Department of Homeland Security: Oversight and Coordination of Research and Development Should Be Strengthened
Released: 2012-09-12T00:00:00


Highlights: section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: Conducting R&D on technologies for detecting, preventing, and mitigating terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the nation. Since its creation, DHS has spent billions of dollars researching and developing technologies used to support its missions including securing the border, detecting nuclear devices, and screening airline passengers and baggage for explosives, among others. Within DHS, S&T conducts R&D and is the component responsible for coordinating R&D across the department, but other components, such as the Coast Guard and DNDO, also conduct R&D to support their respective missions. GAO was asked to identify (1) how much DHS invests in R&D and the extent to which DHS has policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources and efforts across the department, and (2) the extent to which R&D is coordinated within DHS to prevent overlap, fragmentation, or unnecessary duplication. GAO reviewed information on DHS R&D budgets, contracts, and DHS spending on R&D at DOE national laboratories for fiscal years 2010 through 2012. GAO also reviewed DHS R&D plans and project documentation, and interviewed DHS headquarters and component officials.

section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not know the total amount its components invest in research and development (R&D) and does not have policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources across the department. According to DHS, its Science & Technology Directorate (S&T), Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and U. S. Coast Guard are the only components that conduct R&D and, according to GAO’s analysis, these are the only components that report budget authority, obligations, or outlays for R&D activities to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as part of the budget process. However, GAO identified an additional $255 million in R&D obligations by other DHS components. For example, S&T reported receiving $50 million in reimbursements from other DHS components to conduct R&D. Further, 10 components obligated $55 million for R&D contracts to third parties and $151 million to Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories for R&D-related projects, but these were not reported as R&D to OMB. According to DHS, it is difficult to identify all R&D investments across the department because DHS does not have a department wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing components how to report all R&D spending and activities. As a result, it is difficult for DHS to oversee components’ R&D efforts and align them with agency wide R&D goals and priorities. Developing specific policies and guidance could assist DHS components in better understanding how to report R&D activities, and better position DHS to determine how much the agency invests in R&D to effectively oversee these investments.

S&T has taken some steps to coordinate R&D efforts across DHS, but the department's R&D efforts are fragmented and overlapping, which increases the risk of unnecessary duplication. R&D at DHS is inherently fragmented because S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO were each given R&D responsibilities in law, and other DHS components may pursue and conduct their own R&D efforts as long as those activities are coordinated through S&T. S&T uses various mechanisms to coordinate its R&D efforts including component liaisons, component R&D agreements, joint R&D strategies, and integrated R&D product teams composed of S&T and component officials. However, GAO identified 35 instances of overlap among contracts that DHS components awarded for R&D projects. For example, S&T and the Transportation Security Administration both awarded overlapping contracts to different vendors to develop advanced algorithms to detect the same type of explosive. While GAO did not identify instances of unnecessary duplication among these contracts, DHS has not developed a policy defining who is responsible for coordinating R&D and what processes should be used to coordinate it, and does not have mechanisms to track all R&D activities at DHS that could help prevent overlap, fragmentation, or unnecessary duplication. For example, S&T did not track homeland security-related R&D activities that DHS components contracted through DOE national laboratories from fiscal year 2010 through 2013; thus, it could not provide information on those contracts. Developing a policy defining the roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D, and establishing coordination processes and a mechanism to track all R&D projects could help DHS mitigate existing fragmentation and overlap, and reduce the risk of unnecessary duplication.

section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO recommends that DHS develop policies and guidance for defining, reporting and coordinating R&D activities across the department; and that DHS establish a mechanism to track R&D projects. DHS concurred with GAO’s recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Conducting research and development (R&D) on technologies for  detecting, preventing, and mitigating terrorist threats is vital to enhancing  the security of the nation. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  conducts research, development, testing, and evaluation of new  technologies that are intended to strengthen the United States’ ability to  prevent and respond to nuclear, biological, explosive, and other types of  attacks within the United States. The department’s Science and  Technology (S&T) Directorate conducts research, development,  demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities and also has  responsibility for coordinating and integrating all such activities of the  department, as provided by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  Although S&T conducts R&D and has responsibility for coordinating R&D,  other DHS components, including the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office  (DNDO) and the U. S. Coast Guard, conduct R&D in support of their  respective missions.

Since it began operations in 2003, DHS, through both S&T and other  components, has spent billions of dollars researching and developing  technologies used to support a wide range of missions, including securing  the border, detecting nuclear devices, and screening airline passengers  and baggage for explosives, among others. In May 2004, we reported  that DHS had not completed a strategic plan to identify priorities, goals,  objectives, and policies for the R&D of homeland security technologies,  and gaps remained in its efforts to coordinate with other federal agencies  that conduct homeland security R&D. We recommended that DHS  complete a strategic R&D plan and ensure that the plan was integrated  with homeland security R&D conducted by other federal agencies. DHS  agreed with our recommendation but has not yet implemented it. In June  2009, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) reported on  S&T’s structure, processes, and the execution of its cross-government  leadership role. NAPA reported that although S&T was charged by  statute to provide a leading role in guiding homeland-security related  research, S&T has no authority over other federal agencies that conduct  homeland-security related research, and was in a relatively weak position  to carry out its leadership role. NAPA further reported that the  weaknesses in S&T’s strategic planning increased the risk for duplication  of efforts and recommended, among other things, that S&T follow the  Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and GAO guidance in  formulating a strategic plan to guide its work. In July 2012, S&T provided  a draft strategy that identifies the roles and responsibilities for  coordinating homeland security science and technology related functions  across the U.S. government to the White House’s Office of Science &  Technology Policy for review, but the White House had not yet approved  that draft.

In November 2011, we reported that while S&T developed a 5-year R&D  plan in 2008 to guide its efforts and was finalizing a new strategic plan to  align its own R&D investments and goals, DHS had not yet completed a  strategic plan to align all R&D efforts across the department, as we  previously recommended in 2004. We also reported that S&T had  undertaken a series of efforts related to its organizational structure and  underwent a new strategic planning process, developed new strategic  goals, and conducted a reorganization intended to better achieve its  strategic goals as a result of the NAPA study. We also reported that these  efforts had only recently been initiated, so it was too early to assess their  effectiveness.

Not having a department-wide strategy for managing R&D has raised  questions about the extent to which R&D investments and efforts are  being overseen and coordinated effectively across DHS. As a result, you  requested that we conduct a review to determine how DHS oversees  R&D resources and coordinates R&D efforts across the department.  Specifically, this report addresses the following two questions:  1.  How much does DHS invest in R&D and to what extent does it have  policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D  resources and efforts across the department? 2.  To what extent is R&D coordinated within DHS to prevent overlap,  fragmentation, and unnecessary duplication across the department?

To determine how much DHS invests in R&D and the extent to which it  has policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D  resources, we reviewed DHS’s budget and congressional budget  justifications to identify R&D investments reported from fiscal years 2011  through 2013. To identify DHS’s reported R&D budget authority, we  analyzed R&D budget authority included in budget submissions to OMB  from fiscal years 2010 through 2013. We also analyzed S&T, DNDO,  and Coast Guard budgets to identify budget authority for R&D activities in  non-R&D budget accounts. Further, we analyzed data from the Federal  Procurement Data System Next Generation (FPDS-NG) to identify DHS  R&D-related contracts for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. We also  obtained data from the Department of Energy’s (DOE) national  laboratories from fiscal years 2010 through 2012 to identify how much  DHS components obligated for R&D-related work at the national  laboratories. We assessed the reliability of the data we used by  reconciling it with published data, and interviewing officials responsible for  overseeing the relevant data systems about, among other things,  applicable quality control procedures to maintain the integrity of the data.  We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes  of this report. Further, we interviewed S&T, Coast Guard, and DNDO  budget officials to determine what portions of their budgets would  appropriately capture total R&D activities, as well as DHS budget officials  to discuss R&D spending, how DHS oversees R&D funding, and DHS’s  policies and guidance related to defining, overseeing, and coordinating  R&D efforts. We also interviewed other DHS component officials to  discuss the extent to which components conducted R&D, captured R&D  activities in their budgets, and coordinated with S&T. We compared DHS  efforts to develop policies and guidance with GAO’s Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government.

To determine the extent to which R&D is coordinated within DHS to  prevent overlap, fragmentation, and unnecessary duplication, we  reviewed data on about 15,000 federal procurement contract actions  coded as R&D in FPDS-NG made by DHS components from fiscal years  2007 through 2011 to identify contracts that were overlapping or  duplicative of other contracts issued by different components. We selected 50 R&D contracts that appeared to contain overlap and  interviewed the officials of the six components that issued them to discuss  the nature of those contracts. We could not determine the full extent of  duplication or overlap occurring in the department, because, among other  things, the FPDS-NG data system captures only a portion of the total  R&D activities occurring at DHS. We also used our past work on  fragmentation, overlap, and duplication across the federal government,  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, and our prior  work related to federal collaboration to assess DHS’s coordination of R&D  across the department. We also interviewed S&T leadership, technical  division directors, and DHS component officials to discuss S&T and  DHS’s R&D coordination processes. More details on our scope and  methodology can be found in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2011 through  September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
subsections: section_title: Definition of R&D in the Federal Government
paragraphs: OMB requires agencies to submit data on R&D programs as part of their  annual budget submissions. Specifically, agencies are to provide data on  investments for basic research, applied research, development, R&D  facilities construction, and major equipment for R&D. OMB provides one  definition of R&D that all federal agencies are to use to prepare budget  estimates (see app. II for a list of federal R&D definitions). According to  OMB, R&D activities comprise creative work undertaken on a systematic  basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of  man, culture, and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to  devise new applications. R&D is further broken down into the following  three stages, as defined by OMB.

Basic research is a systematic study directed toward a fuller  knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of  phenomena and of observable facts without specific applications  towards processes or products in mind.

Applied research is a systematic study to gain knowledge or  understanding to determine the means by which a recognized and  specific need may be met.

Development is a systematic application of knowledge or  understanding, directed toward the production of useful materials,  devices, and systems or methods, including design, development, and  improvement of prototypes and new processes to meet specific  requirements.

section_title: DHS R&D Investment
paragraphs: There are several mechanisms by which agencies such as DHS are  required to report their investments in R&D, and investments can be  described in the following ways:

Budget authority is the legal authorization to obligate funds.

Obligations are binding agreements for the government to make a  payment (outlay) for goods and services ordered or received.

Outlays are payments to liquidate obligations and represent the  amount actually expended.

For R&D activities, OMB directs agencies to submit information on budget  authority and outlays for each year. Because the executive branch and  Congress generally make budget decisions in terms of budget authority,  budget authority can provide insight into relative priorities within the  annual budget process and changes in budget policies. Agencies report  obligation data to OMB by object classification. Object classes are  categories that present obligations for items or services purchased  according to their initial purpose. For R&D-related obligations, OMB has a  separate category for R&D contracts (object class 25.5). OMB also  includes some advisory and assistance services for R&D in a separate  object class category (object class 25.1).

The other agencies conducting homeland security R&D included the Departments of  Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, and Health and Human Services; the National  Aeronautical and Space Administration; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the  National Science Foundation. being the largest R&D entity. DHS reported $512 million in budget  authority and $752 million in outlays for R&D in fiscal year 2011.

section_title: R&D Roles and Responsibilities at DHS
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established S&T within DHS and  provided it with responsibility for, among other things:  conducting basic and applied research, development, demonstration,  and testing and evaluation activities relevant to any or all elements of  DHS; establishing and administering the primary R&D activities of the  department, including the long-term research and development needs  and capabilities for all elements of the department; and coordinating and integrating all research, development,  demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities of the department.

S&T has six technical divisions responsible for managing S&T’s R&D  portfolio and coordinating with other DHS components to identify R&D  priorities and needs.  As of September 2012, S&T had approximately 79  active R&D projects. Most of S&T’s R&D portfolio consists of applied and  development R&D projects for its DHS customers. It also conducts other  projects for additional customers, including other federal agencies, first  responders, and industry, among others.

These divisions are the Borders and Maritime Division, Chemical/Biological Defense  Division, Cyber Security Division, Explosives Division, Human Factors/ Behavioral  Sciences Division, and the Infrastructure Protection and Disaster Management Division.   In addition, S&T’s First Responder Group (FRG) identifies, validates, and facilitates the  fulfillment of first responder requirements through the use of existing and emerging  technologies, knowledge products, and the development of technical standards, according  to S&T FRG officials.

In addition to S&T, DNDO and the Coast Guard conduct R&D activities.  After its establishment in 2005, DNDO assumed responsibility from S&T  for certain nuclear and radiological R&D activities. DNDO is the primary  federal organization responsible for developing, acquiring, and supporting  the deployment of an enhanced domestic system to detect and report on  attempts to import, possess, store, transport, develop, or use an  unauthorized nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or radiological  material in the United States.estimated that they have 30 R&D projects and plan to obligate $75.9  million for R&D in fiscal year 2012. According to Coast Guard officials, the  Coast Guard R&D Center conducts R&D projects to support the Coast  Guard’s priorities, primarily focusing on maritime safety-related projects.  As of August 2012, Coast Guard officials estimated that they have 60-70  applied research projects and have spent about $30 million on R&D in  fiscal year 2012 so far.

section_title: Our Work on Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication
paragraphs: In 2010, Congress directed us to identify programs, agencies, offices, and  initiatives with duplicative goals and activities within departments and  government-wide and report annually to Congress. In March 2011 and  February 2012, we issued our first two annual reports to Congress in  response to this requirement. The annual reports describe areas in  which we found evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication among  federal programs. Using the framework established in our prior work on  addressing fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, we use the following  definitions for the purpose of assessing DHS’s R&D efforts:

Fragmentation occurs when more than one federal agency (or more  than one organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad  area of national interest.

Overlap occurs when multiple programs have similar goals, engage in  similar activities or strategies to achieve those goals, or target similar  beneficiaries. Overlap may result from statutory or other limitations  beyond the agency’s control.

Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are  engaging in the same activities or providing the same services to the  same beneficiaries.

section_title: DHS Does Not Know Its Total Investment in R&D, and Policies and Guidance Could Help Define and Oversee R&D Efforts
subsections: section_title: DHS Does Not Know Its Total Investment in R&D
paragraphs: DHS does not know how much all of its components invest in R&D,  making it difficult to oversee R&D efforts across the department.  According to DHS budget officials, S&T, DNDO, and the Coast Guard are  the only components that conduct R&D and, according to our analysis,  they are the only components that report budget authority, obligations, or  outlays for R&D activities to OMB as part of the budget process.  However, we identified an additional $255 million in R&D obligations by  other DHS components. Further, we found that DNDO did not report  certain R&D budget data to OMB, and R&D budget accounts include a  mix of R&D and non-R&D spending, further complicating DHS’s ability to  identify its total investment in R&D.

Our analysis of the data that DHS submitted to OMB found that DHS’s  R&D obligations were underreported because other DHS components  obligated money for R&D contracts that were not reported to OMB as  R&D. Specifically, for fiscal year 2011, our analysis identified $255 million  in obligations for R&D that DHS did not report as R&D contracts in the  object classification tables. These obligations included DHS components  providing S&T with funding to conduct R&D on their behalf and  components obligating funds through contracts directly to industry,  universities, or with DOE’s national laboratories for R&D. Specifically:

S&T reported receiving $50 million in reimbursements from other DHS  components, such as U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the  Secret Service, the Office of Health Affairs, Customs and Border  Protection (CBP), and the Transportation Security Administration  (TSA) to conduct R&D projects. These obligations were not  identified as R&D in these components’ budgets.

Our analysis identified 10 components, including CBP, TSA, U.S.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Federal  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), that obligated  approximately $55 million for R&D contracts that were not reported as  R&D.

Our analysis identified that DHS components, outside of S&T, DNDO,  and the Coast Guard, obligated $151 million to DOE national  laboratories for R&D-related projects (44 percent of total DHS  spending at the national laboratories in fiscal year 2011). For example, the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)  obligated $83 million to DOE national laboratories in fiscal year 2011  (see app. III for R&D obligations by component).

Our analysis of the data that DHS submitted to OMB also showed that  DHS’s R&D budget authority and outlays were underreported because  DNDO did not properly report its R&D budget authority and outlays to  OMB for fiscal years 2010 through 2013. Specifically, for fiscal years  2010 through 2013, DHS underreported its total R&D budget authority by  at least $293 million and outlays for R&D by at least $282 million because  DNDO did not accurately report the data. In fiscal year 2011, S&T and the Coast Guard reported $512 million in R&D budget authority and $752  million in outlays, but DNDO did not report $56 million in R&D budget  authority or $80 million in outlays. DNDO officials gave us the data for  the missing years as depicted in figure 1 along with S&T and Coast  Guard data.

DNDO budget officials told us that they are aware of the omission and  confirmed that the OMB submission will be corrected in fiscal year 2013.  DHS budget officials agreed that DHS underreported its R&D spending  and when asked, could not provide a reason why the omission was not  flagged by DHS review.

In addition, within S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO, it is difficult to  identify all R&D funding because their R&D budget accounts fund  both  R&D and non-R&D investments. For fiscal year 2011, we estimated that  78 percent of S&T’s Research, Development, Acquisition, & Operations  account, 51 percent of DNDO’s “Research, Development, & Operations”  account, and 43 percent of the Coast Guard’s R&D budget account fund  R&D activities.  Figure 2 provides the various S&T, DNDO, and Coast  Guard budget accounts and budget activities and what percentage of  each account was obligated for R&D in fiscal year 2011.

DHS’s budget director recognized that spending in areas that cut across  the department, like R&D, are difficult to manage and told us that DHS  does not have oversight of R&D across the department. DHS is taking  some steps to address this, including identifying R&D as a budget line in  DHS’s proposed unified account structure, which was submitted to  Congress in the fiscal year 2013 budget for approval.

In 2007, we reported that appropriators rely on budget exhibits to inform  the decision to authorize and appropriate funds for many programs; thus,  accurate classifications of program and projects by budget activity are  needed for decision makers to readily understand how projects are  progressing and how money is being spent. Specifically regarding R&D,  we reported that decision makers use the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) budget reports, which detail a project’s stage of development, to  assess how much is being invested in fundamental science and  technology and to determine the future capabilities of U.S. military forces.

section_title: Policies and Guidance for Defining and Reporting R&D Could Improve Oversight
paragraphs: DHS does not have a departmentwide policy defining R&D or guidance  directing components how to report R&D activities. As a result, it is  difficult to identify the department’s total investment in R&D, which limits  DHS’s ability to oversee components’ R&D efforts and align them with  agencywide R&D goals and priorities. DHS officials told us that DHS uses  OMB’s definition of R&D, but the definition is broad and its application  may not be uniform across components, and thus, R&D investments may  not always be identified as R&D. For example, DHS officials told us that  test and evaluation is generally not considered R&D because the purpose  is to test how an existing technology fits into an operational environment.  However, S&T’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) told us that S&T reports  test and evaluation activities as part of its R&D budget authority.

Further, DHS officials told us that there is no distinct line between capital  investments and the R&D for technology development. For example,  NPPD officials told us they consider its cybersecurity system to be a  capital investment, and not R&D, but they consider R&D of new  technologies as an important aspect of this system. The variation in R&D  definitions may contribute to the unreliability of the reporting mechanisms  for R&D investments in budget development and execution, as discussed  above. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state  that policies and mechanisms are needed to enforce management’s  directives, such as the process of adhering to requirements for budget  development and execution and to ensure the reliability of those and  other reports for internal and external use. Additionally, we previously  reported that agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts  by defining and articulating a common outcome and establishing  compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across  agency boundaries. Such definitions could help DHS better identify its  R&D investment.

DOD FMR, DoD 7000.14-R, Volume 2B, Chapter 5. appropriation accounts for R&D activities. However, those reports include  R&D that is reported as R&D obligations in the budget process and do not  provide financial details for the R&D investments made by components  other than S&T, DNDO, and the Coast Guard, as described earlier in this  report.

The challenges DHS faces in managing its R&D efforts are similar to the  challenges the department has faced in managing its acquisitions. In  September 2008, we reported that DHS had not integrated the acquisition  function across the department and did not have adequate oversight of all  of its acquisition programs. DHS officials agreed with our findings and  the agency has taken steps to implement policies and guidance to ensure  that components follow consistent acquisition practices and that a  process exists to oversee acquisition programs, as outlined in Acquisition  Management Directive 102-01 (AMD 102-01). Officials at DHS’s  Program Accountability and Risk Management office (PARM) agreed the  department has not developed policies or guidance on how components  should define and oversee R&D investments and efforts. They stated that  they are in the process of updating AMD 102-01 to include additional  sections pertaining to nonacquisition investments and that such R&D  policy and guidance could be incorporated into such updates in the future.  (See App. IV for an illustration of how R&D supports all four phases of  DHS’s Acquisition Life Cycle as defined by AMD 102-01). Such an update  could establish policy and guidance for defining R&D consistently across  the department and outline the processes and procedures for overseeing  R&D, which would provide more oversight into the R&D investments  across the department.

section_title: S&T Coordinates Some R&D at DHS, but DHS R&D Is Fragmented and Overlapping, Increasing the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication
paragraphs: S&T has coordinated R&D efforts across DHS to some extent, but the  department’s R&D efforts are fragmented and overlapping, which  increases the risk of unnecessary duplication. We identified 35 instances  of overlap among contracts that DHS components awarded for R&D  projects, but did not identify instances of duplication among these  contracts. Additionally, DHS has not developed a policy defining who is  responsible for coordinating R&D and what processes should be used to  coordinate it, and S&T does not have mechanisms to track all R&D  activities at DHS. Developing a policy defining the roles and  responsibilities for coordinating R&D, and establishing coordination  processes and a mechanism to track all R&D projects could help DHS  mitigate existing fragmentation and overlap, and reduce the risk of  unnecessary duplication.
subsections: section_title: S&T Has Taken Some Actions to Coordinate R&D across DHS
paragraphs: The Homeland Security Act of 2002, among other things, requires that  S&T coordinate and integrate all research, development, demonstration,  testing, and evaluation activities within DHS and establish and administer  the primary R&D activities of the department. To carry out these  responsibilities, S&T developed coordination practices that fall into four  general categories: (1) S&T component liaisons, (2) R&D agreements  between component heads and S&T, (3) joint R&D strategies between  S&T and components, and (4) various R&D coordination teams made up  of S&T and component project managers.

S&T officials stated that one of the primary ways that S&T mitigates the  risk of overlap and duplication is through component liaisons staffed at  S&T and S&T officials staffed at component agencies. Component  liaisons became a primary coordination mechanism under the former  Under Secretary who requested a Coast Guard official to work at S&T as  a deputy division director. According to S&T officials, these component  liaisons have been integral to S&T’s coordination efforts. As of July 2012,  S&T had eight liaisons from TSA, CBP, ICE, NPPD, the Secret Service,  and the Coast Guard. In addition, S&T had seven employees detailed to  other components, including CBP, the Secret Service, DHS’s Office of  Policy, DHS’s Tactical Communications Program Office, DNDO, and  TSA, as well as two liaisons at FEMA and DHS’s Office of the Chief  Financial Officer. According to S&T, liaisons help S&T maintain  communication with components on R&D needs and related activities.  For example, CBP requested an S&T liaison to provide technical  expertise to its acquisition division. However, S&T does not have liaisons  with every component.

S&T signed agreements with two components—CBP and the Secret  Service—to help coordinate R&D activities. Under those agreements,  S&T is working with the components on high-level “Apex projects” that  are intended to solve components’ strategic operational problems within 2  years. For example, S&T and the Secret Service have an Apex project  called the Science and Technology Operational Research and  Enhancement project that was initiated in June 2010 to provide  technology solutions for the Secret Service to define, establish, and  document the near- and long-term R&D strategy for the protection of  national leaders, visiting heads of state and government, designated  sites, and national special security events. S&T officials stated that the  Apex project required development and testing of about seven  technologies which the Secret Service plans to incorporate into its  operations. As of July 2012, S&T officials reported that all seven  technologies were in the developmental stage and will undergo testing in  late 2012. For the CBP Apex project, S&T is overseeing the development  and evaluation of new technology and infrastructure to help CBP create  Secure Transit Corridors. S&T officials stated that, as of July 2012, the  project was on track to be completed in 1 year. S&T officials stated that it  can accommodate only three or four Apex projects at any given time  because of the time and resources required, but that it anticipates starting  future Apex projects with FEMA and ICE. As a result, these high-level  partnerships are not intended to address all customer needs at DHS.

Further, S&T provided us with three memorandums of agreement it  entered into with DHS components as a means to coordinate R&D efforts.  Specifically, S&T has agreements with CBP to develop a rapid response  prototype, the Coast Guard to develop a test bed, and TSA to coordinate  the transition of the Transportation Security Laboratory from TSA to S&T  which, was completed in 2006. S&T is also currently working with TSA on  an Aviation Security agreement that is to result in S&T supporting TSA in  various areas (as outlined in the agreement) and providing technology to  address capability gaps. S&T plans to initiate similar partnerships first  with CBP, then with ICE and FEMA.

S&T also works with DHS components to ensure that it meets their R&D  needs by signing technology transition agreements (TTA) to ensure that  components use the technologies S&T develops. S&T has 42 TTAs with  DHS components. For example, TSA agreed to integrate automated  intent detection technologies to better detect unknown threats before they  enter the country into its behavior detection-screening program once S&T  successfully demonstrated that the technologies met performance  requirements. Additionally, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service  (USCIS) agreed to deploy rapid DNA-based screening technologies to  determine kinship to use in the refugee and asylum eligibility  determination process upon S&T demonstrating that the technology  meets certain performance criteria. According to S&T officials, none of  these TTAs has yet resulted in a technology being transitioned from S&T  to a component.

In March 2011, S&T and TSA issued a joint R&D strategy for aviation  security that identifies TSA’s R&D priorities. That plan was a result of an  internal planning process that prioritized capability gaps and focused on  the work between TSA and S&T’s Explosives and Human  Factors/Behavioral Sciences Divisions. According to TSA officials, the  joint R&D strategic plan does not represent a TSA-wide R&D strategy  because it does not include surface transportation security capability  gaps. Rather, the officials said that TSA uses the National Infrastructure  Protection Plan and an R&D working group with S&T to identify those  capability gaps. S&T officials stated that it is currently updating its R&D  Strategy with TSA. S&T is also planning to work with the Secret Service,  CBP, ICE, and FEMA to build component-specific R&D strategies that are  linked to component acquisition programs.

S&T’s previous Under Secretary instituted the Capstone Integrated  Product Teams (IPT) process to coordinate R&D efforts between S&T  and components. IPTs served as S&T’s primary mechanism for  coordinating R&D and consisted of members from S&T and component  agencies. In S&T’s 5-year R&D plan for fiscal years 2008 through 2013,  S&T identified 12 IPTs, each of which was focused on a different topic  and brought together decision makers from DHS components and S&T,  as well as end users of technologies. Additionally, the IPT process  included teams to coordinate R&D at the project level among S&T and  components. IPTs solicited input from components to identify and  address technology gaps and needs and were intended to assist  operational units in making decisions about technology investments,  based on S&T’s understanding of technology and the state of applicable  technology solutions. For example, members of the cargo security IPT  determined that the capability gap that should be addressed was  enhancing cargo screening and examination systems through detecting  or identifying terrorist contraband items, like drugs or illegal firearms. As a  result, S&T identified CanScan, a nonintrusive inspection system as a  means for addressing that gap.

We interviewed directors of divisions responsible for coordinating R&D activities  throughout the department. These included Borders and Maritime Division, Chemical and  Biological Division, Cyber Security Division, Explosives Division, Human Factors/  Behavioral Sciences Division, and Infrastructure Protection Division. focus on components’ operational needs.directors, these new teams are not yet fully implemented and they are still  using established relationships with components through the IPT process  to identify components needs and coordinate R&D. Additionally, S&T still  maintains IPTs with TSA on surface transportation.

section_title: DHS R&D Is Fragmented and Overlapping, Increasing the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication
paragraphs: R&D at DHS is inherently fragmented because several components within  DHS—S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO—were each given R&D  responsibilities in law, and other DHS components may pursue and  conduct their own R&D efforts as long as those activities are coordinated  through S&T. Fragmentation among R&D efforts at DHS may be  advantageous if the department determines that it could gain better or  faster results by having multiple components engage in R&D activities  toward a similar goal; however, it can be disadvantageous if those  activities are uncoordinated or unintentionally overlapping or duplicative.

To illustrate overlap and the potential for unnecessary duplication, we  reviewed data on about 15,000 federal procurement contract actions  coded as R&D taken by DHS components from fiscal years 2007 through  2012. See appendix 1 for details on our methodology for identifying  overlap. Of those, we identified 50 R&D contracts issued by six DHS  components—S&T, TSA, FEMA, the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), the  Coast Guard, and CBP—that appeared to have similar activities with  another contract and interviewed component officials about those R&D  activities. We obtained 47 of those 50 contracts and reviewed their  statements of work. On the basis of that analysis and our interviews with  components, we identified 35 instances of overlap where components  awarded R&D contracts that overlapped with R&D activities conducted  elsewhere in the department. We also found that DHS did not have  tracking mechanisms or policies to help ensure that this overlap be  avoided and better coordinated. For example:

S&T awarded four separate contracts to develop methods of detecting  ammonium nitrate and urea nitrate for the counter-IED program. TSA  also awarded a contract to a private vendor to investigate the  detection of ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate-based  explosives. These contracts were similar in that they all addressed the  detection of the same chemical.

S&T awarded four separate contracts to develop advanced algorithms  for explosives detection, while TSA also awarded contracts to develop  algorithms to evaluate images for explosives. We determined that  these R&D contracts overlapped because both components were  involved in developing algorithms for explosives detection.

S&T awarded a contract to a private vendor for support and analysis  for seismic hazards, while FEMA also awarded a contract to a private  vendor to develop seismic guidelines for buildings in the event of an  earthquake. These contracts overlapped because they were both  similar in scope.

Although the contracts we selected overlapped, we determined that they  were not duplicative based on our analysis and our interviews with  component officials. For example, TSA officials stated that all TSA R&D  contracts we requested were initially awarded when TSA still conducted  transportation security-related R&D and were managed by the  Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL), which moved into S&T in  2006. As a result, TSA did not have oversight into those contracts.  Additionally, TSA officials stated that some of the contracts may have  overlapped in the scope of work but were focused on different operational  missions. S&T officials agreed with TSA, stating that some of this overlap  occurred during a period of time when TSA was still conducting R&D  through TSL and during a time when S&T did not have the level of  contract oversight that it has now. FEMA officials stated that FEMA’s  research projects are related to earthquake hazards, rather than to  multiple hazards like S&T’s research projects. They stated that FEMA’s  coordination with S&T is dependent on prior personal relationships rather  than through an established coordination process.

According to S&T officials, a process does not exist at DHS or within S&T  to prevent overlap or unnecessary duplication but that relationships with  components mitigate that risk. They also stated that S&T has improved  interactions with components over time. For example, S&T officials stated  that when CBP requested mobile radios to improve communication  among its field staff, S&T knew that the Secret Service and ICE were  already working in that area. To address this technology need, S&T  provided a senior official to lead the Tactical Communication Team to  address communication among different operational components and  better coordinate those efforts.

In conducting this analysis, we recognize that overlapping R&D activities  across similar areas may not be problematic. However, the existence of  overlapping R&D activities coupled with the lack of policies and guidance  defining R&D (as mentioned previously) and coordination processes is an  indication that not all R&D activities at DHS are coordinated to ensure  that R&D is not unnecessarily duplicative. As a result, DHS could  increase oversight of R&D, and improve coordination of R&D activities to  ensure that any duplication in R&D activities is purposeful rather than  unnecessary, as discussed later in this draft. Overlap and the associated  risk of unnecessary duplication occur throughout the government, as we   However, when  have reported previously, and are not isolated to DHS.coupled with consistent programmatic coordination, the risk of  unnecessary duplication can be diminished.

section_title: Policy and Tracking Mechanism Could Improve Coordination and Reduce Risk of Unnecessary Duplication
paragraphs: DHS and S&T do not have the policies and mechanisms necessary to  coordinate R&D across the department and reduce the risk of  unnecessary duplication. First, as noted earlier in this report, DHS does  not have the policies and guidance necessary to define and oversee R&D  investments across the department. While S&T has taken steps to  coordinate R&D, DHS has not developed a policy defining who is  responsible for coordinating R&D and what processes should be used to  coordinate it. Specifically, while S&T has R&D agreements with some  components, S&T officials rely on the former IPT process to coordinate  with components. For example, S&T division directors cited the IPT  process and personal relationships as the primary means to coordinate  R&D activities with components and generally felt that they were  coordinating effectively.

However, other component officials we interviewed did not view S&T’s  coordination practices as positively. Specifically, we interviewed six  components to discuss the extent to which they coordinated with S&T on  R&D activities. Four components stated that S&T did not have an  established process that detailed how S&T would work with its customers  or for coordinating all activities at DHS. For example, one component  stated that S&T has conducted R&D that it thought would address the  component’s operational need but, when work was completed, the R&D  project did not fit into the operational environment to meet the  component’s needs. In addition, without an established coordination  process, the risk for unnecessary duplication increases, because  components can engage in R&D activities without coordinating them  through S&T (see fig. 3).

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  policies and procedures ensure that the necessary activities occur at all  levels and functions of the organization—not just from top-level  leadership. This ensures that all levels of the organization are  coordinating effectively and as part of a larger strategy. Additionally,  internal control standards provide that agencies should communicate  necessary information effectively by ensuring that they are  communicating with, and obtaining information from, external  stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the agency achieving  its goals. DHS and S&T could be in a better position to coordinate the  department’s R&D efforts by implementing a specific policy outlining R&D  roles and responsibilities and processes for coordinating R&D.

Furthermore, S&T and DHS have not developed a mechanism to track all  ongoing R&D projects conducted across DHS components. Specifically,  neither DHS nor S&T tracks all ongoing R&D projects across the  department, including R&D activities contracted through the national  laboratories. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave DHS the authority  to use DOE laboratories to conduct R&D and established S&T’s Office of  National Laboratories (ONL) to be responsible for coordinating and using  the DOE national laboratories. Additionally, DHS Directive 143 further  directs ONL to serve as the primary point of contact to recommend  contracting activity approval for work by the national laboratories, and  review all statements of work issued from DHS and directed to the  national laboratories. According to S&T, the purpose of that review is to  ensure the proposed work is within the scope, and complies with the  terms and conditions, of the prime contract between DOE and the  national laboratories. We identified 11 components that reimbursed the  national laboratories for R&D between fiscal years 2010 and 2013, but  ONL could not provide us with any information on those activities and told  us it did not track them.information on activities across the department is limited by components  inconsistently operating within the DHS Directive 143 process for working  with the national laboratories. According to the Director of ONL, to identify  activities not reported through the DHS Directive 143 process, S&T uses  other means such as relationships with components and S&T, as well as  reviewing task orders sent to the laboratories from DHS, visiting  laboratories, and laboratories self-reporting their work to ONL.

According to S&T, ONL's ability to provide  We previously reported in 2004 that DHS faced challenges using DOE’s  laboratories and balancing the immediate needs of users of homeland  security technologies with the need to conduct R&D on advanced  technologies for the future. DHS agreed with our recommendation to  create a strategic R&D plan to identify and develop countermeasures to  chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist  threats and to ensure that it detailed how DHS would work with other  federal agencies to establish governmentwide priorities, identify research  gaps, avoid duplication of effort, and leverage resources. DHS noted that  such a plan was critical to the success of the department, and stated that  S&T would complete a strategic planning process in 2004 that would be  reviewed and updated annually. To date, DHS has not yet developed a  departmentwide strategic plan for managing R&D, although S&T has  developed its own plan.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that  controls are needed to provide reasonable assurance that, among other  things, reliable data are obtained, maintained, and fairly disclosed in  reports and agencies comply with laws and regulations. In addition, in  June 2010, we reported that R&D information should be tracked in a  consolidated database in order to fully coordinate cybersecurity R&D  activities to provide essential information about ongoing and completed  R&D. We recommended that the Director of the Office of Science and  Technology Policy (OSTP) direct its subcommittee on Networking and  Information Technology Research and Development to exercise its  leadership responsibilities by, among other things, establishing and using  a mechanism to keep track of federal cybersecurity R&D funding. OSTP  agreed with our recommendation. Additionally, we previously reported  that agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by,  among other things, agreeing on roles and responsibilities and developing  mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results.

DHS officials agreed that such mechanisms to track R&D activities were  necessary, and said they have faced similar challenges in managing  investments across the department. DHS has attempted to address those  challenges by, among other things, creating a database called the  Decision Support Tool that is intended to improve the flow of information  from component program offices to the DHS Management Directorate to  support its governance efforts. The Decision Support Tool could provide an example of how DHS could better track ongoing R&D projects  occurring in the department. DHS’s PARM officials stated that they  recently added new data fields to capture more detailed information on  component activities, such as additional financial data, at a low cost to  DHS, and that such data fields could be added to collect information and  track R&D activities across DHS, such as contracts with private  companies or universities and the associated costs. However, we  reported in March 2012 that DHS executives were not confident enough  in the data to use the Decision Support Tool to make acquisition  decisions, and that DHS’s plans to improve the quality of the data in this  database were limited. We also reported that DHS had limited plans to  improve the quality of the data because PARM only planned to check the  data quality in preparation for key milestone meetings in the acquisition  process. That could significantly diminish the Decision Support Tool’s  value, because users cannot confidently identify and take action to  address problems meeting cost or schedule goals prior to program review  meetings. As a result, improvements to the Decision Support Tool’s data  quality before expanding its use could improve the collecting and tracking  of R&D information and could be used as an example of how to better  track information occurring across components. DHS is taking actions to  address the limitations to the Decision Support Tool’s data quality by  working to validate the Decision Support Tool’s associated acquisition  data. A policy that defines roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D  and coordination processes, as well as a mechanism that tracks all DHS  R&D projects, could better position DHS to mitigate the risk of  overlapping and unnecessarily duplicative R&D projects.

section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Conducting R&D on technologies is a key component of DHS’s efforts to  detect, prevent, and mitigate terrorist threats and is vital to enhancing the  security of the nation. Multiple entities across DHS conduct various types  of R&D in pursuit of their respective missions, but DHS does not have a  department-wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing components  how to report R&D activities and investments. As a result, DHS does not  have the ability to maintain oversight of its total investment in R&D across  the department, which also limits its ability to oversee components’ R&D  efforts and align them with agencywide R&D goals and priorities.  Establishing policies and guidance for defining R&D across the  department and outlining the processes and procedures for overseeing  R&D would provide more oversight of R&D investments across the  department. Furthermore, DHS has taken some steps to coordinate R&D  efforts across the department, but does not have a cohesive policy  defining roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D and mechanisms  to track all DHS R&D projects. A policy that defines roles and  responsibilities for coordinating R&D and coordination processes, as well  as a mechanism that tracks all DHS R&D projects, could better position  DHS to mitigate the risk of overlapping and unnecessarily duplicative  R&D projects.

section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To help ensure that DHS effectively oversees its R&D investment and  efforts and reduces fragmentation, overlap, and the risk of unnecessary  duplication, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security  develop and implement policies and guidance for defining and overseeing  R&D at the department. Such policies and guidance could be included as  an update to the department’s existing acquisition directive and should  include the following elements: a well-understood definition of R&D that provides reasonable  assurance that reliable accounting and reporting of R&D resources  and activities for internal and external use are achieved, a description of the department’s process and roles and  responsibilities for overseeing and coordinating R&D investments and  efforts, and a mechanism to track existing R&D projects and their associated  costs across the department.

section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment.  DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix  V, and concurred with our recommendation. DHS also described actions  it plans to take to address the recommendation. Specifically, according to  DHS, it plans to evaluate the most effective path forward to guide uniform  treatment of R&D across the department in compliance with OMB rules  and is considering a management directive, multi component steering  committee, or new policy guidance to help better oversee and coordinate  R&D. DHS plans to complete these efforts by May 1, 2013. Such actions  should address the overall intent of our recommendation. However, it will  be important that whatever DHS chooses to do, its actions address the  specific elements we outlined in our recommendation, including  developing a definition of R&D, defining roles and responsibilities for  oversight and coordination, and developing a mechanism to track existing  R&D projects and investments.

DHS also provided written technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland  Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested  parties. This report is also available at no charge on GAO’s website at  http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix  VI.

section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
paragraphs: This report answers the following questions:  1.  How much does the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) invest  in research and development (R&D) and to what extent does it have  policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D  resources and efforts across the department? 2.  To what extent is R&D coordinated within DHS to prevent overlap,  fragmentation, and unnecessary duplication across the department?

To determine how much DHS invests in R&D and the extent that it has  policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources  and efforts across the department, we reviewed DHS’s budget and  congressional budget justifications to identify R&D investments reported  from fiscal years 2011 through 2013. We analyzed R&D budget authority,  outlays, and obligations included in budget submissions to the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB) reported for fiscal years 2010 through  2013. We also analyzed Science and Technology Directorate (S&T),  Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and Coast Guard budgets to  identify obligations for R&D funded by non-R&D budget activities as  identified in object class tables that present obligations by the items or  services purchased (e.g. personnel compensation and benefits,  contractual services and supplies, acquisition of assets, grants and fixed  charges). In addition, we assessed DHS’s management and oversight of  its R&D spending against criteria in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control  in the Federal Government.

We analyzed data from the Federal Procurement Data System Next  Generation (FPDS-NG) to identify R&D-related contracts across DHS for  fiscal years 2007 through 2011. We filtered these contracts to include  only those R&D stages coded as basic research, applied research, and  exploratory development and advanced development, which align more  closely with recognized definitions of R&D. We excluded the other four  stages (engineering development, operational systems development,  management/support, and commercialization) of R&D because these  activities are linked more closely to procurements rather than R&D  activities. We also analyzed data from the Department of Energy’s (DOE)  national laboratories from fiscal years 2010 through 2012 to identify how  much DHS components obligated for R&D-related work at the national  labs.

To determine the extent that R&D is coordinated within DHS to prevent  overlap, fragmentation, and unnecessary duplication, we

Reviewed component R&D plans and project documentation. We also  reviewed department and S&T division strategic plans.

Interviewed officials from DHS, DNDO, the Coast Guard, the  Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Office of Health  Affairs (OHA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the  National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), and the Secret  Service to discuss, among other things, their R&D efforts, R&D  budgets, and coordination with S&T. We interviewed DHS budget and  acquisition oversight officials to discuss how DHS oversees and  manages its R&D resources.

Interviewed S&T’s budget official and Homeland Security Advanced  Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) officials, including directors  from each of the six technical divisions, to discuss how they  coordinated with components and prioritized R&D resources.

Used a data-collection instrument to collect information on S&T R&D  projects, associated costs of R&D projects, and division customers  from each HSARPA director and interviewed the Director of S&T’s  Office of National Laboratories, responsible for coordinating S&T and  DHS’s R&D work conducted at the DOE national laboratories to  discuss DHS’s spending at and use of these laboratories.

Compared DHS’s coordination efforts against the relevant legislation  and criteria, including federal internal control standards as well as  GAO’s recommended practices for collaboration and coordination to  identify efforts to meet certain provisions and potential areas for  improvement.

To seek examples of potential overlap and duplication, we

Reviewed data on about 15,000 federal procurement contract actions  coded as R&D in the Federal Procurement Data System Next  Generation (FPDS-NG) made by DHS components from fiscal years  2007 through 2012 to identify contracts that were potentially  overlapping or duplicative of other contracts issued by different  components. This was the total number of DHS contract actions taken  from fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

Established 32 key words based on our knowledge of the likely areas  of overlapping R&D related to component missions in order to identify  areas where components may have issued contracts that were similar  in scope and to eliminate areas where duplicative activities were likely  to be present but acceptable (e.g., personnel support and  management services). We searched for the key words in the FPDS- NG data set to identify contracts containing the same key words  issued by more than one component.

Independently analyzed the contract descriptions and identified 50  R&D contracts issued by six components—S&T, the Coast Guard,  TSA, CBP, OHA, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency  (FEMA)—that appeared to overlap and interviewed officials from  those components to discuss the nature of those contracts.

Obtained 47 out of 50 contracts and analyzed each contract’s  statement of work and objectives to determine the type of R&D activity  and to identify whether each contract was overlapping or duplicative  of any of the other 46 contracts. Two analysts independently reviewed  each contract and then came to agreement regarding the presence of  overlap and duplication.

We could not determine the full extent of duplication or overlap in the  department, because the FPDS-NG data system captures only a portion  of the total R&D activities occurring at DHS and we did not review the  documentation for, or conduct a random sample of, all 15,000 R&D  contract actions. However, the results from our analysis illustrate overlap  and the potential for unnecessary duplication. We also used our past  work on fragmentation, overlap, and duplication across the federal  government; Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government;  and our prior reports to assess DHS’s coordination of R&D across the  department.

We assessed the reliability of the data we used by reconciling the data  with published data and applicable quality control procedures to maintain  the integrity of the data, and interviewing DHS budget and procurement  officials responsible for overseeing the data systems. In addition, we  reviewed available FPDS-NG documentation, such as the user manual,  and OMB guidance to identify related quality control mechanisms. We  also assessed the reliability of data on DOE’s national laboratory work for  others by interviewing DOE officials responsible for compiling and  reporting those data. We concluded that these data were sufficiently  reliable for the purposes of this report.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2011 through  September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government  auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the  audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable  basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We  believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

section_title: Appendix II: Federal Government Definitions of Research and Development
paragraphs: Basic research  Systematic study directed  toward fuller knowledge or  understanding of the  fundamental aspects of  phenomena and observable  facts without specific  applications toward processes or  products.

Applied research  Systematic study to gain knowledge or  understanding necessary to determine  the means by which a recognized and  specific need may be met.

Development  Systematic application of knowledge  or understanding, directed toward  the production of useful materials,  devices, and systems or methods,  including design, development, and  improvement of prototypes and new  processes to meet specific  requirements.

Systematic study to gain  knowledge or understanding of  the fundamental aspects of  phenomena and observable  facts without specific  applications toward processes or  products.

Systematic study to gain knowledge or  understanding necessary for  determining the means by which a  recognized and specific need may be  met.

Systematic use of the knowledge  and understanding gained from  research for the production of useful  materials, devices, systems, or  methods, including the design and  development of prototypes and  processes.

Research directed toward  increasing knowledge in science  with the primary aim being a  fuller knowledge or  understanding of the subject  under study, rather than any  practical application of that  knowledge.

The effort that (1) normally follows  basic research, but may not be  severable from the related basic  research; (2) attempts to determine  and exploit the potential of scientific  discoveries or improvements in  technology, materials, processes,  methods, devices, or techniques; and  (3) attempts to advance the state of  the art.

Systematic use of scientific and  technical knowledge in the design,  development, testing, or evaluation  of a potential new product or service  (or of an improvement in an existing  product or service) to meet specific  performance requirements or  objectives.

Systematic study directed  toward fuller knowledge or  understanding of the  fundamental aspects of  phenomena and observable  facts without specific  applications toward processes or  products.

Systematic study to gain knowledge or  understanding necessary to determine  the means by which a recognized and  specific need may be met.

Systematic application of knowledge  or understanding, directed toward  the production of useful materials,  devices, and systems or methods,  including design, development, and  improvement of prototypes and new  processes to meet specific  requirements. (1) Systematic study directed  toward greater knowledge or  understanding of the  fundamental aspects of  phenomena and of observable  facts without specific  applications toward processes or  precuts in mind. It is farsighted  high payoff research that  provides the basis for  technological progress. (2) Systematic study to understand the  means to meet a recognized and  specific need. Systematic expansion  and application of knowledge to  develop useful materials, devices, and  systems or methods. May be oriented,  ultimately, toward the design,  development, and improvement of  prototypes and new processes to  meet general mission area  requirements. Applied research may  translate promising basic research into  solutions for broadly defined military  needs, short of system development.

section_title: Appendix III: Department of Homeland Security Research and Development Obligations, Fiscal Year 2011

section_title: Appendix IV: Role of Research and Development in Supporting the Department of Homeland Security Acquisition Life Cycle

section_title: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

section_title: Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact

section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the contact named above, Chris Currie, Assistant Director,  and Gary Malavenda, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment.  Emily Gunn and Margaret McKenna made significant contributions to this  report. Also contributing to this report were Katherine Davis, Michele  Fejfar, Eric Hauswirth, Carol Henn, Richard Hung, Julia Kennon, Tracey  King, Nate Tranquilli, Katherine Trimble, and Sarah Veale.


Question-summary annotations: questions: question: What does the Department of Homeland Security currently lack?
answer: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not know the total amount its components invest in research and development (R&D) and does not have policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources across the department.
child_questions: question: What are the components of DHS that conduct R&D?
answer: According to DHS, its Science & Technology Directorate (S&T), Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and U. S. Coast Guard are the only components that conduct R&D and, according to GAO’s analysis, these are the only components that report budget authority, obligations, or outlays for R&D activities to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as part of the budget process.

question: What did GAO identify as R&D obligations by other DHS components?
answer: However, GAO identified an additional $255 million in R&D obligations by other DHS components. For example, S&T reported receiving $50 million in reimbursements from other DHS components to conduct R&D. Further, 10 components obligated $55 million for R&D contracts to third parties and $151 million to Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories for R&D-related projects, but these were not reported as R&D to OMB.
child_questions: question: How did DHS justify these misreported R&D investments?
answer: According to DHS, it is difficult to identify all R&D investments across the department because DHS does not have a department wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing components how to report all R&D spending and activities. As a result, it is difficult for DHS to oversee components’ R&D efforts and align them with agency wide R&D goals and priorities.

question: How can DHS improve their reporting of R&D activities?
answer: Developing specific policies and guidance could assist DHS components in better understanding how to report R&D activities, and better position DHS to determine how much the agency invests in R&D to effectively oversee these investments.

questions: question: What are the effects of S&T taking steps to coordinate R&D efforts across DHS?
answer: S&T has taken some steps to coordinate R&D efforts across DHS, but the department's R&D efforts are fragmented and overlapping, which increases the risk of unnecessary duplication.
child_questions: question: Why is R&D at DHS inherently fragmented?
answer: R&D at DHS is inherently fragmented because S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO were each given R&D responsibilities in law, and other DHS components may pursue and conduct their own R&D efforts as long as those activities are coordinated through S&T.

question: How does S&T coordinate its R&D efforts?
answer: S&T uses various mechanisms to coordinate its R&D efforts including component liaisons, component R&D agreements, joint R&D strategies, and integrated R&D product teams composed of S&T and component officials.

question: What flaws did GAO notice with the S&T coordination mechanisms?
answer: However, GAO identified 35 instances of overlap among contracts that DHS components awarded for R&D projects. For example, S&T and the Transportation Security Administration both awarded overlapping contracts to different vendors to develop advanced algorithms to detect the same type of explosive. While GAO did not identify instances of unnecessary duplication among these contracts, DHS has not developed a policy defining who is responsible for coordinating R&D and what processes should be used to coordinate it, and does not have mechanisms to track all R&D activities at DHS that could help prevent overlap, fragmentation, or unnecessary duplication. For example, S&T did not track homeland security-related R&D activities that DHS components contracted through DOE national laboratories from fiscal year 2010 through 2013; thus, it could not provide information on those contracts.

question: How could the DHS remedy its overlap, fragmentation, or duplication issues?
answer: Developing a policy defining the roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D, and establishing coordination processes and a mechanism to track all R&D projects could help DHS mitigate existing fragmentation and overlap, and reduce the risk of unnecessary duplication.

questions: question: Why is conducting R&D important?
answer: Conducting R&D on technologies for detecting, preventing, and mitigating terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the nation.

question: What has DHS done since its creation?
answer: Since its creation, DHS has spent billions of dollars researching and developing technologies used to support its missions including securing the border, detecting nuclear devices, and screening airline passengers and baggage for explosives, among others.

question: What components within DHS conduct R&D?
answer: Within DHS, S&T conducts R&D and is the component responsible for coordinating R&D across the department, but other components, such as the Coast Guard and DNDO, also conduct R&D to support their respective missions.

question: What was GAO asked to do?
answer: GAO was asked to identify (1) how much DHS invests in R&D and the extent to which DHS has policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources and efforts across the department, and (2) the extent to which R&D is coordinated within DHS to prevent overlap, fragmentation, or unnecessary duplication.
child_questions: question: How did GAO go about investigating the DHS?
answer: GAO reviewed information on DHS R&D budgets, contracts, and DHS spending on R&D at DOE national laboratories for fiscal years 2010 through 2012. GAO also reviewed DHS R&D plans and project documentation, and interviewed DHS headquarters and component officials.