officials’ opinions,  responsibility for equal opportunity may not have been suitable for  transfer in joint basing.

Legal support services. Joint base officials indicated that the level of  consolidation for this installation-support function is very limited, even  though nine of the 11 joint bases reported consolidating some portion  of the function. Joint base officials reported that each service must  adhere to the Uniform Code of Military Justice for courts-martial and  nonjudicial punishment, but the ways in which each service carries out  military justice are substantially different. For example, according to  these officials, it would be very difficult for Air Force personnel to  conduct an Army court-martial or nonjudicial punishment and vice  versa. As a result, in the opinion of these officials, this aspect of the  legal support services cannot be further consolidated at the joint  bases.

Officials from Joint Region Marianas were not part of our survey, but we  interviewed them to discuss their efforts to consolidate support services.  Officials indicated that some functions were easier to consolidate than  others, and they stated that they have made some progress. However,  the officials reported that at times conflicting service practices have also  hindered their efforts. For example, the officials stated that they have not  been able to fully consolidate the chaplain services function because of  differences in how religious programs are managed by the Navy and Air  Force. The Navy requires that tithes and offerings be sent to charitable  organizations, whereas the Air Force allows tithes and offerings to be  reinvested in chapel facilities.

Our survey also showed that 59 of 438 respondents (13 percent)—in  comments about functions for which the joint base commander had some  responsibility—reported that there were additional opportunities to  consolidate installation-support functions that have not been pursued.  The respondents who reported additional opportunities to consolidate  provided a varied range of response details. Of those respondents who  provided detailed responses, we found the following examples. Officials  from one joint base stated that additional consolidation could occur in the  pest-control function by expanding in-house capabilities and eliminating  contract services, but did not elaborate as to why further consolidation  had not been pursued at the time of the survey. In another example,  officials from a different joint base stated that additional consolidation  could occur in the pavement-clearance function by analyzing the function  and selecting the most cost-effective method between in-house and  contract work, as it would allow for completely centralized management of  resources. Furthermore, we asked survey respondents if they had any  additional comments pertaining to the consolidation of their installation- support functions. Our survey results showed that 70 out of 438  respondents (16 percent) provided comments. Generally, the comments  mirrored the issues raised throughout this report. For example, some  reported that certain support functions offered limited opportunities for  consolidation because of geography and others cited differences in  military service policies and procedures that hindered consolidation  efforts.

We also found that, according to survey responses, in some instances  workforces used by the military services to provide installation-support  services prior to joint basing limited opportunities to consolidate some  installation-support functions. The military services can differ in which  workforce—military, civilian, or contractor—they employ to provide  installation support. In our survey, we asked to what extent, if any,  differences in installation-support workforces caused hindrances to  consolidation. In our survey results, 182 of 438 respondents  (approximately 42 percent) reported that differences in workforces used  by the individual military services hindered their ability to consolidate  installation-support functions. Figure 5 illustrates the percent of functions  in which officials reported hindrances in consolidating due to differences  in workforces.

The seven joint bases with the highest percent of functions reporting  significant or moderate consolidation hindrances because of differences  in workforces are listed in table 3.

In interviews and written responses to our survey, Air Force officials  stated that they may use a mix of military and civilian personnel to provide  a specific installation-support function, whereas the Army may have  outsourced the provision of the same support function to contractors.  Also, we found in interviews and in written responses to our survey that  the Navy at times, used a regionalized civilian workforce to provide some  installation-support services for stand-alone Navy bases in the region. In  the survey’s written responses, we also found examples in which  respondents stated that some consolidation efforts were hindered by the  types of workforces used. For example,

Officials at Air Force-led Joint Base Charleston reported that  consolidation efforts have been limited by personnel shortfalls in the  procurement services function. Prior to joint basing, the Navy provided  much of the procurement services for Naval Weapons Station  Charleston, through regional service centers rather than at the  installation. For this reason, according to these officials, no local  civilian workforce transferred to the Air Force. The joint base received  approval to hire more Air Force civilians to carry out the function.  However, many of the approved positions were eventually cut in 2012  as part of the military departments’ response to the DOD effort to cap  the number of civilian positions department-wide.

Officials at Air Force-led Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson reported  that they have not been able to consolidate the facility-sustainment  function because of how the Army and Air Force provided installation  support prior to joint basing. The Army outsourced delivery of this  function to contractors at Fort Richardson, whereas the Air Force  provided this function in-house at Elmendorf Air Force Base.  According to the officials, the Air Force will likely maintain the  contracts for the Richardson side of the base because of insufficient  military and civilian manpower available to insource the function.  These officials reported that, at the same time, the Air Force will  continue to provide the function in-house for the Elmendorf side of the  base as there is currently no authorization to conduct public-private  competitions, which are required before contracting out for functions  currently performed by DOD civilians.

Officials at Air Force-led Joint Base Langley-Eustis reported that they  had not been able to consolidate the utilities function because of  privatization of some support services. The Army privatized water,  wastewater, electricity, and natural gas on the Fort Eustis side of the  base. These officials stated that because of privatization, when  responsibility for the utilities function transferred to the joint base, the  joint base officials could not consolidate the Fort Eustis side with the  in-house provision of utility services that occurred on the Langley Air  Force Base side of the base.

In our survey, we also asked joint base officials about other hindrances to  consolidation. Our content analysis of survey data showed that the most- often cited hindrance was geography, with 111 out of 438 respondents  (25 percent) citing geography as a hindrance. The five joint bases with  the highest percent of functions in which officials that cited geography as  a hindrance are listed in table 4.

According to respondents from Joint Base Langley-Eustis, opportunities  to consolidate support functions, such as information technology services  management, real property management and engineering services  functions are limited because of the geographical separation between  Langley Air Force Base and Fort Eustis—approximately 18 miles. In  addition, some bases that may share some common fence line can also  be hindered by geography. For example, officials at Joint Base Lewis- McChord stated that Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base entrances  are separated by about 5 miles of interstate highway. Having to navigate  the interstate to travel between the two entrances can be a problem  because of traffic according to officials at both locations. The Army has  proposed constructing a gate on the joint base between the two locations,  but has not completed this action. In addition, McChord Airfield is  separated from the rest of the joint base by a public road, making it  necessary to clear security a second time when traveling from the base to  the airfield.

Although cited to a much lesser extent than geography, 28 of the 438  respondents reported that personnel shortages (6 percent) and 19 of the  438 respondents reported budget or funding limitations (4 percent)  hindered consolidation efforts. For example, officials from Joint Base  Charleston reported that the base does not have enough personnel to  adequately provide services in the pest-control function, and that a  workforce study is needed to determine the appropriate size of the  function. In another example, officials from Joint Base McGuire-Dix- Lakehurst reported that current fiscal limitations as well as a hiring freeze  have, in part, hindered the base’s ability to consolidate the real property  management and engineering services function.

OSD officials stated that there is currently not a process to evaluate  installation-support functions on a regular basis (annually or otherwise)  and that they have not systematically identified common limitations to  consolidation and what actions, if any, can be taken to address such  limitations. We found DOD has eliminated—on a case-by-case basis— three installation-support functions from consolidation from the original list  of 47, but has not similarly comprehensively evaluated whether the  remaining functions are still suitable for consolidation. As noted above,  joint base officials have identified limited opportunities to consolidate  some areas of installation support. Furthermore, DOD has not  systematically identified how consolidation can be limited by, for example,  different types of workforces used to provide installation-support services  or geography, and what actions, if any, could potentially help facilitate  consolidation in these situations or any others that may be identified. Our  prior work on federal agency consolidation efforts found that consolidation  initiatives can be immensely complex, politically charged, and costly and  are not quick, easy, or automatic ways of producing desired change. In  addition, key federal practices for consolidation state that federal  agencies need to plan to evaluate and monitor efforts to identify areas for  improvement. Further, reporting on consolidation activities can help key  decision makers within the agencies to obtain feedback for improving   OSD and military service  both policy and operational effectiveness.officials discussed that their approach to date has been to give the  program time to mature but said they now believe a review would be  beneficial because some functions may not easily be consolidated and  there may be common limitations to consolidation that can be addressed  through policy improvements. However, they did not elaborate as to when  they would conduct such a review or provide specifics on how they  planned to do so. Without comprehensively evaluating whether  installation-support functions are still suitable for consolidation and  without identifying and addressing limitations reported by the joint bases,  such as those related to workforces and geography, DOD may not be  able to fully consolidate all installation-support functions.

section_title: Officials Reported Challenges in Consolidation Efforts That Resulted in Inefficiencies or Inequities
paragraphs: Joint base officials whom we surveyed and interviewed reported that at  times consolidation of installation-support functions created challenges  resulting in unintentional inefficiencies or inequities. According to key  federal practices for consolidation, federal agencies need to evaluate their  efforts to identify areas for improvement, and obtain feedback for  improving both policy and operational effectiveness.

Our analysis identified that of the 350 out of 438 responses about  functions that were partially consolidated, 224 officials (64 percent)  reported challenges resulting from consolidation. See figure 6 for a  breakout of the responses of the functions in which officials reported  some challenges with consolidation.

Our analyses of interview and written survey responses found instances  in which respondents stated that some challenges resulting from  consolidation resulted in inefficiencies. For example:

Multiple inspections. Officials whom we interviewed as well as those  who provided written survey responses reported that some functions  were subject to multiple inspections. For example, officials at Navy-led  Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam reported that Air Force officials  continue to inspect emergency management exercises although the  Navy, as the lead component, is responsible for emergency  management on the base and carries out similar inspections. In  addition, officials at Army-led Joint Base Lewis-McChord reported  confusion among Air Force military units about whether they had to  follow Air Force or Army environmental requirements, practices, and  policies while conducting inspections. Furthermore, officials whom we  interviewed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord stated that both the Army  and the Air Force are inspecting the joint base’s child development  centers, though the Army, as the lead component, is responsible for  managing the centers, including inspections. However, Air Force  officials stated they are also conducting their own inspections  because of their concern that the centers meet Air Force standards of  service for providing child care, even though joint bases have agreed  to provide a common level of service for installation-support  functions.

Multiple Data Requirements. Officials at Air Force-led Joint Base  Langley-Eustis reported that staff from the physical-security function  must use two distinct systems for processing personnel-security  investigations—one for Army personnel and one for Air Force  personnel—because of differences in the systems. In another  example, Army-led Joint Base Lewis-McChord reported that the lack  of transferring personnel files locally between the Army and Air Force  has caused the Army to rebuild employee files and submit criminal  background checks more than once for staff in the children and youth- services function, potentially wasting funds by recreating what already  exists.

Our analysis of interview information found instances in which  respondents stated that challenges resulting from consolidation also  resulted in inequities. For example:

Limited promotion opportunities. According to joint base officials, in  some instances the transfer of civilian personnel from one military  service to another may have created inequities, in that civilians  transferring from another military department may have lost some  benefits of seniority, which may have disadvantaged them in  competing for promotion opportunities. For example, former Army  civilian employees at the Air Force-led Joint Base San Antonio  reported limited career opportunities because their total service time  as DOD employees was not recognized by the Air Force, and their job  classifications, in some cases, were downgraded when their positions  were transferred to the joint base. The former Army employees  reported that the military departments do not credit years of  employment from another department. As a result, they cannot  compete for promotions or other Air Force positions that may require  a minimum number of years of service as eligibility criteria for  promotion. In addition, joint base officials whom we interviewed  commented that they believe military service practices of preferentially  hiring internal applicants in response to DOD’s civilian hiring freeze  have prevented these former Army employees from qualifying or  being competitive for vacant Army positions because they are now Air  Force employees.

Limited training opportunities. According to joint base officials,  consolidation has resulted in differences in training for some  installation-support personnel. For example, Air Force officials at the  Army-led Joint Base Lewis-McChord reported that consolidation has  eliminated some training opportunities for uniformed airmen, and  expressed concern that airmen at Joint Base Lewis-McChord are not  receiving training comparable to that which they would receive if they  were stationed at a stand-alone Air Force installation. This situation  is primarily because of the consolidation of installation-support  functions under Army processes—which are largely civilian and  contractor driven—whereas at a stand-alone Air Force base many  installation-support functions are performed by airmen.

We found that neither OSD nor the military services have addressed  these consolidation challenges that may have resulted in inefficiencies  and inequities. Specifically, feedback on inefficiencies and inequities have  not been incorporated into policy improvements, such as additional  guidance, to help the joint bases resolve confusion about which service- specific guidance should be followed to avoid challenges such as multiple  inspections, multiple data requirements, and concerns about limited  promotion and training opportunities. Our survey results identified that  about 59 percent of respondents stated that they did not think additional  guidance from OSD or the military services would improve the level of  consolidation of their installation-support functions. However, officials  from the joint bases, military service headquarters, and OSD stated in  interviews that additional guidance is necessary to address consolidation  challenges.

OSD and military service officials stated that they have not  comprehensively identified the extent to which the joint bases have  consolidated installation-support functions, including any common  challenges associated with consolidation that may have resulted in  negative consequences as described above. OSD and military service  officials stated that their approach to date has been to give the program  time to mature but said they now believe policy actions may be needed to  help address challenges resulting from consolidation. Without having  comprehensively identified any common challenges associated with  consolidation, OSD is unlikely to develop policy solutions, such as  guidance, to assist the joint bases in addressing them. In one instance in  which joint base officials identified a common challenge associated with  consolidation—multiple inspections related to installation support—OSD  officials acknowledged the issue and stated that they were taking action  to address it. Joint base officials stated in interviews that they have raised  concerns at OSD’s annual joint base program-management meetings  about which service-specific guidance to follow when conducting  inspections of installation-support functions on joint bases. OSD officials  told us that while a policy solution is not currently available to resolve this  issue, they are working to update a DOD instruction for inspections that  will address the issue at joint bases. However, in the absence of policy  solutions, such as additional guidance to mitigate other common  challenges resulting from consolidation efforts, including multiple data  requirements for installation-support functions and concerns about limited  promotion and training opportunities for installation-support staff, joint  bases may be unable to avoid or reduce any inefficiencies and inequities  resulting from consolidating installation-support functions.

section_title: Joint Basing Has Produced Some Benefits, but Officials Reported They Are Unable to Achieve Greater Efficiencies and Potential Cost Savings without Additional Direction
paragraphs: results of their collaborative efforts. Further, key federal practices state  that agencies can improve efficiency by reexamining programs and  related processes or organizational structures to determine whether they  effectively and efficiently achieve the mission. Without a collaborative  evaluation of the joint basing program to determine if the stated goals of  the program are still appropriate and subsequent direction to include the  monitoring and evaluation of the achievement of program goals, it will be  difficult for DOD to determine the extent to which the joint basing initiative  is achieving its intended goals.
subsections: section_title: Joint Bases Have Reported Some Progress and Benefits in Addressing Joint Basing Goals
paragraphs: Joint base officials reported that they have made some progress in  achieving greater efficiencies and cost savings, which are the goals of the  joint base program, as well as attained additional benefits. In our  November 2012 report, we found that DOD does not have a fully  developed method for accurately collecting information on cost savings  and efficiencies achieved specifically as a result of joint basing. As a  result, to gain insight into the degree to which DOD has gained  efficiencies and cost savings, our survey asked respondents to identify  the extent to which they have (1) reduced redundant funded positions; (2)  reduced redundant contracts or increased contract efficiencies; and (3)  merged or consolidated redundant procedures.
subsections: section_title: Reduced Redundant Funded Positions
paragraphs: Our analysis of survey responses and other supporting documentation  showed that 53 of 438 respondents (12 percent) stated that they were  able to reduce redundant funded positions (excluding contractors) related  to joint basing. Figure 7 illustrates our analysis.

Our analysis of survey data indicated that joint bases experienced  reductions in funded positions, which respondents attributed to efforts to  reduce redundancy. For example, officials from Joint Base Little Creek- Fort Story reported that the base was able to reduce four staff positions in  the morale, welfare, and recreation function because they were  redundant. In another example, officials from Joint Base Anacostia- Bolling reported that base was able to reduce two positions in the  physical security function. In other instances, the respondents did not  attribute reductions to joint basing, but rather attributed them to other  reasons, such as service-level programmatic decisions. For instance,  officials from Joint Base Charleston noted that a housing manager retired  shortly after the joint base’s establishment, and the Air Force abolished  the position because of personnel cuts unrelated to joint basing.

Many of the respondents who reported no reductions did not provide  detailed explanations. Of those who provided a reason for no reduction,  many reported there were no redundancies in installation-support  positions or there was an increased workload requiring extra positions.  For instance, officials from Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility  Washington reported that the refuse collection and disposal function was  consolidated prior to joint basing, so no positions were available to  consolidate. In another example, officials from Joint Base McGuire-Dix- Lakehurst reported an increased workload in the facilities sustainment  function because of aging facilities and a lack of funding, making  consolidation unlikely to result in fewer personnel. Also, officials from  Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson reported that no redundant positions  were reduced in the physical security function because of no decrease in  workload following consolidation.

Joint base officials whom we interviewed provided some reasons for why  the reduction of redundant funded positions was limited. For example,  officials from Joint Base Langley-Eustis told us that it would have been  difficult to consolidate the functions of the two former bases because of  differences in the mix of personnel who provided installation support.  They said that at Fort Eustis the Army had transitioned almost entirely to  private contracts for installation support, and had eliminated most of its  related civilian workforce. Therefore, in their view, there were no  opportunities to reduce redundant funded positions. In another example,  officials from Joint Base Lewis-McChord said the Air Force transferred  few civilian positions to the Army, the supporting component, because  prior to joint basing the Air Force used uniformed airmen to provide  installation-support services at McChord Air Force Base.

section_title: Reduced Redundant Contracts or Increased Contract Efficiencies
paragraphs: Our analysis of survey responses and other supporting documentation  showed that 111 of 438 respondents (25 percent) stated that they had a  reduction of redundant contracts or increased contract efficiencies related  to joint basing. Figure 8 illustrates our analysis.

Officials from Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst reported that they were  able to consolidate eight separate telephone contracts in the information  technology services management function into a single contract for the  joint base, which they reported saved about $650,000. In another  example, officials from Joint Base Charleston reported that two custodial  contracts existed—one for the Air Force and one for the Navy—and that  these contracts have been combined into a single joint base contract,  which according to the officials, resulted in efficiencies in contract  administration by eliminating the need for multiple contract administrators.  In a third example, officials from Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall  reported the consolidation of contracts for facility fire and alarm inspection  and maintenance in the fire and emergency services function—from three  to one. In another example, officials from Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling  reported that they were able to eliminate a contract in the public affairs  function that was used to provide the supported component’s base  newspaper prior to joint basing.

Many of the respondents who reported no reductions or no increased  efficiencies did not provide a detailed explanation. Of those who provided  a reason for no reduction or increased efficiencies, the reasons included  simply that there were no redundant contracts. In other instances an  installation-support function was not provided via contract, so  consolidation was not applicable. For example, officials from Joint Base  Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington reported there were no reductions  in the small-arms range management function because there were no  contracts were in place for the function— it is handled by military and  civilian personnel.

Joint base officials whom we interviewed provided some reasons for why  reduction of redundant contracts or achieving greater contract efficiencies  was limited. For example, officials from Joint Base San Antonio stated  that federal contracting preferences complicate the task of consolidating  all custodial services under a single contract. Officials from Joint Base  Langley Eustis cited geography as a factor affecting the bases’ ability to  reduce redundant contracts. They told us the distance between Langley  Air Force Base and Fort Eustis is approximately 18 miles, and thereby  would likely increase a contract’s cost because of a wider area of required  service.

section_title: Merged or Consolidated Redundant Procedures
paragraphs: Our analysis of survey responses and other supporting documentation  showed that 105 out of 438 respondents (24 percent) stated they were  able to merge or consolidate redundant procedures related to joint  basing. Figure 9 illustrates our analysis.

Officials from Joint Base Charleston reported that the base reduced the  work of two newspapers and separate news coverage into one  newspaper and website. In another example, officials from Joint Base  Pearl Harbor-Hickam reported that the base eliminated Air Force  procedures for grounds maintenance, which is part of the grounds  maintenance and landscaping function, in favor of standardizing the  procedures under the Navy, the supporting component. In another  example, officials from Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst reported that  requirements processing for base telephone services under the  information technology services management function were consolidated  from three offices into one.

Of those respondents who provided a reason for no merger or  consolidation of redundant procedures, a frequently cited reason was that  there were no redundant procedures to merge or consolidate. For  example, officials from Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling reported that there  were no redundant procedures in the custodial services, emergency  management, and facility sustainment functions. In another instance,  officials from Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington reported  no redundant procedures in the emergency management function  because the Navy did not have an emergency management function prior  to consolidation. In another example, officials from Joint Base McGuire- Dix-Lakehurst reported no merger or consolidation of redundant  procedures in the emergency management function because there was  not an emergency management function at Fort Dix or Naval Engineering  Station Lakehurst.

section_title: Additional Consolidation Benefits
paragraphs: In our analysis of 350 of 438 survey responses in which officials stated  they had consolidated functions, 213 of 350 respondents (61 percent)  reported benefits from consolidation of support functions. Figure 10  illustrates our analysis.

Our analysis of survey data found that benefits included improvements in  the delivery of installation-support services and the sharing of information  and practices across military services. Respondents reported that as a  result of some of these improvements, they believe customer satisfaction  increased. Also, in many instances functional area officials reported  increased efficiencies, but did not elaborate as to what the efficiencies  were or how they were achieved. The following examples are specific to  joint bases, and illustrate that, according to base officials, DOD’s current  approach to joint basing has produced some benefits.

Improved service delivery. Officials from Air Force-led Joint Base  Langley-Eustis reported that the fire chiefs at Fort Eustis are satisfied  with the increased performance of maintenance services on  firefighting vehicles as the Air Force maintains vehicles at a much  higher level than the levels provided by the Army prior to joint basing.  In another example, officials from Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam  reported that the base’s intramural sports program is larger, providing  more games and better competition, which service members enjoy.  Improved information sharing. Officials from Joint Base Charleston  reported that a primary benefit in the family housing function is the  ability to share best practices between two privatization deals—one  used by the Air Force and one used by the Navy prior to joint  basing—to better service the local community. In another example,  officials from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson reported that  consolidation has provided soldiers and airmen with the opportunity to  work and operate in a nondeployed joint environment as part of the  law enforcement patrols function, which has allowed for a better  understanding of each military service’s mission. In a third example,  officials from Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall reported that  consolidation of the physical security function helped increase  awareness of activities affecting the base’s control point because of  access and information that was not previously available to the  individual bases prior to joint basing.

Joint base officials whom we interviewed also reported some benefits  from consolidating installation-support functions and additional benefits  from working closely with other military services. For example, Air Force  officials at the Army-led Joint Base Lewis-McChord told us they were able  to save approximately $280,000 per month in training fees by leveraging  their joint base relationship with the Army to use local Army facilities in  Washington State for Air Force training flights. Prior to the establishment  of the joint base, the Air Force used its own facilities farther away in  Arizona for these flights. In an additional example, Army officials at the Air  Force-led Joint Base San Antonio said the Air Force adopted the Army  Family Action Plan, which the Army operated for soldiers and their  families at Fort Sam Houston, to expand the process, which allows  service members to submit concerns about quality of life issues to the  base command staff to all service members residing in the joint base  area. In another example from Joint Base San Antonio, an Air Force  official stated that the base was able to take advantage of in-house Air  Force welding expertise to repair damage to the main gate of the Fort  Sam Houston area of Joint Base San Antonio rather than contract for the  maintenance, which would have been done prior to joint basing and this  resulted in quicker repairs and avoidance of contract fees.

In our interviews with officials from Joint Region Marianas, officials  indicated that they had been able to take some actions to gain  efficiencies, such as reducing from five to one the number of cell-phone  contracts used to provide cell phones to military and civilian personnel.

They also pointed out that they are in the process of evaluating  approaches to consolidate housing to provide better visibility to service  members on Guam regarding available housing options on the island.  According to the officials, this effort will result in reducing the need for  duplicative housing managers.

section_title: Lack of Direction Has Hindered Joint Base Progress in Achieving Goals
paragraphs: Joint base and military service officials whom we interviewed said OSD  has not provided them with direction on how to achieve greater  efficiencies and cost savings as the goals of joint basing, including  reporting requirements and milestones. OSD officials told us that they  have not collaborated with the military services to evaluate whether the  goals of achieving greater efficiencies and generating cost savings are  still appropriate. According to key federal practices, when federal  organizations collaborate they can define common outcomes, establish  strategies, and develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate and report the  results of their collaborative efforts. Moreover, key change management  practices state that it is essential that top government and agency leaders  are committed to consolidation and play a lead role in executing it by  setting the direction, pace, and tone as well as providing a clear,  consistent rationale for doing so. These practices also state that  establishing implementation goals and milestone dates, and tracking  progress toward those goals helps agency officials pinpoint performance  shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections, including any needed  adjustments to the organization’s future goals and milestones. Further,  key federal practices state that agencies can improve efficiency by  reexamining programs and related processes or organizational structures  to determine whether they effectively and efficiently achieve the  mission.

OSD officials whom we interviewed indicated that they have not  evaluated the joint basing program to determine whether it is meeting the  goals of the 2005 BRAC Commission recommendation or if the goals of  achieving greater efficiencies and generating cost savings are still  appropriate for the program today and looking forward. In written  comments to our 2012 report on joint basing, OSD stated that DOD’s  approach to joint basing was to be patient with obtaining savings and  efficiencies, maintaining that joint basing was a relatively new initiative  and implementation issues were still being resolved. The officials  reaffirmed they were taking this approach during the course of our review.  According to the Secretary of Defense’s justification for joint basing  reproduced in the 2005 BRAC Commission Report, joint basing would  allow DOD to take advantage of opportunities to reduce duplication of  efforts. DOD stated that the resulting reduction of overall manpower and  facilities requirements would help generate savings by paring  unnecessary management personnel and achieving greater efficiencies  through economies of scale. However, as we found in prior work, OSD  did not have a developed method for accurately collecting information on  costs, savings, and efficiencies achieved specifically from joint basing,  and had not developed a plan to guide joint bases in achieving cost  savings and efficiencies. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the  progress that joint bases have made in achieving the goals for joint  basing.

When asked about any challenges associated with consolidation of  installation-support functions, some survey respondents reported that  consolidation increased the need for additional resources in their  functional area. For example, Joint Base Charleston officials reported that  the size of the joint base and the diversity of missions have greatly  increased the need for additional resources for restoration and  modernization of facilities and has also resulted in decreased customer  satisfaction. In another example, Joint Base Little Creek-Fort Story  officials reported that an increase of unaccompanied housing facilities  was not met with a staff increase to help support the additional facilities.  Also, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam officials reported that the  requirements for the physical security function increased following the  joint base’s establishment, but no additional personnel were gained, thus  increasing staff workload. However, OSD officials whom we interviewed  told us respondents may have attributed the consolidation of functions as  driving an increased need for resources, when other factors may have  been the reason. For instance, the OSD officials stated that higher  performance standards for installation support at joint bases may have  caused an increase in workload. Although OSD has provided joint bases  with a memo that acknowledges a reduced funding environment and  encourages Joint Base Commanders to ensure that mission partners  continue to collaboratively determine priorities for applying resources,  OSD officials told us that they have not modified the goals for the joint  base program in light of the current fiscal environment. They stated that  joint bases have been designed to look for efficiencies and cost savings  in providing installation support, and are therefore better positioned than  other installations to withstand budget cuts and operate with lower  budgeted resources.

Our survey data showed that some progress had been made in the joint  bases’ ability to reduce redundant funded positions; reduce redundant  contracts or find contract efficiencies; and merge or consolidate  redundant procedures to gain efficiencies and produce cost savings.  According to joint base and military service officials whom we interviewed,  the joint bases would benefit from more direction on how to pursue  initiatives in a systematic way to achieve these goals or to report on the  achievement of these goals. The officials said OSD has left it up to  individual joint base leadership to determine how to manage and operate  the joint bases, including the extent to which they pursue efficiencies. As  a result, joint base and military service headquarters officials whom we  interviewed stated that in an environment when priority is placed on  getting the mission done with fewer resources, the investment of  resources to pursue initiatives or conduct studies to determine the  feasibility of efforts to cut redundancies and gain efficiencies has not  always been a priority. The officials said that without more direction, the  extent to which joint basing commanders pursued these types of  initiatives was left to their discretion. Furthermore, the officials noted the  degree to which joint bases looked for opportunities to gain efficiencies  and cost savings depended on the commitment of the officials involved as  well as the level of support and commitment they received from their  service headquarters, rather than guided by overarching goals, plans,  milestones, and reporting requirements.

OSD officials stated that they had not conducted a mid-program review  for joint basing and believe this type of review is a good management  practice and may be beneficial at this stage in the joint basing program, in  part because of concerns about the lack of understanding regarding the  goals for the program as well as direction on how to achieve such goals.  However, the officials noted that they do not yet have detailed plans for  such a review. Without a collaborative evaluation of the joint basing  program by OSD and the military services to determine if the stated goals  of the program are still appropriate and continue to be priorities for  DOD—and without clear communication on any revised goals and  additional direction on how to achieve such goals, including reporting  requirements and milestones—it will be difficult for DOD to demonstrate  that the joint basing program has effectively and efficiently achieved its  goals.

section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: DOD’s 11 joint bases and one joint region have been fully operational  since 2010, yet progress to consolidate installation-support functions at  the 11 we surveyed varied by location as well as support function.  According to survey respondents, some functions offer limited, if any,  opportunities for consolidation, including those that are primarily military  service, mission-specific—such as managing a small-arms range—and  those that must adhere to military service-specific policy and procedures  such as legal support services. DOD has eliminated some functions from  consolidation on a case-by-case basis, but has not comprehensively  reviewed the entire list of functions to determine whether additional  functions should be removed from consolidation. Moreover, joint base  officials have reported challenges from consolidation of installation- support functions, such as multiple inspections and limited civilian  personnel promotion opportunities. OSD has not taken steps to address  the challenges that, according to joint base officials, have resulted in  inefficiencies and inequities. Without a comprehensive evaluation of the  suitability of installation-support functions for consolidation and guidance  to address any identified challenges that emerged from consolidation,  individual joint bases may experience inefficiencies and inequities in  consolidating these functions.

Furthermore, DOD has not yet demonstrated that merging 26 bases to  consolidate installation-support functions into 12 joint bases has yielded  the results it forecast when it proposed this initiative to the 2005 BRAC  Commission as a means to reduce duplication of efforts that would in turn  generate cost savings and increase efficiencies. The joint base officials,  in their responses to survey questions and during interviews, did not  report significant achievements in reaching these goals. DOD has data  that indicate the joint bases are obligating less funding than they would  have obligated as stand-alone bases, but it is not clear to what extent  these savings are attributable to the consolidation of installation support  functions. Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent savings and  efficiencies are still the goals of this program. Joint base officials indicated  that they are unclear to what extent these goals are still appropriate and  to what extent they are required to pursue additional opportunities to meet  these goals. DOD has not collaborated with the military services to  reevaluate whether the goals of joint basing are still appropriate or  provided direction to the joint bases for meeting program goals, including  milestones and reporting requirements for the achievement of these  goals. As a result, joint base commanders are responsible for determining  to what extent they will pursue initiatives to reduce redundancy and  achieve potential cost savings or efficiencies, and the extent to which  such initiatives have been pursued varies by joint base. Key practices  from efficiency initiatives state that a primary approach an agency can  take to determine whether a program is effectively and efficiently  achieving its goals is to periodically reexamine it. Furthermore, key  change management practices state that it is essential for top leadership  to set the direction, pace, and tone of organizational change. Until DOD  evaluates its current approach to joint basing and determines whether the  stated goals of the program are still appropriate and continue to be  priorities—and without direction provided to the joint bases to pursue the  goals and report on the ability to meet these goals—it will be difficult for  DOD to determine whether the joint basing program is meeting its  purpose.

section_title: Matter for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: To help ensure DOD’s approach to joint basing achieves the goals as  outlined by DOD in its justification for the 2005 BRAC recommendation  and leverages additional opportunities to reduce duplication of effort that  could in turn generate cost savings and increased efficiencies, Congress  should consider directing the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  (Installations and Environment), in collaboration with the military services  and joint bases, to evaluate the purpose of the program and determine  whether the current goals, as stated in the 2005 BRAC Commission  recommendation, are still appropriate, or whether goals should be  revised; communicate these goals to the military services and joint bases,  and adjust program activities accordingly; provide direction to the joint  bases on requirements for meeting program goals, including determining  reporting requirements and milestones; and determine any next steps for  joint basing, including whether to expand it to other installations.

section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To assist the joint bases in achieving additional opportunities to  consolidate installation-support functions, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  (Installations and Environment), in coordination with the military services  and joint bases, to take the following two actions:

Evaluate the 44 support functions identified in DOD’s guidance for  joint base implementation to determine which functions are still  suitable for consolidation. Subsequently, identify and make any  changes that are appropriate to address limitations reported by the  joint bases in consolidating installation-support functions, such as  limitations related to workforces and geography.

Take policy actions, as appropriate—such as issuing additional  guidance—to address any challenges resulting in inefficiencies and  inequities regarding efforts to consolidate installation-support  functions including, at a minimum, those identified in this report.

To ensure DOD’s approach to joint basing aligns with the intent of the  2005 BRAC recommendation and DOD’s current position on the intent of  joint basing, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), in  collaboration with the military services and joint bases, to take the  following two actions:

Evaluate the purpose of the program and determine whether DOD’s  current goals of achieving greater efficiencies and generating cost  savings for the joint basing program, as stated in the 2005 BRAC  Commission recommendation, are still appropriate or whether goals  should be revised, and communicate these goals to the military  services and joint bases and then adjust program activities  accordingly.

Subsequent to the evaluation above, provide direction to joint bases  on their requirements for meeting the joint base program’s goals.  DOD’s leadership should work with the military services to determine  what reporting requirements and milestones should be put in place to  increase support and commitment for the program’s goals.

section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its  written comments, DOD concurred with one of the four recommendations,  partially concurred with one, and did not concur with two. Given DOD’s  disagreement with the two recommendations, we have added a matter for  congressional consideration to this report. Further details are discussed  below. DOD’s comments are summarized below and reprinted in their  entirety in appendix VI. In addition, DOD provided technical comments  that have been incorporated as appropriate.

In its comments, DOD stated that the department and GAO have  fundamentally different approaches in viewing how DOD should manage  the 12 joint bases, and noted that the report’s recommendations imply  that the joint bases are OSD-run entities that should be addressed  through new DOD policies. DOD stated that it believes that although joint  bases involve added complexities from crossing traditional service lines,  they are ultimately service-run bases similar to all other installations.  Additionally, DOD noted that the military departments already have the  responsibility, as well as sufficient authority and incentives, to deliver  effective and efficient installation support across all their installations,  including joint bases. We believe that the report reflects an understanding  that the joint base management structure consists of shared responsibility  and authority between OSD and the military departments to manage the  joint base program. This point is highlighted by the fact that we designed  our audit work, including our survey and interviews, to focus on the  perspectives of joint base and military service officials. Nonetheless, the  Joint Basing Implementation Guidance assigns responsibilities to the  Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics to  establish overarching guidance, procedures, and policy, in coordination  with appropriate OSD organizations, and to mediate any support  agreement disputes between the components that are not resolved by the  Joint Management Oversight Structure.  We also cited an example in  the report where OSD indicated that it was working to issue policy to  resolve military service inconsistencies, identifying that OSD is providing  such oversight. Furthermore, DOD provided an example of OSD’s  involvement in the management and oversight of the joint bases in its  written comments on the report, citing a Deputy Under Secretary of  Defense for Installation and Environment policy memo on the subject of  joint bases and the supply, storage, and distribution of munitions. As a  result, we continue to view the management of the joint bases as a  shared responsibility between OSD and the services, and believe the  recommendations directed to both are appropriate.

DOD concurred with the first recommendation to evaluate the 44  installation-support functions identified in DOD’s guidance for joint base  implementation to determine which functions are still suitable for  consolidation, and to subsequently identify and make any changes that  are appropriate to address limitations, such as workforce policies and  geography, reported by the joint bases in consolidating the support  functions. DOD also stated that it had already removed some installation- support functions from joint basing because they were not compelled for  inclusion as part of the BRAC recommendation, and otherwise did not  offer opportunities for savings or consolidation. We acknowledge in the  report that OSD has reviewed individual installation-support functions on  a case-by-case basis, and has removed three from the original list of 47  functions to be consolidated. However, during the course of our review,  and as stated in the report, OSD officials told us that there was no  process in place to evaluate the remaining 44 installation-support  functions on a regular basis. We discussed this with military service and  OSD officials in early April 2014. In its letter, DOD stated that in April  2014, the Senior Joint Base Working Group principals tasked their staffs  to identify which installation support functions and performance standards  were not providing value to the joint bases’ various military missions, and  to explore whether these functions and standards should continue to be  included in joint basing. DOD did not provide time frames for completing  such actions. If implemented as intended, these actions should meet the  intent of the recommendation.

DOD partially concurred with the second recommendation to take policy  actions, as appropriate, such as issuing additional guidance, to address  challenges resulting in inefficiencies and inequities in consolidating  installation-support functions. DOD stated that it is mindful of challenges  in implementing and operating joint bases, and agreed that policy actions  can address some challenges. However, DOD stated that it does not  agree that these challenges require OSD-level policies, citing instead the  existing responsibilities and authorities already assigned to the military  departments and the Joint Management Oversight Structure. We  recognize the responsibilities and authorities of the military departments.  Accordingly, the recommendation is for OSD, in coordination with the  military services and joint bases, to take policy actions to help address  any challenges resulting in efficiencies and inequities from consolidation  of installation-support functions at the joint bases. As stated in the report,  and noted above, the Joint Basing Implementation Guidance assigns  responsibilities to OSD to mediate any support agreement disputes  between the components that are not resolved by the Joint Management  Oversight Structure. We also describe the responses of joint base officials  to our survey questions about any need for additional guidance from OSD  and the military services, as well as the interview statements from joint  base, military service headquarters, and OSD officials, who all stated that  there is a need for such guidance. The report also includes an example of  a challenge that required action from OSD to help resolve: OSD issued  guidance in May 2014 that was based on a concern raised more than 2  years earlier in February 2012 to resolve contradictions in military service- level guidance, which had created certain duplicative service-level  inspections on joint bases. DOD also stated in its letter that its Joint  Management Oversight Structure is the process by which the military  departments can formally request OSD assistance to change joint or  DOD policies. However, joint base officials expressed frustration about  the lack of progress and slowness of OSD and the Joint Management  Oversight Structure process to address challenges resulting from  consolidation, particularly regarding issues where the military  departments are unable to identify solutions on their own. Further, some  survey respondents and officials we interviewed at the joint bases and  military service headquarters stated that they wanted additional guidance  from OSD or the military services, or both, to resolve contradictions  between service-level policy where needed or, in some cases, to provide  clearer direction. As a result, we continue to believe that the  recommendation is valid and should be implemented.

DOD did not concur with the third recommendation that OSD, in  collaboration with the military services, evaluate the purpose of the  program and determine whether DOD’s current goals of achieving greater  efficiencies and generating cost savings for the joint basing program, as  stated in the 2005 BRAC Commission recommendation, are still  appropriate or should be revised, and to communicate these goals to the  military services and joint bases and then to adjust program activities  accordingly. DOD stated in its comments that the goal of joint basing  remains to increase the efficiency of delivering installation support at the  12 joint bases as described in the BRAC Commission’s recommendation  number 146. However, as noted in the report, OSD has not evaluated the  joint basing program to determine this or whether the goals are  appropriate for the program today and looking forward.

Further, DOD stated in its written comments that the 12 joint bases have  generated savings. Specifically, DOD stated that the joint bases had  obligated $255 million less in fiscal year 2012 compared to what these  previously stand-alone bases would have obligated, and did so with 1,600  fewer personnel. While we agree that DOD’s estimates show that the joint  bases are obligating less, these reductions in obligations cannot be  attributed solely to the consolidation of installation-support functions at  the joint bases, as OSD acknowledges. We discussed these estimates  with OSD officials in July 2014 after we received their agency comments  on a draft of this report where these numbers were included. OSD  officials explained that their methodology for calculating savings from joint  bases consists of comparing the joint bases’ current fiscal year  obligations with a baseline amount—the cost to provide installation  support at the 26 previously stand-alone installations that constitute the  joint bases—which is updated every fiscal year to reflect changes in  mission requirements and inflation, among other factors. However, this  approach is unable to distinguish savings from efficiencies obtained  through consolidation of installation-support services at the joint bases or  from other factors that also contributed to lower obligations. For instance,  OSD officials said fiscal year 2012 savings were also attributable to  factors such as the military departments’ response to DOD’s efforts to cap  the number of civilian positions. In addition, DOD stated in its letter that  the joint bases’ fiscal year 2013 obligations were $830 million less than if  they were still separate installations. DOD stated that this was a  combination of savings and reduced expenditures caused by the Budget  Control Act and fiscal year 2013’s sequestration actions, as well as from  joint basing. However, OSD cannot determine how much of the $830  million in reduced obligations in fiscal year 2013 is attributable to budget  cuts or efficiencies gained through the consolidation of installation support  functions at the joint bases. Further, OSD cannot explain how  sequestration-driven budget cuts have led to joint basing efficiencies.

Also, as stated in the report, joint base officials told us they are unclear to  what extent achieving greater efficiencies and cost savings are still  appropriate for the goals of joint basing, and to what extent they are  required to pursue additional opportunities beyond the consolidation of  installation-support functions in the joint base memorandums of  agreement to achieve these goals. Joint base and military service  headquarters officials said that in an environment when priority is placed  on getting the mission done with fewer resources, the investment of  resources to pursue initiatives or conduct studies to determine the  feasibility of efforts to cut redundancies and gain efficiencies has not  always been a priority. We believe that the continued confusion at the  joint bases over the goals of the program, as well as cost savings  estimates that reflect uncertainty as to the extent consolidation of  installation-support functions drives savings as compared to simply  cutting the budget, indicate a continuing need to review the goals of the  program and communicate them to the military services and joint bases,  as recommended.

DOD did not concur with the fourth recommendation that OSD, in  collaboration with the military services, provide direction to joint bases on  their requirements for meeting the joint base program’s goals and work  with the military services to determine reporting requirements and  milestones to be put in place to increase support and commitment for the  program’s goals. In its comments, DOD stated that the joint bases have  been fully operational since October 2010 and have proven they can  deliver measurable and tangible savings across the installation-support  portfolio. As such, DOD stated that it does not believe OSD should  establish program milestones. However, DOD’s assertion that the joint  bases have proven they can deliver tangible savings is based on a  method of calculating savings that cannot distinguish savings attributable  to consolidation of installation-support functions at the joint bases from  savings attributable to other factors, including sequestration-driven  budget cuts, as noted above.

DOD further stated that it does not agree OSD should provide additional  direction towards meeting the program’s goals because the joint base  commanders and military departments are in the best position to balance  efficiency with effectiveness and that directing additional consolidations  circumvents their ability to make these decisions. In addition, DOD stated  that establishing milestones implies joint bases are still in an  implementation phase, and noted that OSD has transitioned from  managing joint base implementation to a steady-state oversight role.

The report does not call for OSD to make additional consolidations;  rather, the recommendation states that OSD, in collaboration with the  military services, should provide additional direction to the joint bases on  how to achieve the goals of the program. Moreover, we agree that the  military services are in the best position to balance efficiency with  effectiveness when managing and operating installations, which is one  reason we sent our survey to the joint bases to solicit their views.  However, as stated in the report and noted above, joint base and military  service headquarters officials told us that in an environment when priority  is placed on getting the mission done with fewer resources, the  investment of resources to pursue initiatives or conduct studies to  determine the feasibility of efforts to cut redundancies and gain  efficiencies has not always been a priority. As such, the officials indicated  that the degree to which joint bases looked for opportunities to gain  efficiencies and cost savings depended on the commitment of the officials  involved as well as the level of support and commitment they received  from their service headquarters, because overarching goals, plans,  milestones, and reporting requirements have not been established.

Without OSD establishing goals and milestones to be achieved across  the joint bases, there is a risk that emphasis or priority will not be given to  this pursuit.

Furthermore, DOD stated that it advocates treating joint bases no  differently than other Army, Navy, and Air Force installations, and noted  the only unique quality of joint bases is the sizeable joint presence they  support. Although DOD indicated that joint bases are similar to all other  installations, as stated in the report, 64 percent of survey respondents  reported challenges stemming from consolidation of installation-support  functions—consolidations unlikely to occur on stand-alone installations.  Moreover, joint bases are required to meet certain different installation- support standards that are, at times, higher than those on a stand-alone  installation. Meeting these standards can require additional resources or  prioritization that other installations may not face. DOD did not explain  how joint bases can have support standards and challenges that are  unique to joint basing while still being considered the same as all other  installations. Given (1) that joint bases face unique challenges, and (2)  that joint base and military service officials said it is unclear as to the  extent initial joint basing goals are still appropriate as well as the extent  they are required to pursue cost savings and efficiencies, additional  direction would help joint bases better understand the current and  ongoing goals of joint basing. Therefore, we believe the recommendation  is still warranted.

For the reasons cited above, we continue to believe that OSD should  collaborate with the military services, especially in light of OSD’s  assertions that joint bases have generated savings, to (1) evaluate the  purpose of the program and determine whether the current goals, as  stated in the 2005 BRAC Commission recommendation, are still  appropriate; (2) communicate the goals to the military services and joint  bases, and then adjust program activities accordingly; (3) provide  direction to the joint bases on requirements for meeting program goals,  including reporting requirements and milestones; and (4) determine any  next steps for joint basing, including whether to expand it to other  installations. If joint basing may result in savings, particularly at the level  that OSD asserts, then DOD may want to consider expanding joint basing  to other installations. Further, key change management practices state  that it is essential that top government and agency leaders are committed  to consolidation and play a lead role in executing it by setting the  direction, pace, and tone as well as providing a clear and consistent  rationale for doing so. These practices also state that establishing  implementation goals and milestone dates, and tracking progress toward  those goals, helps agency officials pinpoint performance shortfalls and  suggest midcourse corrections, including any needed adjustments to the  organization’s future goals and milestones. Consequently, and given  DOD’s disagreement with our recommendations that OSD collaborate  with the military services and joint bases to evaluate the purpose of the  program and determine whether DOD’s current goals of achieving greater  efficiencies and generating cost savings for the joint basing program are  still appropriate and subsequently provide direction to joint bases on their  requirements for meeting the joint base program’s goals, we have added  a matter for congressional consideration to this report. Our intent is to  help ensure DOD’s approach to joint basing achieves the goals as  outlined by DOD in its justification for the 2005 BRAC recommendation  and leverages additional opportunities to reduce duplication of effort that  could in turn generate cost savings and increase efficiencies.

We will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the  Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force,  and Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Office of Management  and Budget; and appropriate congressional committees. In addition, the  report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix VII.

section_title: Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
paragraphs: For this review, we conducted site visits at a nongeneralizable sample of  four joint bases: one Navy led, one Army led, and two Air Force led. We  selected these bases to ensure representation from each of the military  services, and to include bases that share and do not share a physical  boundary. Information collected during these site visits provided insight  about initiatives undertaken and outcomes experienced at these  locations. We also obtained and analyzed documents and conducted  interviews, as described later in this section. Furthermore, we conducted  a web-based survey of 11 of the 12 joint bases. Our web-based survey  did not include Joint Region Marianas because it is a joint region rather  than a joint base, and is subject to different expectations for the  consolidation of installation-support, but we interviewed officials from  Joint Region Marianas. Those surveyed at the 11 joint bases included  representatives affiliated with 462 installation-support functional areas (42  each at each of the joint bases) as well as the 11 Joint Base  Commanders (or their designated representative), and we obtained a  response rate of 100 percent.

To conduct our web-based survey, we sent to each joint base the  electronic links to 43 questionnaires, one questionnaire for each of the 42  installation-support functions identified for consolidation per the  Department of Defense’s (DOD) Joint Base Implementation Guidance  and one questionnaire asking a single open-ended question to capture  additional comments from each Joint Base Commander. In consultation  with DOD we excluded two installation-support functions from the survey  (facilities new footprint and real property leases) because DOD officials  indicated that they did not have performance management data and  survey participants may not be able to fully respond to the questions. For  the list of installation-support functions that we included in our survey, see  table 5 below. The survey contained 16 main questions and several  follow-up questions. It was designed to obtain information, using closed-  and open-ended responses, about progress in consolidating functions,  factors that hinder consolidation, and outcomes from consolidation such  as any benefits, challenges, or reductions in duplication (defined as  reductions in redundancy) in three areas—personnel other than  contractors, base operating contracts, and procedures and policies. The  survey also asked about the need for additional or modified guidance  from one or more of the military services or Office of the Secretary of  Defense (OSD) and if there were any additional opportunities to  consolidate that had not yet been implemented. See appendix II for a  copy of the survey questions.

To administer the survey, we provided unique survey log-in information  for each function to the Joint Base Commander’s office. That office was  then responsible for disseminating the information to the appropriate lead  service component’s subject-matter expert for each of the functional  areas. While the survey was provided to the lead component’s subject- matter expert, each base had the opportunity to incorporate views and  comments from the supported component(s). For joint bases that did not  have a given function (e.g., port operations), the joint base representative  simply indicated that the function did not exist and no further questions  were asked or answered.

Our analysis of the survey responses included descriptive statistics from  closed-ended responses and content analysis of open-ended responses.  We reviewed the closed-ended responses to ensure accuracy of  information for six key survey questions: (Q2) “Is any part of this support  function currently the responsibility of the Joint Base Commander?”, and  (Q3) “Since your joint base established the terms of the Joint Base  Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), has any part of this support function  been consolidated?”, and questions 9 through 12 (see Appendix II for the  complete wording of these questions). For these questions, we compared  the closed-ended response to the open-ended elaborations to ensure that  the closed-ended response accurately represented the respondent’s  meaning. When there was a mismatch we also checked the base’s MOA  and supplemental Joint Base Implementation Guidance, if applicable. In  some cases, we modified the closed-ended response to match the  response in the open-ended elaboration or the MOA (e.g., if a respondent  answered “yes” to the closed-ended question about the function being  consolidated but then clearly indicated in the elaboration space “this  function has not been consolidated”). For example, these cases related to  changing: (1) “no” responses to “not applicable” when a function was not  present at the joint base; (2) “not applicable” responses to “no” when the  Joint Base Implementation Guidance excepted the installation-support  function in some instances from being transferred to the Joint Base  Commander; and (3) “no” responses to “yes” when the installation- support function had been consolidated prior to joint basing. Inconsistent  responses were identified through a content analysis of the open-ended  survey questions, in which two GAO analysts independently reviewed the  responses and coded them into several categories, such as “consolidated  prior to joint basing”, “reports no reduction”, and “reductions but not  directly related to joint basing.”

When the coding was completed, both analysts reviewed every code  made by the other analyst and indicated whether they agreed or  disagreed with the code. Then, the analysts met to discuss their coding  determinations and reached agreement on any differences. Because we  made changes to the closed-ended survey responses for the key  questions above based on our analysis of the open-ended responses and  the base MOAs, the results for those questions are not the raw survey  responses; they are the combined result of the original survey responses  and our analyses of those survey responses. We have worded the  results in our report carefully to accurately represent that fact.  Additionally, two analysts independently summarized the responses to  open-ended questions that were not elaborations of closed-ended  questions (e.g., Question 6 regarding other factors that might have  hindered the ability of the base to consolidate a function) through the  same content analysis process described above. We believe the data  analyzed are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

We sent e-mail notifications to base points of contact beginning on  January 13, 2014. We then sent a cover e-mail with the log-in information  for the questionnaire beginning on January 14, 2014, and asked the  bases to complete the questionnaire within one month. To encourage  respondents to complete the questionnaire, we sent e-mail message  reminders and log-in information approximately two weeks, three weeks,  and five weeks after the initial questionnaire was sent; we also extended  the deadline for completion. We also sent customized emails and made  follow-up phone calls to the base points of contact to maximize the  response rate from all functions and to clarify responses for key individual  questions. We closed the survey on March 19, 2014. We achieved a 100  percent response rate from all base functions and commanders.

To minimize errors that might occur from respondents interpreting our  questions differently than we intended, we pretested the questionnaire  with knowledgeable representatives from four joint bases.pretests, we asked the officials to complete the questionnaire as we  observed the process and noted potential problems (two sessions were  conducted in-person and by phone, two were conducted only by phone).

During these  We then discussed the questions and instructions with the officials to  check whether (1) the questions and instructions were clear and  unambiguous, (2) the terms used were accurate, (3) the questionnaire  was unbiased, (4) the questionnaire did not place an undue burden on the  officials completing it, and (5) to identify potential solutions to any  problems identified. We also submitted the questionnaire for review by an  independent GAO survey specialist, OSD officials, and senior staff from  one additional joint base. We modified the questionnaire based on  feedback from the pretests and reviews, as appropriate.

Because we collected data from every joint base rather than a sample of  bases, there was no sampling error. However, the practical difficulties of  conducting any survey may introduce errors, commonly referred to as  nonsampling errors. For example, differences in how a particular question  is interpreted, the sources of information available to respondents, how  the responses were processed and analyzed, or the types of people who  do not respond can influence the accuracy of the survey results. We took  steps in the development of the survey, the data collection, and the data  analysis to minimize these nonsampling errors and to help ensure the  accuracy of the answers that were obtained. For example, a social  science survey specialist designed the questionnaire, in collaboration with  GAO staff with subject-matter expertise. Then, as noted earlier, the draft  questionnaire was pretested to ensure that questions were relevant,  clearly stated, and easy to comprehend. The questionnaire was also  reviewed by external experts and an additional GAO survey specialist.  From these pretests and reviews, we made revisions as necessary to  reduce the likelihood of nonresponse and reporting errors on our  questions. Our analysts answered respondent questions and resolved  difficulties that respondents had in answering our questions. We  examined the survey results and performed computer analyses to identify  inconsistencies and other indications of error and addressed such issues.  A second, independent analyst checked the accuracy of all computer  analyses to minimize the likelihood of errors in data processing. To obtain  additional narrative and supporting context, survey respondents were  given multiple opportunities to provide additional open-ended comments  throughout our survey. Data were electronically exported from the web  survey software into a statistical program for analyses. No manual data  entry was performed, thereby removing an additional potential source of  error. We examined the survey results and performed computer analyses  to identify inconsistencies and other indications of error (e.g., open-ended  responses conflicting with closed-ended responses), and addressed such  issues as necessary.

To determine the extent to which officials have reported consolidating  their installation-support functions, we reviewed DOD’s 2008 Joint Basing  Implementation Guidance to identify DOD’s expectations for  consolidation. Next, we analyzed data obtained through the survey and  information from interviews with officials from the Joint Region Marianas  and the joint bases and compared the results of our analysis to DOD’s  expectations for consolidation. To determine why consolidation had or  had not occurred as intended and to identify any reported factors that  have hindered consolidation and challenges that have resulted from  consolidation efforts, we analyzed information obtained through our  survey and interviewed joint base officials. We evaluated DOD’s efforts to  address reported hindrances to consolidation and challenges that have  resulted from consolidation efforts with key federal practices for  consolidation identified in our prior work on federal agency consolidation  efforts. We did not independently assess the extent to which  consolidation occurred as identified by survey respondents and by  officials during interviews.

To determine the extent to which officials have reported meeting the  goals of joint basing to achieve greater efficiencies and cost savings as  stated in the 2005 BRAC recommendation, we reviewed documents and  guidance from OSD, the military services, and individual joint bases. We  reviewed survey results and information collected from interviews and  compared them to key federal practices for consolidation of management  functions and to key practices agencies can take to improve efficiency as  identified in our prior work. federal practices for consolidation, such as establishing implementation  goals and milestone dates, and tracking progress toward those goals.

GAO-06-15 and GAO-11-908. officials; members of the Joint Base Working Group that represents the  Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps headquarters; as well as  officials from the Army Installation Management Command, the Air Force  Civil Engineer Center, and the Naval Installations Command. We also  interviewed officials at the following locations:

Air Force Air Education and Training Command, Texas

Air Force Air Mobility Command, Illinois

Navy Region Naval District Washington; Washington, District of  Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, District of Columbia  Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia  Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington  Joint Base San Antonio, Texas  Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, Virginia  Joint Region Marianas, Guam

Navy Region Hawaii U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Hawaii  We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 to September 2014  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

section_title: Appendix II: Survey on Consolidation of Joint Base Operations
paragraphs: The questions that we asked in our survey on consolidation of joint base  operations are shown below. The percents in parentheses indicate the  percent of the functional area respondents who chose that particular  answer or that our analysis of open-ended responses and other  supporting documentation for the joint bases indicated were the correct  answers. The number in parentheses next to a closed-ended question  (e.g., “N=462”) indicates the number of respondents who were eligible to  answer that question and is the denominator of the percents reported for  that question. See Appendix I for details of the analyses that led to the  results reported here.
subsections: section_title: SECTION 1: Functional Area
paragraphs: [When a respondent for a specific functional area logged on, the name of  the functional area was displayed along with the definition of the function  taken from the May 2013 Cost and Performance Visibility Framework  Handbook. When the Joint Base Commander’s office logged on, the  following question was displayed.]  If the Joint Base Commander or his/her representative has any  comments about this questionnaire or about your joint base’s  consolidation of installation-support functions, please type them in  the box below.

section_title: SECTION 2: Function Responsibility
paragraphs: 2.  Is ANY part of this support function currently the responsibility  of the Joint Base Commander (JBC)? Check only one answer.  (N=462)

Yes (94.8%)  No (1.9%)  N/A - this base does not have this function (3.2%)

section_title: SECTION 3: Consolidation of Installation-Support Function
paragraphs: 3.  Since your joint base established the terms of the Joint Base  Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), has ANY part of this support  function been consolidated? Check only one answer. (N=438)

Yes (75.8%)  No (19.4%)  Not applicable (4.1% )  Don’t know (.2%)  Blank (.5%)

Please explain your answer in the box below.  4.  How much, if at all, did the preexisting model of providing this  support function (e.g., military personnel, civilian personnel,  contract personnel) hinder the ability of your joint base to  consolidate this support function? Check only one answer.  (N=438)

Significantly (15.8%)  Moderately (14.6%)  Slightly (11.2%)  Not at all (47.9%)  Not applicable (6.4%)  Don’t know (3.4%)  Blank (.7%)

Please explain your answer in the box below.

Please explain your answer in the box below.  5.  How much, if at all, do military service-specific requirements,  practices, or policies hinder the ability to consolidate this  support function? Check only one answer.  (N=438)

Significantly (17.8%)   Moderately (11.9%)  Slightly (15.5 %)  Not at all (46.1 %)  Not applicable (6.4%)  Don’t know (1.6 %)  Blank responses (.7%)  6.  What other factors, if any, have hindered the ability of your joint  base to consolidate this support function (e.g., geography, use  of contractors, impact to mission, etc.)?  7.  Have there been any benefits resulting from the consolidation of  this support function (e.g., adoption of streamlined practices,  increased efficiency, increased customer satisfaction, etc.)?  Check only one answer. (N=350)

Yes (60.9%)  No (34.0%)  Don’t know (4.9%)  Blank (.3%)

Please describe the benefit(s) in the box below.  8.  Have there been any challenges resulting from the consolidation  of this support function (e.g., increased burden on staff,  decreased efficiency, decreased customer satisfaction, etc.)?  Check only one answer. (N=350)

Yes (64.0%)  No (33.1%)  Don’t know (2.9%)

Please describe the challenge(s) in the box below.  9.  Since your joint base established the terms of the Joint Base  MOA, has there been ANY reduction of redundant funded  positions—excluding contractors—(i.e., authorized positions that  were determined to be duplicative or unnecessary after transfer  of total obligation authority, because they included the similar  roles and responsibilities) required to perform this support  function? Check only one answer. (N=438)

Yes (12.1%)  No (40.4%)  Not applicable (40.6%)  Don’t know (6.4%)  Blank (.5%)  9.a. Please describe the reduction(s) and the reason for the  reduction(s) in the box below.  9.b. How many redundant authorized positions have been  eliminated?  9.c. Please explain in the box below.  10. Since your joint base established the terms of the Joint Base  MOA, has there been ANY reduction of redundant contracts or  any increased contract efficiencies (i.e., contracts for the  provision of the same support service that were determined to be  duplicative, or where consolidation of the contract resulted in  improvements, for example, leveraging economies of scale) used  to perform this support function? Check only one answer. (N=438)

Yes (25.3%)  No (24.4%)  Not applicable (43.8%)

Don’t know (5.9%)  Blank (.5%)  10.a. Please describe the reduction(s) or efficiencies in the box  below.  10.b. How many redundant contracts, if any, have been  eliminated?  10.c. Please explain in the box below.  11.  Since your joint base established the terms of the Joint Base  MOA, has there been ANY merger or consolidation of Information  Technology (IT) systems related to performing this support  function (e.g., networks, databases, etc.)? Check only one answer.  (N=438)

Yes (25.3%)  No (34.2%)  Not applicable (32.4%)  Don’t know (7.5%)  Blank (.5%)  11.a. Please describe the merger/consolidation(s) in the box  below.  11.b. Please explain in the box below.  12. Since your joint base established the terms of the Joint Base  MOA, has there been ANY merger or consolidation of redundant  procedures (i.e., procedures that were determined to be  duplicative or unnecessary) used to perform this support  function? Check only one answer. (N=438)

Yes (24.0%)  No (25.6%)  Not applicable (44.5%)  Don’t know (5.5%)  Blank (.5%)  12.a. Please describe the merger/consolidation(s) in the box  below.  12.b. Please explain in the box below.  13. Are there specific areas where additional or modified guidance  from one or more of the military services would improve the  consolidation of this function? Check only one answer. (N=438)

Yes (26.3%)  No (60.3%)  Don’t know or no opinion (12.8%)  Blank (.7%)

Please describe the change(s) in the box below.  14. Are there specific areas where additional or modified guidance  from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) would improve  the consolidation of this function? Check only one answer.  (N=438)

Yes (26.7%)  No (58.2%)  Don’t know or no opinion (14.2%)  Blank (.9%)

Please describe the change(s) in the box below.  15. If there are any additional opportunities to consolidate this  installation-support function that have not yet been  implemented, please describe them in the box below.  16. If you have any additional comments related to the consolidation  of this support function since your joint base established the  terms of the Joint Base MOA, please type them in the box below.

section_title: Appendix III: BRAC Commission Recommendation on Joint Basing (Including Elements of DOD’s Recommendation to the Commission)
paragraphs: Appendix III: BRAC Commission  Recommendation on Joint Basing (Including  Elements of DOD’s Recommendation to the  Commission)

section_title: Appendix IV: Status of Reported Consolidation at Each of the 11 Joint Bases
paragraphs: Legend:  = Some part of the function is consolidated;  = no part of the function is consolidated;  n/a = Joint base does not have the function or the function was not the joint base commander’s  responsibility.

Missing or unknown data.

section_title: Appendix V: Locations of Joint Bases
paragraphs: This appendix contains information presented in figure 1 in a  noninteractive format.

section_title: Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense

section_title: Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact

section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant  Director; Chaneé Gaskin, Susan Langley, Amanda Manning, Joshua  Margraf, Stephanie Moriarty, Richard Powelson, Tida Reveley, Michael  Silver, Amie Steele, Sarah Veale, and Michael Willems made key  contributions to this report.

section_title: Related GAO Products
paragraphs: DOD Joint Bases: Management Needed to Achieve Greater Efficiencies.  GAO-13-134. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2012.

BRAC 2005 Results. GAO-12-513T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2012.

Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy  to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts. GAO-11-814. Washington, D.C.:  September 19, 2011.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Review of the Iowa and Milan  Army Ammunition Plants. GAO-11-488R. Washington, D.C.: April 1,  2011.

GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington,  D.C.: February 17, 2011.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February  2011.

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is  Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the  Defense Access Roads Program. GAO-11-165. Washington, D.C.:  January 26, 2011.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to  Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs.  GAO-10-725R. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.

Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning  Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant Growth.  GAO-10-602. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2010.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have  Increased While Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year  2009. GAO-10-98R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transportation Impact of  Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are  Uncertain and Direct Federal Support Is Limited. GAO-09-750.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings  Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating Supply- Related Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations. GAO-09-703.  Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2009.

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support  Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of  Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. GAO-09-336. Washington, D.C.:  March 30, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in  Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently  Updating Savings Estimates. GAO-09-217. Washington, D.C.: January  30, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to  Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen  Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-1010R.  Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help  Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth.  GAO-08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road  Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R.  Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower  Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC  Recommendations. GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations  Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R.  Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have  Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T.  Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have  Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159.  Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating,  Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of  Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage,  and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics  Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely  Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial  Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13,  2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor  Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve  Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the  2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.

Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers  Are Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and  Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2007.

Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate  Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely  Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641.  Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.

Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental  Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.  GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.

Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and  Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905.  Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and  Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785.  Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC  Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and  Closures. GAO-05-138. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need  for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2004.

Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming  Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.:  March 25, 2004.


Question-summary annotations: questions: question: How did the GAO evaluate the DOD?
answer: GAO designated DOD support infrastructure as a high-risk area to address efficiency challenges.

question: Why were the joint bases recommended?
answer: In 2005, DOD recommended to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission combining 26 installations into 12 joint bases to generate efficiencies and cost savings, initially estimated to be $2.3 billion.
child_questions: question: How was the estimate changed?
answer: In 2009, DOD reduced this estimate to $273 million.

question: How was the GAO directed to watch the DOD?
answer: GAO was mandated to assess DOD's progress in consolidating common services across joint bases.

question: What does this report address?
answer: This report addresses the extent to which officials reported consolidating installation-support functions, and meeting joint basing goals to achieve greater efficiencies and cost savings.
child_questions: question: What information was utilized to complete this report?
answer: GAO conducted a survey of 11 joint bases, and reviewed applicable guidance.

question: Why was Joint Region Marianas excluded from the report?
answer: GAO did not survey Joint Region Marianas because it was subject to different expectations.

questions: question: What action does the GAO recommend Congress to take?
answer: Congress should consider directing DOD to evaluate joint basing goals, provide direction on requirements to meet the goals, and determine next steps for joint basing.
child_questions: question: Why is the GAO giving recommendations to Congress?
answer: GAO included this matter because DOD did not concur with GAO's recommendations to conduct such an evaluation and provide direction, in part because DOD stated joint bases have achieved savings.

question: What recommendations did the DOD concur with?
answer: GAO also recommended DOD evaluate which installation-support functions remain suitable for consolidation, with which DOD concurred, and take policy actions to address challenges, with which DOD partially concurred, noting its existing processes to address challenges.

question: How does the GAO view their evaluations?
answer: GAO continues to believe its findings and recommendations are valid as discussed in this report.