Managing For Results: Agencies Should More Fully Develop Priority Goals under the GPRA Modernization Act
Released: 2013-04-19T00:00:00


Highlights: section_title: Why GAO Did This Study
paragraphs: GAO’s work has repeatedly shown that federal agencies must coordinate better to achieve common outcomes. The act established a more crosscutting and integrated approach to achieving results and improving performance, including a requirement that agencies identified by OMB establish APGs. The act directs GAO to review its implementation at several junctures; this report is part of a series doing so. This report (1) examines the extent to which 24 agencies identified by OMB implemented selected requirements related to 102 APGs, and (2) comments on the 21 APGs of five selected agencies, based on prior GAO and IG work, including the status of relevant open recommendations. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the act’s requirements for APGs, OMB guidance, APG information from Performance.gov and related agency documents; and interviewed OMB officials. GAO selected DHS, HUD, DOT, VA, and OPM for their variety of APG program types and linkage to CAP goals. For each agency, GAO reviewed its past work, as well as that of IGs, related to the APGs and updated the status of open recommendations.

section_title: What GAO Found
paragraphs: For 102 agency priority goals (APGs) for 2012 to 2013 that GAO reviewed, agencies implemented three GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (the act) requirements. Agencies identified (1) a target level of performance within a 2-year time frame; (2) how their APGs contribute to their strategic goals; and (3) an agency official responsible for achieving each APG. These represent important accomplishments, but information about other requirements is incomplete:

Agencies did not fully explain the relationship between APGs and crosscutting efforts. The act directs agencies to identify federal organizations, programs, and activities that contribute to each APG. Agencies identified internal contributors to their APGs, but did not identify external contributors for 34 of 102 APGs. In some cases the APGs appeared to be internally focused; however, in others GAO's work has shown there are external contributors, but none were listed. In addition, the act requires agencies to identify how, if at all, an APG contributes to any cross-agency priority (CAP) goals set by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Although 29 of 102 APGs appeared to support a CAP goal, only two described the link. When agencies do not identify external contributors or links to crosscutting efforts, it is unclear whether agencies are coordinating to limit overlap and duplication.

Most APGs had performance measures, but many lacked interim targets. The act requires agencies to develop quarterly targets for APGs if they provide data of significant value at a reasonable level of burden. However, OMB's guidance does not fully address this. Without interim targets when appropriate, agencies cannot demonstrate that they are comparing actual results against planned performance on a sufficiently frequent basis to address performance issues as they arise.

Agencies did not identify milestones with completion dates for many APGs. The act requires agencies to develop and publish milestones--scheduled events for completing planned actions--for their APGs. However, OMB's guidance does not direct agencies to provide specific completion dates for their milestones. For 39 of 102 APGs, agencies did not provide milestones with clear completion dates for the next quarter or the remainder of the goal period. Without milestones, agencies are unable to demonstrate that they have properly planned for the actions needed to accomplish their goals and are tracking progress.

Most agencies did not describe how APGs reflect congressional input. The act directs agencies to describe for each APG how input from consultations with Congress was incorporated. However, only one agency provided a description. Without transparency regarding congressional input, there is less assurance that meaningful consultations with Congress are occurring.

GAO commented on all 21 of the APGs from the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Transportation (DOT), and Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), based on past GAO and inspectors general (IG) work. The most frequent theme in the comments is that agencies continue to face the long-standing challenge of measuring performance and collecting accurate performance data.

section_title: What GAO Recommends
paragraphs: GAO makes recommendations to OMB to improve APG implementation by revising its guidance to better reflect interim target, milestone, and CAP goal alignment requirements; and ensure that agencies provide complete information about external contributors to their APGs and describe congressional input on APG development. OMB staff agreed with these recommendations.

section_title: Letter
paragraphs: Many of the meaningful results that the federal government seeks to  achieve, such as those related to protecting food and agriculture,  providing homeland security, and ensuring a well-trained and educated  workforce, require the coordinated efforts of more than one federal  agency and often more than one sector and level of government. Both  Congress and the executive branch have recognized the need for  improved collaboration across the federal government. Accordingly, in  January 2011 the almost two-decades-old Government Performance and  Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) was updated with the GPRA Modernization  Act of 2010 (GPRAMA or the act). The act establishes a new framework  aimed at taking a more crosscutting and integrated approach to focusing  on results and improving government performance. Effective  implementation of the act could play an important role in clarifying desired  outcomes, addressing program performance that spans multiple  organizations, and facilitating future actions to reduce unnecessary  duplication, overlap, and fragmentation. Furthermore, under GPRAMA,  agencies are to more frequently review and report the results they are  achieving, which could lead to improved performance if agencies take  more timely actions to address performance challenges as they arise.

Among other things, GPRAMA requires certain agencies, as determined  by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to develop a limited  number of agency priority goals (APGs) every 2 years. These goals are  to reflect the highest priorities of each selected agency, as identified by  the head of the agency, and be informed by broad crosscutting federal  government priority goals (also known as cross-agency priority or CAP  goals) as well as input from relevant congressional committees. In  implementing these goals under the act, agencies are to identify the  various federal organizations, programs and activities—both within and  external to the agency—that contribute to each goal, and review progress  on a quarterly basis. In February 2012, concurrent with the submission of  the President’s Budget, OMB published the 103 APGs developed by 24  agencies on a single, government-wide performance website— Performance.gov.additional information about the APGs as part of the site’s first update.  Going forward, the site is to be updated at least each quarter.

In December 2012, OMB and agencies provided  This report is part of our response to a mandate to assess initial  implementation of GPRAMA. Our specific objectives for this report were  to (1) examine the extent to which agencies implemented selected  planning and reporting requirements and leading practices related to  APGs; and (2) comment on the APGs of several selected agencies based  on our prior work and the work of relevant agency inspectors general  (IGs) and identify related open recommendations and matters for  congressional consideration. To address both objectives, we reviewed  information about the APGs published on Performance.gov in February  2012 and updated in December 2012, as well as the updated strategic  plans and performance plans agencies published in 2012 to reflect  GPRAMA requirements. To assess the reliability of data presented on  Performance.gov we reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed  OMB staff about data quality control procedures. We determined that the  data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. In addition,  to accomplish our first objective, we reviewed and assessed agencies’  implementation of selected GPRAMA planning and reporting  requirements for 102 of the 103 APGs. In addition to the requirements,  our assessment was also informed by the Senate committee report  accompanying GPRAMA, relevant OMB guidance, and our past work on  how to effectively implement GPRA. For our second objective, we  selected five of the 24 agencies that developed APGs—the Departments  of Homeland Security (DHS), Housing and Urban Development (HUD),  Transportation (DOT), and Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Office of  Personnel Management (OPM)—based on several factors, including the  number and variety of types of federal programs involved in achieving the  goals, such as direct service, grant, and regulatory programs, and  whether the APGs were related to any of the CAP goals. We then  reviewed the work that we and relevant IGs have conducted over a  number of years related to each of the 21 APGs developed by the five  agencies. Because the 21 APGs are a non-generalizable sample of all  APGs, our views on those APGs cannot be generalized to the entire  universe, but provide insights about each of the 21 APGs, as well as a  theme common to several APGs. We also updated the status of related  key open recommendations and matters for congressional consideration.  Appendix I provides additional information about our objectives, scope,  and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2012 to April 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.
subsections: section_title: Background
paragraphs: GPRAMA specifies that APGs are to have ambitious targets that can be achieved within a 2-year period; a clearly identified agency official, known as a goal leader, who is  responsible for achieving the goal;  clearly defined quarterly milestones; and  interim quarterly targets for performance measures, if more frequent  updates of actual performance provide data of significant value.

Other GPRAMA requirements provide additional information and context  for the priority goals. For example, agencies are to describe how their  APGs contribute to the agency’s long-term strategic goals,  as well as  any of the CAP goals developed by OMB, as applicable. This  information can help illustrate how an agency’s efforts to achieve its  priority goals fit within a broader, crosscutting context—both within the  agency and across the federal government. In addition, agencies are to  describe how they incorporated any input on their priority goals received  during consultations with relevant congressional committees.

GPRAMA also lays out a schedule for gradual implementation of its  provisions, with a 3-year period of interim implementation following  enactment in January 2011. It required agencies to identify their APGs  and related information in their strategic plans and performance plans,  published concurrently with the President’s Budget in February 2012.  Agencies also were to provide information about their APGs for OMB to  publish on Performance.gov by October 1, 2012, and agencies are to   OMB provided  update this information on at least a quarterly basis. guidance to agencies on implementing the act’s provisions, including  those related to APGs, in several memorandums and its annual Circular  No. A-11 in both 2011 and 2012.

In addition to OMB’s guidance, the Performance Improvement Council  (PIC) shared practices related to developing and implementing APGs with  agencies in 2011 and 2012. The PIC established the Goal Setting  Working Group in May 2011 to assist agencies in setting their 2012 to  2013 APGs. The group produced a draft guide to goal setting, which  included criteria for selecting priority goals as well as elements and  examples of effective goal statements. In September 2012, the PIC also  produced a draft best practices guide for developing milestones; the  guide described the characteristics of milestones and provided several  examples.

section_title: Agencies Have Made Progress Implementing Key Requirements for Priority Goals, but Some Information Is Incomplete
subsections: section_title: Agencies Have Implemented Several Requirements Related to Priority Goals
paragraphs: For each APG, agencies were required, by GPRAMA or OMB guidance,  to make available to OMB for publication on Performance.gov and in their  strategic plans or performance plans (1) a performance goal with a target  level of performance to be achieved in a 2-year time frame; (2) an  explanation of how the goal contributes to agency strategic goals; and (3)  the identification of an agency official as the goal leader responsible for  achieving the goal. Agencies provided information about each of these  requirements for all of the 102 APGs on Performance.gov included in our  assessment—which represents an important accomplishment in the  development of priority goals.

Figure 1 illustrates how information on Performance.gov for one of OPM’s  priority goals meets the three requirements. The full goal statement for  the APG provides a targeted level of performance to achieve  (“participation of at least 2 multi-state health plans in State Affordable  Insurance Exchanges”) within a 2-year timeframe (“by October 1, 2013”).  The layout of information on Performance.gov shows that this APG  supports OPM’s strategic goal to “Improve Access to Health Insurance,”  as part of its strategic objective to “contract with multi-state health plans  to be offered on affordable insurance exchanges.” Finally, information on  the site identifies OPM’s Director of Healthcare and Insurance as the goal  leader for this APG.

As an additional example, the Social Security Administration (SSA)  included information about each of its APGs in an appendix of its fiscal  year 2013 performance plan. As shown in figure 2, for SSA’s priority goal  to ensure faster hearing decisions, the plan provides the targeted level of  performance (“reduce the average time…to 270 days”) and the timeframe  (“by the end of fiscal year 2013”) in the “Priority Goals” column. In the  same column, SSA indicated that the goal is linked to performance  measure 1.1c, which supports the agency’s strategic goal “Deliver Quality  Disability Decisions and Services.” In the “Goal Leaders(s)” column, SSA  identifies the Executive Coordinator for Backlog Initiatives in the Office of  Disability Adjudication and Review.

SSA’s strategic plan for fiscal years 2013 to 2016 also identifies its APGs  and how each supports an agency strategic goal. Figure 3 provides a  table from the strategic plan that presents a list of goals that support each  of its strategic goals and denotes those that are APGs with an asterisk.

Our past work has shown that although the federal government faces a  series of challenges that in many instances are not possible for any single  agency to address alone, agencies often face a range of challenges and  barriers when they attempt to work collaboratively. Our annual reports  on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation highlight a number of areas  where a more crosscutting approach is needed—both across agencies  and within a specific agency.

We found that duplication and overlap  occur because programs have been added incrementally over time to  respond to new needs and challenges, without a strategy to minimize  duplication, overlap, and fragmentation among them. Also, there are not  always interagency mechanisms or strategies in place to coordinate  programs that address crosscutting issues, which can lead to potentially  duplicative, overlapping, and fragmented efforts. GPRAMA establishes a  new framework for taking a crosscutting and integrated approach to  improving government performance, and effective implementation of that  framework could play an important role in clarifying desired outcomes,  addressing performance that spans multiple organizations, and facilitating  actions to reduce unnecessary overlap, duplication, and fragmentation.

Two provisions in GPRAMA, in particular, direct agencies to link their  APGs with crosscutting federal efforts. First, the act requires agencies to  identify federal organizations, program activities, regulations, policies, and  other activities—both internal and external to the agency—that contribute  to each of their APGs and include this information in their performance  plans and provide it to OMB for publication on Performance.gov. In  addition, OMB’s 2012 guidance directs agencies to include tax  expenditures in their identification of organizations and programs that  contribute to their APGs, as part of their updates to Performance.gov.  Since 1994, we have recommended greater scrutiny of tax expenditures,  as periodic reviews could help determine how well specific tax  expenditures work to achieve their goals and how their benefits and costs  compare to those of programs with similar goals. Second, APGs are to  be informed by the CAP goals. The act also requires agencies to  demonstrate in their performance plans any alignment between their  performance goals—including their APGs—and the CAP goals. Both of  these provisions are important because they show how agencies are  coordinating efforts toward a common crosscutting issue. As we have  previously reported, uncoordinated program efforts can waste scarce  funds, confuse and frustrate program customers, and limit the overall  effectiveness of the federal effort.

Agencies identified at least one internal contributor for each of their  APGs, though agencies differed in the amount of detail they provided. For  example, the National Science Foundation (NSF), as shown in figure 4,  identified its Directorate of Engineering as a lead organization and its  Innovation Corps activities and programs as contributing programs to its  APG to increase the number of entrepreneurs emerging from university  laboratories.

DOT, in its fiscal year 2013 performance plan, organized the descriptions  of its planned performance—including its APGs—into broad themes  under its strategic goals. As shown in figure 5, DOT identified the  operating administrations, activities, enabling legislation, regulations, and  other resources that contribute to each theme.

Similarly, DOT identified on Performance.gov a range of contributing  programs to its APG to reduce the risk of aviation accidents (see figure  6).

Agencies identified external contributors for 73 of the 102 APGs. When  they did identify external contributors, agencies differed in the amount of  detail they provided. The Department of State (State), for instance,  identified in its fiscal year 2013 congressional budget justification external  contributors for six of the eight APGs it jointly developed with the U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID). These external  contributors are generally at the department/agency, component, or  program level, such as the Department of Defense (DOD), the  Department of Justice’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development  Assistance and Training, and the Department of Justice’s International  Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, respectively (see  figure 7).

Similarly, State and USAID identified on Performance.gov external  contributors to their APG to advance low emissions, climate-resilient  development, such as the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Forest  Service (a USDA component), the Environmental Protection Agency, and  international governmental and nongovernmental organizations (see  figure 8).

We did not verify that agencies included all relevant internal and external  federal contributors to their APGs. However, it was not always clear why  external contributors were not identified for 29 of the 102 APGs. In some  instances this could be explained by the goal being internally focused. For  example, the Department of the Interior listed no external contributors to  its internally-focused APG to “build the next generation of conservation  and community leaders by supporting youth employment” at the  department. However, our analysis indicates that 8 of the 29 APGs that  lack external contributors are related to crosscutting areas that we have  identified as at risk of potential fragmentation, overlap, or duplication.  For example, NSF did not list any external contributors to its APG to  develop a diverse and highly qualified science and technology workforce  by having 80 percent of institutions funded through NSF’s undergraduate  programs document the extent of use of proven instructional practices by  September 30, 2013. Our past work has identified 209 programs across  13 federal agencies that are focused on science, technology, engineering,  and mathematics education, some which may have efforts related to  those NSF is undertaking for this goal.

In addition, our in-depth examination of a sample of 21 APGs indentified  several APGs related to our work on fragmentation, overlap, and  duplication, including one where not all relevant contributors were  identified. As we have previously reported, HUD, USDA, and the  Department of the Treasury (Treasury) operate rental housing programs  with overlapping purposes, although the products, areas served, and  delivery methods differed, and recommended that further collaboration be  undertaken and documented in strategic plans and performance plans by  these agencies. HUD and USDA generally agreed with the recommendations; Treasury did not provide comments. As illustrated in  figure 9, HUD identified two tax expenditures (Treasury) as contributors to  its APG targeted at preserving affordable rental housing—the only APG  out of all 102 to have tax expenditures identified as external contributors.  However, HUD did not identify USDA or its rental housing programs.
subsections: section_title: Most Agencies Did Not State Whether Their Priority Goals Support Any CAP Goals
paragraphs: The Department of Commerce (Commerce) and State both have export- related APGs, and noted on Performance.gov that their APGs contribute  to the broader CAP goal to double U.S. exports by the end of 2014.  However, our analysis indicates that 27 additional APGs appear to  support at least one of the 14 interim CAP goals, but agencies did not  describe this connection. In part, this could be a result of OMB’s  guidance, which does not state the requirement for agencies to show the  alignment between their performance goals—including their APGs—and  the CAP goals. Instead the guidance directs agencies to refer to  Performance.gov, where the quarterly updates for the CAP goals will  describe how the agency’s goals contribute to the CAP goal. While in a  few instances CAP goals identified contributing APGs, this alignment was  not also provided in the corresponding APG information on the site. For  example, in the quarterly update published in December 2012, the export  CAP goal identified the export-related APGs of Commerce and State—as  well as that of USDA—as supporting the CAP goal’s strategies. Unlike  Commerce and State, USDA did not describe how its export-related APG  supports the broader export CAP goal. According to OMB staff, as the  information presented on Performance.gov and its functionality is  expanded and enhanced, they expect to cross-reference related pieces of  information, which they stated would include the connections between  APGs and any related CAP goals.

We have reported that communicating the relationship between individual  agency goals and outcomes that cut across federal agencies provides an  opportunity to clearly relate and address the contributions of alternative  federal strategies. In addition, as mentioned above, it is important for  agencies to identify areas in which they should be coordinating efforts to  meet crosscutting goals, and we have reported that strategic plans and  performance plans can be tools for doing so.

Without OMB guidance directing agencies to describe how their  performance goals—including APGs—support any relevant CAP goals,  agencies may not understand the importance of examining how their  efforts contribute to broader federal outcomes and planning for those  contributions. Similarly, although we did not analyze whether agencies  included all relevant internal and external contributors for their APGs, our  work on potential areas of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication helped  identify several examples where agencies did not list relevant external  contributors. In addition, OMB’s review process does not systematically  check whether agencies have identified all relevant contributors. This  raises questions as to whether larger issues exist with the completeness  of agencies’ listings of APG contributors. More importantly, without  complete information related to both of these requirements, it is unclear  whether agencies have properly planned to coordinate their efforts. As we  noted earlier, uncoordinated program efforts can waste scarce funds,  confuse and frustrate program customers, and limit the overall  effectiveness of the federal effort.

section_title: Agencies Generally Identified Performance Measures for Their Priority Goals, but Many Measures Did Not Have Related Targets for Measuring Interim Progress
paragraphs: As noted earlier, agencies are to define a target level of performance to  be achieved within a 2-year timeframe for each APG. GPRAMA requires  agencies to establish a set of performance measures (called performance  indicators in the act), which are used to assess progress toward each  goal, at least annually. The act also requires agencies to review and  report on progress toward their APGs on at least a quarterly basis. One  way agencies can gauge progress this frequently is through the  development of interim quarterly performance targets—that is, targets for  each quarter that falls within the 2-year period.interim targets for performance measures when more frequent updates of  actual performance would provide data of significant value to the federal  government, Congress, or program partners at a reasonable level of  administrative burden.

The Senate committee report that accompanied the bill that ultimately  was enacted states that the quarterly performance review requirement for  APGs is intended to increase the use of performance information to  improve performance and results. Our past work has shown that although agencies collect a significant amount of performance  information, they have not consistently used that information to improve  management and results. We have previously identified practices for  enhancing agency use of performance information, one of which is to  communicate performance information, including performance against  targets, frequently and effectively. Frequent, regular communication can  help managers to inform staff and other stakeholders of their commitment  to achieve the agency’s goals and to keep these goals in mind as they  pursue their day-to-day activities. Frequently reporting progress toward  achieving performance targets also allows managers to review the  information in time to make improvements. Without related targets,  agencies may be unable to demonstrate to key stakeholders, including  Congress, program partners, and the public, that they are tracking  progress frequently enough to address any performance issues related to  their APGs as they arise.

In the December 2012 update to Performance.gov, agencies identified  241 performance measures for gauging progress toward 91 of the 102  APGs. For the 11 APGs without performance measures, the agencies  stated that the goals are more appropriately measured by milestones.  Although OMB’s guidance strongly encourages agencies to use  quantitative measures, it allows agencies the flexibility to develop  qualitative goal statements that are supported by milestones to assess  progress. All 24 agencies have at least one APG with an accompanying  performance measure.

The frequency with which agencies collect performance information for  the measures varies, as illustrated in table 1. Agencies collect and report  results on a majority of the measures (166 out of 241, or 69 percent) on at  least a quarterly basis. Measuring and reporting results this frequently  represents substantial progress in agencies’ ability to use performance  information in a timelier manner to pinpoint and act on improvement  opportunities. Previously, GPRA required agencies to report their  performance on an annual basis.

Figure 10 illustrates one of the two measures the Department of Health  and Human Services (HHS) identified for its APG to increase the number  of health centers certified as Patient Centered Medical Homes. The  measure is the percent of health centers with at least one site recognized  as a Patient Centered Medical Home. HHS provided interim performance  targets for each quarter of the goal period, beginning with an interim  target of 4 percent in the first quarter of fiscal year 2012, with subsequent  targets increasing toward the final target of 25 percent by the fourth  quarter of fiscal year 2013. In addition, HHS reported its progress toward  those interim targets on a quarterly basis.

In other cases, agencies did not provide interim targets to show the level  of performance expected for each underlying measure. For a majority of  their measures (136 or 56 percent), agencies provided interim targets that  align with their measures (e.g. quarterly targets for quarterly measures for  each quarter during the 2-year period of the goal). For example, similar to  the HHS example above, for 90 measures agencies provided quarterly  targets to be achieved through the end of the goal period (fourth quarter  of fiscal year 2013) for each measure. But for 77 measures (32 percent),  agencies provided interim targets that align with their measures for only a  portion of the 2-year timeframe. Finally, for 28 measures (12 percent),  agencies did not provide interim targets that align with their measures for  any portion of the 2-year timeframe.

As previously stated, GPRAMA requires agencies to develop interim  quarterly performance targets for their measures if more frequent updates  of actual performance would provide data of significant value to the  federal government, Congress, or program partners at a reasonable level  of administrative burden. While OMB’s 2012 A-11 guidance provides a  definition of “reasonable administrative burden,” it does not define what  constitutes “data of significant value.” Therefore it may be unclear to  agencies when it would be appropriate to develop these targets.  Furthermore, the guidance does not mention the interim quarterly  performance target requirement. OMB staff told us that they expect  agencies to provide such targets, and that they have communicated this  expectation to agencies. OMB staff shared with us the user guide they  developed for agencies to input data for publication on Performance.gov.  According to the guide, indicators should include a target for each  reporting period.

section_title: Agencies Did Not Provide Milestones with Scheduled Completion Dates for Many Priority Goals
paragraphs: The act requires each APG to have clearly defined quarterly milestones— scheduled events signifying the completion of a major deliverable or a set  of related deliverables or a phase of work. Similar to performance  measures, OMB’s guidance states that milestones will follow fiscal year  quarters and notes that agencies may choose monthly milestones if  preferred. In addition, a draft guide developed by the PIC describes  characteristics of a good milestone, such as articulating concrete actions  to be taken and being time-bound.

Milestones can help agencies demonstrate that they have clear and fully  developed strategies and are tracking progress to accomplish their goals.  Such strategies, as identified in our past work, should (1) identify specific  actions agencies are taking or plan to take to carry out their missions, (2)  outline planned accomplishments, and (3) provide a schedule for their  completion. Milestones can help show the connection between  agencies’ day-to-day activities and their goals. In addition, by describing  the strategies to be used to achieve results, including clearly defined  milestones, and the resources to be applied to those strategies, agencies  can provide information that would help key stakeholders, including  Congress, better understand the relationship between resources and  results. Without clearly defined milestones, agencies may have difficulty  demonstrating that they have properly planned the actions needed, and  are tracking progress, to accomplish their APGs.

For 63 of the 102 APGs, agencies identified on Performance.gov clearly- defined milestones for both the near term (presented as “Next Steps,”  with a scheduled completion date in the next fiscal quarter) and longer  term (presented as “Future Actions,” covering the remainder of the goal  period). Figure 11 provides an illustrative example of an APG with both  near-term and longer-term milestones. For its goal to improve awareness  of VA services and benefits by increasing the timeliness and relevance of  online information available to veterans, service members, and eligible  beneficiaries, VA provided milestones scheduled for completion in the  second quarter of fiscal year 2013 (near term) and the fourth quarter of  fiscal year 2013 (the end of the goal period).

Agencies did not always identify the quarterly milestones they planned to  accomplish in order to achieve their APGs during the 2-year goal period.  Furthermore, the presentation of information about milestones on  Performance.gov does not always convey the time frames for expected  action. For the remaining 39 goals, agencies did not provide specific  completion dates in discussions of near-term or longer-term plans (or in  some cases both) for accomplishing the goal. As figure 12 illustrates, the  Small Business Administration (SBA) provided planned actions it intends  to take in the near term and longer term to help accomplish its APG to  process disaster applications efficiently. However, it is unclear when SBA  intends to complete these actions.

OMB’s 2012 A-11 guidance does not adequately reflect that clearly- defined milestones should have scheduled completion dates and be  publicly reported. The guidance states that APGs must have quarterly  milestones to track progress, and it outlines the time frames that near- term and longer-term milestones should cover. However, the guidance  does not state that agencies should provide specific completion dates for  their milestones. In addition, contrary to GPRAMA, the guidance also  states that agencies’ presentations of near-term milestones in the  quarterly updates on Performance.gov are optional. When we asked  OMB staff about this, they agreed that the designation of near-term  milestones as optional for the quarterly updates was an error in A-11  guidance; it should have been required. They told us they intend to  correct this error in the 2013 A-11 guidance. OMB staff further stated that  OMB has communicated to agencies that near-term milestones are to be  included in quarterly updates to Performance.gov in other ways. For  example, the Performance.gov user guide states that “agencies will  summarize how they plan to improve progress…and will include key  milestones planned” for the near term, as part of the “Next Steps” portion  of the APG information. Without clear and consistent guidance about  developing and publishing milestones with clear completion dates,  agencies may continue to omit key information about the actions they  plan to undertake to accomplish their goals.

section_title: Most Agencies Did Not Describe How Their Priority Goals Reflect Congressional Input
paragraphs: Only 1 of the 24 agencies that developed APGs described how those  goals reflect input from congressional consultations. GPRAMA states that  APGs are to reflect the highest priorities of the agency as determined by  the head of the agency and informed by consultations with Congress.  Agencies are to consult with their relevant appropriations, authorization,  and oversight committees when developing or making adjustments to  their strategic plans, including their APGs, at least once every 2 years.  Regarding this requirement, OMB’s guidance highlights that agencies  should specifically consult with Congress on priority goal issue areas, and  suggests agencies could start discussions of their next set of priority  goals in the context of providing Congress an update on progress on the  current APGs.

The act also requires agencies to describe how input provided during  congressional consultations was incorporated for each agency priority  goal on Performance.gov. In addition, agencies are to similarly describe  in their strategic plans how input from congressional consultations was  incorporated into their goals. Without this information, it will be difficult to  know whether an agency’s goals reflect congressional input, and  therefore if the goals will provide useful information for congressional  decision making.

In the December 2012 update to Performance.gov, agencies provided  information about how they engaged stakeholders during their goal  development processes. Although 19 agencies stated that they included  Congress as part of their stakeholder engagement, only SBA provided  information about the input it received on its APGs from those  consultations, as shown in figure 13.

Two agencies, DOD and DOT, broadly mentioned that congressional  input on agency goals was incorporated as appropriate. Education took a  different approach and provided information about how it engaged  stakeholders, including Congress in several instances, for each of its  APGs. However, none of these agencies provided specific information on  the input that was received or how it was incorporated.

Several agencies also provided broad descriptions of their consultations  in their strategic plans. For example, VA states in its plan that in  November 2011 it initiated the process for consulting with Congress  regarding the development of its agency priority goals and the VA  strategic plan. Additionally, in the SSA strategic plan, the agency  mentioned developing its plan in consultation with employees,  stakeholders, advisory groups, and Congress. However, in none of these  instances did agencies provide any further details about how these  consultations influenced their strategic plans, including their APGs.

OMB’s 2011 guidance, which covered the development of APGs for 2012  to 2013, stated that agencies should consult with Congress on priority   OMB staff told  goal issue areas, prior to submitting draft goals to OMB.us that agencies formed a working group on consultations and OMB staff  worked with agencies on how to do the consultations well. However, OMB  staff also told us that agencies were generally not comfortable publishing  the input they received from Congress during their consultation for a  variety of reasons, such as a reluctance to characterize competing or  conflicting congressional interests.

However, without such information, it is unclear that agencies have  adequately engaged Congress and appropriately incorporated  congressional feedback into their APGs. The consultation process was  established by GPRA in 1993 so that agencies could take congressional  views into account as appropriate. But as noted in the Senate committee  report that accompanied the bill that ultimately became GPRAMA, little  evidence existed that agencies had formally or significantly considered  the input of key stakeholders when developing goals. The requirement for  agencies to describe how congressional input was incorporated into their  goals was intended to strengthen the consultation process.

Our past work has noted the importance of considering Congress a  partner in shaping agency goals.  Successful consultations can create a  basic understanding among stakeholders of the competing demands that  confront most agencies, the limited resources available to them, and how  those demands and resources require careful and continuous balancing.  We have also reported that agency consultations with Congress on the  identification of priority goals presents an opportunity to develop such an  understanding, especially given Congress’s role in setting national   Although  priorities and allocating the resources to achieve them.constructive communication across the branches of government can  prove difficult, it is essential for sustaining federal performance  improvement efforts. Consultations provide an important opportunity for  Congress and the executive branch to work together to ensure that  agency missions are focused; goals are specific, results-oriented, and  address congressional concerns about performance; and strategies and  funding expectations are appropriate and reasonable.

section_title: Past Audit Work Provides Perspective on Selected Agencies’ Capacities to Achieve Their Priority Goals
paragraphs: Our prior audit work and in some instances that of relevant agency  inspectors general provide additional perspective on the capacity of DHS,  DOT, HUD, OPM, and VA to achieve their APGs. Our comments on each  of these goals can be found in Appendixes II (DHS), III (HUD), IV (DOT),  V (VA), and VI (OPM). Given the breadth of issues dealt with by these  goals, our comments for each goal cover a range of topics.

Despite this variation, several goals suggested that agencies continue to  grapple with a common challenge from our past work related to  measuring progress toward their goals and ensuring that the related  performance data are accurate. For example, related to both HUD’s and  VA’s APGs to assist in housing and reducing the number of homeless  veterans, we have previously reported that HUD and VA lack key data on  the population of homeless women veterans, including their  characteristics and needs. This hampers VA’s ability to plan services  effectively. In December 2011, we recommended that HUD and VA  should collaborate to ensure appropriate data are collected and use these  data to strategically plan for services. VA concurred with this  recommendation and, in April 2013, stated that it had taken additional  actions to inform policy and operational decisions about homeless and at- risk women veterans. For example, VA stated that it worked with HUD to  ensure that gender specific data were collected during the 2013 Point in  Time count of homeless persons. In another example related to DOT’s  APG to reduce roadway fatalities, our past work has indicated that the  quality of state traffic safety data systems varied across the six data  systems maintained by states. In April 2010, we recommended that the  National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) take steps to  ensure that traffic records assessments provide an in-depth evaluation  that is complete and consistent in addressing quality across all state  traffic safety data systems. In response, NHTSA has taken a number of  steps intended to improve the quality of the assessments and the data  systems, and as of spring 2013, these efforts continue.

section_title: Conclusions
paragraphs: Many of the meaningful results that the federal government seeks to  achieve cannot be realized without effective coordination and  collaboration both within and across agencies. Recognizing this,  Congress and the executive branch established a new crosscutting and  integrated approach for focusing on results and improving government  performance with the passage and enactment of GPRAMA. The act’s  requirements related to the development of APGs, along with more  frequent reviewing and reporting of progress towards them, have the  potential to address crosscutting and other federal performance  management challenges our past work has identified.

OMB and the PIC provided significant support to agencies during their  development of APGs. For example, in 2011 and 2012, OMB developed  and provided to agencies detailed guidance and memorandums to  explain GPRAMA’s requirements and OMB’s expectations for APGs. In  addition, the PIC formed the Goal Setting Working Group to assist  agencies in setting their 2012 to 2013 APGs, and developed draft guides  related to selecting APGs and developing milestones. Given these past  efforts, both OMB and the PIC will have an important role moving forward  to help ensure that agencies fully develop their APGs.

Agencies have implemented key provisions related to their APGs.  However, they have not always provided information about coordination  and collaboration for crosscutting efforts. Agencies also did not always  identify external contributors to their APGs. OMB’s review process for  publishing APG information on Performance.gov checks to make sure  agencies have identified at least one contributor, but it does not verify that  agencies have identified all appropriate contributors. In addition, most  agencies did not describe how their APGs contribute to CAP goals.  OMB’s guidance does not adequately reflect that agencies should  describe this linkage. Revised guidance could help ensure that agencies  are aware of this requirement and provide information accordingly.  Further, without providing information about external contributors or how  APGs contribute to CAP goals, it is unclear whether agencies have  adequately planned to address performance that spans multiple  organizations, thereby putting these efforts at risk for duplication, overlap,  and fragmentation and potentially wasting scarce funds and limiting the  effectiveness of federal efforts.

The requirement for agencies to review progress made toward their APGs  on a quarterly basis is intended to increase agencies’ use of the  significant amount of performance information they collect. This, in turn,  can help agencies to improve their performance and results in a more  timely manner—a challenge our work has previously highlighted.  Agencies generally developed performance measures, and collect  information more frequently than in the past. This shows promise for their  ability to use this information to support more timely decision making,  especially when improvements are needed. However, agencies did not  always identify related interim performance targets. This could be  because OMB’s A-11 guidance does not mention the interim quarterly  performance target requirement or define when it would provide data of  significant value and therefore be required, although other OMB guidance  directs agencies to develop these targets. By revising its guidance  documents to consistently include this information, OMB could help  ensure that agencies are meeting its expectation (and the requirement)  that agencies identify interim performance targets for their APGs when  doing so would provide data of significant value. Without clear targets,  which enable a comparison of results against planned performance, it is  unclear if agency managers have the information they need to determine  if they are making sufficient progress toward each APG—a practice our  past work has shown can actually lead to increased use of information  and improved results. In addition, by not providing targets, key  stakeholders have little assurance that an agency is actively managing its  performance to make progress towards its APGs on a quarterly basis,  thereby limiting oversight and accountability opportunities.

GPRAMA requires agencies to develop clearly defined quarterly  milestones for their APGs, which can help demonstrate that agencies  have identified concrete actions needed to accomplish their goals and  when those actions should be taken. However, agencies did not  consistently publish milestones with scheduled completion dates, thereby  missing an opportunity to assure the public and key stakeholders that  they have appropriate strategies in place to achieve their APGs. Although  OMB’s 2012 A-11 guidance directs agencies to develop quarterly  milestones for their APGs and outlines near-term and longer-term  timeframes those milestones should cover, the guidance does not state  that agencies should provide specific completion dates for their  milestones. In addition, the guidance does not adequately reflect that  GPRAMA requires these milestones to be published on Performance.gov  due to an error. Although OMB has provided additional direction to  agencies about publishing milestones, revising its A-11 guidance to  correct the error would ensure that its direction to agencies is consistent  and clear.

Agencies should consult with Congress as a partner in developing their  goals, in part to ensure that the resulting performance information is  useful for congressional and executive branch decision making. Agencies’  consultations with Congress on their APGs provide opportunities for both  parties to gain a better understanding of the competing demands that  both confront and how those demands and limited resources require  careful and continuous balancing. However, most agencies did not  provide information about how they incorporated any views or  suggestions obtained through congressional consultations when  developing their goals. This lack of information leaves it unclear as to  whether agencies made serious attempts to engage with Congress on  identifying the agencies’ highest priorities for improved performance.

section_title: Recommendations for Executive Action
paragraphs: To ensure that agencies fully develop their APGs, we make the following  seven recommendations to the Director of OMB.

To ensure that agencies can (1) compare actual results to planned  performance on a more frequent basis, as appropriate, and (2)  demonstrate how they plan to accomplish their goals as well as contribute  to the accomplishment of broader federal efforts, we recommend the  Director of OMB revise relevant guidance documents to provide a definition of what constitutes “data of significant value;” direct agencies to develop and publish on Performance.gov interim  quarterly performance targets for their APG performance measures  when the above definition applies; direct agencies to provide and publish on Performance.gov  completion dates, both in the near term and longer term, for their  milestones; and direct agencies to describe in their performance plans how the  agency’s performance goals—including APGs—contribute to any of  the CAP goals.

When such revisions are made, we recommend the Director of OMB work  with the PIC to test and implement these provisions.

In addition, as OMB works with agencies to enhance Performance.gov to  include additional information about APGs, we recommend that the  Director of OMB ensure that agencies adhere to OMB’s guidance for  website updates by providing  complete information about the organizations, program activities,  regulations, tax expenditures, policies, and other activities—both  within and external to the agency—that contribute to each APG; and a description of how input from congressional consultations was  incorporated into each APG.

section_title: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
paragraphs: We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Director  of OMB and the five agencies covered by our in-depth review of APGs  (DHS, DOT, HUD, VA, and OPM). All six agencies provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

In oral comments, staff from OMB’s Office of Performance and Personnel  Management agreed with the recommendations in our report.

In its written comments, reproduced in appendix VII, VA concurred with  the conclusions of our report and provided additional information about its  strategic plan, and related performance measurement efforts, to reduce  its backlog of compensation claims. However, as VA acknowledges in its  comments, the plan does not provide individual performance goals and  metrics for all initiatives, which we believe are necessary for VA to ensure  it is spending its limited resources on proven methods to speed up  disability claims and appeals processes.

We also sought comments from relevant agencies covered by the  illustrative examples used in this report. We received such comments  from Commerce, NSF, SBA, State, and USAID, and incorporated them as  appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Acting Director of OMB and  the heads of the 24 agencies that developed APGs as well as interested  congressional committees and other interested parties. This report will  also be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-6806, or mihmj@gao.gov. Specific questions about our  comments on the sample of APGs contained in appendixes II through VI  may be directed to the contact listed for each goal. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of our report. Key contributors to this report are listed in  appendix VIII.

section_title: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope & Methodology
paragraphs: The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) requires us to review  the act’s implementation at several critical junctures, and this report is  part of a series of reviews planned around the requirement. Our specific  objectives for this report were to (1) examine the extent to which agencies  have implemented selected planning and reporting requirements and  leading practices related to agency priority goals (APG); and (2) comment  on the priority goals of several selected agencies based on our prior work  and that of relevant agency inspectors general (IGs) and identify our  relevant open recommendations and matters for congressional  consideration.

To address both objectives, we reviewed information about the APGs  published on Performance.gov in February 2012 and updated in  December 2012, as well as the updated strategic plans and performance  plans agencies published in 2012 to reflect GPRAMA requirements. To  assess the reliability of information presented on Performance.gov we  reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed Office of Management  and Budget (OMB) staff about data quality control procedures. We  determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this  report.

In addition, for the first objective, we reviewed and assessed the  implementation of selected planning and reporting requirements for 102  of the 103 APGs developed by the 24 agencies selected by OMB and that  were released concurrently with the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget  on Performance.gov.requirements we used to assess implementation included whether the  goal: (1) supports a federal government priority goal (also known as  cross-agency priority or CAP goals); (2) contributes to agency strategic  goals; (3) reflects input from congressional consultations; (4) identifies the  federal organizations, program activities, regulations, policies, and other  activities—both within and external to the agency—that contribute to the  APG; (5) has a clearly identified agency official as the goal leader; (6) has  targets for a 2-year timeframe; (7) has interim quarterly targets; and (8)

The key GPRAMA planning and reporting  has clearly defined quarterly milestones. In addition to the requirements  of GPRAMA, our assessment of the extent of implementation was also  informed by the Senate committee report accompanying GPRAMA,  relevant OMB guidance, and our past work on how to effectively  implement GPRA.

To address the second objective, we selected 5 of the 24 agencies that  developed APGs—the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS),  Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Transportation (DOT), and  Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)— based on several factors, including the number and variety of types of  federal programs involved in achieving the goals, such as direct service,  grant, and regulatory programs, and whether the APGs were related to  any of the CAP goals. We then reviewed the work that we and relevant  IGs have conducted over a number of years related to each of the 21  APGs developed by the 5 agencies. Because the 21 APGs are a non- generalizable sample of all APGs, our views on those APGs cannot be  generalized to the entire universe but provided insights about each of the  21 APGs, as well as a theme common to several APGs. We also updated  the status of related key open recommendations and matters for  congressional consideration  We conducted our performance audit from July 2012 to April 2013 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives.

section_title: Appendix II: Comments on the Department of Homeland Security’s Priority Goals
paragraphs: Based on our past work, as well as that of the DHS IG, we commented on  each of DHS’s three priority goals for 2012 to 2013:  1.  Ensure resilience to disasters by strengthening disaster preparedness  and response capabilities. By September 30, 2013, every state will  have a current, DHS-certified threat, hazard, identification and risk  assessment (THIRA).  2.  Improve the efficiency of the process to detain and remove criminal  aliens from the United States. By September 30, 2013, reduce the  average length of stay in immigration detention of all convicted  criminal aliens prior to their removal from the country by 5 percent.  3.  Strengthen aviation security counterterrorism capabilities by using  intelligence driven information and risk-based decisions. By  September 30, 2013, the Transportation Security Administration will  expand the use of risk-based security initiatives to double the number  of passengers going through expedited screening at airports, thereby  enhancing the passenger experience.

For each goal, we also identify our related past reports and provide an  update on the status of any open recommendations and matters for  congressional consideration that we previously made related to the goal.  We also identify a GAO contact for our work related to each goal.
subsections: section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Ensure resilience to disasters by strengthening disaster preparedness  and response capabilities. By September 30, 2013, every state will have  a current, DHS-certified threat, hazard, identification, and risk  assessment.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: Our past work has identified a number of challenges DHS faces in  achieving its goal of strengthening disaster preparedness and response  capabilities including challenges associated with efforts to measure  national preparedness capabilities and assess the impact of  preparedness grant funding. These efforts involve the Federal Emergency  Management Agency’s (FEMA) preparedness grants.

FEMA provides state and local governments with funding in the form  of grants to enhance the capacity of state and local emergency  responders to prevent where possible, respond to, and recover from  natural disasters and terrorism incidents involving chemical, biological,  radiological, nuclear, or explosive devices, or cyber attacks. States and  urban areas are required to conduct a THIRA as a condition of receiving  preparedness grant funding under programs including the State  Homeland Security Program, Emergency Management Performance  Grant Program and Urban Area Security Initiative grant program.

Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Threat and  Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide Comprehensive Preparedness Guide  (CPG) 201 First Edition, (Washington, D.C., April 2012.) completed their THIRAs. FEMA granted 6-month extensions to the  December 31, 2012, deadline for five states and three local urban areas  affected by Hurricane Sandy in late October 2012.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In March 2011, we suggested that Congress may wish to consider limiting  preparedness grant funding to maintaining existing capabilities (as  determined by FEMA) until FEMA completes a national preparedness  assessment of capability gaps at each level of government based on  tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to enable prioritization of  grant funding. In April 2011, Congress passed the Continuing  Appropriations Act that reduced funding for FEMA preparedness grants  by $875 million from the amount requested in the President’s fiscal year  2011 budget. In December 2011, Congress passed the Consolidated  Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2012 that reduced funding for FEMA  preparedness grants by $1.28 billion from the amount requested in the  President’s fiscal year 2012 budget.

In March 2011, we also suggested that FEMA should complete a national  preparedness assessment of capability gaps at each level based on  tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to enable prioritization of  grant funding, and FEMA could identify the potential costs for establishing  and maintaining those capabilities at each level and determine what  capabilities federal agencies should provide. In June 2012, the DHS OIG  reported that FEMA did not have a system in place to determine the  extent that Homeland Security Grant Program funds enhanced the states’  capabilities to prevent, deter, respond to, and recover from terrorist  attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies before awarding more  funds to the states. As of March 2013, FEMA has not yet completed a  national preparedness assessment of capability gaps at each level.  According to FEMA officials, the urban area, state, territorial, and tribal  nation THIRAs that were due December 31, 2012 will serve as the basis  for assessing national preparedness capabilities and gaps. FEMA will  coordinate the review and analysis by a THIRA Analysis and Review  Team. The team has begun meetings to discuss the common themes and  findings and develop an initial proposed list of priorities for building and  sustaining the core capabilities and update the proposed list of priorities  as needed. These actions are part of the overall process for THIRA  analysis and review, which FEMA officials said will help them develop  guidance for developing capabilities to meet national priorities.

In July 2009, we recommended that the FEMA Administrator should  develop and implement measures to assess how regional collaboration  efforts funded by Urban Area Security Initiative grants build preparedness  capabilities. FEMA contracted the National Academy of Public  Administration to provide recommendations for quantifiable performance  measures to assess the effectiveness of the State Homeland Security  Program and Urban Area Security Initiative grants. The National  Academy of Public Administration issued its report in October 2011 and  FEMA released the report in April 2012. The report recommends that  FEMA conduct an assessment of collaborative approaches, in  coordination with local jurisdictions, states, regions, and urban areas, and  use the results to develop a scoring system for future quantitative or  qualitative performance measures on collaboration. As of March 2013,  FEMA has not yet taken action in response to this recommendation.  However, according to FEMA officials, the THIRA process, along with  planned coordination meetings with urban area, state, tribal, and territorial  officials will likely result in data that they can use to develop collaboration- related performance metrics.

FEMA indentified the “percent of high priority core planning capabilities  rated as proficient by states and territories” as a measure of the agency’s  progress in achieving its priority goal. This measure reports the percent of  high priority core capabilities related to planning that states and territories  rate as proficient. According to FEMA, this information is gathered from  the SPRs (annual self-assessments by states and territories of their levels  of preparedness.) However, as we reported in October 2010, FEMA  officials stated, while the SPRs had enabled FEMA to gather data on the  progress, capabilities, and accomplishments of a state’s, the District of  Columbia’s, or a territory’s preparedness program, these reports include  self-reported data that may be subject to interpretation by the reporting  organizations in each state and not be readily comparable to other states’  data. The officials also stated that they had taken steps to address these  limitations, for example by creating a web-based survey tool to provide a  more standardized way of collecting state preparedness information that  will help them validate the information by comparing it across states.  However, since April 2009, FEMA has made limited progress in  assessing preparedness and capabilities and has not yet developed  national preparedness capability requirements based on established  metrics to provide a framework for these assessments, as we reported in  March 2012.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress in Improving Grant  Management and Assessing Capabilities, but Challenges Remain. GAO- 13-456T. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2013.

Managing Preparedness Grants and Assessing National Capabilities:  Continuing Challenges Impede FEMA’s Progress. GAO-12-526T.  Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2012.

Follow-up on 2011 Report: Status of Actions Taken to Reduce  Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentation, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance  Revenue. GAO-12-453SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

Government Operations: Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in  Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue.  GAO-11-318SP. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2011.

FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Efforts to Develop and Implement a  System to Assess National Preparedness Capabilities. GAO-11-51R.  Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2010.

Urban Area Security Initiative: FEMA Lacks Measures to Assess How  Regional Collaboration Efforts Build Preparedness Capabilities.  GAO-09-651. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2009.

National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to  Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts.  GAO-09-369. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues,  caldwells@gao.gov, (202) 512-8777.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Improve the efficiency of the process to detain and remove criminal aliens  from the United States. By September 30, 2013, reduce the average  length of stay in immigration detention of all convicted criminal aliens prior  to their removal from the country by 5 percent.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: Our past work does not provide a basis to assess DHS’s ability to  improve the efficiency of the process to detain and remove criminal aliens  from the United States. DHS has reported progress toward achieving this  priority goal since fiscal year 2010. The DHS annual performance report  for fiscal years 2011 to 2013—which also serves as the agency’s annual  performance plan—showed that the agency reduced the length of stay in  detention of all convicted criminal aliens prior to removal from the United  States from 37 days in fiscal year 2010 to 34.7 days in fiscal year 2011.  This represents a decline of over 6 percent compared to the priority goal  target to reduce the length of stay by 5 percent. DHS attributed this  decrease in part to expanded detention capacity in locations where  detainee transfers occur most often, as the need to transfer a detainee  from a facility in one location to another location increased the average  length of stay by approximately 14 days. The DHS strategic plan for fiscal  years 2012 to 2016 shows planned targets to maintain the same number  of days (35) in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2016. Similarly, the DHS  annual performance report for fiscal years 2011 to 2013 shows the same  planned target of less than or equal to 35 days for both fiscal year 2012  and fiscal year 2013. DHS reported that it continues to focus on the  development of a detention system that has the right number and type of  facilities in the right locations to align with enforcement and removal  activities. DHS reported making improvements in prior years, but noted  that various challenges, such as case backlogs, could inhibit success in  achieving further improvements in length of stay requirements. For  example, maintaining the average length of stay for criminal aliens at, or  slightly below, 35 days in the long term may require the hiring of  additional immigration judges, according to DHS.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: We currently have no open recommendations or matters for  congressional consideration related to this priority goal.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: We currently have no reports related to this priority goal.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues,  gamblerr@gao.gov, (202) 512-6912.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Strengthen aviation security counterterrorism capabilities by using  intelligence driven information and risk-based decisions. By September  30, 2013, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will expand  the use of risk-based security initiatives to double the number of  passengers going through expedited screening at airports, thereby  enhancing the passenger experience.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: TSA’s goal is stated in broad terms; consequently, quantitatively  measuring progress toward meeting the goal of strengthening aviation  security counterterrorism capabilities will be a challenge. Further, the  stated performance measure, with its focus on expedited passenger  screening, will not allow TSA to assess its progress in using intelligence  driven information and risk-based decisions to meet this goal in other  related areas, such as in screening checked baggage or air cargo. TSA,  as a component of DHS, relies upon multiple layers of security to deter,  detect, and disrupt persons posing a potential risk to aviation security.  These layers focus on screening millions of passengers and pieces of  carry-on and checked baggage, as well as tons of air cargo, on a daily  basis. Our past work has analyzed TSA’s progress in implementing these  security measures and identified challenges it has encountered in  implementing cost-effective aviation security programs and measuring  performance.

To help achieve its priority goal of strengthening aviation security  counterterrorism capabilities by using intelligence driven information and  risk-based decisions, TSA officials stated that the agency will, among  other steps, expand the use of its new “TSA Pre✓™” program to double  the number of passengers going through expedited screening at airports  by September 30, 2013. TSA introduced TSA Pre✓™ in October 2011,  and plans on expanding it to 40 airports by March 2013. Based on current  participation, frequent flyers of five airlines as well as individuals enrolled  in other departmental trusted traveler programs—where passengers are  pre-vetted and deemed a trusted traveler—are eligible to be screened on  an expedited basis. This program is intended to allow TSA to focus its  resources on higher risk travelers. Agency officials have reported that  with the deployment of this program and other risk-based security  initiatives, such as modifying screening procedures for passengers 75  and over and active duty service members, TSA has achieved its stated  goal of doubling the number of passengers going through expedited  screening. According to TSA, by the end of calendar year 2013, TSA will  provide expedited screening to 25 percent of the individuals currently  processed through security screening. Achieving this target will mean that  approximately 450,000 of the 1.8 million passengers who travel on  average each day from the nation’s airports will undergo some form of  expedited screening. However, since this goal is focused on passenger  screening, it will not allow TSA to assess its progress in using intelligence  driven information and risk-based decisions in other areas to achieve the  broader outcome of strengthening aviation security counterterrorism  capabilities, such as in screening checked baggage or air cargo. We plan  to initiate a review of TSA’s progress in implementing TSA Pre✓™ in  2013.

In our past work, we found that TSA has taken steps to implement  aviation security mechanisms that are more intelligence-driven and risk- based. For example, TSA implemented the Secure Flight program to  allow it to focus resources on high risk passengers by vetting passengers’  names, dates of birth, and other information against terrorist watch lists.  In May 2009, we reported that TSA had made significant progress in  developing the Secure Flight program but also noted that it faced  challenges in identifying passengers who might use false identifying  information. We also assessed TSA’s efforts to implement a behavior  detection program that seeks to selectively identify potentially high-risk  passengers for additional screening. Our May 2010 report found that  while TSA has taken actions to validate the science underlying the  program and improve performance measurement, among other actions,  more work remains to ensure the program’s effectiveness, such as  developing comprehensive program performance measures. In March  2012, we reported that questions related to the program will remain until  TSA demonstrates that using behavior detection techniques can help  secure the aviation system against terrorist threats. TSA plans to or is  currently implementing a number of other behavior based programs that  we plan to report on in 2013.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In November 2012, we recommended that TSA take steps to improve its  oversight of air passenger screening complaint processes, by establishing  (1) consistent policies for receiving complaints and informing passengers  about complaint processes, (2) a process to systematically analyze  information on complaints, and (3) a focal point to coordinate these  efforts. In its comments on this report, DHS concurred with the  recommendations and stated that TSA is taking steps to implement them.

In May 2012, we recommended that to help DHS address challenges in  meeting the air cargo screening mandate as it applies to air cargo carried  on passenger flights inbound to the United States, mitigate potential air  cargo security vulnerabilities, and enhance overall efforts to screen and  secure inbound air cargo, the Secretary of Homeland Security should  direct the Administrator of TSA to assess the costs and benefits of  requiring all-cargo carriers to report data on the amount of inbound air  cargo screening being conducted. In comments on the May 2012 report,  DHS concurred with the recommendation and stated that TSA was  working on developing a system that will provide the capability for all- cargo carriers to report data on screened high-risk inbound air cargo  shipments. In April 2013, TSA reported that once this system becomes  fully operational, these data will be available for each all-cargo carrier.

In July 2011, we recommended that TSA develop a plan to deploy  explosives detection systems (EDS) that meet the most recent  explosives-detection requirements and ensure that new machines, as well  as machines deployed in airports, will be operated at the levels  established in those requirements. This plan should include the estimated  costs for new machines and upgrading deployed machines, and the time  frames for procuring and deploying new machines. In commenting on this  report, DHS concurred with the recommendation. As of March 2013, TSA  has a plan in place to evaluate and implement the most recent certified  algorithms on the existing fleet of deployed EDSs. However, our  recommendation calls for a plan to deploy new EDSs as well as to  upgrade existing EDSs in airports to meet the 2010 EDS explosives  detection requirements. Our recommendation was intended to ensure that  all EDSs operating in airports meet the most recent requirements, which  are currently the 2010 requirements. Consequently, we continue to  believe that a plan is needed that describes the approach that TSA will  use to deploy EDSs that meet the most recent explosives detection  requirements and ensure that all deployed machines will be operated at  the levels established in the latest requirements.

In May 2010, we recommended that TSA perform a cost benefit analysis  of TSA’s behavior detection program known as the Screening of  Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT), including a comparison  of the program with other security screening programs, such as random  screening, or other already existing security measures. In commenting on  this report, DHS concurred with the recommendation and TSA completed  the analysis in December 2012. We are evaluating the cost-benefit  analysis as part of ongoing work that we will report on in 2013.

In May 2010, we recommended that TSA take steps to better measure  the effectiveness of the SPOT program and evaluate the performance of  TSA’s behavior detection officers, who implement the program at TSA- regulated airports. We also recommended that TSA establish a plan that  includes objectives, milestones, and time frames to develop outcome- oriented performance measures to help refine the current methods used  by behavior detection officers for identifying individuals who may pose a  risk to the aviation system. In commenting on this report, DHS concurred  with the recommendation and completed its plan in November 2012. We  are evaluating the plan as part of ongoing work that we will report on in  2013.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: Air Passenger Screening: Transportation Security Administration Could  Improve Complaint Processes. GAO-13-43. Washington, D.C.: November  15, 2012.

Aviation Security: Actions Needed to Address Challenges and Potential  Vulnerabilities Related to Securing Inbound Air Cargo. GAO-12-632.  Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012.

Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives Detection  Requirements for Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening Actions  Are Needed. GAO-11-740. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2011.

Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA’s Passenger Screening  Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to  Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges. GAO-10-763.  Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2010.

Aviation Security: TSA Has Completed Key Activities Associated with  Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are Needed to  Mitigate Risks. GAO-09-292. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues,  lords@gao.gov, (202) 512-4379.

section_title: Appendix III: Comments on the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Priority Goals
paragraphs: Based on our past work, as well as that of the HUD IG, we commented on  each of HUD’s six priority goals for 2012 to 2013:  1.  Improve program effectiveness by awarding funds fairly and quickly.

By September 30, 2013, HUD will improve internal processes to  ensure that HUD can obligate 90 percent of Notice of Funding  Availability (NOFA) programs within 180 calendar days from budget  passage, ensuring that America’s neediest families have the shelter  and services they need, when they need them. The timely obligation  and subsequent disbursement of funds will positively impact the  agency’s ability to achieve all of its priority goals.  2.  Increase the energy efficiency and health of the nation’s housing  stock. By September 30, 2013, HUD will enable a total of 159,000  cost effective energy efficient or healthy housing units, as part of a  joint HUD-Department of Energy (DOE) goal of 520,000 in 2012 to  2013 and a total goal of 1.2 million units from 2010 through 2013.  3.  Preserve affordable rental housing. By September 30, 2013, preserve  affordable rental housing by continuing to serve 5.4 million families  and serve an additional 61,000 families through HUD’s affordable  rental housing programs.  4.  Prevent foreclosures. By September 30, 2013, assist 700,000  homeowners who are at risk of losing their homes due to foreclosure.  5.  Reduce vacancy rates. By September 30, 2013 reduce the average  residential vacancy rate in 70 percent of the neighborhoods hardest  hit by the foreclosure crisis relative to comparable areas. Hardest hit  neighborhoods are defined as Neighborhood Stabilization Program  (NSP) 2 Neighborhood Investment Clusters (NIC).  6.  Reducing homelessness. By September 30 2013, in partnership with  the VA, reduce the number of homeless veterans to 35,000 by serving  35,500 additional homeless veterans. HUD is also committed to  making progress towards reducing family and chronic homelessness  and is working towards milestones to allow for tracking of these  populations.

For each goal, we also identify our related past reports and provide an  update on the status of any open recommendations and matters for  congressional consideration that we previously made related to the goal.  We also identify a GAO contact for our work related to each goal.
subsections: section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Improve program effectiveness by awarding funds fairly and quickly. By  September 30, 2013, HUD will improve internal processes to ensure that  HUD can obligate 90 percent of NOFA programs within 180 calendar  days from budget passage, ensuring that America’s neediest families  have the shelter and services they need, when they need them. The  timely obligation and subsequent disbursement of funds will positively  impact the agency’s ability to achieve all of its priority goals.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: Although we have not conducted an in-depth analysis of HUD’s NOFA  processes, our recent work and a recent bid protest decision highlight  some of the challenges HUD has faced when trying to award funds  quickly and the importance of using appropriate processes to award  funds. In our bimonthly reviews of selected states’ and localities’ use of  funds made available under the American Recovery and Reinvestment  Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), we commented on the NOFA process HUD  used to award nearly $1 billion in public housing capital funds to public  housing agencies based on competition for priority investments, including  investments that leveraged private sector funding or financing for  renovations and energy conservation retrofit investments. In September  2009, we reported that HUD had received almost 1,800 applications for  the funds and that its review process had been slower than expected.  According to HUD officials, this was due to the number of applications  with lengthy narratives needing review. Further, HUD officials stated that  their staff were reviewing these applications while carrying out their  ongoing responsibilities related to managing the public housing capital  fund program. Despite these challenges, we reported in December 2009  that HUD had met the Recovery Act requirement to obligate all of the  funds to public housing agencies by September 30, 2009. Specifically,  HUD accepted applications from June 22 to August 18, 2009, and  according to a HUD official, 746 housing agencies submitted 1,817  applications for these competitive grants. In September 2009, HUD  awarded 396 competitive grants to housing agencies that successfully  addressed the NOFA requirements.

In addition, a recent bid protest decision highlights the importance of  using appropriate processes to award funds regardless of the time  involved. On August 15, 2012, we concluded that HUD’s use of a NOFA  that resulted in the issuance of a cooperative agreement to obtain  services for the administration of Project-Based Section 8 Housing  Assistance Payment contracts was improper because the “principal  purpose” of the NOFA was to obtain contract administration services for  HUD’s direct benefit and use, which should be acquired under a  procurement instrument that results in the award of a contract.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In our August 15, 2012, bid protest decision, we recommended that HUD  cancel the NOFA and solicit the contract administration services for the  Project-Based Section 8 rental assistance program through a  procurement instrument that would result in the award of contracts. In its  response, HUD informed us of its intention to proceed with the NOFA and  of its plan to make awards. However, as a result of litigation filed in the  Court of Federal Claims that sought to enjoin it from proceeding with the  NOFA, HUD announced its agreement not to make the awards until the  court rules on the matter. As of March 2013, the court had not yet issued  its decision.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: Assisted Housing Services Corporation; North Tampa Housing  Development Corporation; The Jefferson County Assisted Housing  Corporation; National Housing Compliance; Southwest Housing  Compliance Corporation; CMS Contract Management Services and the  Housing Authority of the City of Bremerton; Massachusetts Housing  Finance Agency. B-406738 et al. August 15, 2012.

Recovery Act: Status of States’ and Localities’ Use of Funds and Efforts  to Ensure Accountability. GAO-10-231. Washington, D.C.: December 10,  2009.

Recovery Act: Funds Continue to Provide Fiscal Relief to States and  Localities, While Accountability and Reporting Challenges Need to Be  Fully Addressed. GAO-09-1016. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2009.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Mathew J. Scirè, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment,  sciremj@gao.gov, (202) 512-8678.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Increase the energy efficiency and health of the nation’s housing stock.  By September 30, 2013, HUD will enable a total of 159,000 cost effective  energy efficient or healthy housing units, as part of a joint HUD-DOE goal  of 520,000 in 2012 to 2013 and a total goal of 1.2 million units from 2010  through 2013.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: Energy-efficient green building practices can increase up-front costs but  also may provide long-term financial, environmental, and health benefits.  In prior work, we credit HUD for using accepted energy-efficient green  building standards developed by others, such as the Environmental  Protection Agency’s (EPA) Energy Star program and the Enterprise  Green Communities, as criteria for measuring progress toward its goal.  These standards are generally recognized as effective measures of  increased energy efficiency. However, our prior work also found that HUD  could do more to promote energy efficiency.

For example, in October 2008, we found that while HUD’s public housing  office had shown leadership and initiative in partnering to develop a  benchmarking tool that could be used to identify properties with high  levels of utility consumption, HUD’s multifamily assisted housing had no  such tool. In the absence of such a tool, HUD cannot target certain  multifamily properties for green building improvements, which could result  in benefits that include reduced resource consumption. In April 2013,  HUD officials told us that they were collaborating with other federal  agencies and industry partners to develop such a tool for its multifamily  portfolio.

Our October 2008 report also identifies ways that HUD could better meet  its priority goal for cost-effective energy-efficient measures, particularly for  water conservation. HUD officials we interviewed identified water  conservation savings as significant and among the biggest potential  opportunities for financial savings, but HUD had provided few incentive  points for water conservation or indoor air quality measures in its  competitive grant programs. Since our report, a number of HUD programs  have added water savings devices to requirements for new construction  and rehabilitation projects. In addition, the Interagency Rental Policy  Working Group, which includes HUD, USDA, and Treasury, has adopted  requirements for water saving products and energy star appliances for  rehabilitation projects.

As stated above, HUD’s priority goal is a portion of a larger HUD-DOE  joint goal. DOE’s weatherization assistance program is one of the largest  residential energy-efficiency programs in the nation and some DOE  weatherization grantees also received HUD assistance. HUD officials told  us that DOE grantees do not report which weatherization recipients  received HUD assistance and HUD grantees are not required to report to  HUD whether they received weatherization assistance. Consequently,  double counting could occur, although HUD indicated that the likelihood  of such double-counting is small. In October 2012, HUD officials told us  that they were planning to use the results of a DOE evaluation of its  weatherization program to identify any double counting and, if necessary,  revise the overall HUD-DOE totals reported previously for 2009 and 2010.  In April 2013, HUD officials told us that the data collection portion of  DOE’s evaluation was complete and they were awaiting the results from  DOE.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: We recommended in October 2008 that HUD ensure the completion of  the regulation that would require the use of energy-efficient products and  appliances for public housing as directed by the Energy Policy Act of  2005. HUD included the statutory requirement in a proposed rule  published in February 2011, but as of March 2013, HUD had not  published the final rule.

We also recommended in October 2008 that HUD work with DOE to  expeditiously implement energy-efficiency updates to the HUD  manufactured housing code. Although manufactured housing is not part  of HUD’s agency priority goal, we believe that energy-efficiency efforts in  this area are directly related to the goal. Manufactured housing is an area  in which HUD has significant influence because it has been responsible  for establishing manufactured building code requirements since 1974. We  found that HUD had not made significant energy efficiency updates to  code for this program since 1994. HUD officials told us that pursuant to  the requirements of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007  which moved responsibility for promulgating manufactured energy  efficiency standards to DOE, they intended to wait to make energy- efficiency updates to the code because they were concerned about  overlapping agency responsibilities between DOE and HUD. We  concluded in October 2008 that waiting to take action could result in years  more of some manufactured homes being built without improved energy  standards.  HUD has worked with DOE in developing more stringent  energy standards for manufactured homes. For example, in February  2010, DOE published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on  energy efficient standards for manufactured homes pursuant to the 2007  Act and HUD officials told us that they met with DOE on the proposal.   Until the rule is finalized, HUD and DOE will continue to miss an  opportunity to improve the energy efficiency of manufactured housing  units.

Additionally, in October 2008 we recommended that HUD work with  DOE’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory and EPA to develop a utility  benchmarking tool for multifamily properties. We pointed out that HUD’s  public housing office had shown leadership and initiative in partnering to  develop a utility benchmarking tool that could be used to identify  multifamily properties with high levels of utility consumption, and that  HUD’s multifamily assisted housing could benefit from a similar tool that  would allow properties to be targeted for green building improvements. In  October 2012, HUD officials told us that Oak Ridge’s data tool is now out  of date. They added that HUD was actively working with DOE, EPA,  Fannie Mae, and industry representatives on a strategy to develop  common data inputs and reporting standards for multifamily properties  that could lead to a multifamily benchmarking tool. In April 2013, HUD  officials told us that they are working to develop a multifamily energy star  benchmark that will provide information on building performance on a  portfolio basis. However, it is not clear when HUD intends to complete its  energy start benchmark. Until such a tool is in place and HUD is able to  benchmark utility costs in its multifamily portfolio, HUD will continue to  miss opportunities to target less-efficient multifamily properties for green  building improvements, and reduce resource consumption and utility  expenses for itself and its funding recipients.

In November 2011 we recommended that DOE, HUD, and EPA lead an  effort to collaborate with other agencies to identify performance  information, such as shared goals and common performance measures,  for green building initiatives for the nonfederal sector. About one-third of  the 94 initiatives we identified have goals and performance measures  specific to green building and about two-thirds do not; therefore the  results of most initiatives and their related investments in green building  are unknown. DOE, HUD, and EPA generally agreed with the  recommendation. In November 2012, HUD officials stated that they had  met with EPA and DOE representatives to review our recommendation.  The agencies generally agreed that initiatives that show potential for  collaboration would be best served through existing interagency  partnerships. HUD stated that the agencies might explore a higher level  of centralized collaboration for the long term, but such efforts would  require additional legislative or executive authority to implement.

In October 2012, we found that key standards for manufactured homes  provide a lower margin of safety against a carbon monoxide exposure  incident than those for site built homes. We found that HUD’s ventilation  standards establish standards for airflow, not air quality, and  recommended that HUD test the performance of its installed ventilation  systems and reassess its ventilation standards. Measuring the actual  airflow achieved by installed ventilation systems would not only permit  HUD to know whether its standards are being met, but also permit HUD  to better understand the potential impact ventilation systems may have on  indoor air quality and the overall health of the homes. HUD generally  agreed with both recommendations and stated that it would bring them  before the Manufactured Housing Consensus Committee, which is  responsible for recommending proposed rules to HUD, for consideration.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: Manufactured Housing Standards: Testing and Performance Evaluation  Could Better Ensure Safe Indoor Air Quality. GAO-13-52. Washington,  D.C.: October 24, 2012.  2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and  Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue.  GAO-12-342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

Green Building: Federal Initiatives for the Nonfederal Sector Could  Benefit from More Interagency Collaboration. GAO-12-79. Washington,  D.C.: November 2, 2011.

Green Affordable Housing: HUD Has Made Progress in Promoting Green  Building, but Expanding Efforts Could Help Reduce Energy Costs and  Benefit Tenants. GAO-09-46. Washington D.C.: October 7, 2008.

section_title: GAO Contacts
paragraphs: William B. Shear, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment,  shearw@gao.gov, (202) 512-8678.

Frank Rusco, Director, Natural Resources and Environment,  ruscof@gao.gov, (202) 512-3841.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Preserve affordable rental housing. By September 30, 2013, preserve  affordable rental housing by continuing to serve 5.4 million families and  serve an additional 61,000 families through HUD’s affordable rental  housing programs.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: HUD’s efforts to achieve this goal involve several HUD programs  including the housing choice voucher, public housing, and project-based  programs, which are HUD’s key programs for delivering rental  assistance.factors that could impact HUD’s ability to meet this goal including the  department’s ability to keep property owners in the project-based program  and serve additional households.

Our past work on these programs has identified a number of  HUD has implemented recommendations we made in April 2007 to help  enhance HUD’s ability to keep project-based property owners in the  program. Specifically, we found that although HUD offered several  incentives to keep property owners in the program, some property  owners, managers, and industry representatives cited concerns with  certain HUD policies and practices, especially the one-to-one  replacement policy (which prohibited reductions in the total number of  program units in a property when a contract was renewed), and the  reimbursement process for operating costs in high cost areas. In 2011,  HUD modified this policy and revised the way it calculates reimbursement  for operating costs. We also found that between 2001 and 2005 owners  renewed 92 percent of contracts and 95 percent of units covered by these  contracts. Property owners, managers, and industry representatives with  whom we spoke as part of our April 2007 report indicated that market  conditions were the primary factors in owners’ decisions to leave or  remain in the program. Similarly, HUD has implemented a  recommendation we made in November 2005 to address late housing  assistance payments to landlords, which may encourage owners to  participate in HUD’s project-based program. Specifically, in 2007 HUD  made improvements to its data, including verifying information on contract  renewal dates and project costs, which should help the department more  reliably determine the timing and amount of funding needed by the  landlords, thereby improving the timeliness of its payments.

Our work has also identified certain factors that could enhance HUD’s  ability to meet its goal to preserve affordable rental housing. For instance,  our March 2012 report on the housing choice voucher program identified  potential areas that, if implemented, could help HUD reach more renter  households. Specifically, excess reserves in the voucher program could  be used to serve additional families, if authorized by Congress. In  addition, certain rent reform options (that is, changes to the calculation of  households’ payment toward rent) may allow HUD to serve more people.  For example, if implemented, rent reform could reduce the federal cost  burden—in some cases, quite considerably—or if Congress chose to  reinvest cost savings in the program, allow the program to serve between  1,400 to 287,000 additional households, depending on which rent reform  option was implemented.

We also noted that HUD could do more to ensure that certain housing  agencies continue to serve households. Specifically, our April 2012 report  found that HUD may not be able to systematically ensure that agencies  participating in the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration program are  meeting the requirement to serve substantially the same number of  households through their rental assistance programs that they would   As a result, the program  have been able to serve prior to participation.may affect HUD’s ability to meet its goal of preserving affordable rental  housing. We found that, contrary to internal control guidance, HUD did  not have a process in place to systematically review compliance with  several program requirements, including the requirement to serve  substantially the same number of households. We concluded that  because Congress is considering expanding the program to many more  housing agencies, the absence of information needed to conduct  compliance reviews is significant. We further stated that without more  complete knowledge of the extent to which agencies are adhering to  program requirements, it is difficult for Congress to know whether an  expanded MTW will benefit additional agencies and the residents they  serve.

More broadly, as part of our work on overlap, fragmentation, and  duplication in federal programs, we reported in August 2012, that  although selected HUD, USDA, and the Department of the Treasury  (Treasury) rental housing programs had overlapping purposes, the  agencies’ products, areas served, and delivery methods differed.  Specifically, we found that although HUD is the only agency that has a  specific priority goal to preserve affordable rental housing, seven of the  nine selected HUD, USDA, and Treasury programs we reviewed have the  shared purpose of financing the development of new rental units or  preserving existing units through refinancing or rehabilitation. However,  we found that five of these programs differ in terms of tenant and  geographic eligibility. Additionally, we found that HUD and USDA  administer project-based rental assistance programs, which provide rental  subsidies to property owners that provide housing to low-income  households. We reported that although HUD serves more households in  rural areas, a large share of units with USDA’s rental assistance were in  rural ZIP codes, while a smaller share of units with HUD rental assistance  were in these areas. In addition, we also found that all three agencies  have been working to consolidate and align requirements in rental   We  housing programs through the Rental Policy Working Group.concluded that although its efforts have been consistent with many key  collaborative practices, the group has not taken full advantage of  opportunities to reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts  through the agencies’ annual and strategic plans, or expanded its guiding  principles to evaluate areas requiring statutory action to generate savings  and efficiencies.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In August 2012, we recommended that to further improve HUD, USDA,  and Treasury’s efforts through the Rental Policy Working Group to  consolidate and align certain requirements in multifamily housing  programs, the Rental Working Group should take steps to document  collaborative efforts in strategic and annual plans to help reinforce agency  accountability for these efforts. HUD and USDA agreed with the  recommendation.

In April 2012, we recommended that the Secretary of the Department of  Housing and Urban Development develop and implement a systematic  process for assessing compliance with statutory requirements. In  response to this recommendation, HUD stated that the agency had  conducted an extensive effort that allowed it to monitor compliance with  the requirement for agencies to continue assisting substantially the same  total number of households that they would have been able to serve prior  to participating in the MTW program. HUD further stated that it was  testing implementation of the process and planned to formalize the  process through the publication of a notice. On January 10, 2013, HUD  issued a notice that describes a compliance effort that, according to HUD,  will ensure that MTW agencies continue to meet the statutory obligation  to serve substantially the same number of families as if they had not  participated in the MTW demonstration.use a numerical indicator to make annual determinations of compliance.

According to the notice, HUD will  In March 2012, we recommended that the HUD Secretary provide  information to Congress on (1) housing agencies’ estimated amount of  excess subsidy reserves and (2) HUD’s criteria for how it will redistribute  excess reserves among housing agencies so that they can serve more  households. In taking these steps, the Secretary should determine a level  of subsidy reserves housing agencies should retain on an ongoing basis  to effectively manage their voucher programs. HUD neither agreed nor  disagreed with our recommendation. HUD noted that it currently provides  quarterly reports to the Congressional Budget Office on subsidy reserve  levels. However, these quarterly reports do not include information on the  estimated amount of agencies’ subsidy reserves that exceed prudent  levels. HUD did not comment on its efforts to provide information to  Congress on the criteria for how it will redistribute excess reserves among  agencies so it can serve more households. In March 2013, HUD officials  told us that, upon request, they provide information to HUD’s  Appropriations Committee on subsidy reserves levels, including those  balances above certain minimum reserve levels. We will continue  monitoring the agency’s progress in implementing our recommendations.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: Housing Assistance: Opportunities Exist to Increase Collaboration and  Consider Consolidation. GAO-12-554. Washington D.C.: August 16,  2012.

Moving to Work Demonstration: Opportunities Exist to Improve  Information and Monitoring. GAO-12-490. Washington D.C.: April 19,  2012.

Housing Choice Vouchers: Options Exist to Increase Program  Efficiencies. GAO-12-300. Washington D.C.: March 19, 2012.

Project-Based Rental Assistance: HUD Should Update Its Policies and  Procedures to Keep Pace with the Changing Housing Market.  GAO-07-290. Washington D.C.: April 11, 2007.

Project-Based Rental Assistance: HUD Should Streamline Its Processes  to Ensure Timely Housing Assistance Payments. GAO-06-57.  Washington D.C.: November 15, 2005.

section_title: GAO Contacts
paragraphs: Daniel Garcia-Diaz, Director, Financial Markets and Community  Investment, garciadiazd@gao.gov, (202) 512-8678.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Prevent foreclosures. By September 30, 2013, assist 700,000  homeowners who are at risk of losing their homes due to foreclosure.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments:
paragraphs: HUD’s efforts to achieve this goal involve the Federal Housing  Administration’s (FHA) early delinquency interventions and loss mitigation  programs. However, our past work raised questions about whether FHA  has collected and analyzed data to assess the effectiveness of these  efforts in preventing redefaults. Further, the HUD IG raised questions  about the extent to which certain efforts were conducted in accordance  with program requirements.

In June 2012, we reported that millions of borrowers faced an elevated  risk of foreclosure and that various indicators showed that the housing  market remained weak. In particular, we noted that the serious  delinquency rate for FHA loans increased in the second half of 2011,  counter to trends in the broader market. We reported that FHA had been  working with loan servicers to identify best practices for reaching  borrowers and had reporting requirements for servicers throughout the  delinquency process. However, we found that although FHA had begun to  calculate redefault rates for specific home retention actions, it had not  used this information to assess the effectiveness of its foreclosure  mitigation efforts. Doing so is particularly important because FHA loan  modifications typically do not reduce borrower’s monthly payments to the  levels that our analysis indicated result in more sustainable modifications.  We also found that FHA had not assessed the impact of loan and  borrower characteristics on the performance of its foreclosure mitigation  efforts. In some cases, FHA did not have the data needed to conduct  these analyses.

In a September 2012 report, the HUD IG estimated that 11,693  preforeclosure sales completed during the 12-month period it reviewed  did not meet HUD’s requirements for participation and recommended that  HUD strengthen controls over the preforeclosure sale program.  Preforeclosure sales are one type of FHA loss mitigation action included  in HUD’s calculation of borrowers assisted. Including ineligible  preforeclosure sales in the calculation of borrowers assisted could  overstate foreclosure prevention efforts.

HUD has previously reported performance that exceeds its target for  preventing foreclosures for fiscal years 2012 and 2013. During the period  covering fiscal years 2010 and 2011, HUD reported assisting 902,431  homeowners that were in danger of losing their homes to foreclosure— 496,197 through FHA early delinquency interventions and 406,234  through FHA loss mitigation programs. For fiscal years 2012 and 2013,  HUD anticipates meeting its foreclosure prevention goal by reaching  500,000 homeowners with early delinquency interventions and an  additional 200,000 through loss mitigation programs. Through the end of  fiscal year 2012, HUD reported that it was more than halfway to meeting  its goal, having reached 290,216 homeowners with early delinquency  interventions and 154,933 homeowners through loss mitigation programs.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In June 2012, we recommended that FHA conduct periodic analyses of  the effectiveness and the long-term costs and benefits of its loss  mitigation strategies and actions. These analyses should consider (1) the  redefault rates associated with each type of home retention action and (2)  the impact that loan and borrower characteristics have on the  performance of different home retention actions. FHA should use the  results from these analyses to reevaluate its loss mitigation approach and  provide additional guidance to servicers to effectively target foreclosure  mitigation actions. If FHA does not maintain data needed to consider this  information, it should require servicers to provide the data. In an August  2012 response to our recommendations, HUD noted that it was  performing a complete review of the structure of its home-retention  assistance. HUD is also undertaking an analysis of borrower and loan  data with the goal of proactively directing servicers as to which assistance  actions should be targeted to particular borrowers. In November 2012,  FHA issued Mortgagee Letter 2012-22, which contained changes to the  requirements for servicers to follow when assessing borrowers for FHA  loss mitigation home-retention options. We requested and plan to assess  the analysis HUD completed as the basis for this change in FHA’s loss  mitigation strategies to determine whether it fully responds to our  recommendation.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: Foreclosure Mitigation: Agencies Could Improve Effectiveness of Federal  Efforts with Additional Data Collection and Analysis, GAO-12-296.  Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2012.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Mathew J. Scirè, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment,  sciremj@gao.gov, (202) 512-8678.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Reduce vacancy rates. By September 30, 2013 reduce the average  residential vacancy rate in 70 percent of the neighborhoods hardest hit by  the foreclosure crisis relative to comparable areas. Hardest hit  neighborhoods are defined as Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP)  2 Neighborhood Investment Clusters (NIC).
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: HUD will apply the results of the second phase of its Neighborhood  Stabilization Program (NSP 2), funded under the American Recovery and  Reinvestment Act, towards achieving this agency priority goal. The  agency considers NSP, which provides grants to government and other  entities to try to reduce the number of foreclosed and abandoned  properties, its primary tool for mitigating the effects of foreclosures on   As we reported in November 2011, high foreclosure  neighborhoods.rates have contributed to increased vacancies, which can impose  additional costs and challenges on communities, including increased  public safety costs and lower tax revenues. While we have not directly  assessed HUD’s capacity to achieve this agency priority goal, our prior  work evaluating NSP indicates that through this program, HUD has the  potential to reduce vacancies in areas receiving NSP funding. In  December 2010, we examined HUD’s implementation of the first phase of  NSP and grantees’ compliance with program requirements in using their  funds to mitigate the impacts of foreclosures, which can include increased  vacancies. We found that HUD and grantees had taken actions to try to  ensure program compliance. While three phases of NSP were authorized  by different pieces of legislation, all three rounds of NSP generally follow  the same requirements. Therefore our previous findings are applicable to  NSP 2, the contributing program to this agency priority goal.

Through its NSP technical assistance program, HUD has hired The  Reinvestment Fund (TRF) to conduct analyses of NSP investments  across the United States. HUD is using aspects of this analysis to  measure progress toward meeting this agency priority goal. As part of its  quarterly studies, TRF is conducting analysis of trends in vacancy rates  within NICs versus comparable areas (or neighborhoods). NICs are  geographic areas with a concentration of properties to which NSP funds  have been applied. On the Performance.gov website, HUD uses “NIC” to  refer to those areas to which NSP 2 funds have been applied. For both  the first and second quarter of 2012, HUD reported that about 78 percent  of NICs had lower vacancy rates than at least one comparable area— outperforming the agency priority goal’s target of 70 percent.

We have not assessed the reliability of TRF’s studies. However, in its  analysis, TRF uses data from HUD’s Disaster Recovery Grant Reporting  (DRGR) system, the information system used by all NSP grantees to  report on their activities and results. In December 2010, we reported that  inconsistencies in the manner in which grantees entered data into DRGR  could complicate the analysis of program outputs and result in over  counting and under counting of program outputs. We recommended that  HUD take several actions to improve the consistency of the data collected  from NSP grantees. In October 2012, HUD addressed these  recommendations by issuing detailed guidance. For the purposes of  measuring progress towards this goal, TRF uses property address  information from DRGR for units that received NSP 2 funding. Quarterly,  HUD standardizes and removes duplicate address information from  DRGR to try to prevent any double counting of properties in TRF’s  analyses.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: We currently have no open recommendations or matters for  congressional consideration related to this priority goal.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: Vacant Properties: Growing Number Increases Communities’ Costs and  Challenges. GAO-12-34. Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2011.

Neighborhood Stabilization Program: HUD and Grantees Are Taking  Actions to Ensure Program Compliance but Data on Program Outputs  Could be Improved. GAO-11-48. Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2010.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Mathew J. Scirè, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment,  sciremj@gao.gov, (202) 512-8678.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Reducing homelessness. By September 30 2013, in partnership with the  VA, reduce the number of homeless veterans to 35,000 by serving 35,500  additional homeless veterans. HUD is also committed to making progress  towards reducing family and chronic homelessness and is working  towards milestones to allow for tracking of these populations.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: HUD notes that several programs are expected to contribute to the  achievement of its priority goal to reduce homelessness, including the  HUD Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) program, HUD  homeless assistance programs, and the Homelessness Prevention and   Our past work has identified a number of  Rapid Re-Housing Program.issues related to these programs. For example, our June 2012 report on  the HUD-VASH program—a collaborative initiative between HUD and VA  that targets the most vulnerable, most needy, and chronically homeless  veterans—states that the program has moved veterans out of  homelessness. Specifically, according to VA, as of March 2012, nearly  31,200 veterans lived in HUD-VASH supported housing, which represents  about 83 percent of the vouchers authorized under the program. In  addition, our December 2011 report on homeless women veterans notes  that although HUD collects data on homeless women and on homeless  veterans, the department does not collect detailed information on  homeless women veterans and neither HUD nor VA captures data on the  overall population of homeless women veterans. Further, our report  states that HUD and VA lack data on the characteristics and needs of  these women on a national, state, and local level. Finally, our report notes  that absent more complete data on homeless women veterans, VA does  not have the information needed to plan services effectively, allocate  grants to providers, and track progress toward its overall goal of ending  veteran homelessness.

Our May 2012 report on the fragmentation, overlap, and duplication  among federal homelessness programs also identified issues related to  the programs that are expected to contribute to the achievement of this  priority goal. For example, our report noted HUD was one of eight federal  agencies that administered 26 targeted homelessness programs in fiscal  year 2011, suggesting fragmentation and some overlap among these  programs.fund housing assistance, but also provides funding for mental health care,  substance abuse treatment, and employment services. Similarly, HHS  and VA administer programs that provide housing and employment  assistance. Fragmentation and overlap can lead to inefficient use of  resources. Some local service providers told us that managing multiple  applications and reporting requirements was burdensome, difficult, and  costly. Moreover, according to providers, persons experiencing   More specifically, HUD not only administers programs that  homelessness have difficulties navigating services that are fragmented  across agencies. Further, our report states that limited information exists  about the efficiency or effectiveness of targeted homelessness programs  because evaluations have not been conducted recently—including for the  six programs HUD administers. Finally, our report states that the U.S.  Interagency Council on Homelessness (Interagency Council) strategic  plan to prevent and end homelessness has served as a useful and  necessary first step in increasing agency coordination and focusing  attention on ending homelessness; however, the plan lacks key  characteristics desirable in a national strategy. For example, the plan  does not list priorities or milestones and does not discuss resource needs  or assign clear roles and responsibilities to federal partners.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In May 2012, we recommended that the Interagency Council and the  Office of Management and Budget, in conjunction with the Secretaries of  HHS, HUD, Labor, and VA, should consider examining inefficiencies that  may result from overlap and fragmentation in their programs for persons  experiencing homelessness. VA agreed with this recommendation. HHS,  HUD, Labor, and the Interagency Council did not explicitly agree or  disagree. We also recommended that to help prioritize, clarify, and refine  efforts to improve coordination across agencies, and improve the  efficiency and effectiveness of federal homelessness programs, the  Interagency Council, in consultation with its member agencies, should  incorporate additional elements into updates to the national strategic plan  or other planning and implementation documents to help set priorities,  measure results, and ensure accountability. According to the Interagency  Council, its fiscal year 2013 report will focus on updates and progress  made on the national strategic plan’s objectives. The Interagency  Council’s national strategic plan broadly describes the federal approach  to preventing and ending homelessness; however, until the key member  agencies fully implement their plans, including setting priorities,  measuring progress and results, and holding federal and nonfederal  partners accountable, they are at risk of not reaching their goal of ending  veteran and chronic homelessness by 2015, and ending homelessness  among children, youth, and families by 2020.

In December 2011, we recommended that in order to help achieve the  goal of ending homelessness among veterans, the Secretaries of HUD  and VA should collaborate to ensure appropriate data are collected on  homeless women veterans, including those with children and those with  disabilities, and use these data to strategically plan for services. In  concurring with this recommendation, VA stated it had several initiatives  already planned or under way to gather information on those homeless  women veterans who are in contact with VA, including the development of  a more streamlined and comprehensive data collection system. In April  2013, VA stated that it had taken additional actions to inform policy and  operational decisions about homeless and at-risk women veterans. For  example, VA stated that in 2013 it worked with HUD to ensure that  gender specific data were collected during the 2013 Point in Time count  of homeless persons. VA added that the results of the 2013 Point in Time  count will be included in the Annual Homeless Assessment Report to  Congress which will be published later in 2013 and will be used by the  department to strategically plan and implement services for all homeless  and at-risk veterans, including women veterans. In addition, VA stated  that in 2012 it revised the Community Homelessness Assessment, Local  Education and Networking Groups survey to capture gender specific data  for homeless veterans to better identify the needs of women veterans and  influence service provision.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: Veteran Homelessness: VA and HUD Are Working to Improve Data on  Supportive Housing Program. GAO-12-726. Washington, D.C.: June 26,  2012.

Homelessness: Fragmentation and Overlap in Programs Highlight the  Need to Identify, Assess, and Reduce Inefficiencies. GAO-12-491.  Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012.

Homeless Women Veterans: Actions Needed to Ensure Safe and  Appropriate Housing. GAO-12-182. Washington, D.C.: December 23,  2011.

Homelessness: A Common Vocabulary Could Help Agencies Collaborate  and Collect More Consistent Data. GAO-10-702. Washington, D.C.: June  30, 2010.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Alicia Puente Cackley, Director, Financial Markets and Community  Investment, cackleya@gao.gov, (202)512-8678.

section_title: Appendix IV: Comments on the Department of Transportation’s Priority Goals
paragraphs: Based on our past work, as well as that of the DOT IG, we commented on  each of DOT’s four priority goals for 2012 to 2013:  1.  Air traffic control systems can improve the efficiency of airspace. By  September 30, 2013, replace a 40-year-old computer system serving  20 air traffic control centers with a modern, automated system that  tracks and displays information on high altitude planes.  2.  Advance the development of passenger rail in the United States. By  September 30, 2013, initiate construction on all 7 high speed rail  corridors and 36 individual high speed rail projects.  3.  Reduce risk of aviation accidents. By September 30, 2013, reduce  aviation fatalities by addressing risk factors both on the ground and in  the air. Commercial aviation (i.e. airlines): Reduce fatalities to no  more than 7.4 per 100 million people on board. General aviation (i.e.  private planes): Reduce fatal accident rate per 100,000 flight hours to  no more than 1.06.  4.  Reduce the rate of roadway fatalities. Reduce the rate of roadway  fatalities from 1.26 in 2008 to 1.03 per 100 million vehicle miles  traveled by December 31, 2013.

For each goal, we also identify our related past reports and provide an  update on the status of any open recommendations and matters for  congressional consideration that we previously made related to the goal.  We also identify a GAO contact for our work related to each goal.
subsections: section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Air traffic control systems can improve the efficiency of airspace. By  September 30, 2013, replace a 40-year-old computer system serving 20  air traffic control centers with a modern, automated system that tracks  and displays information on high altitude planes.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: The priority goal refers to the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA)  replacement of the existing en route air traffic control automation system  used in its en route air traffic control centers (centers) with a new system  architecture, the En Route Automation Modernization system (ERAM).  While our previous work has shown that FAA has experienced delays in  deploying ERAM, FAA has since made progress toward achieving this  goal. As we reported in September 2012, FAA has experienced delays in  deploying ERAM, which affected overall acquisition and maintenance  costs as well as time frames for other programs. Specifically, the ERAM  program is almost 4 years behind its original schedule and about $330  million, or about 15 percent, over its original budget because of the  following factors: unanticipated risks associated with operational complexities at the  field sites,  insufficient testing to identify software issues before deployment at the  field sites,  insufficient communication between the program office and field sites,  and  insufficient stakeholder (e.g., air traffic controller) involvement during  system development and deployment.

The delays added an estimated $18 million per year to the costs of  maintaining the system that ERAM was meant to replace.

Since new budget and schedule baselines for the ERAM program were  established in June 2011, according to FAA reports, the program has  made progress toward its goal of initial operating capability of ERAM by  September 30, 2013. As of March 2013, FAA had achieved initial  operating capability at 16 out of 20 centers and expects to achieve this  goal. In September 2012, the DOT IG reported that FAA’s use of initial  operating capability for tracking progress with ERAM gave FAA decision  makers a false sense of confidence in the maturity of the system when in  reality, much work and time still remained in implementing the system.  For example, after FAA declared its first two sites as achieving initial  operating capability, these sites experienced multiple failures after the  milestone was achieved and went through a measured transition from  limited operations to eventual continuous operations. In response to the  DOT IG’s recommendation to better define key milestones to reflect  progress, FAA is planning to establish criteria for entrance and exit at the  various key milestones, including initial operating capability. FAA also  plans to have all 20 centers operationally ready by August 2014.

As we reported in September 2012, looking more broadly, ERAM is  considered to be the backbone that will support the Next Generation Air  Transportation System (NextGen)—a new air traffic management system  that will replace the current radar-based system and is expected to  enhance the safety and capacity of the air transport system—and delays  with ERAM’s deployment illustrate challenges FAA faces in implementing  NextGen. For example, delays in ERAM affected the implementation of  two other key NextGen acquisitions—Data Communications and System  Wide Information Management. In part because of ERAM’s delay, FAA  pushed the Data Communications program’s start date from September  2011 to May 2012, revised the original plan for the first System Wide  Information Management segment, and delayed the start date for another  segment from 2010 to July 2012. The implementation of NextGen—both  in the midterm (through 2020) and in the long term (beyond 2020)—will  be affected by how well FAA manages these and other program  interdependencies.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: To address past issues with cost estimate and schedule accuracy, such  as those with ERAM, in February 2012, we recommended that when  appropriate for major acquisition programs based on a program’s cost,  schedule, complexity, and risk, FAA  conduct an assessment of major acquisition programs to ensure they  meet all of the established best practices for cost estimates and  schedules contained in our guidance;  require a fully integrated master schedule for each major acquisition  program, including those that are NextGen components; and  conduct independent cost estimates and schedule risk analysis.

As of March 2013, FAA has taken steps to implement these  recommendations. For example, according to FAA officials, FAA’s  Acquisition Executive Board now considers whether an independent cost  estimate or schedules risk analysis is advisable as parts of its program  review. FAA is also developing an Integrated Master Schedule for the  entire NextGen initiative that is, in part, intended to show how changes in  program schedules affect other programs and the timelines for the  NextGen initiative as a whole. To further strengthen schedule integration,  FAA plans to continue populating the integrated master schedule and  then begin integrating this tool with other FAA planning tools, including  the National Airspace System Enterprise Architecture and NextGen  Implementation Plan, in December 2013.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: Next Generation Air Transportation System: FAA Faces Implementation  Challenges. GAO-12-1011T. September 12, 2012.

Air Traffic Control Modernization: Management Challenges Associated  with Program Costs and Schedules Could Hinder NextGen  Implementation. GAO-12-223. February 16, 2012.

NextGen Air Transportation System: FAA’s Metrics Can Be Used to  Report on Status of Individual Programs, but Not of Overall NextGen  Implementation or Outcomes. GAO-10-629. July 27, 2010.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,  dillinghamg@gao.gov, (202) 512-2834.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Advance the development of passenger rail in the United States. By  September 30, 2013, initiate construction on 7 high speed rail corridors  and 36 individual high speed rail projects.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: While our past work does not cover activities related to construction of  high speed rail projects, we and the DOT IG have reported on planning  and other weaknesses with the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA)  High Speed Intercity Passenger Rail (HSIPR) program related to FRA’s  capacity to achieve this APG. The federal government had not historically  had a strong leadership role in intercity passenger rail but this changed in  2009 when the HSIPR program was authorized. The program provides  grants to states and other entities to develop high speed intercity  passenger rail corridors and projects. As of January 2013, FRA had  awarded grants for 150 high speed intercity passenger rail projects. Of  these projects, FRA had obligated about $9.2 billion for 9 corridor  programs and 57 individual high speed rail projects as of December  2012. According to FRA, by this same date, states and other project  sponsors had begun construction on 5 of the high speed rail corridors and  33 of the individual high speed rail projects. By the end of fiscal year  2013, FRA’s goal is to begin construction on a total of 7 corridor and 36  individual high speed rail projects.

The fundamental weaknesses of the HSIPR program include not having  well-defined goals, a clear strategic vision, and performance measures to  track program progress. In March 2009, before the HSIPR program was  established, we reported that several principles could help guide the  potential federal role in high speed rail. These principles included, among  other things, creating well-defined goals based on identified areas of  national interest, incorporating performance and accountability for results  into funding decisions, and employing the best analytical tools and  approaches to emphasize return on investment. Similarly, in June 2010,  we reported that FRA’s strategic vision for high speed rail, as outlined in  the agency’s April 2009 Vision for High-Speed Rail in America, did not  define the goals, stakeholder roles, or objectives for federal involvement  in high speed intercity passenger rail and that the agency’s preliminary  national rail plan did not include recommendations for future action.  Further, although states would be among primary HSIPR grant recipients,  many did not have rail plans that would establish strategies and priorities  for rail investments or identify the public benefits of such investments.  Many of these weaknesses continue. For example, in September 2012  the DOT IG reported that FRA’s HSIPR goals lacked the thoroughness  needed to ensure that grant managers and decision makers, including  Congress, could understand them, and that FRA generally lacked  performance measures needed to assess the program’s progress in  achieving its goals as well as complete monitoring mechanisms.  According to DOT, FRA has taken action to address some of the issues  reported by the DOT IG, including developing a standardized mechanism  for collecting and tracking HSIPR grantee performance and compliance  metrics, and developing a comprehensive grants management training  curriculum.

There are also weaknesses in how the HSIPR program is administered  starting with how HSIPR grants are awarded. In March 2011 we reported  that, although FRA had applied its established criteria during the eligibility  and technical reviews of the HSIPR grant applications, we could not verify  whether it applied its final selection criteria because the documented  rationales for selecting projects were typically vague. We concluded that  without a record that provided insight into why decisions were made, FRA  invited skepticism about the overall fairness of its decision making. Other  program weaknesses include the lack of guidance issued to HSIPR  applicants and FRA’s grants administration framework. In March 2009 we  recommended the Secretary of Transportation develop guidance and  methods for ensuring reliability of ridership and other forecasts used to  determine the viability of high speed rail projects. In March 2012, the DOT  IG also reported that FRA had established only minimal requirements and  guidance on the information HSIPR grant applicants must provide to FRA  on project viability which did not provide enough detail to minimize bias  and ensure accuracy in project viability assessments. In addition, in  September 2012, the DOT IG reported that FRA had issued the policies  and procedures for HSIPR grants management several years after the  program had been established and that insufficient staffing and training  undermined FRA’s efforts to effectively administer and ensure the  accountability of HSIPR grant funds once they are awarded. FRA’s  Grants Management Manual was not issued until April 2012, almost 3  years after the HSIPR program was authorized. FRA’s monitoring plan,  which will, among other things, guide performance and compliance  monitoring for the HSIPR program, was not finalized until March 2012.

Aside from program weaknesses, we have found that implementing high  speed rail projects is difficult. This difficulty could affect achievement of  program goals. Our March 2009 report identified some of the challenges  in developing and financing high speed rail projects, including securing  the up-front investments for such projects and sustaining public and  political support and stakeholder consensus. We concluded that whether  any high speed rail proposals are eventually built hinges on addressing  the funding, public support, and other challenges facing these projects.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In March 2011, we recommended that FRA create additional records to  document the substantive reasons behind award decisions in future  HSIPR funding rounds to better ensure accountability for its use of federal  funds. As of November 2012, FRA had enhanced its grant management  manual with more explicit requirements for documenting the rationale  behind its funding selections.

In March 2009, we recommended, among other things, that the Secretary  of Transportation develop guidance and methods to improve the reliability  and accuracy of ridership, cost, and other forecasts for these systems. As  of November 2012, FRA said it is implementing this recommendation in  conjunction with stakeholders, partners, and researchers, through an  iterative process of developing methods and guidance, using them, and  then refining them. FRA is also working with a research panel of the  Transportation Research Board to develop a handbook that will provide  tools to decision makers in such areas as ridership forecasting and  service characteristics (e.g., frequency of service). FRA said it expects  implementing this recommendation will require from 5 to 10 years.

In September 2012, DOT’s IG recommended that before awarding,  obligating, and disbursing additional grant funds, FRA should take several  actions to establish a comprehensive grants management program with  clear program goals and mechanisms to track grantee performance  toward those goals. In response to the IG’s recommendations, FRA  officials concurred with each recommendation and said they would  implement reports, tools and training programs to meet the IG’s  recommendations starting in late 2012.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: Intercity Passenger Rail: Recording Clearer Reasons for Awards  Decisions Would Improve Otherwise Good Grantmaking Practices.  GAO-11-283. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2011.

High Speed Rail: Learning from Service Start-Ups, Prospects for  Increased Industry Investment, and Federal Oversight. GAO-10-625.  Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2010.

High Speed Passenger Rail: Future Development Will Depend on  Addressing Financial and Other Challenges and Establishing a Clear  Federal Role. GAO-09-317. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2009.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Susan Fleming, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, 202-512-2834,  flemings@gao.gov.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Reduce risk of aviation accidents. By September 30, 2013, reduce  aviation fatalities by addressing risk factors both on the ground and in the  air. Commercial aviation (i.e. airlines): Reduce fatalities to no more than  7.4 per 100 million people on board. General aviation (i.e. private planes):  Reduce fatal accident rate per 100,000 flight hours to no more than 1.06.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: DOT’s FAA has worked toward these goals by partnering with the airline  industry and other stakeholders through the Commercial Aviation Safety  Team (CAST), improving runway safety, shifting toward a risk-based  analysis of airborne aviation system information, establishing safety  management systems (SMS), renewing the General Aviation Joint  Steering Committee (GAJSC), and developing a 5-year strategy for  reducing general aviation fatalities. DOT reported that from 2009 through  2011 FAA exceeded its targets for reducing commercial air carrier  fatalities, well below its 2013 goal. For general aviation fatality rates,  however, FAA has not yet achieved its goal, in part due to challenges we  have recently discussed.

As we reported in April 2012, CAST has contributed to reducing  commercial aviation accidents by analyzing past accidents and incidents  to identify precursors and contributing factors, and ensuring that efforts to  improve safety focus on the most prevalent accident categories. CAST  has reduced commercial aviation risks by focusing on areas including  controlled flight into terrain, loss of control, and runway incursions. CAST  analyzes accident and incident data to identify precipitating conditions  and causes, and then formulates an intervention strategy designed to  reduce the likelihood of a recurrence. According to CAST, its work—along  with new aircraft, regulations, and other activities—reduced the  commercial aviation fatal accident rate by 83 percent from 1998 to 2008  and is an important aspect of FAA’s efforts to improve aviation safety by  sharing and analyzing data. However, as we reported in October 2011,  for safety at and around airports, including runways, the overall rate of  runway incursions (the unauthorized presence of an airplane, vehicle, or  person on the runway) at towered airports has trended steadily upward,  as has the rate and number of airborne operational errors (errors made  by air traffic controllers), though it is not clear whether these recent  increases in operational errors can be attributed to several changes in  reporting policies and procedures at FAA, or increases in actual incidents.

We reported in September 2012 that FAA is seeking to further enhance  commercial aviation safety by shifting to a data-driven, risk-based safety  oversight approach—referred to as SMS. SMS represents a proactive  approach to safety and is intended to continually monitor all aspects of  aviation operations and collect appropriate data to identify emerging  safety problems before they result in death, injury, or significant property  damage. SMS implementation is required for FAA and several of its  business lines and the agency is taking steps to require industry  implementation. Several challenges remain that may affect FAA’s ability  to effectively implement SMS. FAA is taking steps to address some of  these, but challenges related to data concerns, its capacity to conduct  analysis and oversight, and standardization of policies and procedures  could negatively affect FAA’s efforts to implement SMS in a timely and  efficient manner and require some skills that agency employees do not  have. Addressing these challenges is ever more important with air travel  projected to increase over the next 20 years.

FAA has embarked on several initiatives to meet its goal of reducing the  fatal general aviation accident rate; however it reported not meeting its  target fatality rates in any year from 2009 through 2011. As we reported in  October 2012, FAA reported the general aviation fatality rate exceeded  the target rate by 7.4 percent for 2011. FAA initiatives to improve aviation  safety include renewing the GAJSC and implementing the Flight  Standards Service’s 5-year strategy for reducing general aviation  fatalities. The GAJSC, a government-industry partnership similar to the  CAST approach for commercial aviation, focuses on analyzing general  aviation accident data to develop effective intervention strategies. We  believe that the GAJSC has the potential to contribute to a reduction in  general aviation accidents and fatalities over the long term. However, the  5-year strategy has shortcomings that jeopardize its potential for success  because, among other things, the strategy lacks performance measures  for significant activities. Without a strong performance management  structure, FAA will not be able to determine the success or failure of the  significant activities that underlie the strategy. Furthermore, there are  some limitations in flight activity data and other data that preclude a  confident assessment of general aviation safety. For example, FAA’s  survey of general aviation operators, on which the agency bases its  annual flight-hour estimates, continues to suffer from methodological and  conceptual limitations, even with FAA’s efforts to improve it.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In October 2012, we recommended that FAA (1) improve measures of  general aviation activity by requiring the collection of the number of hours  that general aviation aircraft fly, (2) set specific general aviation safety  improvement goals—such as targets for fatal accident reductions—for  individual industry segments (e.g. personal or corporate operations) using  a data-driven, risk management approach and (3) determine whether the  programs and activities underlying the 5-year strategy are successful and  if additional actions are needed, develop performance measures for each  significant program and activity underlying the 5-year strategy. In its  comments to our report, FAA reported that it is working toward  implementing these recommendations.

In September 2012, we recommended that FAA develop a system to  assess whether SMS meets its goals and objectives by identifying and  collecting related data on performance measures. In comments to our  report, FAA stated that it is currently involved in activities directed towards  the development of safety performance measurement capabilities,  including a process and measures for measuring safety performance.  This activity is expected to be completed by April 2015.

In October 2011, we recommended that FAA develop separate risk-based  assessment processes, measures, and performance goals for runway  safety incidents involving commercial and general aviation aircraft, and to  expand the existing risk-based process for assessing airborne losses of  separation. In comments to our report, FAA reported that it is working  toward implementing these recommendations.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: General Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Help Identify and  Mitigate Safety Risks. GAO-13-36. Washington D.C.: October 4, 2012.

Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Enhance Safety Risk  Management. GAO-12-898. Washington D.C.: September 12, 2012.

Aviation Safety: FAA Is Taking Steps to Improve Data, but Challenges for  Managing Safety Risks Remain. GAO-12-660T. Washington D.C.: April  25, 2012.

Aviation Safety: Enhanced Oversight and Improved Availability of Risk-  Based Data Could Further Improve Safety. GAO-12-24. Washington D.C.:  October 5, 2011.

Aviation Safety: Improved Data Quality and Analysis Capabilities Are  Needed as FAA Plans a Risk-Based Approach to Safety Oversight.  GAO-10-414. Washington D.C.: May 6, 2010.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,  dillinghamg@gao.gov, (202) 512-2834.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Reduce the rate of roadway fatalities. Reduce the rate of roadway  fatalities from 1.26 in 2008 to 1.03 per 100 million vehicle miles traveled  by December 31, 2013.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: We have issued a number of reports related to DOT’s efforts to reduce  highway fatalities that highlight the need for improved performance  accountability and data. The number of traffic fatalities decreased from  41,000 in 2000 to fewer than 33,000 in 2010; the fatality rate per 100  million miles traveled also decreased from 1.53 in 2000 to 1.11 in 2010.To help states reduce traffic fatalities, the National Highway Traffic Safety  Administration (NHTSA) within DOT provides traffic safety grants to  states to, among other things, promote and enforce safety belt use and  impaired driving laws and improve traffic safety data systems. While  NHTSA has made progress in developing performance measures to help  NHTSA and states evaluate the effectiveness of traffic safety programs,  we reported in March 2008 that state performance has generally not been  tied to receipt of the grants and improvements in state traffic safety data  are needed to support a more performance-based approach to improving  traffic safety programs.

On July 6, 2012, President Obama signed into law the Moving Ahead for  Progress in the 21st Century Act.transportation program framework more performance-based by: (1)  establishing national performance goals for the federal-aid highway  program in several areas, including goals for the safety of the nation’s  highways; and (2) requiring the Secretary of Transportation, in  consultation with state departments of transportation and others, to  establish performance measures linked to national goals, including  measures for serious injuries and fatalities on public roads. Finally, the  act required states to establish performance targets for those measures  and report their progress in achieving planned outcomes through the  statewide transportation plans. These provisions are consistent with a  performance-based planning framework we recommended to Congress in  December 2010 and, as they are implemented over the next several  years, should help NHTSA and states focus their efforts on key actions  needed to improve traffic safety and reduce highway fatalities.

The act made the surface  While states have implemented projects to improve traffic safety data  systems, such as switching to electronic data reporting and adopting data  collection forms consistent with national guidelines, enhancements in  these systems are still needed to support a performance-based approach  to improving traffic safety. In April 2010, we reported that our analysis of  traffic records assessments—conducted for states by NHTSA technical  teams or contractors at least every 5 years—indicated that the quality of  state traffic safety data systems varied across the six data systems  maintained by states. Assessments include an evaluation of system  quality based on six performance measures. Across all states, we found  that vehicle and driver data systems met performance measures 71  percent and 60 percent of the time, respectively, while roadway, crash,  citation and adjudication, and injury surveillance data systems met  performance measures less than 50 percent of the time. States face  resource and coordination challenges in improving traffic safety data  systems. For example, custodians of data systems are often located in  different state agencies, which may make coordination difficult. In  addition, rural and urban areas may face different challenges in improving  data systems, such as limited technology options for rural areas or timely  processing of large volumes of data in urban areas. States we visited  have used strategies to overcome these challenges, including  establishing an executive-level traffic records coordinating committee  (TRCC), in addition to the technical-level committee that states are  required to establish to qualify for federal traffic safety grant funding. An  executive-level committee could help states address challenges by  targeting limited resources and facilitating data sharing.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In April 2010, we recommended that the Secretary of Transportation  should direct the NHTSA Administrator to (1) ensure that traffic records  assessments provide an in-depth evaluation that is complete and  consistent in addressing all performance measures across all state traffic  safety data systems and (2) study and communicate to Congress the  value of requiring states to establish an executive-level TRCC in order to  qualify for traffic safety data system grant funding.

In response to the first recommendation, NHTSA developed a  comprehensive approach for assessing the systems and processes that  govern the collection, management, and analysis of traffic records data.  Core to this approach is the set of questions for conducting assessments  published in September 2012 in the Traffic Records Program Assessment  Advisory. The Advisory includes standards of evidence to guide state  officials in providing the information necessary to answer each  assessment question. The assessment now asks a comprehensive,  uniform set of questions about data quality performance measures across  all state traffic safety data systems. NHTSA kicked off a pilot program to  test the new process in Indiana in November 2012. This pilot was  successfully completed in February 2013. As part of the new assessment  process, NHTSA will create a database to house data from the new traffic  records systems, conduct research and identify national trends. NHTSA  can then inform states about how the ratings for each of their assessment  questions compares with a national average.

In response to the second recommendation, NHTSA’s study examining  how executive level and technical level TRCCs coordinate traffic records  systems management was initiated with the 2012 pilot test of the new  traffic records assessment process in Indiana. Data collection will  continue through the fiscal year 2015 assessment cycle at which point 10  states will have been assessed and the data set will be large enough to  enable a quality analysis. The data for this study will include the  information submitted by the states as well as the ratings received on the  comprehensive, uniform set of assessment questions. Specifically,  NHTSA plans to examine states’ responses to questions about their  TRCC management, strategic planning, data integration, and the  capabilities of the six core traffic records components. Notable practices  demonstrated by effective TRCC organizations—particularly at the  executive level—will be highlighted.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: Statewide Transportation Planning: Opportunities Exist to Transition to  Performance-Based Planning and Federal Oversight. GAO-11-77.  Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2010.

Traffic Safety Data: State Data System Quality Varies and Limited  Resources and Coordination Can Inhibit Further Progress. GAO-10-454.  Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.

Traffic Safety Programs: Progress, States’ Challenges, and Issues for  Reauthorization. GAO-08-990T. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2008.

Traffic Safety: NHTSA’s Improved Oversight Could Identify Opportunities  to Strengthen Management and Safety in Some States. GAO-08-788.  Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2008.

Traffic Safety: Improved Reporting and Performance Measures Would  Enhance Evaluation of High-Visibility Campaigns. GAO-08-477.  Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2008.

Traffic Safety: Grants Generally Address Key Safety Issues, Despite  State Eligibility and Management Difficulties. GAO-08-398. Washington,  D.C.: March 14, 2008.

Surface Transportation: Restructured Federal Approach Needed for More  Focused, Performance-Based, and Sustainable Programs. GAO-08-400.  Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2008.

section_title: GAO Contacts
paragraphs: Phillip R. Herr, Managing Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,  herrp@gao.gov, (202) 512-2834.

Susan Fleming, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,  flemings@gao.gov, (202) 512-2834.

section_title: Appendix V: Comments on the Department of Veterans Affairs’ Priority Goals
paragraphs: Based on our past work, as well as that of the VA IG, we commented on  each of VA’s three priority goals for 2012 to 2013:  1.  Assist in housing 24,400 additional homeless veterans (12,200 per  year) and reduce the number of homeless veterans to 35,000 in 2013,  to be measured in the January 2014 Point-In-Time homelessness  count. By September 2013, working in conjunction with the U.S.  Interagency Council on Homelessness (Interagency Council) and  HUD, VA will also assist homeless Veterans in obtaining employment,  accessing VA services, and securing permanent supportive housing,  with a long-range goal of eliminating homelessness among Veterans  by 2015.  2.  Improve accuracy and reduce the amount of time it takes to process  veterans’ disability benefit claims. By September 30, 2013, reduce the  veterans’ disability compensation and pension claims backlog to 40  percent from 60.2 percent while achieving 90 percent rating accuracy,  up from 83.8 percent, in pursuit of eliminating the Veterans’ claims  backlog (defined as claims pending more than 125 days) by 2015.  3.  Improve awareness of VA services and benefits by increasing the  timeliness and relevance of on-line information available to veterans,  service members and eligible beneficiaries. By September 30, 2013,  increase the number of registered eBenefits users from 1.0 million to  2.5 million.

For each goal, we also identify our related past reports and provide an  update on the status of any open recommendations and matters for  congressional consideration that we previously made related to the goal.  We also identify a GAO contact for our work related to each goal.
subsections: section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Assist in housing 24,400 additional homeless veterans (12,200 per year)  and reduce the number of homeless veterans to 35,000 in 2013, to be  measured in the January 2014 Point-In-Time homelessness count. By  September 2013, working in conjunction with the U.S. Interagency  Council on Homelessness (Interagency Council) and HUD, VA will also  assist homeless Veterans in obtaining employment, accessing VA  services, and securing permanent supportive housing, with a long-range  goal of eliminating homelessness among veterans by 2015.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: VA notes that several programs are expected to contribute to the  achievement of its priority goal to reduce homelessness among veterans,  including the HUD Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH)  program, Grant and Per Diem program, Domiciliary Care for Homeless  Veterans program, and Health Care for Homeless Veterans program. Our  past work has identified a number of issues related to these programs.  For example, our June 2012 report on the HUD-VASH program—a  collaborative initiative between HUD and VA that targets the most  vulnerable, most needy, and chronically homeless veterans—states that  the program has moved veterans out of homelessness. Specifically,  according to VA, as of March 2012, nearly 31,200 veterans lived in HUD- VASH supported housing, which represents about 83 percent of the rental  assistance vouchers authorized under the program. In addition, our  December 2011 report on homeless women veterans notes that although  HUD collects data on homeless women and on homeless veterans, the  department does not collect detailed data information on homeless  women veterans and neither HUD nor VA captures data on the overall  population of homeless women veterans. Further, our report states that  HUD and VA lack data on the characteristics and needs of these women  on a national, state, and local level. Finally, our report notes that absent  more complete data on homeless women veterans, VA does not have the  information needed to plan services effectively, allocate grants to  providers, and track progress toward its overall goal of ending veteran  homelessness.

Our May 2012 report on the fragmentation, overlap, and duplication  among federal homelessness programs also identified issues related to  the programs that are expected to contribute to the achievement of this  priority goal. For example, our report noted VA was one of eight federal  agencies that administered 26 targeted homelessness programs in fiscal  year 2011, suggesting fragmentation and some overlap among these  programs.funding for supportive services such as health care, substance abuse  treatment, and employment assistance, but also administers programs  that provide housing and employment assistance. Similarly, HUD not only  administers housing assistance, but also provides funding for mental   More specifically, VA typically operates programs or provides  health care, substance abuse treatment, and employment services.  Fragmentation and overlap can lead to inefficient use of resources. Some  local service providers told us that managing multiple applications and  reporting requirements was burdensome, difficult, and costly. Moreover,  according to providers, persons experiencing homelessness have  difficulties navigating services that are fragmented across agencies.  Further, our report states that limited information exists about the  efficiency or effectiveness of targeted homelessness programs because  evaluations have not been conducted recently—including for the 13  programs VA administers or co-administers. Finally, our report states that  the Interagency Council strategic plan to prevent and end homelessness  has served as a useful and necessary first step in increasing agency  coordination and focusing attention on ending homelessness; however,  the plan lacks key characteristics desirable in a national strategy. For  example, the plan does not list priorities or milestones and does not  discuss resource needs or assign clear roles and responsibilities to  federal partners.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In May 2012, we recommended that the Interagency Council and the  Office of Management and Budget––in conjunction with the Secretaries of  HHS, HUD, Labor, and VA––should consider examining inefficiencies that  may result from overlap and fragmentation in their programs for persons  experiencing homelessness. VA agreed with this recommendation. HHS,  HUD, Labor, and the Interagency Council did not explicitly agree or  disagree. We also recommended that to help prioritize, clarify, and refine  efforts to improve coordination across agencies, and improve the  efficiency and effectiveness of federal homelessness programs, the  Interagency Council, in consultation with its member agencies, should  incorporate additional elements into updates to the national strategic plan  or other planning and implementation documents to help set priorities,  measure results, and ensure accountability. According to the Interagency  Council, its fiscal year 2013 report will focus on updates and progress  made on the national strategic plan’s objectives. The Interagency  Council’s national strategic plan broadly describes the federal approach  to preventing and ending homelessness; however, until the key member  agencies fully implement their plans, including setting priorities,  measuring progress and results, and holding federal and nonfederal  partners accountable, they are at risk of not reaching their goal of ending  veteran and chronic homelessness by 2015, and ending homelessness  among children, youth, and families by 2020.

In December 2011, we recommended that in order to help achieve the  goal of ending homelessness among veterans, the Secretaries of HUD  and VA should collaborate to ensure appropriate data are collected on  homeless women veterans, including those with children and those with  disabilities, and use these data to strategically plan for services. In  concurring with this recommendation, VA stated it had several initiatives  already planned or under way to gather information on those homeless  women veterans who are in contact with VA, including the development of  a more streamlined and comprehensive data collection system. In April  2013, VA stated that it had taken additional actions to inform policy and  operational decisions about homeless and at-risk women veterans. For  example, VA stated that in 2013 it worked with HUD to ensure that  gender specific data were collected during the 2013 Point in Time count  of homeless persons. VA added that the results of the 2013 Point in Time  count will be included in the Annual Homeless Assessment Report to  Congress which will be published later in 2013 and will be used by the  department to strategically plan and implement services for all homeless  and at-risk veterans, including women veterans. In addition, VA stated  that in 2012 it revised the Community Homelessness Assessment, Local  Education and Networking Groups survey to capture gender specific data  for homeless veterans to better identify the needs of women veterans and  influence service provision.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: Veteran Homelessness: VA and HUD Are Working to Improve Data on  Supportive Housing Program. GAO-12-726. Washington, D.C.: June 26,  2012.

Homelessness: Fragmentation and Overlap in Programs Highlight the  Need to Identify, Assess, and Reduce Inefficiencies. GAO-12-491.  Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012.

Homeless Women Veterans: Actions Needed to Ensure Safe and  Appropriate Housing. GAO-12-182. Washington, D.C.: December 23,  2011.

Homelessness: A Common Vocabulary Could Help Agencies Collaborate  and Collect More Consistent Data. GAO-10-702. Washington, D.C.: June  30, 2010.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Alicia Puente Cackley, Director, Financial Markets and Community  Investment, cackleya@gao.gov, (202) 512-8678.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Improve accuracy and reduce the amount of time it takes to process  veterans’ disability benefit claims. By September 30, 2013, reduce the  veterans’ disability compensation and pension claims backlog to 40  percent from 60.2 percent while achieving 90 percent rating accuracy, up  from 83.8 percent, in pursuit of eliminating the veterans’ claims backlog  (defined as claims pending more than 125 days) by 2015.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: As we and other organizations have reported over the last decade, VA  has faced challenges improving the accuracy and timeliness of its  disability claims process. VA’s disability compensation benefits program  has been included in our High Risk List, under “Improving and  Modernizing Federal Disability Programs,” since 2003. Our December  2012 report on VA claims processing found that VA’s disability claims  backlog—defined as claims awaiting a decision over 125 days—had more  than tripled since September 2009. In fact, two-thirds of all disability  claims awaiting a decision in August 2012 met VA’s backlog definition.  Moreover, the timeliness of disability claims processing over the last  several years has worsened: the average length of time to complete a  claim increased from 161 days in 2009 to 260 days in 2012. The number  of disability claims received is likely to remain high as VA projects that 1  million service members will become veterans over the next 5 years,  portending ongoing challenges for VA to meet its goal of processing  claims within 125 days by 2015.

While our December 2012 report did not look at claims processing  accuracy, the VA IG established a benefits inspection program in March  2009 which examines claims processing accuracy at VA regional offices.  Based on a review of the VA IG’s benefits inspection findings across 21  VA regional offices in fiscal year 2012, accuracy rates ranged from 40 to  87 percent per office for a sample of selected types of claims.

In December 2012, we reported that the Veterans Benefits Administration  (VBA) has a number of ongoing initiatives designed to improve claims  processing and help VA meet its timeliness goals, but the impact of some  initiatives is uncertain:

The Fully Developed Claims program, implemented nationally in June  2010, provides priority processing to veterans who submit claims with  all relevant private medical evidence. The average processing time for  claims involved in the program is 98 days, but veteran participation in  the program has been low—only 4 percent of all compensation claims  submitted in 2012—minimizing the impact on VA’s claims backlog.

The Claims Organizational Model, which reorganizes claim staff into  cross-functional teams, processes claims by complexity, and  redesigns mailroom functions, was piloted in 3 regional offices in  March 2012 and implemented in all regional offices as of March 2013.

VBA developed standard medical forms—called Disability Benefits  Questionnaires—designed to speed up the claims process by more  accurately capturing medical evidence needed from medical  providers. Although VBA tracks the number and completeness of  questionnaires submitted, VBA is not measuring their impact on  processing time.  In 2010, VBA began to develop the Veterans Benefit Management  System (VBMS), an initiative to help streamline the claims process  and reduce processing times. According to VA officials, VBMS is  intended to convert existing paper-based claims folders into electronic  claims folders that will allow VBA employees electronic access to  claims and their support evidence. Once completed, VBMS will allow  veterans, physicians, and other external parties to submit claims and  supporting evidence electronically. In August 2012, VBA officials told  us that VBMS was not ready for national deployment, citing delays in  scanning claims folders into VBMS as well as other software  performance issues. A recent VA IG report also concluded that VBMS  has experienced some performance issues and the scanning and  digitization of claims lacked a detailed plan. However, according to  VA, as of December 2012, 18 regional offices had implemented  VBMS and all regional offices will implement VBMS by the end of  calendar year 2013.

In our December 2012 report, we stated that without a comprehensive  plan to strategically manage resources and evaluate the effectiveness of  each initiative, VBA risks spending limited resources on initiatives that  may not speed up disability claims processes. In response to our  December 2012 report, on January 25, 2013, VA published the Strategic  Plan to Eliminate the Compensation Claims Backlog.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In a December 2012 report, we reviewed the timeliness of VA claims  processing and recommended that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs  direct the Veterans Benefits Administration to:  1.  Develop improvements for partnering with relevant federal and state  military officials to reduce the time it takes to gather military service  records for National Guard and Reserve sources.  2.  Develop improvements for partnering with Social Security  Administration (SSA) officials to reduce the time it takes to gather  SSA medical records.  3.  Ensure the development of a robust backlog reduction plan for VBA’s  initiatives that, among other best practice elements, identifies  implementation risks and strategies to address them and performance  goals that incorporate the impact of individual initiatives on processing  timeliness.

VA generally concurred with our recommendations, and has taken steps  to address the recommendations. For example, VA stated it has recently  initiated several interagency efforts to improve receipt of military service  records. According to VA, on December 3, 2012, the joint VBA and DOD  Disability Claims Reduction Task Force met to begin to evaluate the  process to request records, among other issues, with the aim of  improving the timeliness of record exchanges between the two agencies.  In addition, the National Guard Bureau and the VA recently agreed to  create a collaboration group that will examine ways to improve the  timeliness and completeness of the records submitted in support of VA  benefit claims. Furthermore, VA officials stated that VBA staff are  currently meeting with SSA on a weekly basis to develop strategies to  improve the records acquisition process and piloting a tool with four VA  regional offices to provide VA staff with direct electronic access to SSA  medical records. We believe these initiatives are heading in the right  direction in order to improve the timeliness of meeting VA requests for  SSA medical records and National Guard and Reservists records.

VA agreed with our recommendation to develop a robust backlog plan for  VBA’s initiatives, and subsequent to our report, published the Strategic  Plan to Eliminate the Compensation Claims Backlog, which identifies  implementation risks as well as tracks overall performance based on a  number of metrics, including processing timeliness. However, this plan  does not provide individual performance goals and metrics for all  initiatives, which are needed to ensure VA is spending its limited  resources on initiatives that are proven to speed up disability claims and  appeals processes.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-13-283. Washington, D.C.: February  14, 2013.

Veterans’ Disability Benefits: Timely Processing Remains a Daunting  Challenge. GAO-13-89. Washington, D.C.: December 21, 2012.

VA Disability Compensation: Actions Needed to Address Hurdles Facing  Program Modernization. GAO-12-846. Washington, D.C.: September 10,  2012.

Veterans Disability Benefits: Clearer Information for Veterans and  Additional Performance Measures Could Improve Appeal Process.  GAO-11-812. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2011.

Veterans’ Disability Benefits: Further Evaluation of Ongoing Initiatives  Could Help Identify Effective Approaches for Improving Claims  Processing. GAO-10-213. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2010.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Daniel Bertoni, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security  Issues, bertonid@gao.gov, 202-512-7215.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Improve awareness of VA services and benefits by increasing the  timeliness and relevance of on-line information available to veterans,  service members and eligible beneficiaries. By September 30, 2013,  increase the number of registered eBenefits users from 1.0 million to 2.5  million.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: While we have not specifically looked at VA’s eBenefits efforts, our past  work has identified challenges VA has faced in its efforts to increase  awareness of its services and benefits which could be applicable to its  ability to achieve this goal.

In February 2011, we reported that VA has a variety of activities to reach  out to and support veterans and service members who may be eligible for  VA education benefits, including the posting of information on its Web site  to support those individuals in the process of applying for education  benefits. We found that veterans service organizations, school officials,  and students receiving VA education benefits had positive feedback for a  recent redesign of the GI Bill web site that highlighted the three main  steps in applying for Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits. However, we also found  that VA did not provide links on the GI Bill Web site to consumer-focused  information generated by other entities. In contrast, the Department of  Education’s College Navigator site aggregated, for example, information  on graduation rates, loan default rates, costs of attendance and available  scholarships. Moreover, we found that little was known about the  effectiveness of VA’s education outreach and support because VA did not  have outcome-oriented performance measures for these activities. For  example, while VA’s education program estimates the number of people  who view or listen to a particular Post-9/11 GI Bill online, radio, or print  advertisement, VA had not determined the extent to which its outreach  campaign has been effective in informing or changing the behavior of  target audiences.

In December 2011, we reported that VA and the Department of Defense  had recently developed the eBenefits web portal to provide veterans with  customized information on VA benefits and assistance, and how to apply  for them, but the portal did not include a direct link to information on  enhanced monthly benefits (which increase recipients’ monthly disability  compensation or pension payments). A few of our focus group  participants—conducted with veterans and their family representatives— commented that they had difficulty finding information about enhanced  monthly benefits on VA’s website. Federal website guidelines recommend  that navigation procedures to access online information should be simple  and that links should be properly labeled to help users obtain desired  results.

In December 2012, we reported on the status of VBA’s recent efforts to  improve disability claims and appeals processing timeliness. In that  report, we noted that veterans can learn about the status of their claims in  several ways, including the use of eBenefits. However, we did not review  veterans’ actual use of eBenefits.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In our February 2011 report, to improve VA’s outreach and support for  eligible service members and veterans, communication with school  officials, and oversight of its education benefit programs, we  recommended that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, among other  actions, (1) develop outcome-oriented performance measures for  outreach to service members and veterans who are seeking VA  education benefits and (2) establish performance measures for the quality  of information provided by VA’s toll-free hotline and for the timeliness and  quality of its Right Now Web service. VA concurred with these  recommendations in commenting upon a draft of the report. With respect  to the first recommendation, VA reported that it had deployed an early  communication tool to inform service members and veterans about their  eligibility for education benefits and, as of April 2013, reported that it was  in the first phase of capturing data on the frequency of visits to dedicated  website Uniform Resource Locators. VA anticipated it will be able to  establish baseline performance measures by the end of July 2013. With  respect to measuring the quality of VA’s customer service on its toll-free  hotline and its online Right Now Web service, VA has established  applicable national performance standards and, in April 2013, VA  reported that the standards have been issued to its field. We have  requested to review the performance standards prior to considering this  recommendation fully implemented, and are awaiting further status  updates with regard to the implementation of the first recommendation.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: Veterans’ Disability Benefits: Timely Processing Remains a Daunting  Challenge. GAO-13-89. Washington, D.C.: December 21, 2012.

VA Enhanced Monthly Benefits: Recipient Population Is Changing, and  Awareness Could Be Improved. GAO-12-153. Washington, D.C.:  December 14, 2011.

VA Education Benefits: Actions Taken, but Outreach and Oversight Could  Be Improved. GAO-11-256. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2011.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Daniel Bertoni, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security  Issues, bertonid@gao.gov, 202-512-7215.

section_title: Appendix VI: Comments on the Office of Personnel Management’s Priority Goals
paragraphs: Based on our past work, we commented on each of OPM’s five priority  goals for 2012 to 2013:  1.  Ensure high quality federal employees. By September 30, 2013,  increase federal manager satisfaction with applicant quality (as an  indicator of hiring quality) from 7.7 to 8.3 on a scale of 1 to 10, while  continually improving timeliness, applicant satisfaction, and other  hiring process efficiency and quality measures.  2.  Improve performance culture in the Goals-Engagement- Accountability-Results (GEAR) pilot agencies to inform the  development of government-wide policies. By September 30, 2013,  employee responses to the annual Employee Viewpoint Survey in  each of the five agencies participating in a performance culture pilot  project will increase by 5 percent or greater on the results-oriented  culture index and the conditions for employee engagement index,  using 2011 survey results as the baseline.  3.  Increase health insurance choices for Americans. By October 1, 2013,  expand competition within health insurance markets by ensuring  participation of at least two multi-state health plans in the State  Affordable Insurance Exchanges.  4.  Maintain speed of national security background investigations.

Through September 30, 2013, maintain a 40 day or less average  completion time for the fastest 90 percent of initial national security  investigations.  5.  Reduce federal retirement processing time. By July 31, 2013,  Retirement Services will have reduced its case inventory so that 90  percent of all claims will be adjudicated within 60 days.

For each goal, we also identify our related past reports and provide an  update on the status of any open recommendations and matters for  congressional consideration that we previously made related to the goal.  We also identify a GAO contact for our work related to each goal.
subsections: section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Ensure high quality federal employees. By September 30, 2013, increase  federal manager satisfaction with applicant quality (as an indicator of  hiring quality) from 7.7 to 8.3 on a scale of 1 to 10, while continually  improving timeliness, applicant satisfaction, and other hiring process  efficiency and quality measures.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: We have not specifically reported on OPM’s ability to ensure high-quality  federal employees by increasing satisfaction with applicant quality.  However, our past work has highlighted efforts OPM has undertaken to  recruit and maintain a high-quality workforce.

Our past work on OPM’s efforts to improve the federal government’s  competitiveness in recruiting and maintaining a high-quality workforce has  shown that in 2005, and again in 2008, OPM issued guidance on the use  of hiring authorities and flexibilities. As we reported in September 2012, in  2006 OPM developed the Hiring Toolkit to assist agency officials in  determining the appropriate hiring flexibilities to use given their specific  situations, and in 2008 OPM launched an 80-day hiring model to help  speed up the hiring process. Also in 2008, OPM established standardized  vacancy announcement templates for common occupations, such as  contract specialist and accounting technician positions, in which agencies  can insert summary information concerning their specific jobs prior to  posting for public announcement. In 2012, OPM issued regulations  launching the Pathways program in order to make it easier to recruit and  hire students and recent graduates and allow for noncompetitive  conversion to permanent positions after meeting certain requirements. If  successfully implemented, initiatives such as Pathways could help  agencies further close critical skills gaps. We narrowed the scope of the  human capital high-risk area in February 2011 to focus on this challenge  of closing mission critical skills gaps and although progress has been  made, the area remains on our recently issued High Risk List in February  2013.

In January 2010, we reported on the use of recruitment, relocation, and  retention (3R) incentives at the Food and Drug Administration and the  oversight provided by Health and Human Services, and how OPM  provides oversight to agency 3R programs. We found that these  flexibilities were widely used by agencies, and that retention incentives  accounted for the majority of these incentive costs. Federal 3R incentives  are among the human capital flexibilities intended to help federal  agencies address human capital challenges and to build and maintain a  high-performing workforce with essential skills and competencies.  According to OPM, the 3R incentives are intended to provide agencies  with discretionary authority to use compensation other than base pay to  help recruit, relocate, and retain employees in difficult staffing situations.  Our review of the steps OPM has taken to help ensure that agencies  have effective oversight of their incentive programs found that while OPM  provided oversight of such incentives through various mechanisms,  including guidance and periodic evaluations and accountability reviews,  there are opportunities for improvement.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In January 2010, we recommended that the Director of OPM require  agencies to incorporate succession planning efforts into the decision  process for awarding retention incentives and document this requirement  for succession planning in their 3R incentive plans. In January 2011,  OPM issued proposed regulations to add succession planning to the list  of factors an agency may consider before approving a retention incentive  for an employee who would be likely to leave the federal service in the  absence of the incentive. OPM stated that specifically listing this factor in  the regulations will strengthen the relationship between succession  planning and retention incentives. OPM anticipates publishing the final  regulations this year.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-13-283. Washington, D.C.: February,  14, 2013.

Human Capital Management: Effectively Implementing Reforms and  Closing Critical Skills Gaps are Key to Addressing Federal Workforce  Challenges. GAO-12-1023T. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2012.

Human Capital: Continued Opportunities Exist for FDA and OPM to  Improve Oversight of Recruitment, Relocation, and Retention Incentives.  GAO-10-226. Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2010.

section_title: GAO Contacts
paragraphs: Robert Goldenkoff, Director, Strategic Issues, goldenkoffr@gao.gov, 202- 512-2757.

Yvonne Jones, Director, Strategic Issues, jonesy@gao.gov, 202-512- 2717.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Improve performance culture in the GEAR pilot agencies to inform the  development of government-wide policies. By September 30, 2013,  employee responses to the annual Employee Viewpoint Survey in each of  the five agencies participating in a performance culture pilot project will  increase by 5 percent or greater on the results-oriented culture index and  the conditions for employee engagement index, using 2011 survey results  as the baseline.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: We have not specifically reported on improving the performance culture of  the five GEAR pilot agencies—OPM, the Departments of Energy,  Housing and Urban Development, and Veterans Affairs, and the U.S.   GEAR is an effort to create high-performing organizations  Coast Guard.that are aligned, accountable, and focused on results. Our past work has  highlighted steps that OPM and agencies should take to improve their  performance cultures.

In March 2003, we reported that effective performance management  systems are not merely used for once or twice-yearly individual  expectation setting and rating processes, but are tools to help the  organization manage on a day-to-day basis. We identified key practices  that create a clear linkage—”line of sight”—between individual  performance and organizational success and, thus, transform agency  cultures to be more results-oriented, customer-focused, and collaborative  in nature. These key practices are: (1) align individual performance  expectations with organizational goals; (2) connect performance  expectations to crosscutting goals; (3) provide and routinely use  performance information to track organizational priorities; (4) require  follow-up actions to address organizational priorities; (5) use  competencies to provide a fuller assessment of performance; (6) link pay  to individual and organizational performance; (7) make meaningful  distinctions in performance; (8) involve employees and stakeholders to  gain ownership of performance management systems; and (9) maintain  continuity during transitions.

As the federal government’s human capital leader, OPM must have the  capacity to effectively assist agencies and to successfully lead and  implement these important human capital management transformations.  In January 2007, we reported that to enhance its capacity to do so, OPM  is working to transform its own organization from less of a rulemaker,  enforcer, and independent agent to more of a consultant, toolmaker, and  strategic partner. We recommended that OPM reexamine its agency-wide  skills and competencies in light of its updated strategic management  document. OPM implemented this recommendation in 2008 by  completing an agencywide competency assessment of all mission critical  occupations. As reform initiatives move forward, it is increasingly  important for OPM to complete this transformation and clearly  demonstrate its capacity to lead and implement such reforms.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: We currently have no open recommendations or matters for  congressional consideration related to this priority goal.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: Results-Oriented Management: Opportunities Exist for Refining the  Oversight and Implementation of the Senior Executive Performance- Based Pay System. GAO-09-82. Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2008.

Office of Personnel Management: Key Lessons Learned to Date for  Strengthening Capacity to Lead and Implement Human Capital Reforms.  GAO-07-90. Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.

Results-Oriented Cultures: Creating a Clear Linkage between Individual  Performance and Organizational Success. GAO-03-488. Washington,  D.C: March 14, 2003.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Robert Goldenkoff, Director, Strategic Issues, goldenkoffr@gao.gov,  (202) 512-2757.

Yvonne Jones, Director, Strategic Issues, jonesy@gao.gov, (202) 512- 2717.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Increase health insurance choices for Americans. By October 1, 2013,  expand competition within health insurance markets by ensuring  participation of at least two multi-state health plans in the State Affordable  Insurance Exchanges.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: Our past work has not specifically focused on the priority goal of ensuring  the participation of at least two multi-state health plans in each insurance  exchange. However, we know from prior work that OPM had awarded a  contract by early 2011 to provide policy and analytical support for this  effort, and in March of 2012 it had issued a notice of proposed  rulemaking.

The achievement of this goal will require OPM to contract with multiple  private health insurance issuers and to coordinate closely with HHS,  which is partnering with states to assure an operating Affordable  Insurance Exchange in each state by January 1, 2014. Our work on  OPM’s role overseeing the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program  and its role in implementing the high risk pool program under the Patient  Protection and Affordable Care Act are illustrative of OPM’s experience in  two activities central to the achievement of this goal.

Negotiate and contract with health insurance issuers. Through its  oversight of the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, OPM  has long been responsible for selecting, contracting with, and  regulating hundreds of health insurance issuers that offer health plans  to millions of federal employees, dependents and retirees, as well as  negotiating benefits and premium rates, as we reported in December  2002. OPM will likely leverage this experience and these relationships  to contract with issuers to offer plans through state exchanges.

Coordinate and collaborate with other agencies. In July 2011, we  reported on OPM’s recent collaboration with HHS in implementing the  new Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (high risk pool) program  required under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Under  an interagency agreement, OPM assists with the administration of the  program, including reviewing the performance of the health insurance  issuer chosen to offer health plans within the federal program, and  overseeing its operations on an ongoing basis.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: We currently have no open recommendations or matters for  congressional consideration related to this priority goal.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Contracts Awarded and  Consultants Retained by Federal Departments and Agencies to Assist in  Implementing the Act. GAO-11-797R. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2011.

Pre-existing Condition Insurance Plans: Program Features, Early  Enrollment and Spending Trends, and Federal Oversight Activities.  GAO-11-662. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2011.

Federal Employees’ Health Plans: Premium Growth and OPM’s Role in  Negotiating Benefits. GAO-03-236. Washington, D.C.: December 31,  2002.

section_title: GAO Contacts
paragraphs: John E. Dicken, Director, Health Care, dickenj@gao.gov, 202-512-7043.

Stanley J. Czerwinski, Director, Strategic Issues, czerwinskis@gao.gov,  202-512-6520.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Maintain speed of national security background investigations. Through  September 30, 2013, maintain a 40 day or less average completion time  for the fastest 90 percent of initial national security investigations.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: OPM’s priority goal of maintaining a 40 day or less average completion  time for the fastest 90 percent of initial national security investigations is  related to an area we previously designated as high risk. Specifically, in  January 2005 we first placed DOD’s security clearance program—which  comprises the vast majority of government-wide clearances—on our High  Risk List because we identified significant delays in completing security  clearances, which sometimes took up to a year to complete. OPM is  currently the investigative service provider for the majority of the  executive branch, including DOD. We removed the high-risk designation  from DOD’s program in February 2011 due to both high-level attention  from various executive branch agencies, including DOD, OMB, and the  Director of National Intelligence and improvement in the timeliness of  DOD clearances, among other things. For example, we found in January  2011 that DOD met the congressionally directed Intelligence Reform and  Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 goal of 40 days for initial investigations  throughout fiscal year 2010. This timeliness measure does not include  data on periodic reinvestigations. Timeliness data for investigations is  OPM’s responsibility as the investigative service provider for DOD. For  example, the fastest 90 percent of DOD initial clearance investigations  were processed by OPM in an average of 35 days in fiscal year 2010. In  addition, in 2010 the Performance Accountability Council (PAC) reported  that OPM was meeting investigation timeliness goals for many of the  agencies for which it conducts national security background  investigations. However, we have not comprehensively reported on the  timeliness statistics for all of the national security background  investigations conducted by OPM. Instead, our previous work has  focused on the timeliness of DOD clearances because DOD’s program  was on our High Risk List.

While OPM conducts background investigations for most of the federal  government, executive branch agencies conduct other phases in the  federal government’s personnel security clearance process. For example,  the requesting agency determines which positions—military, civilian, or  private-industry contracts—require access to classified information and,  therefore, which people must apply for and undergo a security clearance  investigation. OPM, in turn, conducts these investigations using federal  investigative standards and OPM internal guidance as criteria for  collecting background information on applicants. Adjudicators from the  requesting agencies use the information contained in the resulting OPM  investigative reports and consider federal guidelines to determine whether  an applicant is eligible for a personnel security clearance.

During the time while DOD’s security clearance program was on our High  Risk List, the executive branch initiated actions to reform the government- wide security clearance process, in which OPM had a role as the  investigative service provider. As part of this government-wide reform  effort, Executive Order 13467 established a leadership structure by  creating the PAC. The order appointed the Deputy Director for  Management at OMB as the chair of the council and designated the  Director of National Intelligence as the Security Executive Agent and the  Director of OPM as the Suitability Executive Agent. The PAC is  responsible for holding agencies accountable for the implementation of  suitability, security, and, as appropriate, contractor employee fitness  processes and procedures. In turn, the PAC issued a Strategic  Framework in February 2010, which set forth a mission and strategic  goals, performance measures, a communications strategy, roles and  responsibilities, and metrics to measure the quality of security clearance  investigations and adjudications. Some of the goals and performance  measures developed by the PAC were aimed at addressing the  timeliness of initial security clearance investigations. In addition to the  timeliness of initial investigations and as the result of our work, members  of Congress and federal agencies have expressed concerns about the  quality of the background investigations. The leaders of the PAC also  committed to measuring the quality of investigations by further developing  quality metrics in a memorandum to Congress on May 31, 2010. While  OPM’s agency priority goal to measure timeliness is important; it does not  capture the competing priority of measuring the quality of the  investigations. Finally, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention  Act required the executive branch to annually report on timeliness of  background investigations; however, this requirement expired in 2011, so  there is no mechanism to report the timeliness of the end-to-end  clearance process—including timeliness of initiation and adjudication  phases of the process, the timeliness of investigations that took OPM  longer than 40 days to complete, or other security clearance reform- related goals—to Congressional oversight committees.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: In our May 2009 report, we recommended that the Director of OPM direct  the Associate Director of OPM’s Federal Investigative Services Division to  measure the frequency with which its investigative reports meet federal  investigative standards in order to improve the completeness of future  investigation documentation. As of March 2013, OPM has not  implemented the recommendation to measure how frequently  investigative reports meet federal investigative standards. Instead, OPM  assesses the quality of investigations based on voluntary reporting from  customer agencies. Specifically, OPM tracks investigations that are (1)  returned for rework from the requesting agency; (2) identified as deficient  using a web-based survey; and (3) identified as deficient through  adjudicator calls to OPM’s quality hotline. In our past work, we noted that  the number of investigations returned for rework is not by itself a valid  indicator of the quality of investigative work because adjudication officials  said they were reluctant to return incomplete investigations in anticipation  of delays that would impact timeliness. Further, relying on agencies to  voluntarily provide information on investigation quality may not reflect the  quality of OPM’s total investigation workload. One of OPM’s customer  agencies, DOD developed and implemented a tool known as RAISE to  monitor the quality of investigations completed by OPM, However, OPM  does not use DOD’s tool. According to an OPM official, OPM is working  through the PAC to decide how the executive branch will measure quality  government-wide. While the PAC considered using DOD’s RAISE tool,  among others, according to the OPM official, they opted to develop  another tool that better captures quality. Further, the OPM official stated  OPM’s intent to implement that tool once it is developed by the PAC, but  did not provide an estimated timeframe for development and  implementation. Our prior work noted that in May 2010, leaders of the  reform effort provided congressional members with metrics assessing   According to officials  quality and other aspects of the clearance process.from one of the PAC’s working groups, these metrics were communicated  to executive branch agencies in June 2010. RAISE was one tool the  reform team members planned to use for measuring quality.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: Personnel Security Clearances: Continuing Leadership and Attention Can  Enhance Momentum Gained from Reform Effort. GAO-12-815T.  Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2012.

Background Investigations: Office of Personnel Management Needs to  Improve Transparency of Its Pricing and Seek Cost Savings.  GAO-12-197. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February  2011.

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve  Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum.  GAO-11-65. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2010.

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is  Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process.  GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting,  Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed  to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington,  D.C.: May 19, 2009.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management,  farrellb@gao.gov, 202-512-3604.

section_title: Goal Statement
paragraphs: Reduce federal retirement processing time. By July 31, 2013, Retirement  Services will have reduced its case inventory so that 90 percent of all  claims will be adjudicated within 60 days.
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: OPM’s efforts to reduce federal retirement processing time have included  attempts over 2 decades to modernize its retirement processing system  by automating paper-based processes and replacing antiquated  information systems. However, these efforts have been unsuccessful due  to weaknesses in key management practices. Our previous reviews have  identified weaknesses in project management, risk management,  organizational change management, system testing, cost estimating, and  progress reporting. Specifically, in February 2005, we made  recommendations to address weaknesses in the following areas:

Project management: OPM had defined major components of its  retirement modernization effort, such as data conversion of paper files  and development of electronic processes for capture and storage of  data. However, it had not identified the dependencies among these  efforts, increasing the risk that delays in one activity could have  unforeseen impacts on the progress of others.

Risk management: OPM did not have a process for identifying and  tracking project risks and mitigation strategies on a regular basis.  Thus, OPM lacked a mechanism to address potential problems that  could adversely impact the cost, schedule, and quality of the  modernization effort.

Organizational change management: OPM had not adequately  prepared its staff for changes to job responsibilities resulting from the  modernization by developing a detailed transition plan. The absence  of such a plan could lead to confusion about roles and responsibilities  and hinder effective system implementation.

In January 2008, as OPM was on the verge of deploying an automated  retirement processing system, we reported deficiencies in management  capabilities, and made recommendations to address them:

Testing: The results of tests 1 month prior to the deployment of a  major system component revealed that it had not performed as  intended. These defects, along with a compressed testing schedule,  increased the risk that the retirement processing system would not  work as intended upon deployment.

Cost estimating: The cost estimate OPM developed for the  modernization effort was not fully reliable. This meant that the agency  did not have a sound basis for formulating budgets or developing a  program baseline.

Progress reporting: The baseline against which OPM was measuring  the progress of the program did not reflect the full scope of the  program; this increased the risk that variances from planned  performance would not be detected.

In April 2009, we reported that OPM continued to have deficiencies in its  cost estimating, progress reporting, and testing practices and we made  recommendations to address these deficiencies, as well as additional  weaknesses in the planning and oversight of the modernization effort.  OPM agreed with these recommendations and began to address them,  but the agency cancelled its most recent large-scale retirement  modernization effort in February 2011.

In November 2011, agency officials, including the Chief Information  Officer, Chief Operating Officer, and Associate Director for Retirement  Services, told us that OPM does not plan to initiate another large-scale  effort to modernize the retirement process. Rather, the officials said the  agency intends to take targeted steps to improve retirement processing.  More recently, in January 2012, OPM released a new plan to improve  retirement processing that aims at targeted, incremental improvements  rather than a large-scale modernization. Under this plan, the agency  expects to eliminate its retirement processing backlog by July 2013 and  accurately process 90 percent of its cases within 60 days. To meet this  goal, OPM reported that it plans to hire and train 76 new staff to address  retirement claims; establish higher production standards and identify  potential retirement process improvements; and work with other agencies  to improve the accuracy and completeness of the data they provide to  OPM for use in retirement processing. However, as we have previously  noted in February 2012, the plan does not address improving or  eliminating the legacy information systems that currently support  retirement processing. Although we have not assessed OPM’s actions or  progress toward fulfilling its January 2012 plan, Performance.gov was  updated to include information about the agency’s progress in December  2012. For example, the agency reported that it had met its targets for  hiring new staff, as well as improving the accuracy and completeness of  retirement data other agencies provide to OPM.

section_title: Status of Key Open Recommendations and Matters for Congressional Consideration
paragraphs: We currently have no open recommendations or matters for  congressional consideration related to this priority goal.

section_title: Selected GAO Reports
paragraphs: OPM Retirement Modernization: Progress Has Been Hindered by  Longstanding Information Technology Weaknesses. GAO-12-430T.  Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2012.

OPM Retirement Modernization: Longstanding Information Technology  Management Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed. GAO-12-226T.  Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2011.

Office of Personnel Management: Retirement Modernization Planning  and Management Shortcomings Need to Be Addressed. GAO-09-529.  Washington, D.C.: April 21, 2009.

Office of Personnel Management: Improvements Needed to Ensure  Successful Retirement Systems Modernization. GAO-08-345.  Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2008.

Office of Personnel Management: Retirement Systems Modernization  Program Faces Numerous Challenges. GAO-05-237. Washington, D.C.:  February 28, 2005.

section_title: GAO Contact
paragraphs: Valerie C. Melvin, Director, Information Management and Technology  Resources Issues, melvinv@gao.gov, (202) 512-6304.

section_title: Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs
subsections: section_title: GAO Comments
paragraphs: 1.  Although our report included information about VA’s Strategic Plan to  Eliminate the Compensation Claims Backlog in a subsequent  paragraph, we revised the cited paragraph to note that VA, in  response to our December 2012 report, published the plan on  January 25, 2013.   2.  We revised the cited paragraph to focus on VA’s Strategic Plan to  Eliminate the Compensation Claims Backlog. However, as VA  acknowledges in its comments, the plan does not provide individual  performance goals and metrics for all initiatives. We continue to  believe that without performance goals and measures clearly aligned  with each of its initiatives, VA lacks assurance that it is spending its  limited resources on proven methods to speed up disability claims and  appeals processes.

section_title: Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
subsections: section_title: GAO Contact
subsections: section_title: Staff Acknowledgments
paragraphs: In addition to the above contact, Elizabeth Curda (Assistant Director) and  Benjamin T. Licht supervised this review and the development of the  resulting report. Virginia Chanley, Karin Fangman, Patricia Norris, Daniel  Ramsey, and Dan Webb made significant contributions to this report.  Robert Gebhart, Donna Miller, Jessica Nierenberg, and Ulyana  Panchishin also made key contributions.


Question-summary annotations: questions: question: What did GAO's review of APGs for 2012 to 2013 reveal?
answer: For 102 agency priority goals (APGs) for 2012 to 2013 that GAO reviewed, agencies implemented three GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (the act) requirements.
child_questions: question: What requirements did agencies implement?
answer: Agencies identified (1) a target level of performance within a 2-year time frame; (2) how their APGs contribute to their strategic goals; and (3) an agency official responsible for achieving each APG.

questions: question: What did agencies fail to fully explain?
answer: Agencies did not fully explain the relationship between APGs and crosscutting efforts.

question: What does the act direct agencies to identify?
answer: The act directs agencies to identify federal organizations, programs, and activities that contribute to each APG.
child_questions: question: How did agencies fail to meet this requirement?
answer: Agencies identified internal contributors to their APGs, but did not identify external contributors for 34 of 102 APGs. In some cases the APGs appeared to be internally focused; however, in others GAO's work has shown there are external contributors, but none were listed.

question: What does the act require regarding CAP goals?
answer: In addition, the act requires agencies to identify how, if at all, an APG contributes to any cross-agency priority (CAP) goals set by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
child_questions: question: How did agencies fail to meet this requirement?
answer: Although 29 of 102 APGs appeared to support a CAP goal, only two described the link.
child_questions: question: What issues might this lack of documentation raise?
answer: When agencies do not identify external contributors or links to crosscutting efforts, it is unclear whether agencies are coordinating to limit overlap and duplication.

questions: question: What characterized the performance measures of APGs?
answer: Most APGs had performance measures, but many lacked interim targets.
child_questions: question: What issues might the lack of interim targets raise?
answer: Without interim targets when appropriate, agencies cannot demonstrate that they are comparing actual results against planned performance on a sufficiently frequent basis to address performance issues as they arise.

question: What requirement did OMB's guidance fail to meet?
answer: The act requires agencies to develop quarterly targets for APGs if they provide data of significant value at a reasonable level of burden. However, OMB's guidance does not fully address this.

questions: question: What did agencies fail to identify?
answer: Agencies did not identify milestones with completion dates for many APGs.
child_questions: question: How does this differ from the act's requirements?
answer: The act requires agencies to develop and publish milestones--scheduled events for completing planned actions--for their APGs.
child_questions: question: How do the act's requirements differ from OMB guidance?
answer: However, OMB's guidance does not direct agencies to provide specific completion dates for their milestones.

question: How was this demonstrated by GAO's investigation?
answer: For 39 of 102 APGs, agencies did not provide milestones with clear completion dates for the next quarter or the remainder of the goal period.

question: What issues might the lack of milestones cause?
answer: Without milestones, agencies are unable to demonstrate that they have properly planned for the actions needed to accomplish their goals and are tracking progress.

questions: question: What has GAO's work repeatedly shown regarding federal agencies?
answer: GAO’s work has repeatedly shown that federal agencies must coordinate better to achieve common outcomes.

question: What requirements did the act establish?
answer: The act established a more crosscutting and integrated approach to achieving results and improving performance, including a requirement that agencies identified by OMB establish APGs. The act directs GAO to review its implementation at several junctures; this report is part of a series doing so.

question: What does this report examine?
answer: This report (1) examines the extent to which 24 agencies identified by OMB implemented selected requirements related to 102 APGs, and (2) comments on the 21 APGs of five selected agencies, based on prior GAO and IG work, including the status of relevant open recommendations.
child_questions: question: What data did GAO collect to address these objectives?
answer: To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the act’s requirements for APGs, OMB guidance, APG information from Performance.gov and related agency documents; and interviewed OMB officials. GAO selected DHS, HUD, DOT, VA, and OPM for their variety of APG program types and linkage to CAP goals. For each agency, GAO reviewed its past work, as well as that of IGs, related to the APGs and updated the status of open recommendations.